ML20134D398
| ML20134D398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134D393 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-96-14, 50-325-96-14, NUDOCS 9610220116 | |
| Download: ML20134D398 (60) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1996014
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION ll
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Docket Nos:
50-325, 50-324
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License Nos:
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Report No:
50-325/96-14, 50-324/96-14
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Licensee:
Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)
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Facility:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2
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Lr, cation:
8470 River Road SE
Southport, NC 28461
Dates:
June 24 - August 23,1996
Inspectors:
J. Lenahan, Reactor Inspector
N. Merriweather, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:
C. Casto, Chief, Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure 1
9610220116 961004
ADOCK 05000324
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-325/96-14,50-324/96-14
This special inspection included a detailed review of the licensee's environmental
qualification (EQ) program and followup on previous inspection findings (unresolved
items) related to the licensee's EQ program. The areas inspected included followup
on the licensee's corrective actions to address self-assessment findings and to
resolve numerous nonconforming items related to the environmental qualification
program.
Results:
A violation for Failure to Promptly identify and Correct Nonconforming
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Conditions.
A violation for Failure to Maintain the Environmental Qualification
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Program in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.
An unresolved item regarding the effect of operability of the reactor
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building closed cooling water system on the post accident sampling
system.
A weakness was identified in some of the licensee's procedures for control of
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the EQ program.
An unresolved item was identified pending further review of the UFSAR
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regarding environmental conditions in the reactor building.
An inspector followup item was identified to review the effect of EQ
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accuracy on instrument setpoint calculations.
An inspector followup item was identified to review the accuracy of
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ERFIS and SPDS data.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Enaineerino
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Conduct of Engineering
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E1.1 Environmental Qualification Program
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Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed issues related to the environmental qualification (EO)
of electrical equipment. These issues involved both technical and
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programmatic concerns that were idertified in Self-Assessment report number
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95-0041 and in a document titled "EQ Program Self-Assessment" which was
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written in November 1995, but never issued as a formal self-assessment
report. The November 1995, report will herein after be referred to as the
unpublished EQ self-assessment. The issues, some dating back to 1991, in
both reports were similar and were never properly documented or resolved.
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When senior licensee managers became aware of the concerns in the -
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unpublished EQ self-assessment they implemented a program review which
resulted in initiation of Condition Report (CR) 96-01277 in April 1996. The
-licensee performed an additional assessment of the EQ Program at BNP to
determine the technical and programmatic adequacy of the BNP EQ Program
based on concerns raised in CR 96-01277. This self-assessment (96-0271)
was performed during the period of April 22 through 26,1996. During an
inspection conducted June 10-14,1996, six unresolved items pertaining to the
EQ program were identified which are documented in inspection Report
number 50-325, 324/96-08. Subsequent to the June 10 - 14,1996, inspection,
the licensee established an EQ task force to perform an overall review of the
EQ program and to correct the numerous program deficiencies identified in the
self assessments. Additional items have been identified since the licensee
established the EQ Task Fcrce. The specific issues addressed in this report
are:
The EQ Data Base and Adequacy of EQ List
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Consideration of Updated Environmental Data in EQ Evaluations
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EQ of Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
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Corrective Actions to Resolve Previously Identified EQ
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Progran. Deficiencies
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b.
Observations and Findings
CR 96-01277 documented inconsistencies within the BNP EQ Program. These
inconsistencies involved the Equipment Data Base System (EDBS) and
information in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and EQ
documentation which was not updated with the latest plant information.
Subse",uent to the initiation of CR 96-01277, several additional CR's
documenting specific program deficiencies were generated. The licensee has
since completed the Root Cause Evaluation for CR 96-01277 and determined
the following causes for the EQ Program deficiencies.
1.
Personnel responsible for the EQ Program failed to implement the
program effectively, and failed to tace appropriate action to resolve
known deficiencies.
2.
Supervisors responsible for the EQ Projram implementation failed to
recognize the ineffectiveness of the program.
The licensee's EQ task force has identified numerous additional CRs related to
deficiencies in the EQ program. The inspectors reviewed the CRs, the
proposed corrective actions, and discussed the recovery plan to restore the EQ
program with the EQ task force Manager. The specific issues reviewed and
results of these reviews are discussed in the paragraphs below.
Review of the EQ Eauipment Data Base
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10 CFR 50.49 (d) requires licensees to prepare a list of electrical equipment
important to safety, and to include with the list performance specifications of
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the equipment during and following design basis accidents, operating
characteristics of the equipment, and the environmental conditions at the
location where the equipment must perform. The licensee is required to keep
the list and information current and retain the files in an auditable form for the
life of the plant.10 CFR 50.49 (f) requires each item of EQ equipment to be
qualified by testing.10 CFR 50.49 (j) also requires licensees to maintain
qualification records for EQ equipment in an auditable form for the life of the
plant. The inspectors reviewed the following procedures which implement the
above requirements:
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Procedure OPLP-02, Program Document for Compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 (Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical
Equipment), Revision 4
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Engineering Procedure OENP-34.1, Design Control of Environmentally
Qualified Equipment, Revision 004C
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Engineering Procedure OENP-34.3. Qualification Data Package (QDP)
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Control Procedure, Revision 6
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Engineering Procedure OENP-33.6, Equipment Data Base System
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(EDBS) Control and Revision, Revision 8
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In accordance with the licensee's EQ Program, Procedure OPLP-02, Section
5.3, Program Controls, the list of EQ Equipment is displayed on EDBS,
Function 408, and the primary document for demonstrating qualification of the
device (equipment) is the Qualification Data Package (ODP). The procedure
also specifies that ODPs will be generic in its evaluations and that reference to
specific plant (tag) identification is provided through the EQ List on the EDBS
408 Screen. Engineering Procedure OENP-34.3, Section 4.2.1, ODPs,
requires a QDP file be established for each unique type of qualified equipment,
and that each file be given a unique QDP numeric designator which will be
referenced for each device (i.e., EDBS Component Tag number) for each unit.
The procedures require each EQ component to be referenced to a QDP.
On April 29,1996, the licensee identified and documented in CR 96-01400 that
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the EQ List maintained in the EDBS Database, Function 408, had 777
components identified as EQ without a reference to a qualification data
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package (ODP). The licensee reviewed the list of 777 components to
determine if there was a qualification basis for each of the items on the list.
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Several of the items were confirmed qualified by existing QDPs; however,
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walkdowns were required in some cases to verify traceability between the
installed components and the qualification documentation. A majority of the
items that were listed in the EDBS without a reference to a QDP were
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associated with the reactor building motor control centers (MCCs) which
include compartments, breakers, overload relays, contacts, control power
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fuses, etc. The licensee also identified several fuses in the reactor building
MCC compartments that were not addressed in the existing QDPs for the
MCCs (i.e. QDP 67 or 79) or in any other existing ODP. The unqualified fuses
were identified as Types FRN-R, FNA-6, FNA-10, FNM-1.6, FRN-6, FRN-R-6,
NOS-30, RES-30, NON-10, and SC-6. The Status Report included in CR 96-
01400 indicated that ODP-67 would be revised to include qualification for the
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FRN-R (rejection type) based on similarity to the qualified FRN fuse. The
other fuse qualifications will be addressed in ODP-95, which had been
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developed, but not approved and issued. The licensee also identified four
potentiometers (1-1XE-EBO-POT,1-1XF-EE2-POT,2-2XE-EBO-POT, and 2-
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2XF-EE2-POT) for which a QDP had not been found. These potentiometers
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are in the control circuit for motor operated valves 1(2)-SGT-V8N9 which are
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required post accident during operation of the accident containment
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atmospheric dilution (ACAD) system. Failure of the potentiometers due to a
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harsh environment could prevent opening the valves resu! ting in loss of the
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ability to operate the ACAD system. The licensee informed the inspector that
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the ACAD system is not the primary means of hydrogen control. Not
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withstanding the above, NRC Generic Letter 84-09 requires that the
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purge /repressurization systems for Mark l BWR Plants be maintained as safety
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grade pursuant to the applicable requirements of 10 CFP 50.44(f) or 10 CFR
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50.44(g).
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The inspectors concluded from the above that the list of electric equipment
important to safety required to be environmentally qualified (EQ Master List)
was not being maintained current and the EQ files were not auditable. Failure
to maintain the list current and files auditable was identified to the licensee as
an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.49 (d) and (j). The failure to have
qualification data packages in the EQ files demonstrating qualification for the
subject potentiometers and fuses is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.49 (f)
and (j). Both of the above examples of apparent violations were identified to
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the licensee as eel 50-325,324/96-14-01, Failure to Maintain the EQ Program
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in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.
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The licensee was developing qualification documentation or a justification for
continued operation (JCO) for equipment for which they did not have a QDP
prepared.
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Paragraph 6.2.2.1. of CP&L procedure O-ENP-33.6, Equipment Data Base
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System (EDBS) Control and Revision, Revisions 6 and 7, dated 7/22/93 and
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4/5/94, requires changes to the EQ data in the EDBS system be identified and
approved on Form 208. Paragraph 6.2.2.2 of O-ENP-33.6 requires any EQ
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data changes that are not the result of an approved design change document
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will be approved by the NED EQ group.
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Discussions with licensee engineers and review of licensee records disclosed
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that the EQ data in EDBS was revised in 1994 for the 300 EQ components
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listed in CP&L Great Idea numbers NED-326 and NED-327 without being
identified and approved on Form 208, and without the approval of the NED EQ
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group. Subsequent review of these EQ data changes in 1995 and 1996
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disclosed that more than 50 of the 300 components had been downgraded, i.e.
removed from the licensee's EQ Program incorrectly. These components were
subsequently reir, stated in the EQ Program, as required by 10 CFR 50.49.
This problem was subsequently documented on CR 96-02104.
Paragraph 5.8.3.2 of CP&L procedure OENP-33.6, Revision 8, dated 10/30/95
requires that any EQ data changes that are not the result of an approved
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design change document shall be approved by an EQ Technical Reviewer.
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Contrary to this requirement, the inspectors determined that EQ data was
changed in the EDBS in conjunction with ESR 95-01140, a non-design change
ESR, on March 27,1996, without the review and approval of an EQ Technical
Reviewer. This problem was subsequently documented on CR 96- 02361.
During review of procedure OENP-33.6, the inspectors questioned licensee
engineers regarding the meaning of the "or equivalent" in the procedure as it
pertains to the 208 Form when removing items from EQ Program. The
inspectors noted that the term was not defined in the procedure. The
inspectors also noted that the procedure referenced the FSAR, instead of SAR,
under the discussion of 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations. The licensee issued
CR 96-02145 to document these discrepancies. This issue was identified to
the licensee as a program weakness.
Consideration of Updated Environmental Data in EQ Evaluations
Based on review of CRs and discussions with licensee engineers, the
inspectors determined that, in general, the EQ files did not incorporate the
latest design information related to temperature, pressure, and radiation
conditions expected during postulated design basis accidents (i.e., HELBs and
LOCAs) in the reactor building and drywell. The inspectors also determined
that the information contained in the UFSAR regarding peak temperatures in
the reactor building during accident conditions and drywell maximum
temperatures during normal operation may not reflect current plant conditions
and/or latest design documents. The inspectors also determined that the
motor control centers (MCCs) in the reactor building were initially evaluated for
qualification using the temperature and pressure response data developed in
Revisions 1 or 2 of the Reactor Building Environmental Report. Revision 4,
the current revision of the Reactor Building Environmental Report was
approved on December 16,1991. The licensee is presently preparing
Revision 5 of this report which will include consideration of the power uprate
project. The licensee prepared a JCO to address the qualification of the
MCCs.
Tho inspectors were informed by the licensee that Revision 4 of the
environrnental report had not been incorporated into the applicable
QDPs. Revision 4 showed significant changes to some of the
environmental profiles in the reactor building e.g., the peak HELB
temperature at the 20 foot elevation in reactor building went from 2?5 F
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peak to 282 F. The hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) modificat!on is
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another example where plant changes resulted in the normal radiation
levels in the drywell and reactor building being higher than those
previously analyzed in the QDPs. The 40 year integrated radiation dose
used in the QDPs was similar to those referenced in UFSAR Section
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3.11. These values were used in the qualification documentation to
determine the total integrated dose. The HWC operation has increased
the normal expected radiation doses in the proximity of the main steam
piping. These increases in the normal radiation levels have not been
assessed in the QDPs or EQ Files. The licensee has reviewed the
impact of the radiation increases due to the HWC mod and made a
preliminary determination that the EQ age of affected equipment will not
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be exceeded prior to the next refueling outage for either unit. Also
several EERs and ESRs that have not been incorporated into the QDPs.
This resulted in the QDPs not being maintained current and in an
auditable form. Failure to maintain the EQ files current and auditible
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was identified to the licensee as another example of apparent violation
eel 50-325,324/96-14-01.
As stated above, the inspectors determined that the safety related MCCs in the
Reactor building had been evaluated in ODP-67 for qualification using the
environmental profiles developed from Revision 1 of the Reactor Building
Environmental Report dated October 28,1982. This report had a peak surface
temperature in the Reactor Building due to a HELB of 198 F. This surface
temperature was then used in a thermal lag analysis to show that the MCC
components would not exceed the temperature at which the MCCs had been
tested. The licensee's response to 10 CFR 50.49 (g) dated May 20,1983,
stated in part that "the derivation of the temperature and pressure response for
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the reactor building is shown in Reactor Building Environmental Report
Revision 2, dated February 2,1983." In this submittal, the licensee also
provided the temperature response curves in Section VI identified as Profiles
P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, and P-5. The profile applicable to the qualification of the
MCCs was identified as P-4 in the submittal. The P-4 Profile provided the
HELB surface temperature and pressure profile for elevation 20 and higher in
the reactor building. This curve showed a peak surface temperature of 225 F.
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Subsequent to this submittal, plant modifications have been implemented
which resulted in changes in the reactor building accident environment, as
discussed earlier. Revision 4 of the Reactor Building Environmental Report
now shows a peak surface temperature of 282 F from an HELB. However,
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ODP-67 used a peak temperature of 198 F, from the Revision 1 of the
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Reactor Building Environmental Report, for evaluating the qualifications for the
safety-related MCCs in Units 1 and 2. The inspectors concluded that the
MCCs were not qualified based on the information contained in the licensee's
EQ Files. This was identified to the licensee as another example of apparent
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Violation eel 50-325,324/96-14-01.
Another problem identified by the inspectors concerning the MCCs was that
the licensee's analysis assumed the MCC cabinet panel entrances were sealed
and that the door gaskets were intact. During a walkdown, the inspectors
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identified several MCCs which had small diameter holes in the panels where
nameplates had been previously removed and some potentially degraded
gaskets around the door panels. The licensee issued CR 96-02545 to
document this concern.
The original EQ equipment at BNP was required to be qualified in accordance
with the requirements of the NRC Division of Operating Reactors (DOR)
Guidelines. The DOR Guidelines provided criteria for addressing Beta
radiation in the qualification of EQ equipment. The DOR Guidelines states, in
part, that "if it can be shown, by assuming a conservative unshielded surface
beta dose of 2.0 X 10E8 RADS and considering shielding factors discussed
here, that the beta dose to radiation sensitive equipment internals would be
less than or equal to 10% of the total gamma dose to which an item of
equipment has been qualified, then that equipment may be considered
qualified for the total radiation environment (gamma plus beta). If this criterion
is not satisfied, the radiation service condition should include the sum of the
gamma and beta doses." The licensee informed the inspectors that the
current EQ Files do not document or explain how beta radiation exposure was
addressed in evaluating the qualification of EQ equipment inside the drywell.
The inspectors concluded that this issue appeared to be a documentation
issue and that sufficient margin existed in the design parameters so that EQ
age of affected equipment would not be exceeded prior to the next refueling
outage for either unit. The failure to address Beta radiation in the service
environment and lack of documentation, required by 10 CFR 50.49 (d), (f), (j),
and (k), is another example of apparent violation eel 50-325, 324/96-14-01.
The discrepancies in the UFSAR regarding environmental conditions will be
evaluated by NRC in a future inspection. Pending further review, this issue
was identified to the licensee as Unresolved item 50-325,324/96-14-02,
UFSAR Environmental Data Discrepancies.
EQ of Post Accident Samolina System (PASS)
The licensee identified in CR 90-01633 that nine PASS solenoid valves in each
unit classified as safety-related Class "A" were not in the EQ Program. The
nine valves consisted of five Target Rock Solenoid valves, plant tag nos.,1(2)-
RXS-SV-4182,4183,4184,4185 and 4192; and four R. G. Laurance valves,
plant tag nos.,1(2)-RXS-SV-4180,4181,4193, and 4194. The licensee
indicated that documentation was available to demonstrate qualification for the
Target Rock Valves based on similarity to a previously tested configuration;
however, documentation demonstrating qualification of the R. G. Laurance
valves had not been identified. Other non-EQ equipment was also identified
as being necessary to support the PASS system operation. This equipment
included: four RHR valves,1(2)-E11-F079A/B and 1(2)-E11-F080A/B, and
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associated local indicating lights; control switches; limit switches; heat tracing;
and reactor building closed cooling Water system (RBCCW).
The inspectors reviewed the licensing basis and regulatory requirements for
EQ of the PASS. The inspectors found that in a response dated May 8,1984,
to Generic Letter 82-33, Supplement 1, NUREG-0737, Requirements for
Emergency Response Capability Regulatory Guide 1.97, the licensee
committed to make the Post Accident Sampling System seismically and
environmentally qualified. In addition, the licensee's response dated
January 28.1983, to NUREG-0737 Item ll.B.3, Post-Accident Sampling
implemer;tation, stated in part that, "the system is designed to provide useful
samples under all conditions ranging to a full LOCA." The licensee also stated
in this response that " valves added to interface the PASS with plant systems
have been selected with seismic and environmental qualifications
demonstrating their ability to operate in an accident environment." NRC
evaluation of the licensee's submittal on PASS dated October 29,1983, stated,
in part, that "the PASS valves which are not accessible after an accident are
environmentally qualified for the conditions in which they need to operate."
Based on a review of the above, the inspectors concluded that the PASS
System components are required to be environmentally qualified in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.49. The failure to include such items as the nine PASS
solenoid valves, four RHR valves, limit switches, etc., on the EQ List as
required by 10 CFR 50.49 was identified as another example of apparent
violation eel 50-325,324/96-14-01. The licensee issued a JCO to address
operability of PASS.
The RBCCW system is required to be operational in order to obtain samples
from the PASS since one of the functions of RBCCW is to cool the samples. If
RBCCW is not operable, the samples would flash to steam when the sample
valves are opened. Questions have been raised regarding the operability of
RBCCW during some postulated accidents and the effect of loss of RBCCW on
the PASS. Pending further review by NRC, this issue was identified to the
licensee as URI 50-325, 324/96-14-03, Effect of RBCCW Operability on PASS.
Review of the Corrective Actions For Adverse Condition Report (ACR)91-181
ACR 91-181 dated April 5,1991, identified that the EQ data in EDBS was not
being maintained current based on plant design changes. The ACR was
considered a significant adverse condition requiring a formal root cause
analysis. The root cause was identified and corrective actions were put in
place. One of the required corrective actions assigned to the Nuclear
Engineering Department (NED) was to verify that safety-related electrical items
located in a harsh environment are on the EQ List in EDBS with a "Y" in the
EQ data field and associated qualification documentation was in the EQ File.
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This item was being tracked by the licensee as FACTS ltem 91B1190. The
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corrective action for this FACTS Item (91B1190) had been extended several
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times and was subsequently closed on April 29,1993, with the remaining
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corrective actions being transferred to ACR numbers N93-0027 and N93-0101.
The NED follow-up response to FACTS Item 91B1190 was submitted as part
of a request to extend the corrective action due date. The extension was
based upon the remaining and follow-up actions identified in the submittal. In
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this follow-up response, NED identified electric equipment important to safety
that required an EQ Flag change from "N" to "Y" in EDBS. In Enclosure 4,
Detail Component Evaluations (Pages 16 and 17 of 28), NED provided the
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results of their evaluation of the EQ classification for PASS solenoid valves
and integral limit switches. NED concluded that they should be qualified for
post-LOCA conditions and the EQ Flags should be changed in EDBS to EQ
"Y", However, it appears that no action was taken to establish qualification for
the valves and limit switches.
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As discussed above, the licensee documented on May 22,1996, in CR 96-
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01633 that the PASS solenoid valves were not included in the EQ Program
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and a qualification data package did not exist addressing the qualification for
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these valves. In addition, this CR acknowledged the fact that these valves had
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been identified previously in ACR 91-181 as requiring EQ. It further indicated
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that ACR 91-181 had been closed without resolution of the required corrective
action. The specified corrective action was to review ACR 91-181 to determine
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if other EQ equipment had been omitted from the program. This review had
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not been completed during this inspection.
Table 1 below is a list of those PASS solenoid valves and limit switches that
were identified in 1991 in ACR 91-181 that should be included in the EQ
program by changing the EQ Flag in EDBS from "N" to "Y".
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TABLE 1
List of PASS Solenoid Valves and Limit Switclies Shown in ACR 91-181
Unit 1
Unit 2
1-RXS-SV-4180
2-RXS-SV-4180
1-RXS-SV-4180-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4180-33-C
1-RXS-SV-4180-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4180-33-0
1-RXS-SV-4181
2-RXS-SV-4181
1-RXS-SV-4181-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4181-33-C
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1-RXS-bV-4181-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4181-33-0
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1-RXS-SV-4182
2-RXS-SV-4182
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1-RXS-SV-4182-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4182-33-C
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1-RXS-SV-4182-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4182-33-0
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1-RXS-SV-4183
2-RXS-SV-4183
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1-RXS-SV-4183-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4183-33-C
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1-RXS-SV-4183-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4183-33-0
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1-RXS-SV-4184
2-RXS-SV-4184
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1-RXS-SV-4184-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4184-33-C
1-RXS-3V-4184-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4184-33-0
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1-RXS-SV-4185
2-RXS-SV-4185
1-RXS-SV-4185-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4185-33-C
1-RXS-SV-4185-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4185-33-0
1-RXS-SV-4192
2-RXS-SV-4192
1-RXS-SV-4192-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4192-33-C
1-RXS-SV-4192-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4192-33-0
1-RXS-SV-4193
2-RXS-SV-4193
1-RXS-SV-4193-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4193-33-C
1-RXS-SV-4193-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4193-33-0
1-RXS-SV-4194
2-RXS-SV-4194
1-RXS-SV-4194-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4194-33-C
1-RXS-SV-4194-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4194-33-0
ESR 95-01266 was issued by the licensee to evaluate the environmental
qualification for the eight PASS limit switches (four limit switches on each unit)
shown in Table 2.
Table 2
List of Limit Switches Evaluated for Qualification in ESR 95-01266
Unit 1
Unit 2
1-RXS-SV-4180-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4180-33-0
1-RXS-SV-4180-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4180-33-C
1-RXS-SV-4181-33-0
2-RXS-SV-4181-33-0
1-RXS-SV-4181-33-C
2-RXS-SV-4181-33-C
The ESR indicated that the limit switches, which were installed prior to
February 22,1983, had recently been upgraded to Quality Class "A" and that
they were required to be EQ qualified in order to assure associated safety
related circuits would not be degraded by failure of the switches. The
,
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inspectors concluded from a review of ACR 91-181 that these same limit
switches had been categorized as Class "A" as early as September 1991. An
NED evaluation associated with ACR 91-181 indicated that all of the above
valves could be used to obtain post-accident samples and based on this fact
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the valves and limit switches should be qualified. However, it did not address
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the fact that some of the limit switches were also associated with other safety
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related circuits and that failure of the switches could cause loss of position
'
indication for containment isolation valves: 1(2)-RXS-SV-4186, -4187, -4188,
and -4189. The position indication for the containment isolation valves is
required to be EQ qualified in accordance with the licensee's commitments to
RG 1.97, instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to
'
Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident.
The inspectors concluded that the above equipment important to safety listed
in Tables 1 and 2 was omitted from the EQ Program as identified in ACR 91-
181. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50.49. The failure of the licensee to take
prompt corrective action for the deficiencies identified in ACR 91-181 is a
violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This was identified to the
licensee as apparent violation item eel 50-325,324/96-14-04, Failure to
Promptly identify and Correct Nonconforming Conditions.
ESR 9501266 only addressed the qualification of the limit switches shown in
Table 2. It did not address the qualification for those limit switches associated
with solenoid valves 1(2)-RXS-SV-4182,4183,4184, and 4185. Although in
ACR 91-181, these limit switches were previously identified to be upgraded to
EQ. These limit switches are required to maintain control circuit continuity for
the position indication of containment isolation valves,1(2)- RXS-SV-4186, -
4187, -4188, and -4189. Failure of the limit switches as a result of a
postulated design basis accident could cause a loss of the position indication
for these valves. The position indication is required by the licensee's
commitments to RG 1.97. Equipment associated with RG 1.97 is required to
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be environmentally qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49(b)(3). The
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failure of the licensee to document a significant condition adverse to quality
after discovering that the limit switches described in Table 1 above had not
been EQ qualified was identified to the licensee as another example of
apparent violation eel 50-325,324/96-14-04.
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ESR 9501266 evaluated the qualification of the limit switches shown in Table 2
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against the criteria of the DOR Guidelines. The conclusion reached in the
!
ESR was that the switches were qualified based on similarity to the switches
previously qualified in ODP-41. The conclusion section of the ESR indicated
that ODP-41 had been revised to incorporate the results of the ESR. The
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inspector reviewed ODP-41, Revision 1 in the licensee's EQ File and
determined that it had not been revised to incorporate ESR 9501266. In
addition, the inspector found that the index of applicable QDPs that is required
by OENP-34.3, Section 4.2, Organization of Qualification Documentation Files,
was last revised on February 7,1992. Review of this index noted that the
current revision of ODP-41 was revision 1. The inspector also noted that
Finding No.1 in the licensee's Self Assessment 96-00271 identified a similar
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concern that over 25 QDPs had not been revised for more than 1 year after
the equipment was declared operable. The inspector requested information
from the licensee regarding which ODPS had not been revised in a timely
'
manner. The licensee responded with the list of QDPs that are shown in
Attachments 1 and 2. Attachment 1 identifies QDPs with a pending revision.
A majority of the QDPs listed have been in revision status for over two years.
Attachment 2 identifies those QDPs that were never issued. Failure to
maintain the EQ files current was identified to the licensee as an apparent
violation of 10 CFR 50.49 and another example of apparent violation eel 50-
325, 324/96-14-01.
The licensee initiated CR 96-02410 on August 12,1996, when it was identified
that a new type of solenoid valve (Enertech/Herion) was added by ESR 94-
00390 during the Unit 2 outage in 1996 and declared operable without a QDP
being issued and placed in the licensee's EQ Files. A review of ESR 94-00390
Drawing / Document Update Form indicated that the EQ Data Base did not
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require update prior to turnover to Operations. The only basis given was a
reference to QDP-92. The qualification for the new valve, however, is
addressed in QDP 92B as shown by EDBS for Plant Tag # 2-B32-SV-F019.
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This QDP had not been approved and issued prior to the modification being
declared operable. In addition, when the inspector first questioned the
!
licensee regarding those QDPs that had been in revision or pending issue
(during the week of August 5 through 9,1996), it appears that the licensee
was not aware that this QDP was missing or had not been issued. This is
demonstrated by the fact that QDP-92B is not shown on Attachments 1 or 2
which was provided to the inspector by the licensee during that period. The
failure of the licensee to have qualification documentation in a file to
demonstrate qualification of the Enertech/Herion solenoid valve,2-932-SV-
F019 is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.49 (f) and (j) which was identified
to the licensee as another example of apparent violation eel 50-325,324/96-
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14-01.
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Review of Corrective Action for ACR N93-0101 - Associated Circuits
!
!
The licensee initiated ACR N93-0101 (later superseded by ACR 94-0980) on
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August 20,1993, to address a concern that the safety classifications for certain
electrical panel boards did not account for protection of Class 1E circuits from
associated circuits in the same raceway / cables. The design bases allowed
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cables supplying non-safety loads to be routed within the safety-related
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raceway system. However, the breakers feeding these non-safety related
loads were classified as non-safety and non-EQ in the EDBS system. The
licensee determined that if the protective devices are not "EQ Qualified,"
potential common cause and/or common mode failure mechanisms are
possible. The licensee postulated that a HELB or LOCA could result in reactor
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building environmental conditions which could cause multiple load faults and at
the same time cause failures of the breakers to trip. This could allow the cable
to be damaged to the extent that the damage could propagate to the adjacent
cables in the raceway serving safety-related loads. The corrective actions
required by the ACR were to upgrade the non-safety classification for electrical
panels,1(2)A-RX,1(2)B-RX,1(2)C-RX,1(2)D-RX, and 1(2)AB-RX to safety-
related, Quality Class "A".
The above panels are wall mounted 120/208 volt AC distribution panels
located in the reactor buildings. However, there are other wall mounted panels
in the reactor building, and there are other electrical distribution panels located
in the reactor building such as the 120 volt AC panels that are internal to the
MCCs. The inspector noted that the corrective actions for ACR N93-0101 did
not address these panels. Furthermore, the problem description contained in
Section b of ACR 93-0101, clearly stated that the problem involved other
panels such as the 120 volt distribution panels that were internal to the motor
control centers. Yet the ACR failed to identify corrective actions for these
panels and breakers. The inspector noted that the subject panels and
associated breakers were not on the EQ Master List.
On April 29,1996, CR 96-01408 was initiated which re-identified the
associated circuit issue. Corrective actions included development of a JCO
and initiating ESR 9600503 to justify operability of the MCCs and panel
breakers that are associated with Class 1E circuits. The list of reactor building
power supplies that are required to be EQ qualified are summarized in
Attachment A of the ESR. It is clear from review of this list that ACR N93-
0101 did not address all panels located in the reactor building. In addition, the
breakers that were upgraded to Quality Class "A" were never added to the EQ
Program.
The inspectors concluded from this review that electric equipment important to
,
safety identified in ESR 9600503, Attachment A, was omitted from the EQ
Program in violation of 10 CFR 50.49 (d), (f), and (j). This issue was also
,
identified to the licensee as another example of apparent violation eel 50-
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325,324/96-14-01. The failure to identify the full extent of the condition
!
adverse to quality regarding the classification and qualification of 120 Volt
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panels in the reactor buildings when the problem was initially identified in 1993
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was identified to the licensee as an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix
B, Criterion XVI. This was identified as another example of eel 50-
325,324/96-14-04.
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Additional EQ lssues
During review of various documents and discussions during the
inspection, two additional issues were identified pertaining to
environmental qualification of equipment. One issue concerned how
environmental effects (uncertainties) were addressed in evaluating
instrument loop errors and establishing instrument loop setpoints.
Pending further review by NRC, this issue was identified to the licensee
as inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 325, 324/96-14-05, Effect of EQ
Accuracy on Instrument Setpoint Calculations. The other issue
pertained to the accuracy of reactor vessel level determination using the
emergency response facilities information system (ERFIS) and the
accuracy of containment isolation valve position indications in the safety
parameters display system (SPDS). Pending further review by NRC,
this issue was identified to the licensee as IFl 325, 324/96-14-06,
Accuracy of ERFIS and SPDS Data.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee issued JCOs to address questions regarding equipment
operability related to the EQ program deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed
the JCOs and concluded that they contained sufficient information to permit
continued operation of both Units 1 and 2 pending resolution of the EQ
program deficiencies. The licensee also reviewed the EQ age of equipment
affected by the EQ program deficiencies and determined that the equipment
would remain operable for each unit until at least the next current scheduled
refueling outages. The inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to
maintain control of their EQ program for safety-related equipment, as required
y
by 10 CFR 50.49, and failed to take prompt and effective corrective action
when indications of problems were identified in 1991. The licensee also
committed to maintain the EQ program in the CP&L Brunswick Three Year
improvement Program which was submitted to NRC on December 15,1992.
Two apparent violations were identified. Two unresolved items, two inspector
followup items, and a weakness were also identified.
E.8
Miscellaneous Engineering issues
E.8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-325,324/96-08-04, Inconsistencies in the EQ
Program
The inspectors reviewed the issues related to the apparent
inconsistencies in the EQ Program that had been identified in Conamon
Report (CR) 96-01277. These issues, which were originally identified
during Self-Assessment 95-041, were as follows:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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15
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1.
The EQ List, as reflected in the Equipment Data Base System (EDBS),
shows some equipment tag numbers as "EQ" without referring to a
qualification data package (QDP) which demonstrate qualification. In
addition, some referenced ODPs and " qualified life" information shown
on the EQ List appear to be inconsistent.
2.
There appears to be inconsistencies between the Q List of safety
related equipment, EQ List, EQ Maintenance Data Base and EQ
qualification data packages.
3.
EQ documentation does not currently incorporate the latest
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environmental parameters, capture changes caused by engineering
,
evaluation requests (EERs), engineering service requests (ESRs) and
EQ backlog, and address other parameters such as margin, mechanical
cycling and Beta exposure.
4.
The UFSAR does not reflect the latest environmental conditions in the
Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP).
The results of the followup inspection are discussed in report Section E-
1, above. Unresolved item 50-325, 324/96-08-04 is closed and
,
upgraded to apparent violation eel 50-325, 324/96-14-01.
E.8.2 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-325,324/96-08-05, Associated Circuit issue
It has been determined by the licensee that the fault overload protection
on non-safety related equipment / cabling which is not qualified for a
harsh environment, could fail to perform its protective function due to the
effects of a high energy line break (HELB). This could result in damage
to adjacent safety related cables routed in the same raceway. This
issue was initially identified in 1993 as documented on Adverse
Condition Report N93-0101. This event is postulated to occur in both
divisions simultaneously due to the effects of the HELB in the reactor
buildings. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for ACR N93-
0101. The results of the review is discussed in Section E1, above. The
conclusion reached from a review of the corrective actions for ACR N93-
0101 was that ten non-safety related panels and breakers located in
each reactor building were identified to be upgraded in EDBS to Class
,
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"A"
The panels were upgraded in EDBS to Class "A", however, the
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issue regarding whether these panels had to be environmentally
qualified was not addressed by the above EDBS change. In fact the
panels and breakers were never added to the EQ List as equipment
important to safety required to be qualified by the EQ Rule. Another
observation made after review of the corrective actions for ACR N93-
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0101 was that the corrective actions did not address all associated
circuit components that were discussed in the original problem. The
licensee has subsequently identified that there are six categories of
power supplies in the reactor building relating to this issue. None of
these components were previously identified on the EQ List. The
licensee identified that 480 volt AC MCCs,1XG,1XJ,1XK,1XL,2XJ,
,
2XK, and 2XL were required to be EQ. These MCCs were originally
,
procured as O and were subsequently downgraded to non-Q. The
licensee performed a review of work order records to determine if any
non-Q parts had been used in the MCCs during the time they were
classified as non-safety. None were found. Based on this review the
MCCs were upgraded in EDBS to Class "A"
The licensee also
indicated that the qualification for these MCCs is the same as that for
the safety-related MCCs; however, the qualification for the safety-related
MCCs has not been established based on current Reactor Building
Environmental data. A review was still in progress as of the inspection
date to determine if the breakers had exceeded their qualified lives.
This issue will be reviewed as followup action for the apparent
violations. Other equipment involving associated circuits included:
panels located internal to reactor building AC MCCs, wall mounted
distribution panels associated with reactor building DC MCCs, wall
mounted distribution panels that are associated with MCCs, and fuses.
A list of the panels is shown in ESR 96-00503. Unresolved item 50-325,
324/96-08-05 is closed.
E.8.3 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-325, 324/96-08-06, Qualification of Post
Accident Sampling System (PASS). The Post Accident Sampling
system is currently classified as safety-related (Class A) while the
original plant modifications that installed the system classified it as non-
safety and non-EO. The licensee performed a review of the PASS
components and determined that the system was installed in
accordance with seismic design criteria, and that all components were
classified as safety related and were included in the EQ program except
for nine valves on each unit, and certain other components. A detailed
discussion of PASS is included in Section E1, above. CR 96-01939 was
issued to document and disposition this issue. Review of documentation
!
disclosed that five of the valves on each unit were purchased as safety-
related components; however, these valves had not been included in the
licensee's EQ program. Licensee engineers performed a review of
purchase and maintenance records and determined that these five
valves still met the requirements for safety related components and
were currently EQ qualified. These five valves have been incorporated
into the EQ program. The four remaining valves on each unit were
purchased as non-safety related components. Two of these valves are
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17
installed on the shell side of the RHR heat exchangers, while the
remaining two are installed on the reactor building air sampling system.
The electrical circuits for the valves on the RHR heat exchanger are
interconnected with the containment isolation valves on the
hydrogen / oxygen analysis (CAC) system. Failure of the valves on the
RHR system could possibly effect the CAC valves, which could result in
loss of position indication (open or closed) in the control room.
!
Discussions with the EQ task force supe visor disclosed that
compensatory actions to address the effect of failure of the PASS valves
on the RHR system (loss of position indication) were transmitted from
engineering to operations as a Standing Instruction on July 3,1996. On
July 18,1996, at approximately 3:00 PM, the inspector went to the
control room and reviewed the standing instructions. The standing
instruction for the PASS valves was not in the standing instruction
logbook. The inspector questioned the shift supervisor and the Unit 1 &
2 senior reactor operators regarding the standing instruction. These
individuals were not aware of the issue. Further discussions with
'
licensee personnel disclosed that the standing instruction had not yet
been issued by operations management and that the operators on shift
at 3:00 PM on July 18,1996, had not briefed on the problem for a
variety of reasons. A standing instruction covering compensatory
actions regarding possible failure of the PASS valves was issued on
July 19,1996. On August 23,1996, further discussions with BESS
engineering manager disclosed that the issue may have been included
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in the shift supervisor's logbook but may have been inadvertently
i
deleted on or about July 15,1996. The inspector questioned the
'
licensee regarding their investigation of the cause of failure to
disseminate the information regarding the PASS valves to the personnel
onshift on July.18,1996. These discussions disclosed that the licensee
had not issued a CR to identify and correct the problem and apparently
did not conduct an investigation into the issue. Failure to document the
problem on a CR was identified as another example of apparent
i
violation eel 325, 324/96-14-04. The licensee is continuing to review
resolution of the environmental qualification for the eight valves which
were originally purchased as non-safety related.
The inspector reviewed ESR number 96-00426 which documents review
of the seismic integrity of the PASS components. The conclusions of
the ESR was that all PASS equipment was seismically supported,
j
although some documentation was confusing pertaining to seismic
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design qualifications. A walkdown inspection was completed by a
!
licensee civil / structural engineer to determine if the PASS components
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were installed in accordance with seismic design criteria. The results of
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the walkdown disclosed that all components met seismic design criteria,
with the exception of some panels which were identified as outliers
under the licensee's USI A-46 program. The inspector performed a
,
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walkdown in the Unit 1 reactor building and examined portions of the
PASS. The inspector concluded that the system had been installed in
accordance with the licensee's seismic design criteria and in accordance
with the des'ign requirements shown on Drawing numbers F-73059, -
73060, and -73064. The inspector concurred with the conclusions of
ESR 96-00426. Unresolved item 325,324/96-08-06 is closed.
E.8.4 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-325,324/96-08-07, Adequacy of the EQ
Equipment List as shown in EDBS.
Numerous discrepancies have been noted with the information provided
in the EQ Equipment List as shown in EDBS Screen 408. CR 96-01277
documented that 777 items were identified on the EQ List without a
reference to a ODP, After a review by the licensee of the 777 items it
was later determined that EQ documentation did not exist for some of
'
the items included on the EQ List. Some of these items are discussed
in this report. The corrective action for ACR 91-181 identified several
components that were required to be added to the EQ List e.g. PASS
valves and limit switches. These components had not been added to
the EQ List. In addition several other discrepancies noted in ACR 91-
181 with the EQ List were also not resolved in regard to the EQ List in
EDBS. Additionally, approximately 300 items were removed from the
EQ List in response to Great Ideas NED-327 and NED-326. It has now
been determined that many of these items were removed improperly
and most are required to be in the EQ Program. The licensee's task
force on EQ is currently evaluating the EQ List in EDBS and comparing
it to the List submitted to NRC by letter dated May 20,1983.
Differences identified are being reviewed to verify the bases for the
change. The licensee is currently reviewing the completeness of the EQ
List in conjunction with the review of previously identified ACRs that
identified discrepancies with the list in EDBS. The failure by the
licensee to properly identify equipment important to safety requiring
environmental qualification and failure to maintain the list current was
identified as examples of apparent violation 50-325, 324/96-14-01, as
discussed in Section E1, above. Unresolved item 50-325, 324/96-08-07
is closed.
E.8.5 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-325, 324/96-08-08, Use of Thread Sealant
on Environmentally Qualified Equipment. An installation specification
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and maintenance procedures listed some thread sealants for use on EQ
equipment which had not been qualified. This problem was originally
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19
reviewed under ESR 9400743. The conclusions of the ESR were that
some thread cealants were listed in various site procedures which had
not been EQ qualified under a testing program. Failure to initiate
corrective action to revise the procedures was identified to the licensee
as another example of apparent violation eel 325/324/96-14-04. The
licensee documented this problem on CR 96-01445. The licensee is in
the process of reviewing EQ equipment installation records to determine
if any of the unqualified thread sealants had been used onsite. Review
of purchase records disclosed that at least one of the qualified sealants
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was purchased for use as augmented quality. A JCO has been
.
prepared to address the use of potentially unqualified thread sealants.
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Materials purchased as augmented quality have limited qualifications but
do not meet the requirements for use in EQ or safety-related
applications. The licensee has documented the procedural
discrepancies and is in the process of making the necessary corrections
to list only thread sealants for use on EQ equipment which have been
.
qualified. Unresolved item 50-325, 324/96-08-08 is closed.
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E.8.6 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-325,324/96-08-09, Adequacy of Corrective
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Actions to Address Self Assessment Findings. One strength,20
,
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findings, and eight recommendations (areas for improvement) were
!
identified in self-assessment 95-041, EQ Program Adequacy. The self-
assessment was performed by contractors under the guidance and
approval of the site EQ engineer. The strength stated that the overall
EQ program met the general requirements of CP&L procedures and
licensing commitments. However, the 20 findings identified numerous
deficiencies in the EQ program including deficiencies in procedures,
documentation, EQ calculations, design drawings, and equipment data
l
bases. The areas for improvement outlined planned corrective actions
l
to address some of the findings. The inspectors question whether the
corrective actions to resolve the 20 findings identified during the self-
assessment were adequate.
The inspectors noted that these same issues were re-identified during the
recently completed self-assessment 96-0271. The licensee documented the
findings from assessment 96-0271 on CRs.
The inspectors reviewed the 20 findings in self-assessment 95-041 to
determine the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions to resolve
the EQ issues. This review disclosed that discrepancies in the EQ
program were evaluated by ESRs. Some of the problems were also
documented on CRs. The inspector reviewed the ESRs listed below
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and determined that the findings from assessment 95-041 were not properly
addressed in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program. ESRs
reviewed were as follows:
ESR 9400742 - This ESR required screening of previously issued
-
engineering evaluation reports (EERs) to determine which ones
were EQ related and could impact qualification data packages
(QDPs). A total of 369 EERs were reviewed. The licensee
determined that 36 of the EERs could potentially impact the
QDPs. A list of the 36 EERs was attached to the ESR. However,
no additional actions were initiated by the licensee to review the
!
ODPs and determine the impact of the 36 EERS on the
applicable QDPs.
ESR 9400743 - This ESR was issued to address a finding that
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some components may not be installed to reflect as-tested
configurations for EQ installation criteria. The ESR provided a list
of some QDPs which may be affected by this problem. The
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licensee determined that some thread sealants listed in the site
specification and site installation procedures had not been tested.
A list of potentially affected QDPs were listed in the ESR.
However, no additional corrective actions were initiated to
resolve this concern.
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ESR 9400752 - This ESR was an evaluation of the impact of the
hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) related increased radiation
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levels on EQ equipment. The conclusions of the ESR was that
additional review of this issue be performed and that a project be
initiated to perform the review. An associated CR, CR 95-00701
was closed out based on the ESR resolution; however, additional
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review was not performed and corrective action was not initiated
'
for approximately 13 months. The ESR referenced EER 94-0061
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which evaluated the HWC modification. The EQ impact form
attached to EER 94-0061 indicated that the HWC mod had no
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impact on EQ. The inspectors noted that EER 94-0061 was not
listed as an EER reviewed under ESR 9400742. This also
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questions the adequacy of the review performed under ESR
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9400742.
The licensee's corrective action program, PLP-04, requires personnel to
identify, evaluate, and correct adverse conditions and other conditions
not meeting expectations, i. e., nonconformances per the definition of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The corrective action program
requires the use of Condition Reports (CRs) to identify and document
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nonconformances. Condition Reports were not issued to document and
identify the nonconformances identified on ESRs 9400742,743, and
752. This was identified to the licensee as another example of apparent
violation eel 325, 324/96-14-04, Failure to Promptly Identify and
Correct Nonconformances.
Further review of the findings from Self-Assessment 95-041 disclosed
that the site EQ engineer prepared an undated document titled "EQ
Program Self-Assessment" in November 1995. This document is a
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restatement of the findings from self-assessment 95-041. However, the
wording used in the document indicates that the findings from self-
assessment 95-041 are serious issues which have not been resolved
and could possibly impact operability of plant equipment. The
document stated that the purpose of the November 1995 assessment
was to alert management of the deteriorating condition of the EQ
program. The undated document listed ten concerns and approximately
ten serious deficiencies in the EQ program. The document listed
possible resolutions of the problems / issues. The EQ engineer
discussed the assessment with his immediate supervisor and his next
level supervisor several times during December and January,1996.
The inspectors determined that no actions were taken by either of the
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three individuals to initiate CRs to document and disposition the
problems (nonconformances) until CR96-01277 was initiated on April 12,
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1996. The failure to initiate a CR for conditions they became aware of,
.
which is a requirement of PLP-4, was identified as another example of
apparent violation eel 50-325, 324/96-14-04. The licensee initiated a
self assessment due to the concerns raised in CR96-01277. The
conclusions of the self-assessment, documented in Self Assessment
Report 96-00271, was that the Brunswick Environmental Qualification
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program has not been effectively maintained resulting in identification of
17 findings were identified in the assessment.
On February 22,1995, the licensee initiated CR 95-00513 to document
l
a discrepancy in EDBS regarding the safety classification and EQ status
of 250 volt DC overload relays. Discussions with licensee engineers
l
disclosed that the CR resulted from revisions to EDBS made while
changing the EQ data fields for the equipment listed in CP&L Great idea
numbers NED-326 and 327. However, the licensee failed to conduct an
adequate review of the cause of this CR and failed to ensure corrective
,
actions to resolve the problem were effective. Additional discrepancies
)
related to the improper classification (either the safety or EQ
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classification of the equipment listed in NED 326 & 327) have been
recently identified as a result of the EQ program review. This resulted
,
in initiation of additional CRs. The failure of the licensee to ensure that
assigned corrective actions are effective and are implemented as
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required by Paragraph 6.0 of PLP-4 was identified to the licensee as
another example of apparent violation 50-325, 324/96-14-04.
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V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee
management on August 23,1996 and during a telephone conversation on
September 17,1996. Post inspection briefings were conducted on June 28
and July 12,1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify any materials used during the inspection as
proprietary information.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
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W. Campbell, Vice-President, Brunswick
J. Gawron, Manager, Nuclear Assessment Section
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D. Hicks, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
K. Kirk, Site Quality Check Representative
W. Levis, Director, Site Operations
R. Lopriore. Plant Manager
J. McIntyre, Acting Superintendent, Design Control, BESS
C. Pardee, Manager, Operations
H. Pitts, Superintendent, Electrical and I&C, BESS
S. Tabor, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
M. Turkil, Manager, Licensing and Regulatory Programs
R. Williams, Manager, EQ Task Force, BESS
NRC
E. Brown, Resident inspector
M. Janus, Resident inspector
C. Patterson, Senior Resident inspector
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37550:
Engineering
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-325, 324/96-14-01
eel
Failure to Maintain the Environmental
Quali%ation Program in Accordance with 10
CN 50.49 (Paragraph E1)
50-325, 324/96-14-02
UFSAR Environmental Data Discrepancies
(Paragraph E1)
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50-325, 324/96-14-03
Effect of RBCCW System Operability on
PASS (Paragraph E1)
50-325, 324/96-14-04
eel
Failure to Promptly identify and Correct
Nonconforming Conditions (Paragraph E1)
50-325, 324/96-14-05
IFl
Effect of EQ Accuracy on Instrument
Setpoint Calculations (Paragraph E1)
50-325, 324/96-14-06
IFl
Accuracy of ERFIS and SPDS Data
(Paragraph E1)
Closed
50-325, 324/96-08-04
Inconsistencies in the EQ Programs
(paragraph E8.1)
50-325, 324/96-08-05
Associated Circuits issue (Paragraph
E8.2)
50-325, 324/96-08-06
Qualification of PASS (Paragraph E8.3)
50-325, 324/96-08-07
Adequacy of EQ Equipment List as Shown in
EDBS (Paragraph E8.4)
50-325, 324/96-08-08
Use of Thread Sealants on EQ Equipment
Installations (Paragraph E8.5)
50-325, 324/96-08-09
Adequacy of Corrective Actions to Address
Self-Assessment Findings (Paragraph E8.6)
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Alternating Current
Accident Containment Atmospheric Dilution
ACR
Adverse Condition Report
l
BESS
Brunswick Engineering Support Section
BNP
Brunswick Nuclear Plant
Containment Atmospheric Control
CR
Condition Report
Direct Current
DOR
Division of Operating Reactors
EDBS
-Equipment Data Base System
eel
Escalated Enforcement item
Engineering Evaluation Report
.
Environmental Qualification
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ERFIS
Emergency Response Facilities Information System
Engineering Service Request
Hyrodgen Water Chemistry
IFl
Inspector Followup Item
t
JCO
Justification for Continued Operation
Loss of Cooling Accident
Motor Control Center
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NED
Nuclear Engineering Department
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Post Accident Sampling System
l
Qualification Data Package
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Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water
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Safety Parameters Display System
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Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Unresolved item
Violation
WR/JO
Work Request
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. Enc 1;sure 2
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General Statement of Policy
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and Procec ures for NRC
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Enforcement Actions
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Manuscript Completed: June 1995
Date PuHeshed: July 1995
.
Omce of Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
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Abstract
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This document includes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission's
(NRC's or Comission's) revised General Statement of Policy and
_
Procedure for Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy) as it was
'
published in the federal Register on June 30, 1995 (60 FR 34381).
'
This document also includes the notice announcing the removal of the
Enforcement
Policy
from
the
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
'
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(60 FR 34380; June 30, 1995). The Enforcement Policy is a general
!
statement of policy explaining the NRC's policies and procedures in
f
initiating enforcement acti6ns, and of the presiding officers and
the Commission in reviewing these actions. This policy statement is
applicable to enforcement in matters involving the radiological
'
health and safety of the public, including employees' health and
safety, the common defense and security, and the environment. This
statement of general policy and procedure is published as NUREG-1600
'
to provide widespread dissemination of the Commission's Enforcement
Policy.
However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation.
The Commission may deviate from this statement of policy and
procedure as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular
case.
Questions concerning the Enforcement Policy should be directed to
the NRC's Office of Enforcement at 301-415-2741.
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Contents
Abstract
................................
iii
Notice Announcing Removal of the Enforcement Policy From
the Code of Federal Regul ations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Statements of Consideration for Revised Enforcement Policy
3
. . . . ....
Revised Enforcement Policy
.......................
5
Ta bl e o f C o n t e n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
.
1.
Introduction and Purpose
...................... 5
II.
Statutory Authority
........................ 5
A.
Statutory Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B.
Procedural Framework
...................... 6
III. Responsibilities
......................... 6
IV. Severity of Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A.
Aggregation of Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
8.
Repetitive Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C.
Willful Violations
....................... 7
D.
Violations of Reporting Requirements
8
. . . . . . . . . . ....
V.
Predecisional Enforcement Conferences
8
. . . . . . . . . . . ....
VI.
Enforcement Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.
Notice of Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
. . . . . . ....
B.
Civil Penalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.
Base Civil Penalty
....................9
2.
Civil Penalty Assessment
9
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
a.
Initial Escalated Action
. . .
12
. . . . . . . . . . . .
b.
Credit for Actions Related to Identification
. . .
12
. .
c.
Credit for Prompt and Comprehensive
'
Corrective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
d.
Exercise of Discretion
. . .
14
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
C.
Orders
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
D.
Related Administrative Actions
. . .
14
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII.
Exercise of Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
A.
Escalation of Enforcement Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
1.
C i v i l Pe n al t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
2.
Orders
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
3.
Daily Civil Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
B.
Mitigation of Enforcement Sancticns . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
1.
Licensee-Identified Severity Level IV Violations
. . .
15
. .
2.
Violations Identified During Extended Shutdowns
or Work Stoppages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
3.
Violations Involving Old Design Issues
. . .
16
. . . . . . .
4.
Violations Identified Due to Previous
Escalated Enforcement Action
. . .
16
.
. . . . . . . . . . .
5.
Violations Involving Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
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6.
Violations Involving Special Circumstances
. 16
)
. . . . . ...
C.
Exercise of Discretion for an Operating Facility
. . .
16
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. . . .
VIII.
Enforcement Actions Involving Individuals . . . . . . . . . . .
17
IX.
Inaccurate and Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
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X.
Enforcement Action Against Non-Licensees . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
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XI.
Referrals to the Department of Justice
. . .
20
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XII.
Public Disclosure of Enforcement Actions . . . . . . . . . . . .
20
. . . . . . . . . .
XIII. Reopening Closed Enforcement Actions
20
. . . . . . . . . . ...
y
. --
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.
B
.
Supplements
Supplement I - Reactor Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20
Supplement II - Part 50 Facility Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20
Supplement III - Sa feguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
Supplement IV - Health Physics (10 CFR Part 20) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
Supplement V - Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
Supplement VI - Fuel Cycle and Materials Operation
23
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Supplement VII - Miscellaneous Matters
24
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Supplement VIII - Emergency Preparedness
25
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mgure
Civil Penalty Assessment Flowchart
11
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tables
lA Base Civil Penalties
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
IB Base Civil Penalties
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
vi
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Friday
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June 30,1995
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Nuclear Regulatory
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COMMISSION
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Enforcement Actions Policy and
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Procedure: Final Rule and Notice
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34380
Feder".1 Register / Vol. 60. No.126 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Rul s and Rrgulations
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
NRC Enforcement Program." was
effect." (Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale
COtetNSSION
published in April 1995.The team
Oil Co. 796 F.2d 533,539 (D.C. Cir. '
report,in Recommendation IL G-3.
1986) citing 44 U.S.C.1510 (1982)).
recommended that the Enforcement
Therefore, because the Enforcement
Policy be removed from the Code of
Policy is not a regulation, the
Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Federal Regulations (CFR) because the
Commission is removing it from the
Actione; Removal
Enforcement Policy is not a regulation.
Code of Federal Regulations. Revisions
The NRC Enforcement Policy has
of the Enforcement Policy will continue
ActucV: Nuclear Regulatory
been codified at to CFR Part 2
to be published in the Federal Register.
Commission.
Appendix C to provide widespread
To ensure widespread dissemination,
Acn0N: Policy statement.
dissemination of the Commission's
the Enforcement Policy will be provided
Enforcement Policy. However, after the
to licensees, made available on an
suussARY:The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission first published the
electronic bulletin board, and published
Commission (NRC)is removing its
'
"
980
as NUREG-1600, " General Statement of
General Statement of Policy and
5FR
4
(omm a
s
Procedure for Enforcement Actions
maintained that the NRC Enforcement
- "
n
- "I
cti **
(Enforcement Po! Icy) from the Code of
Policy is a policy statement and not a
Federal Regulations because the
regulation. The Commission's reason for Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
Enforcement Policy is not a regulation.
having a policy statement rather than a
This policy statement contains no
DATES:This action is effective on June
rule was explained in the Statement of
information collection requirements
30,1995.
Considerations that accompanied the
and, therefore,is not subject to the
Submit comments on or before August publication of the 1982 Enforcement
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44
14,1995. Comments received after this
Policy. The Commission stated then:
U"S.C. 3501 et
)'
date will be considered if it is practical
An underlyin6 asis of this policy that is
b
to do so but the Commission is able to
reflected througnout it is that the
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 2
assure consideration only for comments determination of the appropriate sanction
Administrative Ptactice and
received on or before this date.
require the exercise of discretion such that
Pg
}t
st( y
A00REssEs: Send written comments to:
fo
is tallo
to e
The Secretary of the Commission. U.S.
discretion provided, the enforcement policy
Environmental protection, Nuclear
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
is being adopted as a statement of general
materials. Nuclear power plants and
Washington, DC 20555. ATI'N:
policy rather than as a regulation.
reactors, Penalties. Sex discrimination,
Docketing and Service Branch. Hand
notwithstanding that the statement hu been
Source material Special nuclear
deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville
promulgated with notice and comment
material. Waste treatment and disposal.
Pike, Rockville. Maryland, between 7:45 procedures. A general statement of policy
am and 4:15 pm. Federal workdays.
will pemut the Commission maxirnum
PART 2-RULES OF PRACTICE FOR
Copies of comments received may be
flexibility in revising the policy statement
dot 4ESTIC UCENSM PROCEEDIMS
,"h'y*g
P
examined at the NRC Public Document
pp
t.
I
evind as AND ISSUANCE OF ORDERS
Room. 2120 L Street, NW,(Lower
nemesary to reflect changes in policy and
Level). Washington. DC.
direction of the Commission (47 FR 9989:
1.The authority citation for part 2
FOR FURTHER WFORMADON CONTACT:
March 9.1992).
continues to read,in part, as follows:
James Lieberman, Director. Officamf
For the same reasons, the Commission
Auserity: secs.1at,1at, sa stat. 94s.
Enforcemant, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
continues to hold the view that the
953, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201,22311: sec. 191, as amended. Pub. L 87-415,76 Stat. 409
Commission. Washington, DC 20555
Enforcement Policy is a policy
(301)415-2741.
statement. However, at least one court.
[42
t . ' Nth
224
' ' ' **
,.
SUPPLEMENTARY WFOResAT1001:On May
in considering whether an enforcement
13,1994, the NRC's Executive Director
policy was a policy statement or a
Appendix C to Part 2 Diemovedi
for Operations established a review
regulation, noted that if the policy were
2. Appendix C to Part 2 is removed.
team to assess the NRC enforcement
published in the CFR,it would be
program. The review team report,
properly treated as a regulation because
Dated at Rockville. MD. this 23rd day of
NUREG-1525,* " Assessment of the
the CFR is reserved for documents
lune,1905.
"having general applicability and legal
. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
8 Copies of NUREG. ts2s rney be purchased kom
IM M.
the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Governmens Royal Road. Springfield. Virgiate 22161. A copy is
Secretaryof the Commission.
Printing Omco. P.O. Boa 27082. Weabinston. DC
alae available for inspection and copying for a see
(FR Doc. 95-15951 Filed 6-29-95; 8:45 aml
2cetS.7062. Copies are also ave 61able kom the
in the NRC Public Document Room. 21to L Street.
Natlonal Technical Information Service, saas Port
NW. (Lower Levell. Washington, DC 20sS6-oo01.
enames CooE rose es.*
2
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Federal Register / Vol. 60. No.126 / Friday. June 30, 1995 / Notices
34381
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
As refketed in the semity levels. s6fety
(2) To encourage prompt
COMMISSION
significance includes actual safety
identification and prompt.
consequence, potential safety consequence,
comprehensive correction of violations.
Revielen of the NRC Enforcement
and regulatory significance. The use of
I
<
pgY
graduated sanctions from Notices of
IV. Severity of Violations
Violation to orders further reflects the
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
varying seriousnme of noncompilances.
Severity Level V violations have been
Commission.
- The enforcement conference is an
eliminated.The examples at that level
le g
u
ACTION: Policy statement.
,$hr*a' cts jv
have been withdrawn from the
sut4 MARY:As a result of an assessment
making significant enforcement decisions.
supplements. Formal enforcement
Although these conferences take time and
actions will now only be taken for
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's effort for both the NRC and licensees, they
violations categorized at Severity Level
(NRC) enforcement program, the NRC
generally contribute to better decision.
I to IV to better focus the inspection and
has revised its General Statement of
making.
enforcement process on safety. To the
Policy and Procedure for Enforcement
- Enforcement actions deliver regulatory
extent that minor violations are
Actions (Enforcement Poll or Policy). messages properly focused on safety.These
described in an inspection re rt, they
m
e emphasise the need for licensees t
will be labeled as Non. Cited olations
By a separate action publi
today in
the Federal Register, the Commission is rj$ujegbe
asiNto initiat
(NCVs). When a licensee does not take
i
- '
the
removing the Enforcement Policy from
opportunities to identify and prevent
corrective action or repeatedly or
tne Code of Federal Regulations.
g {olations.
willfully commhs a minor violation
DATas:This action is effective on June
- The use of discretion and judgment
such that a formal response would be
30,1995, while comments are bein
throughout the deliberative process
needed, the violation should be
I
received. Submit comments on or fore recognizes that enforcement of NRC
categorized at least at a Severity Level
August 14.1995. Additionally, the
requirements d es n t tend itself to
gy,
Commission intends to provide an
- h*"I'*'"*""*'.
l
opportunity for public comments after
However, the Review Team found that
The NRC staff will be reviewing the
this revised Enforcement Policy has
the existing enforcement p ogram at
severity level examples in the
been in effect for about 18 months.
times provided mixed regu atory
supplements over the next 6 months.
t
ApoResses: Send written comments to:
messages to licensees, and room for
The purpose of this review is to ensure
The Secretary of the Commission. U.S.
im rovement existed in the
the examples are appropriately focused
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
En reement Policy. The review
on safety significance. including
Washington, DC 20555. ATTN:
s
sted tha th pmgram s focus
consideration of actual safety
consequence, potential safety
!
s
ca
o.
l
Docketing and Service Branch. Hand
consequence, and regulatory
i
deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville
- Emphasize the importance of identifying significance.
Pike. Rockville. Maryland, between 7:45 problems before events occur, and of taking
l
am and 4:15 pm. Federal workdays.
Prompt. comprehensive corrective action
V.Predecisional Enforcement
Copies of comments received may be
- N;P,r bloms areiden f
Conferences
examined at the NRC Public Document
multiple en$rceme,nt actions in a relatively
Enforcement conferences are being
Room. 2120 L Street NW (Lower
short Period and
renamed "predecisional enforcement
l
Level). Washington, DC.
- Focus on current performance of
conferences." These conferences should
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
licensees.
be held for the purpose of obtaining
James Lieberman. Director. Office of
in addition, the review team found
information to assist NRC in making
Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
that the process for assessing civil
enforcement decisions when the agency
Commission. Washington, DC 20555.
penalties could be simplified to improve reasonably expects that escalated
(301) 415-2741.
the predictability of decision-making
enforcement actions will result. They
SUPPLEMENTARY WHrORMATION: On May
and obtain better consistency between
should also normally be held if
13,1994, the NRC's Executive Director
regions.
uested by a licensee. In addition they
for Operations established a review
As a result of its review, the rev.iew
sh uld normally be held before issuing -
team to assess the NRC enforcement
team made several recommendations to an order or a civil nalty to an
l
program. In its report (NUREG-1525,i
revise the NRC Enforcement Policy to
unlicensed indivi
1.
" Assessment of the NRCEnforcement
produce an enforcement program with
'
Program." A ril 5,1995), the review
clearer
lato focus and more
g g,8g
f
team conclu ed that the existing NRC
redictab lity. e Commission is
Enfore
et
jt
ntinu t a Program
enforcement program, as implemented,
seuing this policy statsment after
is appropriately directed toward
considerin those recommendations and
n
8 8P ro mate 3y 25
t
supporting the age cy's overall safety
the bases r them in NUREG-1525.
8
g,
Pen pu
mission. This conc usion is reflected in
The more significant changes to the
bee at n nd
here alust on.
several aspects of the program:
En
ent Policy are
g
-
- The Policy recognians that violations
open conferences is not to maximize
have differing degrees of safety significance.
I. Introduction and Purpose
public attendance, but is rather for
This section has been modified to
determining whether providing the
i
indM#",$,",$iU' .,D*[co"vern'm"*en, em hasize that the purpose and
public with an opportunity to observe
,
!
Prinuns orace. wou siep ssor, washinston, oc
ob
ves of the enforcement program
the
latory process is compatible
l
20 eon-ents, copies er eies evenebne arem the
are focused on using enforcement
with e NRC's ability to exercise its
Nedonal Techakal laienmodne Service, sats Port
regulatory and safety responsibilities.
Rey.1 need.spriso eid.Virginie astet. A c%' actions:(1) As a deterrent to emphasize the
The provisions of the trial program have
!
n
'd'a**' $ I3,'* M*'d *.9, N suom.
Importance of compliance with
been incorporated into the Enforcement
NW. (Lower Levell, weakission. DC 208:s401.
requirements; and
Policy.
_ . , . . _ - .
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_
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.
34382
Federal Register./ Vol. 60, No.126 / Friday, Juna 30, 1995 / N:tices
VL Enforcement Actions
warrant a more financially meaningful
each of these decisional points may
penalty. A $500 civil penalty for a
have several associated considerations
Severity Level III violation (at 50% of
for any given case. However. the
This section was modified to clarify
the Severity Level I base amount) does
outcome of a caso, absent the exercise of
that the NRC may waive all or portions
not reflect the seriousness of this type
discretion, is limited to three results: no
of a licensee's written response to a
of violation for this category oflicensee. civil penalty, a base civil penalty, or a
Notice of Violation to the extent
It is noted'that with the revised
base civil penalty escalated by 100%
relevant information has already been
assessment approach, these licensees
D. Related Administmtive Actions
provided to the NRC in writing or
will not normally receive a civil penalty
The reference to related
documented in an NRC inspection
if prompt and comprehensive corrective
report and is on the applicable docket
action is taken for isolated non-willful
administrative mechanisms have been
in the NRC Public Document Room.
Severity Level UI violations.
replaced with related administrative
actions to clarify the documents as
B. Civil Penalty
2.CivilPenalty Assessment
actions.
1. Base Civil Penalty
This section has been renamed;to
VIL Exercise of Discretion
re
at ep
afQ,ssesstualy
The ability to exercise discretion is
Tables 1A and IB have been revised.
In Table IB the percentage for Severity
Pe
preserved with the revised poli
Level IV violations has been deleted
8e
e revised process is
Discretion is provided to deviatbrom
d
since such violations will not be subject
. Continue to emphasize compliance the normal approach to either increase
to civil penalties. If a violation that
in a manner that deters future
or decrease sanctions where necessary
would otherwise be categorized,ts a civil
at a
to ensure that the sanction reflects the
Severity LevelIV violation men
.. violations.
. Encotirage prompt identification
significance of the circumstances and
penalty because of its significance, the
and prompt, comprehensive correction
conveys the appropriate regulatory
violation would normally be categorized of violations and their root causes;
message. This section has been modiflad
at a Seventy LevelIII.
. Apply the recognition of good past
to provide examples where it is
Table t A has been simplified t .
performance to give credit to a licensee
appropriate to consider civil penalties
,
combine categones of licensees with the committing a non. willful SL III
or escalate civil penalties
same base penalty amounts. The base
violation who has had no previous
notwithstanding the normal assessment
penalty amounts have generally
significant violations during the past 2
process in Section VI of the
remained unchan d. The revised
Enforcement Policy. One significant
policy notes that t a base penalties may [onger)r 2 inspections (whichever is
example to note involves the loss of a
ears o
be adjusted on a case-by case basis to
. Place greater attention on situationa source. This example is bein8 added to
reflect the ability to pay and the gravity
of greater concem (i.e., where a licensee emphasize the importance of licensees
.
has had more than one significant
being aware of the location of their
of the violation.10 CFR Part 35
licensees (doctors, nuclear pharmacies.
v olation in a 2. year or two-inspection
sources and to recognize that there
and other medical related licensees) are period, where corrective action is less
should not be an economic advantage
j
combined into an overall medical
than prompt and comprehensive, or
for inappropriate disposal or transfer.
i
category, based on the similarity of
where egregious circumstances. such as As to mitigation of sanctions for
hazards. Because transportation
where it is clear that repetitiveness or
violations involving special
violations for all licensees are primarily willfulness, are involved);
circumstances, midgation can be
concemed with the potential for
. Streamline the NRC decisional
considered if the licenses has
personnel exposure to radiation, the
process in a manner that will preserve
demonstrated overall sustained
violations m this area will be treated the udgment and discretion, but will
performance which has been
same as those in the health physics area. provide a clear normative standard and
particularly good. The levels of approval
The $100,000 base civil penalty
produce reladvely predictable results
for exercising discretion are descnbed
tmount for safeguards violations, which for routine cases; and
in this section. Finally, Table 2,
applies to only two categories of
. Provide clear guidance on applying " Examples of Progressions of Escalated
licensees, fuel fabricators and
fewer adjustment factors in various
Enforcement Actions for Similar
independent fuel and monitored
types of cases,in order to increase
Violations in the Same Activity Area
retrievable storage installations, has
consistency and predictability.
Under the Same Licenst ," has been
been deleted. The penalty amount for
Once a violation has been categorized withdrawn from the Enforcement
safeguards should be the same as for
at a Severity LevelIII or above, the
Policy. The gddance in that table is not
other violations at these facilities. NRC
assessment process considers four basic needed because the policy is clear that
has not had significant safeguards
decisional points:
each caso should be judged on its own
violations at these facilides. If the
(1) Whether the licensee has had a
merits, especially those repetitive
penalty that would normally be assessed previous escalated enforcement action
violation cases to which the table
for operational violations is not
during the past 2 years or past 2
applied.
adequate to address the circumstances
inspections, whichever is longer;
VIII. Enforcement Actions Involving
of the violaiton, then discretion would
(2) Whether the licensee should be
Individuals
be used to determine the appropriate
given credit for actions related to
penalty amount.
identification:
The Enforcement Policy has been
The base civil penalty for "other"
(3) Whether the licensee's corrective
clarified to provide that some action is
materials licensees, currently set at
actions may reasonably be considered
normally to be taken against a licensee
$1000, has been increased to 35000. The prompt and comprehensive; and
for violadons caused by significant acts
primary concerns for these licensed
(4) Whether,in view of all the
of wrongdoing by its employees,
acuvities are individual radiation
circumstances, the case in question
contractors, or contractors employees.
exposure and loss of control of material warrants the exercise of discretion. As
The Policy has also been modified to
to the environment, both of which
described in the Enforcement Policy,
state that the nine factors in Secuon VIII
4
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Federal Register / Vol 60, No.126 / Friday, June 30. 1995 / Notices
34383
should be used to assist in the dacialan
3.Violatio a tav
4.Violaticer gOldDesignleeuw
of compliance which the NRC expects.8
on whether r.:.forcement action should
Due 2 Previous
Each enforcement action is depend ==t
be taken against an unlicensed
" " " ' ' " - ""*** ^Cil*a
on the circumstancas of the case and
individual as well as the lima === The
5.Molenos.sInmlving macrtminauon
i
Policy currently uses these factors to
6.Moleuoas mmiving Special
requires the exercise of discretion after
consideration of these policies and
0,e,,
..
determine whether to take enforcement
c Exercies of Discrmion for an Operating
[rocedures, in no case, however, will
action 3 gainst an unlicensed person
Faculty
an- who cannot achieve and
rather than the licensee. These changes
VUL Enfarramane Actions involving
maintain adequate levels of protection
are consistent with the intent of the
Individuals
be permitted to conduct lir=aamd
'j
Commission in promulgating the rule on IL Inamurete and Incomplete information
activities.
deliberate misconduct (se FR 40664,
L
Action Against Nm.
IL Statutory Authority and Procedural
i
t
a
tres d as an
XI.Refumle de Department oOusuce
Fh
XIL
maclosure of Enfor=nant
NCV under Section VILB.1. A Letter of
A. Statutory Authority
Reprimand is not a sanction and is now X10. Reopening Cosed Enforcement Acdons
The NRC's enforcement jurisdiction is
referred to as an administrative action
Supplements
drawn from the AtomicEnergy Act of
consistent with Section VLD of the
1954, as amended, and the Energy
,
'
Policy.
Reorganization Act (ERA) of1974, as
The Commission expects that the
The following statement of general
= nandad.
changes to the Enforcement Policy'
policy and procedure explains the
Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act
should result in an increase in the
enforcement policy and procedures of
authorizes the NRC to conduct
'
protection of the public health and
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
inspections and investigations and to
safety by better emphasizing the
Commission (NRC or Commission) and
lasue orders as may be narmanary or
prevention detection, and correction of the NRC staff (staff)in initiating
desirable to promote the ca==aa
violations before events occur with
enforcement actions, and of the
defense and security or to protect health
impact on the public. In about 2 years
presiding officers and the thi-ion
orto minimize danger to life or
the Commlulon intends to review the
in reviewing these actions.This
Property. Section 186 authorizes the
Enforcement Policy. In that regard, it is
statement is applicable to enforcement
NRC to revoks licenses under certain
expected that in about 18 months an
in matters involving ths radiological
circumstances (e.g., for material falso
opportunity will be provided to receive health and safety or the public,
statements, in response to conditions
public comments on the
including employees' health and safety, that would have warranted refusal of a
implementation of this Policy.
the common defense and security,and
license on an original a.pplicatian, for a
I
General Statement of Policy and
the envimnment.8 This statement of
licensee's failure to butid or operste a
Procedure for NRC Enforcement
general policy and procedure will be
facility in accordance with the terms of
Act o"'
published as NUREG-1600 to provide
the permit or license, and for violation
widespread diamamination of the
of an NRC regulation). Mar *iaa 234
Table of centenes
Commission's Enforcement Policy.
authorizes the NRC toimpose civil
Preface
However, this is a policy statement and Penalties not to exceed $100,000 per
1. Introduction and Purpose
not a Tegulation.Tne Commission may
violation per day for the violation of
II. Statutory Authority
deviate frorn this statement of policy
certain speciAed licensing provisions of
4i
A. Statutory Authtarity
and procedure as appropriate under the the Act. rules, orders, and license terms
B. Procedural Fromework
circumstances of a particular case.
Implementing these provisions, and for
III. Responsibtiltles
violations for which licanema can be
IV. Severity of Violations
L Introduction and Purpose
revoked. In addition to the enumerated
,
'
U
B.i
'
tola
The purpose of the NRC enforcement Provisions in section 234, sections 84
c. Wi$ful violations
Prograrn is to support the NRC's overall and 147 authorize theimposition of
D. Violations of Reporting Requirements
safety mission in prot
the public
civil penahles for violations of
V. Predecisional Enforcement Conferenca
and the environment.C
tent with
regulations implementing those
VI. Enforcement Actions
that purpose, enforcement action should Provisions. Section 232 authorizes the
be used.
NRC to seekinjunctive or other
B. Qvu Penalty
e As a deterrent to emphasise the
aluitable relief for violation of
iQN1.N "Abment
18tPortance of compliance with
%toggents.
a.InitialEscal ted Action
requirements, and
b. Credit for Actions Related to
e To encourage prompt identification Reorganization Act a
the NRC
Identification
and prompt, comprehensive correction
toimPo88 civilgnalties for knowing
eA$o
'
certa
informati
NRC.
stent with the[urpose of this
Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act
d. Exacts of Discretion
and
[,*g,,c$
on will(t$en when
Provides for varying levels of criminal
C. orders
D.Related Administrative Actions
VII. Exercise of Discretion
dealing withliran
, vendors,2
A. Escalation of Enforcement Sanctions
contractors, and their employees, who
NRC H=psey primnih addresem se acewine of
%
=== and Hcame for PSC Hceans.
,
1.Ovtl Penaltta
do not achieve the necessary meticulous hesedne, the term =71 camese* le used thmushout
'
2. Orders
attention to detail and the high standard ** pecy. Howeser. la thee amm whee to NeC
]
3. Delly Ovil Penalties
d",",",d"" M * g M
,
,
,,
B. Mitigetton of Enforument Sanctions
- Aedtrust enforcernest matters will be dealt
Individual, the soldenes la this peHey will be used.
1.1.lconsee.identifled Severity LevelIV
with on a caedy. case beene.
m opphable, spectac ademen neerdias
Violations
one term" vender"as need in this
mesas seinemment action
ladividuale and men.
2. Violations identifled During Extended
a supplier of
acte er savises to be
la en
licensene le
in sectione vm and X.
Shutdowns of Work Stoppages
Nac.1
facility or acurity.
respeatve y.
s
<
5
.
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.
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-
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34384
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.126 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
nalties (i.e., monetary fines and
provide hearing rights, as only
including the decision to issue a Notice
Fmprisonment) for willful violations of Information is being sought. A licensee
of Violation, or to propose or impose a
the Act and regulations or orders issued must answer a Demand. An unlicensed
civil penalty and the amount of this
under sections 65,161(b),161(1), or
person may answer a Demand by either penalty, after considering the general
161(o) of the Act.Section 223 provides
providing the requested information or
principles of this statement of policy
that criminal penalties may be imposed explaining why the Demand should not and the technical significance of the
en certain individuals employed by
have been issued.
violations and the surrounding
firms constructing or supplying basic
III. Responsibilities
.
circumstances.
components of any utilization facility if
Unless Commission consultation or
the individual knowingly and willfully
The Executive Director for Operations notification is required by this policy.
vblates NRC requirements such that a
(EDO) and the principal enforcement
the staff may depart, where warranted in
i
basic component could be significantly
officers of the NRC,the Deputy
the public's interest, from this policy as
!
impaired. Section 235 provides that
Executive Director for Nuclear Material
provided in Section VII," Exercise of
criminal penalties may be imposed on
Safety, Safeguards and Operations
Enforcement Discretion." The
persons who interfere with inspectors.
Support (DEDS) and the Deputy
Commission will be provided written
Section 238 provides that criminal
Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor
notification of al! enforcement actions
penalties may be imposed on persons
Regulation. Regional Operations. and
involving civil penalties or orders. The
who attempt to or cause sabotage at a
Research (DEDR), have been delegated
Commission will also be provided
nuclear facility or to nuclear fuel.
the authority to approve or issue all
notice in those cases where discretion is
Alleged or suspected criminal violations escalated enforcement actions.' The
exercised as discussed in Section
of the Atomic Energy Act are referred to DEDS is responsible to the EDO for the
VII.B.6. In addition, the Commission
the Department of Justice for
NRC enforcement programs. The Office
will be consulted prior to taking action
appropriate action.
of Enforcement (OE) exercises oversight in the following situations (unless the
of and implements the NRC
urgency of the situation dictates
B. Procedural Fromework
enforcement programs. The Director,
immediate action):
Subpart B of to CFR part 2 of NRC's
OE, acts for the Deputy Executive
(1) An action affecting a licensee's
regulations sets forth the procedures the Directors in enforcement matters in
operation that requires balancing the
NRC uses in exercising its enforcement
their absence or as delegated.
public health and safety or common
authority.10 CFR 2.201 sets forth the
Subject to the oversight and direction defense and security implications of not
procedures for issuing notices of
of OE. and with the approval of the
operating with the potential radiological
violation.
appropriate Deputy Executive Director,
or other hazards associated with
The procedure to be used in assessing where necessary, the regional offices
continued operation:
civil penalties is set forth in 10 CFR
normally issue Notices of Violation and
(2) Proposals to impose civil penalties
2.205. This regulation provides that the
proposed civil penalties. However,
in amounts greater than 3 times the
civil penalty process is initiated by
subject to the same oversight as the
Severity Level I values shown in Table
issuing a Notice of Violation and
regional offices, the Offico of Nuclear
1A:
Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty.
Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office
(3) Any proposed enforcement action
The licensee or other person is provided of Nuclear Material Safety and
that involves a Severity Level I
an opportunity to contest in writing the Safeguards (NMSS) may also issue
violation:
,
proposed imposition of a civil penalty.
Notices of Violatica and proposed civil
(4) Any enforcement action that
After evaluation of the response, the
penalties for certain activities.
involves a finding of p material false
civil penalty may be mitigated, remitted, Enforcement orders are normally issued statement:
or imposed. An opportunity is provided by a Deputy Executive Director or the
(5) Exercising discretion for matters
for a hearing if a civil penalty is
Director. OE. However, orders may also meeting the criteria of Section VII.A.1
imposed. If a civil penalty.is not paid
be issued by the EDO, especially those
for Commission consultation:
following a hearing or if a hearing is not involving the more significant matters.
(6) Refraining from taking
requested, the matter may be referred to The Directors of NRR and NMSS have
enforcement action for matters meeting
the U.S. Department of Justice to
also been delegated authority to issue
the criteria of Section VII.B.2:
institute a civil action in District Court.
orders, but it is expected that normal
(7) Any proposed enforcement action
The procedure for issuing an order to
use of this authority by NRR and NMSS that involves the issuance oh civil
institute a proceeding to modify.
will be confined Ao actions not
Penalty or order to an unlicensed
suspend, or revoke a license or to take
associated with compliance issues. The
individual or a civil penalty to a
other action against a licensee or other
Director. Office of the Controller, has
licensed reactor operator.
person subject to the jurisdiction of the
been delegated the authority to issue
(8) Any action the EDO believes
we
s
m1ss
Commission is set forth in 10 CFR
orders ,where licensees violate
9,,
nio men c se
2.202. The licensee or any other person
Commission regulations by nonpayment
adversely affected by the order may
of license and inspection fees.
involvin8 an Office of Investi ation (O!)
request a hearing. The NRC !s
In recognition that the regulation of
report where the staff (other
the O!
staff) does not arrive at the same
authorized to make orders immediatel
nuclear activities in many cases does
effective if required to protect the pubbc not lend itself to a mechanistic
c nelusions as those in the 01 report
issues ofintent if the
health, safety, or interest, or if the
treatment, judgment and discretion
c ncerninfO! concludes that
Duector o
violation is willful. Section 2.204 sets
must be exercised in determining the
Co
issi n nsultation is warranted;
out the procedures for issuing a Demand severity levels of the violations and the
and
for Information (Demand) to a license,
appropriate enforcement sanctions,
(10) An proposed enforcement action
or other person sub}ect to the
on which the Commission asks to be
Commission's jurisdiction for the
me inm escalated enforcement action" as
used in this policy means a Nouco of Violanon or
consuhed.
purpose of determining whether an
civo p.naity sor ny s.veruy L.v.i t u. or m
Crder or other enforcement action
,iot.no, go, prow.m) e any ord.r based upon a
should be issued. The Demand does not
vioteuen.
j
6
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-.
. .
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Federal Register / Vol. 60. No.126 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
34385
IV. Severity of Violations
SupplememsIthrough VH1 provide
a repetitive violation will depend on the
Regulatory requirements 8 have
mmples and serve as guidance in
circumstaarna, such as, but not limited
varying degrees of safety, safeguards, or determining the appropriate sonrity
to the number of times the violation has
environmental signiBcance. Therefore,
level for violations in each of the eight
occurred,the similarity of the violations
the relative importance of each
activity areas. However, the examples
and their root causes, the adequacy of
violation, including both the technical
are neither exhaustive nor controlling,
previous corrective actions, the period
significance and the regulatory
in addition.these examples do not
of time between the violadons. and the
significance is evaluated as the Arst step create new requirements. Each is
significance of the violations.
In the enforcement process.
designed to illustrate the significance
C. Willful Violations
Consequently, for purposes of formal
that the NRC places on a particular type
enforcement action, violations are
of violation of NRC requirements. Ea'ch
Willful violations are by definition of
articular concern to the twaaton
normally categorized in terms of four
of the examples in the supplements is
levels of severity to show their relative
predicated on a violation of a regulatory
use its regulatory program is based
on licensees and their contractors,
im rtance within each of the following requirement.
eig activity areas:
The NRC reviews each case being
employees, and agents acting with
considered for enforcement action on its integrity and connaunicating with
own merits to ensure that the severity of candor. Willful violations cannot be
h,".yNg'yD[,*[on.
a violation is characterized at the level
tolerated by either the Commission or a
'
lu saferuards:
IV. Health Physics:
best suited to the significance of the
licensee.1.icensees are expected to take
V. Transportation:
particular violation. In soce cases,
significant remedial actionin
VI. Fuel Cycle and Materials Operations:
special circumstances may warrant an
moponding to willful violations
Vll. Miscellaneous Matters; and
adjustment to the severity level
commensurate with the circumstances
>
such that it demonstrates the
VIH. Emergency Preparodoen.
categorization.
Licensed activities will be placed in
,
seriousness of the violation thereby
the activity area most suitable in light of
A. Aggregation of violot2ons
creating a deterrent effect within the
the particular violation involved
A group of Severity LevelIV
licensee's organization. Although
including activities not directly covered violations may be evaluated in the
removal of the person is not necessarily
by one of the above listed areas.e.g.,
aggregate and assigned a single.
required. substantial disciplinary action
export license activities. Within each
increased severity level,thereby
is expected,
activity area. Smrity Level I has been
ruulting in a Severity Level III problem.
Therefore, the severity level of a
assigned to violations that are the most
if the violations have the same
violation may be increased if the
significant and Severity LewiIV
underlying cause or programmatic
circumstances surrounding the matter
violations are the least significant.
deficiencies, or the violations
involve careless disregard of
I
Severity Level I and 11 violations are of
contributed to or were unavoidable
uirements, deception,or other
I
very significant regulatory concern. In
consequences of the underlying
in cations of willfulness.The term
l
general, violations that are included in
problem. Normally, Severity Level 11
" willfulness" as used in this policy
these severity categories involve actual
and III violations are not aggregated into embraces a spectrum of violations
I
l
or high potential impact on the public.
a higher senrity level
ranging from deliberste intent to violate
Severity Level Ill violations are cause
The purpose of aggregating violations or falsify to and including careless
'
for significant regulatory concern.
is to focus the licensee's attention on the disregard for requirements. Willfulness
Severity Level IV violations are less
fundamental underlying causes for
does not include acts which do not rise
serious but are of more than minbr
which enforcement action appears
to the level of careless disregard, e.g.,
concern;i.e. ifleft uncorrected,they
warranted and to reflect the fact that
inadvertent clerical errors in a
could lead to a more serious concern.
several violations with a common cause document submitted to the NRC. In
i
l
The Commission recogninos that there may be more significant collectively
determining the specific severity level
are other violations of minor safety or
than individually and may therefore,
of a violation involving willfulness,
environmental concern which are below warrant a more substantial enforcement consideration willbe given to such
the level of significece of Sewrity
action.
factors as the position and
LevelIV violations.These minor
responsibilities of the person invoind
violations are not the subled of formal
B. Repetitive Violations
in the violation (e.g., licensee officiala
enforcement action and are not usually
The severity level of a Sewrity Level
or non-supervisory employee),the
described in inspection reports. To the
IV violation may be increased to
significance of any underlying violation,
!
!
extent such violations are described.
Severity levelIII,if the violation can be the intent of the violator (i.e., careless
they are noted as Non Cited Violations.' considered a repetitive violation? The
disregard or deliberateness), and the
comparisons of signiScance betwo
purpose of escalating the severity lowl
economic or other advantage,if any,
activity arean are inappropriate. For
of a repetitin violation is to
gained as a result of the violation. The
example, the immediacy of any hazard
acknowledge the added significance of
relative weight given to each of these
to the public namar iatari with Severity
the situation based on the licensee's
Imvel I violations in Reactor Operations failure to implement efisctive corrective
am tenn licemen official" as need la thle
a
is not directly comparable to that
action for the previous violation. The
Policy stemswat swane a Ard line empavisor or
at with
ri La"
decision to escalate the severity level of $,*),%,8"d' %,*,[O"di
p
I
whether or not listed on a license. Notwithstanding
ine terra " repetitive violetion* or "shaller
en ladividual's hb utte, severtty level
s & term "requisweent" as need la this policy
violation" as used la thle pol
asa-'sneens
categorisation for willful acts lavolvt ladividuale
rasene a legally bindlas sequisement euch as a
a violation that reasonably
have been
who can be Wlicenses
will
statute, resulation. llcense osaditloa. technical
pee,ented by a licaness's corrective action for a
consider several factors includnas the position of
ag=r8Aa'los. or order.
previous violation nonnally occurring (1) within
the individual relative to the liceasse's
- A Non{ited Violetten (NCV)le a violation that
the past 3 years of the laspectica at lease, or (2) the organisational structere end the ladividual's
has not base lenmalised lato a 10 CPR 3.2et Notice pested within the last two '_q
-. whichever
r=araaaMilties relative to the oveseight of thand
orvs issi.e.
le longer.
ecovities and to the use et licensed menertaL
7
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.
-
-
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.; .
.
-
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34386
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.126 / hiday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
factors in arriving at the apbat on theis not held, b licensee will normally
priate
is a matter of ublic record, such as an
severity level will be depo
be requested to provide a written
adjudicatory kocision by b
l
circumstances of the violation.
response to an inspection report,if
Department of Labor. In addition, with
!
However. If a licensee refuses to correct issued, as to the licensee's views on the the approval of the Executin Director
j
a minor violation within a reasonable
apparent violations and their root
for Operations, conferences will not be
time such that it willfully continues, the causes and a description of planned or
open to the public where good cause has
<
!
violation should be categorized at least
implemented correctin action,
been shown after balancing the beneGt
j
at a Severity LevelIV.
During the predecisional enforcement of the public observation against the
conference, the licensee, vendor, or
potentlalimpact on the agency's
D. Violations of Reporting Requirements
'
other persons will be given an
enforcement action in a particular case.
The NRC expects licensees to provide opportunity to provide information
As soon as it is determined that a
,
complete, accurate,and timely
consistent with the purpose of the
conference will be open-to public
information and reports. Accordingly.
conference, including an explanation to observation, the NRC will notify the
unless otherwise categorized in the
the NRC of the immediate cornctive
licensee that the conference will be
Supplements the senrity level of a
actions (if any) that were taken
open to public observation as part of the
violation involving the failure to make
following identification of the potential agency's trial program. Consistent with
!
a required report to the NRC will be
violation or nonconformance and the
the agency's policy on open meetings,
!
based upon the significance of and the
long-term comprehensive actions that
" Staff Meetings Open to Public."
circumstances surrounding the matter
were taken or willbe taken to prevent
Published September 20.1994 (59 FR
d
j
that should han been reported.
recurrence. Licensees, vendors, or other 48340), the NRC intends to announce
However, the severity level of an
persons will be told when a meeting is
OPen confounces normally at least to
untimely report. in contrast to no report. a redecisionalenforcement conference. working days in advance of conferences
may be reduced depending on the
redecisional enforcement
through (1) notices posted in the Public
circumstances surrounding the matter.
un rence is a meeting between the
Document Room.(2) a toll free
i
A licensee will not normaLy be cited for NRC and the licensee. Conferences are
telephone recording at 800-952-0674,
a failure to report a condition or event
normally held in the regional offices
and (3) a toll-free electronic bulletin
-
unless the licensee was at.tually aware
and are not normally open to public
board at 800-052-9676. In addition, the
of the condition or event that it failed
observation. However, a trial program is NRC will also issue a press release and
to report. A licensee will. on the other
being condec*ed to open approximately notify appropriate State lialaan officers
j
hand, normally be cited for a failure to
25 percent all eligible conferences for that a predecisional enforcement
report a condition or event if the
public observation, i.e., every fourth
conference has been scheduled and that
licensee knew of the information to be
eligible conference involving one of
it is open to public observation.
reported, but did not recognize that it
three categories of licensees (reactor,
The public attending open
was required to make a report.
hospital and other materials licensees)
conferences under the trial program may
V.Predecisional Enforcement
will be open to the public. Conferences
observe but not participate in the
Conferences
will not nor, sally be open to the public
conference. It is noted that the purpose
Whenever the NRC has loamed of the if the enforcement action being
of conducting open conferences under
existence of a potential violation for
contemP ated.
the trial program is not to maximise
l
gg) would b's taken against an
Public attendance, but retlwr to
which escalated enforcement action
appears to be warranted, or recurring
individual, or if the action, though not
determine whether providing the public
nonconformance on the part of a
taken against an individual, turns on
with opportunities to be informed of
whether an individual has committed
NRC activities is compatible with the
vendor, the NRC may provide an
doing.
NRC's ability to exercise its regulatory
opportunity for a predecisional
wQvolves significant personnel
and safety responsibilities.Therefore,
enfoteement conference with the
failures where the NRC has requested
mornbers of the public will be allowed
licensee, vendor, or other person before that the individual (s) involved be
access to the NRC regional offices to
taking enforcement action. The purpose present at the conference:
attend open enforcement conferences in
of the conference is to obtain
(3)is based on the findings of an NRC accordance with the " Standard
information that will assist the NRC in
j
Office ofInvestigations report: or
Operating Procedures For Providing
determining the appropriate
(4) Involves safeguards information.
Security Support For NRC Hearings And
'
er.forcement action. such as:(1) A
Privacy Act information, or information Meetings," published November 1.1991
common understanding of facts, root
which could be considered proprietary; (56 FR 56251).These procedures
causes and missed opportunities
in addition. conferences will not
provide that visitors may be subject to
'
associated with the apparent violations, normally be open to the public if:
personnel screening, that signs banners,
(2) a common understanding of
(5) The conwrence involves medical
posters, etc., not larger than 18" be
j
corrective action taken or planned, and
misadatinistrations or overexposures
permitted, and that disruptive persons
(3) a common understanding of the
and the conference cannot be conducted may be removed.
significance of issues and the need for
without disclosing the exposed
Members of the public attending open
i
lasting comprehensive corrective action. Individual's name: or
conferences will be reminded that (1)
If the NRC concludes that it has
(6) The conference will be conducted the apparent violations discussed at
sufficient information to make en
by telephone or the conference will be
predecisional enforcement conferences
informed enforcement decision, a
conducted at a relatively small
are subject to further review and may be
<
conference will not normally be held
licacee's facility.
subject to change prior to any resulting
unless the licensee requests it. However,
Notwithstanding meeting any of these enforcement action and (2) the
an opportunity for a conference will
criteria, a conference may still be open
statements of views or expressions of
normally be provided before issuing an
if the conference involves issues related opinion made by NRC employees at
order based on a violation of the rule on to an ongoing adjudicatory preceeding
predecisional enforcement conferences.
Deliberate Misconduct or a civil penalty with one or more intervonors or where
or the lack thereof, are not intended to
to an unlicensed person. lf a conference the evidentiary basis for the confecence
represent final determinations or beliefs.
i
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Federal Repleter / Vol. 60. No.126 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
34387
+
' Persons attending open conferences will to be under oath. Normally, responses
management involvement in licanand
be provided an opportunity to submit
under oath will be required only in
activities and a decrease in protection of
written comments concerning the trial
connection with Severity LevelI.11. or
the public health and safety.
program anonymously to the regional
HIviolations or orders.
office.These comments will be
The NRC uses the Notice of Violation
1* Base CivilPenal4
subsequently forwarded to the Director
as the usual method for formalising the
TheNRCimposes diffent levels of
of the OfAce of Enforcement for review
existence of a violation. Issuance of a
penalties for different severity level
and consideration.
Notice of Violation is normally the only violations and different classes of
When needed to protect the public
enforcement action taken, except in
licensees vendors, and other persons.
health and safety or common defense
cases where the criteria for issuance of
Tables 1A and 1B show the base civil
and security, escalated enforcement
civil penalties and orders, as set forth in penalties for various reactor. fuel cycle.
action, such as the issuance of an
Sections VI.B and VI.C, respectively, are matenals, and vendor
(Civil
immediately effective order, will be
met. However, special circumstances
penalties issued to ind v
are
~
taken before the conference. In these
regarding the violation findings may
determined on a case-by. case basis.) The
cases, a conference may be held after the warrant discretion being exercised such structure of these tables generally takes
escalated enforcement action is taken.
that the NRC refrains from issuing a
into account the gravity of the violation
- U,*
i
- '
VI. Enforcement Actions
rimary consideration and the
') hs[I
g do
fo
In adfition. licensees are not ordinarily
Payas a monary
This section describes the
enforcement sanctions available to the
cited for violations resulting from
c naidwouonienemuy,operadons
f"""" "8 8*'
NRC and specifies the conditions under matters not within their control, such as
"'
'*'
" *"d
'"
which each may be used.The buic
8
equi ment failures that were not
avoikable by reasonable licensee quality casequences 19 the public and lic
enforcement sanctions are Notices of
l
receive higher civil
Violation, civil penalties, and orders of assurance measures or management
emP og. Regarding the secondary
various types. As discussed further in
controls. Generally, however, licensees [w
a y of varius classes of
Section VI.D. related administrative
are held responsible for the acts of their
l
actions such as Notices of
empi
. Accordingly this policy
Ucensem to pay the civH penalum,it is
I
I
Y be so
Coni r at
Actio
te o
n
erro .
,
g
!
ormation are used to supplement the
B. CivilPenolty
business (orders, rather than civil
l.
enforcement program. In salecting the
A civil penalty is a monetary penalty
Penalties, are used when the intent is to
'
!
enforcement sanctions or administrative that may be imposed for violation of (1) suspend or terminate licensed activities)
'
actions the NRC will consider
certain specified licensing provisions of or adversely affects a lir====a's ability
'
.
enforcement actions taken by other
the Atomic Energy Act or
to safely conduct licensed activities.
l
Federal or State regulatory bodies
supplementary NRC rules or orders: (2)
The deterrent effect of civil penaltim is
'
having concurrent jurisdiction, such as
any requirement for which a license
best served when the amounts of the
i!
In transportation matters. Usually,
may be revoked: or (3) reporting
Penalties take into account a licensee's
'
whenever a violation of NRC
requirements under section 206 of the
ability to pay. In determining the
'
requirements of more than a minor
Energy Reorganization Act. Civil
amount of civil penalties for licensom
l
concem is identified, enforcement
penalties are designed to deter future
for whom the tables do not reflect the
action is taken. The nature and extent of violations both by the involved licensee ability to pay or the gravity of the
'
the enforcement action is intended to
as well as by other licensees conducting violation, the NRC will consider as
reflect the seriousness of the violation
similar activities and to emphasize the
necessary an increase or decrease on a
involved. For the vast majority of
need for licensees to identify violations case-by-case basis. Normally,if a
violations, a Notice of Violation or a
and take prompt comprehensive
licensee can demonstrate Anancial
Notice of Nonconformance is the normal corrective action.
hardship, the NRC will consider
action.
Civil penalties are considered for
Payments over time, including interat.
Severity level III violations. In addition, rather than reducing the amount of b
civil enalty. However, where a licensee
dvil penalties will normally be assessed
P
A Notice of Violation is a written
for Severity 14 vel I and 11 violations and claims financial hardship, the licensee
notice setting forth one or more
knowing and conscious violations of the will normally be required to address
violations of a legally binding
reporting requirements of section 206 of why it has sufficient resources to safely
requirement.The Notice of Violation
the Energy Reorganization Act.
conduct licensed activities and pay
,
normally requires the recipient to
Civil penalties are used to encourage
license and inspection fees.
provide a written statement describing
prompt identification and prompt and
2. Civil Penalty Assessment
(1) the reasons for the violation or, if
comprehensive correction of violations,
contested, the basis for disputing the
to emphasise compliance in a manner
In an effort to (1) emphasise the
l
violation: (2) corrective steps that have
that deters future violations, and to
importana of adherence to
been taken and the results achieved: (3) serve to focus licensees * attention on
requirements and (2) reinforce prompt
corrective steps that will be taken to
violations of significant regulatory
self-identification of problems and root
prevent recurrence: and (4) the date
concern.
causes and prompt and compshensive
when full compliance will be achieved.
Although management involvement,
correction of violations, the NRC
The NRC may waive all or portions of
direct or indirect. In a violation may
reviews each proposed civil penalty on
.
j
a written recponse to the extent relevant lead to an increase in the civil penalty,
its own merits and, after considering all
i
information has already been provided
the lack of management involvement
relevant circumstanas, may adjust the
l
to the NRC in writing or documented in may not be used to mitigate a civil
base civil penalties shown in Table 1A
an NRC inspection report.The NRC may
Ity. Allowing mitigation in the
and 1B for Severity level I. II. and III
require responses to Notices of Violation
tier case could encourage the lack of
violations as described below.
'
9
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-
-.
- - .
- - -
.
-
. . .
- - - - - .
-
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.-.
-.
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- - . _
c.
_
-..
34388
Federal Register / Vol 60 No.126 / Friday, June 30. 1995 / Notices
The civil penalty a==amamant process
whether the licensee's correctin actions uch violation or pmblem, absent the
considers four decisional points: (a)
are prompt and comprehensin:and(d) exercise of discretion,is limited to one
Whether thelicenses has had any
whether,inview of all the
of the following three results:no dril
previous ==calated enforament action
circumstaneaa. the matter in question
Penalty, a bene civil penalty, or a base
(regardless of the activity area) during
r, quires the exordes of discretion.
dril penalty eeceleted by 200%.The
the past 2 yeare or past 2 inspectfons.
Although each of theco decisional
flow chart presented below is a graphic
whicheveris longer:(b)whether the
points may have several naaaciated
f* Presentation of the civil penalty
licensee should be given credit for
considerations for any given case. the
asessement process.
actions related to identification:(c)
outcome of the assessment prormes for
muses ames rose.ew
l
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10
1
- - . -
. . . . .
. .
. . . .
.
.
_ , _ _ _ _ ,
. . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _
-
-_ . _
._
. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .
. . . ._
___.
_ _ . . _ - . . -
l
-
~ .-
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.126 / Friday, Juno 30. 1995 / Notices
34389
.
l
1
YES
l
9
,
YES
CA
l
CREDIT
?
tot
NON.
WILLFUL
!
SL lil
NO
!
IN
YES
Yiti
BASE
so
.
REDIT *
NO
7
YES
l
l
NO
CA
CREDIT
7
BASE
NO
+100%
- anound me wese ne geven areen he memons
teleted to klenOfteettont
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s&MNO CODE F596 41-#
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34390
Federal Register / Vol. 60. No.126 / Friday Juns 30, 1995 / Notices
a. Iniflol escolored action. When the
(1) Whether the problem requiring
licensee credit for actions related to
NRC determines that a non-willful
corrective action was NRC identified,
identification nonnally should consider -
Sev:rity Level 111 violation or problem
licensee-identified, or revealed through the ease of discovery, whether the event
has occurred, and the licensee has not
an event:'
occurred as the result of a licensee self-
had any previous escalated actions
(ii) Whether prior opportunities
monitoring effort (i.e.. whether the
(regardless of the activity area) during
existed to identify the problem requiring licensee was "looking for the problem"),
th> past 2 years or 2 inspections.
corrective action, and if so, the age and
the d
oflicensee initiative in
whichever is longer, the NRC will
number of those opportunities:
identi ng the problem or problems
consider whether the licensee's
(iii) Whether the problem was
requiring corrective action, and whether
corrective action for the present
revealed as the result of a licensee self-
prior opportunities existed to identify
vi:lation or problem is reasonably
monitoring effort, such as conducting an the problem
prompt and comprehensive (see the
audit, a test, a surveillance, a design
Any of these considerations may be
overridin if particularly noteworthy or
'k
discussion under Section VI.B.2.c.
review, or troubleshootin f:ed throughparticula y egregious.For example,if
(iv) For a problem reven
below). Using 2 years as the basis for
an event. the ease of discovery, and the
the event occurred as the resuk of
-
a' eessment is expected to cover most
s
situations, but considering a slightly
degree of licensee initiative in
conducting a surveillance or similar
'
,
longer or shorter period might be
identifying the root cause of the
self-monitoring effort (i.e. the licensee
wttrented based on the circumstances
Problem and any associated violadons:
was looking for the problem), the
(v) For NRC-identified issues, whether licensee should normally be given credit
cf a particular case. The starting point
the licensee would likely have
for identification. As a second instana,
of this period should be considered the
identified the issue in the same time-
even if the p(e.g.,lem was easilyrevealed by a large sp
rob
dati when the licensee was put on
notice of the need to take corrective
Period if the NRC had not been
discovered
involved:
ofliquid), the NRC may choose to give
acticn. For a licensee-identified
(vi) For NRC identified issues,
credit because noteworthy licensee
vloiation or an event, this would be
whether the licensee should have
effort was exerted in ferreting out the
wh n the licensee is aware that a
identified the issue (and taken action)
root cause and associated violatforts or
problem or violation exists requiring
earlier, and
simply because no prior opportunities
corrective action. For an NRC identified
(vil) For cases m,which the NRC
(e.g., procedural caudons. post-
viriation, the startin point would be
identifies the overall problem requiring maintenance testings quality control
whsn the NRC puts t e licensee on
corrective action (e.g., a programmatic
failures, readily observable parameter
notice, which could be during the
issue), the degree of licensee initiative
trends, or repeated or locked in
inspection, at the inspection exit
or lack of initiative in identifying the
annunciator warnings) existed to
meeting, or as part of post. inspection
problera or problems requiring
the problem.
identify RC Identified. When a problem
l
,
ccmmunication.
corrective action.
(iii) N
if the corrective action is judged to be
(2) Although some cases may consider requiring corrective action is NRC-
I
prompt and comprehensive, a Notice of all of the above factors, the importance
identified the decision on whether to
Viriation normally should be issued
of each factor will vary based on the
give the licensee credit for actions
with no associated civil penalty. If the
corrective action is judged to be less
type of case as discussed in the
related to Identification should
than prompt and comprehensive, the
following general guidance:
normally be based on an additional
(i) Licensee-Identified. When a
question: should the licenses have
Notice of Violation normally should be
Problem requiring corrective action is
reasonably identified the problem (and
issued with a base civil penalty.
licensee-identified (i.e., identifica
taken action) earlier?
b. Credit for octions related to
Id4ntification. (1) If a Severity 1.evel I or before the problem has resulted in an
In most cases, this reasoning may be
!! violation or a willful Severity Leveilli event).the NRC should normally give
based simply on the ease of the NRC
the licensee credit for actions related to
inspector's discovery (e.g., conducting a
violation has occurred-or if, during the
past 2 years or 2 inspections, whichever identification, regardless of whether walkdown, observing in the control
Is longer, the licensee has been issued
prior opportunities existed to identify
room, performing a confirmatory NRC
at 1:sst one other escalated action--the
the problem.
radiation survey, hearing a cavitating
(11) Identified Through an Event.
pump, or finding a velve obviously out
civil penalty assessment should
When a problem requiring corrective
of position). In some cases, the
normally consider the factor of
action is identified through an event,
licensee's missed opportunities to
identification in addition to corrective
the decision on whether to give the
identify the problem might include a
action (see the discussion under Section
VI.B.2.c. below). As to identification,
similar previous violation.NRC or
'^^~""t. as und hws mens W an n nt
industry notices, intomal audits, or
f'
the NRC should consider whether the
w dgraimgo"g
. readily observable trends.
7,rn,"'"d b
licensee should be given credit for
t,
.b,
y
ob
tion or instrumenianoa. or m a r.diolostcal
If the NRC identifies the violation but
) l
,p
tctions related to identification.
In each case, the decision should be
imp ci on pw.onn.1 or ih. .nvironmenon ucas
concludes that, under the
j
focused on identification of the problem of resulatory limits. such a en ov==Posure, a
Circumstances, the licensee's actions
f'
requiring corrective action. In other
3,","g,"dwec ,'.""M' d into sh a spill ofh
related to Identification were not
3
d "*'
unreasonable, the matter would be
words. although giving credit for
sq ipm
reti.,. discover
treated as licensee identified for
Id:ntification and Cornetive Action
liquid. a loud not . the fallure io be,. e system
r pond rop riy or en annunciator alarm would
purposes of assessing the civil penalty.
shauki be separate decisions, the
P
concept ofIdentification presumes that
gj',*,d *",{" $'
h*"","udo *t.
In such cases, the question of
,,
d
th3 identifier recognizes the existence of similarir. it a licea
disco,.r.d.through
Identification credit shifts to whether
a problem, and understands that
quetwir dosimetry r dtns that.mploy.* had
the licensee should be penalized for
corrective action is needed.The
been
vai ly monieor d for udtauen. th.
NRC's identification of the problem.
(iv) Mixed identification. For " mixed
jfd* j,Q**j"* g%.g,,
decision on Identification requires
identification situations (i.e., where
considering all the circumstances of
disei d , o,.,.spo
,.. ih
te... would b
id:ntification including:
considered an ennt.
multiple violations exist. some NRC-
-.
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Federal Register / Vol. 60. No.12G / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Nottoms
34391
identified. some licensee-identified, or
The evaluation of missed
Regardless of other circumstances
where the NRC prompted the licensee to opportunities should normally depend
(e.g., past enforcement history.
take action that resulted in the
on whether the information available to identification), the licensee's corrective
i
identificat!an of the violation), the
the licensee should reasonably have
actions should always be evaluated as
NRC's evaluation shculd normally
caused action that would have
part of the civil penalty assessment
determine whether the licensee could
prevented the vlolation. Missed
process. As a reflection of the
reasonably have been expected to
opportunities is normally not applied
importance given to this factor, an NRC
identify the violation in the NRC's
where the licensee appropriately
judgment that the licensee's corrective
absence. This determination should
reviewed the opportunity for
action has not been prompt and
consider. among other things, the timing application to its activities and
comprehensive will always result in
1
of the NRC's discovery, the information reasonable action was either taken or
issuing at least a base civil penalty.
available to the licensee that caused the planned to be taken within a reasonable
in assessing this factor, consideration
f
NRC concern,the specificity of the
time.
will be given to tbe timeliness of the
in some situations the missed
corrective action (including the
NRC's concem, the scope of the
Opportunity is a violation in itsr'f. In
promptness in developing the schedule
licensee's efforts, the level of licensee
these cases, unless the missed
for long term corrective action) the
resources given to the investigation, and Opportunity is a Seventy Level!!!
adequacy of the licensee's root cause
whether the NRC's path of analysis had violation in itself, the missed
analysis for the violation, and, given the
been dismissed or was being pursued in opportunity violation may be grouped significance and complexity of the
parallel by the licensee.
with the other violations into a single
issue, the comprehensiveness of the
la some cases, the IIcensee may have
Seventy Level 111 " problem. IIowever,
corrective action (i.e., whether the
addressed the isolated symptoms of
if the missed opportunity is the only
action is focus,ed narrowly to the
each violation (and may have identified vi lation, then it should not normally be specific violatton or broadly to the
the violations), but failed to recognize
c unted twice (i.e., both as the violation general area of concem). Even in cases
the common root cause and taken the
and as a missed opportunity- double
when the NRC, at the time of the
necessary comprehensive action. Where c unting ) unless the number of
enforcement conference, identifies
this is true, the decision on whether to
. Portunities missed was particularly
additional peripheral or minor
p
correcttve action still to be taken, the
give licensee credit for actions related to si mficant.
d
h Id f
he timin of the missed opportunity licensee may be given credit in this area,
de
cat on of he pro e requiring
should also considered. While a rigid as long as the licensee's actions
corrective action (e.g., the Programmatic time-frame is unnecessary, a 2 year
addressed the underlying root cause and
Period should generally be considered
are considered sufficient to prevent
'
c rono o8Y the various v olat ons, the for consistency in implementation, as
recurrence of the violation and similar
earliest of the individual violations
eriod re
violations.
might be considered missed
the[ormance.flecting relatively currentNonnally,the judgment of the
p,
opportunities for the licensee to have
(3) When the NRC determines that the adequacy of corrective actions will
identified the larger problem.
licensee should receive credit for
hinge on whether the NRC had to take
(v) Missed Opportunities to identify.
actions related to identification, the
action to focus the licensee's evaluative
Missed opportunities include prior
civil penalty assessment should
and corrective process in order to obtain
notifications or missed opportunities to normally result in either no civil
comprehensive corrective action. This
identify or prevent-violations such as (1) penalty or a base civil penalty, based on will normally be judged at the time of
through normal surveillances, audits or whether Corrective Action is judged to
the enforcement conference (e.g., by
quality assurance (QA) activities;(2)
be reasonably prompt and
outlining substantive additional areas
through prior notice i.e., specific NRC or comprehensive. When the licensee is
where corructive action is needed).
industry notification; or (3) through
not given credit for actions related to
Earlier informal discussions between
other reasonable indication of a
identification, the civil penalty
the licensee and NRC inspectors or
potential problem or violation, such as
assessment should normally result in a
management may result in improved
observations of employees and
Notice of Violation with either a base
corrective action, but should not
contractors, and failure to take effective civil penalty or a base civil penalty
normally be a basis to deny credit for
corrective steps. It may include findings escalated by 100%, depending on the
Corrective Action. For cases in which
of the NRC, the licensee, or industry
quality of Corrective Action, because the the licensee does not get credit for
made at other facilities operated by the
licensee's performance is clearly not
actions related to identification because
licensee where it is reasonable to expect acceptable.
the NRC identified the problem, the
thb licensee to take action to identify or
c. Credit for prompt and
assessment of the licensee's corrective
prevent similar problems at the facility
comprehensive corrective oction. The
action should begin from the time when
subject to the enforcement action at
purpose of the Corrective Action factor
the NRC put the licensee on notice of
issue. In assessing this factor,
is to encourage licensees to (1) take the
the problem. Notwithstanding eventual
consideration will be given to, among
immediate actions necessary upon
good comprehensive corrective action, if
other things, the opportunities available discovery of a violation that will restore immediate corrective action was not
to discover the violation.the ease of
safety and compliance with the license, taken to restore safety and compliance
discovery, the similarity between the
regulation (s). or other requirement (sh
once the violation was identifled,
violation and the notification, the
and (2) develop and implement (in a
corrective action would not be
perio'd of time between when the
timely manner) the lasting actions that
considered prompt and comprehensive.
violation occurred and when the
will not only prevent recurrence of the
Corrective action for violations
notification was issued, the action taken violation at issue, but will be
involving discrimination should
(or planned) by the licensee in response appropriately comprehensive, given the normally only be considered
to the notification, and the level of
significance and complexity of the
comprehensive if the licensee takes
management review that the notification violation, to prevent occurrence of
prompt, comprehensive corrective
received (or should have received).
violations with similar root causes.
action that (1) addresses the broader
13
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34392
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.120 / Friday, Juno 30, 1995 / Notices
cnvironment for raisite safety concerns correction of an improperly constructed willfulness. Otherwise, a prior .
In the workplace and (2, orovides a
safety.related system or component; or
opportunity for a hearing on the order
remedy for the particular o!scrimination
(ii) The licensee's quality assurance
is afforded. For cases in which the NRC
at issue.
program implementation is not adequate believes a basis could reasonably exist
d. Eiercise of discretion. As provided to provide confidence that construction
for not taking the action as proposed,
in Section VII," Exercise of Discretion." activities are being properly carried out: the licensee will ordinarily be afforded
disc'retion may be exercised by either
(c) When the licensee has not
an opportunity to show why the order
escalating or mitigating the amount of
responded adequately to other
should not be issued in the proposed
the civil pensity determined after
enforcement action:
manner by way of a Demand for
applying the civil penalty adjustment
(d) When the licensee interferes with
Information. (See 10 CFR 2.204)
factors to ensure that the proposed civil the conduct of an inspection or
D. Reloted odministmtive actions. In
penalty reflects the NRC's concem
investigation: or
addition to the formal enforcement
regarding the violation at issue and that
(e) For any reason not mentioned
actions, Notices of Violation. civil
it conveys the appropriate message to
above for which license revocation is
penalties, and orders the NRC also uses
the licensee. However, in no instance
legally authorized.
administrative actions, such as Notices
'will a civil penalty for any one violation
Suspensions may apply to all or part
of Deviation. Notices of
exceed $100.000 per day.
of the licensed activity. Ordinarily, a
Nonconformance. Confirmatory Action
licensed activity is not suspended (nor
I.etters, Letters of Reprimand, and
TABLE 1 A.-Base Civil Penalties
is a suspension prolonged) for failure to Demands for Information to supplement
comply with requirements where such
its enforcement program. The NRC
a. Power reactors
$100.000 failure is not willful and adequate
expects licensees and vendors to adhere
b. Fuel fabricators, industnal
corrective action has been taken.
to any obligations and commitments
processors, and independent
3. Revocation Orders may be used:
resulting from these actions and will not
spent fuel and rnorutored re-
(a) When a licensee is unable or
hesitate to issue appropriate orders to
trievable storage matanations
25.000 unwilling to comply with NRC
ensure that these obligations and
c. Test reactors, mas and ura-
requirements;
commitments are met.
nium conversion faceties.
(b) When a licensee refuses to correct
1. Notices of Deviation are writtet
contractas vendors. waste
a violation:
notices describing a licensee's faliure to
disposal licensees. and in-
(c) When licensee does not respond to satisfy a commitment where the
'
- ~ -
'
d
-
a Notice of Violation where a response
commitment involved has not beee
was required:
made a legally binding requirement. A
demm. necal, a our rna.
tenancensee '
5.000
(d) When a licensee refuses to pay an
Notice of Deviation requests a licensee
applicable fee under the Commi.ssion's
to provide a written explanation or
- This applies to nonproht institutons not regulations; or
statement describing corrective steps
Nar e"vc
e r prIrnacies'.Qy
(e) For any other reason for which
taken (or planned) the results achieved.
revocation is authonzed under section
and the date when corrective action will
cian offices.
186 of the Atomic Energy Act (e.g., any
be completed.
TABLE 18.-BASE civil PENALTIES
condition which would warrant refusal
2. Noticos of Nonconformance are
of a license on an original application).
written notices describing vendor's
~
Base civil pen.
4. Cease and Desist Orders may be
failures to meet commitments which
alty amount (Per- used to stop an unauthorized activity
have not been made legally binding
Seventy level
cent of armunt that has continued after notification by
requirements by NRC, An example is a
"$t'd 7) Tablethe NRC that the activity is
commitment made in a procurement
3
unauthorized.
contract with a licensee as required by
i
100
5. Orders to unlicensed persons.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Notices of
n.
80 including vendors and contractors, and
Nonconformances request non-licensees
lu .
50 employees of any of them, are used
to provide written explanations or
when the NRC has identifled deliberate statements describing corrective steps
C. Orders. An order is a written NRC
misconduct that may cause a licensee to (taken or planned), the results achieved,
directive to modify, suspend, or revoke
be in violation of an NRC requirement
the dates when corrective actions will
a license; to cease and desist from a
or where incomplete or inaccurate
be completed, and measures taken to
given practice or activity; or to take such information is deliberately submitted or preclude recurrence.
other action as may be proper (see 10
where the NRC loses its reasonable
3. Confirmatory Action Letters are
CFR 2.202). Orders may also be issued
assurance that the licensee will meet
letters confirming a licensee's or
In lieu of, or in addition to, civil
NRC requirements with that person
vendor's agreement to take certain
penalties, as appropriate for Severity
involved in licensed activities.
actions to remove significant concerns
Level !. IL or III violations. Orders may
Unless a separate response is
about health and safety, safeguards, or
be issued as follows:
warranted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, a
the environment.
1. License Modification orders are
Notice of Violation need not be issued
4. Letters of Reprimand are letters
issued when some change in licensee
where an order is based on violations
addressed to individuals subject to
equipment, procedures, personnel, or
described in the order. The violations
Commission jurisdiction identifying a
management controls is necessary.
described in an order need not be
significant deficiency in their
2. Suspension Orders may be used:
categorized by severity level
performance of licensed activities.
(a) To remove a threat to the public
Orders are made effective
5. Demands for Information are
health and safety, common defense and
immediately, without prior opportunity demands for information from licensees
security, or the environment;
for hearing, whenever it is determined
or other persons for the purpose of
(b) To stop facility construction when, that the public health, interest, or safety enabling the NRC to determine whether
(i) Further work could preclude or
so requires, or when the order is
an order or other enforcement action
significantly hinder the identification or responding to a violation involving
should be issued.
14
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Federal Register /.Vol,to. No.126 / Friday Juns 30, 1995 / Notices
34393
l
l
Vil. Exercise of Discretion
(e) Situations when the excessive
when discredon should be considered
Notwithstanding the normal guidance duration of a problern has resulted in a for departing from the normal approach
3
~
substandalincreasein risk:
In Section VI.B include but are not
contained in this policy, as provided in
(f) Situations when the licensee made limited to the followina:
Section lH. Responsibilities." the NRC a conscious decision to be in
1.1.icensee-Identified Senrity Level
'
'
may choose to exercise discretion and
necompliance in order to obtain an
IV Violations.The NRC.with the
either escalate or mitigate enforcement
economic benefit;or
approval of b Regional Administrator
sanctions within b Commission's
(g)Casesinvolvingtheloss of a
or his designee, may refrain from
4
statuto Y authority to ensure that the
source. In addition, unless the licensee
issuing a Notice of Violation for a
'
10
f
self-identifies and reports the loss to the Severity levelIV violadon thatis
rop a ly fle s th le elof NRC
NRC, these cases should normally result documented in an inspecuan report (or
I
concern regarding the violation at issue
in a civil penal in an amount at ler *
official Sold notes for some material
I
and conveys the appropriate message to in the order of e cost of an authoraed cases) and described therein as a Non-
1
the 11consee.
disposal of the material or of the transfer Cited Violation (NCV) provided that the
A. Escalation of Enforcement Sanctions of the material to an authorized
inspection report includes abrief
4
f*Ci ient.
description of the correctin action and
P
The NRC considers violations
2. Orders. The NRC may, where
that the violation meets allof the
categorized at Severity LevelI, H or III
necessary or desirable, lasues orders la
following criteria:
to be of significant
latory concern.
conjunction with or in lieu of civil
(a) It was identified by the licensee,
a
1
If the application o
normal
P*n$lties to achieve or formalise
including identification through an
guidance in this policy does not result
corrective actions and to deter further
event:
in an apfropriate sanction,with themcurance of serius violations.
(b)It was not a violation that could
approvs of the appropriate Deputy
3. Daily civil penalties.In order to
reasonably be expected to have been
Executin Director and consukation
recognize the added technical safety
prevented by the licensee's correctin
with the EDO and Commission, as
significance or regulatory significance
action for a previous violation or a
warranted, the NRC may apply its full
f r bee cases where a wry strong
previous licensee finding that occurred
i
enforcement authority where the action message is warranted for a significant
w thin the past 2 years of the inspsction
i
'
is warranted. NRC actiot may include
violation that continues for more than
at issue, or the period within the last
(t) escalating civil penalties. (2) issuing
ne day, the NRC may exercise
two inspecJions, whichever is longer:
priate orders, and (3) assenalng
discretion and assess a separate
(c)It was ur will be corrected within
afv penalties for continuing violations violation and attendant civil penalty uP a reasonable time, by sp
,
c
on a per day basis, up to the statutokay. to the statutory limit of $100,000 for
action committed to by the licensee by
limit of $100,000 per violation, per
each day the violation continues. The
the end of the inspection, including
1. Civil penalties. Notwithstanding
NRC may exercise this discretion if a
immediate corrective action and
2
i
the outcome of the normal civil penalty licensee was awam or clearly should
comprehensive cornettve action to
assessment process addressed in Section have been aware of a violation, or if the
prevent recurrence;
i
VI.B. the NRC may exercise discretion
limasee had an opportunity to identify
(d)It was not a willful violation or if
by either proposing a civil penalty
and correct the violation but failed to do it was a willful violation:
where application of the factors would
- ;The information concoming the
so.
otherwise result in zero penalty or by
violation, if not required to be reported.
escalating the amount of the resulting
B. Mitigation of Enfomement Sanctions
was promptly provided to appropriate
civil penalty (i.e.. base or twice the base
'llie NRC may exercise discretion and NRC personnel, such as a resident
civil penalty) to ensure that the
refrain from issuing a civil {e cutcomenalty and/ inspector or regional section
osed civil
Ity reflects the
i
or a Notice of Violation. if t
chief-
IInificance ofcircumstances and
'
of b n nual rocess describedin
(ii) The violation involwd the acts of
P
priate regulatory
'
conveys the abicensee. ConsultationSection VI.B does not result in a
a low-levelindividual(and not a
message to th
sanction consistent with an appmpriate licensee official as defined in Section
.
with b Commission is required if the
regulatory message. In addition, even if IV.Cl:
deviation in the amount of the civil
the NRC exercises this discretion, when
(iii) The violation appears to be the
bnaltfe amount of the civilpenaltyproposed under this discretion
the licensee failed to make a required
isolated action of the employee without
!
assessed under the normal process is
r* Port to the NRC, a se
to
management involument and the
t
-
enforceavmt action wi normally be
violation was not caused by lack of
more than two times the base civil
issued for the licana=='s failure to make
management owrsight as evidenced by
$ty shown in Tables 1A and 18.ples when this discretion should
a required report.The approval of the
either a history ofisolated willful
I
,
'
Director,OfBce of Enforcement,with
violations or a lack of adequate audits
be considered include, but am not
consultation with the appropriate
or supervision of emplo
- and
limited to the followin .
Deputy Executin Director as warranted.
(iv) Significant rem
I action
(a) Problems cat
at Severity
is rsquired for exercising discretion of
commensurate with the circumstances
14wlI or II.
(b) OurEposures.or rolesses of
the type described in Section VII.B.1.b
was taken by the licensee such that it
where a willful violation is involved.
demonstrated the seriousness of the
radiological material la excess of NRC
and of the types described in Sections
violation to other employees and
i
imments:
) Situations involving particularly
VILB.2 through VH.B.5. Commission
contractors, thereby creating a deterrent
-
poor licensee performance, or involving consultation is required for exercising
effect within the licensee's organization.
'
J
willfulness:
discretion of the type described in
Although removal of the employee from
(d) Situations when the licensee's
Section VR.B.2 and the approval of the
licensed activities is not necessarily
previous enforcement history has been
appropriate Deputy Executive Director
requimd, substantial disciplinary action
particularly
,or when the current
and Commission notification is required is expected.
J
violation is
y repetitive of an
for exercising the discretion of the type
2. Violations identlRed During
l
earlierviolation .
described in Section VII.B.S. Examples
Extended Shutdowns or Work
4
15
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34394
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.128 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
St:ppages. The NRC may refrain from
violation was caused by conduct that is action when the licensee has addreened
3
issuing a Notico of Violation or a
not reasonably linked to present
the overall work environment for raising
proposed civil penalty for a violation
performance (normally, violations that
safety concerns and has publicized that
that is identined after (1) the NRC has
are at least 3 years old or violations
a complaint of discrimination for
taken significant enforcement action
occurring during plant construction)
engaging in protected activity was made
based upon a major safety event
and there had not been prior notice so
to the DOL, that the matter was settled
contributing to an extended shutdown
that the licensee should have reasonably to the satisfaction of the employee (the
of an operating reactor or a material
identified the violation earlier. This
terms of the specific settlement
licensee (or a work stcp
exercise of discretion is to place a
agreement need not be posted), and that,
construction site), or (ii)page at athe licensee
premium on licensees initiating efforts
if the DOL Area Office found
enters an extended shutdown or work
to identify and correct subtle violations discrimination. the licenase has taken
st:ppage related to generally poor
that are not likely to be identified by
action to positively reemphasize that
performance over a long period of time,
routine efforts before degraded safety
discrimination will not be tolerated.
-
provided that the violation is
systems are called upon to work.
Similarly,the NRC may refrain from
documented in an inspection report (or
4. Violations identified Due to
taking enforcement action if a licensee
official field notes for some material
Previous Escalated Enforcement Action. settles a matter promptly after a person
cases) and that it meets all of the
Tha NRC may refrain from issuing a
comes to the NRC without going to the
i
i
following criteria:
Notice of Violation or a proposed civil
DOL.Such discretion would normauy
'
(a) It was either licensee-identified as penalty for a violation that is identified
not be exercised in cases in which the
'
a result of a comprehensive program for after the NRC has taken escalated
licensee does not appropriately address
problem identification and correction
enforcement action for a Severity Level
the overall work environment (e.g., by
that was developed in response to the
11 or HI violation provided that the
using training, postings, revised policies
shutdown or identified as a result of an
violation is documented in an
or procedures, any necessary
- '
cmployee allegation to the licensee:(If
inspection report (or official field notes
disciplinary action, etc.. to
th NRC identifies the violation and all
for some material cases) that includes a
communicate its policy against
of the other criteria are met, the NRC
description of the corrective action and
discrimination) or in cases that involve:
,
shculd determine whether enforcement that it meets all of the foHowing criteria: allegations of discrimination as a result
action is necessary to achieve remedial
(a) It was licensee. identified as part of of providing information directly to the
action, or if discretion may still be
the corrective action for the previous
NRC, allegations of discrimination
riate.)
escalated enforcement action:
apkl is based upon activities of the
(b)It has the same or similar root
caused by a manager above first line
supervisor (consistent with cunent
lic:nsee rior to the events leading to
cause as the violation for which
thsshut own:
escalated enforcement action was
Enforcement Policy classification of
Severity LevelI or 11 violations),
(c)It would not be categorized at a
issued;
allegations of discrimination where a
severity level higher than Severity Level
(c)It does not substantially change the
g,
safety significance or the character of
history cf findings of discrimination (by
the DOL or the NRC) or settlements
'(d)It was not willful; and
the regulatory concem arising out of the
(e) The licensee's decision to restart
initial violation: and
suggests a programmatic rather than an
the plant requires NRC concurrence.
(d)It was or will be corrected-
isolated discnmination problem, or
3. Violations involving Old Design
including immediate corrective action
auegations of discrimination which
ap& Violations Involving Specialpear particu
Issues. The NRC may refrain from
and long term comprehensive corrective
proposing a civil penalty for a Severity
action to prevent recurrence, within a
Levell! or IU violation involving a past
reasonable time following identification- Circumstances. Notwithstanding the
problem, such as in engineering, design,
i Violations involving Certain
outcome of the normal civil penalty
or installation, provided that the
Discrimination issues. Enforcement
assessment process addressed in Section
violation is documented in an
discretion may be exercised for
VI.B as provided in Section ill,
inspection report (or official field notes
discrimination cases when a licens**
" Responsibilities " the NRC may reduce
~
for some material cases) that includes a
who, without the need for government
or refrain from issuing a civil penalty or
'
description of the corrective action and
intervention, identifies an issue of
a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level
11 or III violation based on the merits of
that it meets all of the following criteria: discrimination and takes prompt,
the case after considering the guidance
(a)It was licensee-identified as a
comprehensive, and effective corrective
in this statement of policy and such
result ofits voluntary initiative:
action to address both the particular
factors as the age of the violation, the
(b)It was or will be corrected,
situation and the overall work
safety significance of the violation, the
'
including immediate corrective action
environment for raising safety concerns. overall sustained performance of the
and long term comprehensive corrective similarly, enforcement may not be
licensee has been particularly good, and
action to prevent recunence, within a
warranted where a complaint is filed
other relevant circumstances. including
reasonable time following identification with the Department of Labor (DOL)
any that may have changed since the
(this action should involve expanding
under Section 211 of the Energy
violation. This discretion is expected to
the initiative, as necessary, to identify
Reorganization Act of1974,as
be exercised only where application of
other failures caused by similar root
amended, but the licensee settles the
the normal guidance in the policy is
causesh and
matter before the DOL makes an initial
unwarranted.
(c)It was not likely to be identified
finding of discrimination and addresses
(after the violation occurred) by routing the overall work environment.
C. Exercise ofDiscretionforon
licensee efforts such as normal
Alternatively,if a finding of
Opemting Focility
surveillance or quality assurance (QA)
discrimination is made, the licensee
On occasion, circumstances may arise
activities,
may choose to settle the case before the
where a licensee's compliance with a
In addition, the NRC may refrain from evidentiary hearing begins. In such
Technical Specification (TS) Limiting
issuing a Notice of Violation for cases
cases, the NRC may exercise its
Condition for Operation or with other
thit meet the above criteria provided the discretion not to take enforcement
license conditions would involve an
16
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Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.126 / Friday June 30. 1995 / Notices
34395
tmnocessary plant traaient or
exercised with respect to equipment or
knowingly or with celess disregard
performance of testing. inspection,or
systems only when it has at least
(i.e. with more than more negligence)
system realignment that is inappropriate concluded that. notwithstanding the
failed to take required actions which
with the specific plant conditions, or
conditions of the license:(1) The
have actual or potential safet
unnecessary delays in plant startup
equipment or system does not perform
significance. Most tra
ans of
without a corresponding health and
a safety function in the mode in which
individuals at the level f Severity Level
safety benefit. In these circumstances,
operation is to occur. (2) the safety
Ill or IV violations will be handled by
the NRC staff may choose not to enforce function performed by the equipment or citing only the facility licensee.
the applicable TS or other license
system is of only marginal safety
More serious violations including
conditlon. This enforcement discretion, benefit, provided remrining in the
those involving the integrity of an
j
designated as a Notice of Enforcement
current mode increases the likelihood of individual (e.g., lying to the NRC)
-
Discretion (NOED), will only be
an unnecessary plant transient: or (3)
concernin6 matters within the scope of
exercised if the NRC staffis clearly
the TS or other license condition
the individual's respanalhilities, will be
satisfied that the action is consistent
requires a test. Inspection or system
considered for enforcement action
1
with protecting the public health and
realignment that is inappropriate for the against the individual as well as against
safety. A licensee seeking the issuance
particular plant conditions. in that it
the facility licensee. Action against the
'
of a NOED must provide a written
does not provide a safety benefit, or
individual, however, will not be taken
justification. or in circumstances whm may. in fact, be detrimental to safety in
iftholmpro
action by the individual
good cause is shown, oral lustification
the particular plant condition.
was caused
management failures.
followed as soon as possible by written
The decision to exercise enforcement The following examples of situations
justification, which documents the
discretion does not change the fact that
illustrate this concept:
safety basis for the request and provides a violation will occur nor does it imply
e inadvertentindividualmistakes
whatever other information the NRC
that enforcement discretion is being
resulting from inadequate training or
staff deems necessary in making a
exercised for any violation that may
guidance provided by the facility
decision on whether or not to issue a
have led to the violation at issue. in
licensee.
NOED.
each case where the NRC staff has
e inadvertently missing an
The appropriate Regional
chosen to issue a NOED. enforcement
insignificant procedural requirement
Administrator, or his or her designee,
action will normally be taken for the
when the action is routine, fairly
i
may issue a NOED where the
root causes, to the extent violations
uncomplicated, and there is no unusual
noncompliance is temporary and
wm involved, that led to the
cir--indicating that the
nonrecurring when an amendment is
noncompliance for which enforcement
procedures should be referred to and
I
not practical. The Director. Office of
discretion was used. The enforcement
followed step-by. step.
'
l
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or his or
action is intended to emphasize that
e Compliance with an express
her designee, may issue a NOED if the
licensees should not rely on the NRC's
direction of management, such a the
i
<
expected noncompliance will occur
authority to exercise enforcement
Shift Supervisor or Plant Manager,
i
during the brief period of time it
discretion as a routine substitute for
resulted in a violation unless the
'
requires the NRC staff to process an
compliance or for requesting a license
individual did not express his or her
emergency or exigent license
amendment.
concem or objection to the direction.
i
amendment under the provisions of to
Finally,it is expected that the NRC
- Individual error directly resulting
i
CFR 50.9t(s)(5) or (6). The person
staff will exercise enforcement
from following the technical advice of
<
exercising enforcement discretion will
discretion in this area infrequently.
an expert unless the advice was clearly
document the decision.
Although a plant must shut down,
unreasonable and the licensed
,
For en operating plant, this exercise of refueling activities may be suspended.
Individual should have rooognized it as
enforcement discretion is intended to
or plant startup may be delayed, absent
such.
minimize the potential safety
the exercise of enforcement discretion.
. Violations resulting from
consequences of unnecessary plant
the NRC staff is under no obligation to
inadequate procedures unless the
transients with the accompanying
take such a step merely because it has
individual used a faulty procedure
operational risks and impacts or to
been requested. The decision to fotogo
knowing it was faulty and had not
eliminate testing. inspection, or system enforcement is discretionary. When
attempted to get the procedure
i
realignment which is inappropriate for
enforcement discretion is to be
corrected.
the particular plant conditions. For
exercised. it is to be exercised only if
Listed below are exarnples of
plants in a shutdown condition.
the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that
situations which could result in
exercising enforcement discretion is
such action is warranted from a health
enforcement actions involving
intended to reduce shutdown risk by,
and safety perspective,
individuals, licensed or unlicensed. If
f
again, avoiding testin . Ins
ion or
the actions described in these examples
VIH, Eht Actions favolving
are taken by a licensed operator or taken
system realignment w (ch
ladividuals
deliberately by an unlicensed
>
inappropriate for the particular plant
<
conditions, in that, it does not provide
Enforcement actions involving
individual, enforcement action may be
a safety benefit or may,in fact.be
individuals, including licensed
taken directly against the individual.
i
detrimental to safety in the particular
operatore, are significant personnel
However, violations invol
willful
'
plant condition. Exercising enforcement actions, which will be closely controlled conduct not amounting to de
e
discretion for plants attempting to
and judiciously applied. An
action by an unlicensed individualin
startup is less likely than exercising it
enforcement action involving an
these situations may result in
for an operating plant, as simply
individual will normally be taken only
enforcement action against a licensee
e
dels ing startup does not usually leave
when the NRCla satisfied that the
that mayimpact an individualThe
the lant in a condition in which it
individual fully understood, or should
situations include, but are not limited
cou d experience undesirable transients. have understood, his or her
to, violations that involve:
In such cases, the Commission would
responsibility: knew, or should have
e Willfully causing a liconese to be in
expect that discretion would be
known,the required actions: and
violation of NRC requirements.
i
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34396
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.126 / Friday, Juns 30, 1995 / Notices
~
limnase,th' NRCrecognizes that
until certain conditions are satisfied,
. Willfully taking action that would
s
h:ve caused a licensee to be in violation judgments will have to be made on a
e.g., completing specified training or-
of NRC requirements but the action did
case by case basis,la making these
meeting certain qualifications.
not do so because it was detected and
decisions, the NRC will consider factors
- Require notification to the NRC
ccrrective action was taken.
such as the following:
before resuming work in licensed
e Recognizing a violation of
1.The level of the individual within
activities.
procedural requirements and willfully
the organization.
- Require the person to tell a
l
not taking corrective action.
2.The individual's training and
Prospective employer or customer
. Willfully defeating alarms which
experience as well as knowledge of the
engaged in licensed activities that the
have safety signillcance.
potential consequences of the
Person has been subject to an NRC
.
e Unauthorized abandoning of reactor wrongdoing.
order.
l
controls.
3..The safety consequences of the
In the case of a licensed operator's
!
. Dereliction of duty.
misconduct.
failure to meet applicable fitness.for-
. Falsifying records required by NRC
4. The benefit to the wrongdoer, e.g.,
duty requirements (10 CFR 55.53(l)), the
. regulations or by the facility license.
personal or corporate gain.
NRC may issue a Notice of Violation or
. Willfully providing,or causing a
5. The degree of supervision of the
a civil penalty to the Part 55 licensee,
licensee to provide, an NRC inspector or individual. i.e., how closely is the
or en order to suspend, modify, or
investigator with inaccurate or
individual monitored or audited, and
revoke the Part 55 license.These actions
i
incomplete information on a matter
the likelihood of detection (such as a
may be taken the first time a licensed
l
material to the NRC.
radiographer working independently in Operator fails a drug or alcohol test, that
l
e Willfully withholding safety
the field as contrasted with a team
is, receives a confirmed positive test
that exceeds the cutoff levels of 10 CFR
signlilcant information rather than
activity at a power plant).
'
making such information known to
6. The employer's response. e.g.,
Part 26 or the facility licensee's cutoff
appropriate supervisory or technical
disciplinary action taken.
levels, if lower. However, normally only
personnel in the licensee's organization.
7. The attitude of the wrongdoer,- e.g.,
a Notice of Violation will be issued for
. Submitting false information and as admission of wrongdoing, acceptance of the first confirmed positive test in the
a result gaining unescorted access to a
responsibility,
absence of aggravating circumstances
nuclear power plant.
8. The degree of management
such as errors in the performance of
l
. Willfully providing false data to a
responsibility or culpability.
licensed duties or evidence of prolonged
licensee by a contractor or other person
9. Who identified the misconduct.
use:In addition, the NRC intends to
who provides test or other services.
Any proposed enforcement action
issue an order to suspend the Part 55
'
involving individuals must be issued
license for up to 3 years the second time
when the data affects the licensee s
j
compliance with 10 CFR part 50,
with the concurrence of the appropriate a licensed operator exceeds those cutoff
levels. In the event there are less than
appendix B, or other regulatory
Deputy Executive Director.The
i
requirement.
particular sanction to be used should be 3 years remaining in the tem of the
. Willfully providing false
determined on a case.by-case basis.m
individual's license, the NRC may
certification that components meet the
Notices of Violation and Orders are
consider not renewing the individual's
license r n t issuing a new license after
requirements of their intended use, such examples of enforcement actions that
the three year period is completed. The
as ASME Code,
b
i
indi id al
{,Ye7nitai
. Willfully supplying, by vendors of
NRC intends to issue an order to revoke
adm
a on of a 1 tter o
the Part 55 license the third time a
equipment for transportation of
Reprimand may also be considered. In
licensed operator exceeds those cutoff
radioactive material, casks that do not
addition, the NRC may issue Demands
levels. A licensed operator or applicant
comp y with their certificates of
for Information to gather information to who refuses to participate in the drug
com lance.
enable it to determine whether an order
illfully performing unauthorized
or other enforcement action should be
and alcohol testmg programs
e
bypassing of requtred reactor or other
established by the facihty licensee or
issued.
who is involved in the sale use, or
facility safety systems,
Orders to NRC-licensed reactot
. Willfully taking actions that violate
possession of an illegal drug is also
Technical Specification 1.imiting
CPerstors may involve suspension nor a
subject to license suspension.
Conditions forOperation or other
specifled period, modification, or
revocationior denial.
revocation of their individual licenses.
license conditions (enforcement action
In addition the NRC may take
for a willful violation will not be taken
Orders to unlicensed individuals might enforcement action against a licensee
if thablation is the result of action
include provisions that would:
that may impact an individuel, where
e Prohibit involvement in NRC
taken following the NRC's decision to
the conduct of the individual places in
forego enforcement of the Technical
licensed activities for a specified period question the NRC's reasonable
Specification or other license condition of tirne (normall the period of
assurance that licensed ' ctivities will be
a
or if the operator meets the
suspension wou not exceed 5 years) or properly conducted.The NRC may take
ment scha h masons Q
utrements of to CFR 50.54 (x). (i.e..
en
a sucepi for individuale subiect to civil penshies would warrant refusal to issue a hcense
un ess the operator acted unreasonably
unda sociton nos of the Enersy Reorsentaeuen Ac,
considering all the relevant
of sm. m emended. Nec win not normany impou on an original application. Accordingly,
circumstances surrounding the
e civil penehy aestant en individual. Howevw.
appropriate enforcement actions may be
sation m of the Atomic Enwgy AcHAEA) slm
.'"$'*,$*UN
taken regarding matters that raise issues
I
emergency.)
l
Normally, some enforcement action is
'h*$.~
of integrity, competence, fitness for-
,,
taken against a licensee for violations
secoon sin of the AsA to include individual e
duty, or other matters that may not
caused by significant acts of wrongdoing variety of orsentations, and any representatives ce necessarily be a violation of specific
by its employees. contractors, or
esente. This sive the conunienion autharter '*
Commission requirements.
i
j
contractors' employees. In deciding
yP_e#
fIOFe#
In the case of an unlicensed person.
U
- " "
p
.
, n e
whether to issue an enforcement action
,,q,i,
, di,ecoy imposed on than te
whether a firm or an individual, an
l
'
to an unlicensed person as well as to the conunieted,
order modifying the facility license may
l
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Federal Register / Vol 60 No.126 / Friday June 30. 1995 / Notices
34397
.
be issued to require (1) The removal of
action may be taken for an
failure to provide significant
the person from all licensed activities
unintentionally incomplete or
information. In any event. in serious
for a specified period of time or
inaccurate oral statement provided to-
cases where b licensee's actions in not
indefinitely. (2) prior nouco to the NRC the NRC by a licensee official or others
correcting or providing information
before utlllaing the person in licensed
on behalf of a licensee,if a record was
raise quations about its commitment to
activities, or (3) tholicensee to provide
made of b oralinformation and
safety or its fundamental
nouce of the issuance of such an order
provided to the licensa thereby
trustworthiness, b Commission may
exercise its aut ority to issue orders
to other persons involved in licensed
permitting an opportunity to correct the
h
activities making reference inquiries. In oral information, such as if a transcript
modifying, suspending, or revoking the
addition, orders to employers might
of the communication or meeting
license.The Commission recognizes
,
require retraining, additional oversight,
summary containing the error was made that enforcement determinations must
or independent verification of activities available to the licensee and was not
be made on a case-by case basis, taking
performed by the person,1f the person
subsequently corrected in a timely
into consideration b issues described
'
is to be involved in licensed activities,
manner.
in this section.
,,f,g"oc,,p"lete
tion,
X.Enfarcement Action Against Non.
IX. Inaccurate and lacomplete
g,
'
""
I
I*"
the decision to issue a Notice of
A violation of the regulations
Violation for the initialinaccurate or
The Commission's enforcement policy
involving submittal of incomplete and/
incomplete information normally will
is also applicable to non licensees,
or inaccurate information. whether or
be dependent on the circumstances,
including employees of licensees, to
not conaldered a material falso
including the esse of detection of the
contractors and subcontractors, and to
statement, can result in the full range of error, the timeliness of the correction,
employees of contractors and
enforcement sanctions.The labeling of a whether the NRC or the licensoo
subcontractors, who knowingly provide
communication failure as a material
identified the problem with the
components, equipment, or other goods
false statement will be made on a case-
communication, and whether the NRC
or services that relate to a licensee's
by-case basis and will be reserved for
relied on the information prior to the
activities subject to NRC regulation. The
egregious violations. Violations
correction. Generally,if the matter was
prohibitions and sanctions for any of
involving inaccurate or incomplete
promptly identified and corrected by
these persons who engage in deliberate
information or the failure to provide
the licensee prior to reliance by the
misconduct or submission of
significant information identified by a
NRC, or before the NRC raised a
incomplete or inaccurate information
I
licensee normally will be categorized
question about the information,no
are provided in the rule on deliberste
based on the guidance herein, in Section enforcement action will be taken for the misconduct, e.g.,10 CFR 30.10 and 50.5.
IV," Severity of Violations " and in
initialinaccurate or incomplete
Vendors of products or services
Supplement VII.
Information. On the other hand. if the
provided for use in nuclear activities are
Tlie Commission recognizes that oral
misinformation is identified after the
subject to certain requirements designed
information may in some situations be
NRC relies on it, or after some question - to ensure that the products or services
inhmntly less reliable than written
is raised regarding the accuracy of the
supplied that could affect safety are of
submittels because of the absence of an
information, then some enforcement
high quality. Through procurement
opportunity for reflection and
action normally will be taken even ifit
contracts with reactor licensees, vendors
management review. However, the
is in fact corrected. However,if the
may be required to have quality
Commission must be able to rely on oral Initial submittal was accurate when
assurance programs that meet applicable
communications from licensee officials
made but later turns out to be erroneous requirements including 10 CFR Part 50,
concoming significant information.
because of newly discovered
Appendix B. and 10 CFR Part 71
Therefore, in determining whether to
information or advance in technology, a Subpart H. Vendors supplying products
take enforcement action for en oral
citation normally would not be
or services to reactor, materiais, and 10
statement, consideration may be given
appropriate if, when the new
CFR Part 71 licensees are subject to the
to factors such as (1)The degree of
information became evallable or the
requirements of to CFR Part 21
knowledge that the communicator
advancement in technology was made,
regarding reporting of defects in basic
should have had, regarding the matter.
the initial submittal was corrected.
components,
in view of his or her position, training,
The failure to correct inaccurate or
When inspections determine that
and experience:(2) the opportunity and incomplete information which the
violations of NRC requirements have
time available prior to the
licensee does not identify as significant
occurred, or that vendors have failed to
communication to assure the accuracy
normally will not constitute a separate
fulfill contractual commitments (e.g.,10
or completeness of the information:(3)
violation. However, the circumstances
CFR Part 50, Appendix B) that could
the degree of intent or neglisence, if
surrounding the failure to correct may
adversely affect the quality of a safety
any, involved:(4)the formality of the
be considered relevant to the
significant product or service,
communication:(5) the reasonableness
determination of enforcement action for enforcement action will be taken.
of NRC reliance on the information:(6)
the initial inaccurate or incomplete
Notices of Violation and civil penalties
the importance of the information
statement. For example, an
will be used, as appropriate, for licensee
which was wrong or not provided: and
unintentionally inaccurate or
failures to ensure that their vendors
(7) the reasonableness of the
incomplete submission may be treated
have programs that meet applicable
explanation for not providing complete
as a more severe matter if the licensee
requirements. Notices of Violation will
and accurate information.
later determines that the initial
be issued for vendors that ' iolate to
v
Absent at least careless disregard, an
submittal was in error and does not
CFR Part 21. Civil penalties will be
incomplete or inaccurate unsworn oral
correct it or if there were clear
imposed against individual directors or
statement normally will not be subject
opportunities to identify the error. If
responsible officers of a vendor
to enforcement action unless it involves information not corrected was
organization who knowingly and
significant information provided by a
recognized by a licensee as significant,
consciously fall to provide the notice
limasse official. However, enforcement a separate citation may be made for the
required by 10 CFR 21.21(b)(1). Notices
19-
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34398
Federd Register / Vol. 60 No.126 / Friday, Juns 30, 1995 / Notlets
of Nonconformance will be used for
able to perform its intended safety
3. Insttentiveness to duty on the part
vendors which fall to meet
function t2 when actually called upon to oflicensed personnel:
commitments related to NRC activities.
work:
4. Changes in reactor pararneters that
3. An a
nta
ce
r
cause unandcipated aduedons in
XL Referrals to the Department of
4. A licensed operator at e controls
margins of safety;
of a nuclear reactor, or a senior operator
5. A sigrdficant failure to meet the
Alleged or suspected criminal
directing licensed activities, involved in requirements of to CFR 50.59, including
violations of the Atomic Energy Act
procedural errors which neult in, or
a failure such that a required license
(and of other relevant Federal laws) are
examrbete the consequences of, an alert amendment was not sought:
referred to the Department of Justice
or higher level emergency and who, as
6. A licensee failure to conduct
(DOJ) for invutigation. Referral to the
a result of subsequent testing receives
adequate outsight of vendors resulting
DOJ does not preclude the NRC from
a confirmed positive test result for drugs in the use of products or services that
taking other enforcement action under
or alcohol.
are of defective or indeterminate quality
this policy. However, enforcement
B. Severity LevelII-Violations
and that have safety significance-
actions will be coordinated with the
involving for example:
7. A bmakdown in the control'of
mitigate sen,m desianert to prevent orous safety events not being
of violations that are' related (a numb
DOJ In accordance with the
1. A syste
licensed activities involvin
Memorandum of Understanding
orif
between the NRC and the DOJ,53 FR
able to perform its intended safety
50317 (December 14,1988),
function:
isolated, that are recurring violations)
2. A licensed operator involved in the that collectively represent a potentially
XII. Public Disclosure of Enforcement
Actions
or the consum on of alcohoYc1 drugs
significant lack of attention or
use, sale, or possemion ofill
camlessness toward licensed
Enforcement actions and licensees
beveraga, wi
the protected area: or
r**Ponsibilities: or
rrsponses,in accordance with to CFR
3. A licensed operator at the control
8. A licensed operator's conarmed
2.790, are publicly available for
of a nuclear reactor, or a senior operator Positive test for drugs or alcohol that
inspection. In addition, press releases
directing licensed activities, involnd in does not result in a Severity LevelI or
are generally issued for orders and civil procedural errors and who, as a result
11 violation.
penalties and are issued at the same
of subsequent testing, receives a
9. Equipment failures caused by
time the order or proposed imposition
confirmed positive test result for drugs
inadequate or improper maintenance
of the civil penalty is issued. In
er alcohol.
that substantially complicates recovery
addition, press releases are usually
C. Severity Level!!I-Violations
frorn a plant transient.
Issued when a proposed civil penalty is involving for example:
D. Seveaty LevelIV Violations
withdrawn or substandaily mitignied by
1. A significant failure to comply with involvi ,g for example:
some amount. Press 1eleases are not
the Action Statement for a Technical
,1. A less significant failure to comply
S ecification Limiting Condition for
wah the Action Statement for a
normally issued for Notices of Violation
P
that are not accompanied by orders or
Operation where the appropriate action Technical Specification Limiting
proposed civil penalties.
was not taken within the required time, Condition for Operation where the
such as:
appropriate action was not taken within
XIII. Reopening Closed Enforcement
(a)In a pressurized water reactor,in
the required time, such as:
,
Actions
the applicable modes, having one high-
(a)In a pressurized water reactor, a
If significant new informationis
pressure safety injection pump
5% deficiency in the required volume of
received or obtained by NRC which
Inoperable for a period in excom of that the condensate storage tank: or
indicates that an enforcement sanction
allowed by the action statement: or
. (b)In a boiling water reactor, one
was incorrectly applied, consideration
(b)In a boiling water reactor, one
subsystem of the two independent MSIV
may be given, dependent on the
Primary containment isolation valve
leakage control subsystems inoperable
circumstances, to reopening a cloud
inoperable for a period in excess of that
2. A failure to meet the requirements
enforcement action to increase or
allowed by the action statement.
of 10 CFR 50.59 that does not result in
decrease the sentity of a sanction or to
2. A system designed to prevent or
a Severity Level I,11. or III violation:
correct the record. Roopening decisions mitigate a serious safety event:
3. A failure to meet regulatory
will be made on a case by-case basis, are
(a) Not being able to perform its
reouirements that have more than minor
expected to occur rarely, and require the intended function under certain
safety or environmental significana: or
specific approval of the appropriate
conditions (e.g., safety system not
4. A failure to make a required
Deputy Executive Director.
operable unlas offsite power is
Licensee Event Report.
available: materials or components not
Sepplement I-Reactor Operations
environmentally ualified);or
Suppleasent II-Part 50 Facility
This supplement provides examples
(b)Being d
ed to the extent that
Cemetruction
i
of violations in each of the four sentity a detailed av untion would be required
This supplement rovides examples
1:vels as guidance in determi
the
to determine its operability (e.g.,
of violations in each of the four severity
appropriate severitylevelforvio tions component parameters outside
lents as guidance in determining the
in the area of reactor operations,
approved limits such as pump flow
appropriate severity level for violations
A. Severity LevelI-Violations
rates, heat exchanger transfer
in the area of Part 50 facility
.
involving for example:
characteristics, safety valve lift
construction.
1. A Safety Limit, as denned in to
setpoints, or valve stroke times):
A. Severity LevelI-Violations
CFR 50.36 and the Technical
involving structures or systems that are
Specifications being exceeded;
meneeenal contml systeme, a weil u physical
completed 83 in such a manner that they
2. A system ti deel ed to prevent or
'7"""*
,,
mitigate a serious se ety event not being selety m. enn not directed toward a km
aThe term completed'* u uand in thle
of - '
H. A lose of one subsysteen does not
supplement meene compiedon'of construction
H The tonn " system'* es used in these
dedent the intended eefety funcuen es long as the
includine review and eccepeance by the
supplements includes administrative and
other subsystem le operable.
construction QA orgenlaation.
l
1
20
.
,,,eg
,w.m
-ema-
e'
- me mmisss+=,4w
e
F4e w- e
A--m+--s
V
'P
'
"
.
. _
____
-
. _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._ _ ____ _ _
__
. _ . _ _
____
,n
.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.126 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
34399
-
!
j
would not have satisfied their intended able to perform its intended safety
considered to be significant while the
,
safety related purpose.
function when actually called upon to
information is outside the protected area
1
B. Severity LevellI-Violations
work: or
and accessible to those not authorized
involving for example:
(c) An accidental criticality occurred: access to the protected area:
1. A breakdown in the Quality
2. The theft, loss, or diversion of a
6. A significant failure to respond to
'
l
Assurance (QA) program as exemplified formula quantity 84 of special nuclear
an event eitherin sufficient time to
l
by deficienciesin construction QA
material (SNMh or
provide protection to vital equipment or
related to more than one work activity
3. Actual unauthorized production of strategic SNM. or with an adequate
j
(e.g., structural, piping. electrical,
a formula quantity of SNM.
response force:
foundations).These deficiencies
B. Severity LevellI-Violations
7. A failure to perform en appropriate
s
!
normally involve the licensee's failure
involving for example:
evaluation or background investigation
!
to conduct adequate audits or to take
1.The entry of an unauthorized
so that information relevant to the
prompt corrective action on the basis of individualiswho represents a threat
access determination was not obtained
such audits and normally involve
into a vital areaa from outside the
or considered and as a result a person.
multiple examples of deficient
protected area;
who would likely not have been granted
construction or construction of
2.The theft, loss or diversion of SNM access by the licensee,if the required
i
unknown quality due to inadequate
of moderate strategic significance " in
investigation or evaluation hadbeen
program implementation: or
which the security system did not
perforrned was granted access:or
,
2. A structure or system that is
function as required: or
8. A breakdown in the security
completed in such a manner that it
3. Actual unauthorized production of program involving a number of
l
could have an adverse effect on the
SNM.
violations that are related (or, if isolated.
l
safety of operations.
C. Severity LevellII-Violations
that are recurring violations) that
C. Seventy Level llI-VJolations
involving for example:
collectively reflect a potentially
.
involving for example:
1. A failure or inability to control
significant lack of attention or
!
1. A deficiency in a licensee QA
access through established systems or
carelessness toward licensed
i.
program for construction related to a
procedures, such that an unauthorized
responsibilities,
i
single work activity (e.g.. structural,
individual (i.e., not authorized
D. Saverity LevelIV-Violations
piping, electrical or foundations). This
unescorted access to protected area)
involving for example:
3
significant deficiency normally involves could easily gain undetected access
1. A fatture or inability to control
J
the licensee's failure to conduct
into a vital area from outside the
access such that an unauthorized
!
adequate audits or to take prompt
protected area:
Individual (i.e., authorized to protected
I
corrective action on the basis of such
2. A failure to conduct any search at
area but not to vital area) could easily
i
audits, and normally involves multiple
the access control point or conducting
gain undetected access into a vital area
i
examples of deficient construction or
an inadequate search that resulted in the from inside the protected area or into a
l
construction of unknown quality due to introduction to the protected area of
controlled access area:
j
inadequate program implementation:
firearms, explosives, or incendiary
2. A failure to respond to a suspected
2. A failure to confirm the design
devices and reasonable facsimiles
event in either a timely manner or with
i
safety requirements of a structure or
thereof that could significantly assist
an adequate response force:
,
system as a result of inadequate
radiological sabotage or theft of strategic
3. A failure to implement to CFR
l
preoperational test program
SNM:
Parts 25 and 95 with respect to the
j
implementation: or
3. A failure, degradation, or other
information addressed under Section
j
3. A failure to make a required 10 CFR deficienc'y of the protected area
142 of the Act, and the NRC approved
50.55(e) report.
Intrusion detection or alarm assessment security plan relevant to those parts:
a
!
D. Seventy Level IV-Violations
systems such that an unauthorized
4. A failure to make, maintain, or
j
involving failure to meet regulatory
individual who represents a threat
provide log entries in accbrdance with
j
requirements including one or more
could predictably circumvent the
10 CFR 73.71 (c) and (d), where the
a
Quality Assurance Criterion not
system or defeat 'a specific zone with a
omitted information (i) is not otherwise
i
amounting to Severity Level 1. II, or III
high degree of confidence without
available in easily retrievable records,
i
violations that have more than minor
insider knowledge, or other significant
and (ii) significantly contributes to the
'i
safety or environmental significance.
degradation of overall system capability ability of either the NRC or the licensee
4. A si nificant failure of the
to identify a programmatic breakdown;
Supplement III-Safeguards
safeguarks systems designed or used to5. A failure to conduct a proper search
This supplement provides examples
prevent or detect the theft, loss, or
at the access control point:
of violations in each of the four severity diversion of strategic SNM:
6. A failure to properly secure or
levels as guidance in determining the
5..A failure to protect or control
protect classified or safeguards
appropriate severity level for violations classified or safeguards information
information inside the protected area
in the area of safeguards.
which could assist an individual in an
A. Severity lavelI-Violations
u su to cnt n.: for the denniuon of-formula act of radiological sabotage or theR of
involving for example:
quanusy."
strategic SNM where the infonnation
1. An act of radiological sabotage in
a h tenn "unautherland individual * as used
was not removed from the protected
which the security system did not
$8",Pkenw
mmne
un
arte:
,
,
function as required and, as a result of
not atherised to enin in the manner muwed.
7. A failure to control access such that
the failure, there was a significant event,
m phree vuel nu as used in this
an opportunity exists that could allow
suPP anent inclades whal amm and matwiel eccam unauthorized and undetected access
such as:
l
(a) A Safety Limit, as defined in 10
into the protected area but which was
"*-
CFR 50.36 and the Technical
j gcrags
sg neither easily or likely to be e loitable:
g,
8. A failure to conduct an a
te
Sp(ecifications, was exceeded:
= In dmenniales whether accom con be emuy
b) A system designed to prevent or
sataed. facine ewh a pediciabouy. idenunabiuty. search at the exit from a matori access
mitigate a serious safety event was not
and een of peessee should be considemd.
area:
21
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. ....
.
34400
Federal Register / Vol. 60 No.126 / Friday, June 30,1995 / gicts
_
9. A theft or loss of SNM oflow
skin of the whole body, or to the feet.
applcable limits in to CFR Part 20
strategic significance that was not
ankles, hands or forearms, or to any
Sectians 20.1001-20.2401 whether or
detected within the time period
other organ or tissue:
not ar. exposure or reluse occurs:
specified in the security plan, other
4. An annual exposure of a member of
9. Disposal of licensed material not
relevant document. or regulation: or
the public in excess of 0.5 rem total
covered in Severity Levels I or 11:
10.Other violations that have more
effective dose equivalent:
10. A release for unrestricted use of
than minor safeguards significance.
5. A release of radioactive material to
contaminated or radioactive material or
an unnstricted area at concentration: in equipment that poses a realistic
Supplement IV--Health Physics (to
excess f to tin m the limits for
potential for exposum of the public to
CFR Part 20)
members of the public as described in
levels or doses exceeding the annual
l
This supplement provides examples
to CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(1) (except when
dose limits for members of the public,
of violations in each of the four severity operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been
or that allects a programmatic (rather
levols as guidance in determining the
approved by the Commission under
than an isolated) weaknasin the
. appropriate severity level for violations Section 20.1301(c)h
radiation control program:
in the area of hulth physics.10 CFR 6. Disposal oflicensed materialin
11. Conduct of licensee activities by a
l
Part 20.*
quantitles or concentrations in excess of technically unqualified person:
A. Severity LevelI Violations
five times the limits of to CFR 20.2003:
12. A significant failure to control
'
involving for example:
or
licensed material: or
l
1. A radiation exposure during any
7. A failure to make an immediate
13. A breakdown in the radiation
l
year of a workerin excess of 25 rems
notification as requimd by to CFR
safety program involving a number of
I
total effective dose equivalent. 75 rems
20.2202 (a)(1) or (a)(2).
violations that are related (or, if isolated.
l
to the lens of the eye, or 250 rads to the
C. Severity LevelIII-Violations
that are recurring) that collectively
skin of the whole body, or to the feet.
involving for example:
represent a potentially significant lack
ankles, hands or forearms, or to any
1. A radiation exposure during any
of attention or carelessness toward
other organ or tissue:
year of a worker in excess of 5 rems total licensed asponsibilities.
2. A radiation exposure over the
effective dose equivalent.15 rems to the
D. Severity I4vellV-Violations
gestation period of the embryo / fetus of
lens of the eye, or 50 roms to the skin
involving for example:
I
a declared pregnant woman in excess of of the whole body or to the feet. ankles.
1. Exposures in excus of the limits of
1
I
2.5 rems total effective dose equivalent; hands or forearms, or to any other organ 10 CFR 20.1201,20.1207, or 20.1208 not
3. A radiation exposum during any
or tissue
constituting Severity Level I. II. or III
year of a minor in excess of 2.5 rems
2. A radiation exposure over the
violations
total effective dose equivalent,7.5 rems gestation riod of the embryo / fetus of
2. A release of radioactive material to
a deci
pregnant woman in excess of an unrestricted area at concentrations in
to the lens of the eye, or 25 rems to the
skin of the whole body, or to the feet,
0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent
excess of the limits for members of the
ankles, hands or forearms, or to any
(*xc8Pt when doses an in accordance
public as referenced in to CFR
other organ or tissue;
with the provisions ofSection
20.1302(b)(2)(1) (except when operation
4. An annual exposure of a member of 20.1208(d)h
up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved
the public in excess of 1.0 rem total
3. A radiation exposure during any
by the Commission under Section
effective dose equivalent;
yur of a minorin excess of 0.5 rem total 20.1301(c));
5. A release of radioactive material to effective dose equivalent; 1.5 roms to
3. A radiation dose rate in an
)
an unrestricted area at concentrations in the lens of the eye, or 5 rems to the skin unrestricted or controlled area in excess
excess of 50 times the limits for
i the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, of 0.002 rem in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (2 millirem /
members of the public as described in
hands or forearms, or to any other organ hour) or 50 millirems in a year:
or tissue:
4. Failure to maintain and implement
6. Disposal oflicensed materialin
4. A worker exposure above
radiation p
ms to keep radiation
'
quantities or concentrations in excess of replatory limits when such exposure
exposuresas owasisreasonably
'
to times the limits of to CFR 20.2003.
muscts a programmatic (rather than an
acmovable:
isolated) weekness in the radiation
5. Doses to a member of the public in
B. Severity LevelII-Violations
involving for example,
control program;
excess of any EPA generally a plicable
1. A radiation exposure during an
5. An annual exposure of a member of environmentalradiation stan ards,such
yest of a worker in excess of 10 rems
the public in excess of 0.1 rem total
as 40 CFR Part 190:
tctal effective dose equivalent. 30 rems
effective dose equivalent (e
t when
6. A failure to make the 30-day
operation up to O'.5 rem a year as been
notification required by to CFR
to the lens of the eye, or 100 rems to the approved by the CommWon under
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) or 20.2203(a);
skin of the whole body, or to the feet,
7. A failure to make a timely written
Section 20.1301(c))[-6. A release of ra ilosctive material to
report as required by 10 CFR 20.2201(b),
ankles, hands or forearms, or to any
other organ or tissue:
an unrestricted area at concentrations in 20.2204, or 20.2206: or
2. A radiation exposure over the
excess of two times the effluent
8. Any other matter that has more
gestation riod of the embryo / fetus of
concentration limits referenced in 10
than a minor safety, health, or
ufva
CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(1)(except when
environmental significance.
1.0 m otal activ
t
a ur
bun
3. A radiation exposure during any
MyQ,0
Supplement V-Transportation
,p
o
.
yur of a minor in excess of 1 rem total
Section 20.1301(c))*.
Es supplement provides examples
effective dose equivalent: 3.0 rems to
7. A failure to make a 24-hour
of violations in each of the four severity
the lens of the eye, or to rems to the
notification required by to CFR
levels as guidance in determining the
20.2202(b) or an immediate notification appropriate severity level for violations
Et I .'e"inc N uTNN.Yb,
]uired by to CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(1);
"*
. A substantial potential for
emeegency response effon will be usated on a ceae.
by<s= basie.
exposune or releases in excess of the
22
,
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-
r -.
-
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~
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.
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- . - - - -
_ - - - _ - - - - - - _
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Federal Register / Vol. 60 No.126 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
34401
. In the area of NRC transportation
collectively reflect a potentially
C. Severity Levellli-Violations
requirements 5
significant lack of attention or
involvina for example:
A, . Severity Level 1-Violations
carelessness toward licensed
1. A failure to control access to
involving fer example:
raponsibilities.
Licensed materials for radiation
1. Failure to meet transportation
D. Severity levelIV-Violations
purposes as specified by NRC
requirements that resulted in loss of
involving for example:
rements:
control of radioactive material with a
1. A breach of
gointogt ty
. Possession or use of unauthorized
breach in package integrity such that the withoutextemal ediationle s
eq pment or materials in b conduct
material caused a radiation exposure to
exceeding the NRC limit or without
of consee activities which degrades
l
a member of the public and there was
contamination levels exceeding'five
safety:
clear potential for the public to receive
times the NRClimits:
3. Use of radioactive material on
more than .1 rem to the whole body:
2. Surface contamination in excess of humans where such use is not
2. Surface contamination in excess of but not more than five timw the NRC
authorized;
j
50 times the NRC limit: or
limit:
4. Conduct of licensed activities by a
,
j
3. External radiation levels in excess
3. A failure to registe.' as an
technically unqualified person:
l
of to times the NRC limit.
authorized user of an NRC-Certified
5. Radiation levels, contamination
!
B. Severity Levet II-Violations
Transport package;
levels. or releases that exceed h limits
involving for example:
4. A noncompliance with ship g
specified in the license:
l
1. Failure to meet transportation
papers, marking, labeling, pl
ing,
8. Substantial failure to implement
i
requirements that resulted in loss of
packaging or loading not amounting to
the quality management program as
'
control of radioactive material with a
a Severity Level I. IL or 111 violation:
required by Se:: tion 35.32 that does not
,
brach in package integrity such that
5. A failure to demonstrate that
result in a misedministration: failure to
there was a clear potential for the
packages for special foot radioactive
report a misadministration: or
member of the public to receive more
material meets applicable regulatory
programmatic weakness in the
than .1 rem to the whole body
requirements:
implementation of the quality
2. Surface contamination in excess of
6. A failure to demonstrate that
managemwnt program that results in a
10, but not more than 50 times the NRC packages meet DOT Specifications for
misadministration.
'
l_
limit:
7A
A packages:or
7. A breakdown in the control of
licensed activities involving (a number
-
3. Extemal radiation levels in excess
7
er violations that have more
of violations that are related or. if
!
of five, but not more than 10 times the
than minor safety or environmental
NRC limit; or
significance.
Isolated, that are recurring violations)
that collectively represent a potentially
4. A failure to make required initial
SuPP ement VI-FuelCycle and
sigrifficant lack of attention or
l
i
notifications associated with Severity
Materials Operations
carelessness toward licensed
LevelI or !! violations.
C. Severity Leveillt-Violations
This supplement provides examples
responsibilities:
involving for exarriple:
of violations in each of the four severity
8. A failure,during radiographic
1. Surface contamination in excess of levels as guidance in determining the
operations, to have present or to use
,
five but not more than to times the NRC appropriate severity level for violations radiographic equipment, radiation
l
limit:
in the area of fuel cycle and materials
survey instruments, and/or personnel
2. Extemal radiation in excess of one
operations,
monitoring devices as required by to
but not more than five times the NRC
A. Severity Level 1-Violations
CFR Part 34:
Ilmit:
involving for example:
9. A failure to submit an NRC Form
3. Any noncompliance withlabeling,
le Radiation. levels, contamination
241 in accordance with the
placarding, shipping papor, packaging,
levels, or releases that exceed to times
requirements in Section 150.20 of to
loading. or other requirements that
the limits specified in the license:
CFR Part 150:
could reasonably result in the following:
2. A system designed to prevent or
10. A failure to receive required NRC
(a) A significant failure to identify the mitigate a serious safety event not being approval prior to the implementation of
ty
quantity,or form of material:
operable when actually required to
a change in licensed activities that has
A failure of the carrier or recipient perform its design function:
radiological or programmatic
to exercise adequete controls; or
3. A nuclear criticality accident: or
significance. such as, a change in
,
(c) A substantial potential for either
4. A failure to follow the procedures
ownership: lack of an RSO or
personnel exposure or contamination
of the quality management program,
replacement of an RSO with an
.
above regulatory limits or improper
required by Section 35.32. that results in unqualified individual; a change in the
'
transfer of material:
a oesth or serious injury (e.g.,
location where licensed activities are
4. A failure to'make required initial
substantial organ impairment) to a
being conducted, or where licensed
notification esaociated with Severity
patient.
material is being stored where the new
t
l
Level 111 violations; or
B. Severity LevelII-Violations
facilities do not meet safety guidelines:
l
5. A breakdown in the licensee's
involving for example:
or a change in the quantity or type of
program for the transportation of
1. Radiation levels, contamination
radioactive material being processed or
licensed materialinvolvin a number'of levels. or releases that exceed five times used that has radiological significance;
violations that are re'ated , if isolated, the limits specilled in the license:
or
that are recurring violations) that
2. A system designed to prevent or
11. A significant failure to meet
mitigate a serious safety event being
decommissioning requirements
wsomeinnsponenoa aquirweseen er epplied
inoperable; or
including a failure to notify the NRC as
to non then one licenses tavolved in the earne
3. A substantial programmatic failure
required by regulation or license
agcasgh4e shipper
in the implementation of the quality
condition, substantial failure to meet
wb*a
management program required by 10
decommissioning standards, failure to
,
,
,
[
ection will be d
ecstasi the responenbie
ticenseewhich. dertheesse-orihe
CFR 35.32 that results in a
conduct and/or complete
,
case, may be one or men of the licensees navolved.
misadministration.
decommissioning activities in
23
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.
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.
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. _ _ _ _ . _ _
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l
34402
Federal Register / Vcl. 60, N2.126 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
accordance with regulation or license
or the common defense and security
EAP's staffis aware thet en individual's
condition, or failure to meet required
("signi8 cent information identified by a condition may adverselyiffect safety
schedules without adequate
licensee") and is deliberately withheld
related activities: or
just1Bcation.
from the Commission:
9. 'Ibe failure of licensee ====gn=a'it
!
D. Sewrity LevelIV-Violations
4. Action by senior corporate
to take effective action in carrecting a
involving for example:
man *6ementin violation of to CFR 50.7 hostile work environment.
'
1. A failure to maintain patients
orsimilar re
hospitall ed who have cobalt-60
employee; gulations against an
C. Severity IAvelIII-Violations
involving forexample:
cesium 137, or iridium-192 Implants or
5. A knowing and intentional failure
1. Incomplete orinaccurate
l
to conduct required leakage or
to provide the notice required by to
information that is provided to the NRC
1
1
!
contamination tests, or to use properly
CFR Part 21: or
(a) because ofI
actions on the
l
calibrated equipment:
6. A failure to substantially
Part of banaan o
but_not
2.Other violations that have more
implement the required Etness-for-duty amounting to a Severity 14 veli orII
than minor safety or environmental
program
violation, or (b) If the information. bd
n
'
.
significance: or
B. Severity levelII-Violations
it been complete and accurate at the
!
3. Failure to follow the quality
involving for example:
time provided,likely would have
{
management program, including
1. Inaccurate orincomplete
resulted in a reconsideration of a
procedures, whether or not a
information that is provided to the NRC regulatory position or substantial further
l
misadministration occurs. provided the (a) by a licensee ofAclal because of
inquiry such as an additionalinspection
failures are isolated, do not demonstrate careless disregard for the completeness
or a formal request for information:
a programm, tic weakness in the
or accuracy of the information, or (b) if
2. Incomplete or inaccurate
implementation of the QM program, and the information, had it been complete
information that the NRC requires be
)
l
han limited consequences if a
and accurate at the time pmvided. likely kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplato
i
misadministration is involved: failure to would haw resulted in regulatory action or inaccurate because ofinadequate
l
l
conduct the required program review: or such as a show cause order or a different actions on the part of licensee officials
'
failure to take corrective actions as
regulatory position:
but not amounting to a Severity IAvel I
required by Section 35.32: or
2. Incomplete or inaccurate
or 11 violation, or (b) if the information,
i
4. A failure to keep the records
information that the NRC requires be
had it been complete and accurate when
i
l
required by Sections 35.32 or 35.33.
kept by a licensee which is (a)
reviewed by the NRC, likely would have
l
incomP ete or inaccurate because of
resulted in a reconsideration of a
Supplement VII-Miscellaneous
Matt
careless disregard for the accuracy of the regulatory F ation or substantial further
information on the part of a licensee
inquiry such as an additional inspection
This supplement provides examples
ofBcial, or (b) if the information. had it
or a formal request forinformation:
,
of violations in each of the four senrity been complete and accurate when
3.A failure to provide "signi6 cant
'
levels as guidance in' determining the
reviewed by the NRC, likely would have information identified by a limnase to
appropriate severity level for violations
resulted in regulatory action such as a
the Commission and not amounting to
involving miscellaneous matters.
show cause order or a different
a Severity LevelI orII violation:
A. Severity 1Avel 1-Violations
Fogulatory posillonl
4. An action by first line supervision
involving for example:
3. "Significant information identified in violation of to CFR 50.7 or similar
1. Inaccurate or incomplete
by a licensee" and not provided to the
regulations against an employee:
information 25 that is provided to the
Commission because of careless
5. An inadequate review or failure to
NRC (a) deliberately with the knowledge disregard on the part of a licensee
review such that,if an appropriate
of a licensee official that the information ofBcial:
review had been made as required,a 10
is incomplete or inaccurate, or (b) if the
4. An action by plant management
CFR Part 21 report would han been
information, had it been complete and
above first line supervision in violation made:
,
accurate at the time provided, likely
of 10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations
6. A failure to complete a suitable
would have resulted in regulatory action against an employee:
inquiry on the basis of to CFR Part 26,
such as an immediate order required by
5. A failure to provide the notice
keep records concerning the denial of
the public health and safety.
required by 10 CFR Part 21:
access, or respond to inquiries
2. Incomplete orinaccurate
6. A failure to remove an individual.
concerning denials of access so that. as
information that the NRC requires be
from unescorted access who has been
a result of the failure, a person
kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplete involved in the sale, use, or possession
previouaiv denied access for Atness-for-
or inaccurate because of falsification by ofillegal drugs within the protected area duty reasons was improperly granted
or with the knowledge of a licensee
or take action for on duty misuse of
access:
l
l
official, or (b) if the information, had it
orescri
7. A failure ta take the ri> quired action
i
been complete and accurate when
alcohol. drugs; ption drugs, or over-the. for a person confirmed to have bee
,
counter
reviewed by the NRC, likely would have
7. A failure to take reasonable action
tested positive for illegal drug use or
!
resulted in regulatory action such as an
when observe i behavior within the
take action for onsite alcohol use: not
immediate order required by public
protected arm. or credible information
amounting to a Severity LevelII
,
'
health and safety considerations:
concerning activities within the
violation:
3.Information that the licensee has
protected aree indicates possible
8. A failure to assure, as required, that
,
identified as having significant
unfitness for duty based on drug or
contractors or vendors have an effective
implications for public health and safety alcohol use:
fitness-for duty program:
8. A deliberate failure of the licensee's
9. A breakdown in the fitness-for-duty
recording inaccursie er incompiow 6alennesian and
oyoo Assistance Program (EAP) to
Program involving a number of
J
- In applying the seamples la this supplement
i
licensee's managenwnt when
violations of the basic elements of the
l
recorde, resemnee should eleo be made so the
n
1
sundance in Section IX. " Inaccurate end Incomplete
fitness-for-duty MEram that-
1
l
Intonnation. and to the densation et-ticenses
asThe seample for violseione for ateenwor duty
collectively re
a significant lack of
t
orncial conminedinsectioniv.c.
eenese to vionsuene et to cra part es,
attention or carele,ssness owards
!
24
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Federal Register / Vol. 60. No.126 / Friday June 30, 1995 / Notices
34403
'
,
meeting the objectives c f 10 CFR 26.10:
in the area of emergency preparedness.
standard involving assessment or
I
it should be noted that citations are not
notification.
i
or
10. Threats of discrimination or
normally made for violations involving
C. Severity LevelIII-Violations
restrictive agreements which are
emergency preparedness occurring
involving for example:
4
l
violations under NP.C regulations such
during emergency exercises. However.
1. In an alert. Licensee failure to
as to CFR 50.7(0
where exercises reveal (i) training.
promptly (1) correctly classify the event.
D. Severity Level .'.V-Violations
procedural, or repetitive failures for
(2) make required notifications to
involving for example:
which corrective actions have not been
responsible Federal. State. and locai
'
1. Incomplete or maccurate
taken. (11) an overall concern regarding
agencies, or(3) respond to the evimt
1
information of more than minor
the licensee's ability to implement its
(e.g., assess actual or potential o$lte
,
i
significance that is provided to the NRC plan in a manner that adequately
consequences, activate ereer ency
s
but not amounting to a Severity Levell, protects public health and safety, or (111) response facilities, and riugment shift
II. or III violation:
poor self critiques of the licensee's
stafC:
l
2. Information that the NRC requires
exercises, enforcement action may be
2. A licensee failure to meet or
i
be kept by a licensee and that is
appropriate.
Implement more than one emergency
j
incomplete or inaccurate and of more
A. Severity lavelI-Violations
planning standard involving assessment
!
than minor significance but not
involving for example:
or notification: or
!
amounting to a Severity Level 1. II, or til
in a general emergency, licensee
3. A breakdown in the control of
violation:
failure to promptly (1) correctly classify licensed activities involvin6 a number
3. An inadequate review or failure to
the event. (2) make required
of violations that are related (or,if
,
review under 10 CFR Part 21 or other
notifications to responsible Federal
isolated. that are recurring violational
procedural violations associated with 10 State, and local agencies. or (3) respond that collectively represent a potentially
4
CFR Part 21 with more than minor
to the event (e.g., sar,ess actual or
significant lack of attention or
safety significance:
potential offsite consequences, activate
carelessness toward licensed
,
<
!
4. Violations of the requirements of
emergency response facilities, and
responsibilities.
Part 28 of more than minor significance; augment shift staf0.
D. Severity LevelIV-Violations
i
5. A failure to report acts of licensed
B. Severity Level 11-Violations
involving for example:
j
operators or supervisors pursuant to 10
involving for example:
A licensee failure to meet or
i
CFR 26.73: or
1. In a site emergency, lice'nsee failure implement any emergency planning
6. Discrimination cases which. in
to promptly (1) correctly classify the
standard or requirement not directly
themselves, do not warrant a Severity
event. (2) make required notifications to related to assessment and notification
LevelIIIcategorization,
responsible Federal. State. and local
gig,'Yg,gg, g,
agencies, or (3) respond to the event
oOune m5.
Supplement VIII-Emergency
(e.g., assess actual or potential offsite
h'or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Preparedness
consequences, activate emergency
This supplement provides examples
response facilities, and augment shift
r a C.Heyle,
of violations in each of the four severity staf0: or
Secretaryof theCommission.
levels as guidance in determining the
2. A licensee failure to meet or
(FR Doc. 95-15952 F11ed 6-29-95: 8:45 aml
j
sppropriate severity level for violations implement one emergency planning
esame caos rose ow
i
25
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NRC FOGM 335
U S. NUCLEGR CEGULATO2V COMMIS$10N
1. REPORT WUMBEW
l
SLe2,
!^"1 Aeo.', .",,,,iZ"h,,'*f* "" -
- * *
!
22o1. 22o2
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET
N U R E G - 16 0 0
l
tsaa rmerver,om on ana re, arse,
a
,
.
!
2. TITLE AND SU8 TITLE
I
L
l
3~
O ATE REPORT PUBLISHEO
General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions
.
'
vo,g ,,
,,,,
July
1995
5. AUTHOR (Si
6. TYPE OF REPORT
l
Regulatory
l
Office of Enforcement
L PE RDOO COVERED tincreme caren
8. PER F ORMING ORG ANIZAT ION - N AME AND ADD R ESS ter vec. ora .se o,ves,on. orrece or aer
a. u.s Nucmar nevuotory comm won, ,an ,n,,s,a,,co,ess. n coner,cror. o,o.,oe
none and me,wse scoress b
Office of Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
9. SPONSORING ORG ANIZ ATION - N AM E AN D ADDR ESS 10 Nnc, r,pe mme as neo e". ,r contractor. orov ae Nnc o,vos on. on,ce ar nes,on. u 1 Nucwor nesuurer, comm, won.
saa aia,s,a, acoresa s
Same as 8 above.
10. SUPPLEMENT ARY NOTES
11, ABSTR ACT (200. ores or mus
This document includes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's or Commission's) revised
General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy) as it was
published in the Federal Register on June 30,1995 (60 FR 34381). This document also includes the
notice announcing the removal of the Enforcement Policy from the Code of Federal Regulations
(60 FR 34380; June 30,1995). The Enforcement Policy is a general statement of policy explaining the
NRC's policies and procedures in initiating enforcement actions, and of the presiding officers and the
Commission in reviewing these actions. This policy statement is applicable to enforcement in matters
involving the radiological health and safety of the public, including employees' health and safety, the
common defense and security, and the environment. This statement of general policy and procedure is
published as NUREG-1600 to provide widespread dissemination of the Commission's Enforcement
Policy. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from
this statemmt of policy and procedure as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case.
i2. K E Y WO RDS10 E SC R : P TO R S It,se woros er onrews ener =>st esust rewareners m sacar,av ene reoort. s
t3. Av AiLAst u I y 5i A T E MEN r
i
Unlimited
l
NRC enforcement guidance
... ucuma r cussmcA no~
!
traa
e,
l
NRC enforcement program
Unclassified
NRC enforcement responsibilities
'ra a=
'
Unclassified
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
16. PRICE
NAC FORM 335 42491
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