IR 05000160/1987008

Forwards Summary of 880223 Enforcement Conference Re NRC Concerns W/Mgt Control of Health Physics & Operations Program Based on Aug 1987 Contamination Event,Per Insp Rept 50-160/87-08.Related Info & Incident Rept Also Encl

ML20148E325
Person / Time
Site:	Neely Research Reactor
Issue date:	03/14/1988
From:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Stelson T Neely Research Reactor, ATLANTA, GA
Shared Package
ML20148E330	List: IR 05000160/1987008 ML20148E325 ML20148E345
References
NUDOCS 8803250064
Preceding documents:	ML20151H499 (18 July 1988)
Download: ML20148E325 (10)

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UNITED STATE ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h[Y C71 J

[" n REGION il y j 101 MARIETTA STREET, *

't ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323

\...../ MAR 14 %38 Docket No. 50-160 '

License No. R-97 Georgia Institute of Technology 5 ATTN: Dr. Thomas E. Stelson Vice President for Research 225 North Avenue Atlanta, GA 30332 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-160/87-08)

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on February 23, 1988. This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Georgia Institute of Technology, Neely Nuclear Research Center facility. The issues discussed at this conference related to NRC concerns with management control of health physics and operation programs precipitated by an August 1987 contamination event combined with previous enforcement issues identified at your facilit A sunnary, a list of attendees, and a copy of your handout are enclose We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement actio In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federai Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact u

Sincerely,

, . Wh J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Enclosures: Enforcement Confererece Summary List of Attendees NNRC Action Plan 1988 (Handout) Incident Report, Cadmium Spill, August, 18, 1987

cp w/ercis 1, 2, & 3 v6r. Ratib A. Karam, Director ,

Neely Nuclear Research Center 900 Atlantic Drive, NW Atlanta, GA 30332

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j ENCLOSURE 1 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMARY The Regional interested in theAdministrator (RA)ofopened Georgia Institute Technologythe meeting (by stating that GT) self assessment of thethe NRC was August 1987 event as it relates to the effectiveness of management control He also stated that the NRC goal was to ensure public health and safety. He referenced the NRC Order restricting experiments and also the GT President's decision to shut the unit down. The RA also stated that the NRC wants to be advised of their proposed corrective actions prior to the restart of the reactor. At this time, the President of GT requested that, to keep each party appropriately advised, the NRC and GT inform each other of press announcements prior to the releas The NRC advised GT that it does not coordinate press releases with licensees. However, it was their standard procedure in enforce-ment cases to advise the licensee of any press releases just prior to the releas The Deputy RA described the NRC's escalated enforcement proces He discussed the NRC's concern with the history of the number and nature of items of non-compliance at GT, and mentioned that the preliminary results of NRC's ongoing investigation had identified several other apparent safety concerns through interviews with several personnel. He stated that the combination of potential issues identified at these interviews along with the past enforcement history of GT reveals an apparent serious management problem at the Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC), and one purpose of this Enforcement Conference was to assure that GT fully understood the nature of NRC's concerns and some of the facts that led to those concern The Deputy RA also stated that GT should be striving to provide an excellent example for health physics and nuclear engineering students, who someday would carry that example into the nuclear industry. He also stated that the viola-tions listed in the referenced inspection report and in others documented from 1982 through 1987 were largely operations oriented. Therefore, the NRC's concern, with respect to management controls, is with the overall reactor operation and not just health physics. He also stated that it was apparent that there was much discontent within the health physics section of the current organizatio The Vice President (VP) of Research stated that his impression was that during an Enforcement Conference in May 1987, the NRC had concurred with GT that health physics had been the major problem. The VP also stated that the present GT position continued to be that the fundamental management control problem existing within the facility is the health physics sectio NRC representa-tives stated that NRC concerns included inadequate review of expariments and failure to properly control experiment irradiation times, which were major I reasons for the issuance of the January 1988 Orde Thus the NRC's concerns l about the safety of reactor operations were not limited to the facility health '

physics organization. A number of other instances of poor operator actions were described to GT, including failure to follow procedures and regulatory requirement e i

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Enclosure 1 &

A general discussion then ensued on the is:ue of harassment of research reactor personnel. GT representatives stated that individuals had not brought problems to the proper levels of GT management. Additional discussion was conducted on whether or not GT management had properly addressed safety issues which had been brought to their attention, thus prompting personnel to approach the NRC with their safety concer The methods by which individuals can bring concerns to GT management and the NRC were then discussed. The NRC emphasized that although the NRC strongly recommends that individuals bring problems to the GT management, workers have the right to bring safety concerns directly to the NRC without fear of retribution from GT. GT representatives discussed briefly the upgrade of the health physics group, by requiring degreed personnel in selected staff position The NRC then stated that although effort and intent are important, safety results are the bottom line for the NRC assessr.en The VP of Research continued the discussion by giving a brief history of the NNRC managemen He addressed the reorganization of the Safeguards Committee in 1987 and the current upgrade of operations and health physics area Specifically, he stated that recruitment and hiring of a new health physics manager was a high priority and that the number of licensed operators was being increase l The NNRC Director then commenced a detailed discussion covering the ongoing I progress at GT. He stated that GT used operators, review connittees, and the NRC to provide feedback for action. He discussed the 1988 NNRC Action Plan (Enclosure 3). Specifically, he addressed the addition of two operator candi-dates, for a total of three trainees (five operators total when those are licensed); the addition of a second operator in the control room; the upgrade of the health physics staff; the plans for an independent evaluation of the reactor facility; and improvements to the reactor facility procedure Discussion on these changes ensued, with the NRC concerned as to whether replacing the health physics personnel and adding an additional operator in the control room would really solve the principal problems. NRC noted that GT management needed to provide an expectation of excellence by direction and exampl The NNRC Director provided a brief discussion on cadmium sublimation as it related to the August 1987 contamination event. The NNRC Associate Director then discussed a recreation of the August 1987 event. This recreation provoked discussion concerning la.ge time discrepancies and other matters between infor-mation provided on the actual event and those portrayed in the recreatio Also discursed were recent surveys done on surfaces and filters inside the

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reactor building which indicated to the licensee that airborne contamination was not significan NRC representatives initiated discussions concerning the adequacy of the survey results used by the licensee to evaluate radiological hazards at the facilit Records of the limited surveys done inside the reactor building (which GT stated on January 22, 1988, showed no contamination problems) were discusse The NRC stated that all surveys conducted were not recorded and that from

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Enclosure 1

/3 discussions with licensee personnel who conducted radiation surveys, radio-active contamination had been noted over extensive areas in.the reactor build-ing, e.g., even on the catwalk which encircles the containment wall. The NRC asked whether the reactor building catwalk contamination data had been reviewed or discussed. The Associate Director stated that a catwalk survey was not con-ducted during the recent survey because he was not aware of any contamination in the area. It was pointed out at this time that this contamination was known by both the health physics staff and the Director of the NNRC. In addition, NRC staff stated that contamination levels on the top of the reactor resulting from the incident (20 mR/hr) could not be characterized as "no problem." NRC representatives stated that the failure to coordinate survey data collection, thoroughly investigate the incident, and evaluate its seriousness was indica-tive of a lack of effectiveness of licensee managemen At this time, the NRC stated that GT's management regulatory sensitivity and basic comunications with the NRC did not compare favorably with those at other major research reactors in Region I The President then stated that the reactor would not restart until GT and the NRC were both convinced that operations and health physics activities could be safely conducted. The RA reiterated that although the NRC will be involved in any decision to restart, the responsibility to decide that the reactor is ready first rests with GT. The RA stated that he believed the meeting to be quite beneficial and enlightening. The Deputy RA then confirmed with the President i that the, reactor would not start up until GT and NRC agree on the restart. The j RA stated that it was vitally important for the GT staff to know that safety is a GT management requirement, and not something solely to meet NRC requirement j At this time the NNRC Director provided to the NRC a document entitled i

"Incident Report, Cadmium Spill, August 18, 1987" (Enclosure 4).

The Deputy RA thanked GT for their presentation and concluded by sumarizing the two issues which may require further regulatory action: Evaluation of certain events as they relate to operator license requirements, and evaluation of the alleged intimidation and harassment issues. He also stated that the GT comitments regarding reactor startup would be documented by the NRC through official correspondence. The President concluded with 1 request that the NRC and GT conduct periodic management meetings to discuss the status of the Action Plan. The first such meeting was tentatively set up for about three weeks hence.

NOTE: Although the schedule proposed by GT in the Action Plan (Enclosure 3)

proposes an early April lifting of the present NRC Order, in the media interview conducted imediately after the Enforcement Conference, President Crecine indicated a more realistic date may be several months .

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ENCLOSURE 2 LIST OF ATTENDEES FEBRUARY 23, 1988 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

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Georgia Institute of Technology J. P. Crecine, President T. E. Stelson, Vice President of Research R. A. Karam, Director, Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC)

R. N. MacDonald, Associate Director, NNRC B. Kahn, Radiation Safety Officer R. Moore, Director, Communications J. M. Puckett, Consultant ,

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Region II)

J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety D. M.Safeguards Collins, Acting)

(DRSS Director, Division of Radiation Safety and G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)

P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief, DRP G. B. Kuzo, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS 8. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, EICS S. J. Vias, Project Engineer, DRP Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Headquarters)

L. S. Rubenstein, Director, Division of Standardization and Non-Power Reactors, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

H. Wong, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Enforcement W. Troskoski, Regional Coordinator, Office of the Executive Director for Operations A. Adams, Project Manager, NRR

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ENCLOSURE 3

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NNRC ACTION PLAN (1988) ,

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E ACTICN PLAN 1988

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Ft2HDR( MWH APRIL hMY JLif JULY ALI3UST 1 I I I I l 1 3 Additional Operators  :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::I :**::::::::::I i

(Oarrpletion expected in 5 to 12 nonths ) l 2 Mininun of 2 Operators * (cprplete 2/22/88)

in Control i

3 Upgrade EP Organizat- *::::::: '

ion,11hD,1 (Ms or '

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l Bs), 1 Technician j

4a Upgrade IP and Operat-  ::: :::: ::::: ::::::::::

lons Procedures to

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Address Order Concerns

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4b Upgrade Procedures for  ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

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Both Operations and (Ctrrpletion scheduled for 2/28/89)

Health Physics (all)

5 Regulatory Sensitivity  :::::::::::::

(conplete staf f by 3/22/88 and then ongoing annually)

- Training 6 Outside Evaluation *** (Evaluation i;egins 3/24/88)

l I 7 Li f t NC Order + (Pending results of Outside Evaluation and BEC Review)

Restricting irradia-tion experiment r

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ENCLOSURE 4 Enf. Conf. Summary INCIDENT REPORT, CADMIUM SPILL 50-160/87-08 AUGUST 18, 1987 NNRC ACTION PLAN d General remarks about NRC & GT talking to each other Strengthening Programs at NNRC More operators 5 in 12 months Minimum of two operators in control room Upgrade health physics organization -- 1 PhD, 1(MS or BS), 1 technician (3 months) Upgrade health physics and operation procedures to lift concerns expressed in order (March 15) Upgrade procedures for health physics and operations (12 months) Increase regulatory sensitivity (training in safety &

regulatory compliance; immediately and continuing) Outside expert evaluation (March 24, 1988) Increase management capabilities Evaluation of Program Neakness in health physics Weakness in operation Weakness in management Weakness in administrative control Low regulatory sensitivity , _- . . ._ .. -. - - . - _- .. .

v Inunediate Corrective Actions ' Experiment approval procedure shift supervisor approval Operating log experiment status Two operator requirement in control room Sample handling procedures Incident Specifics

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