IR 05000160/1985004: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20138Q893
| number = ML20154A378
| issue date = 12/09/1985
| issue date = 02/25/1986
| title = Insp Rept 50-160/85-04 on 851028-1101.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Appraisal
| title = Ack Receipt of 860122 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Engineering Preparedness Appraisal Rept 50-160/85-04.Item B,Number 6 Clarified in 860213 Telcon
| author name = Decker T, Marston R
| author name = Walker R
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Karam R
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, ATLANTA, GA
| docket = 05000160
| docket = 05000160
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-160-85-04, 50-160-85-4, NUDOCS 8512300063
| document report number = NUDOCS 8603040006
| package number = ML20138Q872
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 1
| page count = 18
}}
}}


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  \*****/  DEC 181985 Report No.: 50-160/85-04 Licensee: Georgia Institute of Technology 225 North Avenue Atlanta, GA 30332 Docket No.: 50-160    License No.: R-97 Facility Name: Georgia Institute of Technology Inspection Conducted: October 28 - November 1, 1985 Inspecthrh[N  6  /2/4/85 R. R..Marston' ~ ~p'
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Dit e' Signed
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Accompanying Personnel: A. Gooden
  . Hogan (IE HQs)
Approved by:  MC  _ /,d ! f 8 7 T. R. Decker, Section Chief  D6te' Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, anncunced inspection involved 108 inspector-hours on site in the areas of an emergency preparedness appraisal.


!
FEB 2 51986 Georgia Institute of Technology ATTN: Dr. Ratib A. Karam, Director of Nuclear Research Center 900 Atlantic Drive, Atlanta, GA 30332 Gentlemen:
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
SUBJECT: REPORT NO. 50-160/85-04 Thank you for your response of January 22, 1986, to our Engineering Preparedness Appraisal Report issued on December 18, 1985, concerning activities conducted at your Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility. Your response indicated a lack of understanding of the meaning of the item described in Appendix B, Number 6. This item was clarified in the telephone conversation between Dr. Karam and Mr. R. Marston of this office on February 13, 1986. We vill examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection We appreciate your cooperation in this matte


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Sincerely,
,
;   Original Signed by
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i 0512300063 e51218 0 DR ADOCK 050
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  .-  .
Roger D. Walker
      - = .,  . . _ - . .. .  .-
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Roger D. Walker, Director Division of Reactor Projects cc evT. E. Stelson, Vice President for Research bcc:/icenseFeeManagementBranch
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. 4. Mathews, EPLB, IEHQ EP Section Files Document Control Desk State of Georgia      '
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TABLE 4 0F CONTENTS
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"v INTRODUCTION            ,
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i- EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION
*
1.1 Onsite    !$
1.1.1- Functional Area: and Assignments 1. Interviews and Walkthroughs      ,
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1.2 Offsite            s
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1. FunctionaldreasandAssignments      A  .
1. InterviewsSand Walkthroughs   1, EMERGENCY RESPONSE      -
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  ,21 Notification and Acy vation of Emergency Organi;ation
  /  2. P rocedt.re''d * -
      -
2. Communica'tions
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  '2.2 Classification and Assessment    (
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2. Identification and Classification    " 1
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2. Assessment Action  /    3  '
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- Protective /CorrectiveActjans    '/ tig ,;    .;  !
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  .2. ~ FaciT1 ties and Equipment 4    ..,
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2. Evacuation and Accountabilit'y    q '.
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2. Personnel Exposure ControF          "!'
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First Aid and Rescue i  .            .
! MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS    * ;  -q gE ?      -t 3.1pTraining and lletraining Program I
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4.0 PERSONS CONTACTED          2
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INTRODUCTION      ,
3  ; The purpose of this appraisal was to perform h c'omprehensive evaluation of the l  licensee's emergency preparedness prograp. Tnts appraisal included an evaluation
:  of the adequacy and offectiveness oh arais for which explicit regulatory
$  requiremints may not currently exist.]  V' .
The appraisal scope and findings were'summapized on November 1, 1985, with those h  personsindicatedinSection4.0ofthh[repbr '
    \  .
1.0 EMEk'4ENCY ORGANIZATION 1.1 Osite Organization  ,
      :( , ;
. 1.1,1 Functional Areas-
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Th'is area was reviewed with resp)ect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.A.2, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS
        ~
  \'1    15.16-1982, Se'ction k
  ,. The' inspector reviewed the Emergency Plan (EP) and
  ''. discussed the emergency organization with licensee representative The inspector verified that the licensee dt atified the functional areas of: Director x  ofEmergen{cy perations (Emergency Director), Coordinator To  of Emergenc Preparedness (Emergency Coordinator),
  -
Pubi Information Liaison (Nuclear Research Center y Mana.icgement 'through the University News Bureau), Radi-
      ^
  ,
ological Assessment Coordinator (Radiological Safety Office), , Individual authorized to terminate emergency and initiate recovery-(Emergency Director), Individual authcrizetl ito permit reentry (Emergency Director), and
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  *
Individuals authorized sto permit volunteer workers to
    ,  incur radiation exposurelin excess of normal occupational a  limits (Emergepcy Director with concurrence of Radi-
    ;  'ological Sa fety Officer (RS0)). . In addition, the t
  '3l'  - licWee defined the specific assignments, authorities,
  *    anhesponsibilitiesintheonsiteemergencyorganizatio These .id? ntifications and definitions were found in
      -
i    Section;3.0 of the Erergen'cy P7an.
 
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  ,_
    *
Noviolktionsordeviationswere' identifie \
  < ,The inspector determined through discussion with licensee g representativds and ireview of the EP, -Section 3.0, that -
n line 6ti succession was -provided - for the following
    't: p pcsitions: Emergency Director, Public Information-
    '
      -Liaison, and Radiological Assessment Coordinator. A line of succession was not provided "for thCEmergency , ; Coordinator since the responsibilities of this position ~s
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      } insolved ' maintaining and. updating emergency phns and 1  'q  - 3 iniplementing procedure h'    i  , , . 9#  2 i
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. 2 No violations or deviations were identifie The inspector determir,- through interviews with licensee personnel thc- all members of the onsite emergency organization had work experience ap repriate to their designated emergency assignment {
No violations or deviations were itentifie l Interviews with five members of the onsite emergency organization showed that they understood the interfaces between and among the onsite functional area An organization chart showing these interfaces was included l in the Emergency Plan as Figure No violations or deviations were identifie The Director of the Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC)
stated that he had authority to spend certain money under emergency conditions. He also stated that he had direct access to the University's Vice President for Research and the Assistant to the President to secure additional fund No violations or deviations were identified.
 
l The F.P, Section 7.1 stated that, "The NNRC emergency ;
i  organization, including offsite support, is capable of l  functioning around the clock in the event of prolonged emergencies." The Center Director stated that no specific plans had been made, but the staff could work shift work for the duration of the emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie . I'nterviews and Walkthroughs The inspector conducted interviews and walkthroughs with five members of the onsite organization. They 'all appeared to understand their responsibilities and authorities for their functional areas of-responsibilit No violations or deviations were identifie .2 Offsite Support 1. Functional Areas and Assignments The EP,' Sections 3.1 and 3.2, identified notification requirements and support provided by Federal, State, and local offsite agencies. Fire protection was provided by .the. Atlanta Fire Department, police protection was w-      _
 
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provided by the Georgia Tech Police, and through them, the Atlanta Police Department. Ambulance and medical support was provided by Grady Hospita Federal and State emergency plans discussed support from the local agencies cited above. A letter of agreement was in effect with Grady Hospital, Police and fire protection would be provided through agreements with the Georgia Tech and Atlanta Police, and Atlanta Fire Depart-ments, respectivel The letter of agreement with Grady Hospital was dated June 6, 198 Other support was provided under the agencies' emergency plan Licensee representatives stated that emergency training had been provided to the Atlanta Fire Department and the Georgia Tech Police. The Fire Department and Hospital /
Ambulance Service participated in appropriate drill No violations or deviations were identifie .2.2 Interviews and Walkthroughs The inspector interviewed representatives of the various support groups specified in the Emergency Plan. All support groups appeared to be aware of their responsi-bilities. Inspection disclosed, however, that the only group which received comprehensive training regarding their duties and responsibilities was the Georgia Tech Polic ,
b Personnel from the various support groups were asked to evaluate the adequacy of the training received pertaining to emergencias at the NNRC. The fire support cantact stated that they needed additional trainin Training for medical and ambulance ' personnel consisted of participating in drills involving simulated contaminated injuries. Other offsite groups had not participated in drills or classroom training. The Georgia Tech Police stated that they had been provided adequate trainin See Section 3.1 of this report for an evaluation of the
_
training program.
 
.
 
      ,
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. 4 2.1 NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION This area was inspected with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.D, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-198 . Procedures The inspector reviewed Sections 7.1 and 7.4 of the Emergency Plan, " Activation of the NNRC Emergency Organization," and
  " Reporting of Emergencies," respectively. The plan specified that the Emergency Director is responsible for initiating the emergency plan and notifying the emergency organization and offsite support personnel, as appropriate. Information to be provided to the NRC was also defined in the Pla Detailed information on notification was provided in the Emergency Plan, Section 7.4, " Reporting of Emergencies." There were no specific notification instructions in ,the Emergency Procedures, howeve The following item is identified for improvement:
  -
Developing a procedure which describes notification methods including the following: the title of the person responsible; the agencies which must be notified for each class of emergency; the time period during which notification must be mede; and the information to be provided (50-160/85-04-01).
 
No violations or deviations were identifie . Communications The primary methods of notification consisted of a public address system (for duty hours in the Center) and telephones (for off-duty hours, and to make notifications). The emer-gency organization notification rosters were posted on bulletin boards throughout the building. The licensee had not checked the status of all of _ the emergency action telephone numbers to ensure that they were updated and correc The Emergency Command Center (ECC) had a telephone-but not a readily available backup means 'of communication within the
  . facilit Internal communication between the ECC and emer-gency teams would_ be by word of mouth. Offsite communi-
  . cations would be backed up by the Georgia Tech Police radios when-the Georgia Tech Police respon ?!arious types of alarms were used by the Georgia Tech reactor
  . facilit The criticality alarms, low pool water level alarms, ,
low zine bromide __ level alarms in the hot cell windows, and
_ - - _-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .- _ _ _
 
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the fire and intrusion alarms were activated at the Georgia Tech Police Departmen Procedures specified actions to be taken upon initiation of various alarm The alarms were tested periodically to assure operabilit Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:
    -
Performing quarterly updates and documentation of the emergency organization rosters should be required (50-160/85-04-02).
 
-
Provision for backup internal communication .at the ECC should be established (50-160/85-04-03).
 
No violations or deviations were identifie .2 Classification and Assessment 2. Identification and Classification This area of the licensee's program was inspected with raspect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982, Section .2. Procedures The inspector reviewed the EP and Emergency Procedures, and discussed this ares with licensee representative The Eu rgency Procedures consisted of eight parts. Part I was a general procedure and Parts II through VIII- addressed specific types of emergencies, and were primarily operational-type emergency procedure The " implementing" procedures were found as parts of the Emergency Pla Sections through 4.5 discussed and defined the emergency classification system used at the Research Center. .An Operational Event was defined as a class less severe than Notification of Unusual Event. Notification of unusual Event, Alert, and : Site Area Emergency . classifications were also discussed. Section 4.5. stated that a General Emergency was not a credible accident at the Center. Section 5.0 discussed Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and referenced Table I,
        " Emergency Classification Guide," which related the Emergency Class, Action Level, and-Purpose for the classes from Operational. Event
. _ = _ . - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ - - - ._ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - .  . - _ . -
 
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. 6 through Aler Section 7.0, " Emergency Response," discussed activation of the emer-gency organization, assessment actions, and protective actions for each classification discussed in Table The EALs appeared to be consistent with those
^
in Table I, " Emergency Classes," found in ANSI /ANS 15.16-198 EALs for thyroid doses at the site boundary _ were included for only the Alert classificatio Licensee repre-sentatives stated that iodine releases were not considered to be a serious threat for this reacto The EALs in Table I were generally based on information readily available to the respon-sible individual Where practical, the EALs also related to facility parameters, effluent release levels, and equipment conditions for each emergency clas The Emergency Procedures and Section 7.0 of the Plan discussed emergency actions for each emergency classificatio Radiological surveys and media sampling were also discussed in Section 7.0 of the Plan, and specifically in the RSO's Health Physics Procedure The EP and Emergency Procedures also made reference to after hours. emergencies. Certain emergency alarms were provided at the Georgia '
Tech Police headquarter Based on the above findings, the following Emergency Plan deficiency was identi.fied:
The Emergency Plan was inconsistent because a Site Area Emergency was defined in Section 4.0; however, respective EALs-were not identified'in Table Further, response to this classification was not-discussed in Section 7.0 (50-160/85-04-04).
 
Your response to the subject item will be reviewed. This -finding will also be reviewed during subsequent inspection No violations or deviations were identifie !
 
n
. 7 2.2. Equipment Through discussions with licensee representa-tives, observation, and inspection of equipment, the inspector determined that the radiological and nonradiological monitors and indicators described in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Procedures were in place and operable. The equipment was described as being necessary for emergency detection and classificatio The monitors appeared to have operating characteristics capable of assessing potential accident conditions. The Kanne A Stack Monitor recorder was labeled to indicate radionuclide concentrations in the stack effluen Other recorders had appropriate trip, alert, or alarm levels assigne Records were reviewed for the calendar year-to-date which showed that operability and calibration checks were performed on the equipment, and that equipment condition or status was documente Licensee representa-tives stated that Technical Specifications required replacement of inoperable instruments, and repair of sam Laboratory facilities and portable sampling and survey equipment were available for post accident sampling and analysis. A licensee representative stated that a backup laboratory was available at another Engineering Building on campus and that State Mobile Lab facilities could be used in an emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie .2.2 Assessment Actions This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982, Section The inspector reviewed the Emergency Plan, Section 7.0, the Emergency Procedures, and the Health Physics Procedure These references described the methods, systems, and equipment for collecting and processing information and data required to define the basis for decisions to escalate or de-escalate emergency response actions. Monitoring of radiation dose rates and contamination levels were described in the Emergency Procedures and Health Physics Procedure Section 7.0 of the Emergency Plan and the Health Physics Procedures described monitoring at the site boundary. This section also stated that the emergency organization was capable of operating for a protracted period of tim No violations or deviations were identifie . Interviews and Walkthroughs The inspector interviewed two Radiation Safety Officers, the Reactor Supervisor, and a Senior Reactor Operato The individuals responsible for emergency detection, classi-fication, and continuing assessment appeared to be familiar witn the plan and procedure During walkthroughs, the individuals .were able to adequately perform emergency detection and classificatio The individuals interviewed stated that. they were trained through a variety of methods including lectures, seminars, tours, and drill No violations or deviations were identifie .3 Protective / Corrective Actions 2. Facilities and Equipment 2.3. Emergeacy Command Center The Emergency Command Center (ECC) was inspected against the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and the criteria . of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982. The ECC was discussed in Section 8.1 of the Emergency Pla The ECC was located in.the NNRC machine shop on the
,  ground level immediately adjacent to the assembly are It was at the farthest location from any potential source of radioactivity. A tour of this
,  area revealed that although telephones were available in the ECC, no procedures or copy.of the Plan were located in the ECC but would need to be brought by the staff. (Other problems with' the ECC were discussed in section 2.1, Communications).
 
Based on the above findings, the following item is recommended for improvement:
  -
Placing copies of the Emergency Plan ' and Procedures in the ECC (50-160/85-04-05).
 
No violations or deviations were ' identifie ,.
 
~
. 9 2.3.1.2 Protective Equipment The adequacy of protective equipment was determined by a tour of the health physics office and an inventory check of the emergency supply cabinet The licensee maintained two emergency supply cabinets; one near the reactor airlock door and one in the ECC. Each cabinet appeared to be adequately stocked with equipment for onsite personnel and provisions were made for providing equipment, such as dosimetry and protective clothing for offsite support groups who might be required to enter a radiation or contaminated area. In addition, the Atlanta Fire Department and the Georgia Tech Police maintained radiation monitoring devices for use during an emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie .3.1.3 Decontamination Capabilities Decontamination was discussed in Section 8.4 of the Emergency Plan, " Decontamination Facilities." The inspector reviewed this portion of the plan and it appeared to be adequat Decontamination facilities and procedures were available throughout the laboratory and reactor building No violations or deviations were identifie .3.1.4 Equipment Maintenance and Calibrations Emergency equipment and supplies were discussed in Sections 8.2 and 10.5 of the Emergency Plan. The Emergency Plan required that the emergency kits be inventoried annuall Radiation monitoring equipment was checked quarterly for operability and calibrated semiannually. Calibrations of facility air monitors were performed annually and calibrations of area radiation monitors were performed monthl No violations or deviations were identifie l I
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. 10 2.3.2 Evacuation and Accountability 2.3. Evacuation Part I of the Emergency Procedures, " General Rules and Guides for Reacting to Emergencies," discussed guidelines for an orderly evacuation of facility personnel and visitor It discussed conditions for partial and complete evacuation during an emergenc However, evacuation routes were not clearly posted. An evacuation alarm was in place at the facility and was tested for operability periodically.
 
.
Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered for improvement:
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Posting evacuation routes with maps showing the location of the assembly area throughout the facility. Old evacuation routes should be removed (50-160/85-04-06).
 
No violations or deviations were identified.
 
'
2.3. Accountability
.
2.3. Assembly Areas Accountability was discussed briefly in the Emer-gency Plan and Part I of the Emergency Procedure The northwest corner of the parking lot, just
.
outside the ECC was designated as the assembly are Segregation of potentially contaminated individuals at the assembly - area was discussed in- Sections 7.5.4 - and 7.6. A of the Plan. The inspector reviewed this procedure .and determined
  -
that there was insufficient detail of the account-ability methods.
 
.
Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered for improvement:
  -
Including a description of- accountability methods and the title of the - responsible person in the procedures (50-160/85-04-07).
 
No violations or deviations were identifie . _ . _ . . . _ . - . _ - - - ~
. 11 2.3. Personnel Monitoring Sections 7.5.4 and 7.6.4 of the Emergency Plan briefly described the responsibility for segre-gating contaminated personnel following facility evacuatio Detection equipment was available at the ECC for accomplishing this responsibility. A review of the procedures describing actions to be taken after building evacuation determined that personnel monitoring was not discusse Based on the above findings, the following appraisal deficiency was identified:
  '  -
Develop and implement an Emergency Procedure which discusses monitoring of personnel at the assembly area and isolation and decontamina-tion, if necessary (50-160/85-04-08).
 
This item constitutes an appraisal deficienc Your response will be reviewe This item will also be reviewed during subsequent inspection No violations or deviations were identifie '
2.3.3 Personnel Exposure Control The licensee developed new emergency procedures describing protective actions to be taken by any individuals in the building during an emergency. The inspector toured the facility and discovered that outdated emergency procedures were posted on fire alarms, doors and bulletin board Exposure guidelines were included in section 7.2, " Protective Action Values," which discussed emergency exposure limits for personnel in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits. Dosimetry was provided for all personnel with access to radiation area Extra dosimetry was available at the ECC-for support personne The licensee had the capability for monitoring personnel doses during emergencies; however, the procedures did not address provisions for performing this activit Provisions for isolation and access control were discussed in section 7.3 of the Plan. Health physics personnel were responsible for supervising isolation and access control to restricted areas to minimize exposures to radiation and to-minimize the spread of radioactive contamination.
 
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  . 12 Based on the above findings, the following items are recommended for improvement:
  -
Removing outdated emergency procedures from doors, bulletin boards and fire alarm Posting current directions with emergency notification rosters in
  ,  appropriate' locations (50-160/85-04-09).
 
-
Developing methods and plans for keeping track of personnel dose during emergencies and making them available in the ECC (50-160/85-04-10).
 
No violations or deviations were identifie .3.4 First Aid and. Rescue First aid equipment was kept in the emergent / supply cabinets, and 'the equipment appeared to be adequate. First aid was also covered in Section 8.3 of the Emergency Fla Accidents resulting in personnel injury without contamination would be handled by the Georgia Tech Police who would administer first aid. In the event of an injury with contamina-tion, the individual would be transported to Grady Memorial Hospital in Grady's Ambulance Service for treatment and decontaminatio No violations or deviations were identified.
 
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3.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 3.1 Emergency Training and Retraining Program The inspector reviewed this area of the licensee's program with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F, and criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982, Section 3.1 This part of the program was inspected through review of licensee records, discussion with licensee representatives, and discussion with representatives of offsite support agencies. The training / retraining was conducted through lectures and weekly seminar sessions, tours, self-study, and attendance at a Radiation Safety Short Cours The attendance sheet for onsite training held in October 1985 showed that four members of the onsite organization did not attend the training on Emergency Procedures. In addition, there was a lack of formal documentation of the training program. No lesson plans or outlines were maintaine Review of records and interviews with personnel showed that not all offsite support agencies were trained as stated in Section 10.1 of the Emergency Pla Six members of the Georgia Tech Police force were trained October 10, 1985. Previous training was conducted in August 198 Eight members of the Atlanta Fire Bureau's Hazardous Materials Team were trained during October 1985. The nearest and most likely first response Engine and Ladder Company was not trained, howeve No personnel from Grady Hospital (emergency room or ambulance) have been trained at the Cente Hospital representatives stated that the hospital has its own in-service training program to familiarize personnel in handling radioactive materials. Licensee representatives stated that ambulance personnel would not enter the containment area,
.
and that Center personnel would remove a victim to a pickup poin The inspector also noted that no formal documentation system existed for recording training and retraining of onsite and offsite personnel with emergency assignment Refer to Section 1.2.2.b above regarding training of onsite and offsite support personnel and agencie The above . findings and those of Section 1.2.2.b of this report are inconsistent with Section 10.1 of the Emergency Plan, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. The referenced requirements specify training of both onsite and offsite personnel and agencies. Accordingly, the requirement is specified to include formal and practical training. The latter includes periodic drills and exercise This finding constitutes an Appraisal Deficiency:
_ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _
 
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Emergency response training to onsite and offsite response personnel provided for all likely emergency response personnel in accordance with requirements (50-160/85-04-11).
 
In addition, the following item should be considered for improvement:
  -
Establishing a formal documentation system for emergency organiza-tion training and retraining (50-160/85-04-12).
 
3.2 Drills This area of the licensee's program was inspected pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982, Section 3.1 The inspector reviewed the established drill and exercise program with licensee personnel. The most recent drill involving offsite participa-tion was held in July 1984. This drill involved the Georgia Tech Police and the Grady Hospital ambulance and medical staff. A scenario was developed and a student observer evaluated the response. However, no documentation existed to show that a critique was hel Licensee representatives stated that evacuation drills were held frequently to test the evacuation plan and warning systems. The Center Director and the RSO were responsible for ensuring that drills were held and for following up on corrective actions. Communicatior, drills had not been held with the Georgia Emergency' Management Agency (GEMA)
or Department of Natural Resources / Environmental Protection Division (DNR/EPD).
 
A written scenario was available for the July 1984 drill. No comments from drill critiques were availabl '
Contrary to requirements that an annual drill be conducted, the licensee's approved EP was accepted with a commitment to a biennial dril Based on the above findings, the following Emergency Plan Deficiency was identified:
The Emergency Plan, Section 10.2 required that drills be conducted biennially rather than annually as specified 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F (50-160/85-04-13).
 
Your response to this finding will be reviewed. This item will also be reviewed during subsequent inspection In addition, the following item should be censidered for improvement:
R________________1__.____________________
 
  . . _ . .  . . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . ._ _ .  -
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  . 15
  -
Documenting drill critiques and providing for incorporation of lessons learned into plan or procedures (50-160/85-04-14).
 
t No violations or deviations were identified.
 
!
3.3 Maintenance of Procedures and Plan This area was inspected pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.G, and the  criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982, l  Section 3.10.2.
 
!
~
The EP, Section '10.4, described the licensee's review and update process, but no procedure was in effec The Nuclear Safeguards
,  Committee, the Center Director, and the RSO shared responsibility for
  .
the biennial review. There was no document control system established for plan distribution. The Center Director determined that only the Georgia Tech Police and Atlanta Emergency Management Agency required
. copie Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:
  -
Developing a procedure for update and revision of the Emergency Plan (50-160/85-04-15).
 
-
Developing a document control and distribution system for the i  Emergency Plan which includes dating the Plan and Procedures, and providing copies to applicable personnel and agencies (50-160/'
85-04-16).
 
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,  16 i
l 4.0 PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Contacts
*R. A.'Karam, Neely Nuclear Research Center Director
*R. M. Boyd, Radiological Safety Of#icer L. D. McDowell, Reactor Supervisor W. H. Downs, Senior Reactor Operator S. N. Millspaugh, Deputy Radiological Safety. 0fficer P. Sharpe, Health Physicist Offsite Contacts P. Deal, i*aining Officer, Atlanta-Fulton County Emergency Management Agency Lt. A. P. Miller, Fire Protection Communications, Atlanta Fire Bureau Lt. H. C. Seales, Training Assistant, Atlanta Fire Bureau C. P. Blackman, Environmental Specialist, Department of Natural Resource /
. Environmental Protection Division Dr. A. G. Yancey, Medical Director, Grady Memorial Hospital  ,
Major W. W. Holly, Director of Special Operations, Atlanta Police Bureau Chief J. Vickery, Chief of Police, Georgia Tech Police C. Harmon, Staff, Georgia Tech News Bureau
  ,
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Revision as of 18:20, 23 October 2020

Ack Receipt of 860122 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Engineering Preparedness Appraisal Rept 50-160/85-04.Item B,Number 6 Clarified in 860213 Telcon
ML20154A378
Person / Time
Site: Neely Research Reactor
Issue date: 02/25/1986
From: Walker R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Karam R
Neely Research Reactor, ATLANTA, GA
References
NUDOCS 8603040006
Download: ML20154A378 (1)
v • d • e


Text

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h

FEB 2 51986 Georgia Institute of Technology ATTN: Dr. Ratib A. Karam, Director of Nuclear Research Center 900 Atlantic Drive, Atlanta, GA 30332 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: REPORT NO. 50-160/85-04 Thank you for your response of January 22, 1986, to our Engineering Preparedness Appraisal Report issued on December 18, 1985, concerning activities conducted at your Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility. Your response indicated a lack of understanding of the meaning of the item described in Appendix B, Number 6. This item was clarified in the telephone conversation between Dr. Karam and Mr. R. Marston of this office on February 13, 1986. We vill examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection We appreciate your cooperation in this matte

Sincerely,

Original Signed by

Roger D. Walker

-.... . - . - - - -

Roger D. Walker, Director Division of Reactor Projects cc evT. E. Stelson, Vice President for Research bcc:/icenseFeeManagementBranch

. 4. Mathews, EPLB, IEHQ EP Section Files Document Control Desk State of Georgia '

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