ML20058D656
| ML20058D656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1993 |
| From: | Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D646 | List: |
| References | |
| 2.206, DD-93-17, NUDOCS 9312030251 | |
| Download: ML20058D656 (28) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ DD-93-17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULA10RY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Thomas E. Murley, Director In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-293 ) BOSTON EDIS0N COMPANY ) License No. DPR-35 l ) (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) ) (10 C.F.R. Section 2.206) DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. 2.206 f INTRODUCTION i The Petition F On October 31, 1991, Jane Fleming filed a petition requesting that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission reconsider its July 30, 1991, decision giving unanimous approval of a task force recommendation that it was not necessary for the NRC to reconsider its reasonable assurance preparednessforthePilgrimNuclearPowerStation.[indingregardingemergency Backaround The events leading up to the Commission's approval of July 30,.1991, which Ms. Fleming asks the Connission to reconsider, are as follows: On September 6, 1990, the NRC held a public meeting in Plymouth, Massachusetts, to obtain information from public officials and private citizens regarding the current state of offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness around the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. During the meeting, 25 persons, including Commonwealth and local officials and private citizens, testified and tendered documents regarding issues and concerns about emergency preparedness (EP) for the Pilgrim Station. On September 12, 1990, NRC's Executive Director for Operations (ED0) informed the Commission that he was establishing a special task force to review the assertions and documents presented to the staff at the public meeting on September 6, 1990. On September 24, 1990, the EDO forwarded the charter for the task force to the Commission; the charter included the following five specific tasks: 'Ms. Fleming presented her paper to the Commission on October 30, 1991. It was docketed the following day. 9312030251 931119 PDR ADOCK 05000293 C PDR
. (1) Identify Pilgrim offsite EP issues in dispute. (2) Determine the factual status of issues in dispute. (3) Describe the current status of offsite EP for Pilgrim. (4) Identify and assess the significance of existing EP problems. (5) Recommend whether the NRC should reconsider its reasonable assurance finding (that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station). The Task Force The Pilgrim Task Force comprised staff from the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supported by contractors. Factual information for the review was obtained primarily by task force teams working with State and local officials responsible for emergency preparedness in the area of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Although. staff from both the NRC and FEMA participated in the effort, the task force activity was not intended as a substitute for NRC's normal regulatory oversight of Pilgrim EP nor as a substitute for FEMA's ongoing review of offsite EP for the Pilgrim Station. The task force categorized information from the September 6, 1990, public-meeting into about 20 topics; these topics were then assigned to field teams for fact finding. The task force field teams started work on October 31, 1990. Before issuing its final report and recommendation, the task force published a draft report for comment on May 28, 1991. It conducted a public meeting to receive comments on June 12, 1991. On June 18, 1991, the task force presented its final report and recommendation to NRC's Executive Director for Operations, who forwarded them to the Commission. The Commission On July 30, 1991, the Commission unanimously approved the task force recommendation that it was not necessary for the NRC to reconsider its reasonable assurance finding regarding emergency preparedness for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The Asserted Bases for the Petition As stated above, on October 31, 1991, Jane Fleming filed a petition asking the Commission to reconsider its decision approving the task force recommendation.
't i l 1 She also requested that the Commission set the "120 day clock." Although i Ms. Fleming did not cite Section 50.54(s)(2)(li) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii)), I interpreted the request to mean, in accordance with the regulation, that the NRC should find that the state of emergency preparedness at Pilgrim does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency and, if the deficiencies are not corrected within four months of that finding, the Commission should determine whether the reactor should be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other appropriate enforcement action should be taken. As bases for her request, Ms. Fleming asserted that the task force did not achieve the goals set out in its charter, that the task force was disbanded before the final recommendation was made, that the task force ignored established NRC policy, that the Commission overlooked areas of concern, and that the Commission's approval could not properly have been based on the findings provided by the task force. Ms. Fleming further alleged that emergency planning for Pilgrim Station is in i violation of 10 CFR 50.47 and is not in accordance with NUREG-0654, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." Ms. Fleming asserted 10 bases for this allegation:
- 1) the reception center to the north is not adequate, 2) transportation is not adequate, 3) monitoring of school children is not adequate, 4) monitoring of the handicapped is not adequate, 5) decontamination of the handicapped is non-existent, 6) planning for evacuation i
of Saquish-Gurnet and Clark's Island is not adequate,-7) interfacing of plans is not adequate, 8) public information is not adequate, 9) direct torus vent interfacing with emergency planning issues is not resolved, and 10) congregate care facilities are not under agreement. On November 7,1991, Ms. Fleming telephoned David Trimble of Commissioner Curtiss' staff to raise a new concern about the egress route from Saguish-Gurnet. In addition, Ms. Fleming telefaxed to Mr Trimble a copy of her i comments on the State's preparations for the graded exercise for Pilgrim scheduled for December 12, 1991. Ms. Fleming expressed to Mr. Trimble a belief that her comments on the planned graded exercise were relevant to the issues raised in her petition. I have treated the information that Ms. Fleming to Mr. Trimble as a supplement to Ms. Fleming's petition and have considered this material in preparing my response to the petition. On November 15, 1991, Ms. Fleming forwarded to William M. Hill, Jr., of the Commission's office of the Secretary a copy of a memorandum from Grant C. Peterson, Associate Director for State and Local Programs, FEMA, to Russell F. Miller, Inspector General of FEMA concerning Ms. Fleming's allegation to FEMA regarding the Pilgrim Offsite Emergency Preparedness Task Force. In a cover note to Mr. Hill, Ms. Fleming expressed her belief that the information she
f f was providing supported.the position she had taken in her petition. I have treated the material provided by Ms. Fleming on November 15, 1991, as the second supplement to her petition and have considered this material in preparing my response to the petition. ? DISCUSSION i A. The Commission's Interpretation of its Emergency Planning Regulations f The Commission's regulation governing emergency plans for nuclear power i reactor applicants seeking operating licenses, 10 CFR 50.47, states in i paragraph (a)(1) that no operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be l taken in the event of a radiological emergency. For operating reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) requires the following: "If the NRC finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a i radiological emergency...the Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement action is appropriate." The NRC bases its findings in both of these cases on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adaquate and capable of-being implemented, in addition to the J NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's emergency plans are adequate i and capable of being implemented. Paragraph (b) of.10 CFR 50.47 lists 16 standards that must be met by the onsite and offsite emergency l response plans in order for the NRC to make a positive finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 1 The Commission has defined the phrase " adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency" on several occasions. In Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear. Power Station, Unit 1), CL1-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 (1986), the Commission stated: Our emergency planning regulations are an important part of the regulatory framework for protecting the public health and safety. But they differ in character from most of our siting and engineering design requirements which are directed at achieving or maintaining a minimum level of public safety protection. See. e.a., 10 CFR 100.11. Our W.+ e- -m- --w-w wr-
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. emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate i plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose saving or a minimum evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a serious accident. Rather, they attempt to achieve reasonable and feasible dose reduction under the i circumstances; what may be reasonable or feasible for one plant site may not be for another. More recently the Commission addressed the intent of its emergency planning requirements in Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-90-02, 31 NRC 197, 217 (1990). There the Commission stated: t Emergency plans are to be evaluated on their own merits, against the 16 planning standards of 10 CFR 550.47(b), with j presumptive validity accorded to FEMA's expert judgments on offsite planning; that the evaluation does not entail consideration of dose consequences that might be calculated under various hypothetical circumstances; and that a plan judged against those planning standards is considered l generally comparable to any other plan that has been. found i adequate. On an appeal brought by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other i petitioners, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Reaulatorv Commission, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed the Commission's interpretation of its emergency planning regulations. The court stated: e Section 182(a) [of the Atomic Energy Act] does not expressly require that " adequate protection" be judged by a single standard for different categories of safety features. In fact, we have repeatedly emphasized the broad discretion available to the agency in devising appropriate standards and have held that " adequate protection" permits the acceptance of some level of risk. See Union of Concerned Scientists vs. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 117-18 (D. C. Cir. 1987). It is for the NRC to determine whether a level of, or i approach to, risk reduction is acceptable for offsite planning that may not be adequate for plant siting and design engineering. Thus, in reviewing emergency plans, the question is not whether the plan is perfect, but whether it provides for " reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety." It is in this context that I have reviewed Ms. Fleming's request for reconsideration of the NRC's approval of the emergency plan for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. i
. B. The Allegation That the Task Force Failed to Meet Its Charter The petition addresses the matter of whether the task force met its charter. This concern is expressed in the petition as follows: There are too many areas in which the task force simply failed to make factual findings or in which it otherwise fell far short of its full charter obligations. a. Describing the current status of offsite EP. As just one example of this, the task force neglected to mention in its findings that the " quick fix" is only an interim measure, for 4 to 6 months. This may be just long enough to get Boston Edison Company (BECo) through the exercise, but planning is for an accident that may happen at any time, not just for an exercise 4 to 6 months hence. Sheet II, also in the packet before you, gives a number of aspects in which the task force's supposed description of the current status of emergency planning are not correct. b. Identifying and assessing the significance of existing EP problems. The lack of assessment of the current Letter of Agreement format mentioned above is a prime example. Sheet III, before you,- i identifies several others. c. Accepting " solutions" that do not comport with Federal regulation and guidelines. ~i A number of " solutions" accepted by the task force indicate a strong desire to accommodate the utility; but not to protect the public.or to comport with Federal regulation and Guidelines. The now well-known quick fix is one of the more blatant examples. Sheet IV, again in the packet before you, J describes a number of others. d. Disbanding before making an independent recommendation as to whether the NRC should reconsider its " reasonable assurance" findings. Ms. Fleming's allegation that the task force failed to meet its charter is unsubstantiated. The task force meticulously followed its charter, which the EDO sent to the Commission on September 24, 1990, and revised on September 26, 1990. The task force published the charter in Section 1.2 of its report (NUREG-1438). The task force was diligent in fulfilling its charter. obligations; these were not intended to substitute for NRC's normal regulatory oversight of emergency preparedness (EP) at Pilgrim nor to i I
. substitute for FEMA's ongoing review of offsite EP for Pilgrim Station. The scope of the task force work was limited by its charter to determining the factual status and assessing the significance of issues raised at a public meeting on September 6,1990, and corollary issues that the task force identified in the course of its fact-finding work. Specifically, the task force did not attempt to conduct a comprehensive review of offsite emergency plans such as FEMA might perform as part of its certification process under Part 350 of Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These practical limitations on the scope of task force activities are clearly stated in Section 1.4 of the task force report. In response to Ms. Fleming's allegation that the task force accepted temporary (quick fix) " solutions," it should be pointed out that the task force charter explicitly states that: The review should also consider compensatory measures that local and State entities may have established to address weaknesses while working towards a permanent resolution. Ms. Fleming alleged that the " lack of assessment of the current LOA (letter of agreement) format" is a " prime example" of task force failure to identify and assess the significance of existing emergency preparedness problems. Ms. Fleming raised this concsrn along with others in a day-long meeting with the task force on January 30, 1991. The transcript of that meeting is cited as document PT-52 in the list of references in Appendix A of the task force report (NUREG-1438). It is available in the NRC Public Document Room in Washington, D.C., and tFe local public document room in the public library in Plymouth, Massachusetts. Ms. Fleming's concern involved a proposed new format which was neither final nor in effect at the time the task force conducted its review. The task force conducted a very thorough and i detailed assessment of the existina LOAs between offsite officials and transportation providers..The task force found that, although some of the existing LOAs were not clear, concise, or consistent, as a group they were adequate to meet the guidance of NUREG-0654. i Ms. Fleming refers to her " Sheet IV" as containing examples of solutions accepted by the task force indicating "a strong desire to accommodate the utility" rather than protect the public health and safety. In " Sheet IV," among other things, Ms. Fleming attacked Commonwealth and BEco officials for agreeing "that 32 persons are adequate to handle the Wellesley Reception Center." She challenged the veracity of private companies that provide transportation resources in support of emergency planning. She also challenged FEMA's qualification to work with the Commonwealth on problems involving field monitoring teams. No bases have been provided to show that the 32 persons at the Wellesley Reception Center would not be an adequate staff or to question the sincerity of the private transportation companies or the qui :fications of FEMA. " Sheet IV" provides no basis for Ms. Fleming's unsupported allegations.
. C. The Allegation That the Task Force Was Disbanded Before a Final Recommendation Was Made Concerning the allegation that the task force was disbanded before a final recommendation was made, the petition makes the following statement: The statement "the Conaission... approved the task force recommendation..." does not accurately portray the sequence of events that occurred. My understanding is that the Task Force, as a body, was disbanded before any final recommendation was made. Although the EDO had the right to recall and seek advice and opinions from individual members, the Task Force as an entity did not exist. Therefore, the independence that the " Task Force" as a body enjoyed was no longer in place when the EDO, as an individual, formulated the final recommendation that there was no need for the NRC to reconsider its reasonable assurance finding regarding emergency preparedness for Pilgrim Station. There was no recommendation of an independent " Task Force" for the Commission to approve. Ms. Fleming's allegation regarding the task force's recommendation and the Commission's approval of it is without any basis in fact.
- Rather, the facts are to the contrary and are as follows:
On June 18, 1991, all NRC members of the task force formally concurred on SECY 91-190, " Final Report and Recommendation of the Task Force on Pilgrim Offsite Emergency Preparedness (EP)." As stated in that paper, " FEMA personnel fully participated in the compilation of the task force report and concur in its_ assessments." However, since FEMA is not authorized under its rules to make a direct recommendation to the Commission, FEMA members of the task force presented instead a separate statement on the results of FEMA's own review process. That statement, in a letter of June 18, 1991, from Grant C. Peterson (FEMA) to James M. Taylor (NRC), conveyed a FEMA finding that " adequate protective measures t can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the Pilgrim Station." The FEMA letter was incorporated as Enclosure 4 to SECY 91-190. in summary, SECY 91-190 contains the June _18, -1991, recommendation of the task force, which the EDO forwarded to the Commission on June 24, 1991, and which was approved by the Commission on July-30, 1991.
- Thus, the task force was not disbanded before a final recommendation was made.
All these documents are available to the public. i l 3 5 0
1 i ) i ! i a D. The Allegation That the Task Force Ignored Established NRC Policy l i The allegation that the task force ignored NRC policy is stated in the petition as follows: { The task force ignored established NRC policy. The NRC is the ultimate authority on Emergency planning, as has been upheld by the court's on numerous occasions. As the NRC 1.G. audit explained, the NRC's policy is that a fundamental flaw can be ascertained from a review of the ~ plan itself, and should be corrected when found. As I illustrated by the examples from Sheet I which you have before you, the task force ignored this NRC policy, and instead embraced FEMA's philosophy that deficiencies are identified solely through an exercise. 4 The facts surrounding the issue raised by Ms. Fleming's allegation charging that the task force ignored established NRC policy do not support the allegation. Rather, they establish that the allegation had no basis. 2 The task force report (NUREG-1438) identified a number of planning matters that were being resolved and improvements that were being made by officials and agencies responsible for offsite emergency planning and preparedness for Pilgrim Station. None of these, including areas i identified by the task force as warranting attention before the next exercise, were considered serious enough to bear upon the question of reasonable assurance. In fact, the task force recommendation in SECY 91-190 reflected the judgment that problems bearing on reasonable assurance had already been satisfactorily resolved through actions taken by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, local communities, and BECo. Nevertheless, the task force considered it reasonable and prudent for i FEMA to monitor progress where commitments had been made and i improvements undertaken. Accordingly, throughout the task force report one finds statements such as " FEMA will evaluate" or " FEMA will monitor." None of these statements indicate any failure in the plan, but rather relate to additional FEMA duties under the FEMA-NRC Memorandum of Understanding, 3 50 FR 15485 (1985). Moreover, in considering Ms. Fleming's request that i the NRC make an adverse finding under its regulations in 10 CFR 50.54(s), I note that very regulation states "the NRC will base its i finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of i being implemented." [10 CFR 50.54(s)(3)] in summary, the NRC found the plan adequate. Further, it is reasonable and prudent to monitor progress being made in offsite emergency preparedness for the Pilgrim Station and altogether proper mr this to l be done by FEMA. 4 l I
i l ! t i E. The Allegation That Others Have Acted on Information Since the Commission's July Approval of the Task Force Recommendation This allegation is explained in the petition as follows: a. As shown by the information in the Packet before you, l FEMA's I.G. has found that my concerns on the adequacy ? of staffing and monitoring at the Wellesley Reception Center, and adequacy of transportation, in particular for handicapped, were valid; and have requested that specific corrective actions be taken. (See footnote 3) This Commission's decision clearly overlooked these areas of concern. b. During dialogue I had with the task force concerning the new LOA format, it promised to " pursue" my questions and concerns. Despite its guarantee that it would do so "The task force did not review the new LOA format." These LOA's are useless letters of intent. In time, thanks to the review and assessment of Dave Rodham, of MEMA, a new and approved LOA will be implemented. Today, because the task force failed to conduct its promised review of the LOA format; the public has no " reasonable assurance" that the necessary transportation will be provided. (See footnote 4) c. The NRC I.G. is currently considering a rumber of other concerns I have raised regarding the task force assessment of emergency planning. (See footnote 5) The Office of Investigation is investigating what only can be characterized as BEco lies. In short, others have considered and found valid a number of 4 important points that the Commission decision apparently did l not consider in its Decision, even though I and others have presented them to you and your staff in the past. t Contrary to the allegation stated in the petition, the facts surrounding these matters are as follows: a. FEMA IG On September 27, 1991, William C. Tidball, FEMA's Acting Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, responded to Ms. Fleming's allegations. That letter contained the following statement: j
l A r After investigating these issues, we found no issue that would result in a reversal of FEMA's finding that offsite i radiological emergency planning and preparedness were i adequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident at the Pilgrim plant. This statement is clear and unequivocal, and sumarizes the conclusion drawn by the FEMA OlG regarding Ms. Fleming's allegations. b. MEMA Implementina New Imoroved letters of Aareement As stated in the task force report (NUREG-1438), page 2-133: The task force found that the transportation letters of i agreement were executed wi+h all transportation providers (except those facilities providing their own transportation) and as a group were adequate to meet the guidance of NUREG-0654. This is the important conclusion drawn by the task force. l The task force report goes on to state the following: j Maintenance of the letters of agreement by Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (MCDA) was inadequate. When this report was prepared, BECo and MCDA were renewing the letters of agreement using a new format that they expected would ensure uniformity and clarity of commitments. The task force did not review the new LOA format. However, MCDA has provided draft procedures to FEMA that address the maintenance of letters of agreement. Contingent upon implementation of such procedures, this aspect of the maintenance of transportation arrangements is resolved. [ FEMA will monitor the implementation of this procedure. ~ In summary, the task force identified maintenance of the LOA's--not format--as a matter of some concern, noting nevertheless that BECo and i MCDA (now MEMA) were introducing a new format. Accordingly, followup i action and monitoring by FEMA seemed appropriate and was focused on the LOA maintenance procedure. c. NRC OlG and Ol By letter of October 22, 1991, Frank J. Congel, Director, Division of i Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness, NRR, informed Ms. l Fleming that the staff had ieviewed concerns she had expressed to the Chairman's office about the way emergency planning issues for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station were being handled. That letter contained the following statements:
l h The staff reviewed your concerns and the documentation you provided and concluded that the substance of the issues i raised had been considered by the Pilgrim Offsite Emergency i Preparedness Task Force. With respect to your concerns on how the task force dealt with the issues, we have conveyed your concerns and documents to the NRC Inspector General's office for whatever action is deemed appropriate. The NRC Office of Investigations has also been notified of your concerns regarding statements made by the licensee. i In transmitting this petitioner's information to the NRC Office of the inspector General and Office of Investigations, respectively, the NRC staff did not recommend investigations. This does not preclude self-initiated actions by those offices. The NRC information that the staff c provided to NRC's 0IG and 01 does not call into question the adequacy of offsite emergency planning and preparedness for Pilgrim Station. F. The Allegation That the Commission's Approval Could Not Properly Have ~, Been Based on the Findings Provided by the Task Force In her petition, Ms. Fleming alleged in the following words that the Commission's approval could not properly have been based on the findings piovided by the task force: Tha Commission's " approval" could not properly have been i based on the findings provided by the task force. This is the fundamental basis of my petition. There are too many areas in which the task force simply failed to make factual findings or in which it otherwise fell far short of its full charter obligations. Ms. Fleming's allegation charging that the Commission's approval could not properly have been based on the task force's findings is unsubstantiated. In making this allegation, Ms. Fleming fails to recognize that the task force findings did not constitute the sole basis for the Commission's decision which this petition asks the Commission to reconsider. This is clearly stated in the following comments by Chairman Carr accompanying his vote on June 28, 1991, which have been made available to the public: I approve the recommendation of the task force not to j reconsider the NRC's reasonable assurance finding regarding emergency preparedness for Pilgrim Station. I base this approval on several considerations-l f
.a ! l (1) The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has, on l June 18, 1991, confirmed to the agency that FEMA i " finds that adequate protective measures can be taken i offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at [the Pilgrim Station) site." (2) The task force has determined the factual status of issues in dispute through an extensive review of documents, inspections of facilities, and meetings with local officials and other interested parties. (3) Notwithstanding the fact that five areas of offsite emergency preparedness were found by the task force to require attention before the next exercise, the general level of emergency preparedness at the site meets the requirements of the agency's regulations. i (4) It is not necessary for an adequate assurance finding l that all aspects be found to be in full compliance. In this case, those aspects that need attention have i adequate follow-up actions and responsible parties have been identified. I (5) Attention to emergency preparedness for this site will continue throu;h the required quarterly status reports ? to the Commission by the staff. In summary, the Commission based its decision on findings of the task l force on specific issues as well as broader FEMA findings and information provided by officials responsible for offsite emerger.:y planning and preparedness for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. In alleging that "there are too many areas in which the task force simply failed to make factual findings," the petitioner fails to recognize the j scope and limitations of the task force work, which are clearly spelled out in Section 1.4 of the task force report. As stated therein, on page ~ 1-3: Although staff from both NRC and FEMA participated in this effort, the task force activity was not intended as a substitute for NRC's normal regulatory oversight of Pilgrim l EP nor as a substitute for FEMA's ongoing review of offsite i EP for the Pilgrim Station. Specifically, the task force did not attempt to conduct a comprehensive review of offsite emergency plans such as FEMA might perform as part of its certification process under Part 350 of Title 44 of the Code i of Federal Regulations (CFR). -) l l l
i I 5 t l G. Petitioner's Objections to Task Force Findings l Ms. Fleming's petition includes four " sheets" (lists) of statements l extracted from the task force report (NUREG-1438). Ms. Fleming alleged that these sheets of excerpts indicate, respectively: i (1) Task force dependence on exercise and FEMA to make i determination whether or not a flaw exists. (2) Task force flaws describing the current status of EP. (3) Task force flaws in identifying and assessing the significance of EP problems. i (4) Acceptance of certain solutions by the task force to accommodate the utility, but not to protect the i public. I fail to find the grounds for Ms. Fleming's assertions in the material excerpted from the task force report. Regarding the first assertion, and corresponding sheet of excerpts, the task force report identified a i number of planning matters that were being resolved and improvements that were being made by officials and agencies responsible for offsite emergency planning and preparedness for Pilgrim Station. The task force concluded that none of these were serious enough to bear upon the question of reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nevertheless, it was considered prudent for FEMA to monitor progress where commitments had been made and improvements i undertaken, and the next exercise provided a good opportunity to assess j that progress. Petitioner's remaining assertions and corresponding sheets of excerpts from the task force report reflect dissatisfaction with various findings and judgments of the task force. Nevertheless, petitioner's views are not shared by Commonwealth officials responsible for offsite emergency j planning for Pilgrim Station, as evidenced by the following comment frem the Director, Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and Office of Emergency Preparedness (now the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency), to the task force on June 12, 1991: In general, we agree with the findings and are engaged in a continuing process to improve the plans for Pilgrim offsite emergency preparedness. As you are aware, we have solved multiple issues, especially during the last few months that t were of concern to the task force. This was as a result of i a tremendous cooperative effort between FEMA, local government, other State agencies, the utility, the Executive i Office of Public Safety and our own MCDA staff. We will, of course, keep FEMA informed as we continue to address any and all items in which interested parties and the task force had a concern. i l r w
i l
- This comment was contained in a memorandum to the task force which'was also enclosed with SECY 91-190 and made available to the public.
On October 30, 1991, the Commission met in open session and heard i directly from officials responsible for offsite emergency preparedness for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. (Ms. Fleming attended this meeting, and at the end of the meetings she addressed the Commission and presented her petition.) During the meeting, the Commonwealth of l Massachusetts reaffirmed its satisfaction with the task force report. In remarks prepared for that meeting and sent to the Secretary of the Commission by letter of October 28, 1991, Mr. A. David Rodham, Director of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, made the following statement: I As you are well aware, State and local public employees, officials and volunteers spent many hours with the task force members providing information which reflected the status of the program. The task force's report, NUREG-1438, a has provided the basis for quantifying and closing out the i remaining issues. Thus, notwithstanding petitioner's dissatisfaction with findings and l judgments of the task force, as reflected in NUREG-1438, it is evident that the task force report was judged sound by Commonwealth officials responsible for offsite emergency planning and accepted by them as a i guide for resolving emergency preparedness issues for the Pilgrim { Nuclear Power Station. Accordingly I conclude that petitioner's remarks about the task force and its report are unfounded. Petitioner's i complaint that the task form accepted "certain solutions" has already i been discussed in the context of the task force charter which required i the task force to consider compensatory measures addressing weaknesses. i In that regard, as well as the other aspects of its work, the task force was faithful to its charter. 1 l H. Ten Specific Allegations In her petition, Ms. fleming cited 10 specific " reasons" why the Commission should reverse its decision regarding emergency preparedness for Pilgrim Station. I have considered each of them and conclude that l l they are not supported by the recorded facts, as discussed below. 1. Petitioner alleges that the reception center to the north is not adequate. The facts do not substantiate this allegation. On the contrary, as stated on page 2-94 of its report, the task force toured the Wellesley Reception Center on November 7, 1990, and confirmed that i n
l r i L I the reception cer.ter and its associated emergency operations center were equipped to function. The task force also noted that the center would be evaluated in the December 1991 exercise (NUREG-1438, page 2-96) i In remarks prepared for the Commission meeting of October 30, 1991, 'ir. Richard H. Strome, FEMA Regional Director, provided-further information on this subject as follows: i a There are new developments concerning the Wellesley l Reception Center and Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Area II. At one time, both these' facilities used members of the Massachusetts National Guard for functions requiring rapid mobilization. The task force found the use of the Guard for this type of l function unacceptable because of their long mobilization response 'ime. As a result, the Commonwealth instituted an interim solution using BECo' staff and also, for Wellesley, staff from State agencies. On October 8, 1991, FEMA was informed by the Commonwealth that instead of using BECo and State agency staff as the initial response group at i Wellesley, it will now use members and associates of-the Massachusetts Radiological Defense Officers i Society. One training session,. including classroom j and hands-on training, has already taken place for the } new group. When sufficient staff have been assembled, i the Massachusetts National Guard will assume i monitoring and decontamination duties at the reception center. .j Mr. Strome also noted that' this matter had been raised through ] FEMA's independent Office of the Inspector General. _In his words: l The Inspector General has completed his inquiry. He i did not take issue with FEMA's actions concerning i staffing levels at the Wellesley Reception Center. He requested that FEMA's State and Local Programs and l i Support Directorate provide an update after the December exercise and when a generic standard is developed by the Federal Radiological s'repTredness Coordinating Committee for portal monitors, such as those used at Wellesley. The subject reception center is adequate. l 2. Petitioner alleges that transportation is not adequate. { Petitioner's assertion focuses principally upon letters of agreement with transportation providers which she characterizes as- " worthless letters of intent." ] ') 1
i This assertion is unsubstantiated. The matter of transportation i letters of agreement is treated in Section 2.13.2 of the task i force report. The task force assessment is stated on page 2-133 i of NUREG-1438 as follows: i The task force found that the transportation letters of agreement were executed with all transportation providers (except those facilities providing their own transportation) and cs a group were adequate to meet the guidance of NUREG-0654. Some letters of agreement were not clear, concise, or consistent. It was unclear whether some letters were signed by someone i authorized to commit resources for the provider. 6 Maintenance of the letters of agreement by MCDA was inadequate. When this report was prepared, BECo and i MCDA were renewing the letters of agreement using a new format that they expected would ensure uniformity and clarity of commitments. The task force did not review the new LOA format. However, MCDA has provided draft procedures to FEMA that address the maintenance of letters of agreement. Contingent upon implementation of such procedures, this aspect of the maintenance of transportation arrangements is i resolved. FEMA will monitor the implementation of I this procedure. Moreover, in reviewing material provided by Ms. Fleming on November 15, l 1991, as the second supplement to her petition, I note that it includes a copy of a memorandum of November 4, 1991, from Grant C. Peterson, FEMA t Associate Director, to Russell F. Miller, Inspector General. Attached i to that memorandum is another document labeled " Response to Document Marked Enclosure and Entitled ' Buses' or the Lack Thereof." Rather than t supporting Ms. Fleming's petition, this FEMA document is an exhaustive analysis that refutes her allegation and substantiates a conclusion that l transportation resources are adequate. 3. Petit ioner alleges that monitoring of school children is not I adeqt ate. l Apparently Ms. Fleming objects to-the concept of monitoring school i children at reception centers if that should be necessary. However, this issue was. squarely addressed by the task force on i page 2-43 of its report, which states: The task force finds that the concept of monitoring school children at reception centers is acceptable. This'is the State's option and is not unique to l Pilgrim emergency planning or to that of l Massachusetts. i r I .-,.~. -...,.-.-.
i l I find no reason to disagree with the task force conclusion that j the provisions for monitoring school children are adequate. j 4 Petitioner alleges that monitoring of handicapped is not adequate. l This allegation is unfounded. Evacuees are typically monitored at i reception centers. The task force confirmed that each of these centers at Wellesley, Bridgewater, and Taunton was accessible to l handi apped persons. (See pages 2-97, 2-103, and 2-106, respectively, of NUREG-1438.) i i 5. Petitioner alleges that decontamination of handicapped is non-existent. She cites as a basis for this allegation the following statement from page 2-125 of the task force report: l l Hospitals - Understandings of commitments regarding i the support that hospitals would provide are inconsistent. l l Petitioner also cites a letter of March 7,1991, from Robert M. Hallisey of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health to Chief Carl D. O'Neil, Civil Defense Director of Duxbury. In her petition, Ms. Fleming characterizes this letter as follows: l A March 7, 1991 (the day after the trip), letter from "BECo" Bob Hallisey of Massachusetts Dept. of Public Health to Carl O'Neil of Duxbury stated, in section 5, i entitled Hospitals Handlina of In.iured and Handicapped Population, that the hospitals under agreement are -l strictly for injured contaminated; and that a i non-injured contaminated person is not included in this grouping. To make this point perfectly clear-- There is no decontamination in place for handicapped a people (See enclosed copy of letter). i The petitioner refers to a letter that reinforces the task force l finding that understandings of commitments were inconsistent l regarding the support that hospitals would provide. This inconsistency, however, is not related to the decontamination of handicapped persons, as the petitioner infers:. Rather,.it involves having some hospitals host nursing home' residents. This 'l is ~ quite clear in the full statement from page 2-125 of the task j force report, which Ms. Fleming only partially quotes in her [ petition. The full statement reads as follows: -{ liosoitals - Understandings of commitments regarding the support that hospitals would provide are -) inconsistent. Hospitals, assigned by State and town _l i i
i ^ planners to receive nursing home residents or other group { home residents, need to reaffirm their understanding of the commitments in their letters of agreement. t The letter from Mr. Hallisey to Chief O'Neil, which Ms. Fleming enclosed with her petition, is actually dated March 13, 1991. The i relevant section of the letter reads as follows: Hospital Handlino of In_iured and Handicapped Populatiens l As you know, Chief O'Neil, this is one area of great confusion and concern to the individuals. It is our understanding that hospitals only accept injured or l sick individuals and our programs have been directed j toward assuring that there is sufficient capability at these hospitals to handle all contaminated, injured. It is not our intent that large numbers of individuals i would be sent to hospitals for this monitoring activity. Individuals who are not injured do not need to be sent to the hospital for monitoring and subsequent decontamination if necessary. We have conducted surveys of hospitals to find out the number 4 of injured and contaminated individuals that can be handled at the hospitals. We need to all strive to educate the public and emergency planning individuals relative to the fact that a contaminated ind.ividual is not necessarily an injured individual, nor does that individual necessarily need to go to a hospital. As shown in Mr. Hallisey's letter (referenced above), and by FEMA staff meeting notes of May 16, 1991 (PT-208), and a May 17, 1991, memorandum from the Director of MCDA to FEMA (PT-200), the State clarified its intention with regard to the monitoring and decontamination of nursing home residents.2 According to the State, nursing home evacuees would be monitored and subsequently decontaminated, if necessary, at host nursing homes. On this basis, the petitioner's assertion that there is no decontamination in place for handicapped people is incorrect. 4 2The references PT-208 and PT-200, along with other task force references, are described in Appendix A of the Pilgrim Task Force report, " Findings on Issues ) of Offsite Emergency Preparedness for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station," NUREG-1438, 1 ~ June 1991. These referenced documents are available to the public in NRC's J Public Document Room in Washington, D.C. and in the Local Public Document Room in the public library in Plymouth, Massachusetts. 1 1 j 4 ,-w, g
d - l 6. Petitioner alleges that planning for evacuation of Saquish-Gurnet and Clarks Island is not adequate. 3 It is generally acknowledged that Gurnet-Saquish and Clarks Island can present special problems for egress. Local authorities recognize this and take it into account in emergency planning for these areas. Gurnet-Saguish is a narrow beach area located at the i end of the Duxbury Beach peninsula in the Town of Plymouth (but physically connected to the Town cf Duxbury) between 4 and 5 miles north of the Pilgrim Station. Saquish Neck is a barrier spit l extending in a westward arc from the foot of Gurnet Point. Under certain tidal conditions, the egress routes from the Saquish Neck portion of the beach become flooded'and such finding. could delay evacuation. Section 2.7 of the task force report (NUREG-1438) contains an extensive analysis and discussion of the floooing phenomenon i associated with egress routes from the Saquish Neck. The task l force assessment of this issue included the following on page 2-75 of its report l The NRC and FEMA believe that emergency plans that i meet the planning standards and guidance criteria of NUREG-0654 are flexible enough to accommodate possible delays in evacuation that may result because of i natural phenomena; however, the actual amount of flexibility is difficult to establish and cannot be quantified. The NRC and FEMA require that the j emergency plans and procedures include practical and' t feasible measures to account for expected natural conditions. For Saquish Neck, these include provisions to evacuate the area at the Alert stage of an emergency, the development of a' specific implementing procedure for the area (Plymouth IP-15), warning sirens with loudspeakers, and radio communications with Plymouth's emergency response organization. In addition, there are' efforts under j way for coordination with the Town of Duxbury for assistance during an emergency. The task force concludes that the provisions in the current emergency plans provide acceptable flexibility for the evacuation of Gurnet-Saguish. Clarks Island is located in the Town of Plymouth about 5 miles i north-northwest of the Pilgrim plant. The Plymouth Assessor's Office gave the task force a printout listing eight residences on Clarks Island (PT-150). Unlike egress from Saquish Neck, which is --.~. 3 Ms. Fleming refers to the area of concern as "Saguish-Gurnet." As the task force report refers to it as "Gurnet-$aquish," I have followed that usage. 1
? I 4 affected at high tide, egress from Clark's Island is affected at l low tide. The task force report includes the following i description of provisions for dealing with this situation: Provisions for alerting and notifying the residents of l Clarks Island are included in both the Plymouth and. Duxbury emergency plans. The plans call for Clarks Island to be closed at the Alert stage'and for the i Plymouth Harbormaster to coordinate with the Duxbury i Harbormaster to ensure that the Clarks Island I popul6 tion is advised of the closing or other protective action. Since Clarks Island is in the portion of Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Subarea 12 assigned to Duxbury, the Duxbury Harbormaster is responsible for establishing contact with the residents of Clarks Island by VHF radio, CB radio, or telephone to notify them of the emergency (Duxbury I IP-ll, Draft 6, April 5, 1990). If these means fail, l the Duxbury Harbormaster is to dispatch a boat to i notify the residents by using the public address -l system. (The nautical chart for the area - NOAA 13253 1 - shows a relatively deep channel approaching the j northeast side of the island.) In addition, two tone alert radios have been provided to the residents on l Clarks Island (NUREG-1438, page 2-83). On the basis of these considerations, the task force concludrQ l that the emergency plans provided " acceptable measures for accounting for the low tide situation at Clarks Island" J (NUREG-1438, page 2-83). i Although I acknowledge that tidal conditions may complicate the evacuation of Saquish Neck and Clarks Island, should that ever be 1 necessary, I.nevertheless conclude that reasonable steps have been taken to address such contingencies in emergency planning for these places. 1 7. Petitioner alleges that interfacing of plans is not adequate. Although Ms. Fleming did not elaborate on this point in her petition, the Pilgrim Task Force identified coordination of plans i l~ and procedures as an area warranting attention. The task force finding in this regard is summarized on page 1-6 of its report as follows: Plans and implementing procedures for the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (HCDA) and the Department of Public Health and MCDA Area 11 need to be made consistent with those of the local ~ communities. 1
I ! 7 l Transportation procedures need to be better l coordinated among MCDA Area II,' transportation providers, and the towns, j> State plans need specific procedures to guide officials who must make protective action decisions. l This finding was also presented to the Commission in SECY-91-190 together with the response of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that the responsible parties were addressing the finding appropriately, and it would be resolved. The Commission was also inforned that FEMA would follow up on this and other items warranting attention and would give the staff information for j quarterly status reports on these open items. In his prepared statement for the Commission's meeting of 4 October 30, 1991, A. David Rodham, the Director of the r Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, said the following on this topic: Commonwealth Plans and Procedures There are two areas under this topic which warrant discussion. The first is the coordination of 1 transportation procedures. Transportation procedures have been looked at very carefully by the NRC task force, FEMA Region I and FEMA Headquarters personnel, i and the planners who work with these procedures on a day to day basis. The changes which were identified 1 during this review have been updated or will be j updated to provide for more accurate and effective procedures. In addition, MEMA and Boston Edison are presently developing an administrative maintenance procedure to ensure consistent revision to the j transportation procedures and data. The second area is the development of procedures on protective action decision-making. The specific procedures which provide guidance for protective action decisions are i currently being reviewed by FEMA and will be_ evaluated i during the December exercise. In remarks prepared for that same meeting Mr. Richard H. Strome, FEMA Regional Director, stated the following: The fifth area identified by the task force report 1 concerned a lack of consistency _between State and local procedures, especially in two areas: 1) l transportation procedures and 2) procedures to guide off M als who must make protective action decisions. i i +
4 I Concerning transportation procedures, a transportation working group met in the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Area II office in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, from September 9-18, 1991, to update the task force assessment of the adequacy of transportation resources and to re-examine the process for managing them. The group was composed of staff of FEMA, NRC, and FEMA contractors. They met with representatives of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and BECo. On October 4, 1991, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency issued a report responding to issues raised by the group. FEMA is still in the process of analyzing its findings and i the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency response. Concerning the area of protective action decision l guidelines, on October 1, 1991, FEMA received a revised version of the Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the Massachusetts Department of Public Health Procedures contained in the Nuclear Incident Advisory Team (also called NIAT) Handbook. These documents are designed to provide, among other things, guidelines and procedures for officials who must make protective action decisions. i FEMA is in the process of reviewing the revised documents. The performance of Commonwealth officials in the December exercise will be evaluated against these planning documents. In conclusion, since information regarding t is matter is well documented in the task force report (NUREG-1438), in SECY-91-190, .t and in subsequent status reports, and has been duly considered by the Commission, I find no basis for this allegation. j .t 8. Petitioner alleges that public information is not adequate. The petition includes the following notes on this subject: l l 2,14 Public Information 151 " FEMA will continue i to review the public information materials annually." .j q The "public information materials" include " facts i About Radiation" which the NRC has already found i flawed. Since when is FEMA expert in Radiation and t the world of nuclear? i It is not clear why petitioner is dissatisfied with the public information regarding emergency planning for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. As the task force stated on page 2-151 of its i report: i i i .. -. ~
l ~
- i l
The purpose of public information material is to provide information to the public before an accident that it can use to protect itself from the consequences of an accident. The task force did not review the public information calendar for overall adequacy, since FEMA had done so. Comments on the draft calendar are reflected in the-FEMA review, dated September 7, 1990. In the final calendar, BEco addressed all the comments either by correcting inconsistencies, clarifying unclear passages, or removing sections (such as a section identifying host schools) where information was not final. True, the task-force expressed concern about one statement in the public information material, as follows: The section, " Facts About Radiation," contains the statement, "In large doses, radiation may cause observable i health problems such as flu-like symptoms or may increase i the change of health problems later in life."
- However, 1
flu-like symptoms are the prodrome or symptoms of the onset of the acute radiation syndrome. Accordingly, without further elaboration, this discussion of health effects is incomplete. (The reference to " flu like symptoms" has been removed from the 1992 calendar.) The task force conclusion appears on that same page of the report as follows-On balance, the task force concludes that the 1991 calendar i meets the basic requirements of Planning Standard G and the guidance of Evaluation Criterion 1. FEMA will continue to review the public information materials annually. L I find no basis in Ms. Fleming's petition for taking issue with [ the task force conclusion. 9. Petitioner alleges that direct torus vent interfacing with emergency planning issues are not resolved. Ms. Fleming's petition includes the following comments on this topic: l 2-167 Task force' assessment (direct torus vent): 1 ...the task force is not certain that the declaration l of an emergency and notification of offsite authorities would always precede activation of the DTVS....The task force considers it important that BEco develop and implement appropriate controls for its staff responsible for emergency classification." I a
' i The public certainly feels this is important as well; who is making sure something is done? During its review of this issue involving the DTVS, the task force noted that a general emergency would be declared at Pilgrim when the primary containment hydrogen and oxygen concentrations exceed deflagration levels or if those concentrations could not be determined to be below deflagration levels. The operators, under these conditions, are directed to vent and purge the primary containment. The task force noted that the licensee's emergency action level (EAL) scheme, however, did not specify that the declaration of the general emergency would be based on the hydrogen and oxygen concentration levels in the containment orior l to its venting. i The task force also concluded that, lacking additional documentation, the existing emergency and associated DTVS procedures may not result in the proper emergency classification and offsite notifications preceding the activation of the DTVS (NUREG-1438, p. 2-167). l The Boston Edison Company (BEco) acknowledged this task force finding in BECo letter 91-075, dated June 6, 1991, which was incorporated along with other comments received on draft NUREG-1438 in Appendix F of the final report. The following appears as a footnote on page 2 of the BECo letter: One of the task force's recommendations addresses Boston Edison's procedures for emergency classification, offsite notification and use of the direct torus vent. Task force report at p. 2-165. Although Boston Edison believes that existing controls are adequate to ensure that emergency classification and offsite notification will precede use of the direct torus vent, we will discuss this issue further with the NRC staff. i 1 l On November 29, 1991, BEco submitted a revised version of its Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Manual, which incorporated the necessary clarifications to EALs 3.5.1.4 and 3.5.2.4, that directs the operator to declare a general emergency based on 1 hydrogen and oxygen concentrations in the containment prior to its i venting.' On March 30, 1992, BEco submitted to the NRC the I 'BECo letter 91-142 from G.W. Davis to U.S. NRC, November 29,- 1991, License DPR-35. Docket Number 50-293, "10 CFR 50, Appendix E.V.: Submittal of Revised Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures." l 1 ir a er
t ventingtheprimarycontainment.yclearPowerStationprocedurefor l revised portion of the Pilgrim N j l Thus, I conclude that this matter concerning direct torus venting 1 and emergency planing has been properly resolved by the licensee j l and the NRC. 10. Petitioner alleges that congregate care facilities are not under l agreement. The petition includes the following comments on this~ i topic: i 2.96...."No letters of agreement exist with regard to j the congregate care centers. This item is being -l i l pursued by MCDA (now MEMA) and will be evaluated by i l FEMA in the 1991 exercise." ] Evaluate what?? This certainly does not comport with NUREG 0654 II A. 3. page i I 2-97...." FEMA and the NRC do not require letters of agreement between the State and the Red Cross." (Maybe they don't but NUREG 0654 clearly does. [A.3, pg-32]) Congregate care is not directly related to protective actions i I taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Congregate care, l' which refers to the provision of temporary housing and basic l necessities for evacuees, is somewhat ancillary to.more fundamental emergency planning and preparedness measures taken to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The term " congregate care center" refers to a facility for temporary housing, care, and feeding of evacuees which should be located at least 5 miles, and preferably 10 miles, beyond the boundaries of the EPZ. I While noting that there were no letters of agreement with regard to congregate care centers, the task force report explains that adequate congregate care facilities are designated in comprehensive emergency management plans and umbrella agreements l with the Red Cross. l Furthermore, as stated on page 2-97 of the task force report: ~ i FEMA and the NRC do not require letters of agreement between j L the State and the Red Cross relating to their support services in a radiological emergency. 5BECo letter 92-035 from Roy A. Anderson to U.S. NRC, March 30, 1992, License DPR-35, Docket Number 50-293. l - -,. - - - i
) .J, The Commission addressed this point in Lona Island Liahtina Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-87-5, 25 NRC 884, 888 (1987). There, the Commission denied Intervenor's request to reopen the record on the lack of an agreement between the utility and the American Red Cross (ARC) for its participation in emergency response, because the ARC's charter and policy requireittog*ssistinemergencyresponsewhetherornotthereis an agreement. The NRC and FEMA do not discourage agencies and support organizations from extending their planning and preparedness as far as they deem prudent and practicable, which may include agreements and arrangements beyond those specifically described in Federal regulations and guidance. However, such l actions and measures are not considered necessary or essential to adequate radiological emergency planning and preparedness. Thus, this allegation has no merit. Emeraency Plannina and Preparedness Is a Dynamic Process Ms. Fleming supplemented her petition with telefaxed information on November 8,1991, that described coastal damage caused by the northeast storm of October 30, 1991. Ms. Fleming asserted that Saquish Neck was now currently accessible only by boat and expressed concern that evacuation would not be possible during storm conditions. She also criticized exercise planning activities described in a letter of October 16, 1991, from A. David Rodham, Director, MEMA, to Patricia Dowd, Board of Selectmen, Duxbury. Storm damage is typical of the kind of problems that demand continuing efforts and attentior M local, State and Federal agencies responsible. for offsite i emergency p. ..ing and preparedness. Persons, circumstances, and conditions l affecting emergency planning and. preparedness for licensed nuclear power plants are continually changing. Moreover, as noted in my. earlier discussion of Gurnet-Saquish, the task force pointed out that emergency plans meeting the criteria of NUREG-0654 are flexible enough to accommodate possible delays in evacuations that may result from natural phenomena. i As far as exercises are concerned, NRC regulations in Apper. dix E,10 CFR Part 50 require each licensee at each site to exercise its emergency plan annually i and to exercise with offsite authorities so that State and local emergency 'The American Red Cross and the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency executed a new letter of agreement'on April 3, 1992. The Commission's Licensing Boards have looked at letters of agreement In f 7 philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP ' 14, 21 NRC 1219 (1985), the Licensing Board addressed the concept at length in the context of evaluating a contention alleging that a reasonable assurance finding could.not be made absent. full documentation of the existence of appropriate letters of agreement with support organizations and agencies. See 21 NRC 1219 at 1366-68. i l
. plans for each operating reactor site are exercised biennially with full or partial participation by State and local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such exercises are intended to provide training for participants and to identify weak or deficient areas that need correction. The NRC requires that weaknesses or deficiencies be corrected. CONCLUSION Ms. Fleming has failed to provide a basis for the relief she requests, namely that the Commission reconsider its approval of the task force recommendation that the NRC need not reconsider its reasonable assurance finding regarding emergency preparedness for Pilgrim Station. Because Ms. Fleming has not provided any basis for disturbing the reasonable assurance finding, her petition is denied. A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Commission to review as provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c). FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Thomas E. Murley, Directo Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu a ion Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of November 1993. t v _, _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.}}