ML20154D997
| ML20154D997 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1987 |
| From: | Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20150E217 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8809160189 | |
| Download: ML20154D997 (37) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. KANE BEFORE THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF THE PILGRIM STATION NUCLEAR GENERATION FACILITY AT PLYMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS APRIL 27, 1987 GOOD MORNING.
MY NAME IS WILLIAM F. KANE AND I'M THE DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS AT THE NRC'S REGION I 0FFICE.
I WISH TO THANK THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF THE PILGRIM STATION FOR GIVING ME 1HE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THE NRC'S VIEW OF THE BOSTON EDISON COMPANY'S (BECO) PROGRESS, SINCE THE SHUTDOWN ON APRIL 12, 1986, ON CORRECTING IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCIES AND IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AT PILGRIM.
I HAVE KEPT MY PREPARED STATEMENT BRIEF IN ORDER TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR ANSWERING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THE CCMMITTEE MAY HAVE.
PRIOR TO THE APRIL 1986 SHUTDOWN, THE NRC DEFERMINED THROUGH ITS INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND THROUGH THE SALP PROCESS THAT BECO'S PERFORMANCE IN CERTAIN PROGRAM AREAS WAS WEAK.
IN SPITE OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UTILITY SINCE 1982, BECO CONTINUED ITS WEAK PERFORMANCE.
IN OUR VIEW, THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THESE CONTINUING PROBLEMS INCLUDED:
I) INCOMPLETE STAFFING, TN PARTICULAR, OPERATOR AND KCY MID-LEVEL SUPERVISORY PERSONW!.; 2) A PREVAILING VIEW IN THE ORGANIZATION THAT THE IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO DA'E HAD CORRECTED THE PROBLEMS; 3) RELUCTANCE, BY MANAGEMENT, TO ACKNOWLEDGE SOME PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY THE NRC; AND 4) DEPENDENCE ON THIRD PARTIES TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS RATHER THAN IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM FOR SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF WEAKNESSES. CON-SEQUENTLY, FOLLOWING THE PLANT TRIPS WHICH SHUT THE PLANT DOWN IN APRIL THE i
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Testimony of William F. Kane 2
h;C REGION 1 ADMINISTRATOR EXPANDED THE HEREQUISITES FOR RESTART TO INCLUDE RESOLUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFFING DEF1CIENCIES AND HARbWARE ISSUES AT THE PLANT.
FURTHER, PERIODIC MEETINGS BETWEEN SENIOR NRC AWD BECO MANAGEMENT WERE ESTABLISHED TO MONITOR BECO'S CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAMS.
OURING THE SHUTDOWN, BECO HAS MADE SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONA.L CHANGES AND STAFFING AND HARDWARE CHANGES AND COMMITMENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO CORRECT 1HE LONGSTANDING ISSUES.
IN GENERAL, THE NRC VIEWS THESE CHANGES AS POSITIVE WITH THE POTENTIAL TO RESULT I:4 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT.
SOME OF THE MORE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ARE:
ASSIGNMENT OF A NEW SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT RESPONSIBLE FOR BECO'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
AN ONSITE RE0isGANIZAT10N TO ELIMINATE A DUAL REPORTING CHAIN WHICH HAD OBSCURED THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND WEAKENED ACCOUNTABILITY.
HIRING A NEW OPERATIONS SECTION MANAGER, A CHIEF RADIOLOGICAL ENGINEER, AND FILLING THE MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR VACANCIES.
APPRDVING INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF LICENSE 0 OPERATOR STAFF AND ACTIVELY RECRUITING CANDIDATES FROM OUTSIDE THE COMPANY.
Tenimony of William F. Kane 3
STAFFING INCREASES IN THE SECURITY AND FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM AREAS.
4 FORMING A NEW ONSITE SYSTEM SPECIALIST GROUP TO PROVIDE ENGINEERING SUPPORT AND AUGMENTING THE ONSITE QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDITOR GROUP.
INITIATION OF A MAINTENANCE BACKLOG CLEARING PROGRAM AND WORK PLANNING PROCESS.
INCREAS!d3 CORPORATE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT PRESENCE ONSITE.
i INCREASING THE EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS STAFF AND COMPLETING THE NEW EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY.
EXTENDING OVERTIME CONTROLS TO ALL EMPLOYEES.
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INITIATION OF A MAJOR EFFORT TO CLEAN UP THE CONTAMINATED AREAS OF TH PLANT.
r INITIATION OF THE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT MODIFICATIONS TO IMPROVE THE CO j
TION AND SAFETY OPERATION OF THE PLANT.
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COMPLETION OF THE PLANT SPECIFIC SIMULATOR AND INITIATION OF TRAINING O IT.
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l HOWEVER,,WHILE SOME IMPROVEMENT HAS BEEN MADE, THE NRC FOUND PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW DURING THIS OUTAGE ON RESOLVING IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS. MANY OF THE CHANGE NOTED ABOVE HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED OR IN-PLACE LONG ENOUGH TO DETER-MINE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS OR DURABILITY. NONETHELESS, THEY 00 INDICATE A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE BY BECO.
THE DEFENSIVENESS AND RELUCTANCE TO RECOGNIZE PROBLEMS ARE BY AND LARGE GONE FROM BECO'S APPROACH.
IT IS CLEAR THAT BECO SENIOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT IS COMMITTED TO ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP OF ITS i
NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND HAS TAKEN STEPS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE STAFFING AND IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY.
ALSO, THE INCREASE IN THE SITE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS PROVIDES BECO THE OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS AND REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON THIRD PARTIES THE DECISION THAT EXTENDED THE OUTAGE TO CORRECT MANAGEMENT AND HARDWAk2 PROBLEMS INDICATES THAT BECO RECOGNIZES THERE ARE PROBLEMS AND HAS TAKEN TO IDENTIFY THE SCOPE OF THE PRCBLEMS AND ACTIONS TO RESOLVE THEM.
AS THE COMMITTEE IS AWARE, THE NaC RECENTLY ISSUED THE PILGRIM SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
FOR THE 15 MONTH PERIOD NOVEMBER I,1985 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1987.
THE REPORT IDENTIFIES THE SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENTS EECO R\\S MADE. MOST NOTABLE WERE: A SIGNIFICANT REDUC NUMBER AND EXTENT OF CONTAMINATED AREAS IN THE PLANT; COMPLETION OF A NEW EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY; AND IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING AND REQUALIFICATION PROGRAMS.
HOWEVER, THE REPORT ALSO IDENTIFIES i
RECURRING PROGRAMMATIC WEAKNESSES IN SEVERAL FUNCTIONAL AREAS INCLUDING:
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS; SURVEILLANCE; FIRE PROTECTION; SECURITY; AND ASSURANCE i
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Testimony of William F. Kane 5
l 0F QUALITY. THE NRC BELIEVES THE LOW SALP GRADES REFLECT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE l
PROBLEMS AND CONFIRMS BECO'S PRUDENCE IN EXTENDING THE OUTAGE TO RESOLVE THEM.
l THE NRC ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE CHANGES MADE DURING THE SALP PERIOD AND TWO l
OTHER CHANGES, THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE NEW SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT-NUCLEAR OPERA-l TIONS AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE DUAL HEADED ONSITE ORGANIZATION, MADE AFTER l
THE SALP PERIOD ARE ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT AND WILL PROVIDE A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENT.
l CURRENTLY, BECO REQUIRES NRC APPROVAL PRIOR TO RESTARTING PILGRIM.
BECO.IS AWARE THAT T.iE N;C IS LOOKING FOR PROGRESS IN CORRECTING THE IDENTIFIED PROB-LEMS PRIOR TO OETAININ3 THAT APPROVAL.
BECO 15 REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A FORMAL READINESS FOR RESTART ASSESSMENT AND A RESTART SCHEDULE FOR NRC REVIEW AND APPROVAL. THE NRC ALSO INTENDS TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT IN-DEPTH READINESS ASSESSMENT TEAM INSPECTION PRIOR TO APPROVING RESTART TO ENSURE THAT THE l
PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED AND THE PLANT IS READY FOR SAFE l
OPERATION.
IN ADDITION, PILGRIM, AS A HIGH PRIORITY SITE, MAS AND WILL CON-l TINUE TO RECEIVE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF THE REGION I INSPECTION RESOURCES.
l THIS INCLUDES PERMANENTLY ASSIGNING THREE RESIDENT INSPECTORS TO THE SITE, l
SUPPLEMENTED WITH PERIODIC INSPECTIONS BY EXPERIENCED RESIDENT INSPECTORS FROM OTHER SITES, AND PROGRAMMATIC REVIEWS OF ALL SALP FUNCTIONAL AREAS BY REGION BASED SPECIALIST INSPECTORS.
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Testimony of William F. Kane 6
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SUMMARY
, THE NRC BELIEVES BECO IS TAKING MANY STEPS TO RESOLVE THE LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS AT PILGRIM.
HOWEVER, TO DATE, PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW.
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THE NRC INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO CLOSELY MONITOR BECO IMPROVEMENT PRO ENSURE THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN'DO RESULT IN REAL PROGRESS AND THAT T MENTS MADE WILL BE PERMANENT. AGAIN, I WANT TO THANK THE COMMITTEE FOR GIVING ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THE NRC'S VIEW OF BECO'S PROGRESS THU THE OUTAGE, AND I AM PREPARED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE.
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e THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSSACHUSETTS REPORT OF THE SPECI AL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY RELATIVE TO THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR GENERATING FACILITY AT PLYMOUTH UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SENATE ORDER 2044 ADOPTED IN THE YEAR 1986 i
JULY 1987 i
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l RECOMMENDATIONS Creation of'the Division of Nuclear Facilities Safety.
I)
Endorsement of Comprehensive Load Management and Conservation II)
Programs.
Prioritize Massachusetts Based Electrical Generating III)
Facilities.
Department of Public Utilities to Establish a Five-Year IV)
Supply Plan without reliance on the Pilgrim Plant.
Committee Review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission V)
(NRC) Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Report (SALP) and Recommended Measures to Correct Serious Functional Deficiencies at the rilgrim Nuclear Generating Facility at Plymouth.
Improved Emergency Preparedness Plan.
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RECOMMENDATION I l
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RECOMMENDATION I CREATION OF A DIVISION OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY After many hours of deliberation over topics such as emergency preparedness and planning, monitoring of many areas regarding public. saf ety need immediate attention and After reviewing and hearing the testimony of the and the Department of Public improvement.
Department of Public Health (DPH)
Safety, the committee concluded that lack of funding, along with shortf alls in strict compliance with many sections of. Chapter 796 of the acts of 1979, have led to a less ti.an appropriate handling of The committee, radiation monitoring and emergency preparedness.therefore, re f ormation of a Division of Nuclear Facility Safety to oversee nuclear generated power production in the Commonwealth.
The Division of Nuclear Facility Safety shall provide the following provisions and services:
I The Division of Nuclear Facility Safety shall be a division of the Department of Public Safety and shall be responsible for monitoring the operation and modification of the two nuclear In addition, it shall be power plants within the Commonwealth. responsible for developing with Massachusetts Civil Defense for responding to accidentsMajor activities sh involving nuclear power plant facilities. installation, operation and mainten includes l
remote monitoring of radioactive discharges f rom the nuclear power I
plants, in conjunction and under the supervision of the Department of Public Healths development and review of the Massachusetts Emergency Preparedness Plan (MRAEPP);
Radiological Accident oversight of training of state and local civil defense personnelEnforcement of rule responsible for implementation of the MRAEPP.
and regulations prescribing standards for in service testing of I
pressurized systems at nuclear power plants which the Department of Public Safety oversees.
The Massachusetts Radiological Accident Emergency 1) i Preparedneso Plan.
The Hassachusetts Radiological Accident Emergency integral Preparedness Plan shall establish a program for statewide, r
management procedures in the event of an accident which may occu i
a nuclear power reactor site.
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provide a coordinated response by state and local governmental officials for the protection of the citizens of the Commonwealth.
The plan shall include site specific planning to cover the urgency of protecting citizens living near nuclear plants; a concept of and an operations so that the plan can be effectively carried out; effective allocation of resources and personnel.
The plan shall pre-assign the duties and responsibilities that would be taken by all the respondents to a nuclear accident thus enabling actions to be made quickly and efficiently.
The Massachusetts Division of Nuclear Facility Safety and the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency shall share the primary responsibility for developing the plan with integral component agencies such as the state police and the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) communities' local officials.
The utilities' security and l
safety personnel must also play a major role in planning.
Specifically, the Division of Nuclear Facility Safety shall be and the responsible for the technical functions of this effort, Civil Defense Agency shall be responsible for the operational The plan shall be reviewed every year for accuracy and a's pec t s.
proper appropriation to assure a fully functional quality plan. 'The appropriate components shall be distributed to the proper state, county and municipal agencies and organisations in the Commonwealth for implementation.
The Division of Nuclear Facility Safety shall plan to expand the EPZ to 50 miles f rom each reactor with the understanding that greater planning and preparedness efforts are necessary closer to the reactor and that evacuation will not likely be recommended f or all areas within a 50 'lle radius.
These plans should be tailored.to meet each cc-nity's specific needs.
The Division of Nuclear Facility Safety shall clarify evacuation plans for regional schools which have students from at of least one, but not all, towns in the school system which are part Division and Civil Defense officials working with school an EP3.
administrators and parents' groups must develop worktble student and teacher evacuation plans and establish criteria for ottermining l
when, if ever, it would be appropriate to send children home first l
to evacuate with their families.
The Division of Nuclear Facility Safety shall establish emergency evacuation time estimates and traffic control plans based l
on evacuations of people within the ZPz to reception centers at least 30 miles from the reactor and should anticipate secondary or l
shadow evacuations.
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commission a site-specific probabilistic risk analysis of severe accident probabilities at Pilgrim and the consequences of radioactive releases and the probable health effects at various distances from the plant.
l Major operations specified in the Plan and agency responsibilities are outlined in Recommendation VI.
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Monitoring.
The committee recommends that the Division of Nuclear and the Department of Public Health adopt Facility Safety which shall incorporate and develop a Remote Monitoring System (RMS) gross gamma detectors ra three major components:
around each nuclear power station; an automated, isotopic points; and a reactor parameter data communication link to eachIn additio facilities on-site computer.
liquid effluent monitors, which will be located at each plant's All of these RMS components shall be liquid discharge points.
connected through a dodicated data communications lin Technical staff shall review the data and perform Headquarters.
analyses of plant conditions.
The ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM:
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Division of Nuclear Facility Safety shall develop a dual ring system of environmental radiation monitors utilizing gross gamma detectors and automated isotopic detectors which shall be installed and maintained around each reactor site that would measure a change in radiation levels resulting from a radioactive release at the reactor It shall This system shall serve a multitude of purposes.
define the existence of a radioactive release suf ficiently large site.
as well as detect a release enough to impact upon the environment, In addition, the system shall through an unmonitored release path.
provide a backup capability should the ef fluent monitoring system be inoperable, and shall also help reveal the presence of atmospheric which could reault in plume dispersal not conditions (windshear) following anticipated direction of travel.
The Environmental Radiation Monitoring System shall be (1) up to 16 moni' tors developed to provide the following features:
at a distance of per site (1 detector f or each 22.5 degree segment) minimum detection (2) approximately 2 miles f rom the reactor site; level of 1 microRoent (3) maximum approximately 7 to 10 microRoentgens per hour); detection limit is (4) automatic transmission of radiation normal background levels);
readings to the Nuclear Facility Safety Division headquarters transmission of alarm computer system every 8 minutes; and (5) signals to the NuclearFacility Safety Division headquarters in the event of h levels or failure of environmental monitoring system components, b)
REACTOR PARAMETER DATA LINK:
The Kassachusetts Division of Nuclear Facility Safety shall install a direct data communication link between the Division headquarters computer and each nuclear reactor's control room computer f or the monitoring of the Commonwealth's two nuclear power reactors and their safety This data link shall be developed for early notification This system is an systems.
of events that could lead to nuclear accidents.
essential element in providing continuous plant saf ety assessment, early detection of abnormal conditions, and evaluation of nuclear 4
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The system signals to be received at the Division's headquarters shall be the same signals available to the nuclear The Division shall select particular plant personnel on-site.
parameters to be transmitted to them from an index containing all available plant system information.
Parameters selected by the Department provide detailed information on the operation characteristics of all essential plant safety systems.
Some major features that are available that may be included in this system ares (1) 1,000 to 1,300 parameters (signals) per reactor accessible 8er transmission every two minutes; (2) technical parameters includ-reactor power levels, reactor er levels, containment water levels, steam generator -
temperatures, engineered safety system availability, and essential pump flow rates; and (3) system software for displaying either current or historical signals.
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THE RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING SYSTEM:
The Division of Nuclear Facility Safety and the Department of Public Health shall be directed to utilize and implement a custom designed automated system to monitor gases routinely released by nuclear The Radioactive Gaseous Monitoring System is designed power plants.
to identify and quantify the radioactive components of the gaseous discharges from each stack and other gaseous release points to the environment and transmit the information immediately to the Division of so that appropriate emergency action can be directed in the event a nuclear accident.
The Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring System is a i
state of the art, computerized system which continuously transmits data from the nuclear power plant to the Division's headquarter computer.
This system includes the following features:
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dedicated computer at the power plant sites for operation and analysis; (2) minimum detection level of 10 to 13 microcuries/ cubic centimeter; (3) maximum accident detection limit of 10 microcuries/ cubic centimeters (4) collection and analyses of radiation in three forms:
iodines, particulates, and noble gases (5) automatic background level checks (6) automatic check on source verifications: (7) remote computer access to determine operational status and datas (8) signal alarms in the event of high radiation levels or failure of a system function; (9) detection of specific isotopes based on radiation energy; and (10) accelerated operation rates designed to maximize data collection during an accident d)
EMISSION STANDARDS:
It is essential that Massachusetts Public Health Officials review and determine the j
maximum permissible levels of airborne radioactive emissions f rom nuclear power plants that do not threaten the public health and safety.
By adopting state emission standards as authorized by the clean Air Act amendments of 1977, the Commonwealth will ensure that safe standards are in place and strictly enforced.
Until such standards are set by the Department of Public Health, the federal.. -
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the state standards should be adopted as state standards so that officials immediately have the power to inspect onsite and off-site monitoring equipment and have independent enforcement authority over The state shall assess all licensees for the cost of emissions.
setting up a monitoring system for the Commonwealth.
Perhaps the most important safety function of a monitoring system is to assist emergency response officials in determining the extent of a serious accident and the amount and We recommend installation of a direction of radiation releases.
comprehensive and sophisticated new monitoring system simila substantially more public protection.
Possible Adverse Health Effects From Pilgrim 3)
Radioactive Emissions Radiation exposure can cause cancer, birth defects a) and chromosomal damage.
The Department of Public Health has determined that there has been a significant increase in leukomia is cases in the area surrounding Pilgrim, although the department still studying what the cause of those leukemias may be, b)
The Special Committee recommends that four health studies be conducted:
1)
A follow-up study on the leukemia cases in the Plymouth area to determine what environmental or occupational exposures may have caused those leukemias.
2)
A study to test the theory that coastal winds may concentrate the radioactive emissions from the Pilgrim plant in such a way as to cause adverse health consequences in coastal areas.
3)
A regional study of adverse health impacts, including leukemia incidences, birth defects and infant mortality, downwind from other nuclear reactors in New England.
4)
A health study of all past and present Pilgrim employees to determine the adverse ef fects, if any, of exposure to radiation from Pilgrim.
The cost of the Division of Nuclear racility Safety and 4) be the Department of Public Health's monitoring system should not borne by all taxpayers but by the utility ratepayers through an assessment of the nuclear plant licensees..
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RECOMMENDATION II ENDORSEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE LOAD MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION PROGRAMS The special committee investigating the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Facility reviewed testimony involving energy supply, load The management and conservation measures during several hearings.
in order to meet current and future power committee concluded that supply demands all utilities in the Commonwealth must implement The stringent load management and conservation programming.
committee stresses that authority should be given to the Department of Public Utilities to oversee the implementation of aggressive load management and conservation programs for any electric utility relying on the continual operation of the Pilgrim Generating Facility.
LOAD MANAGEMENT:
The committee endorses the concepts contained in the Final Report of the Boston Edison Review Panel as they relate to The increased load management programs by Boston Edison Company.
committee recommends that the Department of Public Utilities (DPU) be required to encourage and assist Boston Edison in implementing The DPU shall also be the specific load management programs.
required to encourage and assist Commonwealth Electric Company in implementing appropriate cost-ef f ective load management programs that offer the company similar energy-saving results.
Boston Edison Company should identify and fund effective "load management" measures, such as radio-controlled water heaters and nighttime water chilling systems, which reduce peak energy use and are cheaper than the cost of producing electricity In addition, the utility should provide from new power plants.
incentives for commercial and industrial sector cuotomers to form "load-shedding cooperatives," where a group of participants agrees to share minimal energy use redactions during peak demand emergencies.
CONSERVATION:
The special committee endorses the concepts contained in the Final Report of the Boston Edison Review Panel as they relate to increased, cost-ef f ective conservation programs by Boston Edison The DPU should be required to encourage and assist Boston The DPU Company.
Edison in implementing the specific conservation programs.
shall also be required to encourage and assist Commonwealth Electric 1
Company in implementing appropriate, cost-effective conservation 0
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The programs that of fer the company similar energy-saving resu?,ts. investments in DPU should direct all utilities to make significant energy conservation and energy ef ficiency programs, known asto reduce the energy de "demand-side management" pr og r ams,
The DPU should set target investment all utilities' customers.
levels and participate in the design of demand-side management Such programs should include, but not be limited to the p rog rams.
following, where shown to be cost effective:
The special committee recommends all utilities 1)should employ design teams to go into buildings that use large quantities of electricity to identify the full package of demand-side management measures and practices that are cheaper than the utilities commensurate cost of producing electricity from new power plants over the useful life of the conservation The utility should then fund the purchase and measures.
installation of identified cost-effective measures.
All electric utility companies should offer the'ir 2)customers incentives for a wide range of efficiency This incentive program should go far beyond measures.
the limited scope of current and prior utiltity rebate programs for refrigerators and efficient lights.
All electric utiltity companies should also provide 3) incentives for electrical energy efficiency in new construction including hook-up fee and penalties.
4)
All electric utili?.y companies should convene an auction for energy efficiency improvements similar to the bidding process that is currently being used to promote the development of small power atid cogeneration facilities.
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The committee recommends that the DPU should be allowed to provide all utilities with a profit, or "rate of return" on the investment the company makes in demand-side management programs.
This rate of return, to be recovered from the companie's ratepayers, could be at least as high and or up to two percentage points higher than the rate the utiltities are authorized to receive for capital investments in new power plants, i
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1 RECOMMENDATION III 1
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RECOMMENDATION III PRIORITIZE MASSACRUSETTS BASED ELECTRICAL GENERATING FACILITIES The Committee recommends that the Energy Facilities Siting I.Council and the Department of Public Utilities give priority consideration to the construction of non-nuclear electric generating plants located within the Commonwealth when reviewing the plans of any electric utility for the construction of a new generating plant.
The Masschusetts General Laws and regulations promulgated by regulatory agencies require utility companics to provide ratepayers with electricity at the lowest possible economic cost and with the least possible environmental impact.
In planning to meet the electrical energy needs of ratepayers, the Department of Public Utilities, the Energy Facilities Siting Council, and the utilitisJ should consider and evaluate the following factors:
1)
The full "life cycle" economic costs of each en3rgy rescarce option.
These include costs for construction, financing, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning.
With respect to energy efficiency. v.
load management programs, costs f or materials and installation and program administration should be considered.
2)
The full environmental costs of each energy resource option.
Environmental impacts associated with the siting of facilities, degradation of outdoor and indoor air quality, potentially adverse impacts on water quality, and c:isks to public health should all be fully considered when deciding which energy option to pursue.
3)
The number of jobs created by the use of each energy resource option.
The number of long and short-term jobs that are directly and indirectly created as a result of developing various energy resource options should be considered and compared.
Other state and local economic development costs and benefits, such as support of indigenous industry and inflows or outflows of capital resulting from development of each energy resource optien should also be considered. _
f The reliability of the energy resource option.
4)Massachusetts needs affordable and reliable energy Energy resources to help wastain a healthy economy.
resource options chat decentralize and diversify the region's fuel. mix, and which reduce reliance on non-indigenous fuels, should be prioritised.
All potential resource options--including energy efficiency improvements and practices, load management measures and practices, nmall power i
production, co-generation, and small and large oil, i
natural gas and clJan coal technologies should be evaluated and compared using the above criteria.
The Committee believes that priority should be given to The Committes is concerned about the Massachusetts based plants.
increased dependence on plants located outside Massachusetts for our It believes that this trend increases electric generating needs.
the likelihood of supply disruptions, thereby complicating unduly This trend of reliance l
our ability to forecast long range supply.
on plants outside Massachusetts is also detrimental to our economy, since it creates jobs in other states that would otherwise benefit I
Massachusetts workers.
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9 RECOMMENDATION IV I
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RECOMMENDATION IV DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES TO ESTABLISH A FIVE-YEAR SUPPLY PLAN WITHOUT RELI ANCE ON THE PILGRIM PLANT The Committee has found that the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Facility at Plymouth, Massachusetts has suffered from serious and continuous mismanagement.
Although significant efforts are being made by its owners to rectify the management problems, considerable uncertainty remains over the reliability of the plant to contribute to the electric supply needs of the commonwealth.
The Committee theref ore recommends that the Department of Public establish a five-year plan for ensuring adequate Utilities (DPU) supply without consideratic n of the electrical production of Pilgrim plant.
Due to the uncertain future of Pilgrim, the DPU should establish a supply plan for the Commonwealth that does not require Such plan shall include a any dependence on the Pilgrim plant.
f orecast of f uture supply and demand which deliniates each source of power and its location.
January 1, 1988 is the due date for the implementation of the initial five-year plan.
The Committee recommends that in determining whether to restart tne Pilgrim Nuclear Power Dlant, the availability of sufficient cost effective and safe alternate ensigy resources shall be taken into consideration.
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RECOMMENDATION V COMMITTEE REVIEW OF THE NUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REPORT (SALP) l AND RECOMMENDED MEASURES TO CORRECT SERIOUS FUNCTIONAL DEFICIENCIES AT THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR GENERATING FACILITY AT PLYMOUTH The Pilgrim nuclear power plant has a well documented, and This history has called into well publicized, history of problems.
question both the level of safety when Pilgrim is operating and Boston Edison's ability to run the plant.
With an issue as emotional as nuclear power the loss of public confidence must be i
addressed in addition to the actual safety problems.
Massachusetts, particularly res'6 dents of Scutheastern Massachusetts, have every right to demand that Pilgrim be one of the best run plants in the country rather than one of the worst.
Clearly L 4e initiative f or this belor,gs to Boston Edison.
Pilgrim has been "off-line" for more than a year.
During that time the utility has undertaken significant initiatives to improve its In some cases they have taken a lead in the nuclear performance.
industry to address certain problems.
More work remains to be done, j
however, and how ef fective the company is in its work will have to a
be judgod when it is completed.
I This is neither a "pro-nuclear" nor an "anti-nuclear" The concittee f eels that where there are problems, they report.
must be addressed, prior to restart, and that the plant should not Individual operate until all major deficiencies are corrected.
members will have their own views on nuclear power but everyone agreed that the overriding issue here was not to resolve the nuclear debate but to address the problems of one particular plant.
The committee heard testimony on specific operaticr.s and i
i plant problems f rom Boston Edison, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and representatives f rom citizen groups.
In addition,
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the committee has had access to Public Saf ety Secretary Charles Barry's report to the Governor on the plant and volumes of NRC l
reports.
To try and identify every single prob 1wn and the appropriste solutions would be beyond the committee's capability and jurisdiction.
The sheer number of technical matters, the lack of expert staf f, and the debate within scientific and regulatory circles over some issues made it unrealistic for us to devise the specific solutions to many particular problems, Likewise, it makes i
little sense to list every specific problem since it would make more i
difficult our aim to focus public attention on the most substantive 4
problems.
4
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that it is useful for the The committee does feel, though, Legislature to summarize the patterns of problems and our perceptions of the work which needs to be done. This, we hope, will not only focus greater attention on the major problem Edison's progress.
The NRC, on many occasions, has claimed it will force Edison As to prove significant improvements before restart is allowed.
part of their process they will develop a detailed check list ofThe comm matters requiring solutions.
If addressed, we feel plant our concerns as part of that process.
safety will be enhanced and public confidence raised.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently issued the Pilgrim for the 15 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)31, 1987. SALP is month period of November 1, 1985 through January a comprehensive assessment of the plant analyzed into twelveThe l
functional areas.
radiological weaknesses in five functional areas includingtfire protection; security and ass J
controls; surveillance; l
- quality, These five functional areas received low SALP grades of 3.
The NRC rates on a 1, 2, and 3 basis and defines a 3, the lowest i
rating, as follows:
=Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
is Licensee management attention or involvement acceptable and considered nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident: licensee resources appear to be strained or not effectively used so that l
minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational sat'oty is being achieved."
i The fellowing is an outline of the problems in euch of the l
five functional areas as reported by the NRC, followed by the committee's recommendations.
i L
l
" This assessment covers radiation RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL' I
(1) procection, ef fluent monitoring and controls, radwaste SALP found that shipping and environmental monitoring.
the licensee made numerous improvements in the overall i
- However, quality of the radiological controls program.
implementation of the program continues to be weak.
When problems with program implementation or adequacy are identified, corrective actions are somotimes not adequate or not implemented resulting in the need for j
furthe-NRC involvement.
In the area of effluent monitcring and' control, the licensee implemented the
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new effluent technical specifications in a generally 4
l acceptable manner, however, failure to take action on significant long standing deficiencies in the environ-i nental Thermolumenescent Dosimeters (TLD) program 4
detracted f rom the good ef fort.'
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS:
a)--Aggressively supervise the radiological control program, b)--Establish and implement measures to f
J.
verify program implementation and implement corrective actions for deficiencies.
l c)--Interactions with personnel outside l
4 the radiological group should be significantly strengthened.
j d)--Continued clean up of plant and l
reduction of contaminated areas.
e)--Strengthen the role and company jurisdiction I
of radiation control department over the other 4
l departments.
l f)--Exposure histories of past and present employees and contracted workers be compiled, continually updated, and reported to CPH l
and Huclear Facility Safety Division.
g)--Improve programs f or replacement of thermo-luminescent dosimeters.
h)--Improve training of employees in radiological t
environmental technical specifications, i)--Improve control and accounting of special nuclear j
material under one gram, j)--Improved access control to high radiation areas.
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k)--Improved inspection of vehicles leaving site for any l
contamination.
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" Individual surveillance tests were well i
(2)
SURVEILL ANCE:
conducted arid controlled.
The response to recurring i
local leak rate test f ailures was also positive
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Rowever, the licensee has been slow to recognise and t
correct weaknesses in the control of the program tests.
j This lack of progress is reflected in the large number l
j of surveillance-related licensee event reports and NRC t
violations issued during the current period.
The
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3 control of the program is fragmented and not always
)
ef fective and appears to depend more on historical past j
practice then in a well founded, systematic approach.
t The This is a major werkness that must be corrected.
i licensee's measuring and test equipment control program 2
i also need improvemant."
)
j COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS:
f a)--Significant site and corporate management attention is needed to correct deficiencies l
in this area.
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1 bl--Place a single qualified individual in overall charge of the surveillance program.
l (3)
FIRE PROTECTION:
"The licensee has been slow to 1
Problems j
j strengthen the fire protection program.
included inadequate surveillance procedures, l
s degraded fire barriers, inoperable fire protection i
system equipment, and poor quality fire brigade Although action has been taken to address training.
these concerns the program has suffered from a j
chronic lack of attention and should be closely 1
monitored.'
J 4
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COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS:
I a)--Significantly reduce the amount of inoperable ftre protection equipment l
in the station.
b)--System f or assessing priority needs and l
j timely correction of any deficiencies in fire j
barriers and protection equipment.
c)--Improved supervision and training of fire watchers.
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d)--Provision for independent water and power supplies.
l e)--Completion of all Appendix R improvements.
l f)--System to control combustible material on-I site.
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i SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS:
"The previous SALP r9 port l
(4) identified serious NRC concerns regarding the l
licensee's awareness of, and attention to, NRC j
physical security objectives and the need for g
additional management attention to, and support of, i
the security program to insure that the program was The previous SALP report also properly implemented.
identified NRC's belief that the licansee had initiated j
actions to resolve those concerns and that the security program was receiving increased manageneat attention.
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j sowever, shortly after the beginning of this assessment period, it bect e apparent to the NRC that, due to the 1
j number and complexity of the identified problems and j
some other problew.s which were then surfaced, far mo'.e extensive management attention and resources would N i
j As evidenced during this assessment perfwi, required.
the need for additional attention and resources by the licensee continued until late in this assessment period.
1 l
As a result, little physical progress toward trproving l
the program was accomplished by the licansee during the period."
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COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS _:
a)--High level corporate and site management attention to the recently established priority level for the security program upgrade should continue in order to implement commitments and develop an ef f ective program.
b)--NRC/ Boston Edison review of relationship of contracted security force over Boston Edison and other contracted employees.
Does Security have adequate power to control plant personnel and question employee activities?
c)--Develop and implement ef fective program to eliminate any presence or use of alcohol and drugs.
d)--Eliminetion of any violations or weaknesses in security barriers.
"Although the licensee has A.3URANCF OF QUALITY:
t eihibited good perf ormance in certain activitles such (5) as cutage control and engineering and has displayedsignificant initiative in its saf ety enhancement program,in radi,ilogical deficiencies still were found to existfire protection and security.
controls, surveillancu, l
some of these deficiencies have existed throughout the period and have been identified in previous SALP reviews, and by the licensee's own quality assuranceThe am i
organization. structure and the instability in the corporate and site management tear. neve resulted in the licensee'sina problems without repeated prompting and overview by Senior corporate management was slow in confronting 4
l the problems and in implementing corrective actio NRC.
l the licensee took steps to address its organizational However, the effectiveness of these efforts it, weaknesses.
in improving the licensee's performaace remains a matter of continuing NRC interest and concern."
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COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS:
I a)--Continee senior management attention to identify problems to ensure that they are 1
promptly and effectively resolved.
b)--Improve tests and surveillance of equipment i
p r og ram.
c)--Greater authority of quality control staff over other departments to resolve any I
conflicts between procedures and personnel
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in different operation groups.
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i d)--Improve training and supervision over contract workers, e)--Improvements in visual surveillance system to properly identify and describe deficiencies, f)--Improve training, testing and requalification of personnel.
(6)
PLANT / EQUIPMENT COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS:
a)--Maintenance requests back log be eliminated.
l b)--Complete review of maintenance and testing J
i schedules with all incomplete testing being finished and any deficiencies corrected, i
c)--Identification and repair of Main Stream Isolation "alve and RRR pumps which caused initial spur'ous scram which closed the plant.
d)--NRC investigation and public explanation of recent reports of deficiencies in certain General Electric reactors, including Pilgrim.
The public should be inf ormed of the possible j
problems and any action taken by General i
Electric or Boston Edison which has corrected these deficiencies. All uncorrected problems shcald be corrected.
e)--The NRC and General Electric should also make i
available to the public the General Electric report.
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(7)
GENERAL MANAGEMENT CONCERNS:
The following are recommendations which address general management areas which the committee f eels need review.
i COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS:
a)--Staf f vacancies in key areas should be filled to adequate levels.
j b)--Demonstration that the new programs, divisions and personnel can actually perf orm as planned, c)--Resolution of inter-group conflicts and clearer lines of authority f or safety, ALARA (As low as reasonably achievable), and fire 4
protection personnel over other divisions.
d)--Review and planning of cransition from outage and maintenance mode to on-line operation so that they are prepared if restart is approved.
(8)
REACTOR CONTAINMENT:
In its most recent SALP report the NRC noted the f ollowing:
"Plant hardware changes were also impressive, particularly the planned Mark I
)
containment enhancements.
The modifications go j
considerably beyond NRC recommendations and show a
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concern for nuclear safety."
Nevertheless, serious concerns have been raised, both inside and outside of i
the NRC, about the Mark I containment and its i
possible fail'.re in the event of a major accident.
The Committee has sent a letter to Boston Edison j
a i
seeking more information on exactly what work is planned to enhance the containment system.
In additioa, the committee strongly urges that prior to restart the NRC, the state, and Boston Edison shall hold a public hearing on:
1 a)
The possible defects or weaknesses of the Mark I containment; j
b) the work planned by soston Edison to improve it; i
c) the schedule for that work; t
i d)
NRC studies and others done on the itegrity l
i or possible failure of the containment in the i
event of a major accident.
The containment is l
j such a crucial safety feature in nuclear plants
]
that all work to strengthen any weaknesses must be completed prior to restart.
e)
An evaluation of any additional safety features i
such as filtered venting of the containment, j
molten core barriers, underground residual heat removal system, and a secondary steel containment.
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(9)
STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM:
Prior to refueling the I
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problems identified with the Standby Gas Treatment j
system should be corrected.
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i10) DECOMMISSIONING PGAN:
It is unclear what happens to the
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plant and storage of radioactive waste when the plant is permanently closed.
The questions of the cost involved l
decommissioning, the impact on Plymouth taxes, waste storage, security, and dismantling or "sealing" of the reactor building are of great concern to area residents, i
i The NRC, the state and Boston Edison should develop i
decommissioning plans, well before a scheduled closing, j
to answer these and other questions.
i 1
j The Committee af ter intensive review of the NRC SALP report recommends the Boston Edison Company immediately take positive j
action on all of the above recommendations.
Boston Edison should improve all of the categories which received grades of category 3 on the most recent SALP report.
The two primary causes f or the NRC's category 3 findings were slowness in making improvements and lack of management attention.
These problems should be resolved so that none of the functional areas maintains a category 3 grade.
It is imperative that all improvements are completed before action is taken to restart the Pilgrim Nuclear j
Power generating facility at Plymouth.
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RECOMHENDATION VI i
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RECOMMENDATION VI IMPROVED EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING Emergency preparedness is the last layer of protection for 4
public health and safety in the event of an accident at a nuclear Until recently, emergency planning seems to have been plant.
perceived more as a regulatory requirement than a form of protection As public concern over nuclear which night be called into use.
plants has increased over the past year, so has emergency planning come under greater scrutiny.
This scrutiny has found the obvious current emergency planning is inadequate.
The primary responsibility to correct these inadequacies rests with the state.
Working with federal officials, local of ficials, and the utility the state must take immediate action to develop plans that are more realistic and dependable.
The federal government has reserved to itself most powers dealing with nuclear power plants.
The state, however, is left with total responsibility in protecting the public should an almost accident ever happen.
While this may be jurisdictionally awkward there is no substitute for state and local planning.
Local and state officials are the most qualified to prepare and implement emergency plans.
)
It is unacceptable to this committee for a private utility or l
i federal agency to try and fulfill or usurp state and local r e spon si bility.
The committee feels that prior to restart emergency i
plans must first be reviewed and approved by town of ficials, in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) communities, and by the state.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Boston Edison, the State, and towns should work on a schedule to coordinate the review and decis'.on on whether to approve, i
prior to restart.
i Tnere is growing debate over how f ar states can use the j
i planning approval requirement as a means of preventing a new plant f rom being licensed or of closing a licensed plant, if a state does not believe an emergency response plan can adequately protect the public health and safety.
It appears that the NRC, Congress, and undoubtedly the courts will be reviewing this issue as more states i
withhold approvals.
l The state should pursue two courses.
State and local j
governments should develop the strongest possible emergency plans.
1 l
The public's health and saf ety demands nothing less.
If, after those plans are developed, the Governor feels they are still l
inadequate then he may withhold approval.
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The committee heard testimony f rom the Depar tment of Public Safety about the need to plan beyond a set limit of ten miles.
The Department stressed, though, that with deficiencies in current ten
' nile planning any work beyond the ten mile zone should not deflect Communities any at.tention from the communities with).n the zone.
closest to the plant require a higher level of planning than communities farther away.
The Department also testified that while Civil Def ense is the primary agency f or dealing with emergencies other divisions are involved such as the National Guard, Public Safety, and Public Health.
The Department nottd that coordination between state agencies for nuclear emergency planning needs to be improved.
Local Civil Defense officials from several towns in the EPZ testified before the committee.
Their concerns included:
e A)
Lack of a reception / decontamination areat A need for greater technical and material assistance from B) the state and utility:
C)
Criticism that the plans lacked specific written agreements with parties which might be involved with an emergency, such as bus companies and hospitals:
D)
A need to plan for regional school systems in whi.ch students come f rom one but not all towns within the EPtr and E)
The need f or more inter-community planning in order to have a coordinated regional plan, The town of Plymouth has created its own local advisory committee on nuclear matters.
That committee has thoroughly reviewed the town's emergency response plan.
Tneir report has been made available to the committee and demonstrates the kind of i
t detailed planning necessary for a strong response plan.
It also demonstrates the indispensable role of local governments in i
developing plans.
Many of their recommendations would be helpf ul to other towns.
Their report is included (see Appendix 9).
While primary responsibility for planning rests with state and local of ficials there is necessary assistance which should come from the utility.
This includes technical advice as well as material support accepted by the state, a county, or a town.
The committee feels that this assistance should be paid for through utility assessments which will be passed on to utility ratepayers rather than all taxpayers.
specific improvements to the emergency plans need to come from the utility, towns and state.
The committee recommends the f ollowing improvements:
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4 BOSTON EDISON PLANNING ASSISTANCE:
(1)
Bostor. Edison Company should provide updated and accurate Evacuation Time Estimates under a wide variety of accident scenarios.
This will enable state and local officials to better plan traf fic management in the event of an emergency.
Identification, notification and workable evacuation (2) plans for mobility impaired and individuals who will have difficulty being notified of an emergency or in being f amiliar with the emergency response procedure.
Such individuals include the physically disabled, those depending on public transportation, the hard of hearing and those who speak limited English.
Greater attention of these individuals will help ensure that no one is excluded from the planning.
BOSTON EDISON EQUIPMENT:
(1)
Boston Edison should improve Public Ale
- Systems including testing.
Sirens shouad be tested more frequently with improved monitoring and identification of individual siren deficiencies.
Siren systems should be audible in the entire EPZ, l
and loud enough to be heard in buildings wit,h closed windows.
In addition, this system should f
be supplemented with an adequate number of loudspeaker equipped vehicles.
(2)
Review and supply of needed equipment for shelters and reception areas for evacuations.
During summer months local population swells, increasing the need
.l for sheltering areas for non-resident visitors.
l (3)
Provide greater information in the event of an j
emergency.
During an incident, people may not have written inf ormation on hand about procedures to be i
1 followed.
This is particule.rly true for non-i residents.
Printed material with procedures for an emergency should be pre-printed for quick distribu-j tion in group shelters, relocation areas, hospitals, public transportation, and through school children during an emergency.
(4)
Boston Edison should update the Nuclear Energy Pamphlet to impress upon the public the importance of following official instructions.
Necessary 4
information should include' maps, location of J
public shelters, locations of public transportation facilities, Emergency Broadcast System affiliates, traffic routes, reception areas and personal safety
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precautions.
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EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (EFZ):
i (1)
Clarify that when any part of a town lies within an EP2, the entire town shall be part of the EPZ.
Planning and resources f or these towns will have to be upgraded.
Clarify planning for regional schools which have (2) students f rom at least one, but not all, towns in the school system which are part of an EP2.
1 Clarify author!,ty of Public Safety to plan for a (3) radiological emergency beyond a 10 mile EP2.
(See Recommendation I--Division of Nuclear i
racility Safety) r Evacuation time estimates and traffic control plans (4) should be based on avacuations of people within the EPZ to centers well beyond the 10 mile zone and should anticipate secondary or shadow ovacuations.
STATE PLANNING:
1 (1)
Increase state assistance to local planners.
This should include technical assistance as well an financial assistance for local use.
The goal should be coordinated regional planning as well as strengthened local plans.
1 (2)
Inventory and where necessary create adequate local i
shelters to protect non-resident visitors in the event of emergencies which may not require l
evacuation.
1 j
(3) tdentify area medical services, hospitals and medical pursonnel available for use outside of the EPZs.
4 Also evaluate any additional services and supplies which may be necessary to. serve EP1 population in the event of an emergency, including energency treatment l
)
facilities and training of medical personnel, (4)
The state and towns should participate in appropriate energency drills.
j (5)
Specific planning shall be developed for emergency i
I notification, evacuation plaiining, and traffic i
control planning should be imposed in areas outside J
of an EPZ which pose unique problems, e.g.:
Cape Cod and the Islands.
't (6)
Inventory of available buses, ambulances and handicapped / elderly vans, to assist in an evacuation.
Develop an inventory of service 1
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(7)
Supervise planning by towns, ensure a coordinated, regional plan, and ensure cooperation between the utilities and area towns.
(8)
Identify and designate adequate reception and decontamination centers and, ensure the availabiltiy of adequate supplies and equipment..
(9)
Ensure appropriate annual review and publication of plans working with the utilities, towns and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
(10)
Evaluate and where necessary correct effectiveness of notification and communication system between a
state and local officials.
(11)
Identification, notification and wor..able evacuation 3
plans f or people in all institutional f acilities --
such as hospitals, nursing homes, schools and prisons -- inside the EPZ.
(12)
Contractual agreements for the above services where appropriate should be made to avoid any erroneous j
assumptionc of transportation in the event of an evacuation.
l i
LOCAL PLANNING:
(1)
Each town in an EPZ should consider establishieg an Radiological Emergency Response Plan Committee to 1
review matters pertaining to emergency response a
planning.
l (2)
Local plans nead more thorough documentation and 1
letters of agreement between involved parties to i
ensure clear lines of responsibilities in 'the evant of an emergency.
(3)
Local of ficials should inventory local planning needs, equipment and resources which can be provided i
by the Division of Nuclear Facility Safety or the utilities.
(4)
In addition to plan for their own communities, local officials should work closely with neighboring communities to ensure workable. regional planning.
l (5)
Each town in an EPZ should establish plans for
,l informing non-residents of procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency.
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J The state and utility have been ineffectual and too informal in developing adequate emergency response plans.
The committee, therefore, finds:
A)
The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant should not restart until, and unless, an emergency preparedness plan, including evacuation, has been approved by the Selectmen in the EPZ communities and by the Governor B)
Federal, state, and local officials and the utility should coordinate actions in order to reach a decision on whether
')
to approve emergency response plans prior to restart.
1 C)
The cost of emergency planning should not be borne by all taxpayers but financed through utility assessments, l
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