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PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH SAFETY EVALUATION REFORT REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM REQUIREMENT TO INSTALL 8-HOUR PATTERY POWERED LIGHTIJNG IN OUTSIDE YARD AREAS BOSTON EDISON COMPANY PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-793 l
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INTRODUCTION l
By letter dated April 1, 1987 (8Eco 87-053), the licensee requested an exerrption from the specific technical requirements of Section III.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 pertaining to installation of 8-hour battery powered lighting units in the outside yard area.
Section III.J of Appendix R states that, "Emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto." The yard area in question is outside the reactor building and in the access / egress route to alternative shutdown stations located in the Emergency Diesel Rooms, the reactor building Auxiliary Bay, and other portions of the reactor building that are not involved in the fire.
Lighting is already provided throughout the outside yard area (including this part of the yard area which is the access route to the various alternative safe shutdown stations) to satisfy security requirements.
l This existing security lighting is powered by normal off-site power and by an errergency security diesel-generator unit, an independent on-site unit which starts automatically upon loss of off-site power.
The licensee states that the security lights are adequate to illuminate the access
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2 routes in the outside yard area and are as reliable as individual battery powered lights.
Therefore, they believe there is no need to also install individual battery powered lighting units.
2.0 EVALUATION Questions raised by the staff during this evaluation concerned both the adequacy and the reliability of the existing yard lighting.
Regarding adecuacy, there are three separate considerations.
First, cperators are simply traversing the yard area; there are no alternative shutdown stations in the yard area.
Second, the yard lighting is fostalled to facilitate security surveillance of the yard 'rea and is, therefore, adequate to allow passage by plant operators to those buildings housing alternative safe shutdown panels.
Third, operators crossing the yard ared to those buildings housing alternative safe shutdown panels will have hand held flashlights, should supplemental lighting be required.
Regarding reliability of the yard lighting, it is powered by a separate security diesel-generator unit. Also, the entire security yard-lighting system is installed and maintained to requirements at least as stringent as those contained in Section III.J of Appendix R.
The staff finds the existing yard Ifghting system installation adequate and acceptable.
3.0 CONCLUSION
On the basis of the above evaluation, we conclude that the requested exemption to utilize existing security yard-lighting is acceptable to satisfy the specific requirementsSection III.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 for emergency lighting for access and egress routes to alternative safe shutdown panels.
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t PSB SALP INPUT Plant Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Licensee:
Boston Edison Company Docket No.:
50-293 SER
Subject:
REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM REQUIREMENT TO INSTALL 8-HOUR BATTERY POWERED LIGHTING IN OUTSIDE YARD AREAS PERFORMANCE (1) Management Involvement in Assuring Quality PARAMETERS:
(2) Ap;;*oach to Resolution of Technical Issues l
from a Safety Standpoint i
Response to NRC Initiatives Staffing (Including Management)
Reporting and Analysis of Reportable Events Training and Qualification Effectiveness Any other SALP Functional Area PERFORMANCE NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF CATEGORY / RATING PARAMETER LICENSEE'S PERFORMANCE i
(1)
This request for exemption was relatively 2,
simple and straight forward. Documentation provided indicated management involvement l
throughout preparation in that the request I
was clearly written and technically well justified. Management is aware of the need for adeounte lighting in all areas of the l
plant required for operation of safe shutdown l
equipment and access and egress routes thereto j
and has assured required lighting in the outside yard areas from the security lights.
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(2)
The technical issues involving provision of 1
adequate lighting in the outside yard areas l
were thoroughly addressed and the alternative l
provided is more than adequate in all respects.
(3)
The licensee responded adeouately to questions 2
raised by the staff during the course of the review.
(4)
Not Applicable (5)
Not Applicable (6)
Not Applicable (7)
Not Applicable 1
Overall Rating: 2 t
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p.m %:l EOSTON E0150N COMPANY l
PILGRIM L
CHAIR'GN, EDARD Or DIRECTORS AND f
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER I
S. Sweeney 1
I SENIOR VP, NUCLEAR t
1 R. Bird 4
I swt Ass.suw, EXECUTIVE AS$1STANT-----------I Liv. p. g. )
(Outage Oversight) 1 I
b Va rity
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R. Ledgett l
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V.P. NUCLEAR ENGINEERING O! RECTOR V.P. NUCLEAR
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AND QUALITY ASSURANCE PLANNING &
OPERATIONS RESTART E. Howard D. Gillispie Vacant I
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I NUCLEAR OVALITY NUCLEAR,1.tt.1VfiV6 MANAGE.
ASSURANCE EN31N. t l
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1 0.Cronin H.Brannan 0.$wanson l
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I FIRE NUCLEAR E. P.
i TRAIN!N3 PROTECTION SECURITY OPERATIONS COORDINATOR E. Ziemianski G. Wozniak C. Higgins K. Roberts 4. Z iv;-
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l TECHNICAL.
DUTAGE OPERA 110NS RADIOLOGICAL MAINTENANCE
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1 SECTION MANAGER SECTION SECTION SECTION h
J. Seery N. Brosee
- 5. Hudson T. Sowdon R. Sherry
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d JUN 191987 he 4
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SUBJECT:
EVENT FULLOWUP REPORT NO.87-067 i
50.72 EVENT JUNE 11, 1987 PLANT - PILGRIM PROJECT MANGER - RICPARD WESSMAN COGNIZANT ENGINEER - JERRY CARTER PROBLEM Rust was found in the containment spray headers and nozzles in the drywell.
Up to 1/2 inch of rust was found in the upper drywell header.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The spray pattern and cooling water flow rate in the containment cooling subsystem may not be that assumed.
O!SCUSEION The utility, based upon recomendations from GE and those in the Mark I Initiatives, alected to make improvements to the containment spray system.
These changes were being done af ter a licensee 50.59 review; the staff, in an April 1987 letter, asked for the licensee's evaluation of the modification to the spray system.
The rust was discovered during implementation of the planned modifications.
o The utility was planning to provide an independent source of water to the containment spray system.
Since the new cooling water flow rate is smaller and was being removed so that 6 of 7 spray holes could be plugged.m This would enable a pressure differential across the nozzle to be maintained at the reduced flow rates, thereby assuring a uniform spray pattern.
The reduced cooling water flow rate prevents overcooling and possible formation of negative pressure in the drywell.
The source of the rust is currently believed to be the high humidity environment working on the carbon steel piping of the spray headers.
rust found in the upper header may be attributed to two factors.The larger amount of The higher terperature in the upper portion of the drywell could result in higher corrosion rates.
when ? block valves were improperly aligned.In 1984, inadvertent
/ rom the piping and caused it to collect near the spray nozzles.This actuat rust Technicil Specification surveillance requirement for operab containment cooling subsystem.
The system "passed".
Recently, the licensee ran a water flow test on a spray nozzle with rust.
reported as "dribbles" with a pressure differential ofSince the water flow was 100 psi, the validity of the air test is suspect.
Therefore, the need for a meaningful test is emphasized by the recent water flow test and the increased significance given to the operability of the containment spray system by the Mark I Initiatives.
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2 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Containment spray systems in BWRs may not be effective in controlling temperature / pressure in containment following core reflood in the event of a LOCA.
3 FOLLOWUP To collect additional infomation, the following steps have been taken:
H1 grim -
The utility has been asked to describe the basis for believing the torus spray / headers are not similarly effected by rust.
Peach Bottos - The utility was asked to inspect spray nozzles. On June 19, 1987,
.%gion I informed us that no significant rust was found at Unit 2.
Browns Ferry - The utility has agreed to pull a nozzle from the drywell location.
On Monday, June 22, the utility will identify the unit and schedule (probably next.taak).
Cooper -
Region IV infomed us that Cooper had an inadvertent spray in 1980 and in 1985, an inspection of the nozzle and header did not e
reveal any significant rust.
CLOSECUT Based on the available information I believe the long term review should be transferred to Plant Systems Branch.
They are best qualified to assess the data expected from the additional scheduled nozzle inspections and, if necessary, determine a more appropriate surveillance requirement. They should also detemine whether se:ne type of generic comunication will be required and to prepare a draft of the comunication.
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err Carter, BWR Events Assessment Branch i
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SUBJECT:
EVENT FOLLOWUP REPORT NO.87-067 d
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PROJECT MANAGER - RICHARD WESSPAN y
COGNIZANT ENGINEER - JERRY CARTER bb PROBLEM Rust was found in the containment spray headers and nozzles in the drywell.
Up to 1/2 inch of rust was found in the.oper drywell header.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The spray pattern and cooling water 71tw rate in the containment cooling subsystem may not be that assumed.
DISCUSSION The utility based upon recomendations from GE and those in the Mark I Initiative elected to make improvements to the containment spray system.
These changes were being done after a licenste 50.59 review; the staff, in an April 19P7 letter, asked for the licensee's evaluation of the modification to the spray system.
The rust was discovered during implementation of the planned modifications.
The utility was planning to provide an independent source of water to the containment spray system. Since the new cooling water flow rate is smaller and more appropriate to the actual cooling needs, each spray nozzle in the drywell was being removed so that 6 of 7 spray holes cculd be plugged. This would enable a pressure differential across the nozzle to be maintained at the reduced flow rates, thereby assuring a uniform spray pattern.
The reduced cooling water flow rate prevents overcooling and possible fonnation of negative pressure in the drywell.
The source of the rust is currently believed to be the high humidity environment workingonthecarbonsteelpipingofthesprayheaqers. The larger amount of rust found in the upper header may be attributed to two factors.
The highe*
temperattde in the upper portion of the drywell could result in higher corrosion rates.
In 1984, inadvertent spray actuation (upper header only) occurred during valve. testing when 2 block valves were improperly aligned. This actuation may have dislodged rust from the piping and caused it to collect near the spray noIzles.
In 1982, a qualitative air flow test was perfonrad at Pilgrim to satisfy a Technical Specification surveillance requirement for operability of the containment cooling subsystem.
The system "passed".
kecently, the licensee ran a water flow test on a spray nozzle with rust.
Since the water flow was reported as "dribbles" with a pressure differential of ) 100 psi, the validity of the air test is suspect.
Therefore the need for a meaningful test is emphasized by the recent water flow test and the increased significance given to the operability c' the containnent spray system by the Mark I Initiatives, b
2 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Containment spray systr.ms in BWRs may not be useful in controllir.
temperature / pressure in containment following core reflood in the event of a LOCA.
FOLLOWUP To collect additional infomation, the following steps have been taken:
Pilgrim -
The utility has been asked to describe the basis for believing the torus spray / headers are not similarly effected by rust.
A direct request to pull : torus spray nozzle for Inspection was not made because of the difficulty in obtaining the nozzle.
Scaffolding was removed from seetorus thereby necessitating the use of a rubber boat and air packs.
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Peach Bottom - The utility has been asked to pull one spray nozzle fr,om the dry well.
.u. s. y.. s i Browns Ferry - The utility will be asked to pull a nozzle from each +eader location.
CLOSE00T Based on the available infomation, I believe the long term review should be transferred to Plant Systems Branch, They are best tiualified to assess the data expected from the additional scheduled nozzle inspections and, if necessary, determine a more appropriate surveillance requirement. They should also detemine whether some type of generic comunication will be required and to prepare a draft of the comunication.
Jerry Carter BWR Events Assessment Branch
((l6nn u" JUN ! ! 19W
SUBJECT:
ADDENDut. (O EVENT FOLLOWilP REPORT NO.87-028 50.77 EVENT #8589 MAY 6, 1987 PLANT - PILC. RIM FROJECT MANAGER - RICHARP VESSMAN COGNIZANT ENGINEER - JERRY CARTER DISCUS $10N Regico I, in a morning report #
a June 1, 1987, stated that the licensee for
,the Pilgrim Statior, determined M 31 of 145 HCUs had loose or missing hold down bolts. They also concluded th'. the worst case failures could result in an unisolatable leak.
I contacted Chuck Von Dam of GE (408 905-1248) to determina hcw GE would explain the different conclusions reached by Boston Edison. GE does not currently knew the answer, but they plan to be in contact with Carl Berlinger, Chief, Generic Connunications Branch.
Region 1, on June 3,1987, sent me a copy of the Boston Edison Part P1 clated Fay 30, 1988 (copy attached).
The followup for this item now resides with tne Generic Comunications Branch as a Part 21 action. Therefore, this concludes Events Assessment Branch effort; no transfer is necessary.
b 6 err CP.rter, PWR Events Assessment Branch l
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the ereup t-w s s e s t.a d 4een eewered f r ee, t t.e statten eewer transformers since t i.e e/26. eelse lere of e(esite cowee events.
Liter.,ee/f ac I l 6 t v Netifscaifore/ Subject
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5/27 Licensee Call
. 74e-3 3 Vart 28 Revert
(~ vent E eine en laspection et the Centrol Red terive s< stem lesdraulic Centrol Unit 86KUt i s.s t a l l a t l en. f t.e licensee identfiled that i t.e 86.0 surpert f. eld dee 4 elf,
.er e leese or missine en 38 ef ifee 145 IKUs (see l'a i l e ne por t o f 5/6 3 The 8
inseettien was eer (s r eed i t. r e s eet.s e to a General Electric letter dated 10/22/96. whicts indicated the eretelem wa s identieled at another (acility and s e c :.see r.Je d a l l e l s e. t s c he c er t i.e i r SKU i s.s t a l l a t i es.o.
The licensee's evatwatten concl.eded that as a result. the abilite of the IKU sweeert to withstand t i.e safe s t.wi dewes e a r t t.gu s t-e 45'A l was imea ir e d and i t.a t the worst case eallwre e..sr ine an SSE we.s id lead to an unisolable leak.
The l i c e s.s e e elaas en resterine at
- he ae f ec ted leCtts to the or i e t e.a t desten condittee. erler to restart.
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s June 12,1987 EVENT FOLLOWUP REPORT NO. 87-0?8
SUBJECT:
50.72 EVENT #8589 May 6, 1987 Pt /NT - PILGRIM COGNf 7/,hT ENGINEER Jerry Carter PROBLEM Licensee detected sorte loose or missing hold-down bolts on the Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) for the Control Pod Drive (CPD) system.
CAUSE TFeFe appeared to be a discrepancy between the actual and specified terque on the bolts versus the torque used during seismic qualification testing.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Curir.f a postulated selsnic event, the HLU rright fail, thereby keep the CR0 from operating.
DISCUSSION Boston Edison stated that a 'Potentially Reportable Condition" letter bsd been sent by GE ta the BWR owners. Boston Edison found their deficiency while The GE letter dated 10/?2/E6 stated performing the inspection suggested by GE.
that the missing bolts do not constitutt, a safety problem during a faulted ever.t.
Snug tight bolts wculd enable the HCU to scram the control rods.
A separate check verified that the LaSalle and Quad Cities units had received a similar letter and perfortned a walkdown in 1986. Susquehanna also had a walkdown.
CLOSE0tLT Even though there is a slight indication that perhaps a few plants may not have received the GE letter, the GE conclusion regarding "snug tight" bolts being acceptable and the general licensee practice as a result of A-46, "Seismic Qualification", provide an adequate basis to conclude that no generic comunication by HRC is necessary at this tice, f
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i erry arter BWR Section Events Astessment Branch i
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R. Wessman l
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12812 PILGRIM NRL' SESIDENT P02
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oc, a.x. nam ns
,j-n.L. Onnen october 22, 1986 n.s. Pos.r.en FG j
5.r. Kearney Mr. R. N. Swanam H.F. Brar?w)
- il h iear Engineering Managar
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Plavidal, GE antas D51sm cogan/
R.F. 'rbilmtit, GE 25 Braintree Hill Office Park l
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Subject:
Pilgrim NPS
]f GE Pic 46-08; Improper EU Insu11, tion gi 3 9164 h
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The following infomation is prwidad as part of the General El u.,......da for evaluation of Potentially Reportable conditions (MC) in antisfactim o 10CPR Part 21. General Electric has conclu$sd that this IAfamation is not germane to safety, nor does a naportable conditie exist within the aceps o as t
technical inforumtion.
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with respect to corrective actions and preventive unamures sich are outsid
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G3's omtrol, GE.e anmanda and stility evalusta this infoematim as it re stas l
to existing or future plant vi==nt, conditions, peacekares or plans.
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Gs is notifying all Inst owiers of the infomation. 'these issues have aires y been prwidad to the wc in June,1946 by the utility *1ch emerves the i
con Lition.
l During ar, inspection of the tqrdraaite ocatrol mIdts,!AEissk M M G O /
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was <*==rvuS that the holdom bolts Sor smay pJOEM fra M-did not appear to be tightened mafficiandy M.y,.
l the 16 brardi jonction =*1am (IEms) was ar 3," /
l (A RJM is an enclosure containing red position senscu amble tamminations an 4
voltage regulationg transfomare for M Mod contro.'t ant Infoemation Systa It t
j is sounted to one of a grug of Isre mich it servei.)
l Plant ard GE sita perecusnel corductad an investigati.on an$ fount that (1) t a torque specified for the isz ba1Ma-i bolts differett from the valus uses fc -
seianic tasting and reportes in the kvirarmental Salification Report, seul (2) ducira installation the nJMs were attachel to the EUs in accordance with a GR drawing, but the num seismic test configuration used for gaalification did at J
include a lum.
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'the plant omar stated in a. Licensing Event Maport (1230 makaitted to the 1 C 1
that GE was responsible for the two installation discrepancias because the
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utility was not notified of the correct installation requirementa imposed 1
- the seimnic qualification tants.
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12:13 PILGRIM NRC RESIDENT P03 NO N@ H-M L QlW Mr. R. N. Swanson October 22, 1986 Page 2 BNiprent Qualification (30) became a separate program unique to each plant ani was performd af ter original eqaipment had been supplied to meet not Mc requiramnts. (i.e. WRIE 0585), Wien became affective after plant interfa e rapirements had been incluaal in the ESS design documentAtlon. GE Oftere to pttwide a design doeurnantation update service to incorporate any new interf ce requiramnts resultirg frcn the IQ program, but participating utllitien y
declined. '1herefore, the responsibility for laplementing adequata 300 bolt j
I bolddown torque rests with the utility..'Ihe bolt toque, if recogninas practices such as "snug tight" torquirn are avW, shculd not cause a sa 'ety risk nor necessarily be inconsistant with the ification test resalta, particularly if perioiic surveillance ana' ures are also enployed.
s GE concitated that neither the missing or loose holdooun bolts nor the erroc sus s attachnent ctwarvei at the BW6 constituted a safet/ petblan å a faultad event, nor wculd thuy at any other sm, the r-Ma= bn1% bol :s, if srug tight, wtuld enabale the H:0 toscram the cx:mtrol rais. The u attadent to the IG wculd not prevent a scran hn-a only Sg of the n weight of 120 lbs wculd load the t00-1000 lb. 33J. st:o relatively -11 1 M weight wculd not significantly cha.ge the dynamic characteristics of the a J.
After sounining the installation a d ruviewing the eqaipment quallfloation results, the actions taken at the plant were to retorque the haw bolt: and to reinrSte the a typer support sounting point. Similar actions are zw. aad for other plants to assure that no long taza us) timm1 problems can coeur and to correct any significant inconsistene betsmen he aco equiprent qualification ram 11ts ard the actual field installation.
GE ranr==nds that all plants check their N3J installatican to.aeanze tha.
following:
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1he IG m:mnting, W with bolts or walding, is.ocos
.,. h.tha.
seismic qualtfloation test configuration. Sus utilitIyh
' ta" 'y
. umm the actual 33J asismic gialification tortpa valus'to' assare
tightness.
2 Branch $nction modules, where incorporatas, are not attached dir ctly to the 53J frame above the floor asespt in cases where the u he, been considermi in the equipat qualification results.
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s7 12 14 PILGRIM NRC RESIDENT PO4 l
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- 7/7 ar. x., s. s=ne=
22, 1986 cctober installation so ts the Page 3 to assure that each EUn taken, no specialJ w !
Correct.tve action should ce takenOnce the corrective actions tion point.
prwentive measuras are required Also for the IkN zu:unting the outto the EU as an u requirements.
holddown bolts.sodified to eliminate reference Vay truly yours, R. G. FurgesonServices Pro $t Managernacicar
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Licensee / Facility Notification /Sebject 5/s ENS Call 011po m HCU Seismic Oeatification ri DN s 293 Eocct During an inspection of the Cent rol Red Drive system Hydraulic Cent rol Unit
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lHCUl insta11atten, the licensee identified that some of the HCU held down belts As a ressit the MCU configuration did not correspond ;e were leese er missing.
used during the seismic gealifIcation testing.
The inspection was to a General Electric letter dated 10/22/88, which
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that performed in response indicated the problem was identified at another facility and recommended all plcnts check their HCU installattens. Licensee engineering evaluation is c oct inuing. The resident inspectors will review the results of this evaluatiep cad the licensee correclive actions.
Licensee / Facility Notificattem/Sebject SALP Management Mheting/
Pilgrim DN 50-293 Information Item tocat The SAlp Menagement hketing with the Boston Edison Company is being held today La Ch11tenv111e, Messachusetts.
~ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 MAY 7. 1957 Licensee / Facility Notification /Sebject Yankee Atomic 5/8 ENS Call Failure of Appendin J Type A Test DN 50-29 Econt The Containment Integrated Leah Rate Test (CILRT) was declared a test failure at 7:00 a.m. en 5/S.
inis resulted from identification of a significant, but not geantiftsble leak at a blank flange in the feel cycle dewetering system.
The Irak was discovered during the containment presserisation phase of the CILRT.
with the pressere at appresimetely 32 psig.
Followsag maintenance actions to occure 1%e lesh 9, the test was resumed. As a result of large swings in test data and indications of abneraal operatten of t he cont aInment pres.'re meinllering instrumentation the licensee performed treeblesheeting an.
discovered water in the cocIainment pressure instrumentation. The resident Accpector has reviewed the licensee's actions in response to these occurrences and verified them to be appropriate. The performence of the CILRT is being followed by the resident anspector.
Licensee / Facility Natifiestion/Sebject 5:cgwehanna Units IA2 5/7 Information Item
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!%Y 28,1987 I
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'Ib Managers Infomation Meeting attendees Frcant Bill Connolly
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Mails P-203 I
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Subject:
Annowrement o_f, three new ccrpany officers; infomaticn dissertination f
requested.
l THE DCIDSED NEMS REIIASE, MADE PUBLICLY AVAIIABM THIS !OINING, IS BEDG SD7F TO YOU AS KEY INFOPMATICN CCNIACTS TERCOGHOUT THE SYSITM.
1 PLEASE REPRCOUCE ':HE NIMS PILEASE AT YCUR IOCAL 1CPX AREAS EITHER FOR INDIVIDUAL HANDCUTS, BULIETIN BOARD POSTDGS, PICX UP AT HIGi TPAITIC AREAS, OR AS YOU SEE FIT FOR THE WIDEST POSSIBM DISTRIBUTICN.
THANK YOU FOR YCCR HELP.
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c.-ree s.wrmm:tmevrvnnemr.mxxemarmee w w w meMe EDISON soo soAton St. roston, MA 02t99 For more information:
Mike Monahan 617-424-2460 (Evenings and Weekends) 617-424-2055 May 23, 1987 BOSTON EDISON ELECTS THREE OFFICERS Boston Edison Company today announced the election by the Board of Directors of two senior vice presidents and a vice president.
Named senior vice presidents are Douglas C. Bauer and Thomas J. Hay.
Hay, 40, mves up from vice president, finance and accounting, and retains his post as treasurer.
Bauer, 49, is presently senior vice president, strategic planning, for the Edison Electric Institute in Washington 0.C.
At Boston Edison, he will have responsibility for supply and demand planning, corporate relations and comercial operations when he joins the company on or about July 1.
Elected vice president, power planning, is Richard S. Hahn, 36.
He currently serves as manager, supply and demand planning department.
Both Hahn and May will assume their new responsibilities June 1, 1987.
l In announcing the changes Stephen J. Sweeney, chairman, president and chief executive officer, called the action "a significant step in restructuring Boston Edison to meet the challenges of a changing and more competitive utility market.
Doug Bauer, Tom Hay and Dick Hahn have proven capabilities and reputations for innovation, creativity and initiative.
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- c esseu m WIP'9 M 9Per M=W+tiWNtTWEEEUH!P"mm e
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.F EDISON 800 Boylston 5t. Boston, MA 02199 particularly pleased that we are able to attract a person with Ooug Bauer's experience and education to our management team.
His decision to join us is indicative of a positive future for the company and its 600,000 customers."
May joined Boston Edison in 1976 as assistant treasurer after seven years with the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand where he was general practice manager.
He also served as head of Edison's financial management department.
A certified pubile accountant, May holds a bachelor's degree frem Stonehill College and a master's degree in finance fro:n Bentley College.
He is a member of the Stonehill College Board of Advisors and the Financial Executives Institute.
Hay is also a member of the accounting management committee of the Edison Electric Institute and a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Bauer has extensive experience in utility policy and planning and in federal energy requiation.
Before becoming senior vice president, strategic planning, at EEI, hs was EEI's senior vice pt esident, economics and finance.
In 1972, he begsn his federal gcvernment career as a White House Fellcw.
He then served as director of energy conservation research and development at tne former Federal Energy Administration and director of nuclear applications at the former Energy Research and Developme"It Administration.
(Both FEA and ERCA were merged into the Department of Energy.)
In 1977, he became assistant administrator for DOE's Economic Regulatory Administration.
Before joining EEI in 1979, he served as executive assistant to the president of American Electric Power.
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- g EDISON 800 00phton $t. coston, MA 02199 Bauer holds 4 Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from Carnegie-Hellen Univer.ity, a law degree from Georgetown University and bachelor's and master's degrees in engineering from Cornell University.
He is a U.S.
representative on long-range energy and economic studies to the International Energy Agency in Paris and has carried out international assignments in the public and private sectors in Saudi Arabia, Japan, China, the U.S.S.R. and Eastern and Hestern Europe.
Hahn joined Boston Edison in 1973.
He serve 1 in various engineering and public affairs capacities, including manager of information resources.
He also served as a staff assistant to the senior vice president and was manager of the fuel regulation and performance group before becoming manager of a new supply and demand planning department in 1984.
Hahn holds bachelor's and master's degrees in electrical engineering from Northeastern University and a master's in business administration from Boston College.
J Internal Note: Also, effective June 1, 1987, Harren Roche, Vice President, Human Resources, will report directly to Chairman, President and Chief Executive Of ficer Stephen J. Sweeney.
Tne Humari Resource Organization previously reported to Senior Vice President John R. Stevens, i
7/v47 Plant:
Pilgrin Nuclear power Plant license No. OPR-35 Docket: 50-293 Owner / operator:
Boston Edison Company 8,
addrass:
Roston Edison Company H/C Nuclear ATTN: Mr. Ralph G. Bird Senior Vice president Nuclear F00 Boylstr Street Roston, MA 02199 b/R 1 Type:
Boiling Water Reactor NSSS Supplier /AE/ Turbine Supplier: CE/Bechtel/GE Max. Capacity:
1998 Wt, 690 We (gross), 670 MWe (net)
Fuel:
580 fuel asserblies (8 x 8 design) active fuel hei ht 3
- 144 inches; sintered 00, pellets; core volume = 740 ft ;
Zircaloy clad; 4 types ave, enrichment 2.19, P.62, 2.65, 2.82'.
Control:
145 sheathed crucifore array of SS tubes filled with boron'-
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carbide powdt'r - controlled by hydraulic control units. Each control red is surrounded by 4 fuel assemblies. The CRDP' is a double act.ing rechanically latched hydraulic cylinder.
Reactor vessel:
224 in. 10; 770) in Ith; 5.7 in, thick; design pressure and temperature: 1250 psig e 575'F; SA533Gr8 Carbon Steel /
clad with S.S.
Therral &
1020 psia operatint pressure; 359'F feedwater temp; 558'F Fydra uli c:
average fuel red surface temp; four (4) 20 in, d'a. steam pipes; two (2) 28 in, dia, recirculation lines; recigculation purp flow rate 45,200 gpm; steam flow rate 7.98 x 10 lb/hr.;
25% turbine bypass valve capacity.
Certainment:
Primry - light bulb shape - steel 56 psig internal design
( M ' A '1) pressure, 281' temperature;.5% f ree volune/ day design leak rate. Secondary - reinforced and precast concrete-steel sheet roofed building; design controlled leakage 1001/ day at.?S in. H,0 vacuum; includes Standby Gas Treatment System and reactor building ventilation isolation system.
ECCS:
Quantity Drive
- Type, GPM y
HPCI 1
Stm 4250 ADS 4 SRV's N/A Safety 15% stm Relief Valve CS 2
Elec.
Centrif. 3600 LPCI 4
Elec.
Centrif. 4800 (PCIC 1
Stm 400)
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Containrent Torus /drywell cooling provided by 4 RHR purps.via 2 RHR WX's; Cooling:
6 RTCCW pumps; 2 RBCCW Nt's; and 5 Salt Service Water puros.
Electrical:
Offsite Pcwer: 2 345 Ky. Trans. lines 1
24 Kv. Trans. lines Ba ttery: 125, 250 V DC Diesel Generator: 2. ?600 KW (.8PF), 4160v.
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12/17/p PAGE:
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Boston Edison appoints nuclear operations executive Patret Ledger staff operation of the plant and reporta directly to Bird, a former admiral in I
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Pl.YMotfrH - Boston Edison the Navy's nuclear operations.
yhas a new vice president for nuclear Ouen left the company effective
..) d C D.Mor's $ rations at the Pilgrim nuc!*ar Jane 1 under a mutual agreement p
- t. Seven months after lev Open with Edi.en which precluded his left the job under a mutual agreement discusion of plutt operations or his with the compar.y.
artare from the company.
y Kenneth Highful. a veteran of iso., aho has recectly fuled nuclear operations in the Navy, a newly crnted positions at the plant power plant consultant and long-as part of a3 effort by Bird to give time friend of senior vice presiden; managers mo e spectfic duties at for nuclear operations Ra!ph Bird.
Pilgrun'Aleaander has reptsced Sta.
was aprolated to the post this we.sk.
4-Jack according to Edison spokesm.sn ven Hudsori as opeations section Elaine Robinson.
manager, while Hudu has moved Highful sened la the Navy's up to a new post as staf! 0asistant to nuclear operations for 26 years, and nuclear operations. Robers Barrett most recently was founder and chair-has (Uled the new bb of deputf plant man of ASTA Inc a firm consulting manager.
with nuclear planta on training.
Donald long was recently named i
maintenance and operations, as the replacement for resigned secu. y The vice president oversees dad / nty manager Clay Higgins.
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GENERAL $ ELECTRIC PILGRIM THERMAL SLEEVE HOCKUP TEST PLAN AND PROCEDURE This procedure. defines the fabrication and metallurgical evaluation of a mockup assembly that closely afeulates the Pilgrim recirculation inlet thereal sleeve assembly. The purpose of this work is to confirm that the design configuration and velding procedure used during actual installation would produce a condition on the 0.D. of the outer thermal sleeve that could lead to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (ICSCC) in-s e rvi c e.
1.
Introduction and Background During safe end replacement work at the Pilgrim Station in 1984, isolated cracking was discovered on the 0.D. of the outer thernal sleeves. The thermal sleeve dimensions and locations of the cracking are shown in Figure 1.
The cracking around the velded alignment pad areas as well as at other locationg was evaluated as ICSCC. This was based on the following:
1.
The entire outer region of the thermal sleeve, with a vall thickness of 0.45 inch, could be sensitized by the inner to outer thermal sleeve attachment veld. This was further supported by the high carbon content reported for the outer thermal sleeve. 0.062 %.
2.
This same area contained excessive plastic strain due to the radial shrinkage of the attachment veld. This shrinkage strain forther enhances the veld sensitiration response and increases the hardness of the material on the outer thermal sleeve surface, which both would make the material more susceptible to ICSCC in-service.
(as-built measurements taken during field construction show radial shrinkage at the end of the outer thereal sleeve of 0.25 to 0.38 inch).
3.
The combination of residual stresses and susceptible alcrostructure veuld be expected to result in ICSCC.
The characteristics and orientation of the cracking further support this conclusion.
Due to the discovery of this cracking late in the outage, and due to the complexity of thermal sleeve replacement, the decision was made tu leave the thermal sleeves in place.
This decision was supported by General Electric evaluations on structural integrity and crack growth, as well as Boston Edison's plans to implement Hydrogen Water Cheaistry which would mitigate the i
cracking. Additional information is contained in Reference 1.
2.
Test Procedure DescriptLon The test program is surmatized in the following major tasks:
I 1.
Design suir.ble mockup from available fabrication and construction records.
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GENERAL $ ELECTRIC 2.
Fabricate mockup and set-up for veld of inner te outer thermal sleeve.
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3.
Weld inner to outer thermal sleeve. Record welding parameters, distortion and temperature on 0.D. of outer thermal sleeve.
4.
Disassemble mockup. Measure sensitization and residual stresses on outer thermal sleeve and through-wall. Cut and metallographically cross-section thernal sleeve veld to obtain profile of sensitization.
5.
Prepare technical report suitable for licensing submittal.
The sockup will be constructed to match the Pilgrim thermal sleeve configuration and installation sequence as much as possible. This vill include the inner and outer thermal sleeve, steulated riser /elbov/ jet pump assembly restraint and a simulated norale bore / vessel wall structure. This assembly will provide the same degree of restraint to the thermal sleeve veld l
as applied during construction.
I Welding vill be performed to match the welding process and sequence based on field construction records. During velding, dimensional distortion and temperatures on the 0.D. of the outer thermal sleeve vill be recorded for future reference.
Following completion of welding, the 0.D. of the outer thermal sleeve vill be measured for sensitization using the Electro-Potentiokinetic Reactivation (EPR) method developed by CE.
This vill ptovide an accurate measure of the degree of sensitization which can be correlated to ICSCC susceptibility.
(This test vill not require cutting or other destructive examination so that so intact specteen is available for residual stress characterization).
The thermal sleeve weld region will be removed from the uockup and sent to Ce
.41 Electric Schenectady Laboratories for residual stress measurements.
'..< 0 D of the outer thernal sleeve vill be mapped at a sinteum of two azimuths to determine the residual stress profile on the surfaces where cracking initiated.
The strain gage sectioning method vill be used, which GE has used extensively for residual stresses in stainless steel veldsents.
Finally. destructive metallographic evaluations for sensitization. hardness l
and weld shrinkage ef fects will be performed.
Following the completion of all tests, a complete report suitable for ifcensing transmittal purposes vill be provided.
Included in the report will be an update of the discussion an thernal sleeve cracking provided previously by CE in Report NEDC-30730-P.
References 1.
General Electric Company Report NEDC-30730-P. "Pilgria Nuclear Power Station Recirculation Norale Repair Program and Hydrogen Water Chemistry Materials Qualification". September 1984 2
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Areas found to contain isolated cracking M LDING OISTOMTION
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Dimensions of Pilgrim inner and outer thermal sleeves and location of cracking.
(Refer to NEDC.30730.P for additional information).
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