ML20148E325

Forwards Summary of 880223 Enforcement Conference Re NRC Concerns W/Mgt Control of Health Physics & Operations Program Based on Aug 1987 Contamination Event,Per Insp Rept 50-160/87-08.Related Info & Incident Rept Also Encl

ML20148E325
Person / Time
Site:	Neely Research Reactor
Issue date:	03/14/1988
From:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Stelson T Neely Research Reactor, ATLANTA, GA
Shared Package
ML20148E330	List: IR 05000160/1987008 ML20148E325 ML20148E345
References
NUDOCS 8803250064
Download: ML20148E325 (10)

See also: IR 05000160/1987008

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UNITED STATES. ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Docket No. 50-160 '

License No. R-97

Georgia Institute of Technology

5 ATTN: Dr. Thomas E. Stelson

Vice President for Research

225 North Avenue

Atlanta, GA 30332

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-160/87-08)

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on

February 23, 1988. This meeting concerned activities authorized for your

Georgia Institute of Technology, Neely Nuclear Research Center facility. The

issues discussed at this conference related to NRC concerns with management

control of health physics and operation programs precipitated by an August 1987

contamination event combined with previous enforcement issues identified at

your facility. A sunnary, a list of attendees, and a copy of your handout are

enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the

appropriate enforcement action.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,

Title 10, Code of Federai Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures

will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

, . Wh

J. Nelson Grace

Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. Enforcement Confererece Summary

2. List of Attendees

3. NNRC Action Plan 1988 (Handout)

4. Incident Report, Cadmium Spill,

August, 18, 1987

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v6r. Ratib A. Karam, Director ,

Neely Nuclear Research Center

900 Atlantic Drive, NW

Atlanta, GA 30332

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ENCLOSURE 1

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMARY

The Regional

interested in theAdministrator (RA)ofopened

Georgia Institute Technologythe meeting (by stating that

GT) self assessment of thethe NRC was

August 1987 event as it relates to the effectiveness of management controls.

He also stated that the NRC goal was to ensure public health and safety. He

referenced the NRC Order restricting experiments and also the GT President's

decision to shut the unit down. The RA also stated that the NRC wants to be

advised of their proposed corrective actions prior to the restart of the

reactor. At this time, the President of GT requested that, to keep each party

appropriately advised, the NRC and GT inform each other of press announcements

prior to the release. The NRC advised GT that it does not coordinate press

releases with licensees. However, it was their standard procedure in enforce-

ment cases to advise the licensee of any press releases just prior to the

release.

The Deputy RA described the NRC's escalated enforcement process. He discussed

the NRC's concern with the history of the number and nature of items of non-

compliance at GT, and mentioned that the preliminary results of NRC's ongoing

investigation had identified several other apparent safety concerns through

interviews with several personnel. He stated that the combination of potential

issues identified at these interviews along with the past enforcement history

of GT reveals an apparent serious management problem at the Neely Nuclear

Research Center (NNRC), and one purpose of this Enforcement Conference was to

assure that GT fully understood the nature of NRC's concerns and some of the

facts that led to those concerns.

The Deputy RA also stated that GT should be striving to provide an excellent

example for health physics and nuclear engineering students, who someday would

carry that example into the nuclear industry. He also stated that the viola-

tions listed in the referenced inspection report and in others documented from

1982 through 1987 were largely operations oriented. Therefore, the NRC's

concern, with respect to management controls, is with the overall reactor

operation and not just health physics. He also stated that it was apparent

that there was much discontent within the health physics section of the

current organization.

The Vice President (VP) of Research stated that his impression was that during

an Enforcement Conference in May 1987, the NRC had concurred with GT that

health physics had been the major problem. The VP also stated that the present

GT position continued to be that the fundamental management control problem

existing within the facility is the health physics section. NRC representa-

tives stated that NRC concerns included inadequate review of expariments and

failure to properly control experiment irradiation times, which were major I

reasons for the issuance of the January 1988 Order. Thus the NRC's concerns l

about the safety of reactor operations were not limited to the facility health '

physics organization. A number of other instances of poor operator actions

were described to GT, including failure to follow procedures and regulatory

requirements. e

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Enclosure 1 &

A general discussion then ensued on the is:ue of harassment of research reactor

personnel. GT representatives stated that individuals had not brought problems

to the proper levels of GT management. Additional discussion was conducted on

whether or not GT management had properly addressed safety issues which had

been brought to their attention, thus prompting personnel to approach the

NRC with their safety concerr.s. The methods by which individuals can bring

concerns to GT management and the NRC were then discussed. The NRC emphasized

that although the NRC strongly recommends that individuals bring problems

to the GT management, workers have the right to bring safety concerns directly

to the NRC without fear of retribution from GT. GT representatives discussed

briefly the upgrade of the health physics group, by requiring degreed personnel

in selected staff positions. The NRC then stated that although effort and

intent are important, safety results are the bottom line for the NRC assessr.ent.

The VP of Research continued the discussion by giving a brief history of the

NNRC management. He addressed the reorganization of the Safeguards Committee

in 1987 and the current upgrade of operations and health physics areas.

Specifically, he stated that recruitment and hiring of a new health physics

manager was a high priority and that the number of licensed operators was being

increased.

l

The NNRC Director then commenced a detailed discussion covering the ongoing I

progress at GT. He stated that GT used operators, review connittees, and the

NRC to provide feedback for action. He discussed the 1988 NNRC Action Plan

(Enclosure 3). Specifically, he addressed the addition of two operator candi-

dates, for a total of three trainees (five operators total when those are

licensed); the addition of a second operator in the control room; the upgrade

of the health physics staff; the plans for an independent evaluation of the

reactor facility; and improvements to the reactor facility procedures.

Discussion on these changes ensued, with the NRC concerned as to whether

replacing the health physics personnel and adding an additional operator in

the control room would really solve the principal problems. NRC noted that

GT management needed to provide an expectation of excellence by direction and

example.

The NNRC Director provided a brief discussion on cadmium sublimation as it

related to the August 1987 contamination event. The NNRC Associate Director

then discussed a recreation of the August 1987 event. This recreation provoked

discussion concerning la.ge time discrepancies and other matters between infor-

mation provided on the actual event and those portrayed in the recreation.

Also discursed were recent surveys done on surfaces and filters inside the

,

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reactor building which indicated to the licensee that airborne contamination

was not significant.

NRC representatives initiated discussions concerning the adequacy of the survey

results used by the licensee to evaluate radiological hazards at the facility.

Records of the limited surveys done inside the reactor building (which GT

stated on January 22, 1988, showed no contamination problems) were discussed.

The NRC stated that all surveys conducted were not recorded and that from

,

Enclosure 1

/3

discussions with licensee personnel who conducted radiation surveys, radio-

active contamination had been noted over extensive areas in.the reactor build-

ing, e.g., even on the catwalk which encircles the containment wall. The NRC

asked whether the reactor building catwalk contamination data had been reviewed

or discussed. The Associate Director stated that a catwalk survey was not con-

ducted during the recent survey because he was not aware of any contamination

in the area. It was pointed out at this time that this contamination was known

by both the health physics staff and the Director of the NNRC. In addition,

NRC staff stated that contamination levels on the top of the reactor resulting

from the incident (20 mR/hr) could not be characterized as "no problem." NRC

representatives stated that the failure to coordinate survey data collection,

thoroughly investigate the incident, and evaluate its seriousness was indica-

tive of a lack of effectiveness of licensee management.

At this time, the NRC stated that GT's management regulatory sensitivity and

basic comunications with the NRC did not compare favorably with those at other

major research reactors in Region II.

The President then stated that the reactor would not restart until GT and the

NRC were both convinced that operations and health physics activities could be

safely conducted. The RA reiterated that although the NRC will be involved in

any decision to restart, the responsibility to decide that the reactor is ready

first rests with GT. The RA stated that he believed the meeting to be quite

beneficial and enlightening. The Deputy RA then confirmed with the President i

that the, reactor would not start up until GT and NRC agree on the restart. The j

RA stated that it was vitally important for the GT staff to know that safety is

a GT management requirement, and not something solely to meet NRC requirements. j

At this time the NNRC Director provided to the NRC a document entitled

i

"Incident Report, Cadmium Spill, August 18, 1987" (Enclosure 4).

The Deputy RA thanked GT for their presentation and concluded by sumarizing

the two issues which may require further regulatory action: Evaluation of

certain events as they relate to operator license requirements, and evaluation

of the alleged intimidation and harassment issues. He also stated that the

GT comitments regarding reactor startup would be documented by the NRC

through official correspondence. The President concluded with 1 request that

the NRC and GT conduct periodic management meetings to discuss the status of

the Action Plan. The first such meeting was tentatively set up for about

three weeks hence.

NOTE: Although the schedule proposed by GT in the Action Plan (Enclosure 3)

proposes an early April lifting of the present NRC Order, in the media

interview conducted imediately after the Enforcement Conference,

President Crecine indicated a more realistic date may be several months .

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ENCLOSURE 2

LIST OF ATTENDEES

FEBRUARY 23, 1988

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

.

Georgia Institute of Technology

J. P. Crecine, President

T. E. Stelson, Vice President of Research

R. A. Karam, Director, Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC)

R. N. MacDonald, Associate Director, NNRC

B. Kahn, Radiation Safety Officer

R. Moore, Director, Communications

J. M. Puckett, Consultant ,

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Region II)

J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator

M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator

L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety

D. M.Safeguards

Collins, Acting)

(DRSS Director, Division of Radiation Safety and

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination

Staff (EICS)

P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief, DRP

G. B. Kuzo, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS

8. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, EICS

S. J. Vias, Project Engineer, DRP

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Headquarters)

L. S. Rubenstein, Director, Division of Standardization and Non-Power

Reactors, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

H. Wong, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Enforcement

W. Troskoski, Regional Coordinator, Office of the Executive Director

for Operations

A. Adams, Project Manager, NRR

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ENCLOSURE 3

'_ _

NNRC ACTION PLAN (1988) ,

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E ACTICN PLAN 1988

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Ft2HDR( MWH APRIL hMY JLif JULY ALI3UST

1 I I I I l

1 3 Additional Operators  :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::I :**::::::::::I i

(Oarrpletion expected in 5 to 12 nonths ) l

2 Mininun of 2 Operators * (cprplete 2/22/88)

in Control

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3 Upgrade EP Organizat- *::::::: '

5

ion,11hD,1 (Ms or '

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Bs), 1 Technician

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4a Upgrade IP and Operat-  ::: :::: ::::: ::::::::::

lons Procedures to

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Address Order Concerns

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4b Upgrade Procedures for  ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

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Both Operations and (Ctrrpletion scheduled for 2/28/89)

Health Physics (all)

5 Regulatory Sensitivity  :::::::::::::

(conplete staf f by 3/22/88 and then ongoing annually)

- Training

6 Outside Evaluation *** (Evaluation i;egins 3/24/88)

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7 Li f t NC Order + (Pending results of Outside Evaluation and BEC Review)

Restricting irradia-

tion experiments.

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ENCLOSURE 4 Enf. Conf. Summary

INCIDENT REPORT, CADMIUM SPILL 50-160/87-08

AUGUST 18, 1987

NNRC ACTION PLAN

d

1. General remarks about NRC & GT talking to each other

2. Strengthening Programs at NNRC

a. More operators 5 in 12 months

b. Minimum of two operators in control room

c. Upgrade health physics organization -- 1 PhD, 1(MS or

BS), 1 technician (3 months)

d. Upgrade health physics and operation procedures to

lift concerns expressed in order (March 15)

e. Upgrade procedures for health physics and operations

(12 months)

f. Increase regulatory sensitivity (training in safety &

regulatory compliance; immediately and continuing)

g. Outside expert evaluation (March 24, 1988)

h. Increase management capabilities

3. Evaluation of Program

a. Neakness in health physics

b. Weakness in operation

c. Weakness in management

d. Weakness in administrative control

e. Low regulatory sensitivity

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4. Inunediate Corrective Actions '

a. Experiment approval procedure

b. shift supervisor approval

c. Operating log experiment status

d. Two operator requirement in control room

e. Sample handling procedures

S. Incident Specifics

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