ML20235T828
| ML20235T828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1988 |
| From: | PLYMOUTH, MA |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#189-8156 2.206, NUDOCS 8903080492 | |
| Download: ML20235T828 (251) | |
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l TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE REGARDING THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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1 C.0-.N T E N T S s i
. 2 Statement o.y : a panel, . including:
3 Gritee'Healy, Chairperson of' Plymouth 4 Committee on Nuclear Matters; Mary Ott, 5 Co-Chairperson of Citizens Urgining Responsible .
6 Energy;. Neil Johnson, Chairperson of the'Duxbury 7 Citizens Committee on Nuclear Matters; Ann 8 Waitkus-Arnold, Ch'airperson of the Disabled Persons 9 Advisory. Group on Nuclear Evacuation for the State 10 office on Handicap Affairs, and William Abbott, 11 President of the Plymouth County Nuclear Committee.
12 A panel, including':'
- 13 State Representative Lawrence Alexander; ' i 6 - '
l 14' State Representative Peter Foreman; David Malaguti, '
15 Chairman of the Plymouth Board of Selectmen, and 16 Rachaal Shimshak, Massachusetts Public Interest 17 Research Group I 18 Statement of Lt. Governor Evelyn Murphy; l I L 19 Statement of Attorney General William 20 Shannon; . I' 21 A panel, including: , j i
22 Secretsry of State of Energy Sharon Pollard; l 23 Public 9ealth Commissioner, Debra Prothrow-Stith:
24 Assisttant Secretary of Public Safety, Peter Anges 1
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1 A panel, including:
2 Dr. Thomas Murley, Qirector of the NRC's 3 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations; Mr. William 4 Russell, NRC's Regional Administrator; Mr. Richard 5 Krimm, Assist' ant Associate Director of FEMA; and 6 Mr. Jack Doland, FEMA Region I, 7
[ STATEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED].
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10 11 12 13 .
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1
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., 2L NEARING ON THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION -
3 Thursday, January 7, 1988 l
4 United States Senate Committee on Labor and 5 Human Reschrees, Plymouth, Massachusetts l
l 6 The Committee met at 7:00 p.m. at the Carver 7 Regional High School, Plymouth, Honorable Edward M.
8 Kennedy, Chairman, presiding.
9 ~The Chairman: We'll come to order. We have a 10 very full program this evening and this is an 11 extremely important hearing. We're going to insist 12 on order. We very much appreciate all the b
' 13 '
curtesies that have been provided by'the 14 townspeople here in Plymouth. We want to thank Nr.
15 Simon, the superintendent of schools, for making 16 the facility possible.
17 As I mentioned, we have a full agenda, a 18 number of panels. We want to make sure that our --
19 all of our witnesses are going to be given adequate 20 consideration to their views, so we're going to 21 insist that we move the hearing along. In a 22 situation like this, we are always caught in a time 1
23 bind between giving people an opportunity to speak 24 and reducing the amount of time that people have, m nmmm~n nnm n ~nn--- - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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l 1 but that is tha ncture of many of thsse hacrings',
f 2 particularlyfthose hearings that we have out in the l 3 field. 4 l ~
4 We will ask all of the witnesses oh the 5 panel to limit -
their statements to three minutes.
6 If they have additional comments, they will make
- 7. their statements a part of the record.
8 I would expect in a hearing like this that we 9 -- anyone who is going to appear before this 10 ' committee ought to be able to summarize and state 11 their views since we are looking at four expert 12 testimonies.
I' 13 We will try and conclude this hearing.around 14 9:30 or quarter of ten. If it looks like we'~re 15 going after, we'll take a brief break into the 16 hearing, in a couple of hours. I'll make a brief 17 opening statement, and then we'll move on to the 18 first panel of witnesses.
19 We're going to insist that all of our 20 witnesses are going to be sworn in during the 21 course of these, hearings. We are going to insist 22 on order and we're going to desist from any r
23 exclamations of approval or disapproval. We're 24 going to maintain the decorum of a committee of the l
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l' Unit'sd States Ssnato.
2 The Committee on Labor and Human Resoures are
,. 3 here to look into the proposed restart.of the 4 ' Plymouth Nbelear Power Plant, and the. potential'
.I 5- implications for the public health and safety in 6- the surrounding communities., This Committee has 7 had a long involvement in over sight of nuclear 8 power plant safety and its effects on public 9 health. In 1979, the committee held hearings on 10 the_ accident at Three Mile Island, and a year ago, 11 we investigated the accident at Chernobyl in the 12 Soviet Union. .
. ',[ 13' Since the dawn'of nuclear power, we have "
14 learned a great deal of its potential and about its 15 awesome potential for destruction. We know more 16 today about the health effects of radiation 17 exposure, but many unanswered questions remain.
18 And there is one fact of which we-are certain, 19 radiation if unleashed can cause unparallel injury 20 and devastation. The world learned that 3essson
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21 again from the tragedy at Chernobyl where 31 people /
22 }/ h lost their lives and thousands more died of pc ,+
23 1eukemia an 6' other radiation re:ated disease. / r\"t i
24 We know that nuclear plant accidents can #
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- 1. hcppsn, cnd do hoppon. In fcct, the Nuclear 2 Regulatory Commission estimates that in the next 20 3 years, there is a substantial chance for core 4 meltdown in the U. S. power plants. .
5 In view of these serious implications, the NRC 6 *should be evaluating more effective ways to improve 7 public safety. Regrettably, the opposite has been 8 true. In recent years, the Commission has weakened
. 9 its efforts to protect the public, and the 10 experience of Plymouth is a case in point.
11 Plymouth's history is replete with cases of 12 mismanagement, equipment failure and regulatory l'3 vi'olations.
14 In May 1986, NRC officials identified it as
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15 one of the least safe plants in the country. It 16 has been involved in a number of enforcement 17 actions, and in January 1982,' was subjected to one 18 of the largest NRC fines in history, totaling
- 19 $550,000.
20 Plymouth has also received excessive g.inimum 21 satisfactory ratings by the NRC. In its periodic 22 assessment report, the plant relies on the 23 j containment structure that many experts agree is 24 likely to rupture in the event of high pressure
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1 buildup.
.1 2 Fina'11y, and perhaps more important', both the 3- Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Federal ,
4 Emergency Management Agency have concluded that -i 5 residents living near the plant do not have an 6 adequate evacuation p'lan in the event of a 7 radiation emergency. Yet despite these serious 8 ongoing problem, the Commission is continuing-with 9 the process 1for restarting the plant.
10 Residents and state officials have
. 11 repeatedly called on the Agency for meaningful 12 participation in restart decisions. Their ,
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" petitions'have fallen on deaf ears . The NRC has 14 consistently rejected requests to hold a hearing.
15 To some extent this hearing is intended to fill 16 that gap.
17 Our concerns are not limited to people 18 residing within the ten mile emergency' plan zone, 19 but for residents in the Cape Code and in the South i l
20 Shore area as a whole. Residents fear that they 21 will not be safely evacuated in the case of a 1
22 nuclear accident and their fear is compounded l 23 because the plant's record is unsatisfactory.
24 Through this hearing, the Committee will i
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1 obtain a bottor understanding of how the Commission 1
, 2 makes its restart decisions and how it evaluates j 1'
3 recommendations for the public from the State and 4 from FEMA, and I look forward to hearing from the
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- witnesses.
6 Our_f. irs _t._ panel of-witnesses this evening is 7 comprised of residents'of this area, Plymouth and 8 Duxbury, which could be most directly affected by a l 9 restart of the Pilgrim plant. They have done a .
. 10 tremendous' amount of work on the subject, and they 11 are the most Eivid proof of the democratic process 12 in action. So I would welcome them here tonight.
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13 , I would like them to come to the witness table and
. 14 we'll all hear their presentations.
15 Mr. Golden: Good evening, Mr. Chairman.
16 For the record, my name is State Senator William 17 Golden from the Norfolk, Plymouth District.
18 It is my pleasure tonight to welcome you and 19 to thank you for beginning tonight a process which 20 the Nuclear Regulator Commission of the United i
21 States has denied the people of America and the
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22 citizens of America's hometown, Plymouth, and that 23 is the opportunity to participate in the process of 24 determining the future of the nuclear power plant
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1 here in Plymouth.
2- The witnesses on this panel before you this i 3 evening, Mr.. Chairman, will be Grace Healy, the 4 chairperson of Plymouth Committee on Nuclear 1
.5 Matters; Mary Ott, co-chairperson of Citizens 6 Urging' Responsible Energy; Neil Johnson, ,
7 . chairperson of the Duxbury Citizens Committee on 8 Nuclear Matters; Ann Waitkus-Arnold, chairperson of 9 - the Disabled-Persons Advisory Group on Nuclear 10- Evacuations for the State Office on Handicap 11 Affairs, and William Abbott, President of the ,
12 Plymouth County Nuclear Committee.
. e a The. Chairman:
. 13 Well, thank you very much,'
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14 Mr. Golden. We will ask all of you.if you would be 15 kind enough to stand.
1 16 (Witnesses sworn). '
17 The Chairman: We'll start with Mr. Abbott.
18 Mr. Abbott: Mr. Chairman, thank you for the 19 opportunity to testify before your committee.
20 You're about to near tonight what will be the 21 impact upon the health and safety of the community 22 surrounding the Pilgrim s I plant should it be 23 allowed to start up in the next few months. '
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24 We would like to address the issue of
1 protection against the catcotrophic accident and.
2 emergency plan. I would like to focus my brief 3 comments to recommendations on the subject of 4 radiation emissions for Pilgrim I and their control 5 and their montoring, or as is usually the case, 6 their lack thereof by th'e NRC.
7 Over a year ago, I testified before two 8 Massachusetts legislative committees advocating the 9 funding of an effective monitoring system by the 10 State of Massachusetts to take up.what the'NRC does 11 not perform. Legislation was introduced, but it 12 died a few days ago in the final-hours of the '87 -
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1,3 legislative session; thus we must still' rely on t'he 14 NCR to release the operations of Pilgrim I; a 15 reliance, which based on past experience, certainly 16 gives me and the residents of this area little 17 comfort.
18 Pilgrim I has had a history of continued 19 unplanned radiation releases, which were among the 20 highest in the nation. Again and again, we see 21 reports of radiation releases in the file, which we 22 must diligently dig through unpublicized NRC 23 reports to see that there is this recurrent public 24 health menace.
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1, Now, Senctor, givGn the reports of 2 substantially higher than average incidents of 3 cancer in Plymouth and' towns downwind of the plant, 4 this do-nothing approach by the State of 5 Massachusetts and by the NRC can no longer be 6 tolerated. To date, our efforts have been 7 singula rly unsuccessful in getting the NRC to do 8 anything about this. They have failed miserably 9 .over the years, both in discharging their public 10 protection function, and equally as in important, 11 in giving the public any comforting perceptions 12 that it is fulfilling this function.
13 Operating from a distance, King of Prussia, ,'
14 Pennsylvania or Washington, their typical 15 involvement is to become active after receiving a 16 report from Edison; dispatch a team to the site; 17 listen to Edison's explanation, and then generally 18 endorse and ratify Edison's report with the usual 19 conclusion, without any further investigation that l 20 the public health is not, in fact, impacted by the I
21 incident.
22 Massachusetts, likewise, has effectively 23 failed to monitor the plant. Ne, through a federal 24 court suit years ago, got the Department of Public n n mmmmm x x- - ----- --
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t 1 Health to indtall dosimatsra in Plymouth and 2 surrounding towns to monitor the release of
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3 radiation.
4 Unfortunately, this function is -- carrying l
5 out of this function has been proven nearly 6 worthless since the devices were only read 7 quarterly; results are hidden from public view, and i 8 even worse, Mr. Chairman, no attempt is made to 9 correlate the reading of these devices with known i
10 accidents of the plant, which could lead to 11 off-site releases, despite Edison's predictable, 12 self-serving statements that all releases are lf. 13 contained within the site pa'rameters. ,
14 Let me illustrate this fundamental failure 15 with one example to show you that the responsible ;
16 authorities are not protecting the citizens of the 17 South Shore. We researched this ourselves.
18 In June 1982, Edison sent a detailed report 19 to the NRC regional office explaining that highly 20 radioactive resin particulate matters, which had 21 accumulated over an extended period of time were 22 found and accidently injected into the ventilation 23 system and near the outside of the building. It 24 was only discovered in the rooms of several of the m n m% --.m m __ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ____ _--
1 buildings and on the groundo of Pilgrim.I pinnt
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_ 2 site.
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3 The Region I NRC office dispatched a team to 1
4 the site and found that this material had been 1 5 probably released through the' vent duct which j 6 exhausts through the atmospheric elevation of 100 j i
7 feet. Ten cubic feet of this highly radioactive
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8 resin was found in the standby gas treatment system 9 inlet plenum. This is the spot which releases 10 materials from there to the atmosphere.
l 11 Now, despite the very serious potential of 12 this accident for off-site contamination and the
.- _ 13 carrying away of radioactive, dust.by the winds, no 14 effort was made to read the off-site TLDS -- ther~e l 15 are three separate sets of these maintained by the 16 NRC, Boston Edison and the State of Massachusetts I
17 -- no efforts were made to correlate those readings 18 with this observed accident. Nobody bothered to 19 ' read them to see if -- the typical statement of 20 Edison was made at the time that no radiation 21 escaped off-site -- it was, in fact, true.
22 Now, this failure was probably due to the f
23 fact that the readings did not become available --
24 they are only read quarterly -- until several weeks
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E 1 ofter ths perticular roleese.
L . l 2 We did check the readings, and.the results 3 1 were highly significant. For.i^nstance, in the
-'4 4 summer of 1982, all TLD locations hs registered by 5 Edison, the NRC and the state showed a large rise I
6 and then declined by the same percentage, .
7 . indicating a consistent pattern. Lik'ewise, the 1
8 dose rate decreased with distance away from the 9 plant as one would expect from a point source. The 10 zone closest to the plant showing the --
11 Mr. Chairman: What does that mean in 12 practical terms,'in terms of the health hazard for .
g{; 13 the population, those-kin'ds of increase ~s?
14 Mr. Abbott: Senator, they are substantially 15 in excess of background radiation, and I think that 16 anytime you add the background radiation from the 17 Pilgrim Nuclea'r Plant, you are adding to the health 18 hazard of the people of the area.
19 We have asked the State of Massachusetts to 20 hold hearings to set new levels of radiation 21 standards, emission standards. This is one of the 22 ' pr'oblems we have with the NRC, that their standards 23 that they have, don't take care of keeping up with ,
1 24 the most highly -- with current scientific
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O 1 cvidcnco. But tha koy hore ic that 21though the 2 statement was made that nothing escaped, clearly 3 there did. Out as far as 20 miles toward the 4 northwest, all locations showed an increase of 5 radiation. The dose rates were nearly triple in 6 the third quarter of 1982.
7 We brought this -- A year ago, I discussed 8 this at a meeting with NRC at a public forum. They 9 told me that they had not read the -- the gentleman 10 that was there was on a team that inspected the 11 plant after that accident, had not read the TLD 12 data. He said s.ome four years after the incident 13' i he thought the TLD data was worth checking. The 14 State Department of Public Health did not do much 15 better.
16 The Chairman: I'll give you another minute.
17 Mr. Abbott: The remedy to this failure is 18 starkly obvious. Either the NRC or the State or 19 both should gear up the necessary manpower and 20 equipment to monitor the day-to-day operations at 21 Pilgrim I, including all planned and unplanned 22 . releases of radiation on a regular, continuous 23 basis, not this haphazard hit-or-miss system that 24 we have now. It should be read on a real time,
1 continuous up to at locot 20 miles from the plant
- . 2 with these devices,.and the results made public so 3 we don't have to search for them. Until that is in 4 place, Senator, I say the plant should not be '
5 allowed to re-open.
6 The people of the South Shore deserve to 7 know what they are being exposed to. It's a 8 fundamental importance to our mental well-being and 9 physical health that this system be in place. We .
10 ask the support of your committee to insure that 11 the NRC not give its approval to Pilgrim restart, 12 unless and until an effective real-time, continuous g> - .13
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- radiation monitoring ' system has been ful'y l 14 implemented. Thank you.
15 The Chairman: I'm going to come back to 16 some questions for Mr. Abbott. I would like to try 17 and go down the panel first, and then come back 18 with some questions. I'll ask that Anne 19 Waitkus-Arn'old, and then we'll proceed. Chairwoman 20 of the Plymouth Commission on Handicap.
21 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: Thank you, Senator.
22 The Chairman: Put that mike a little 23 closer. '
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24 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: Thank you for the 1
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I I 1 . opportunity to testify before your committee- . My' l 4- 2 name is Ann Waitkus-Arnold and I represent the 3 Massachusetts Office on Handicap Affairs, and chairwoman for the Disabled Persons for the 4 '
i 5 Disabled Advisory Group on Nuclear Evacuations.
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q 6 I'm also'the chairperson for the Public .
7 Commission on Handicap Affairs, Resource 8 Coordinator for We the People and --
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.The Chairman: Slow down just a little, 10 Anne, so we can all -- E 11 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: .Okay. I'm also a 12 member of the Massachusetts Advisory Council on
'13 Handicap Affairs.
14 The purpose of the advisory group is to make 15 recommendations to be used by the Mass. Civil i
16 Defense Agency and the utilities. This is a 17 crucial first step in a state-wide effort to insure 18 that all people are included in planning, not only 19 for Pilgrim I, but for Massachusetts residents 20 affected by Yankee Atomic and for Yankee Rowe 21 Nuclear Power Plants.
22 In my official capacity for the state, I 23 - have had the opportunity to t91k with 1 24 representatives from Civil Defense, Department of AAmnnme x m-^ - *-- -
1 Public Safety, Boston Edison, Vankee Atomic, and 2 I've address FEMA and the NRC on several occasions.
3 However, I have seen little evidence of any real 4 efforts to insure the health and safety of the 1 5 special needs of populations by these agencies.
6 They may give the appearance of concern, but I have 7 found this to be mostly lip service. Government 8 assurances to protect the public in the event of an 9 accident at Pilgrim I have been deceptive and 10 grossly irresponsible.
11 The NRC has licensed nuclear facilities that 12 have not included people with disabilities and g{ 13 pain. And o.nly recently has FEMA conc 1uded that 14 plans for Pilgrim I plant are not adequace for 15 people with special needs.
16 The State's newest revised draft of October -
17 1987, developed with the assistance of Boston 18 Edison, now states that potassium iodine will be 19 stockpiled for use for those who will be left 20 behind, instead of including all citizens in actual 21 evacuations --
22 The Chairman: Would you like to expand on 23 that point?
24 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: Okay.
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P7T 1 The choirman: The significance of storing 2- that particular chemical.
3 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: They will be storing l
4 that chemical -- the chemical protects the thyroid 5 gland igainst radioactive iodine. The problem that 6 we have with this is that it is only to be given 7 out to people in nursing homes, hospitals and --
8 The Chairman: Let's get a little more 9 complete picture. You are talking abou't included 10 in any suggestion of an evacuation plan, is that 11 people might leave, but that others might leave 12 those.who have physical disabilities behind?
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13 Ms. Waitkus-Arnol'd[ Righ,t. '
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The Chairman: Nursing homes or other !
15 physical disabilities, and what are they going to 16 - be innoc.ulated with this or do they take a pill?
17 They take the pill, and they take whatever 18 radiation there is. The other people have 19 effectively got off the hill, and, hopefully, they 20 leave their handicapped or physically disabled --
l 21 or physically challenged, as my son would say --
22 behind, to take their pill and hope for the best?
23 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: Right. This is a drug 24 that can cause severe allergic reactions, m o ams~m m m_ _ ___.__ _ _ _ - - - - - . _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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'l .h:morrhaging, and even', death.- J
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'N 2 Mr. Chairman: Do you have any instant I
3 reaction to.that' type of an, evacuation plan? I i 4 .can't let that quite slide by, se quickly.
5 -Ms. Wa'itkus-Arnold: My instant reaction is-1.
6 anger, discrimination, and I think.-it is a.very 7 inhuman way to treat people, especially el'ders and I
-8 disabled. .Those are the only people targeted out 9 for this particular type of treatment.
10 The Chairman: The elderly and the disabled? -!
11 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: Elderly and disabled.
12- That means that we have a discriminatory system ini g l,, 13 our country today. , .
14 In my opinion and the opinion of the 15 advisory group, Edison has spent a great deal of 16 t1.me lulling people into a false sense of security, 17 and has consistently been. misleading and disceptive 18 on the issues of special needs.
19 One example is a special needs survey done 20 by Edison at the insistence of our disability 21 group. The purpose of the survey was to identify 22 people who will need assistance during evacuation; I
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23 unfortunately, they ignored our suggestions and 24 ' offers of assistance. The reru3 ting survey was l
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4 1 dacignsd in such a way as to exclude most of the 2 peopic with disabilities.
3 Consequently, there is a stunning j 4 discrepancy between the 1986 Disability Census 5 figure, which shows 4,000 people in Plymouth alone 6 with severe limitations and the utilities' figures 7 showing only 474. Edison then incorporated these 8 erroneous figures into their new evacuation time 9 estimates of special needs population.
10 Mr ., Chairman: As I understand, partially ,
11 because many of those who have physical 12 disabilities don't report them; is that right?
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13 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: No. It's because the 14 survey tras kind of a bogus survey. It wasn't sent 15 out to people -- it wasn't sent out to any 16 handicapped or elderly house. They refused to send 17 it out to every household in the town of Plymouth.
18 It wasn't understandable by many disabled people:
19 elders who had no idea that the service pertained 20 to them because it spoke about severe disabi'lities, 21 and it did not include c lot of questions about 22 many disabilities. Obvicusly, if one is blind, one
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23 would not be able to fill out the survey.
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24 In addition, we have advocated for two years n n mm m mns., a nnn - ----- - - - - - - - - -
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1- thst; Edison comply with NRC'c regulations to notify 1 2 and alert all segment of the community in case of 3 an accidentHof Pilgrim I. This includes people who-4 are deaf and hard of hearing.
5 I have' testified before the NRC several 6 times on this issue; however, proper action has not 7 been taken to obtain and distribute special 8 equipment to the 420 residents who have requested 9 it from Boston Edison. I feel that the NRC is 10 complicit in its violations of federal law because 11 they have been aware of this violation, but have 12 taken no action to make Boston Edison comply. '
13 With few excepti~ons,'there appears to be an 14 attitude from the federal government on down that 15 some elderly and disabled people are not worth 16 consideration because exclusion is permitted. The 17 quality of our government is reflected by the way 18 the government deals with its citizens that are in 19 need of assistance, and until this attitude 20 changes, disabled people will be continued to be
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21 treated as second-class citizens. I'm talking 1
. 22 about people who we love and care about, our j 23 children, parents, grandparents who may have 1 l
24 hearing, vision or phyiscal disabilities, the j l
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thousands.of oldsrly who will 'nosd cocistence in en 1
. , 2 evacuation; our disabled-veterans in homes and 3 ' hospitals and'the many retarded persons in group 4 homes, who.may-not even recognize that an emergency 5 exists. .What will happen to them during an
- 6. emergency?
l .7 We are not asking for special treatment, 8 only' equal treatment. Failure to include elderly' 9 and disabled.in planning is deprivation under the
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10 equal treatment under the Fourth and Fourteenth 11 Amendments.- We-are not saying.we ought to come-12 first. .We just'want the same chance to escape as ,
13, leveryode else'has. Basic civil' rights.are the- -
14 hirthright of all Americans and second class '
15 citizenship should no longer be allowed. Realistic j l
16 and humane emergency plans must be developed for i l
17 all people and every town and village from Cape. j 18 Code to the borders of New Hampshire affected by 19 .this plant. Unless a workable plan can be designed 20 for everybody, and until such a plan can be tested 21 and implemented, Pilgrim I should remain closed.
I 1 22 There have been serious incidents which i
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I 23 . reveal the GE containr.ent systems, like the Pilgrim 24 I containment, had an unsafe design, making it very
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1 unlikoly to withstand a major accident. This i
. . 2 report was kept. secret by GE and the NRC for 12 3 years. In addition, the report stated that
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4 radioactive and chemical waste in Plymouth by 5 Boston Edison was duly reported to state and 6 federal authorities and has yet to be investigated ,
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7 after seven years.
We feel that waiting seven 8 years is seven years too long to find out whether
. 9 our soil and water have been contaminated.
10 In light of the above examples, there must 11 be an immediate moratorium on the operation of all 12 nuclear plants which affect Massachusetts g' , '3 1 r'esidents, and Congress must hold a full L
14 investigation into why the NRC has failed to 15 protect the health and safety of elderly and 16 disabled people as well as the rest of the general 17 public. Thank you very much' for inviting me to 18 speak.
19 The Chairman: We'll come back. Do you have 20 of your own knowledge whether other evacuation l
21 plans, other parts, treat the handicap like this? i i
22 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: Jerome Plant.
23 The Chairman: Where they have similar kinds 24 of --
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Ma. Waitkus-Arnold: Exactly. *~
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-i 2 The Chairman: Mr. Johnson, u -
3 s Mr. Johnson: .Thank you, Senator for this 7
l .4 opportunity to testify before the committee.
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5- My name is Neil Johnson. I'm the chairman 6' of the Duxbury Citizens Committee on Nuclear 7 Matters, and a member of the Duxbury Emergency 8 Response Committee also. I am a registered 9 professional engineer and have design experience 10 working on nuclear power plants as a licensing, 11 environmental engineer.
J 12 ,
I would like to address three areas:
- , 13 Switchyard and emergency diesel generators, l 14- overpressurization failure and direct torus venting u
15 and stress corrosion cracking.
16 First, the switchyard and emergency diesel 17 generators. On November 12, 1987, at approximately 18 2:10 a.m., the Pilgrim Nuclet.r Power Station 19 experienced a complete loss of offsite power, LOOP, 20 during adverse weather conditions. This resulted j 1
21 in a startup of two emergency diesel generators.
22 Prior to the restoration of offsite power at 11:15
' 23 p.m. on the same day, one of the diesel generators ,
4 24 had to be shut down, leaving only one diesel
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1 gancrctor op3 rating. The ovent was not given a e i 2 licensee emergency classification by the NRC, as 3 the plant was in cold shutdown.
i 4 It was reported that the loss of offsite j
'5 power was associated with icing in the switchyard.
6 I'm concerned that similar problems with the plant ,
l 7 operating could occur in the future that could 1]
8 result in more serious consequences. l l 9 Since June of 1972, there have been 20' -
10 instances of loss of the 345 kv offsite system and 11 four instances of loss of both the 345 kv and the 12 23 kv offsite system. This would be considered g{? , 13 . LOOP events, L,0 0 P. .
14 l I believe that prior to restart, the NRC 15 should review the switchyard and emergency diesel 1 16 generators as a system and assure the public that i
17 the integrity of this system can be maintained )
18 under adverse conditions.
1 19 Based on the recent diesel generators and l 20 switchyard problems, I believe th'at the NRC should j 1
21 require' completion of the installation of the new t j
i 22 2,000 kw blackout diesel prior to the restart.
23 Ths conclusion of the NRC Augnented l
l 24 Inspection Team review of the November 12 incident,
- , - - - ~ - - ~ - - - _
1 tha loao of tho offsita pow;r wc0 that tho 2 inoperability of the B emergency diesel generator 3 resulted from the performance of maintenance using 4 inadequate or incomplete maintenance procedures.
5 I believe that the NRC should assure the 6 public that BECO will more aggressively pursue 7 courses of action to mitigate mechanical problems 8 such as those experienced on the B emergency diesel 9 generator.
10 The next topic is on overpressurization 11 failure and direct torus venting.
12 The Chairman: Let me just briefly -- What 13 would have been t'he effect if you have a diesel 14 generator fail, if the plant had been on-line?
15 Mr. Johnson: Had the last diesel generator 16 failed and the plant been on-line, it would have 17 been a station blackout. There is -- there are 18 some emergency batteries that would keep things 19 going for a shcrt time. But without offsite power 20 and without the two diesel generators, you have a 21 station blackout.
22 The Chairman: What does that mean, station 23 blackout?
l 24 Mr. Johnson: That means you don't have a i
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1 chcrga. You run'tho corvico work cystcm your r s 2' systems requires for safety.- -
3 The Chairman: So'the systems for safety 4 would have been effectively shut down; is that what 5 you are saying?
6 Mr. Johnson: Yes. There are some batteries -
9 7 that would keep things going for a period of time.
8 Okay. Overpressurization failure and direct 9 torus venting: I understand that severe accidents 10 in the extreme can generate pressures of more than 11 twice the design pressure of a Mark I containment 12 structure similar to the one at Pilgrim and could ,
13' - '
cause containment rupture. One core damage.
{-
14 prevention stategy utilized is' containment venting y 15 of excess pressure gradually. I have a sketch i
16 attached for those who would like to see. This is 17 achieved by bubbling the release from the gas 18 treatment system -- excuse me, from the reactor I
19 drywell through the wet well on through the standby 20 gas treatment system, the SBGT, where remaining l 21 radioactive iodine and particulate are removed, 22 fina21y venting out through the main plant stack.
23 Incid&ntly, the standby gas treatment system 24 remained out of service from 1984 throuch at least nAmmmmm nA.m - mm_ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - -
1 1986 at Pilgrim.
,: 2
, It is also my understanding that the 3 existing vent ductwork assorfated with the standby 4 gas treatment system is of fairly light gauge and 5 may be broached in accident venting. Therefore, 6 the installation of the direct torus vent system, 7 which provides a direct vent path, with heavier 8 gauge pipe around the standby gas treatment system 9 was proposed at Pilgrim. Installation of this 10 system was begun, but not completed due to a lack l
l '
11 of approval by the NRC.
I 12 I believe that the NRC should be concerned 1
13 about the effects of secondary release' of .
14 radioactive gas into the reactor building in the 15 event of ductwork failure. Also", if in the future, 1
16 the NRC approves the direct torus venting system, I 17 believe that they should review the operation of 18 the manual override, which would allow the operator 19 to manually override switches to allow venting to 20 continue even with high radiation in the torus 21 vapor space. I know that's fairly technical, -
22 but --
23 The Chairman: That is very technical.
24 (Laugh). I'll give you 30 seconds to translate' it W
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
O
sv 1 for overyone. Let's just take a minute and give us 2 the essence of it, if you would.
3 Mr. Johnson: ,Okay. With a station 4 blackout, there are spray systems that would cool 5 ,
the reactor. However, if those fail due to no 6 power or some other problem, then there is direct 7 torus venting or a venting out of the dry well 8 portion of the containment through the wet well.
9 The Chairman: As I understand it, they 10 don't have torus venting; they want to have torus 11 venting?
12 Mr. Johnson: Yes. They have torus venting
{ Il3 which would bypass the stand'by gas heating system.
14 That has not been given approvai by the NRC.
15 The Chairman: If they were to desire to 16 design a standby system, that is Edison, NRC has 17 not approved that.
18 Mr. Johnson: They felt it was conflicting 19 -- I forget the exact terminology. Conflicting 20 safety use, I think is the terminology.
21 The Chairman: Some translate that as they 22 put it in here -- even though Boston Edison might 23 be prepared to put it in here, that it might 24 suggest that others put it on their plants and A n mnnnmm nmm m em --- -- --
1 othora might not ba willing to do it. 1 don't know 2 if that's fair.
s 3 Mr. Johnson: I'm also a bit concerned in 4 that there is a manual override in the high 5 pressure and high radiation that would allow an 6 operator to open a valve to bypass and to go right 7 out to restart.
8 The Chairman: Okay. We'll go to Mary Ott.
9 We're trying to open up the background here so that 10 we can have some of our other guests go to the 11 stage. It might be somewhat uncomfortable, but at 12 least they'll be able to observe. -
1 F 13 I'm informed that there is a room down here
(, ,
14 where they are covering this through the monitor, 15 so I don't know what the -- I'm informed it's 16 loaded with equipment. I don't know where the fire 17 marshall is, but anyway, we'll move on.
18 Mary Ott, we'll hear from you.
19 Ms. Ott: Good evening, Senator Kennedy. We 20 connend you for calling this important meeting and 21 are very grateful for the opportunity to express 22 our deepening concern about the health and safety 23 i m p a c t w i t h t h e' r e s t a r t o f P i l g r i m , and further at 24 the failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
1 parform ito ocnctionod duty to ragula.te'its
-, 2 utilties.
ee -
3 Our concerns' encompass Pilgrims GE Mark I 4 containment, its poor managemen history, the lack-
. l 5 of evacuation plans for area residents, the threat l 6 posed by.the continued stockpile of tons of nuclear
~
7 waste onsite, the alarming increase in cancer in ~
8 the five towns downwind, and finally, the 1
9 credibility of the Boston Edison Company and its 10 regulator, the NRC.
11- Although a conclusive link has not been 12 found, Pilgrim's history has heighten suspicion of 13 the connection betweeh the plant.and increased 4
E'
'14 cancer incidents in surrounding communities. The f 15 State Department of Public Health confirmed this 16 increase in 1986. ,
17 Because the report was criticized for 18 omitting crucial data, a new study was promised, 19 which was to include more recent data, causal 20 factors, occupational risks and study of the cancer 21 incidents in communities near nuclear power plants 22 in New England. This study should be completed 23 before Pilgrim is allowed to restart.
24 Pilgrim's poor management has been a serious O'BRIENANDLEVINECOURTREPORTINGSERV[CE, INC.
l' conccrn cinco th9 picnt was licencad in 1972.
O 2 Edf. son' decision to use known defective fuel
.,:?
3 resulted in wide-spread contamination of the plant 4 and contributed to their inability to control 5 iodine releases during the early '70s. Th,ey 6 subanquently applied to the NRC for a revision of 7 specifications to provide for, quote, operational -
i 8 flexibility, end quote. It was granted.
l 9
Following Edison study findings in 1982, the 10 NRC assigned special priorities to monitoring the 11 management of Pilgrim. By 1986, 16,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of 12 inspection time had been spent at Pilgrim, and a '
13 third resident inspector. assigned.. This is 50 14- percent more inspection hours than spent in similar 15 plants in the northeast, a peculiar committment of i
16 resources to oversee a plant that the NRC keeps 17 assuring us has always been operated in a safe 18 manner.
19 Following Edison -- oh, excuse me. Still 20 the problems persist. Since 1984, about 100 21 mishaps have occurred at Pilgrim; 12 accidents have 22 occurred since 1982, causing Edison to notify state 23 officials and police. Despite the objection of 24 State Secretary of Publi,c Safety, 22 legislators ;
^
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 Gnd concGrncd rosidento, Edison rofuoled ths
, 2 reactor with no evacuation plan in place and i
- r. j
. 3 without notifying th'e appropriate authorities.
4 They also commenced the reviewing on the 5 very day-they assured the press that the procedure 6 would be done a week later. When question about 7 the contradiction, the NRC responded, quote, if the 8 utility lied to the public or to reporters, there 1 9 is no authority under the Atomic Energy Act for the 10 NRC'to do anything about it. There is no law that I
11 says.they have to tell reporters the truth," and ;
)
12 quote.
13 In' November of 1987, a . series of spills and
~14 leaks resulted'in the contamination of'several -
15 workers. Edison's vice president was in Florida at ;
i 16 the time. There was no NRC resident inspector '
17 onsite. Plant spokesmen originally denied any 18 leaks, and then later acknowledged them. Later a I l
19 single generator was the only source of electricity l 20 to provide cooling for the loaded reactor. If the 21 plant had been operating and that generator failed, l 22 we would have had to' implement the evacuation plan l
23 that we do not have. )
1 24 Something is wrong here, S'enator. Boston l 1
(
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. '
l
1 Edicon hea withhold docum;nts from tha public I
2 document room with the permission of the NRC. Many l
3 missing have been obtained through the Freedom of !
1 4 Information Act and tae chronological history of i 5 our monitoring releases to our enviroment. Edison 6 continues to tell us that there has been no 7 releases in excess of technical specifications. '
8 The NRC has not made any attempt to contradict the 9 information.
10 During the last 18 months, we have been 11 assured by the NRC and the industry that nuclear 12 power has defense in depth, and we're often 13 reminded that there are inherent' risks associated-f 14 with all forms of energy. The risks we are being 15 asked to bear are unacceptable.
16 Since local and state officials are 17 powerless to resolve our dilemma and the NRC 18 refuses to hear our requests for a legal hearing, 19 we appeal to your committee to initiate an 20 independent, congressionally-sponsored 21 investigation into the health and safety impact of 22 the operation of Pilgrim, and further into the 23 conduct of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Only
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24 a legal inquiry can provide the truth about O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 Pilgrim'a troub1Gd history. Such'c henring is A k:i 2 needed if public conf 1dence~in our system and in 3 the NRC is to be restored. Thank you, Senator.
4 The Chairman: .Dr.'Healy.
5 Dr. Healy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
6 The Plymouth Committee on Nuclear Matters, 7 formally constituted by the Board of Selectmen on 8 August 19, 1986, consists of nine members of F diverse backgrounds and experience, with expertise 10 in the medical and legal fields; in business and 11 industry, including the utilities; in physics and 12 engineering, in planning and in public policy. l 13 The Committe'e members while diff,ering \ -
14 sometimes radica11'y in their opinions h' ave one 15 common passion, that of the discovery of what is 16 fact. We have done our best to put aside our 17 individual biases in order to listen to 18 knowledgeable others.
19 Thus far, the Committee has issued two 20 reports. The first on the Plymouth Radiological 21 Emergency Response Plan; the second on Enviremental 22 Radiation Monitoring. In the first report, we said 23 the following.in March 1987:
24
- There are deficiencies in the Plymouth I
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
l -
1_ Radiological Emsrgancy Responco Plan which are
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2 serious enough in the Committee's judgment to c;r 3 preclude reasonable assurance that adequate 4 protective measures can and will be taken by the 5 town an,d the state in the event of a radiological 6 emergency.
7 Hence, the Committee made the following 8 recommendations:
9 1. That there be a comprehensive, revision 10 of the Plymouth Radiological Emergency Response 11 Plan. This task is incomplete..
12 2. That there be an appointment made of a 13 '. full-time civil defense director. That individua'l 14 wi'll begin on January 11', next Monday. ,
15 3. Development of funds for emergency 16 preparedness from federal, state and utility
. i 17 sources. The.only funds forthcoming have been from 18 Boston Edison. l 19 4. Full town participation in a 20 comprehensive drill prior to Pilgrim's coming back I
21 on-line. This has not been done..
22 Regarding the second Committee report, the 23 Committee on Nuclear Matters is strongly concerned 24 with what it considers to be the insufficient O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. l
1 numbsr of m:nitoring ctationa, tha minimal and 2 perfunctory involvement of the State in the 3 monitory process and the complete lack of an 4 oversight monitoring system.
5 All of the six reports reviewed by the 6 Committee on Nuclear Matters indicate to its 7 members that the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant does '
8 have a continuing environmental impact. In all the I 9 materials reviewed, however, Edison, NRC and the 10 Commonwealth hold that offsite releases from the 11 plant, as indicated by current monitoring, have not 12 exceeded technical specifications.
13 , Boston Edison Company, the.NRC an'd the .
14 Commonwealth'then draw the conclusion that there 15 has been no measurable impact upon the citizenry.
16 They further claim that even if there had been any 17 impact, it would have been minimal and far less 18 than the effects of previous worldwide weapons 19 testing or of the Chernobyl accident.
20 The Committee on Nuclear Matters takes 21 little comfort in the above comparisons. Any 22 environmental impact is our concern and needs to be 23 ,
examined. Let us not forget that the impact of 24 such effects is cummulative. The Committee O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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i l quactieno tho cdcquacy of current m.onitoring around I
, , .nf:. 2 Pilgrim I, even though it is more extensive than i
' l
- 3 that at some other nuclear plants.
l i
4 Hence, the Committee recommends increased l 5 monitoring, higher quality monitoring, proper 6 timin s monitoring to reveal effects of specific 7 plant incidences which involve radioactive releases 8 and prompt reporting of the results.
9 Accomplishment of these recommendations is basic to 10 an investigation of the impact of the station upon 11' citizens' health; an investigation which has yet to '
12 be accomplished.
13 , We. respectfully request your assistance, Nr.
14 Chairman,' on two related matters which may not be 15 the direct concern of your committee. We request 16 that you exert your considerable leadership at the 17 national level to help mitigate the unintended, 18 negative consequences of past congressional action 19 and inaction which have led to America's Hometown 20 becoming, in fact, a high level nuclear dump site.
21 We beg you to assist in relieving us of this 22 burden. Only Congress can do it, not the utilities 23 and not Boston Edison. -
24 We ask that you monitor closely the progress O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 of tha Dsp rtmsnt'of Enorgy's work et tho Yucca i f, 2 Mountain drilling site in Neveda to insure that the l
3 nation will obtain as soon as possible a long, l 4 overdue, permanent repository for high level 5 nuclear waste. . -
6 We also respectfully suggest that you help 7 to initiate a congressional review of the role and '
8 the performance of the Nuclear Regulatory 9 Commission, and reasserting of congressional 10 authority relative to the nuclear industry. It is 11 needed. We request that you introduce corrective 12 legislation which will ensure congressional
., 13 authority and responsibility. .
14 -
Thank' you very much for t'his opportunity, P
15 Mr. Chairman. It is deeply appreciated. I shall 16 be happy to answer any questions insofar as I am 17 able.
18 The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Healy. I 19 think we'll hear more about some of these issues 20 when we hear from some of our state officials and 21 the relationship that the auphority and the power 22 of the Regulatory Agency has stated and I look 23 forward to that.
24 .Let me ask you, Dr. Healy. You're familar l
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
l-
1 with Dr. Cobb's raport about tho incrocssd laukamic
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, . 2 rates.that he discovered?
3 Dr. Healy: Yes.
4 The Chairman: And we'll make that a part of 5 the record, and rather than me reading through 6 that, perhaps you could briefly describe the 7 conclusions.
8 Dr. Healy: Well, what Dr. Cobbs did is he 9 made note of the highly unusual incidents of 10 leukemia in a five-town range, which includes:
11 Plymouth, Kingston, Duxbury, Marshfield and 12 Scituate and what he attempted to do was to connect
'13 this in.cident with radioactive emissions' from ,th'e-
~
14 plant. -
15 What he -- my understanding is what he 16 hypothesized was that the topography, the coastal 17 wind circulation and the coastal fogs formed a 18 natural barrier, which would hold and entrap 19 radioactive residues from Pilgrim I.
20 Our committee is aware that there is some 21 disagreement with the topography-wind hypothesis, 22 but we are checking into it with our experts, but 23 quite frank'ly, Mr. Chairman, our committee is not 24 so much interested in such theories. We are far
f 1 acro intorosted in ths.deta that ws con got from .
T g,. 2- the field,=and those' data, and only those data, we y
3 feel,- from the' monitoring are going to ' allow us to 4 get to any causalainferences, and we strongly 5 recommend --
6 . The Chairman: Now, the State has looked 7 into this as well, has it not? '
8 Dr. Healy: The State has used data from'-- I 9 my understanding is that the State has analyzed and ;
10 re-analyzed data from the cancer Registry, but 11 those data our committee feels are flawed in that 12 the procedures.and the methodolgy are flawed. It 13- is my understanding that they are moving toward a
.'~ .14 comprehensive study at this. time, but our 15 committee, it will be recommending that we go far 16 beyond the State to the national level.
17 The' Chairman: I think the suggestions.which -
18 you make, and Mary Ott and others have made with 4 1
19 regar'd to the kinds of health studies are an' !
20 excellent suggestion, as in hearing of this 21 testimony, in preparation of the hearing and also 22 the previous communications that we have received 23 from many of you and from others. It seems that 24 the kind of -- the pattern that we have heard here O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 cro v;ry aimilar to tha typa of pattorn that wa *
[py 2 heard repehted at Three Mile Island in 1979 when 1
{
1 3 this committee held hearings on the health 1
4 implications of that particular difficulty. l 5 So I have asked -- written a letter to the 6 National Institute of Health, Dr. Winegarten, who j 7 is the director of the NIA Institute, asked him to 8 do a health study, which investigation specially 9 refers to, and I quote, " Reports of excessive 10 leukemia in certain Massachusetts towns downwind 11 from Pilgrim I Power Plant in Plymouth, and 12 specifically asked him to have his people determine 13 whether there is a causal connection. I hope as.
14 well, you might want to take a look at the problems i
15 at Three Mile Island as well, but find out and do a i 16 very deliberate study, and I will -- I have sent 17 that out today.
18 I will be in touch personally with Dr.
19 Winetart a, and as soon as I get some results or 20 some response, I will share it with you and other 21 members of the community.
22 I mentioned th,at the last paragraph -- next 23 to last paragraph, "And I would suggest that such 24 an undertaking be used as its first model for 1
d l
l
1 Ovcluation, THI, Pilgrim I ccscr, which I
<: 2 described. I think the National Institute of 1 s.
3 Health probably has as good a capability and 4 capacity to do that as any in the country.
5 Hopefully, they will coordinate their work with the 6 state officials and local officials as well.
7 I would hope that we would be able to call 8 on much of the expertise that we have heard this 9 evening and other expertise in their consideration.
10 Let me ask, because we want to move on, Mr.
11 Abbott, one is'a suggestion has been made is 12 whether we ought to have -- create independent of
,g . 13- the NRC, an independent bod'y to oversee the public g ,
14 health aspects of nuclear plant radiation releases.
15 I don't know if you have any opinions about that.
16 I don't know quite how we would set it up.
17 Mr. Abbott: Well, Mr. Chairman, there is a 18 definite perception of the public that the NRC is 19 still promoting nuclear power, rather then being 20 most concerned cbout the health and effect of 21 nuclear power.
22 "I think part of what I was trying to express 23 was that the perception of the public was that 24 really nothing was being done to protect it, and I J l
1 l
l l
l j
_m__~_ -_____ _
1: don't think wo hcvo cny comfort level thot the NRC
.{;t
. 2 is doing it. Whether -- I have pleadi,ngs to the State of Massachusetts to have another federal 3
4 agency which is to be kept totally independent of 5 the promotion of nuclear power; then that might do 6 the job.
7 The Chairman: This is another issue that
- 8. maybe we ougnt to try to -- I thought through your 9 testimony, Mary Ott, with regards to the 10 difficulties that you had in terms cf getting 11 information, having to run through the Freedom 12 Information Act to get that, is obviously n, .. 13, enormously discouraging. I don',.t know whethe,r you 1' .
14 have any reaction to some independent health 15 advisory group to monitor these types of 16 activities.
17 Of course, then again, ite have who appoints 18 it; who it is accountable to and whether we are 19 just creating more bureaucracy, but maybe you can 20 give some thought to it. We might try to 21' circularize at least some suggestions along those 22 lines and try to get some of your reaction to it.
23 And, Anne, I'm still troubled by your report 24 in terms of how any evacuation plan is going to e
+
n n nn n% Ae m %mmm_- _ _ - - - _ - - - - - - - - -
1
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1 havo to don 1 with' coma of thoos who hovo physicci (hj:, 2 or mental limitations in terms of their physical 3 capabilities. You, as I understand, have made 4' those representations to FEMA, have you?
5 Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: FEMA, yes.
6 The Chairman: And.I understand that one of 7 the major conclusions FEMA reaches when they 8 withdrew their approval was that the evacuation 9 plan for -- when they withdrew their approval, did i
10 so because of the inadequate planning for the 11 evacuation of special needs population.
12 , Ms. Waitkus-Arnold: Right.
13 -
The thairman: And these -- I think,,you
~
14 should'take some sense of satisfaction that someone 15 at least listened to what, I think, is really one 16 of the most provocative, unbelievable conclusions 17 that I've heard in terms of preparation for the 1
18 hearing. I must sa I was absolutely dumbfounded.
19 I should probably have known about it, but I think i 2.0 it must have stirred the heart and soul of any 21 citizen to think that that's the way we're going to 1
22 treat our fellow citizens, particularly those who 23 are fa'cing some physical challenge.
24 I want to thank all of you very muci You O
n n m A mm mmm . ___-___ m _ _ _ - - - - - - ---
ll - havo.basn cxtromaly.holpful. I think-tha questions .{
I jf 2' that you have' raised have enormous potential _ impact
- 3 for the people living in the area and throughout ;
i i
4 the state. We're very grateful to all of.you for '
5- the hard work. It is quite clear from your i 1
6 testimony and from your fuller' statements of the 7
time and the expertise that you have put-into this i l
8 consideration, not only through yourselves, but
. 1
)
9 through your fellow citizens. It is really a l 10 citizenship at its very best. !
11 I'l1~just make sure as I'll indicate in the.
12 and how we're going to treat the compilation of all 1
the material th'at well get this aveni'ng, and the
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13 ,
I 14 '
concluding remarks. But I'm. grateful to.you, and I l i
15 will take the liberty, when I talk to Dr.
16 Winegarten, to mention each of you, send along your 17 testimonies, and, hopefully, will have your input 18 when the NIH does its work. I want to thank all of 19 you for your presentations. Thank you very much.
20 (Applause). 1 21 The Chairman: Our next panel is comprised l 22 of some representatives and public officals who 23 represent people who live in the area and the 24 representative,of one of our most foremost public
,n mmmms mam a ~ -- - . - - - -
1 intorsst organizations. All of thGse witnosses l ,,
2
- have worked long and hard on Pilgrim I questions.
. 3 I welcome them here-this evening to share with the 4 committee their judgments and concerns.
5 First, we have Senator Bill Golden, who I'm 6 , sure is no stranger to any of you nor to me. Bill i
7 has been unrelenting in his attention to Pilgrim 8 and I look forward to his testimony.
9 We'll also hear from-State Representative, 10 Larry Alexander, who has previously testified for 11 Congress on Pilgrim. Peter Foreman, State 12 Representative from Plymouth, who led a legislative 1,3 effort on the subject of Pilgrim; David'Halaguti,'
P' .
14 who is/ the chairman.sf the Plymouth Board of .
15 Selectmen, and who has devoted a lot of time on the 16 issue; and Ms. Rachael Shimshak -- is that correct?
17 -- Shimshak, from the Massachusetts Public Interest 18 Research Group, an organization which over the last 19 sever'al years has issued three major reports 20 dealing with the Pilgrim I plant, ,
4 21 I welcome all of you here and look forward 1
22 to your presentation. Why don't we go left to l 23 '
right. Three minutes.
24 Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Senator. I also O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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0 1 would liko to thenk you.for this opportunity, and I j; 2- have some additional materials which I would liket 3- to offer as an appendix to your committee, along' 4- with' copies of my testimony.
5 As chairman -- House Cha,irman of the 6 Massachusetts Legisture Joint Committee on 7 Energy --
8 The Chairman: Wait a second. I forgot to 9 swear you in. (Applause).
10 (Witnesses sworn).
11 Mr. Alexander: Well, if that's the case, 12 let me change my speech. (Laughter). Just p 13 -
kidding. - - -
g, -
14 Senator, it is with great appreciation that 15 I testify today for your concern about this very 16 important subject. I'm State Representative Larry 17 Alexander. I.'m House Chairman of the Legislature's 18 Joint Committee on Energy, and I believe that there-19 are two significant issues associated with nuclear 20 power that warrant major federal investigations 21 immediately.
I 22 First, Congress should order an in-depth, L 23 nationwide analysis of whether people suffer 24 adverse health con, sequences as a result of living
~ _ ~ - - - - - - _ _ - _ _ _ - - - _ _ --
. 1 'nocr'nuclocr powor plants. I was da1Lghtsd'to hear.
2 -
'about'your request to the-National'Insitute of
). 7 3 Health in that regard.
7
'4 Secondly, I believe that. Congress should 5 order an intense investigation of the safety 6 systems that. operators of European nuclear reactors 7- have'added'to'their nuclear power plants-to 8 determine whether operators of America nuclear 9 power plants should make similar modifications.
i 10 Let me discuss each of these in a little 11 more detail. First of all, with respect to the 12' health effects of living near nuclear reactors,
. 13 there is an increasing body of scientific evi'dence 14 .that seems to suggest that routine and accidental 15 releases of radiation from nuclear reactors may be 16 causing increased leukemia, cancer, infant '
17 ' mortality, congential defects and other adverse 18 consequences.
9 19 For that reason, I filed a bill to have 20 Massachusetts set its own standards for emissions, I 21 which it is allowed to do under federal law. I'm 22 pleased to say the bill passed the House, but it 3
23 has failed to pass the Senate yet, but I hope that )
24 ultimately, we'll be able to pass that law.
- - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . 1
~
, 1 Tha Mecccchucotts Dspertm2nt of Public
. 2 Health has found statistically significant 3 increased incidgnts of leukemias in communities 4 near the Pilgrim reactor. There was a 59 percent 5 increase in blood disorders, including leukemia for 6 Plymouth, Kingston, Duxbury, Marshfield and 7 Scituate for the years 1982 through 1984. In 1985, 8 there were,three times as many cases of these blood 9 disorders than would normally be expected for women 10 in Plymouth, six cases instead of two, and the 11 total increase for the five towns from 1982 through 12 1985 was a statistically significant 43 percent.
13 . Dr. Sidney Cobb, whom you alluded to
~
14' earlier, also found that there"seemed ,to be an 15 increase in infant mortality and congenital defect 16 rates that took place in coastal communities 17 adjacent to or north of Plymouth soon after 18 significant radioactive emissions were discharged 19 from Pilgrim in the 1970s.
20 There also seems to be some evidence of 21 perhaps increased leukemia for people living y 22 downwind from Maine and Connecticut reactors. And 23 there was a recent study in Lancet magazine 24 suggesting a significant correlation between the a, m----- -- - -____-- - _--- - - ________ __ _ _ ~ - - - _ _ _
l i
1 i proximity to nuclacr powar plcnts cnd increagad- I 2 leukemia incidents in, England.
3 Therefore, I hope that Congress will'do a j l
4 major kind of analysis of this issue to explore . 1 5 this issue on a nationwide basis to put this issue 6 to rest one way or the other for its citizens who 7 live near those plants.
8 Let me turn now briefly to the issue of 9 nuclear reactor safety, particularly with reference 10 to the General Electric Mark I reactor found at 11 Pilgrim. I have serious doubts about the adequacy 12 of the containment structure at Pilgrim. q 13 . Many European reactors have safety reactor 14 features that American reactors don't have. Some,'
15 for instance, have a filtered vent to prevent ,
16 overpressurization and a consequent breach of f '
17 containment. These filters trap most the 18 radiation.
19 My understanding is that Boston Edison has -
20 not put any filters in the vents that it is going 21 to put in for the Boston Edison plant 7 find that 22 strange. Even the owners of the Shoreham reactor s
23 in Long Island have announced their intention to 24 install such a filtered vent, and I fail to see why m am k m mm - m m_ _ _. _ - - - - -- --
1 011 tho Pilgrim ownarc fciled to do so es wall.
2 Also, many European reactors have an
. 3 additional, independent decay heat removal system 4 that serves as sort of a back-up cooling system in 5 case of failure of the original residual heat or 6 the emergency core cooling system. And again, some 7 of the European systems have done that, and yet 8 Boston Edison has not seen fit to install that 9 here. I wonder, if it's good enough for some of 10 the European plants, why it is not good enough for 11 having here.
12 A federal investigation, preferably
-, 13 independent of the NRC,.should be undertaken I! ..
14 immediately of the filtered vent, the bunkered RHR 15 system, and other European safety systems to 16 determine whether they should be added to American 17 nuclear power plants.
18 Congress should also consider requiring 19 construction of a second steel-reinforced concrete 20 containment structure and molten core barriers 21 before General Electric Mark I-designed plants, {
l 22 such as Pilgrim, are allowed to continue to ,
23 operate. Pilgrim should also not be allowed to l 1
J 24 restart unless the Governor reaches a threshold I
l l
l O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
_ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l 1 datorminction that en ovacuation plan can 1
,- 2 adequately protect public health and safety and '
3 local officials and the Governor have approved such 4 a plan.
5 Let me add one final word with regard to 1
l 6 Pilgrim. I am becoming more and more convinced 7 that we may not need the power from Pilgrim.
8 Boston Edison's own forecast of electric supply and 9- demand shows that it probably won't need Pilgrim 10 power from 1990 to the year 2000. With 11 conservation and energy produced by small-power.
12 facilities, we may not need electricity from 13 Pilgrim.
14 So, therefore, all of us should ask 15 ourselver why we should take a risk that we don't 16 have to take. All of us should ask ourselves the 17 ultimate question, do we really need to take the 18 risk of Pilgrim re-opening when we may not even 19 need 'the power it might produce? (Applause).
20 Thank you very much.
21 The Chairman: Provocative. (Laughter).
22 Representative Foreman.
23 Mr. Foreman: Thank you, Senator. My name 24 is Peter Foreman. I'm a state representative from O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, kNC.
11 Pilgrim and Kingston; I'm a roaidant of Kingston 2 and Plymouth. I recently. served as House Chairman 3 of the Legislature's Joint Special Committee to l
y 4 investigate the plant.
5 I want to congratulate you for the hearing.
6 While many state and local officials have been '
\
7 quite vocal and active trying to keep pressure on -
8 the NRC, it is obvious that there is little. state 9 or local jurisdiction over nuclear plants, as it is 10 all exclusively federal control, and as such, we 11 are very pleased to you take this initiative.
12 I understood from your staff that the focus 13 of the hearing was not so.m'uch on Edison's !
lh.
, .l 14 perform'ance, rather the performan'ce of the federal 15 agency, particularly the NRC, who regulates the 16 utiltities. So I would like to offer a few broad 17 observations about the NRC's work.
18 one of the most commonly heard criticisms is 19 that the NRC is too much an advocate to nuclear 20 power and not a watchdog and I would like to give 21 you two examples of how I think some of the NRC's 22 thinking has already entered to its keeping the j 23 plants open. l 24 The first is the lack of decommissioning i
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. I
. I
1 pleno. In tho many mastings hsid, wa hevo como
' i l,
. 2 away with a sense that one reason NRC is reluctant 3 to close any plant is because nobody seems to know 4 what to do with plant once it is closed, and that 4
5 sort of perpet.uates an interest in making sure that j 6 they are open so those very tough questions don't 7 have to be addressed immediately.
J 8 .
I would urge, as a previous witness has, 9 that Congress and the Administration not allow any 10 delay in selecting a federal disposal site because 11 I think that's one of the reason we don't want to 12 address the issue of decommissioning.
L= 13 In the meantime, I think, 'though' I thi'nk 3 -
14 everyone would be well served with decommissioning 15 plans for power plants, including Pilgrim, and I 16 would like to urge the NRC and Boston Edison, along 17 with any state, federal and local officials to i
18 begin planning for decommissioning, so area )
l 19 residents and rate payers and state officials will 20 know what's in store for us when a plant is 21 permanently closed.
22 The second example of NRC gravitation toward 23 ' keeping plants open is their grading system of l 24 plants' peformance. We're all familiar with the l l
l 1
- - - - - ~ ~ - - - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ - _ _ - _ . - __
F Sullivan roporto and thoir thrso psformanco 1
, 2 retings. None of these rating categories include
- s. .
3 failures or fail rates. There are no objective 4- criteria or peformance that would trigger a license
-5 revocation or a continued review of licensee 6 peformance. I think that the public and nuclear 7 industry need to see clear standards as to exactly 8 what constitues a poorly run or a failing plant.
9 The issues surrounding public health are, of 10 courre, paramount, but I get the sense that the NRC 11 works in short-trrm incident specific reviews of 12 whether or not a plan is responsible for any threat m
. 13 , to pu.blic health . I would urge the Congress, or an.
14 agency other than the NRC, begin some sort of 15 comprehensive long-term studies to the public 16 health impact, if any, around nuclear power plants.
17 These studies should include the exposure to health 18 histories, as well as the cumulative exposure to 19 the general public.
20 I would like to make another general 21 observation about work place safety not related to j 22 radiation exposure. Not too long ago, Edison had a 23 project remove asbestos from the plant, and one of 24 the plant employees suggested to me that the work
{
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O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 waa'poorly dono and that thara was unnecesacry 2 risks of asbestos exposure to the employees in the l .
Questions were raised about tnose 3 . area.
4 disabilities to supervisors to investigate this 5 problem. And I think some' work needs to bd done to 6 insure that the NRC regulations and the industry 7 standard to reduce radiation exposure, as well as 8 NRC's almost exclusive jurisdiction over nuclear 9 plant, does not reduce non-radiation related 10 workplace safety standards.
11 On another matter, questions have been 12 raised about the relationship with contract workers
. 13 in the plant; who do they answer to, what kind of -
14 quality control is achieved and how well do they 15 work with other employees, and understand the NRC 16 regulations, and I would hope that part of the NRC 17 is to have some sort of fuller investigation into 18 those questions.
19 As House Chairman of the Special Committee, 20 legislative committee dealing with Pilgrim, there 21 were two matters that we simp 2y were not able to 22 resolve. One was the issue of Mark I designs. Is 23 there, in fact, an increase of containment failure 24 in a Mark I design 1
m 1- The Chairmon: Do thoco highor r'isks, if
[ 2 any, compensate for some'other measures?
I
~
3- Mr. Foreman: The other is overcharges of 4 past releases. And Mr. Abbott, I thinN, has 5 probably_done the best job in documenting one such 6 release in 1982.
U 7 Should the NRC refuse an adjudicatory 8 hearing on Pilgrim's license, then, at least, the ,
9 NRC, or through your outfit, would have some sort 10 of hearings on these two issues.because these are 11 of critical concern to the area residents, and we 12 simply do not have the resource in our state 13 legislature to begin sorting out.the issues o.f. pas't 14 releases in the Mark I containment issue.
15 . Finally, I would like to very quickly touch 16 on the issue of emergency preparedness. The NRC 17 has created what, I think, is a real jurisdictional 18 mess over the issue of emergency preparedness by 19 requiring local approval of plans, the NRC may or 20 may not have given states the power to close 21 plants. How far this power actually gces is 22 unclear, but I think it i.s in everyone's interest i
23 that it needs to be clarified, clarified 24 preferrably by Congress, not the NRC. This should mpgA N m NA Aa% - -*_____ _m _- -- --- - - - _ _ --
-1J 'bsLdens ao soon co possible, so that stcto- .-
e s r 2 officials will have some sense as to how much -
t 3 power, if any, state and local officials have.faa 4' closing a plant and preventing a plant like Pilgrom ]
5 from coming back online or: preventing one from q p 6 opening up through the use of the' emergency' l
7 preparedness plans.
8 Again, Senator, let me congratulate you for 9 focusing some congressional attention on this, and 10 particularly on the NRC and its role as a' federal 11 regulator.
12 The Chairman: Thank you very much. Mr.
13 G, olden.
- P;, ..
14 Mr. Golden: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank 15 you first for your continuing and long standing 16 interest-in this issue, and particularly for 17 responding to the request of, local officials to 18 bring this hearing to us this evening. I 19 part'icularly thank you for the opportunity to 20 testify before you this evening.
21 I believe that the Pilgrim Nuclear Power 22 Station should be closed for reasons of safety, 23 reliability and economics. There is overwhelming 24 evidence that you will hear tonight that it is one O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1- ,of ths.worno'mensgsd nuclear.powar.plents in-the. -]
q J(1j ,
2 country. Its containment' vessel has been proven to j sn' ' !
- 3 be defective, no emergency plans exist to 7
4 adequately protect the public in the event of a 5 serious accident at the plant. Evidence has also
\ 6- been mounting of serious security and radiological ,
7 control problems at the plant, and a recent study 8 has demonstrate'd that it would be less expensive to 9 shut Pilgrim down than it would be to allow it to 10 start up again; yet no level of government has 11 acted decisively to shut this plant down.
12 Under'the Atomic Energy Act, states have 13 almost no power regarding the safety of nuclear g.
14 power plants. Federal authority, which is embodied 15 in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has a virtual 16 monopoly regarding the operation of nuclear plants.
17 Unfortunately, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 18 has failed to distinguish between plants that are 19 safe and those that are not.
20 Rather than providing a fair and open forum 21 for resolution of nuclear safety concerns, as well 22 as a mechanism for closing unsafe plants, the NRC 23 has chosen instead to be an advocate of the nuclear 1
24 industry. Despite all the well documented problems !
l n n_n~ -__ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - -
- 1. ot Pilgrim, tha NRC hoc chossn to keep the plant 1
l '
- 2. licensed.
3 In July of 196 -- in 1986, I filed on behalf l 4 of myself and 49 others state legislators and 5, Massachusetts, Public Interest Research Group and 1
6 other players, a petition with the NRC requesting a 7 formal hearing on suspension or revocation of 8 Pilgrim's license to operate. Both the government 9 and the Attorney General has since filed similar 10 show cause petitions with the NRC requesting 11 hearings on the* Pilgrim's license.
12 The NRC's failure to consider fully and
& , 13 fairly and in a timely manner these petiti'ons has y . -
4 14 convince'd us that we cannot rely on the NRC to 15 protect the public from the dangers presented by 16 the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant. We urge and 17 respectfully request that you join our efforts by 18 using the power of this committe to demand that the 19 NRC hold formal hearings, so that Boston Edison may 20 demonstrate why it should be allowed to operate a 21 plant that is unsafe, unreliable and uneconomical.
22 A year and a half ago, I testified at length 23 before the Congressional Subcommittee on Energy 24 Conservation and Power in Washington, D. C. on the
T 1 prob 1 cms ati Pilgrim. Unfortunately very little has 2 changed since that hearing, and the-problems what I L
'. 3 ' discussed in that testimony have.not been' resolved.
4 Accordingly.,-I would like to submit that testimony 5- again to your committee, and a_ copy of it has been 6- submitted.
7 The fact of the matter is, Senator, that we' '
8 need your help. We are in a situation where we 9 have a utility that plans to file for restart of
~
10 this plan even though they don't have the approved Lil management performance, even though there is no 12 emergency plan to' adequately protect the public, s1 .
13 even though the containment vessel is flawed and 'we V .
, n .
'14 have a 90 percent rate of failure in the event of a 15 serious accident of-the plant, and even though 16 radiological control problems seem to threaten the 17 health of workers and the general public. The NRC 18 has determinedly been an advocate for the industry.
19 It ha's sought to shut out public participation.
20 You have opened the door tonight to that
- 21. public participation to state and local officials 22 and the general public. We deeply appreciate it.
23 We would ask that you conEinue that effort by using 24 the power of this committee to request the NRC, in O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
4
l l
L l 1 fcet, hold on svidsnticry hocring on why ths 2 license of the Boston Edison Company should not be 3 . suspended or revoked. (Applause).
4 The Chairman: Excellent testimony.
5 (Booing).
6 The Chairman: Voices of' Boston Edison. Let 7 me say we have tried to get to the NRC to have such f
I 8 a hearing with regard to Seabrook. We were: unable 9 to do so. We have, not only myself, we were joined 10 by just about the whole congressional delegation, ]
(
11 and we have -- and also Senators from New York that I 12 -- we work together, the Senators from New York.
. 13 _ (Laughter).. -- and we'll continue to try and do 14- so. -
15 I really am troubled by the fact that we 16 can't get such an open hearing. We are going to 17 insist, as we.did in Seabrook. I mentioned earlier 18 what I would do, if we're unable to get the NRC to 19 open -- I would certainly hope that they will. I 20 will take every action I possibly can to see that 21 they do. I know -- I'm sure I speak for my 22 colleagues, Senator Kerry and Congressman Studd.
23 But they -- but if we're unable to do so, we 24 certainly can testify. I give you assurance I O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
. .n .
L El cortninly will, and I'll bring all the tostimony h ' ._
2/ that we heard today and try to present it in as
~,3 effective way as"I possibly can. David Malaguti.
4 Is that how it's pronounced? Did I say-it right?
L 5 Mr. Malaguti: Yes, Senator. As a matter of 6 fact, you're just fine.
7 Senator, I'm the new chairman of the local 1:
8 Board of Selectment, and on behalf of my board, I' i 1.
9 would weldome you to Plymouth. It is a pleasure 10 and an honor to have you here. We would like to 11 see you more.often, perhaps, but it is indeed a 12 pleasure. I'm afraid that at this point my l'3 . testimony, some of it,.might be old hst', but I ,
14 think it is important enough to state again.
15 The Plymouth Board of Selectmen has 16 discussed at regularly scheduled and posted 17 meetings and has taken the following position. The 18 Pilgrim Power Station should not be permitted to 19 restart until en effective radiological emergency 20 response plan approved by the town of Plymouth is !
21 in place. I quote from -the Board's letter to the 22 NRC, dated September 2, 1987.
i 23 The Plymouth Board of Selectmen recommends 24 that t h e P i l g r i m N u c l e a'r P o w e r S t a t i o n l o c a t e d i n j
m nmmm m, ,,m n nnn---- - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9 1- our community not ba'ollowadito restart until the L
1 p- 2 '.
- radiological emergency ~ response plan of this town.
'3 is in an effective form," end of quote. 3 l
4 ; That position statement was taken after S receiving a first report of the town's Committee on 6 , ' Nuclear Matters dated March 1987, and on the advice 7 of the civil defense lawyer. 'Our position was
)
8 : reiterated in a second letter to the NRC, dated-9 November 16, 1987.
- 10 "Our present radiological emergency response 11 plan dated May 1985, is inadequate, outdated and l l
1 12 has serious. deficiencies. While we are working 13 'hard to bring'into being a n.ew plant that would *
"permitbstoprovidehortheheal,thandsafetyof 14-15 our citizens during a radiological emergency, an 16' approved plan does not exist at this time. It will 17 take several more months of work before such a plan 18 can be presented for the action of the Board of 19 Selectmen."
20 Senator, the magnitude of this problem can 21 be grim if you will just bear in mind two l 22 population figures. When Pilgrim Station opened in 23 1972, the population of Plymouth was '9,000. Today 24 it is in excess of 44,000. Our town is 17 miles in O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 1cngth. Strotching clong tha ocoan, wa hcva three 2 major escape routes: Route 3A, Route 44 and the
'. 3 Route 3 Expressway. All routes suffer from traffic 4 gridlocks periodically, especially during the 5 tourist season when people flock throughout our 6 historic town. Winter storms, fall hurricanes, and 7 other adverse weather conditions only exacerbate 8 the problem.
9 The town of Plymouth is in the best position 10 to assess the public's safety. We are the 11 population most at risk, and we have the experience 12 of the years in dealing with divaster. No public 13 .
utility must be permitted by the Nuclear Regulatory 14 Ag'ency to dictate a evacuation' plan, thereby 15 usurping the traditonal powers and authority of the 16 local elected Officials. We not about to surrender I 17 our rights to govern ourselves. We are united with 18 our Massa'chusetts civil defense director, our state 19 public safety director and with our governor. We ]
20 maintain, as did Governor Dukakis in his letter of 1
21 December 17, 1987, that the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
{
22 Station should not be permitted to restart the 23 reactor until all safety issues are resolved, and l 24 until adequate approved emergency response plans l
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
a
1:
c
, hevo'bacn davslopsd'by-this town-and st, ate.
2 We recommend-that your committee exert
', 3 congressional pressure on the NRC to keep the-4 Pilgrim nuclear power station closed until.an
~5 effective town-approved' emergency plans have been 6 develo, ped for the safety of our citizens and'for 7 the protection of their. property in this state.
8 I thank you Senator-for the opportunity to 9 testify.
10 The Chairman: Ms. Shimshak.
11 Ms. Shimshak: Thank you, Senator. It's an 12 honor to testify before you tonight, and also to 13 sit with so many distin'guished legislative . ,
14 representatives', of which I'm not one of'them.
15 My name is Rachel Shimshak. I'm an advocate 16 for Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group. ,
17 MASSPIRG is a state-wide organization, working on 18 consumer and environmental protection and energy i
19 issues.. We have about 150,000 members across the 20 state. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
)
l 21 tonight about the historically troubled Pilgrim J
- 22. reactor.
~
23 MASSPIRG has followed the problems of 24 Pilgrim over the past decade and has conducted
~
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
j
r, m < .
l'
- j. 1 osvoral studies on smsrgency plcnning-issues and I
..... 2' the-economic benefits of closing the-reactor and '
cc' '
3 investing in alternatives. I've brought _with me 4 copies'of those. reports'and I would like to submit q 5- .them for the record, if I could. -
4 6 In July of 1986, as Senator Golden 7 - mentioned, MASSPIRG, along with'many state 8 legislators, elected officials and dozens of 9 citizen groups represented here tonight, submitted
- 10 a.Show Cause petition to the Nuclear Regulator 11 Commission which detailed management, structural, 12 emergency planning and radiological exposure g, 13 . pro.blems at the reactor. 'MASSPIRG'.is certainly not .
EF ~ -
14 alone in its! criticism of the~ plan. Reports from; 15 the NRC' the Department of PublicLUtility, the 16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, the State 17 Department of Public Safety, and even Boston 18 Edison's own review panel, the Hogan Commission,
- 19 have' detailed their criticism,of Boston' Edison's 20 management and of Pilgrim's plant. If a horse had 21 as many problems as the Pilgrim plant had, it wpuld 22 have been shot. (Laughter, applause).
23 It.would be wise to acknowledge Edison's 24 inability to. correct these problems and to put the O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 plent out of ito micory by clocing it parmonently.
2 Today I would like to focus my comments on-
\
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3 the conclusions of an emergency planning survey j 4 released this fall entitled "No Exit". MASSPIRG's l
5 earlier reports generally looked at the adequacy of 6 the emergency plans themselves. This report 7 approached the emergency plans from a different 8 angle. It looked not at the plans themselves, but 9 at the people who would be asked to follow them.
10 Such information is crucial to assessing the 11 feasibility of the plan, particularly in light of 12 the General Accounting Office's finding that, a 13 , quote, "No federal agency assess public kn.owledge W .
14 of radiological emergency procedures." -
15 In the summer of 1987, MASSPIRG surveyed 363 16 residents of the Pilgrim emergency planning zone to 17 determine what people knew about the official 18 emergency plan, and whether they would follow those 19 plans in case of an accident at the plant. ,
20 The key findings of this survey show that 21 residents are even less informed about Pilgrim 22 emergency plan then they were at the time of j 23 MASSPIRG's last survey conducted in 1983.
24 Moreover, they said they would refuse to follow
E l
1 officici instructions in thG cvent of cn cmergancy.
2 Let me just review a few of the findings of the 3 report. -
4 First, residents have only a limited 5 knowledge of emergency plans for their communities.
6 Only 56 percent of those surveyed said that they 7 had received the Emergency Public Information 8 booklet from Boston Edison, the operators of the 9 plant, compared with 67 percent who remembered 10 receiving the booklet in 1983. Moreover, only 23 11 percent of those surveyed said they had actually 12 read the thing, compared to 38 percent in 1983.
13 .Second, many re'idents s wou-ld not follow the:
14 emergency plan in case of a serious problem with 15 Pilgrim. For instance, the most common response to 16 an accident at Pilgrim, about 27 percent of the 17 people polled, would immediately evacuate; a direct 18 contradiction of the instructions contained in the 19 Emergency Information booklet. In nice big letters 20 in the booklet, incidently.
21 Second, only 19 percent of those questioned 22 said that they would go to one of the designated 23 reception centers in case of an evacuation, and two 24 thirds of those few who would follow the emergency O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 plcn, would go to the Hanovar Mall, which io no 2 longer an official reception center.
r,
~
3 Perhaps the most stunning thing that we 1
4 found was about school age children, and of the 37 5 percent surveyed who had school age children said 6 that they would try to pick up their school age 7 children from school in the event of an emergency.
8 Again, precisely what the Emergency booklet 9- instructed them not to do. Just 9 percent of 10 parents said that they would follow the 11 instructions to meet their children outside the 12 danger zone. And then, just for good measure, 79
- 13 percent of the re.spondents felt that Pilgrim should .
4 14 remain shut down if management and safet'y problems 15 persist. -
16 Allowing the Pilgrim plant to reopen in 17 light of these results has serious management and 18 safety problems that persist in such a plan, would 19 be like giving a drunk the keys to drive home.
20 MASSPIRG recommends that the Pilgrim plant not 21 be --
{
22 The Chairman: Did they indicate who those 9 '
23 percent parent,s were that were" going to leave i 24 their children? (Laughter).
1 MD. Shimchok: Nino porcent said that they.
- 2 would actually follow, I --
~
~
3 The Chairman: I guess that doesn't actually 4 leave them.
5 Ms. Shimshak: Right.
6 The Chairman: It doesn't include, as I 7 understand it, the children going to private 8 schools; is that correct?
9 Ms. Shimshak: There are currently no plans 10 for those people.
11 The Chairman: What do the~y do? Do they 12 stay behind and take that wonderful tablet?
' ~
- 13. Ms. Sh'imshak: Per'h'aps they coul'd wait'for l( _
14
~
the buses, for the buses to arrive from Boston to 15 pick them up.
16 The Chairman: A serious question. What is 17 the -- Do you know the number of children that 18 would be in the private and parochial schools; are 19 there many?
20 Ms. Shimshak: I'm sure that there are, but 21 perhaps you can.
22 Mr. Malaguti: I don't have the numbers.
23 The Chairman: Okay. Well, we'll talk.
1 24 Please continue.
1L Mo. Shimchok: MASSPIRG rccommands that~the-
-2 Pilgrim plant not be opened unless it is determined
-3 that, one: a workable plan can bIe developed; two 4 such' plans have been effectively disseminated and 5 implemented, and three, that outstanding 6 management, safety and economic questions have been.
7 resolved.
8 We also recommended that Boston Edison use 9 this unique opportunity to implement the 10 conservation and load management recommendations of 11 the Hogan report, rather than spend more' money on 12' this plan. Thank you.
.13 ' '
'The Chairman:' I want to move along, but I
- 14. have somes que'stions. First of the legislators, I 15 want to ask each of them if they -- Representive 16 Foreman spoke about the adequacy of the ability of 1 17 the local and state governments to deal with some '
18 of the NRC ruling.
19 I don't know whether you have it any --
20 First of all, I congratulate you on the report that 21 was made to the legislative -- Special Legislative 22 Committee Investigating report, and I'm going to 23 make that part of the hearing record as well.
24 . Do you have suggestions of ways in which the l
~1 NRC.should'oxpand-the rol's of tho state and local 2' communities, or:maybe you could - Well, if you-
. 3 want to think about it and make'it a part of the-4 record.
5 Mr. Foreman: I, frankly, don't see-the 6 problem with giving the states the power' to decide 7 whether or not they have nuclear power plants. I 8 fully understand and accept the rational that 9 states and. local governments shouldn't necessarily 10 regulate-nuclear power pl' ants in monitoring them in 11 terms of their operation as well as in terms of the
- 12 conditions of health effects. But I have a problem g, 13 ,
with ,the federal gove nment prohibiting states fr'om F >?
14- deciding whether or not they want plants in their.,
- 15. state.
16 I'm also troubled by the fact that the only 17 straw that we seem to be grabbing at in trying to 18 create some state authority is the use of emergency 19 prepa' redness and withdrawal of state approval or 20 denial of state approval for emergency plans. I l 21 think that could lead to actually some public 22 safety risks, depending on how the the court and I 23 the NRC interpret the state authority. So I would 1
24 urge Congress and the Administration to consider ;
i l .
O'BRIEN AND.LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
v- _ _ _ _ . ___ __ _ . .-A
1 soma outright cpproval to ctatos cercas tha 2 country, not just because of Pilgrim, but in terms 3 ,of state authority and federal.
4 The Chairman: What do we do on nuclear 5 waste? Do we give the states authority to reject 6 that?
7 Mr. Foreman: We keep the pressure on 8 Congress and the Administration to pick a site out 9 in Nevada. (Laughter).
10 The Chairman: Do we give those states the 11 power to reject?
12 Mr. Foreman: I don't think we can.
13 The Chairman: First of all,.we might just 14 make it normdl procedure if the state is going-to 15 use nuclear power, let them take the risk of in 16 terms of storing it. (Applause).
17 Mr. Foreman: If I can suggest something in 18 response to that. We deal with issues in this 19 state over low level waste,. solid waste and we run 20 into those problems. I think that you can clearly 21 infer a distinction between th,e states a 22 willingness or desire to have an operating plant 23 sited in this state as opposed to national public 24 ', health i=nterest of finding a disposal site which is O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
-1 anvirom9ntc11y cound.
2 The Chairman: I think that's right.
3 Mr. Alexander: I would say, first of all, 4 that the legal issue of the state's problem is
)
5' still up in the air. You know Governor Celeste of 1
6 Ohio actually withdrew the Emergency Response Plan 7 for nuclear power plants there until the Commission i 8 could take another look at it, and that's in the 9 court as to whether or not he has that authority or 10 not.
11 So I would first.say that it is still 12 unclear whether Massachusetts'can say, "Nell, 13 we're not going <to allow Pilgrim to operate becaus'e 14 we don't feel that the emergency response plan is -
15 adequate," but I do think it would be worthwhile to 16 allow Congress to allow states the ability to 17 regulate nuclear power to the extent that if 18 Congress has a standard, that states should be 19 allowed to have standards that are at least as 20 tough as those of the federal standards; that way 21 you are not going to have people who might not be 22 as expert weakening the standards.
On the other 23 hand, if the states should have proper standards, 24 it should be allowed to do so.
f f
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l' The Chairman: Sanctor Goldon, wo very much acknowledge the very important contributions you 2
3 have'made in terms of raising so many of these 4 issues. I'm grateful for your presence here this 5 evening.
6 -
Let me ask you, given what you'have said about 7 the evacuation plans, do you think it is possible 8 for the development of any evacuation at this 9 point?
10 Mr. Golden: I believe it would be very 11 difficult, Senator, to develop an effective 12 evacuation plan. I believe, given the limited 13 transportation routes in this area, we've lost 14 effectively 180 degrees because the plant is on the 15 shoreline, and because of the limited north, south, 16 east and west transportation access that we have to 17 the site, I believe that if the site were to 18 restart, it would require significant sheltering ;
19 plans with shelters that were properly equipped and 20 those that could withstand the pressure and stress 21 of the public's access to them. Right now, we 22 don't have that. There are people who are being 23 sheltered in two-foot crawl spaces, according to l 24 the existing plan, and in buildings that don't
.O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 cxist cny mora. So wo nood a lot of input --
e
/ 2 If I could just briefly respond, Senator, to 3 your question about access to the public. I would t >
) 4 like to see Congress change the Atomic Energy Act 5 and permit the governor of a state, as a matter of 6 right, to demand a show.cause petition. Our 7 governor has requested a Show Cause hearing. I
- 8. believe each governor of each state should have 9 that right, at least, and that would open the 10 public process. The public process could also be i 11 opened up, I believe, by enabling local government, 12 as well as state government, an act of law with pg -13 formulation and implementation of these plans, and i
14 with that role, the veto power over over the plants 15 for their own communities because they do know 16 their communities well.
17 The Chairman: Let me ask just quickly we 18 move on. You stressed in your other statements on 19 this issue in other forums, the importance of 20 development of cheap energy. Are these forums 21 consistent with what you would like to see in 22 terms of development of cheaper energy?
2 23 Mr. Foreman: Yes, Mr. Chairman. One form 24 of cheap energy production is energy conservation.
n , n* n~-- - - _ . ~ - - _ - - ~ - - _
1 1 Ao Rechaal Shimchak from MASSPIRG has indicated, 2 this company, through its own committee, the Hogan 3 Committee, it was chaired and directed by U. S. --
4 former-U. S. Senator Saunders, indicated this 5, company by the year 2000 saved a thousand megawatts 6 of power. The company in response would request s 7 proposal, a proposal submitted in excess of 2,000 ,
\
8 - megawatts. l 9 All of that power would provide, I believe, 10 a cheap alternative to Pilgrim. Given the fact 11 especially, Mr. Chairman, that since April of 1986,
, 12 when this plant was shut down, there has been 9 ,13 ,
expenditu,res i totaling.over 300 millio'n. dollars for E' , . -
14 replacement power and construction cost on this
{
15 plant. That's 300 million dollars, and we're not l i
16 any better off today with all that expenditure than )
17 we were 20 months ago when the plant was shut down.
18 19 The Chairman: Just quickly, Mr. Alexander. .
20 Mr. Alexander: Thank you, Senator. l 21 Certainly the cheapest form of power is 1
22 conservation when we don't have to produce more 23 power. An example is the Appliance Efficiency Law 24 that was passed here in Massachusetts, which that O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 low clono by allowing psoplot to buy refrigarctors 2 that were efficient, having those -- being ones
- (
- 3 that you see at department stores, will be able to
-4 save us the. amount of power equivalent to about
'5 half of the output at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power 6 plant, one simple law. And the federal ' law is going to save Pilgrim'about 23 nuclear power 7-8 plants.
9 'Also, it needs to be said that'if you do 10 need new sources of power, it makes much more sense 11 to have small generating facilities that are 12 relatively local in place, so that if one, for.
pp '13 instance, had,an ou,tage, we don't all of,a sudden' g 4 14 ' find the kind of crisis that New England Power
~
15 approval suggests we're going to have, when a 16 couple of nuclear power plants are down for total i
17 plant maintenance.
18 Mr. Foreman: I have a slightly different 19 . view 'on the importance of conservation. Any sound 20 energy policy obviously has to include 21 conser'ation, v but I think that we are somewhat 22 misguided in assuming that in a region that is 23 growing, an economy that is growing and dependent f
24 on energy, that we're going to survive for too long
)
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
, 1 l
1 in tho futu'ro simply by conosrving. Thore is s' 2 finite limit on how much we can conserve and 3 continue to grow.
4 I think one of the great problems we have in 5 this country is that we don't have a national 6 energy policy that anyone can identify, and from 7 what I can tell, the state doesn't either. I don't 8 know of any states that do have a policy, and 9 that's a real problem. It doesn't have to be based 10 on nuclear. Clearly, we can have energy policy.
11 without it, but both the state and the country, we
'12 need some sound energy policy that will go way 13 ubeyond conservation and talks about generation of 14 new power sources for growing areas, such as a 15 fossil plant in Weymouth. (Applause).
16 The Chairman: Thank you very much. I want 17 to first of all thank you, the people of Plymouth, 18 through you, for all of their willingness and 19 hospitality this evening for helping us so much 20 about these various events.
21 I had just one point. You made your -- As I 22 understand your testimony, that the Plymouth Board 23 of Selectmen had made their objections known to the 24 NRC concerning restarting of the plan without an AA m mm nne n m-~--m~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - -
~ 1. ., .odoquete preparednson plan. I would like to ask-
. 2 you how the'NRC has. responded to.your concern.
'. 3 Mr. Malaguti:. We have constant 4 communication'with the'NRC.. We had indications 5 that they are receptive to our comments.
6 The Chairman: Did they saylthey wouldn't 7 restart until they-worked out the new evacuation '
l 8 plan?
9 EMr. Malaguti: No,' sir. They have not.
10 The Chairman: Do you think they should?
11 Mr. Malaguti:
. Absolutely.
12 The chairman: Okay. We'll include all'of
. 13 your studies in the - ,as part of our record -- I 14 think. There is -- The first is the '83 report '
15 entitled " Blueprint for Chaos," and there is a 16 report described -- dated 1987 report, "No Exit,"
17 and the '87 report, " Nuclear Dilemma". All those 18 will be included.
19 In your -- Let me ask you questions because 20 there, in your report, you talked about advance 21 public information and education. And there are l
22 some that would say -- some people would say that 23 people would claim not to know the evacuation '
24 procedurer.; they are against the plan any way, so I
. i O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. '
t 1 it is not their intoract to ba halpful; it io not l
l 2- ein their interest to make sure if they read the l .
l 3 plan; they told you that if they read the plan, 4 they think that will be helpful to Boston Edison.
I 5 How do you respond to that criticism? That is a 6 ,
' criticism that has been made, and, in fact, will be 7 made a little later.
8 Ms. Shimshak: Having participated in a 9 survey, people gave us very honest answers. I 10 believe that they told you the truth when they said 11 they didn't really know what to do in the event of 12 an emergency,and they said they hadn't actually 13, received the Emergency Informa, tion Booklet in the - -
14 mail.
15 One thing that did stand out with people's 16 answer to these questions is an air of cynicism.
17 Having been through 15 years worth of history of 18 this plant, and seeing how many problems it has and 19 experiencing the NR0's lack of attention to those 20 plans -- those problems, I think people have a very 21 cynical view. And even if they were given proper 22 instructions, my guess is they wouldn't follow 23 ) them. They'll get together with their families 24 because that's what's most important to them and O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING S'ERVICE, INC.
1 thoy'll'do what they think 10 bast at the momsnt, 2 wnd I don't believe that that will be following~thet 4
3 prescribed directions. '
4 The Chairman: Are you, from your own 5 perspective, optimistic or pessimistic as to 6 whether that plan will restart?
7 Ms. Shimshak: Well, I would be tempted to 8 say that I'm pessimistic just because of the NRC's 9 record in the past, and given the fact that they 10 never really shut a plant down for being as bad as 11 Pilgrim is. But I must admit, I'm feeling optimism 12 for two reasons, and one is that you've taken an 13
- interest in' , as well as many other elected
- 14 officials, and, hopefully, that will stimulate some 15 good action on this; and also since the plant has 16 been shut dann for 21 months, which I don't believe 17 any of us would have expected in 1986 when it 18 originally closed down.
19 The Chairman: Thank you very much for --
20 you're a very helpful panel, helpful reports.
21 Wish we had more time to go into the issues. I 22 may want to submit some of the questions to you, 23 but we appreciate the time. We are very much l
24 impressed with the -- but not surprised -- by the
t
. 1 quality of the rsprescntation of our ,e of the 2 -
member of the gr 2t general court, the State
[}
3 Senate. Your testimony obviously -- Es well as 7
4 Mr. Malaguti, and the very exemplary work that has 5 been done. I want to thank all of you very much.
6 -
(One-minute break).
7 The Chairman: I want to announce for the 8 record, we were not able to include all the State 9 Representatives and Senators in the course of our 10 hearing. We had about ten or 12 that had made 11 applications. We want to indicate to any of those 12 that want to have.their statement -- including the 13 State Senator that. represents the' local community.
14 We tried to get the State Representative, 15 the Board of Selectmen and the chairman of the 16 Energy Committee in the Great' General Court. But 17 we want to indicate to any of them, if they want 18 their statement included in the record, we will 19 keep the record open. But it was really a question 20 of trying to hear again from as many of the 21 different representatives who have interest and 22 responsibilities in the local community, from the 23 local representatives as well as the 24 representatives of the hRC.
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o 1 Wa wentcd to -- and not to try to go balow c 2 three or four minutes presentation; otherwise, you i 3 lose the real context of the hearing. So those are 4 the reasons, quite frankly. We were not intending r
5 to be disrespectful to any of those, but we'are 6 particularly delighted to have an old friend of 7 mine, and one of our very fine public servants, Lt.
8 Governor of our state, Evelyn Murphy. I welcome 9 her to this -- our hearing as the second ranking 10 state official in a position of responsibility for 11 the state for its health and well being, as she 4 12 brings a special perspective to this hearing, and 13 -
we very much look forward to her testimony. I'll 14 ask you she'll be go'od enough to stand and take the 15 cath.
16 (Lt. Governor Eveyln Murphy sworn).
17 Lt. Governor Murphy: Thank you Senator 18 Kennedy. I want to thank you for giving all of us 19 the opportunity to come here tonight and discuss 20 the Pilgrit Nuclear Power Plant and the serious 21 public health and safety questions surrounding it.
22 And you've seen the turnout tonight on one of the 23 coldest nigh'ts of this winter, it is the testimony 24 to the intense feelings that people have abcut the
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)
I come here tonight, not just as Lt.
2 3 Governor, but as the Acting Governor to express the 4 Governor's and my concern about the threat to the 5 public's health and safety of this plant, and 6 insist on behalf of the people of the Commonwealth 7 of Massachusetts upon two very reasonable specific ,
8 actions.
9 First that the NRC hold an adjudicatory l b .
10 hearing in Plymouth before this plant opens, and 11 second, that Pilgrim not be allowed to reopen until 12 the emergency evacuation concerns of both FEMA and 13 Go,vernor Dukakis have been satis'factorily resolved.
14 In June of 1986, the plant was closed -
if because of serious charges concerning the safety of 16 the management facility. I won't dwell on the 17 specifics. You are going to hear from a panel of 18 state officials here tonight: Mr. Agnes, the 19 Assistant Secretary of Public Safety; Deputy to the 20 Commissioner of Public Health, Deborah 21 Prothrow-Smith; Attorney General; Secretary 22 Pollard, all prepared to supply in detail from the 23 State's prospective about the concerns that 24 Governor Dukakis and I share.
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
e d
1 Sinco the closing of tha fccility, Governor 2 Dukakis has laid out three preconditions for its
~~
3 reopening. Public' health and safety are the 4 ,
precedent of these criteria. First,"the inadequate ,
5 safety problems at the plant must be corrected; 6 second, the management pro'blems must be resolved, 7 and third, the evacuation plan must be adequate.
8 These three criteria have been offered as 9 reasonable demands for the operation of the nuclear 10 power plant in a heavily populated area. They have 11 not yet been met by Borton Edison.
12 This Administration has the responsibility p; ~13 to protect our citizens. And our' insistence that c.
14 -
the plants be operated with protection to people's 15 health and safety as the foremost guarantee is I
16 absolutely non-negotiable. '
17 My own reservations about this plant and.
18 nuclear power date back to 1975 when I rejected the 19 draft Environmental Impact Report for Pilgrim 2. At i 20 that time the comments were on the questions of j 21 disposal of waste and about plant safety. Those i
22 issues are the same, remain unanswered today, so my )
23 reservations have become more resolutions to 24 resolve to prevent our safety and economic health 1
m nm m m mm m n. -- - ----s_- - - - - - - - . - - - --
1 from boing hold hostega to cny eno powar sourca,
' ,.vs 2 and the resolution to w'rk o toward the development
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3 of safety.
i 4 As you deliberate here tonight on the future 5 of the Pilgrim plant, please disregard the issues -
6 involved in supply and demand on the New England 7 power grid. Let me be very clear. We have 8 sufficient energy generating capacity for all but 9 the most unusual situations today. As a matter of 10 fact, Tuesday night, demand hit a record-breaking 11 peak of 18,471 megawatts, that was met through 12 contingency purchases and other standard operating p 13 procedures,'once we h'it those contingency, plans. '
14 So meeting even high electricity demands is 15 possible without' Pilgrim, without Seabrook and 16 without a crisis.
17 Today's problems of tight energy in New 18 England are more due to the lack of judicious 19 management and maintenance practices as well as the 20 needs of aggressive action on short term, 21 augmentation of supplies, as we just discussed by 22 the panel; some of the small scale of power that 23 could be brought online quickly,' and some of the 24 cnergy'conser-Vdbn lod me q Ed
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - l
1 hava cortcinly bacn recommended and are possible.
L ' 2 In recent months, the State has.been very v .j I
3 active to do this, and we're pulling together a j L 4 task force and' group under the Governor's request 5 to meet t.o leave that with the Secretaries involved l
6 with the powers and some of the state offices that 7 are involved. So we are doing that. And I would 8 only say to you that I would hold that question-9 about the New England power supply aside., It has i
10 no relevancy whatsoever tonight.
11 Having expressed these concerns to you, I 12 must say that I realize how difficult it is for you, Governor'Dukakis and'me.and other responsible s- 13 ,
),, ..' . *
~14 public officials to make any headway against.an 15 unresponsive federal bureacracy, who actually 16 doesn't seem to care about the health and safety l 17 for the citizens of the State. )
l 18 It seems to me that NRC has been 1 19 surprisingly nonresponsive to date. Let me be more 20 specific, but I would like to go through a little 21 bit of the sequence here. In July of '86, as 22 Senator Golden mentioned,'I joined him and others 23 and MASSPIRG, and many other in signing that Show ;
24 Cause petition for addressing three points on 9 .4
u q
1 1 nuclosr rocctor cofety, cmargsney planning and
,,, 2 maintenance. The NRC rather callously dismissed-i 3 the first two and deferred consideration on the
! -4 third point. MASSPIRG appealed denials, and 5 Attorney Genera 1 St. non, who is about to testify 6 after me, is now an intervenor in those appeals.
7 And yet there has been no response. I find this 8 difficult to accept.
9 In October of 1987, Governor Dukakis and 10 Attorney General Shannon filed a show Cause 11 petition asking for the adjudicatory hearings 12 whether this plant should-be allowed to reopen.
g '13 '
There has been no response. Nor has the NRC
- 14 responded to a substantive -- in a. substantive 15 manner to the two reports on Pilgrim prepared by 16 Secretary of Public Safety Charles Barry, and 17 submitted by Governor Dukakis at first on December 18 1, 1986; the second December of 1987. And it is 19 now my understanding, Senator, you and Congressman 20 Studds also submitted a request that has been 21 denied in term of appeal to an adjudicatory 22 hearing.
23 -
NRC has indicated that it will meet with 24 pe,titioners, and this, I believe, for all of us is
l' unccceptablo. ' Citizens of the State.have a right 2 to see this case argued.in a formal setting.
.} I ,
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3 would encourage you.to do everything in your power 4 to see that this hearing' takes place. .You have my committment and the' Governor's committment to fully
~
5 6 support your' efforts.
7 What-the Governor and the people of 8 Massachusetts are put before the.NRC, we believe.to 9 be specific and reasonable requests, but when 10 confronted by bureaucratic stonewalling, that 11 reasonableness is likely to turn out to be more 12 increasing outrage.
l3' -
In closing, let me make one final point 14 - regarding FEMA and the NRC. As you know, currently
.15 FEMA's role is strictly advisory. It has been 16 mentioned several times. The situation here is a
- 17. prime example ,of how the NRC could overrule the 18 recommendations of both the Governor and to the
'19 . NRC, 'as it's own advisory body . This is absurd.
20 The Governor and I would wholeheartedly 21 support any congressional action that you would 22 take in passing a requirement that the NRC be bound 23 by the recomraendations of
- the government and of 24 FEMA. For Massachusetts, that would mean that m n m m mmn A e - - - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - - - - - - - -
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l 1 Pilgrim would not.rastert until the people of
- , ; 2 Massachusetts.were satisfied with the emergency j 3 plan.
l 4- We thank you once again for doing this 5 tonight and for,your invovement and we're quite 6 really quite grateful.
7 The Chairman: Thank you very much. We're 8 grateful for your presence here, for.your.taking 9 the time.
10 Let me ask you. Given the governor's 11
~
position on the Seabrook and on the Pilgrim, what 12 is the implication, due to the fact that the 3 - -
l'3 nuclear power pro' vide some 33 percent'of the power
- J~- ,
14 resources for New England, if Seabrook isn't opened 15 and Pilgrim is not re-opened, what.are the energy 16 implications going to be in terms of Massachusetts, 17 and responding first of all, and then respond to 18 the point that the legislators made in terms of 19 increasing pressures in term of the growth in the 20 future. How are we going to deal with it?
21 Lt. Governor Murphy: We11, 7
I think those 1
22 matters go hand in hand. We have right now 23 sufficient energy on the power grid to responu to 24 -
even the most extreme matters that we see right
-l 1 now,~that wo had this summor.
2' The real issues before us are-how to move 3 now to augment our supply. There are lots of 4' proposed plants for small scale co-generation-5 hydroelectric, environmentally sound, small scale 6 plants now in,the licensing ~ proceedings within the 7- state government. We are looking to expedite 8 those. There is the equivalent of one Pilgrim 9 plant right now within that licensing procedure.
10 So we can see ways in the short term to augment 11 supplies. I think we can also see ways in the 12- short. term to dampen some of the demands,-
. 13 conservat. ion;and.;1oad management procedures, and -
14 also to take some action shich even includes th'e ,
15 planning, which we have been doing the last couple
-16 of days, to ask the utility companies to get more 17 aggressive when they are interrupting rate 18 contracts.
19- So in the'short term, Senator, we believe 20 very strongly that there is sufficient power for 21 not only meeting today's demands, but in the 22 short-term summer growth. Over the longer trek, 23 there is no doubt that in the mid '90s, the Federal 24 Reserve Board Study is a wise and sound one, and i
mer n .A A A ANm mnm ~^mm-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
L s 1 that wa'11 nosd to look at coms lergor-ocolod plans *
- $ 2 to be-brought online. That explains some of the 3 Governor's initiatives around natural gas, and the-4 initiatives right now to look at increased 5 resources from HydroQuebec, and our looking at even 6 the'way se station.
1 .
7 So we see a way right now of moving from the 8 over-reliance of nuclear power to other options, 9 diversifying what we have for all of New England.
10 power, which makes us feel safer and insures the 11 kind of reliabilities, so that we can continue to 12 have a sustained economic growth and the jobs that 13 we now enjoy, but it means getting on with this.
. 14- And I think the faster we can put to rest the 15 controversies of nuclear power and all the other 16 options, the healthier and safer and more reliable 17 our energy sources are going to be.
18 The Chairman: I thank you very much. I 19 think in your summation of the three major 20 criteria which are necessary before you and the 21 Governor will support an opening of the --
22 capsulized the essence of the argument. You have 23 --
the rest of your presentation certainly 24 supports it. I want to thank you very much for --
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Lt'. Govornor Murphy: Thcnk-you'. *
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- The. chairman: -- joining. We're grateful 3-for your participation in this matter. Thank you.
7 4- Our next witness is our Attorney General i 5 BilleShannon. He is a long-time, personal friend:
6 of mine, who has been very much in.volved in the 7 Pilgrim question even before he assumed'the present 8 position. He is an uniquely qualified person.
9- Some of the legal ramifications relationships 10 between the state and federal government in nuclear 7 11 power field,-this is an issue I know, General, that 12 we heard earlier in the course of our hearing, but
(.
E13 a good deal of a comments from a number of 6 -
14 witnesses without -- how would this relationship be
< 15 adjusted.in order to'be changed, in order that the 16 principal health concerns and safety concerns and
~
17 the management concern be addressed by the public l
18 and by the state officials. So we're enormously 1 19 interested in your own views on those subjects, as 20 well as what the current state of the situation is,
)
I 21 and what actions you are proposing to take should i 22 there be a decision to, move ahead. We look forward 23 to your testimony, and we'll ask you to be kind l 24 enough to stand.
A nm m .mn mmm - mmmm-_- -_m_ _ - - -
1' 1- (Attorney Ganarni William Shtnnon sworn).
2
.3 Attorney General Shannon: Thank you, 4 Senator Kennedy. I want to thank you for holding 5 ,
this hearing this evening, and also for the 6 leadership that you have brought to this very 7 important issue to the people of the Commonwealth 8 and in the United States Senate.
9 The issue before you, the health 10 implications of restarting the Pilgrim Nuclear 11 Power Plant is one of tremendous importance to 12 everybody in the Commonwealth, but particularly to 13 those people.who are neighbors to'this plant.,
I f-14 commend you, too,'for coming here tonight so that l 15 the people who have been shut out of the process 16 can finally be heard.
17 The facts of this case have been very well 18 documented. The NRC currently ranks Pilgrim as one 19 of the worse managed plants in the country. This 1
20 past summer, the General Accounting Office reported !
21 that most of Pilgrim's management deficiencies 22 remained
- uncorrected. In 1982, the NRC fined 23 Boston Edison S550,000 for submitting false 24 information to the NRC and improperly operating
w 1 Pilgrim.
.;l . 2: By 1985, the utility had paid additional 3 civil penalties totaling $90,000. In fact, between 4 1983 and 1985, the NRC cited Pilgrim for 52 5 violation, ranging from operations to surveillance 6- and radiological control. Finally, in April 1986, 7 Boston Edison shut Pilgrim down.
8 These facts compel an open process, one in 9 which Boston Edison will be required to prove its 10 public plan that its problems are solved. Instead, 11 it appears the NRC intends to decide the fate of 12 this plant on the basis of a closed inspection and 13- evaluation. , , , ,
i 14 The people of the Commonwealth deserve 15 better than that. No one should consider reopening
-16 the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant until there has ;
17 been a full adjudicatory hearing, which clearly 18 demonstrates that these problems have been solved. L 19 Senator Kennedy, both you and Congressman l
20 Studds have been forceful in calling for these 21 hearings. The NRC's response that a public meeting l 22 be held is completely inadequate, if we are to 23 insure public health and safety.
24 In 1986, before my election as Attorney I ,
[ O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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Gonarcl,.I wasin patitioner along with savaral j
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'2 others here' tonight, calling for a.fullL
". 3- adjudicatory hearing on the: reopening ofsthis 4 ' plant. Jus Attorney General, I filed alsecond q 5- petition for the same full' legal proceeding, along.
6- with Governor Dukakis. The NRC essentially i
7 ' rejected the first, and has yet to act cnt the 8 second. The private petitioners have' appealed the 9 NRC, and my office is taking a lead role'in that 10 litigation.
-11 I. continue to be deeply concerned, not-only.
12 about the threat this plant poses to public health
. 13 _and safety,,but the unwillingness of both the .
,e
' 14 l utility and the NRC to address both these issues in 15 an open hearing. The NRC has a formal hearing 16 process and they should use-it if they expect to 17 restore public confidence in this power plant.
18 These two petitions are straightforward.
19 They call for the NRC to hold a hearing in which l 20 Boston Edison must prove it can operate this plant i
21 safely and effectively; a hearing in which we can i 22 cross examine the company and NRC's expert, and 23 offer our own independent experts to review the j 24 facts; a hearing in which the NRC must issue a s
m ai--~m m.- m __. _ _ _ ~ ~ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ . m. -
)
1 written decision which is cubjoct to review in
- } 2' courts. The public deserves.a full hearing on the 3 safety of this troubled nuclear. plants. Boston 4 Edison must be' held to a' burden of proof in an ,
5 adjudicatory hearing to show that it can operate 6 the plant safely, something which it has yet to 7 prove.
8 Over the past year as Attorney General, I've 9 been deep 1 involved in'the very serious questions 10 surrounding the regulation of the nuclear power 11 industry, both here at Pilgrim and through the 12 licensing process of the Seabrook plant in New 13 Hampshire. Last year, I created a nucle'ar safety .
.' 14 unit in the Attorney General's Office because i't 15 was clear to me that these issues demanded special' 16 resource and technical expertise if we were to meet 17 the industry on level ground. I always expected 18 the nuclear industry to be a formidable adversary, 19 but what I did not expect to find was the Nuclear 20 Regulatory Commission intent on insulating itself 21 from public participation and public process.
22 In Seabrook we have seen it evidences time 23 and time again, but most recently.and most 24 blatantly in the Commiss' ion's decision to change m nnmmme mmmm m ------ _ _ - - - - ---
1 .the rulos endEsttempt ~ to. knock Mtssechusetts out of, Aj 2 she licensing process. And on that ~ issue we'll 3- meet the'NRC in court. Here at' Pilgrim, we see it 4 again in the failure of the NRC'to allow a full 5 adjudicatory hearing on the many questions 6 surrounding this troubled plant. Should the NRC 7 reject the Commonwealth's pending petition.for
'8 appearance, then I'm prepared-to take'that issue to 9 court. The NRC should require a full adjudicatory i
10 hearing on these issues. It has,.after all, cited 11 the plant repeatedly for its' mechanical.and safety 12 and management problems.
.13 - The issues that have brough't you h.ere r; .,W -
14 tonight, the health implications of. restarting this 15 plant are both real and deadly serious. We simply 16 cannot allow this federal agency to continue its 17 closed dcor deliberations in a matter of this
- 18. magnitude. As Attorney General I will use the full 19 resources of my office to hold this utility and 20 this Commission accountable to the people of the 21 Commonwealth who deserve real answers obtained in a 22 formal public hearing process.
23 I know, Mr. Chairman, that you and the 24 members of your committee will continue to press
1 tho NRC:for auch a roopensible.public response.
L r ,:l,. J.
2 I-would also like to say, Senator Kennedy,
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t
. 3 that I'm. deeply disappointed that the management of 4- Boston Edison has refused to participate in L 5 tonight's hearing. They are in this room; they are
.6 citting in the audience. If we are to trust them, 7 they should be at least willing to.come forward and 8 state their case to you and to the people of this 9 area. (Applause).
10 I think their management has been 11 characterized by an ostrich-like quality for the 12 last several years. They tell us things have my 13 changed. I think their failure to participate F. -
14 tonight raises s'erious questions as to whether we 15 should trust them, and I hope that they will join 16 us in requesting of the NRC a full process where j 17 they can make their case in a way that might 18 restore confidence in management and leave the 19 people of Massachusetts feeling that their health 20 and safety will be adequately protected if Pilgrim 21 is ever to go back on the line.
22 The Chairman: Thank you very much, 23 Attorney General.Shannon. Let me ask you a few 24 questions Maybe you can review with us just a O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1 fGw minutes, what tha 1sgel cituation tp relevant j
e ?, 2 . to the state of Massachusetts and the NRC, should C; s-
. 3 the NRC plan'to give the approval for the startup 4 of Pilgrim I. What powers reside in you and the 5 state to affect that decision? Maybe you could l 6 discuss that for us if you will.
7- Attorney General Shannon: I'll be happy to.
8 'As has been pointed out by previous witnesses, i 9 there are really two petitions which have been 10 filed, one which has been essentially rejected by 11 the NRC. There is an appeal pending; now, we're
{
12 involved -- Commonwealth is involved as Intervenor 13 in that appeal. The oth'er one is -- -
P. .
14 The Chairman: What is that?
15 Attorney General Shannon: That is the 16 petition which was put together by MASSPIRG 17 included a number of members of the state 18 legislature: myself, Lt. Governor Murphy, filed 19 during the summer of 1986.
20 In the fall of 1987, I filed on behalf of 21 Governor Dukakis and myself another petition, based 22 on some of the old concerns that we had and some 23 new ones which had been raised about this 24 particular reactor and which had come to light O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
... q t
Ja; 1: cfter'the Borry-report on evacuation planning.- .
1 I(4,} 2 We're waiting for a decision from'the Nuclear L~'
'3 Regulatory Cor.tmission on that . petition.
? .,.
4 If the NRC denies us a' hearing'after that j
5 -- process, then we'll take'that matter to the federal- l l
6 court, it is our'right. But I also want to say, 9
7 while there has been some suggestion that the-8 federal regulation completely preempts state 9 officials from acting to protect the health and 10 safety of the public; well, they don't accept that 11 for a moment. I think that Governor Dukakis~,
12 myself, other responsible state officials have 1 ,13 .' implicit authority to act to protect the people of 14 Massachusetts and we're willing to act t'o protect 15 the people of Massachusetts, and we're willing to 16 assert those arguments in court as well around the 17 Pilgrim Plant as we are around the Seabroot Nuclear.
18 Plants 19 The Chairman: You wouldn't draft the law 20 the way it is now as the way it was drafted before?
~
21 Mr. Shannon: That's right, Senator. I 22 think I would be a little clearer about where the I
23 federal government authority en'ds and the states 24 begin. What 'is clear thou'h, g and I was in the
'. l
- 11 Congrooc whenfthat legis1'etion waslbeing debated,-
J,. bf 2' as.were you, and what'is clear is'that it x ,
3 post-Three.Hile Island, Congress intended for the 4- ' states to play a very.important role along with the
'5 federal government to actively protect their'own 6 ' citizens.
- 7. As a. matter of fact, the premise of all 8 . congressional action was that all health and safety-9 -
people could not be protected unless the states 10 were included in that process. So I don't yield 11 for a moment to the notion that we, the state 12 - officials, have authority to act to protect people pg ; 13 , frgm the dangers of a poorly managed or poorly -
K', '
14 constructed powe'r plant.
)
15 The Chairman: .I think that you should know 16 that some of the NRC people are very adamant; they 17 say that they,'ll be darned that they let these 18 nuclear power plants be held hostage to the whims 19 of the state. ,How do you react to that? . j 20 Mr. Shannon: I've heard that suggestion !
21 from some people in the NRC. The notion that that 22 we are acting arbitrarily and capriciously,
~
l 23 particularly in this case, is just outrageous. '
24 This is documented to be, by the NRC, one of i
4 I
n,_~ - - - - - - - - _ - - - - _
1 1 the most poorly.msnogsd nuc1scr power plcnts wa
,. / 2 have ever seen in the history of nuclear power. As
~~
3- late as just a few months ago, further deficiencies 4
, - were pointed out in the way in which"the Pilgrim .
5' Nuclear-Power Plant has been run, by the Nuclear 6 Regulatory Commission.' Th5y have fined Boston' 7 !'
Edison in the past, and yet these deficiencies have 8 not been corrected. Serious questions have been !
9 raised about this reactor over the period of the 10 last year, so the notion that we are acting at all 11 arbitrarily or that this plant is being held 12 hostage, I think, is an affront, and I don't think i gh 13. that the people of the Commonwealth are going'to 3 .
L5 14 buy that and I don't think people around the 15 country will either.
16 The Chairman: You are familiar with the 17 MASSPIRG's report on the economic implications of 18 a permanent shutdown of Pilgrim?
19 Mr. Shannon: I am.
1 20 The Chairman: Then you know that they 21 conclude that the utility customers would actually 22 save money if that happens; is that right?
23 Mr. Shannon: That's right.
24 The Chairman: Have any of your pecple in
)
g g RN &Nmg gnA m NaNmmA - - - ^ ^ * ~ - - " " - - - -
l- -the-Attorney Genoral Office.looksd otzthat
.jj ~ question?
12 '
I 3 Mr. Shannon: Yes, Senator, we have-looked 4 at the MASSPIRG report. We do find it of real
- 5 value'as part-of our evaluation. We are looking'at ,
6 ' the question of economics at Pilgrim'right now. '
7 While I can't give you a definitive answer, I can 8 say this. That we have concluded, and <ni the basis 9 .
of the study we have'done todate, we have concluded 10 that at best, Pilgrim is now marginally economic'.
11 So I think that -- I like to think of the safety-12 concerns apart from the economics because I don't b
,.y 13 think that there is any price we can put'on the,-
14 health and safety of the people who live in the 15 areas around nuc1' ear power plants. (Applause).
16 But apart from the safety concerne.,that I've got, I i
17 think we got to look at those economic questions l
18 and I think that when we look at them, we are going 19 to find a lot of what MASSPIRG has said proves to 20 be absolutely correct.
21L The Chairman: Is it safe for me to assume 22 that if a decision is to move ahead, that you are 23 going to exercise all the rights as Attorney 24 General in every possible way to do everything that m nmmmma --e - - - - - - - --
1 you possibly:cEn to insure that that.sventuclity.
> e:. .
- {J
'2 does not come about?.
3 Attorney General Shannon: Senator, as.you 4 know and the people of the' Commonwealth know, we 5 have beenvery actively involved over the last year ~
6 in asserting, at every point we can, the rights'of 7 the people of the Commonwealth in protecting them- , j 8 against the Seabrook Power Plant. I want to'say 9 here tonight that I feel equally about thb Pilgrim 10 Nuclear Power Plant. The Pilgrim Nuclear Power
~
11 Plant has the added disadvantage of a proven record 12 of mismanagement on the part of the utility company 13 which m'anages them, and I i'nt'end to,figh't just as .
14 hard to protect people around Pilgrim as we h' ave 15 around Seabrook. (Applause).
16 Sena, tor, I would like to ask that the 17 petition filed by Governor Dukakis and myself be 18 included in the record.
19 The Chairman: Thank you, Attorney General.
20 Glad to see an old friend.
21 We'll move right along. I'm pleased to 22 welcome the distinguished members of our third 23 panel, representing the various branches in state 24 government involved in the Pilgrim restart process, l
m nm m ~s nn- - - --- - - - - - . _
.)
1 I rom 2mbar the days whsn the Stcte Sacretary.
Jgf 2 ..of, Energy,.Sharon Pollard,.was a freshman
'. 3 legislator, bright and enthusiastic, deeply I
l
'4 committed ~.to public service, now she has moved onto 5 . higher office, and I'm delighted that she has the 6 same enthusiasm and is an aggressive champion of
- u. I 7 the public interest in the issues we've been 8 discussing this evening. I'm delighted to'have her 9 with us.
10 Ms. Pollard: Thank you, Senator.
11 The Chairman: Our new Public Health s
12 Commissioner, Debra Prothrow-Stith, her first 3 .13 , public appearance this. evening, was recentily ,
y3
- 14
- appointed to tha position. Commissioner 15 Prothrow-Stith will.be discussing the important 16 role of the Department of Public-Health will play 17 in determining what public health impacts are 18 associated with Pilgrim Power Plant. We are 19 fortunate to have had breakfast with the Reverend 20 Stith this morning, so we've been with the family 21 all day.
22 Last, but not least, Assistant Secretary of 23 e, P,ublic Safety, Peter Agnes. Peter has perhaps the l'
24 most difficult job of all because he is trying to 1
l .
15 O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
_f1_-_-._.-.--_--__.. -- - - .
1 anko en unworkcIblo ovocuction plan workcblo. I'm l
l c 5; 2 looking forward to hearing from him. We'll start -
' ^'
3 with Peter Agnes, left to right.
4 Mr. Agnes: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm 5 here on behalf of Secretary Charles Barry, who by 6 Executive Order is the Disaster coordinator for the 7 Commonwealth, and also by the Governor's i
8 designation, is the liaison officer for 9 Massachusetts to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 and in that capacity, the Secretary is the 11 principal point of contact between state officials 12 and the NRC. _,
13 '
'At the outset, I would fike to address a b 14 point that was made by one'of the earlier speakers,'
15 Ann Waitkus-Arnold, concerning the use of potassium 16 iodine, not from a public health standpoint, which 17 the Commission can do, but from a planning 18 standpoint. And I want to correct a matter that 19 was r'eferred to in her testimony.
20 There is no plan today; there has never been 21 to my knowledge a plan in the past and there will 22 never be under the Dukakis Administration, a plan J 23 that would leave behind any member of the 24 community, be they a special needs person or !
m.n m m mm nnnm n ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - -
'1 othorwiso, in ths event'of'on cvocuation.by bhbl.
sm 2 'subst'ituting some drug, such as potassium iodine, 3 Tor a' cafe'and secure' care ofLthat person. So no 4 one should be misled'into thinking that there is-5 any thought given to leaving anyone.behind during 6~ an evacuation who would require attention, care or
~
7 evacuation.
8 Over the past two years, we have taken three 9 major actions to respond to the health and safety 10 concerns of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant.
11 First, we have prepared and filed'with the Governor-12 two comprehensive written reports, which other ,
^
p 13 speakers here'have referred to, the most recent K;* .
14 which . was released jus't several weeks ago. .An'd we 15 would like to make those reports, which also were 1
16 transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 17 and to FEMA, a part.of the record of these
' 18 proceedings.
19 These reports deal with at great lengths 20 with the history of emergency planning activities, 21 both at the state,and federal level, and with the
- 22 many specific problems associated with the Pilgrim 23 Plant. It is 'our opinion, to paraphrase the 24 Federal Regulatory Standard, that the existing 9'
n.n m m m m ,a e n ~-Am-- - - - - - - - -
l u
! I cmsrgancy plans for Pilgrim Station cra.not.
all. 2- adequate to protec't the public health and safety in
.C
'. 3' the event of a radiological emergency offsite; and 4 that, therefore, the plant should not be allowed to-5 restart unless and until adequate plans are 6 developed tested and approved by FEMA and the other
~
7 safety related concerns.have been resolved.
8 The Chairman: I'm to give you a couple.
4 9' more' minutes.
10 Mr. Agnes: Thank you, Senator. I.have'said 11 this on many occasione and I want to reiterate it
~
11 2 tonight, our position has been* clear.and. consistent 13 in the'past two y' ears on this point. And one of-Ei,,,, .
14 the unfortunate things'that we.-- excus'e me -- that.
15 we are facing is the-lack on the part of the NRC to 16 ^ make clear precisely what corrections or changes it 17 will insist upon in the emergency plans before the 18 plant is restarted.
19 The second activity we have undertaken is to 20 establish a new division in the state within the 21 Civil Defense Agency devoted excusively to nuclear 22 emergency preparedness. Despite all of the 23 activities that follow Three Mile Island, at the 24 congressional level and at the state level, it is 1
m,nAAmNm x Am n ma n m - A- - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 -only in ths'1 cat two yocrs withianeinitictive taken.
( D,4 2: by Governor Dukakis, that a new division devoted 3 excusively to this purpose has been established and 4 devoted to the emergency planning problems.
5 Third, for the first time again, a planning 6 pr.oce'ss has been put in place at the state level,.
7 which requires work on the part of the utility, 8 local government and state government in an effort 9- to develop adequate emergency plans.
10 I would like to conclude my remark, Mr.
11 ' Chairman, by commenting briefly, but more, i
12 specifically on both the progress that has been 13 made.and also the problem that stil'1 remain.
{l 14 On the progress side of the ledger, the 15 Boston Edison Company for the first time is a full 16 partner with state and local official in emergency 17 planning. This is evidenced by. financial support 18 the company has provided to local communities and 19 the fact that it has assigned over 20 people to 20 work in the field with state and local government 21 to aid in the development of draft planning.
22 Planning resources have been invested in by the 23 company for the first time to help state and local 24 officials, and a very adequate etwrgency n a m,n m m ,,Am + mm m m - - ----~~ - -
l :..
1: _ communicate ~on oystem.that was. identified'in our.
- l gg.y 2 earlier'repor't has now been replaced by the 1 . e,i
- l. -
3- company.
7-4 The company has produced several reports to .
5 aid in the emergency planning process, including a 6 new evacuation time study that was given to the 7 Commonwealth in the fall, and also a study 8 concerning the adequacy of relying upon only two, 9 . instead of the previous three reception centers.
10 The Chairman: You got 30 seconds, Peter.
11 Mr. Agnes: On the problem side of the 12 ledger, we do have some severe problems that a6 l'3 rema'in.' We do not,.as I indicated earlier, have a II '
14 formally approved plan at this time. We do not 15 have implementing procedures, which are the key 16 part of the plan, to help deal with the evacuation 17 and sheltering of special needs people and school 18 children and the infirm and the elderly. The 19 shelter study that has been submitted by the 20 company is inadequate and we are insistent that 21 additional work be done.
22 The reception center study that we just 23 recently received and which is of great concern to 24 residents here in the Plymouth area, while useful, !
l m a a A m% .mmm x ~. m um ---- - - ---- ---- - - - - - - - - -
1 is not cufficisnt in our opinion, and wo hevo I~ 2 determined that a third reception center for the 3 Pilgrim must be sited and we will make a decision 4 in that regard as to a new site very shortly.
5 - -
In conclusion, I would like to say that on l 6 balance, our diagnosis is that while the patient 7 has improved; it remains quite ill and the 8 prognosis is very uncertain. It remains to be 9 seen, in our judgment, whether or not adequate ;
10 emergency plans for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant 11 can be developed,'and as many of the speakers here 12 before have indicated, the only way to insure that
- p. 13 the issues that we have' identified are a' ired -
14 totally and fairly is to hold an adjudicatory 15 hearing before restart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
16 ,
The Chairman: Thank you. Sharon Pollard.
17 Ms. Pollard: Thank you, Senator. It is 18 nice to be here, and I as well would like to thank 19 to you for holding this hearing on a subject so 20 important to.not only the people in and around 21 Plymouth area, but certainly to all the people of 22 Massachusetts.
23 You've asked for me this evening to speak 24 about the demand for Pilgrim's ;. ~rer in meeting
1 1 Macocchucetts' cnd Now Eng1cnd's ensrgy situation.
6 2 While the current supply in the Commonwealth of i I
3 Massachusetts of energy is tight, it is not so 4 tight that the public health and safety need be 5 placed at risk with the operation of any given 6 power plants, including the Pilgrim Nuclear Power 7 Plant.
8 New analyses prepared by the New England 9 Governors' Conference and the New England Energy 10 Policy have indicated that New England's power 11 needs can be met with existing and planned 12 resources and potential new resources combined with 13 ' . , effective management *. These analyses havs provided r .,
14 evidence that Pilgrim will not make or break the 15 electricity supply of New England.
16 In Massachusetts, state and utility 17 officials are working to assure that power will be 18 available when needed and at a reasonable cost, 19 both over the short term and ths long term.
20 Recent accomplishments of state and utility 21 officials will improve the power supply of the 22 region. For example, the enactment of the state 23 appliance efficiency standards last year; a more <
24 efficient building code, so that the buildings we
- - _ ~ - - - ~ - __ --
1 . construct in-Massachusetts could be ones that could g 2' use energy efficiently. The establishment of a 9
'. 3 ' cogeneration ofismall. power bidding and development
'4- process, and the approval-by the Energy Facility 5 siting Council, of which I chaired a couple of 6 weeks ago, of a 300 megawatts gas unit in 1
7: Bellingham Massachusetts. These will make 8 substantial contributions to the Massachusetts-
.9 electricity need.
.10 In addition, current projects will enhance 11 future power planning and supply. For example, 12 state officials have requested utilities to
' 13 increase their' capabilities to manage load ~ , ,
14 requirements at the time of peak demand. The state 15 is also investing ways to fully develop 16 conservation, load management and cogeneration at 17 state facilities. Furthermore,.the Executive
- t 18 Office of Energy Resource and others are working 19 with the Department of Public Utilities to 20 establish least-cost planning process, which will 21 significantly enhance the development of cost 22 effective, socially beneficial electric resources 23 in Massachusetts.
24 What I would also like to note is that a n MA mm n mm. n .~mm-- - - - - - -
1 Pilgrim'a pact opsrating psrformanco indicates.that i c.
. 2 it cannot necessarily be relied upon to provide the 3 power that we need. Pilgrim's lifetime operating 4 peformance is worse than roughly 80 percent of all 5 the other nuclear power plants in the country. In 6 the past, Pilgrim has been available to produce 7 electricity less than half of the time that it was 8 needed. -
9 In addition, there is not a strong need to 10 operate Pilgrim for economic reasons. While there 11 are many uncertainties as to the economics of 12 future power supplies, a recent analysis indicates 13 ,
.that Pilgrim many not necessar'ily provide'any 14 economic savings to ratepayers if it operates.
15 . Therefore, I would like to make it clear 16 that while peak electricity resources are currently 17 tight, there is no compelling need to operate 18 Pilgrim for power supply or economic purposes if it 19 poses an unacceptable risks to the health and 20 safety of the people of Massachusetts.
21 As was indicated by my colleagues from the 22 Administration, Governor Dukakis has not yet made a 23 determination as to the ultimate role which he 24 believes Pilgrim should play, if any. The n n a m m mm n m.m m _ - .__.m - - _ _ - - - - - - - - _
'dsterminetion will bs made only after-the icouos of' 1-IO 2 plant management, containment integrity and i L~ "
3 evacuation plan adequacy have been resolved. Thank 4 you very much, Senator.
5 The Chairman: Thank you very much.
6 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: _ Good evening, Senator.
f i
7 Let me start by adding my thanks to you for this 8 opportunity. I represent Secretary. Johnson of 9 Health and Human Services and the Department of 10 Public Health as its commissioner.
11 We take seriously our responsibilities for 12 the health of'the: citizens of Massachusetts, and
- 13 ' "with'rmgard to the Pilgrim planc have two - .
14 responsi$ilities. One has to do with monitoring' 15 radiation exposure, and the other one has to do 16 with investigation of disease outbreak.
17 Relative to monitoring, we are the primary 18 state agency responsible for radiation control. We 19 have conducted radiation monitoring activities in 20 the vicinity of the plant since the mid 1970's.
21 These activities include: one, a network of 22 monitoring stations; two, periodic surveys to 23 determine the extent and seriousness of radiation 24 dosage received by humans and animals; and, three, i
l n n nnnn_ n-- - ~ - ~ - - ---- - '
1 par, iodic inepactions of tha pow;r plcnts itacif.
c.' 2 Our monitoring of radiation includes the dosimeters located at 46 sites to measure 3
4 radiation. They are tested quarterly and would-5 indicate any unusual exposure to radiation among 6 the population within five miles of the reactor.
7 We also monitor airborne radiation at the plant.
8 Water, milk, food, fish and sediment samples are 9 also tested regularly. We conduct weekly
~
l 10 inspections of the Pilgrim plant, checking internal 11 monitoring and safet'y protocol. In the event of an 12 accident, we would.be responsible for a dose 13 assessment and for recommendations around 14 appropriate protective actions.
15 The Department wants to establish a state of 16 the art comprehensive monitoring program in the 17 vicinity of Pilgrim that could serve as an early
'18 notification system and insure prompt emergency 19 response in the event of any releases of 20 radioactivity that might present a threat to the 21 public health and safety, and also to insure 22 adequate monitoring points to measure radiation in
- 23. the vicinity of the reactor.
24 The Department wants a rea2 time monitoring l
O'BR'IEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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l.
1' L 1 systsm which would involve the transmission to a
.;[ 2 st' ate facility of ongoing radiation levels at selected. locations both within the boundries and 3
4- offsite of the nuclear power plants. This system, 5 similar to one in place in Illinois, would-allow 6 the Department to know instantaneously when 7 radiation was released into the environment. In 8 addition, an on-line data communication link to the 9 state's facilities computer would be included in 10 this system. This would allow us to know the 11 status of the reactor, i.e. the temperature, the' !
12 pressure, the. water level, et cetera, on a real r, 13 time basis, as well as'further provide early /- -
14 notification of events that could lead to nuclear 15 accidents. We bel'ieve that this improved 16 monitoring is an important part of a safety a 17 evacuation plan.
18 on our second responsibility for the 19 investigation of diseased outbreak.
20 The Chairman: Let me ask you. In that 21 monitoring program, is that going to be -- funding 22 for that is going to cost something, I imagine?
23 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: It will cost something.
24 The Chairman: Is that going to be a
.ar
. O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
9 1 . priority for the otato or cre you going to the
. 2 federal government or what?
'- 3 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: This is something that 4 at this point, we are proposing; it has been 5 proposed in the past and it is in the very early 6 stages of a more recent proposal.
7 The Chairman: Does Illinois -- do they pay
-8 for it out of the state or do they get some federal 9 funding, do you know?
10 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: I'll not sure.
11 The Chairman: Okay. Well, let me just say 12 I have an - ~if they have -- if you might let us
- p. , 13 know on .that., ,If it is d6ne on the' state's', ' -
o'bviously we'll welcome that.
14 If you feel you have-15 to come to the federal government, I'll be glad to 16 submit --
17 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: An offer that we would 18 appreciate. (Laughter).
19 The Chairman: We'll stop right now, and 20 I'll ask you to stand, if you would. (Laughter).
21 Listen carefully.
22 (Witnesses sworn).
23 The Chairman: Three years of law school." -
24 Well, that is a serious matter. As you mentioned, ,
f
. O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
" 1 the work that is.done in Illinois appears to ba-2- important and significant,. and we'd like to'know i
3 'how it is going to proceed and hope you keep in 4 touch.
5 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: 'We would like to do 6 that. i 7 Relevant to investigation disease outbreak 8 that might be caused by contamination in the 9 environment,;we are currently conducting a study in 10 the Plymouth area into the causes of f elevated rates
-1 11 of. leukemia, a type of cancer that is shown to be 12 caused by ionizing radiation.
\
We' concluded an " assessment of'the 19'82 to l'3 .
l[ . .
^
14 '85 health-related data for'the area around the 15 plant' in order to determine the health of South 16 Shore residents and how that might be affected by 17 the Pilgrim reactor. That assessment showed no 18 unusual statistical trends in the patterns of death 19 from cancer or in.the frequency of infant
'20 mortality. Some anaomalies in infant mortality and 21 low birth rates had been reported. The number are 22 so small that it's impossible ::o draw any 23 statistically valid conclusion.
l 24 .
We did find, however, a statistically i
n et .m m m Nm n e m ~m---- - - - - - - --
l f
L 1 significant excosa in the incidents of leukemia
. 2 among males in the five coas.tal communities 3 surveyed. These elevations are specifically among
- i
, 4 the types of leukemia that can be caused by t
5 exposure to radiation.
! '6 The incidents of leukemia among females was 7 also elevated, but not to the same significant 8 degree. The group should question, of course, 9 whether Pilgrim is responsible for the high 10 incidents of leukemia. At present it is impossible 11 to answer that question, but the Department of 12 Public Health is currently conducting two separate 13 investigations that may bring.'us closer to the 14 answer.
15 First, we are conducting a case-control 16 epidemiological study to help us identify the 17 possible causes of the excess leukemia. In the 18 course of this study, we will interview all 19 leukemia cases diagnosed since 1982, or their 20 families, in the communities of Plymouth, Kingston 21 Duxbury, Marshfield and Scituate. We'll take data 22 on the places of residence, occupation and medical 23 histories. This information will be compared with 24 similar data from people without leukemia from the m n mmm~m n,_ .~ ~----- - ---- -
1 otms communities in order to look for cny
. 2 differences. This study will help determine any 3 association between leukemia and possible other 4
sources of exposure, such as Benzene, chemotherapy, 5 et cetera. '
6 We must be very frank about the limitations 7 of this study. Epidemiology has its limits, 8
especially in cases'where we are dealing v,,ith small 9 populations, relatively small number of cases, 10 small doses.and small levels of exposure, but if we 11 don't look, we won't learn anything at all.
12 Second, we're looking into the possibilities
. 13 that.a coastal wind pattern may have c'entributed'to.
l .
14 the' dispersion of radiation emission from Pilgrim-15 in a way that bypassed existing radiation 16 monitoring. This work, being conducted through a 17 contract at the Harvard School of Public Health, 18 will determine the feasibility of estimating the 19 level of radiation reaching the general population.
20 This study is up and running and should be 21 completed within the next couple'of months in its 22 initial phase.
23 It is our objective that the combined 24 -
results of these investigations will permit an 1
A A mn o mh nam n mnm--- - - - - - - - - -
1 informsd estimato of the contributions of Pilgrim Lt l ,,.-
21 emissions to the elevated incidents of leukemia in 3- the vicinity of Pilgrim. We would like to work' 4 with Dr. Winegarten, if, in fact, NIH is very 5 interested in'doing some work here. We would be-i 6' excited about that opportunity. -
l.
l 7 In summary, we are interested in. increasing 4
8 our monitoring capabilities so that you have state 9 of the art capability, and also we are very-10 interested in-continuing these studies, but as 11 well, participating with NIH if that opportunity'is l 12 available. Thank you very much. I 13 ,The Chairman: Thank you very much, Doctor. ,
14 We can appreciate your testimony and your 15 comments.
t 16 Let's move to Ms. Pollard. I know that 17 we're relying to some degree on HydroQuebec; is 18 that correct.
19 Ms. Pollard: We are receiving -- 3 p,ercent 20 of the electricity we use in New England is i
21 imported from Canada, so right now it is a very I 22 small percentage. It increases to about 10 percent 23 by the year 1991. About 10 percent of all the 24 electricity that we use is not considered O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 cxcocsiva. Howavor, cny cdditional import of 2 electricity beyond that would have to be looked at
. 3 that for that reason. We know from past experience 4 that --
S The Chairman: Someone mentioned to me about 6 -- earlier today, about the possibility of 7 importing energy from the midwest.
8 Ms. Pollard: Yes.
9 The Chairman: I'm unfamiliar with both with l'0 the possibilities, the realities and the 11 difficulties.
12 Ms. Pollard: Very briefly, the governors of g -13 New England.have spoken with some of the governors 14 in the midwest that have some coal resources within 15 their states. It would work this way. That New 16 England ratepayers would bill power plants in the 17 midwest, that New England ratepayers would put on 18 those power plants the best available control 19 '
technology to help with our acid rain situation.
20 It is thought that that energy would still 21 be reasonable in terms of the cost to the 22 ratepayers. So there is some thought that you get 23 double win from this. That your access is 24 reasonable energy prices and that you are also 1
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1 halping with the acid rein situation. Thara is 2 only one problem. You would have to put a 3 transmission line through the states of 4 Pennsylvania and through the State of New York, and 5 there is some concern that those two states might.
6 not be thrilled about the idea.
7 The Chairman: Let's keep moving on. I'd 8 like to know more about it. We'll inquire you.
9 DOE rated New England -- You are probably aware of 10 the Department of Energy comparing the record of 11 power plants nationwide, and the Department of 12 Energy rated New England 23 out of 26 reach in its
. 13 ability to keep its p3 ants open from 1983 to 1985.
(, '
14 I wonder if' you are familiar with though findings, 15 knd if so --
16 Ms. Pollard: We are.
17 The Chairman: What you concluded.
18 Ms. Pollard: The Federal Department of 19 Energ'y has conducted that history. We are 20 obviously not pleased with the evidence and the 21 information that was presented in that report. We 22 have our power plants not maintained as well as 23 other power plants in other parts of the country; 24 our have a tendency to be down at a more frequent MW7 A nmAMmm ame n mmm--m- - - - - - - - - - - - - '-
1 roto thnn in othar parte of tha country. And wa 2 believe that part of the problem this past summer 3 was just precisely that. When you have one-third 4 of your available electricity down and unable to be 5 used, that's what causes you some concern and it 6 may cause you some problem.
7 We have continued -- have in the past, and 8 will continue to encourage the utilities to 9 maintain their plants well and to schedule their 10 maintenance at times of the year when we are not 11 experiencing the greatest demand for electric.
12 The Chairtaan: What is the single most
- g. 13 important~ criteria for.j6dging whe'ther or not the K .
14 Pilgrim plant shodld be operational?
15 Ms. Pollard: The health and safety of the 16 people who live within the radius of this power 17 plant and that is the most.important criteria that 18 the Governor will consider.
19 The Chairman: Doctor, let me ask you what 20 -- how you respond to some of the criticism you 21 heard earlier levied against the Department 22 concerning its interaction with local residents of 23 the local area as well as statewide? We know you 24 just recently become the commissioner of these O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
l l
i difficulties which cliegedly havo oxisted prior to' )
2 -- certainly your responsibility, but I imagine you 3 have heard of them and are concerned about them, !
1 1
, 4 and I'm just wondering what kind of reassurance you 5 might be able to give your people in the area what i
, i 6 you might -- the way you might perceive?
7 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: I think it's important 8 to say that we are committed to the health, and the 9 protection of the health, of the citizens of the l
10 Commonwealth, and as a new commissioner in the i
11 Department of Public. Health, that committment is i 12 something that I feel very comfortable reaffirming.
n 13 .
It is important.to say that I think part'of -
3.
14 i
the history of the problem that we have had has !
15 been a situation where some promises were made that 16 were not able to be met and perhaps mistakes were )
1 17 made. I don't know the details of those histories, I l
18 but I would say very clearly to the citizens here 19 tonight that the committment is strong at the 20 Department of Public Health and we intend not only 21 to complete these studies, but to work with the 22 community, as we have continued to do in the last
. 23 few months, in order to make sure that the health
- 24 and safety concerns are addressed.
m n mmmme Axxm - m--mm.~- __~w - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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The Chairman: Woll, I think I have known'
', 2 you as I have, I feel certainly -- think that the 3 people in this area would have a good sense of 4 appreciation for those and that committment 5 because I know it will be carried forward.
6 I mentioned -- I think you talked about our 7 request for a study by the NIH. You might be 8 helpful to us working with the NIH in terms of the 9 development of that study. I would ask you to do 10 that at some time.
11 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: What I wou'1d like to 12 do, perhaps, is to forward to you some:of the 13 information that -- in a cover letter, that I could 14 send Dr. Winegarten offering what we currently know l 3i in our participation.
16 The Chairman: A final point. Boston 17 Edison has been identified as having a higher rate 18 of worker exposure. Does the Department of Public 19 Heal ~th have the options of conducting a study of 20 worker exposure or is this something that is refer 21 to OSHA 22 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: The Department of Labor 23 has that responsibility. Edison and the Department 24 of Labor are looking into that issue. We would O'BRIEN,AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
i 1 cncourtgo that moro b9 dona. It is important, nnd l l
~
2 I think the NIH participation may help us with !
l 3 this, to look at national data and some O
l 4 international data, as well as worker data, as a l 5 way to full.y appreciate the. health risks. So I 6 would encourage that more be done, and if we can , l 7 help in any way, though it is not our direct i 8 responsibility, we would be willing to do that.
9 The Chairman: I want to thank the panel 10 here. They had a chance to see your testimony and 11 you covered many additional areas which we were 12 interested in. I think this panel has helped us g 13 .to understand better..the problems of emergen.cy 14 '
planning energy s0pplies and the public health and 1 15 concerns. We value very much all of your 16 testimony. It has been very, very helpful. I 17 know where to go for additional information, so we 18 are grateful to all of you.
19 Dr. Prothrow-Stith: Senator, may I say one 20 other thing. I just learned that the utilities pay 21 for the monitoring system in Illinois.
22 The Chairman: I wonder where that little bit 23 of information came from. (Laughter). '
l 24 .
I want to -- We have final panel. We want to O'BRIEN AND LEVINE CdURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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-l- giva them como attention. We're going to proceed I ~2 to it. We have been in for for three hours. I 3 want you to know this is a very important panel.
4 We put great emphasis on it. I would like to have 5' about a ten minutes recess, and then we're going to 6 stay here~as long as it takes to run through the 7 panel. We want to give them our attention. We 8 have important questions, but we want to take our 9 time with that panel. They deserve attention.
10 You have been a very attentive audience.
11 This has been a very informative hearing. We have-12 collected a great deal of information and we're.
~ ' ~
13 ' grateful to all of those who partic'ipated and
~
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14 helped us, but since wi have been in here for this 15 period of time, we have a 10-minutes recess. I 16 know some people have to leave. We're grateful to 17 them for their presence, but I would hope as many 18 as possible would stay. I think this would be an i
19 informative session.
20 (Ten-minute recess).
21 The Chairman: I ask that everybody rejoin 22 us and take their seat so we can give their full 23 attention to the final panel. Again, you've very 24 attentive. We'll ask that people be kind enough m n .n m m Wn iknm a m------ - - - - - - - - - - . _ _ - - -
l 1 to toko their sect. -
! 2 First of all, we want to thank Nadine -
3' O'Neill, and I'm going to ask all of you if you 4 will join in giving-our wonderful interpreter a 5 hand this evening. (Applause). She's doing a 6 -
magnificent job. -
7 I shall ask our panelist if they will be 8 kind enough to raise their hand and do say if --
9 (Witnesses sworn).
10 The Chairman: Housekeeping details, a 11 statement from some of our colleagues, Senator 12 tsrry, Senator Studds, Senator Simon will include l'3 ' 'their statements in the record. I'll. indicate 14 those have not been -- whose testimony we have'not 15 been able to receive, given the time that's been 16 available to us, we'll be glad do receive that 17 testimony. I.know that it won't be considered a 18 sworn testimony, but nonetheless, it will be 19 valuable to us if it is informational, and we will 20 instruct the staff to make that part of the 21 testimony which is relevant to this hearing a part 22 of the record and we'll leave the record open to 23 the time that the congress comes back in, later in 24 this month. So if there are those have opinions e
a n mamma ame a em---- - -- -
1: 'or~who have views or who would tsks diffbring.
2-
- views from what we have heard this evening, who 3' would like\ to be part of that record, they shall'~
4 be.
5 Our final
_x panel this evening from the people 6 who make the decisions,,_Nuclear Regulatory .- . . . -
7 Commissi_on and jhe Federal Emergency Management WeEheard a great many serious concerns, 8 Agency. !
l 9 voices, this evening about the way in which the NRC 10 and FEMA are regulating the Pilgrim plant, planning
-11 for emergency preparedness- . Here this evening to 12 respond to these questions.are Dr. Thomas Murley,.
13
,- Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor-L- ~
'14 Regulation. Along with Dr. Murley is Mr. William 15 Russell, NRC's regional administrator. Also on the-16 panel will be the representatives from FEMA, Mr. '
17 Richard Krimm,. the assistant associate director of 18 FEMA and Mr. Jack Doland from FEMA Region Number 1.
19 And I'm anxious to hear from you, gentlemen, in 20 response.
21 First of all, I guess we'll hear from Mr.
22 Krimm '
23 Mr. Krimm: Thank you very much.
24 The Chairman: They have been sworn in.
mnmkmma m' ne m ~--- - - - -
- f. .
o a mi ~ " le Mr. Krimm: My ncma is Richard;Krimm. I'm J C ,, 2 the associate director of the Federal Emergency I 3 Management Agency responsible for the development 4 and management of FEMA's; program related to l J 5 technological and natural hazards. These programs 6 include radiological emergency planning around-7 nuclear power plants, as well as planning-for 8 hazardous materials incidents, earthquakes, dam 9 safety and hurricane. Accompanying me is Mr. Jack 10 Doland,1 FEMA Region I, Boston, Mr. George Watson, 11 from our Office of. General Counsel.
12 The primary concern of. FEMA's REP program is, 13 th'e health and saf'ety of the,public around nuclear.
14 power plants. FEMA works to achieve this goal 15 .through an evaluation of plans and preparedness 16 under the FEMA regulation. The evaluation process 17 includes participation by regional assistance 18 committee, chaired by FEMA, which includes nine 19 other federal agencies.
20 The RAC reviews state and local plans 21 against published criteria, and agency 22 representatives give advice on their particular 23 area of expertise. The published criteria were 24 developed jointly by FEMA and NRC with full public
7_--__
- 1. participation cnd contcino all the ostcblished.
Ii 2 federal criteria for developing, reviewing and
.- 3 evaluating radiological emergency, planning and 4 preparedness'for commercial nuclear power plants.
5 -
Ultimately, the plans are reviewed and 6 approved at FEMA headquarters. Following approval, T
. 7 FEMA notifies the NRC and the Governor and 8 publishes a notice in the Federal Registry. This 9 is done only if a determination is made following ,
10 appropriate plan exercises that there is reasonable 11 assurance that the public health and safety can be 12 protected in the event of a. radiological emergency 13 , at the plants. .
14 Let me just briefly discuss Pilgrim. In a -
15 series of meetings with the Commonwealth and the 16 local communities in the spring of 1986, FEMA 17 identified problem with the Commonwealth's 18 Emergency response plan. Based on issues raised at 19 these' meetings and information received -
)
20 subsequently, FEMA decided to conduct a review of 21 the Emergency Response Plan and preparedness for 22 the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, and so informed 23 the Commonwealth in a letter to the Massachusetts .
24 Civil Defense Agency on September 5, 1986.
1 I
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1 , On Docambar 22, 1986, tho Sacretcry of
(
('
2 Public Safety, Charles Barry, forwarded to' FEMA a
". 3 copy of the report to the Governor on emergency 4 preparedness for an incident or for an accident at 5 the Pilgrim Power Station. This report stated that l 6 the Massachusetts plan and its preparedness are 7 inadequate to protect the health and safety of the .
8 public in.the event of and accident at the Pilgrim 9 Nuclear Power Station. In the course of its 10 self-initiated review, FEMA treated this report as 11 the authoritative and' current position of 12 Commonwealth.
s 13 . On August 6, 1987,. FEMA transmitted to the
[~ 14 Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the NRC its 15 report entitled, "Self-Initiated Review and Interim 16 Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station."
17 The report was provided to the Commonwealth and NRC 18 pursuant to the regulation and identified six areas 19 of major concern.
20 These are lack of reception center for 21 people evacuating to the north; lack of evacuation 22 plans for public and private schools and daycare 23 .
centers; and lack of identifiable public public 24 shelters for the beach population; inadequate '
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 planning for the ovocuction of the cpacial naads
( ,, 2 population; inadequate p1'anning for evacuation of 3 the transport dependent population, and overall 4 -lack of progress in planning in emergency 5 preparedness.
6 Based on the Self-Initiated Review and 7 Interim Finding, FEMA concluded that Massachusetts 8 offsite radiological emergency planning and
~
9 preparedness was inadequate to protect the public 10 health and safety in the event of an accident at 11 Pilgrim. The current status of this when we 12 translated the Self-Initiated Review to
., 13 Massachusetts, we sugge'sted that they work with us.'
- E. -
14 to develop a plan and schedule to correct the 15 inadequacies in the'ir plan. The Commonwealth has 16 not yet developed such a work plan as scheduled.
17 However, since the issuance of the new 18 interim finding and the publication of FEMA's 19 Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding on 20 Pilgrim, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has 21 taken action to address some outstanding issues.
22 FEMA Looks forward to working with the 23 Commonwealth and affected communities in order to 24 achieve our common goal of protecting the public m aamm%n ame m ~~w-- - __ -
4 1 .haelth nnd sofoty.
/ 2 We are prepared to respond to your 3 questions, Senator Kennedy.
~
4 The Chairman: We'll hear from both the 5 representatives of FEMA.
a
. 6 Mr. Doland: I don't have a statement 7 Senator.
8 The Chairman: I want to say first of all, 9 how much we appreciate your attendance here, Mr.
10 Krimm. I understand that there have been 11 occasions when FEMA has not been so willing to 12 attend meetings. I also want to say that I regret 13 FEMA's decisic.n 'concernin'g' the participation of'
?
14 Mr. Ed Thomas. It is unfortunate that the agency 15 doesn't feel that this hearing was of sufficient 16 importance to warrant Mr. Thomas' presence.
17 I've had the opportunity to review the 18 emergency preparedness plan which was in place when 19 FEMA published its interim finding, that the plan 20 offered reasonable assurance that the public could 21 be protected in the event of radiological 22 nhio7gency. I'd like for a moment to present some 23 exerpts from the FEMA's Self-Initiated Review of '
24 that plan.
1 m n mmm~m m _ - ___ _ _ _ _ _ - ~ _ _ - - - -
l 1 I quota, " Existing locci pleno do not
( '. 2 include a list of the resources the town plan used 3 in assisting mobility impaired people during 4 evacuation. FEMA could no longer state with 5 confidence that the beach population can be l
6 protected; FEMA can no longer state with confidence 7 that a reasonable assurance exists that the health 8 and safety to transport the dependent population 9 can be protected in the event of an accident."
1 10 These are just a few of the serious deficiencies 11 quoted in FEMA's own assessment.
12 I would like to know, Mr. Krimm, how a plan
-13 so obviously dificent could possibly have received' E
14 interim approval by FEMA?
15 Mr. Krimm: In early 1980, when we did give 16 approval at an earlier time, I think that, number 17 one, we were n.ew in the game, as was the 18 Commonwealth of Massachusetts. We were really just 19 starting out. I think as we have gotten more staff 20 on hand, we have gotten much more expertise; then 21 looking at plans and reviewing them and making our 22 findings to the NRC.
23 -
The Chairman: Well, it would seem you 24 wouldn't need a lot of experience in developing an z_- -- -_ __ _
1 ovacustion plcn if you c- wa know thct tha plcn
{ ,
2 used in assisting mobility impaired people 3 limited, and that you can no longer state with .
4 confidence the beach population to b'e protected, I 5 mean, you don't need -- I would think, if you drew 6 that kind of conclusion, it's -- and you can no 7 longer state with confidence that reasonable 8 assurance exists that the health and safety of the 9 dependent population could be protected; that's 10 pretty basic and fundamental questions, I would 11 think. I mean, you don't have been to be terribly 12 new in the game to understand'if you can't find 13 ways of" evacuating people who are sick or infirm, 14 it would seem to me'that that would pretty well 15 jump out at you. I mean, if you can't evacuate 16 the people along the beach population -- I mean, 17 those would be pretty self-evident, it would seem 18 to me in term of raising serious questions about 19 the effectiveness and the efficiency of such a 20 plan.
21 Mr. Krimm: I believe that when Mr. Thomas 22 and his staff reviewed the plans at that time, that 23 they did assume that some of those things were in 24 order and they had been working with the O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
l l .
1 Commonwac1th.
l C;.; 2 I don't know, Mr. Doland, if you would like 3 to make any further comnents at this time.
4 Mr. Doland: I think at the the time when I was there, we became much mor'e sophisticated than 5
6 what we did. And when we started with this work in 7 1982, it was in its infancy, and the other thing.
8 that is an important factor is the fact that the 9 population changed dramatically in this area, and 10 that had a profound effect on both the 11 identification of mobility impaired people, and, 12 additionally, the protection of the beach p 13' population.
E , -
14 The Chairman: You indicated that FEMA --
15 Does the fact that it missed the important 16 problems first time around indicate that FEMA 17 needs additional staffing to evaluate emergency 18 preparedness plan?
19 Mr. Krimm: Senator Kennedy, fortunately, in i
20 the past few years that we have received additional 21 staff from t.he Congress, and the 2 Congress in fiscal 22 year '88 appropriation budget, gave us ten I
23 additional positions. Some of these additional i
l 24 positions will be put into the Boston regional I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - l
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ . =_ _ _ - - - ._
1 offico.
iC'ft n,~
2-The: Chairman: Has there been an increase
~
3 ,
for Massachusetts,-for example?
4 Mr. Krimm: Yes, sir. We are. increasing the 5 staff.
6 The Chairman: You are increasing. Has
'7 there been as of today?
8 Mr. Krimm: As of today, share are just six 9 people allocated to us.
10 The Chairman: How many were there two years i
11 ago?
12 Mr. Krimm: I'm not sure how many.
(Laughter)'.
-, 13 r-Mr. Dol'and: Eight. .
'14 The Chairman: So there we're eight people
-15 two years ago. That's some arithmetic. Well --
16 Mr. Krimm: It was the case, Senator 17 Kennedy, people sometime leave the agency.
18 The Chairman: Well, I know that. 'But I 19 mean, that's a tough way to try to explain to j 20 somebody about evacuation plans that you missed --
21 I'm very sympathetic. I happen to be very 22 sympathetic to agencies. I wish they would come 23 out and say we can't get the job done unless you 24 give us the personnel and don't expect us to do it. '
c ms m.n m m nnm n nnn~_ ~ ~ - ~ . - - - - - - - - --
m- -
1
- 1' .You know,"I liko to hear that. We're reclictic end-2^
(f - understand you;have to live with the rest of'it, L -3 but'thers'is ne' reason for professional people to 4! take:that kind of, I*think, abuse. If you haven't 5' got the people, then you can't do the job, then you
? 6' -are doing them an enormous disservice to the.
- 7. ' responsibility.that you have. I think it's -- I 8 think.it's unfair to you, and I think it'sLunfair 9 in term of trying to deal with an issue that-is.so-
~
y 10 vital in terms of people's' lives. I don't want'to 11 belabor the point, but it's,.you know, it',s
.12 something which -- you know, we can't catch some of
- 13 the things because'we didn't have inadequate-f-, ,
e
, 14 personnel, and yet we are talking about some 15 matters'affecting very, very considerable public 16 health safety issues and people -- the American 17 people are certainly entitled to,those 18 understandings, j 19 , Let me quote from the FEMA's Self-Initiated- 1 20 Review during the June 30, '86 public meeting in 1
21 the town of Plymouth, the citizen whose children i 22 attended private schools inquired about the plans .
l 23 for their evacuation. FEMA promptly researched 24 that and discovered for the first time that private
, (
4 O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING S*4RVICE, INC.
1 cchools waro not includ0d in the locci plans."
[f 2 Is that, Mr. Krimm, is that how FEMA usually 3 , assesses plan by waiting for the local citizens to 4 tell you whether their children are protected? Why 5 is it that people have to ask? Why is it that you 6 miss something that would probably be as basically 7 fundamental as that? You did miss that? Is the 8 rest of the plan flawed?
9 Mr. Krimm: As a rule, Senator Kennedy, we do 10 try to be very thorough, but one of the purposes of 11 having public meetings is to allow the local 12 citizens to bring to our attention things that my 13 have been overicoked, and ,that is'a very important IB. -
14 part, trying t'o get public input into the --
15
- The Chairman: Well, if you believe that's '
16 the case, why doesn't the NRC believe that's the I
17 case, if they can hear from local citizens. Well, i 18 I'll have a chance to ask them.
19 Focusing on the issue of the Memorandum of 20 Understanding between FEMA and the NRC, it is my 21 understanding from the NRC that FEMA serves as the 22 offsite expert in emergency preparedness plan; is 23 that so?
24' Mr. Krimm: Yes O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
-1 The Chairman: Yet the NRC cleo coys that' I-) 2 FEMA's advice is nonbinding; that the NRC can 3 accept or reject FEMA's findings; is that so?
4 Mr. Krimm: Yes.
5 - -
The Chairman: Does it not appear 6 contradictory to you that the-NRC claims FEMA to 7 have the expertise in emergency preparedness, but 8 reserve for itself the right to overrule your 9 determination? -
10 Mr. Krimm: Well, the NRC has the authority 11' in the licensing in making the determination --
12 The. Chairman: I understand 13' Mr. Kr,imm: -- Excuse me. We do act as a L
14 consultant to them. We provide the information to 15 the NRC, and, of course, it is their determination j i
16 ,
'what they do with our information.
17 The Chairman: Well, does it seem -- I know 18 what the law says, but, I mean, the logic, the 19 common sense; you are the expert, you make 20 recommendations they can ignore. What sense of 21 confidence do you think people ought to have in 22 terms of that process and procedure? I mean, 23 it's --
24 Mr. Krimm: Excuse me. I would say in many
= ~ - - - --_ -_ __
1 conos,-Senator'Kannady, that the NRC does take our*
f.
.2- advice and does consider our-findings. By' making
' ;:.'g
'. 3 an example, in 1983, we made a negative finding at
,4 the Indian Point Power Plant in New York State, and 5
the NRC did.take action to issue, what is known as ebel 6 a 120 day Log., whereby they advise the utility that- (h-7 they would close the plant.
8' The Chairman: Did they close it?
9 Mr. Krimm: No. Because the issues.were 10 cleared up. Governor Coumo developed an emergency ;
11 plan for which was a non-participating county at 12 that time-13 -
The Chairman:- Well; wasn't a'resu'lt of it -
14 that the NRC actually overruled FEMA and allowed 15 the Indian Point to restart?
16 Mr. Krimm: No, sir. They emergency-plans 17 were developed and the negative findings -- the i
18 negative deficiencies were cleared up.
]
19 The Chairman: And FEMA approved the final i
20 plans?
21 Mr. Krimm: We approved the final pians.
1 22 The major deficiencies at Indian Point at that time l
. 23 was failure of Rockman County to participate and j l
24 the State of New York cleared that up. And we also a o emmN- a _- _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
1 werkad with Wactchastgr County on tha bus icsue, i
.c 2 and with some of the other counties with some of 3 their problems 4 The Chairman: At the present time, the 5 federal regulations require that an area 6 encompassing a 10-mile radius of a nuclear power 7 plant have an evacuation plan. Did you know Cape 8 Cod lies just outside the 10-mile radius. It is my 9 understanding that in the event of a full scale 10 evacuation Sagamore Bridge would be closed to off 11 Cape traffic, and all residents seeking to leave 12 the Cape, would be rerouted over Bourne Bridge.
13 _ Now, I don't know if you ever had the 14 pleasure (Laughter) of trying to drive through the 15 Cape at the end of a sunny, lovely summer weekend, 16 but I can assure you, as a resident, that the 17 experience is not pleasant one. It is not uncommon 18 to experience hours of traffic delays and both 19 bridg~es are open for use, and I cannot imagine the 20 nightmare that would ensue if Cape Cod residents 21 were asked to use only one of the bridges for 22 emergency evacuation.
23 I would ask you do you really feel that the 24 residents are adequately protected? Let me remind O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 .you that in the cass of;the Chernobyl occident, 1 l
((. , 2' _significantly more than a 10-mile radius was' '
. . "c 3 evacuated. In'the case of Three Mile Island 4 accident, over 100,000 people left the area; in:
5 ' spite of the' instructions tha't told them to stay.
6 Mr. Krimm: I'm very sorry that I'm not .
7 familiar with that particular area. I would like 8 to ask Mr. Doland to respond to that.
9 Mr. Doland: Senator, in 1984, at the
{'
10 request of the NRC and as a result of a petition, 11' we did an extensive study of the traffic management 12 in the area of -- from the plant to.the other side p 13, of1the bridge on the Cape Cod canal. And the state 14 ,
participated in depth in that study.
15 Our experts told us that the Cape could be '
16 evacuated using the procedures set forth by the 17 Massachusetts State Police and the Massachusetts 18 Department of Public Works. And currently,'the !
19 Commonwealth of Massachusetts has told us that they 20 are again taking a look at the situation with 21 regard to that and they are contemplating the 22 expansion of the emergency planning zones of the 23 Pilgrim Power Plant to include the towns of Bourne',
l 24' Wareham, and the third escape, the towns in that
.O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
n
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- 1. sron,,cnd thet's whore'it stands right-now.
' i- '2 The Chairman:
~
Have'you been down there
~~
- 3. .recently?' '
4- Mr. Doland: Oh, yes, sir. All'my life.
i:
5 The Chairman: Well', you can take some 6 judicial. notice, as they say, of what those 7 , weekends are like and what just ordinary traffic 8 'is.like.
9 Mr. Doland: Well, Senator, I believe it can 10 be evacuat d as.long as it can be managed properly 11 (Laughter).
12 The Chairman! We'll go on. I mean, I don't know wha-t's not managed properly'on just the
~
r, - l'3 '
, 3 .a . . <~
14 ordinary -- tbt ordinary -- just, not only the 15 . weekends, but the ordinary traffic, and this is one 16 of the growth areas of the country, not only of our 17 state, but of the country. And even if you left l
18 out that whole railroad bridge, you would have ,
4 19 l people scampering across there. (Laughter) You l
{
-20 are not going to be able to deal much with it. It 21 really defies the common understanding. I think we 1
22 might.want to move on this, but it's --
23 As I understand it, Mr. Krimm, you are from 24 the Washington headquarters?
__ _ _ ~ _ _____ _ _ - - - ._.
L .1' Mr. Krimm: Yss, sir.
L
- l >
2 The chairman: Do you have any great 3 knowledge cfLthese evacuation plans?
4 Mr. Kr!.mm: Not.specifically the area that 5 you mention. I am faciliar with certain evacuation
~6 plans throughout the country.
7 The Chairman: The area that I was just 8 talking about Cape Cod; what about this area here?
9 Mr. Krimm: No, sir. I'm not.
10 The Chairman: Well, it would seem to me 11 that someone of your responsibility would have 12 some information of the key element in terms of a 13 evacuation plan. You've got major ,
14 responsibility'ies, as I understand, in. making some 15 judgments on this. And it kind of appa11s me that 16 -- I mean, I don't except you to have the full 17 information, perhaps the detail information that 18 the people in the locale have, but I would j J
19 certainly hope that, given the kinds of problems 20 that have affected this particular plant and the 21 significance of the evacuation that's been a very 22 much a part of the concern of everyone in this 1
23 state, and I would think people around the 24 country, that you have given it the kind of i
. l
_A 6.A A N N.A AAm a AnAmaAW h ---- - - - - -
1
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1 ottsntion that opporsntly you hcve given to soma 2 of the others.
3 In view of the fact that FEMA ,is unable to
- 4. supercede the NRC's decision on emergency
, 5 preparedness, would FEMA support a congressional to l
l 6 give FEMA'the authority to override the NRC's 7 concern irtues of emergency preparedness?
8 Mr. Krimm: I list _ened very carefully'when 9 th,' Lt. Got $rnor brought that up. If I may submit 10 something for the record, I would like to think 11 about it a little before. I would like to try to 12 waive the cons and pros for it. I would submit
. 13 something for the record.
14 The Chairman: When you do, we'll make that 15 available to the citizens up here. But what I'm 16 really interested is with FEMA's support having the 17 final decision over whether a plant stays open, if ;
18 the plant -- if the public cannot be reasonably ,
)
19 assured of protection; that would be the question 20 I'm interested in your response.
21 One final question, you mentioned in your 22 testimony the report by Secretary Barry on the 23 emergency preparedness plan; the fact that the 24 State has not yet submitted to you all of its m a -Am-- _ _ _ . _ ._ __-.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
1- 'rovision. I.wondar if' you cen tall: us how lona it 4 2 would take FEMA-to evaluate the plan after it's 3 been submitted and'how long it would take FEMA to
-4 ultimately advise the NRC of the acceptability of'a 5 plan?
6 Mr. Krimm: Once the plan is submitted,'of-7 course, it will be reviewed by the Regional 8 Assistance Committee, and depending on the time and 9 the problems, they should be able do it in about 30 10 days.
11 Mr. Doland: Three months.
12 .Mr. Krimm: Ninety days.
13 .
The Cha'irman: Well,'is there.any -- what *
- l{: * -
14- a'asurance can you give us that Pilgrim won't start 15 before that time?
16 Mr. Krimm: That is not my decision. I 17 can't give you any assurances.
18 The Chairman: Whose decision -- Does that 19 bring you --
20 Mr. Krimm: That's the Regulatory 21 Commission's decision.
~
22 The Chairman: Can you give us any assurance I
! 23 about that?
24 Mr. Murley: I'll speak to that in my
~
l i l
'1
. i 1 _tostimony, if I could.
I 2 The Chairman: We'11 hear'from Dr. Murley, 2
3 who is the director of the Office of Nuclear 4 Regulatory Commission.
5 Mr. Murley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll i 6 summarize my remarks, which I provided to the'
.7 committee in more detail.
1 8 First, I should say that we're not prepared 9, at this' time to recommended restart of the Pilgrim -
10- plant nor'do we have a schedule for the restart for .
11 the plant. It is well known --
12 The Chairman: Let me -- just before.you c'; . 13 ' move *on. You say,% we are'not ready to restart nor L. ,
14 do we have a plan." can you indicate to us what 15 would be the factors that you would-look for to 16 determine whether you will have a plan or whether 17 you will restart? What are the events? What are 18 the things that have to happen.
19 Mr. Murley: What I --
20 The Chairman: If you repeat them, I would 21 like to permit you the full opportunity, but I 22 would also, ,,as you move through the testimony, 23 we're reaching toward the end of it, so I'm going 24 to take a little more flexibility. I don't want to
- J
1 1 --
' if you got it later on, just msntion it to ma, 2 but if you don't, I would appreciate if you would
'. 3 be responsive.
4 Mr. Murley: I'll mention the major factors 5 that we're going to look for are the deficiencies 6 and the plant equipment that we found through our 7 inspection; the deficiencies in the management of 8 .
the plant and the deficiencies in the emergency 9 preparedness.
10 The Chairman: But again can you indicate 11 how long it will take to do plant management and 12 evacuation? Do you have any general ballpark
_ 13 -
figures? Mr. Doland indicated,they. thought around 14 90 days. In each-one of though -- Let's take each 15 one of those day in the plant, first of all, how 16 long would that take.
17 Mr. Murley: After the Boston Edison Cor.pany l
18 submits to us their indication that they believe 19 they are ready to restart, we think it will take i 1
20 i perhaps a month to two months, probably closer to l t
1 21 two months by the time we send our own team of "
22 inspectors in, review and come to our own 23 -
conclusion.
.I 24 The Chairman: When does Boston Edison I l
n n mnmmn n ne m m- n m --- --__- _ - - - " - - - - - - - - -
1 indicots to you they will submit thsir 3,7 2 recommendations?
3 Mr. Murley: They have indicated, I think, 4 informally to us, it would probably be in late 5 January or February, more like-in February.
6 The Chairman: On the question of the plant, 7 you expect late January, February, to receive from 8 Boston Edison the final plant designs in term of-9 safety, and then that will take you approximately 10 30 days for you to send your people up there and 11 conduct -- and then they start their review or 12 does it take 30 days to get your people to get ,
13 together?'
~
l, .
14 Mr. Murley: No, we would have our teams ,
15 ready. It would ta'ke probably two to three weeks 16 at the plant. We would then have to collect our 17 information and come to pull it together, make our 18 conclusions and that, in terms, would take another 19 month, so altogether, perhaps two months.
20 The Chairman: So we are generally thinking 21 sometime'in early March that you got -- everything i
22 goes on, you'll at least be able to make some 23 judgment, I suppose. I suppose you may have to go 24 back and get additional information. The fastest m n mmmnn nnm n n-n~-~~ ~ - - - - - - - -
i 1-
- track would b2 in March. What about with regards>
- [,,' ,2 to management?
3 Mr. Murley: With management, we're. making 4' continuous assessments. What we will do, of 5 course, is watch their peformance while they are 6 getting the plant ready and also during the times 7 when they will be. conducting what we call " hot 8 functional tests."
9 The Chairman: What is a " hot function 10 test"? When do they start?
11 Mr. Murley: Well, they'll being doing some 12 testing, not nuclear testing, and we'll be watching a 13 and observing how the plagt is being operated.
- g. ,
14 'The Chairman: What sort of testing do they 15 do now?
16 Mr. Murley: For example', I was in the plant 17 all morning, and they have a steam supply that they l 1 '
18 b,r'ought. I'd say it's a fossil-fired boiler just 19 to generate steam to run steam turbines that 20 generate steam for the safety pumps. So they will 21 test them and they will test the systems to see if 22 there is leak. That sort of thing is done. We 23 watch them carefully because it is a nuclear plan [ '
24 and there is radiation in the plant and even though -
( _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _
.i lL this:ia o non nuclear test, , wa.wetch'thsm. j I
- ,V 2 The Chairman: Have you reached any 3 preliminary conclusions that you want to share with 4 4 us?
-5 Mr. Murleyr N
.o firm conclusions. I think 6 we can say that they made some significant 7 management changes in-the company that we believe 8 . are improvements. Ralph Byrd, for example, was 9 brought in-after years of experience in the nuclear 10 navy, who was an admiral. He, in turn, has brought 11; in a number of capable people. It rema' ins to be 1
12 seen whether they can gel as a team that can really
' ' ~ ' '
- l'3 manage --
14 'The Chairman: How long does it take in 5
15 terms of evacuation to get those guy, ready?
16 Mr. Murley: What we will do is, we are n
' rP'
")
\ y; ' l 17 reviewing the drafts as they are prepared by the 6' !
18 state and local authorities, and we expect that the 19 state will send those to FEMA, and we'll expect 20 we'll get them. At the time, we'll have to come to ,
21 a judgment as to the status of those plans.
22 Perhaps -- I think I say it in a little more 23 structured way in the testimony, if I could go 24 through it, I would like to do that.
m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1 Tho Chairman: , ' Al? right . Go ahead.
., j; - 2 Mr. Murley: With regard to the current 3 '~
' status of the major,NRC activities regarding 4 Pilgrim, the plant is shut down; the'NRC has me't' 5 -frequently with the Boston Edison Company, members 6- of,the public and.with the Commonwealth, as well as 7' local officials, to discuss the issue regarding 8 Pilgrim.
'9- Boston Edison has developed a restart plan
' 10. that described their programs and plans, but they ,
{
11 have not reach a position where they would request i I
12 NRC.to consider a restart decision. In addition, 13 as part of its safety enhancemen't program, Boston 14 Edison has proposed a number of modifications 15 intended to improve plant peformance in the event 16 of an accident at Pilgrim. These modifications are ~
ccnm e 17 - in wentimonee with the NRC's goals of enhancing and
?
18 obtaining performance.under severe accident 19 conditions.
1 20- We will conduct several public meetings to ;
i 21 insure opportunity for public participation and 22 input to the assessment panel regarding Boston l 23 Edison's restart plan. These meetings will be d
24 formal, transcribed session in which the public's 1 ..
A n nA m% mAm - mmmm--- - - - - - - -
1 tastimony will ba hoc.rd by NRC se.nior staff.
}
2 After the NRC staff has completed the 3 restarts readiness assessment, there will be a 4 public meeting at NRC headquarters at which the 5 staff will inform the NRC commissioners on our' 6 findings and recommendations, so that the i
7 Commission itself can make the final restart 8 decision.
9 The Chairman: Now, who is going to be able I
10 to appear at that public meeting?
11 Mr. Murley: Any interested citizen.
12 The Chairman: This is in Washington; is 13 that correct 14 Mr. Murley: I'm norry. The meetings that.
15 we'll have will be here in the Plymouth area to get 16 concerned citizens' input on the plan itself and 17 our approach to the plan. The Commission meeting, 18 if that's what --
i 19 The Chairman: Who will be at the meeting? !
l 20 Mr. Murley: It will be the senior staff 21 from our headquarter and from our; regional office.
1 22 The Chairman: None of the Commissioners j 23 \
would come up to that meeting? '
24 Mr. Murley: Probably not. It would not be l
l O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
1 en adjudicatory hooring. It would ba a more i
2 informal meeting.
q;.
It will last as long as people i
', 3 will be interested in talking.
4 The Chairman: You and I know that, quite 5 frankly, there is a difference if you have -- the 6 staff have the hearing or whether you have the '
7 principals. With no disrespect, because.I have an 8 excellent staff and am proud of them, as you know, 9 and I know, there is a quantum difference on those 10 kind of reactions. People are busy, and all the 11 rest, but it is an unique set of circumstances.
12 You got two-situations, both Pilgrim and Seabrook.
, 13 You~know the kinds of -- you.may.have, I don't.
lf . . - -
14 know, half a dozen maybe -- I don't know what the 15 others would be. I know one or-two that are of 16 such a significance and importance.
17 I find it difficult to understand what would 18 be more important than those fellows getting out in 19 one of those Gulfstream planes that the goveznment 20 has and spend a nice day up in the Plymouth area 21 and' fly back so they could be back with their 22 families at nighttime'. I really don't know what in 23 the world is more important than spending that 24 particular day -- I really do -- I really mean --
O'BRIEN AND LEVINE COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC;
1~ (Applause). We'll request it nicely to them.
- 2. Hopefully, they'll be responsive, but ~ it -- I 3- think, you know that the - whateverfdecisions is 4 going to be made, how important it'is that people ,
5 have an opportunity to be heard on these issues, 6 and I t'hink'having sat thzough the hearings
'7 tonight, I find that these are well-thought out, 8 well-considered, very well-studied testimonies. I-9, mean, we're not. talking about things, quite 10 frankly, that all of us, what we represent, ought 11 ' to be able to hear whatever people have on,their i
12 minds in any event, but I think,' as you would -- I
- p. 13 think as'you would be.able to understand these very El 14 impressive pieces of testimony that people spent a 15 lot of time on. Well, I urge you to give that 16 consideration. I will, and I'm sure I will be 17 joined by my colleagues, but let's go on with your 18 testimony.
19 . Mr. Murley: Yes, Senator. I'll move on now 1
20 to emergency preparedness, 21 The Chairman: What page are you on?
22 Mr. Murley: I'm sorry. I have a version 23 that -- when you asked that we limit it to three 24 minutes.
A a 'am mmm nme - mm~~- _ . _ _ _ - - - - -
l i
1 The Chairman: You con tcko c little longer
. . 1 i 2 time, if you'd like to. I have longer -- one of l 3 the testimony which you submitted earlier where you-4 talked about on Page 1, the report brought back j
5 into focus a number of problem areas in Pilgrim, )
6 such as the shortage of licensed operators, large 7 maintenance backlog, a number of management 8 vacancies in maintenance areas, radiological l
)
9 protection weaknesses and emergency preparedness {
10 program weaknesses, instances of court procedures l
11 and administrative practice of the plant, and I d
'12 continues on. Have all of these been corrected?
They have not yet been,'
. 13' ,
Mr. Murley: .
14 corrected. No, sir. <
~
15 The Chairman: On the top of 2, and then 16 I'll let you pick up, you report, "there are fi.ve 17 areas that have exhibited recurrent program 18 weaknesses: radiological controls, surveillance of 19 safety-related equipment, fire protection, i
20 physical security and safeguards and assurances of 1
21 quality.
22 Now, have those been corrected yet?
23 Mr. Murley: They have not been corrected.
24 We have seen signs of improvement, particularly in, A AA A A NA Anm m m-xA~-- - - - - - - - --
l' tho radiological. control cron and firo protection
'U ' -
- 2 and assurance of. quality, but we haven't -- they
- 3, haven't.been corrected.
4 The Chairman: Can you give us a rough 5 . .
idea? . Ten is the standard in order to be -- you 6 ought to get your C grade. I mean that's sort of -
7 minimum grade. Where are you if you were on the 8 radiological control? How close are they to being 9 minimum standards?- -
10 Mr. Murley: I think I would say now that 11 they do meet our mi*imum n standards. It's difficult 12 to give them a numerical grade, but I can give you
,$ [ - 13 - an idea of'the action that we'take when we think 3 ' '
14, they fall below standards in ohe of these areas, 15 and this was several year ago.
16 We felt if they fell below these standards, 17 there were practices at the plant that we thought 18 were unacceptable, and we took an enforcement 19 action by issuing them an order. And an order is a 20 formal action that modifies a license and we l 21 directed them.to get an outside consultant to come i 22 in and help them formulate improvements to the l 23 program, and we then made them implement those 1
24 improvements. It took a very long time for them to
( _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. - . -
4 1 do it, end just racontly Mr. Rusca11 closed out the'
, 2 order on the basis-that we have seen improv'ements.
'. 3 The Chairman: Wel2, when you found these 4 deficiencies, radiological control to be -- did 5 ,you close down the plant?
6 Mr. Murley: No, we didn't. We --
7 The Chairman: Why not?
8 Mr. Murley: There are many areas that go 9 into our an assessment, judgment, as to the overall 10 operation of the plant. Radiological control is 11 one of them. I said fire protection is another.
12 If there's an area we judge to be serious enough, ,
em 13 we'll net hesitate to' shut it down. We have nine -
- 3. -
14 p'lants shut down in the United States today because 15 we don't think they are safe enough to operate; 16 Pilgrim being one of them.
17 The radiological control, what we did, as I 18 said, is issue an enforcement order on our license.
19 The Chairman: Well, you know, I would think 20 that after the NRC identified that this plant was 21 probably the least safe plant in the country and
)
22 you don't close down, people are going to ask about 23 it; don't you think? What does it take? You got 24 nine down. You say that this is one of the least I
t _ - - _ _ _ _ __ __ ______- - _ _ _ _
o - - _ - -
1- sofo plcnto in the country. BoDton Edison clocos 2- it down, but you people don't. What kind of
~~
3 assurances csn people have in terms --
4 Mr. Murley: In fact, although we didn't 5 issue formal enforcement order, we did, in fact, 6 tell them to shut down the plant. This was in ,
7 April of 1986 8 The Chairman: That's right. Well, in the 9 other circumstance, you closed them or do you ask 10 the company to close them down? ,
11 Mr. Murley: We ask the company to close 12 them down.
f In the case of the Keachbottom plant,
~ ~
E 13 '
we ordered them to immediately shut down. So'in EL 14 that case we issued an immediately effective order.
15 In some case we do and other cases, we --
16 The Chairman: All right. Can you do that 17 -- Let's just continue with your testimony.
18 Mr. Murley: I'm now talking about --
j 19 The Chairman: Let's go down -- I'm not, you 3 20 know, we've had a long evening, but I'm not in any 1 21 hurry right now. If we could down the bottom of 2.
22 You say, "Let's summarize the current status, j 23 Boston Edison and NRC regarding Pilgrim." Let's --
24 why don't we pick up there. Have you got your nnmmmmm n ;4m - - - ~ - - _ _--- - ---
1 -copy?
. 1 Mr. Murley: I now have my lengthy copy.
- "- Yes, sir. The facility remained shut down.
3 The 4 NRC has met frequently with Boston Edison, members 5 of the public and with the commonwealth as well as 6 with local officials.
7 The Chairman: Who have you met with the 8 public? Do you know?.
9 Mr. Murley: Yes. I have met several times 10 with the Selectmen. I have spent an evening'in 11 this very auditorium with the Selectmen and with 12 several other' people, probably until past midnight, ,
. 13 asking questions. My staff and.M'r. Russel'1's. staff -
14 have met in Duxbury with similar groups. I would 15 guess there have been probably, all in all, half a 16 dozen or more meetings with people in this area.
17 The Chairman: Continue.
18 Mr. Murley: Boston Edison has developed a 19 restart plan that describes the program plans, 20 actions considered necessary by the company to 21 restart and safe'1y operate the company. Although 22 Boston Edison has not reached a position where it 23 could request of NAC to consider a restart 24 decision, the utility has completed a number of
1- plant improvGmsnts' ,
- 2 The reactor was refueled in October and
. 3 several major system tests on the reactor cooling 4 system and containment structure has been 5 completed. As part of its safety enhancement i I
6 program, Boston Edison has proposed a number of '
7 modification intended to improve plant peformance 8 in the event of an accident at Pilgrim.
9 The NRC staff reviewed these modifications 10 in August of 1987, and concluded that many of the l
11 modifications were appropriate for implementation.
12 The Chairman: Does that suggest anything :
, , .I 13 * '
to you?, It says Boston Edison proposed a number
- g. ,
14 of modifications to imp ~ rove plant performance in 15 the event of an accident at Pilgrim. Does that 16 suggest anything to you? Did we draw any 17 conclusions about their consideration as to the 18 safety?
19 Mr. Murley: Yes. We have underway, 20 Senator, a generic study. It is a research study 21 on how we can make these containments even safer.
22 As you know, the issue was raised earler this 23 evening about the safety of the 3WR Mark I 24 containment of the type that Pilgrim has. There
,ammm~s n nm n ~n~-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4
'I are, I-balieve, 24 such reactors.
. 2 We.believe -- NRC believes that they are 3 being safely operated today, but we have research 4 programs to see if we canimake them safer,. Boston 5 Edison knows the kinds of things that are being 6 considered. They, presumably on their own, assumedi 7 that the NRC is coming out with new requirements.
8 We haven't done that, but we are scheduled to go to- -
9 our Commission this summer and make such 10 ' recommendations.
11 The Chairman: Well, then you wouldn't bring 12 ,
this on-line before then, would you, if you were going to make specific recommendations.'this summer r . 3 _,
13 ,
L_
14 regarding safety. It wouldn't make any sense, 15 would it, to try to do this prior to that. time?
16 Mr. Murley: There is really two answers, 17 Senator. One,i:s' that many of the types of things 18 that we're looking at generically, are the very 19 things that Boston Edison has done on their own to 20 improve the plant; and second, if the Commission 21 decides to do even more, we would make at that 22 time, no matter when that is, we would make Boston ,
23 Edison back --
24 The Chairman: Can you be just more e
aA m a m mn a am ---m-mA __m_ _ - _ _ _ - - - - -
1 -cpacific?
Does that includo-the torus.imprhvemont?
- 6. , ~
/ .' . 2 Mr. Murley: In<our; review of that proposed 3 modification, we asked;them a number of questions, 4 . particularly when you would use it and when you 1 5- wouldn't. They still owe us a reply on that.
6 The Chairman:- You are familiar with the.' .
7 technology?
8 Mr. Murley: Yes.
9 The Chairman: I mean, do'you think that- l 10 that is a large additonal safety or is not?
11.- Mr. Murley: It does if it'is used l 12 correctly, and it is very 1mportant -- ,
13 'he T Chairman: L'et's assume that~they use.it' 1, .
14 correctly. I mean, if they are not going to use it 15 correctly, then nothing make any sense at all.
16 (Laughter).
17 Mr. Murley: Sir, I wish things were always 18 that clear. But when we ask, our questions will .
l 19 elicit that very information; namely, have you 20 studied all the cases and where it could hurt. And 21 that's --
22 The Chairman: What was your impression? .
- 23 Mr. Murley
- Excuse me, Senator. I really 24 have-to make this point, Senator. That the n n mh mm ,m m m wnn-- - - - ~ - - - - - -
l' conteinmant io e very importent structure to the t,- 2 plant. Chernobyl did not have such a containment.
3 The containment that was designed has been-required 4 by the NRC from day one on these reactors to 5 contain radioactivity in fission products.
6 One does not lightly go and change the ,
7 design that will deliver the ultimate unless you 8 really know what you -- and under the right 9 circumstances. And that's why we're being very 10 cautious on this.
11 The Chairman: Does your report reach any 12 -
conclusion about whether it will be successful or
' . 4
, 13 . fail? .
lL1.. -
14 Mr. Murley: There is a report of some of 15 our experts that we have in our laboratory. They 16 have been looking at the. behavior of these kinds of 17 Mark I containments under very severe accident, 18 really unlikely core meltdown accident, and they --
19 I have not read the report myself, but the 20 indications I have is they concluded that under 21 these very severe conditions, the contairaent could 22 fail when molten fuel touches -- reaches some of 23 the steel liner parts.
24 Th9 Chairman: That's 80 or 90 percent of
- _ ~ - - - - _ _ _ _ - __ -- _-_
\
O is .
- .~
1 the tiras,. as I understand?-
1
' ;*r.s f.' ' ' 2 -Mr. Murley: Again, the understanding that I l
3 have, under these very unlikely. conditions, that'it 4 could fail,.yes.
5 The Chairman: As I -- two excerpts from the 6 document, one, the probability of early containment ,
7 failure for' Mark I boiling water reactors is the 80 8 or 90 percent range of two primary containment
- 9. -
failure by melt-through is a highly' probable *
' 10 mechanism of early containment failure.
11 What Brookhaven has said is that Mark I 12 reactors are highly likely to rupture,' release high
~
13 'amoun*ts of' radiation into the environment.
- L:? -
14 Am I to understand that the NRC is 15 permitting nuclear plants to rely on Mark I system 16 to continue to operate?
17 Mr. Murley: Yes. The -- As I said, I think 18 I need to say this because people are concerned.
19 The N'RC believes that the Mark I plants are ,.
20 operated safely today. We have research program 21 that are looking for ways to make it safer.
22 The Chairman: I don't want --
23 Mr. Murley: I don't want to leave the 24 impression that these plants are like Chernobyl I s _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - .
1 think' thct would bs a disservice, bsemuse they are
'- 2 not. These containments, we think, will function
^
3- and do their job in most accidents. It is only the 4 very severe and very unlikely accident that we are 5 talking about where they could fail early.
6 The Chairman: That ought to be reassuring.
7 (Laughter).
8 Mr. Murley: As I said, we are looking for 9 ways that can improve even that chance.
10 The Chairman: I think that the problem that 11 you got to -- the study that is done by your own 1R commission and that gives this kind of -- draws .
13
~
p this kind of a. conclusion, which I have just read, L
14 and then'you respon'd there really isn't a problem.
15 What kind of a -- what are people suppose to assume 16 on.that? You have a study that your commission 17 reached one conclusion and then you comment and 18 testify that there is nothing really to worry 19 about.
20 Mr. Murley: I didn't quite say that, sir.
21 The Chairman: All right. There is 22 something to worry about?
23 Mr. Murley: In the sense, under very severe 24 accident conditions, these containments cou2d fail, l
mnmmmma mme m -~~~mm . - - ~ - - - - -
l-4 1 end;ws aro looking et that, and I'm sctisfied with 2 that, and we're looking to see what improvements E -
3- can be made'to reduce that failure problem.
4 The Chairman: Let's continue.
5 Mr. Murley: Questions have been raised 6 regarding the Mark I containment at Pilgrim and the 7 direct torus vent modification being considered by 8 Boston Edison. The direct torus vent would provide 9 a hardened path from the containment torus 10 structure to the plant stack and would be used to 11 relieve containment pressure in certain severe 12 accident condition. During staff review of this
^
13 modification,.a number of questions were asked of ,
14 Boston Edison regarding the use of the direct torus 15 vent. These questions must be resolved before this 16 system is placed into service.
17 Regarding the management area, Boston Edison 18 has made a number of changes that we believe are 19 4. improvements. In early 1987, Mr. Ralph Bird was 20 hired as the senior vice president of Nuclear. He 21 has extensive nuclear navy and management 22 experience. Changes have been made in the onsite 23 organization, additional personnel have been hired 24 and programs for improvement are being implemented.
1 1 The NRC stcff hes-a'opacial. programmatic
,I 2 . approach for assessing the Boston _ Edison progress
- 3 at_ Pilgrim. Our activities are'being coordinated 4 by;an_ Assessment Panel that is chaired.by the
, 5 senior staff members from Region 1, and includes 1 *
- l. 6 . representative from the region'and from NRC .
7 headquarters. -Once the Pilgrim restart plan has 8 been reviewed by NRC, and after Boston Edison has 9 stated it is ready to restart Pilgrim, this panel 10 , then will assess restart readiness. It's 11 assessment will be a comprehensive evaluation that' 12 considers the general readiness of the plant and.
e 13' personnel to resume safe. operation and'will' include.
L. ,
14 a comprehensive onsite team inspection.
15- In addition, as we. indicated to you, Senator 16 Kennedy, and to Congressman Studds in Chairman 17 Zech's letters of November 20, 1987, we will 18 conduct several public meetings to insure 19 opportunity for public participation and input to 20 the assessment panel regarding the Boston Edison 21 restart plan. These meetings will be formal, 22 transcribed sessions at which the public's s v .
23 testimony will be heard by NRC senior staff. After 24 the NRC staff has completed the restart readiness pp p m mM nf.,_M m Mmmaam - -+-- - - - - - - - - -
'1: casacamsnt, there williba c publie n meeting at NRC 4
'2 ' headquarters at which the staff will brief the NRC 3 Commissioners on our findings and recommendation so-4 that the Commission itself can make the ultimate.
- 5. decision. -
6_ .The Chairman: That's partoof the problem.
{
7 I mean with all respect to your' dedication-and 8 service, you heg the testimony; you make the'
'9 recommendation; then they, the Commissioners, can
- .(
L. 10' either take it or not take it. There is no 11- opportunity - perhaps you can reach one kindiof 12 conclusion., As I. understand the proceeding, there 13 is not much opportunity.for those who differ with q I1 -
{
14 you, whether they are for against, to be able to 15 make presentations. The Commissioner can either 16 take yours or not take your recommendations.. And 17 that, I think, is.the reason or part of the reason 18 why people want to have an adjudicatory hearing.
19 Now, as I understand -- Would you answer 20 this? How many of those Section 2.206 petitions 21 for adjudicatory hearings have been filed with the 1
22 NRC? !
" l 23 ~
Mr. Murley: I'll have to provide you the 24 exact number for the record. A good many.
i
, a_ - -- - - - - - - - - - _ - -
1 Tha Chcirman: .Do hou know how many hcvc 0
- 2 been granted?
3 Mr. Murley: JE don't know that.
4 The Chairman: As I understand it, one has 5 been, and only once did the NRC grant a special one
~
6 as a result of a petition. Do you know any reason 7 why they don't grant any more of these hearings?
8 Mr. Murley: I do think it is probably more 9 than one, but we'll get you the correct number for 10 the record. Frequently, the petitions that we 11 receive are asking us to reconsider a licensing 12 action that we've already taken, and in many 13 cases --
14 The Chairman: What if it comes before you 15 make a judgment? If we make that petition, will 16 you support that for us?
17 Mr. Murley: I'm sorry --
18 The Chairman: Would you -- if we.make that 19 petition for adjudicator proceedings prior to the 20 time that there is the announcement; would you 21 support that, given the fact that you have been 22, 1 bare this evening, the type of witnesses that we 1
23 have heard tonight?
24 Mr. Murley: We already responded to that, n n nnnmr a mm a ~ - - - - _ - - - - - - -
4 Y
L 'l - Sanctor, and the anewsr is that we-agreed that we e
. :/ > f l .2 should get the views of_the public and we think l 3 tha*t there are several opportunities, I've l
4 m e n t i o n e d s e v e r a l' o f t h e m , forJgetting there. But 5 in hearing rights that are -- the adjudicatory 6 hearing rights are triggered really by.NRC 7 licensing action,.which in this case would be.an 8 action against Boston Edison's license, which would i
9 be an enforcement matter. Boston Edison would be 10 the one'to have the hearing rights.
11 The Chairman: As I understand it, it is 12- granted on a discretionary basis. I think we can i3 get the standard out, but the law, as I understand-14 it, it's done on a discretionary basis.
-15 Mr. Murley: Yes. There can be hearing 1'6 rights, adjudicatory hearing rights, granted on a 17 discretionary basis and the commissioners have done 18 that very --
19 The Chairman: But you will support our 20 petition, Mr. Murley, (Laughter) while you're in 21 front of all these n. ice people he$e.
22 Mr. Murley: I absolutely support the need 23 to get the views of the public and I have done that 24 myself. I work for the Commissioners and I have to i
l
- _ -- - - _ _ -. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . 1
i 1 got their opproval.
2 The Chairman: Let me move en to another
~~
3 subject. As I understand, the petitions flied by 4 the utility required to be granted. We find that 5 the -- those in terms the of discretionary power in 6 terms of the NRC, when their petitions have come '
7 from the other rarely -- I had one instance --
8 we'll stand by your record, but this -- how do you 9 think people will react to that? What the -
10 companies want, they get; and if the people want 11 it, they give it a lot of thought for 12 consideration. What ir your perception? What do
_f t
. *13 you.believe people believe wh'en the system is kind -
14 of rigged like that? I don't mean to say rig all l 15 the time, but when it is rigged lixe that?
16 Mr. Murley: I understand your concern and 17 the public's concern. We are -- I don't .elieve we 18 do have to follow our administrative procedures.
19 ~We're professionals. We're trying to regulate in 20 an area that is --
1 21 The Chairman: Order. We want to give the 22 ,,
witness full attention and full courtesy this 1
23 evening. We still got additional testimony and I ;
24 would ask him to proceed.
=.
1 Mr. Murley: I'll continue with my prepared-
", 2l testimony. If restart is authorized, NRC would 3 increase:its. inspection coverage for the restart -
4 program and by the round-the-clock coverage in:
5 startup in site activity. A. number of hold points 6 would be instituted and Boston Edison would not be- .
.7 permitted to proceed without NRC authorization.
9 8 These decisions would be based on the on-site 9 .. ,
inspection team's evaluation of the Pilgrim 10 operation.
11 In addition of the areas previously '
12 discussed, a number of emergency preparedness 13 concerns have been raised at Pi1 grim since the 14 Confirmatory Action Letter was issued in April 15 1986. Much of what follows on the next page has 16 been repeated, Mr. Krimm has already testified in 17 the FEMA findings.
l 18 On August 18, 1987, the NRC transmitted the l
19 FEMA report to Boston Edison and requested that the 1
i 20 utility provide us an action plan and a schedule 21 for assisting the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and 22 local governments in addressing the FEMA-identified 23 emergency planning issues. Boston Edison submitted 24 its action plan on September 17, 1987. This action
(
i I _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___._ l
1 plan d0tnils Boston Edicon'a plcns to casist the 2 Commonwealth and local governments as well as 3 describing resources and a schedule for completion.
4 over the past few months, Boston Edison, the 5 Commonwealth and the local governments in the -
6 Pilgrim area have committed considerable resources 7 and efforts toward resolving these concerns. The 8 current status, as we understand, is as follows:
9 Drafts of local plans were completed November 1, 10 1987. These currently are in review in the 11 respective towns. Drafts of local procedures are 12 in preparation. These address issues such as buses 13 and shelt'ering. The draft Massasc.hustts Civi'l ,
i 14 Defense Authority Area II plan is complete and I l
15 und'er review by the Commonwealth. The draft of the 16 Commonwealth plan for Pilgrim is nearing ,
17 completion. A training program has been developed l
18 by Boston Edison and provided to the Massachusetts 19 Civil Defense Authority.
20 On December 17, 1987, the NRC received the
]
21 report on Emergency Preparedness for an Accident at 22 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant from the Commonwealth.
23 NRC and FEMA will consider this report in their
^
24 ongoing review. !
l 4
l I A n nm m--m mm_ _ _ . _ __
t 1 Additionally, Boston Edison submitted an
^
2 exemption request to NRC on the requirement for
. 3 conducting its Biennial Full Participation 4 Exercise. The. request was based on the need to 5 .
.make improvements in emergency plans. NRC approved 6 that exemption request, stipulating that the 7 exercise be conducted no later that June 30, 1988.
8 The NRC agrees that emergency planning l
1 9 deficiencies do exist at Pilgrim and further agrees. ,
10 that corrective actions are needed. However, il considering the shut'down status of the plant and.
i2 the progress,that is being made to address up 13 -
emergency planning. issues,' we have n,ot needed to k
14 , take enforcement action regardihg emergency 15 planning.
16 ,
The NRC will not permit the facility to 17 resume operation until corrective actions 18 satisfactory to NRC have been taken to address the i 19 emergency planning deficiencies identified by FEMA.
20 We will give special attention to the improved 21 evacuation plans for school and day care centers, 22 as well as improved evacuation plans for special 23 needs and transportation-dependent population in 24 the 10-mile emergency planning zone. We will i
l l
1 rcquire coms demonstration of the critical espects 2 of these, evacuation plans before we can decide if 3 Pilgrim i's ready to resume operation..
4- However, it may be-that restart'can be 5 a'uthorized with some emergancy planning issues not 6 fully resolved. Under the NRC framework, whether ,
7 an outstanding emergency planning deficiency must 8 delay restart.will depend upon considerations of 9 the gravity of the deficiency, the nature of any 10 compensatory action and progress toward correction 11 of the deficiency. For Pilgrim, this decision will 12 be made ultimately by the commission itself.
- 13 ,
kn conclusion, there has been and will .
14 continue to be a high level of NRC management i
15 attention to Pilgrim. The NRC staff has adopted a 16 unique approach for monitoring the peformance of 17 the utility as it implements needed improvement.
- 18. This approach includes. opportunities for public 19 input to the process. I want to assure the 20 Committee that Pilgrim will not be permitted to 21 restart until the NRC staff has reviewed carefully 22 the plant improvements, the management improvements
!o .
23 and the offsite emergency preparedness improvement and has concluded that the planiwill be operating 24 c_
- . ~ _ ~ - - - _ _ _ - - - - _ - _ _ - .
O I I
11 cafely.
2 Thank you, Senator. That. concludes my 3 testimony.
4 The Chairman: Do you know what-I think is 5 almost as much of a problem as some of the
{
6 technical issues, some of which we have gone over ,
]
I
~7 -- we'll have time to go over some more -- but 8 there is a problem, I think, in the tone of your 9 testimony, which seems to run throughout the l
10 statement, seems to lean towards restart. It 11 leaves the impression that the issues have'already 12 b e e n d e-c i d e d , almost as if the NRC has already 13 ' ,
decided why Pilgrim should not be allowed to i IL.
14 start. It seems to me to lean toward restart.
15 Leaves the impression that the issues have already 16 been decided. Isn't that backwards? 1 l
17 Mr. Murley: I am the one who decided in 18 April of 1986, that the plant ought to stay shut 19 down. I'm the one that told them that there are 20 some additional things that need to corrected and 21 NRC is the one that is keeping it shut down. There 22 is not a presumption that the plant can restart.
23 They have to convince us that they have made these 24 corrections.
l i
n n m m "m mun n.nh a %-m-.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e , . .
L 1 The Chairman: The top of Page 9 in your-2 testimony, you start off, "It may be that restart
'd -
3 can be authorized with_some emergency planning l
L 4 issues not' fully resolved."
5 . Now, that'sreally(freassuring, I would 6 expect, to a lot of people.
l 7 Mr. Murley: Ca/n. explain that?
A 8 The Chairman: Sure. It looks like -- why 9 can't they just maintain that they can't restart 10 until the State of Massachusetts is more satisfied 11 that'they have in place a more effective emergency 12 plan. ,
13- Mr. Murley: I don't mean.that to be a 14 pugnacious statement, but I have to explain that 15 emergency preparedness is a changing process. Mr.
16 Krimm mentioned earlier that things change around 17 the site: population changes, new schools come in.
18 That's why we require regular exercise in these 19 things. And so it is not uncommon to find 20 deficiencies in operating plants and we don't l
21 gen,erally require' that a plant be shut down while 22 these deficiencies are corrected. The defense 23 'in-depth philosphy has guided the nuclear
^
24 regulation over the years, which is an area that i
1 reliso on sovercl levels of protection. And so, l
2 therefore, we don't necessarily have to shut plants I 3 down while deficiencies are corrected; nontheless i 4 with Pilgrim, we agreed that these deficiencies are 5 quite serious and that they must take corrective 6 action before we allow them to restart. .
7 The Chairman: Wouldn't you agree with me, 8 Dr. Murley, that there is a considerable question 9 in the minds of many when problems which you 10 identified, which you have gone through the first 11 page of your testimony and we reviewed briefly 12 during the course of your oral presentation, that t 13' -
they would have some-serious problems'in knowing '
14 whether they were resolved unless -- without P
15 performinganotherSALfpriortotherestart? -
16 Don't you believe that the NRC should conduct f
17 another SAL /?
~~
18 Mr. Murley: As I said, we are going to do a 19 compr ensive evaluation, including an 20 around-the-clock inspection. I'll let Mr. Russell, 21 who's responsible for the $ i Report )( respond to '
22 that. l 23 Mr. Russell: Senator Kennedy, I would like 24 to add two points to the record as it relates to t
1 n nmmmNn nm.m n mm a e m. ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - -
1: ovaluation by the ataff of'the itemo which are; e \
l
,- 2 identified.
L3, First, during'the public hearing that we 4 proposed to hold, the first.one'was to. gather 5 concerns. We agreed to come back.and hold a second 6 meeting to identify the resciution of'those 7 concerns, at least to the staff's standards of what 8 is required.
9 We have also indicated that we will conduct 10 a detailed team inspection to address both the 11 management issues and whether tha program can be 12 put into place effectively. We have indicated to 3; l13 . the State of Massachusetts that they may.have an 3- -
14 observer to observe that inspection as it is 15 conducted by the NRC, such that they would be in a 16 position to see how that process is conducted.
17 We will.al'so have self assessment performed 18 by the utility themselves, which would be the P
19 equivalentoftheultimateSAL/ report and the <b 20 staff will be there to evaluate the peformance.
21 The purpose.is to compare the two results and see 22 if the utility is able to critically evaluate their 4 :
23 own peformance. Those are the --
24 The Chairman: How will that differ from a e
n n Am x 41 mn nnm n Amm- - - - ~_~A- _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
P- *i 1 SAL rGport?
P l 2 Mr. Russell: ASALfreport, if I can call
~
P 3
it, Mini-SALf. This has been done fon two 4 facilities recently in Region 1 for Beaver Valley ;
i 5 Unit II during their startup program and for a pine <b-6 mile unit from the power section to actually <
= '
7 evaluate the peformance of the company in 8 critical --
9 The Chairman: I hear your words. I was P
10 just trying to gather how a Mini-SAL 7 is different P
11 fromfullSALf?
12 Mr. Russell: The difference is that we y 13 specifieyparticular areas to be eval'uated of <6-(' /
14 concerns that are associated with operation.
15 The Chairman: Do they cover the other areas 16 as well? Do they have special emphasis in the 17 areas of monitoring or the areas that you have 18 identified for weakness?
19 Mr. Russell: We will specifically address 20 each of the areas of the five areas that have been 21 identified as being marginal peformance:
l 22 radiological monitoring, security surveillance, ,
l 23 Those areas as indicated each will be addressed in l
24 detail. )
l I
\ .
j
_mm__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . I
1 Tho Chairman: And the other parts that are P
. 2 includedintheevaluationintheSALfreport will (-
~~
3 also'be included?
4 Mr. Russell: Yes, sir. We will reach a 5 conclusion. The format will be somewhat different.
6 I will be issuing a Readiness for Operation Report ;
7 that will go to the Dr. Wilson as a part of the 8 deliberations. That will be a process --
9 The' Chairman: Excuse me for interrup. ting, 10 but the hour is late. As I understand what you say P
11 when I asked about whether you had a SAL / report, 6 l'
12 .
yousaytherearemanySALfS. You'll look in d-r ,
13 '
, evaluation at the qritical areas which have been 14 identified as' troubled areas and you get a full 15 report on that, and then the other areas which you P
16 would normally do in a SALT report will also be d '
17 covered. Do -- is that your --
18 Mr. Russell: That is correct. They are in P
19 different documents. TheSALfreport is --
n , 23 l 24 - l 1' COBOIONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ..; 2; COUNTY OF NORFOLK . 3 I, Sylvia M. Daniel, a Professional 4 Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the . Commonwealth of Massachusetts, do hereby certify 5 that the foregoing hearing was taken before me on January 7, 1987. 6 Testimony was taken stenographically by . 7 myself and then transcribed. To the best-of my knowledge, the within transcript is a true and 8 accurate record of said testimony. 9 I am not connected by blood or marriage with any of the said parties, nor interested 10 directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy. 11 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set 12 my hand and Notarial Seal this th January, 1988. 13 , G b. . l~ . e ) {s[ylviaM. Daniel, Notary Public 14 In and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 15 My Commission Expires: June 10, 1994 16 PLEASE NOTE: 17 THE FOREGOING CERTIFICATION OF THIS 18 TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT APPLY TO ANY REPRODUCTION OF THE SAME BY ANY MEANS UNLESS UNDER THE DIRECT 19 CONTROL AND/OR DIRECTION OF THE CERTIFYING REPORTER. 20 21 22 23 ' 24 , \ 1 . .. , -y .!
- l. .
1 , l j e ! TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE REGARDING THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION l DR. THOMAS MURLEY, DIRECTOR - .,0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o PLYMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS-JANUARY 7, 1988 e e $ Thank you, Mr. Chaiman. In response to the request of the Committee, I am here t'o discuss the status *of the issues concerning Pe restart of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. With me today is Mr. William Russell, who is the 3egional AdministratorofNRC'sRegionIoffice. . - As part of its regulatory process, the NRC performs a Systematic Assessment of . Licensee Performance (SALP). In early 1986 the NRC staff issued a SALP report on Pilgrim covering a 12-month period from October 1984 to October 1985. That report brought into focus a number of problem areas at Pilgrim such as a shortage of licensed operators; a large maintenance backlog with a number of management vacancies in the ma'intenance area; radiological protection program L weaknesses; emergency preparedness progrtm weaknesses; and instances of poor - pr.ocedural adherence and administrative practices et the plant. These problems. '. were compounded by a lack of critical s' elf-nsessment on'the pa'rt of Boston Edis.on and a tendency toward superficial corrective actions. We met with the senior management of Boston Edison in Jsnuary 1986 and forcefully told them of our concerns. In February 1985, a special team of inspectors was sent to the plant forseveralweeksof)round-the-clockinspection. We did this to obtain a more complete understanding of the underlying reasons for the poor perfomance. This team confimed the SALP conclusions. On April 12, 1986, a series of plant hardware problems caused the plant to shut down. At that time, ! issued a Confirmatory Action Letter documenting Boston ) Edison's intent to keep the plant shut down. Later in the sumer of 1986, ! 1 revised and extended the Confirmatory Action Letter to confim that Boston Edison would keep Pilgrim shut down until resolution of those management deficiencies identified in the SALP report and by the special team inspections. .xM 4 . Our most recent SALP review covered the period from November 1985 to January 1987[ and wa's issued April 8, 1987. This report identified five areas that exhibited recur' ring program weaknesses. These are: ,
- ~
radiological controls' '. surveillance of safety related equipment fire protection physical security and safeguards . assurance of quality Over the past few years the NRC has c'evoted considerable resources 'to monitor the Boston Edison efforts to address these weaknesses. For example, the NRC has three full-time resident inspectors at Pilgrim, whereas most single-unit facilities have two residents. Furthermore, we have-supplemented these resident inspectors with an extensive region-based inspe,ction effort and have corrnitted additional - headquarters resoupces to review and evaluate Pilgrim issues. This includes a dedicated assessment panel composed of NRC rianagers to overview and consolidate the-NRC approach to Pilgrim activities. v Let me summarize the current status of major Boston Edison and NRC. activities ~ regarding the Pilgrim facility. The facility remains shut down. The NRC has met frequently with Boston Edison, members of the public, and with the i Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as well as with local officials to discuss issues regarding Pilgrim. Boston Edison has developed a restart plan that describes tbe programs, plans, and actions considered necessary by the company to restart and safely operate Pilgrim. Although Boston Edison has not reached a position where it would request that NRC consider a restart decision, the utility has completed a number of plant improvements. The reactor was refueled 4 in October and several major systems tests on the reactor coolant system and containment structure have been completed. 1 3 ! ~ , As part of its Safety Enhancement Program (SEP), Boston Edison has proposed a l numbef of modifications intended to improve plant performance in the event of an accident at Pilgrim. The NRC staff reviewed these modifications in August 1987 and concluded that eight of the modifications were appropriate for implementation. These include containment spray nozzle modifications, the installation of a third emergency diesel generator, modifications to fire protection systems, and features ! to respond to an anticipated transient without scram. The SEP modifications are designed to mitigate the effects of abnormal conditions that could develop in containment in the event of an unlikely accident. These modifications are in consonance with NRC goals to enhance containrrent performance under severe accident conditions. We have not made them formal requi.rements:for restart li of Pilgrim. We are, however, ensuring that these modifications do not result in lessened safety for the plant. Questions have been raised regarding the Mark I containment at Pilgrim and the Direct Torus Vent mod,jfication being considered by Boston E'dison. The Direct Torus Vent would provide a hardened path from the containment torus structure to the plant stack and would be used to relieve containment pressure in certain severe accident situations. During staff review of this proposed modification a number of questions were asked of Boston Edison regarding the use of the Direct Torus Vent. These questions must be resolved before this system is placed into service.
- Regarding the management area, Boston Edison has made a number of changes that we believe are improvements. In early 1987 Mr. Ralph Bird was hired as the 6
i -4 Senior Vice President - Nuclear. He has extensive nuclear navy and management exper3ence. Changes have been made in the onsite organization, additional-personnel have been hired and programs for improvement are being implemented. j 1 ~ The NRC staff will assess the effectiveness of these programs and management l changes in the coming months. - The NRC has a special programmatic approach for assessing the Boston Edison progress at Pilgrim. Our activities are being coordinated by an Assessmert Panel that is chaired by a senior staff member from Region I and includes representatives from the region and headquarters. Once the Pilgrim restart plan has been reviewed by NRC and after Boston Edison has. stated it is . ready to , restart Pilgrim, this Panel will assess restart r'eadiness. This assessment will be a comprehensive evaluation that considers the general readiness of the , ) plant and personnel to resume safe operation and will include a comprehensive ~ onsite team inspection. In addition, as we indicated to Senator Kennedy and Congressman Studds in Chairman Zech's letters of November 20, 1987, we will conduct several public meetings to ensure opportunity for public participation and input to.the Assessment Panel regarding the Boston Edison restart plan. These meetings will be formal, transcribed sessions at which the public's testimony will be heard by NRC senior staff. After the NRC staff has comple'ted the restart readiness assessment, . there will be a public meeting at NRC headquarters at which the staff will brief the NRC Commissioners on our findings and recommendations so that the Comission itself can make the ultimate restart decision. If restart is authorized, NRC would increase its inspection coverage for the startiup program to provide around-the-clock coverage of startup and site activi t'ies. A number of " hold-points" will be instituted and Boston Edison - would not be permitted to proceed without NRC authorization. These decisions , would be based on the on-site inspection team's evaluation of Pilgrim operation. We In addition to the areas previously discussed, a number of emergency preparedness concerns have been raised at Pilgrim since the Confirmatory Action Letter was issued in April 1986. On July 15, 1986, State Senator William B. Golden and , others filed a Petition with the;NRC, requesting that NRC order Boston Edison j to show cause why Pilgrim should.ndt remaiti closed or have it's operating licer.se suspende'd. That request was based, in part, on emergency preparedness concerns. On December 22, 1986, the Secretary of Public Safety of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.sent FEMA a copy of an Office of.Public Safety report entitled. l " Report to the Governor on Emergency Preparedness for an Accident at the Pilgrim l Nuciear Power Station," dated December 1986. In a memorandum to NRC dated March 31, 1987. FEMA stated that it was also conducting a self-initiated review of the overall state of emergency preparedness at Pilgrim Station. FEMA subsequently comitted to prepare, on a priority basis, a consolidated evaluation that would i address the Petition issues, the report submitted by the Office of Public Safety, its self-initiated review, and other relevant available information. On August 6,1987, FEMA sent its report to NRC. It is entitled, "Self-Initiated i l E Review and Interim Finding for-the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth, Massachusetts.* In this report, FEMA listed the following six areas of concern , in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts emergency plans for the ten-mile emergency planning zone surrounding Pilgrim: -
- 1. Lack of evacuation plans for public and priva'te schools and day care centers.
- 2. Lack of a reception center for people evacuating to the north.
- 3. Lack of identifiable public shelters for the beach population.
- 4. Inadequate planning for the evacuation of the special needs population.
- 5. Inadequate planning for the evacuation of the. transportation-dependent.
population.. ,
- 6. Overall lack of progress in planning and apparent diminutim in emergency i
preparedness. On August 18, 1987, the NRC transmitted the FEMA report to Boston Edison and requested that the utility provide an action plan and schedule for assisting the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and local governments in addressing the FEMA identified emergency planning issues. Boston Edison submitted its Action Plan on September 17, 1987. This action plan details Boston Edison's plans to assist the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and local governments, as well as describing resources and a schedule for completion. ~ . Over the past few months, Boston Edison, the Commonwealth, and the local f 9 1"f , i ' governments in the Pilgrim area have comitted considerable resources and effort, toward resolving these concerns. Current status is as follows: - - Drafts of local plans were complete November 1,1987. These currently are in review in the respective towns. - Drafts of local procedures are in preparation. These address issues such as buses and sheltering. - The Draft Massachusetts Civil Defense Authority Area II Plan is ~ complete and under review by the Commonwealth. - The draft of the Commonwealth Plan for Pilgrim is nearing completion. - A training program has been developed by Boston Edison and provided to the Massachusetts Civil Defense Authority. 9 i l 1 - On December 17, 1987 the NRC received the " Report on Emergency Preparedness for an Accident at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station," from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. NRC and FEMA will consider this report in their ongoing reviews. O l . t .', 8- ' $ y Additionally, Boston Edison submitted an exemption request to NRC on the requirements' for conducting its Biennial Full Participation Exercise. The ' l request was based on the need to make improvements in emergency plans. NRC approved that exemption request, stipulating that the exercise be conducted , no later than June 30, 1988. l The NRC agrees that emergency planning deficiencies do exist at Pilgrim and furthe'r agrees that corrective actions are needed. However, considering the shutdow.' status of the plant and the progress that is being made to address , emergency planning issues,' we hin e not needed to take enforcement action regarding emergency planning. The NRC will not permit the facility to resume operation until corrective actions satisfactory to NRC have been taken to address the emergency planning deficiencies identified by FEMA. We will give special attention to the improved evacuation plans for schools and day care centers as well as the improved evacuation plans for special-needs and transportation-dependent populations in the ten-mile emergency planning zone. Wewillreghiresome demonstration of the critical aspects of these evacuation plans before we can decide that Pilgrim is ready to resume operation. However, it may be that restart can be authorized with some emergency , planning issues not fully resolved. Under the NRC's regulatory framework, whether an outstanding emergency planning deficiency must delay restart will depend upon considerations of the gravity of the deficiency, the nature of any compensatory actions, and progress toward correction of the deficiency. For Pilgrim this decision will be made ultimately by the Comission itself. .g. ~ i I In conclusion, there has been and will continue t'o be a high level of NRC management attention to Pilgrim. The NRC staff has adopted a unique approach ! for monitoring the performance of the utility as it implements needed ! improvements. This approach includes. opportunities for public input to the . process. I want to assure the Comittee that Pilgrim will not be pemitted to restart until the NRC staff has reviewed carefully the plant improvements, the managemerit improvements, and the offsite emergency preparedness improvements and has concluded that the plant will be operated safely. This concludes my testimony. Mr. Russell and I would be glad to answer questions. . 8 e Y 'W h s 4 Good evening. My name is'Neil Johnson, and I,m the Chairman of. the Duxbury Citizens Committee on Nuclear Matters and a member of the Duxbury Emergency Response Committee. I amla registered ~ Professional Engineer and have 13 ' years of design experience working on nuclear power plants as a Licensing, Environmental.and Structural Engineer. I,d like to addres.s 3 areas - Switchyard and Emergency Diesel Generators, Overpressurization Failure and Direct Torus Venting and Stress Corrosion Cracking. . Switchyard and Emergency Diesel Generators On November 12,1987 at approximately 2:10 AM, the Pilgrim Ibelear Power Station experienced a complete loss of offsite power (LOOP) during adverse weather conditions. This resulted in startup of the two emergency diesel generators. Prior to the restoration of offsite-power at 11:15 P.M. on the same day, one of the diesel generators had to be shut down leaving only one diesel generator operating. The event was not given'a licensee Emergency Class-ification by the NRC as the plant was in cold shutdown. It'.was. reported that the loss of offsite power was associated with' icing in the switchyard. I am concerned. that similar problems with the plant operating could occur in the future that could result in more serious consequences. i Since June of 1972 there have been 20 instances of loss of the 345 kV offsite system and 4 instances of loss of both the 345 kV { l and the 23 kV offsite systems ( 4 LOOP events ). I I I believe, that prior to restart, the NRC should review the swit-chyard and ' emergency die'sel generators as a system and assure , the public that the integrity of this system can be maintained under adverse conditions. Based on the recent diesel generator and switchyard problems I believe that the NRC should require completion of the installa-tion of the new 2000 KW blackout diesel prior to the restart. The conclusion of the Augmented Inspection Team review of the November 12, 1987 loss of offsite power was that the in-operability of the "B" emergency diesel generator resulted frer the performance of maintenance using inadequate or incomplete i maintenance procedures. I believe that the NRC should assure the public that BECO will more aggressively pursue courses of action to mitigate mechanical problems such as those experienced on the "B" emergency diesel generator? , d l 1 n c - j . 1 e a Overpressure Failure and Direct Torus Venting - l .____________________________________________ j , IL understand that severe accidents in the extreme can generate < 1 [ i. pressures of more than twice the design pressure.of a Mark I con-tainment structure similar to the one at Pilgrim and could cause containment rupture. One core damage prevention strategy ized is containment util-venting of excess pressure gradually. (see attached sketch). .This is achieved by bubbling the release'from the reactor-drywell,'through Gas Treatment the wet well, on through the Standby System and particulate are removed, (SBGT) where remaining radioactive iodine finally venting out through the main plant stack. Incidentally, the Standby Gas Treatment System remained out of service from 1984 through Pilgrim. at least 1986 at It is also my understanding that the existing vent ductwork as- ; sociated with the Standby Gas Treatment System is of fairly light gague and may be breached in accident venting. I . installation of a Direct Torus . Vent System which Therefore the provid,es' a - ' direct vent path, with heavier gauge pipe, around the Standby Gas 4 Treatment. System was proposed at Pilgrim. Installation of this i system was begun but not completed due to a lack of approval by j the.NRC. 1 I believe that the NRC should be concerned about the effects of secondary release of radioactive gas into the reactor building in ' the event of a ductwork failure. Also, if in the future the NRC approves the Direct Torus Venting System, I believe that they should review'the operation of the manual overide which would al-low the operator to manually overide switches to allow venting to continue even with high radiation in the Torus vapor space. 1 a 2 y, vr ~ M U OE 2C , - A'N ~ C A ',' '2 / - 0
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- 1
- 1 9
Stress Corrosion Cracking The 1987 update of the summary of findings and recommendations in the Reed Report - 1975 - General Electric Corporation states that stress corrosion cracking ( SCC ) is a complex, industry-wide problem affecting both BWR's and PWR's, and relates fundamentally to the harsh environment in which components and piping must operate in nuclear power plants. q l In December of 1983, the NRC ordered the lisensee to shut down ! and inspect the recirculating system piping for integranular stress corrosion cracking. The licensee replaced the recirculat-j ing system piping and was authorized to-restart in December 1984. I recomr.end that the NRC make sure that all recommendations by General Elec,tric go upgrade BWR reliability 's a impacted by, stress corrosion. cracking have been implemented ~at -Pilgrim so that this . condition does not reoccur in the future. . . i l i t 'a o
- 4P t
- ___u____ - m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _7___ l. s [ . Questions In the . restart plan reference is made to the fact of operators and that will be available during startup and po that 4 shifts. ' shifts are 6 shifts not will be available in the longer term wer ascension regular use of overtimeable to cover the work week of 21 Since wi'thcut shifts 4 have 6 shifts available? ( 50 % overtime ), how soon'will Edison Would i the NRC please obtain and make available to the records.of 1987 hours worked by the operators on duty on Nov public ember the would be A two appropriate. week period prior to and' including November 12, 12, 1987 The restart plan ace'eptance criteria. states that. "It is not intended as a go
- 2. reasonably'Within a goal?" They may proceed if th.eir performance /no go falls e
. falls within a goal and what criteria is used?Who determin's'if performance- their ' We would like the NRC to methods. discuss decommissioning costs and adequately How can funded for Pilgrim that dec:mmissioning will be we be assured usefulness? I when it has pingport What Pa. decommissioning? lessons has the NRC learned fromoutlived the Ship-its What will l the"NRC. do through the seams in the Process Building walltoand conduit insure that groundwater i through the penetration for the switchyard sump pump is correct ed? . 4 N ,i-TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 1 ABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE .n . 1 Y'[ OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Commit tee Chairman) By Dr. Grace M. Realy, Chairman. COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS ! TOWN OF PLYMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS lj i Thursday, January 7, 1988 The Plymouth Committee on Nuclear Matters, formally constituted by the ) Board of Selectmen un August 19, 1986, consists of nine members of diverse backgrounds .and experience with expertise in the medical and legal fields, in business and industry including che utilities, in physics and engineering,-in - ; planning, and in public policy. i The Committee members, while differing sometimes radically in their opinions, have one common passion - that of the discovery of what is La_e_t. I We have done our best to put as'.de our individual biases in order to listen l to knowledgeable others. We have' researched facts, gathering available l information from voluminous written materials and reports, from interviews of relevant parties and from public hearings. We have visited the plant, . . ' participated in' simulated emergency and training drills, consulted with. 7 technical experts and deliberated with one another during lengthy committee meetings. , Our deliberations have, at times, been difficult. In the end, we have managed to reach consensus on most recommendations. ~It is clear that we stand together in our concern for the safety of all residents of Plymouth. Thus far the Committee has issued two Reports: the first on the Plymouth Radiological Emergency Response Plan; the second on Environmental Radistica Monitoring.- In the first report we said the following in March 1987: There are deficiencies in the Plymouth Radiological Emergency Response Plan which are serious enough, in the Committee's judgment, to preclude "... j reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken I (by the Town and State) in the event of a Radiological Emergency." There is reason to believe that as things stand now, the Selectmen cannot fulfill their legal responsibility, particularly during a Radiological Emergency, ".. to provide for the health and safety of persons and their property ) ) The Plymouth Radiological Emergency Response Plan is a " paper" plan, l essentially untested relative to mobilization of some of the essential l personnel. Hence, the Committee made the following recommendations:
- 1. Comprehensive revision of the Plymouth Radiological Emergency i Response Plan. I This task is not complete.
I u Page 2 Y
- 2. Appointment of a full-time Civil Defense Director, with staff as
' needed , with adequate interim headquarters, and with long-ters ' plans for location in one of the new Town buildings. The Civil Defense Director will begin work on January 11. 1988. >
- 3. -Development of funds for emergency preparedness from fede'ral, state and utility sources.
Only funds from Boston Edison are beine made available to the Town.
- 4. Full . Town participation in a comprehensive drill prior to Pilgrim's .
coming back on-line. This has not been done. The Committee holds that the Plan must be operationalized. Procedures must be specified and tested. Commitments of personnel 'nd a materials must be legally formalized. Anything less is unacceptable. Regarding the second Committee Report: The Committee on Nuclear Matters, in an attempt to understand the monitoring of environmental radiation associated with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. , reviewed documents provided by Boston Edison and interviewed knowledgeable persons, including but not limited to Boston Edison representatives, Nuclear Industry repres.entatives, Department of Public , Health representatives and State Officials. .. The ' Committee on Nuclear Matters is. strongly concerned with what it considers to be the insufficient number of monitoring stations, the minimal involvement of the State in the monitoring process, and the complete lack of an " oversight" monitoring system. All of the Reports reviewed by the Committee on Nuclear Matters (1982-1987). indicate to its members that the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant does have . a continuing environmental impact. In all of the materials reviewed, I however, Boston Edison Company, the N.R.C., and the Commonwealth hold that offsite releases from the Plant (as indicated by current monitoring) have not l exceeded technical specifications. Boston Edison Company, the N.R.C., and ' the Commonwealth then ' draw the conclusion that there has been no measurable impact upon the citizenry. They further claim that even if there had been any impact it would have been minimal, and far less than the effects of previous worldwide weapons testing or of the Chernobyl accident. The Committee on Nuclear Matters takes little comfort in the above comparisons. Any environmental impact is of concern and needs to be examined if.public health is to be protected. Let us not forget that the impast of , such effects is cumulative! The Committee questions the adequacy of current , monitoring around Pilgrim I, even though it is more extensive than that at ' some other nuclear plants. Hence, the Committee recommends incress_ed monitoring. higher cuality monitoring. proper timine of monitoring to reves1 , effects of specific plant incidences which involve radioactive releases and prompt reporting of the results. Accomplishment of these recommendat ions is basic to an investigation of the impact of PNPS upon citizens' health. . . an investigation which has yet to be accomplished. o Page 3 ,m , The two Committee Reports mentioned here are being made available to i your staff, Mr. Chairman, as will be future reports and recommendations _from our Committee. We respectfully request your assistance on two related matters which may not .be the direct concern of your Committee. We request that you exert your considerable leadership at the national level to help mitigate the unintended l negative consequences of past Congress ~ional action and inaction which have led to America's Home Town becening, in fact a high level nuclear dump site. We beg you to assist in relie<ing us of this burden. Only Congress can do it, not the utilities - not Boston Edison. - We ask that you monitor closely the progress of the Department of Energy's work at the Yucca Mountain drilling site in Nevada to insure that ' . the nation will obtain as soon as nossible a permanent repository for high level nuclear waste. l We also respectfully suggest that you help to initiate a Congressional review of the role and performance of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the reasserting of Congressional authority relative to the Nuclear Industry. If it is needed, we request that you introduce corrective legislation which will ensure Congressional authority and responsibility. Thank you very much for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman; it is deeply . appreciated.> I shall be happy to answer any of your questions insofar as I - am able. - Y O e a:
- 26 OnlM1DJ!11w11hk fn_t_4ns' 11As'//L
, house OF REPRESENTATIVES g , STATE HOUSE. SCSTON 02833 e LAWRENCE R. ALEXANDER REPRESENTATIVE Chairman ein EssEx otsinicT Commalee on Energy MA a H AD MA 0 5 ROOM S40 STATE HOUSE , TEL. 439 7644 - Rgsgsacu O,ngeson Acusmistaateve Assist &NT MICHAEL ERNST - ,. MEussA sunxt TESTIMONY OF STATE REPRESENTATIVE LAWRENCE R. ALEXANDER, HOUSE CHAIRMAN OF THE MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE'S JOINT COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, BEFORE THE LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE i l JANUARY 7, 1988 I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members o'f this committee, for your deep concern over this issue and for holding this important hearing i here in Massachusetts so that you can hear directly from the citizens who are most affected by the Pilgrim nuclear power plant. . As House Chair, man of the Joint Committee on Energy of the Massachusetts Legislature, I believe there are two significant issues associated with nuclear power that warrant major federal investigations immediately. First, Congress should order an in-depth nationwide analysis of whether I people suffer adverse health consequences as a result of living near nuclear power plants. Second, Congress should order an intense investigation of the safety l systems that operators of European nuclear reactors have added to their nuclear j i I power plants, to determine whether operators of American nuclear power plants. should make similar modifications. '* t Let me discuss each of these matters in more detail. ) l With respect to the health effects of living near nuclear reactors, there l ~ - _-- a_n__ n _,. ~-~ -c_ _ _~ - .- ~_ _ - - .~c_- 3 and accidental releases'of radiation from nuclear reactors may be causing Cy 5 - increased _ leukemia. canc~er,Jinfant mortality, congenital defects and other adverse consequences.* The Massachusetts Department of Public Health has found a statistically-significant. increased' incidence of leukemias in communities near the Pilgrim 1. reactor.1 There was a 59 percent increase in blood disorders including l leukemias L for Plymouth, Kingston, Duxbury, Marshfield and Scituate for the years 1982 through 1984. In 1985, there were three times as many cases of these blood - disorders than would normally be expected for women in Plymouth (6 cases instead of 2), and the total increase for the five towns from 1982 through 1985'was
- a. statistically significant 43 percent.
Dr. Sidney Cobb, the distinguished epidemiologist who originally identified this increase in leukemias, has also found that an increase in infant mortality - and congenital defect rates took place in coastal communities' adjacent to or north of Plymouth soon after significant radioactive emissions were discharged from Pilgrim in the 1970's.2 . Evidence also seems to suggest some increased leukemias for people living downwind from Maine and Connecticut reactors. Dr. Bailus Walker, President of the American Public Health Association, and a former Massachusetts Commissioner of Public Health, has recommended a regional analysis of the health consequent.es of living near nuclear reactors. Dr. Jay Gould recently released a national study revealing higher infant and fetal mortality rates in counties close to boiling water reactors.' He believes that emissions from nuclear reactors are associated with nearly 9,000 excess deaths each year.5 , The United States is not the only country in which studies show possible adverse health consequences for. people living near nuclear power plants. A 1987 study in Lancet magazine suggests a significant correlation between proximity to nuclear power plants and increased leukemia incidence in England.6 . v' -- 3 ) /. t '.
- Other studies also suggest a need for further investigation.
While it is very difficult to prove a definite causal link between the -50 million curies of radioactive emissions released from American nuclear reactors and the specific adverse health effects that people have suffered, 1 the growing body of epidemiological evidence suggesting the possibility of - such a link makes it imperative that we explore this issue in more, detail. ' The only way,to do this thoroughly is for Congress to order a comprehensive nationwide epidemiological study of this matter immediately. Let me now turn to the issue of nuclear reactor safety, particul'arly with reference'to the General Electric Mark I reactor found at Pilgrim. I i have serious doubts about the adequacy of the containment structure at Pilgrim. ' Former NRC Commissioner James Asselstine has stated, " America can expect tc,see a core meltdown accident within the next 20 years, and it is possible that such an accident could result in off-site releases of radiation which I are as large as, or larger than, the releases estimated to have occurred at I Chernobyl."8 American reactors, he notes, "were not designed to withstand ! i large-scale core meltdowns."' Many European reactors, on the other hand, have safety features that American reactors do not have. Some, for instance, have a filtered vent to prevent overpressurization and a consequent breach of containment. Their l filters trap most of the radiation. The owners of the Shoreham reactor in Long Island have announced their intention to install such a filtered vent. Pilgrim should not restart until and unless Pilgrim has such a filtered vent. Many European reactors have an additional, independent decay heat removal system that serves as a back-up cooling system in case of failure of the original residual heat removal (RHR) system and of the emergency core cooling system. This back-up system is also independently powered in case of station blackout and is " bunkered" underground to protect against earthquake damage and sabotage. ( ._ i 7 Swiss authorities have started retrofitting some Swiss-reactors with this ' system, including an older boiling water reactor. The Pilgrim reactor was shut down in 1986 due to failures of the RHR system. It does not have a back-up, bunkered RHR system. If Europeans are installing additional coo. ling systems in their boiling water reactors, why, shouldn't Boston Edison install the same system to provide more protection - against meltdowns at the Pilgrim reactor? Boston Edison should install a bunkered RHR system at Pilgrim before restart. A. federal investigation- preferably independent of the NRC--should be undertaken immediately of the filtered vent, the bunkered RHR system, ar.d j other European safety systems to determine whether they should be added to American nuclear power plants. Congress should also consider requiring construction of a second steel-reinforced concrete con'tainment structure and molten core ',' barriers before General Electric Mark I-designed plants such as Pilgrim are allowed to continue to operate. Pilgrim should also not be allowed to re-start unless the Governor reaches a threshold determination that an evacuation plan can adequately protect public health and safety, and. local officials and the Governor have approved such a plan. Let me add one final word with regard to Pilgrim. I am becoming more and more corivinced that we may not need the power from Pilgrim. Boston Edison's own forecast of electric supply and demand shows that it probably won't need Pilgrim power from 1990 to 2000.12 With conservation and energy produced by small power facilities, we may not need electricity from Pilgrim. All of us should ask ourselves why we should take a risk that we don't have to take. All of us should ask ourselves the ultimate question--do we j l really need to take the risk of Pilgrim re-opening when we may not even need { the power it might produce? Thank you very much. , c - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - g . R' FOOTNOTES
- 1. " Health Surveillance of the Plymouth' Area," Mass. Department of Public Health, March 16, 1987. (Appendix A) , ,
- 2. " Testimony of Sidney Cobb, M.D.," presented to the Joint Committee on Energy,
' March 24, 1987. (Appendix B)
- 3. Ibid.
- 4. " Nuclear Emissions Take Their Tolls" Could, J.M. et al; Council on Economic-Priorities Publication N86-12; December, 1986, p. 7. (Appendix C)
- 5. Ibid., p. 9.
- 6. " Cancer Near Nuclear Installation," Beral, V., Lancet, March 7, 1987, p.
556. (Appendix D) I
- 7. Bibliography of over 100 relevant research papers. (Appendix E)
- 8. " Testimony of Commissi.oner James K. Asselstine, U.S. N.R C., before the Subcommittee'e on Energy' Conservation and Power,of the Committee on Energy 4
, and Commerce,." May 22, 1986, p. 3. '(Appendix F) ' I
- 9. Ibid. ,
. I
- 10. " International Nuclear Reactor Hazard Study," Anderson, R. et al, Volume !
II, September, 1986; " Europeans Head Toward Filtered Vented Containments after Chernobyl,, Nucleonics Week, June 12, 1986. ! i
- 11. "Muehleberg'Begins Backfit'for Bunkered Emergency Cooling System," Nucleonics Week, November 13, 1986. Telephone conversations between staff of Commissioner Asselstine, November, 1986, and staff of Joint Committee on Energy.
- 12. " Conservation and Load Management," Boston Edison, Exhibit V-1 (" Boston Edison's Long Range Resource Plan " Between 1990-2000, Boston Edison will have more than 500 MW of capacity beyond its reserve capacity needs--Boston-Edison receives less than 500 MW of capacity from Pilgrim), submitted to 'the Department of Public Utilities in November, 1987. (Appendix G) 9
p - r butHtona:Cal0! cf e/YaJJacbdelb: $reculhr hl tie cf'heryy heJearces ,. /00 YrmlrtWye $rced $oom f500 uscuseu s ounAnss GOVERNOR ho3foy, .)a;sucjuseffs Offff SHARON M. POLLARD SEcmETARY (617) 727 4732 TESTIMONY OF , l SHARON M. POLLARD SECRETARY OF ENERGY RESOURCES COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS i - ~ BEFORE THE - . I UNITED STATES SENATE LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE l i JANUARY 7, 1988 PLYMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS - - - - - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ - . - . _ _ - - - . _ _ - - _ . _ _ _ __ 0 _ MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: l As the Commonwealth's Secretary of Energy Resources, I ) ( wo.uld like to briefly address the demand for Pilgrim's power in { 1 meeting Massach'usetts' and New England's electricity needs. While the current power supply in Massachusetts is tight, it is j not so tight that the public health and safety need be placed I at risk with the operation of any given power plant including Pilgrim. Analyses prepared by the New England Governors' Conference and the New England Energy Policy Council have indicated that New England's power needs can be met with existing and planned resources and , potential new resources combined with effective, management. These analyses have'provided evidence that Pilgrim will not "make-or-break" the electricity supply in New England. l ( ) J In Massac)usetts, state and utility officials are working i to assure that power will be available when needed and at a reasonable cost, both over the short-term and the long-term. Recent accomplishments of' state and utility officials will improve the power supplies of the region. For example, the enactment of state appliance efficiency standards and a more efficient building code, the establishment of a cogeneration ' bidding and development process, and the approval for construction of the 300 MW gas unit in Bellingham, will all l l 9 'l !. ; o f J make' substantial contributions to Massachusetts' electricity q 1 needs. In addition, current projects will enhance future power ~ planning and supply. For example, state officials have 2 ) requested utilities to increase their capabilities to manage 1 ~ load requirements at the time of peak demand. The state is also investigating ways to fully develop conservation, load management and cogeneration at state facilities. Furthermore, the Executive Office of Energy Resources and others are working with the Department of Public Utilities to. establish a 4 least-cost planning process, which will significantly enhance ! the development of tost-ef f ective, socially beneficial electric ; resources in Massachusetts. . I would also like to note that Pilgrim 's past operating performance indicates that it can not necessarily be relied upon to provide power when needed. Pilgrim's lifetime , operating performance is worse than roughly 80 percent of other nuclear plants in the country. In the past, Pilgrim has been available to produce electricity less than half of the time that it was needed. . In addition, there is not a strong need to operate Pilgrim for economic reasons. ' While there are many uncertainties as to the economics of future power supplies, a recent analysis indicates that Pilgrim may not necessarily provide any economic savings to ratepayers if it operates. 9 = _. _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ Thorafore, I would like to take it clear that, while peak electricity resources are currently tight, there is no , t compelling need to operate Pilgrim for power supply or economic purposes if it poses an unacceptable risk to the health and l l safety of the public. As was indicated by my colleagues from the Administration, Governor Dukakis has not yet made a determination as to the ultimate role which he believes Pilgrim should play, if any, in That determination will be made only after ! our power supply. the issues of plant management, containment integrity and evacuation plan adequacy have been resolved. 2143C , a 1 l 5 ^ 5"aop9La5yy ~u.- emn W $4 SamM Of108 (6/7)727 777s TESTIMONY OF PETER W. AGNES, JR. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY JANUARY 7, 1988 GOOD EVENING MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. I AM HERE ON BEHALF OF SECRETARY CHARLES V. BARRY NHO BY EXECUTIVE ORDER IS THE DISASTER COORDINATOR FOR THE STATE AND BY DESIGNATION OF THE GOVERNOR IS THE LI AISON OFFICER FOR MASSACHUSETTS TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.- IN THE LATTER CAPACITY., THE SE'CRETARY IS THE PRINCIPAL POINT OF CONTACT BETWEEN STATE OFFICIALS AND THE N.R.C. THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY SUPERINTENDS TWO STATE AGENCIES WITH RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AREA--THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY WHICH LICENSES NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATORS AND THE CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARING j AND UPDATING EMREGENCY PLANS. MOREOVER, OTHER AGENCIES AND DIVI $ IONS WITHIN DUR SECRETARIAT WOULD PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN j 1 RESPONDING TO ANY EMERGENCY AT A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WHERE THERE WAS A PUBLIC HEALTH OR SAFETY IMPACT OUTSIDE THE PLANT. j OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, WE'VE TAKEN THREE MAJOR ACTIONS TO RESPOND TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY CONCERNS AT THE PILGRIM PLANT. FIRST, WE HAVE PREPARED AND FILED WITH THE GOVERNOR TWO COMPREHENSIVE WRITTEN REPORTS, THE MOST RECENT OF WHICH WAS e I TESTIMONY OF PETER W. AGNES, JR. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY / PAGE TWO RELEASED JUST SEVER'AL WEEKS AGO. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THESE REFORTS PART 0F THE RECORD. THESE REPORTS DEAL AT LENGTH WITH THE HISTORY OF EMERGENCY PLANNING ACTIVITIES AT THE STATE AND ' FEDERAL LEVEL AND WITH THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH - .THE PILGRIM PLANT. IT IS OUR OPINION, TO PARAISRASE THE- - FEDERAL REGULATORY STANDARD, THAT EXISTING EMERGENCY PLANS FOR I PILGRIM STATION ARE NOT ADEQUATE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE EVENT OF A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY OFFSITE AND THAT THE PLANT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RESTART UNLESS AND ! ~UNTIL ADEQUATE PLANS ARE DEVELOPED, TESTED AND APPROVED BY FEMA, NND THE .OTHER' SAFETY RELATED CONCERUS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. " SECOND, WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A NEW DIVISION WITHIN THE CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY WITH FISCAL OVESIGHT WITHIN EOPS DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS. THIS DIVISION IS TAKING A LEADERSHIP ROLE WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND UTILITY EMPLOYEES TO IN50RE THAT,.UNLIKE IN THE PAST, THERE IS ONLY ONE PLANNING PROCESS UNDER STATE SUPERVISION. THIRD, HE HAVE ESTABLISHED A FORMAL PLANNING PROCESS TO CARRY OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO US UNDER STATE LAW. THE PROCESS INVOLVES THE UTILITY, COMMUNITY GROUPS, AND LOCAL AND STATE OFFICIALS MEETING TOGETHER REGULARLY TO ADDRESS EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ISSUES. IN DOING SO WE HAVE BEEN 1 CAREFUL TO UNDERTAKE THIS PROCESS ON BEHALF OF THE THREE LICENSED PLANTS THAT AFFECT MASSACHUSETTS--PILGRIM, ROWE, AND 1 VERNON--AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY THE STATE'S POLTCY THAT THERE SHALL BE NO PLA. .4ING FOR THE SEABROOK PLANT. - - - _ - - _ - - _ - - _ - . _ _ _ _ _ a 1-TE'STIMONY OF PETER'W. AGNES, JR. ASSISTANT' SEC,RETARY 0F PUBLIC SAFETY - V- PAGE THREE .- I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE MY REMARKS BY COMMENTING BRIEFLY, BUT,MORE SPEC 7'ICALLY ON SOME OF THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE AND h PROBLEMS THAT STILL REMAIN. ON THE PROGRESS SIDE,OF THE LEDGER THE BOSTON EDISON' l COMPANY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, IS A FULL PARTNER WITH STATE.AND- . LOCAL OFFICIALS IN'THE EMERGENLY PLANNING EFFORT. THE UTILITY IS INVESTING IN THE PLANNING RESOURCES REQUIRED BY LOCAL AND-STATE OFFICIALS. .THE UTILIITY HAS REPLACED AN INADEQUATE EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WITH A MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED AND ENLARGED SYSTEM. THE UTILTY HAS ASSIGNED MORE THAN TWENTY PERSONS TO WORK WITH STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND-HAS AIDED IN THE: DEVELOPMENT OF DRAFT EMERGENCY PLANS NHICH ARE CURENTLY . BEING REVIEWED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS. THE UTILITY HAS PRODUCED A. NEW EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE STUDY THAT WE RECEIVED DURING THE SUMMER AND HAS JUST PROVIDED US WITH A STUDY ON THE ADEQUACY OF USING ONLY THE TWO EXISTING RECEPTION CENTERS FOR THE EPZ. FINALLY THE UTILITY HAS MADE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS NUCLEAR OPERATION AND INVESTED HEAYILY IN AN ON-SITE SAFETY , ; 1 ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM. ALSO, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SPECIAL ) TASK FORCES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS THE SPECIAL NEEDS ISSUES AND TO RECOMMEND IMPROVEMENTS IN THE EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION MATERIAL THAT IS DISTRIBUTED ANNUALLY.THESE ARE ' SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.
- . e
- TESTIMONY OF PETER W. AGNES, JR. . ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY PAGE FOUR SIMILARLY, LOCAL OFFICIALS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE STAFF OF THE NEW DIVISION OF NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SAFETY WITHIN CIVIL DEFENSE IN AN EFFORT .* DEVELOP THE BEST POSSIBLE EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLA,NS. IN MARY CASES, THIS EFFORT HAS MEANT THAT LOCAL AND STATE OFFICIALS HAVE WORKED NIGHTS AND WEEKENDS WITHOUT COMPENSATION. ON THE PROBLEM SIDE OF ,THE LEDGER, WE DO NOT YET HAVE A FORMALLY APPROVED EMERGENCY PLAN TO RESPOND TO AN ACCIDENT AT PILGRIM STATION AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER AN ADEQUATE PLAN CAN BE DEVELOPED. THE MOST IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT PART OF THE E'ERGENCY M PLANS--THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FOR PERSONS WITH'SPECIAL NEEDS.(S'CHOOL CHILDREN, THE HANDICAPPED, THE INFIRM ETC.)--DO NOT YET EXIST EVEN IN DRAFT FORM. QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES ANS WE HAVE DECIDED TO SUBMIT IT FOR AN OUTSIDE EVALUATION. THE SHELTERING STUDY PREPARED BY BECO. EARLIER IN THE YEAR IS INADEQUATE AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THERE IS ADEQUATE SHELTER FOR THE POPULATION. A SURVEY OF j PERSONS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS WAS PREPARED BY BECO. EARLIER IN THE YEAR WITHOUT STATE OR LOCAL PARTICIPATION OR APPROVAL AND IS j ~ INADEQUATE. THE RECEPTION CENTER STUDY WE RECEIVED TWO WEEKS AGO IS USEFUL, BUT WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A THIRD RECEPTION CENTER FOR THE NORTHERN EPZ RESIDENTS IS NECESSARY. WE WILL DESIGNATE A SITE IN A SHORT WHILE. IN TERMS OF ON-SITE ACTIVITITES, WE ARE TROUBLED BY THE DECISION OF THE N.R.C. TO LEAVE UNRESOLVED THE SAFETY ISSUES . , . c. . TESTIMONY OF PETER W. AGNES, JR. ., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY PAGE FIVE , PRESENTED BY BOSTON EDISON COMPANY'S PROPOSAL TO INSTALL A DIRECT TORUS. VENT TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN KINDS OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE MARK ONE CONTAINMENT. THE EDISON I INITIATIVE WAS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO AN N.R.C. STAFF RECOMMENDATION. IN AUGUST, 1987, DR. TOM MURLEY WROTE TO BECO.AND ADVISED THEM THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO APPROVE THE i DIRECT VENT PROPOSAL WITHOUT FURTHER INFORMATION. TO OUR , KNOWLLEDGE, BECO. HAS NOT SUBMITTED ITS RESPONSE. THIS IS JUST ONE REASON WHY OUR CALL UPON EDISON TO PRODUCE.THE i 'PROBABALISTIC' RISK ANALYSIS WE BELIEVE HAS BEEN' PREPARED IS SO IMPORTANT. MANAGEMENT CONCERNS ALSO CONTINUE TO EXIST AT PILGRIM. THE MOST RECENT SYSTEMATIC' ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE ! REPORT (SALP) INDICATES THAT BECO. SCORED LOW IN A NUMBER OF SAFETY RELATED CATEGORIES. IN AUGUST, SECURITY VIOLATIONS OCCURRED AT THE PLANT THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF AN ONGOING N.R.C. INVESTIGATION. A LOSS OF POWER INCIDENT ON NOVEMBER 12, 1987 l WAS THE SUBJECT OF A RECENT AUGMENTED INSPECTION REPORT. ALTHOUGH NO VIOLATION OF REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS WAS FOUND, THE REPORT CRITICIZES THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT OF THE RECOVERY AND FOUND PLANNING WEAKNESS. - TESTIMONY OF PETER W. AGNES, JR. 'f ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY-PAGE SIX ON BALANCE, MY DIAGNOSIS IS THAT'THE PATIENT.HAS IMPROVED 'BUT REMAINS QUITE ILL AND THE PROGNOSIS IS UNCERTAIN. FOR THESE REASONS, IT IS IMPERATIVE,'IN OUR JUDGMENT, TH1.T -THE N.R.C. HEED THE CALL BY. GOVERNOR DUKAKIS AND ATTORNEY GENERAL SHANNON TO CONDUCT AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING BEFORE' CONSIDERING ANY REQUEST TO RESTART THE PILGRIM PLANT. , I WOULD BE HAPPY TO TAKE ANY QUESTIONS. - RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Peter W. Agnes, Jr. Assistant Secretary . O Y e l' I - \ l STATEMENT BY RICHARD W. KRIMM ASSISTANT ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR ] 0FFICE OF NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS PROGRAMS ] I STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAMS AND SUPPORT DIRECTORATE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGEfCY BEFORE TE l C(EMITTEE ON LABOR AND HlEAN RESOURCES O.S. SENATE - ] 1 IN PLYM0 LITH, MASSACHUSETTS i ( l JANUARY 7, 1988 ) i . 1 1 e ] 1 ___________m_.__. __ ( . .Mt NA"E rS RICHARD W. KRIMM. I AM ASSISTANT ASSOCI ATE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MNAGEMENT AGENCY (F BA) RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT .0F FBA'S PROGRMS RELATED TO TECHNOLOGICAL AND NATURAL HAZARDS. IHESE PROGRAMS INCLUDE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY. PLANNING AROUND NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, AS WELL AS PLANNING FOR HAZARDOUS t%TERI ALS INCIDENTS, EARTHQUAKES, DAM SAFETY AND HURRICANES. ALSO,AS OFFICE DIRECTOR, I CHAIR THE FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS COORDINATING COMMITTEE (FRPCC) WHICH INCLUDES OFFICI ALS FROM THE DEPARTMENTS OF ENERGY, COMMERCE, HEALTH AND fbMAN SERVICES, TRANSPORTATION, AGRICULTURE, INTERIOR, DEFENSE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. IN ADDITION, I CO-CHAIR WITH THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) MONTHLY MEETINGS OF THE FEMA /NRC STEERING COMMITTEE. THESE TWO COMMITTEES, AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, DEAL WITH POLICY MATTERS RELATED TO OFFSITE PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS AT COMMERCI AL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY. I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TO REPRESENT THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MNAGEMENT AGENCY AND TO DISCUSS THE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (REP) PROGRM, AS IT RELATES TO OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING IN THE PLUME EXPOSURE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FOR THE P!LGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION. ACCOMPANYING ME IS MR. JACK DOLAN, FBA REGION I, BOSTON' AND MR. GEORGE WATSON FROM OUR OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL. BEFORE DISCUSSING PILGRIM SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE THE CONTEXT 0F PROGRAM PR0CEDURES AND PHILOSOPHY IN WHICH THE PILGRIM SITUATION HAS . UNFOLDED. IHE PRIMARY CONCERN OF FBA'S REP PROGRAM IS THE HEALTH AND SAFETY l OF THE PUBLIC AROUND NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. FBA WORKS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL THROUGH AN EVALUATION OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS UNDER THE FBA REGULATION ' 44 CFR 350 THIS FBA PROCESS, GOVERNED BY THE REGULATION, PRIMARILY INVOLVES A FORMAL SUBMISSION BY THE G0vERNOR, OR HIS/HER DESIGNEE, OF THE STATE AND LOCAL PLANS FOR THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (EPZ) AROUND A SPECIFIC NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THE EVALUATION PROCESS INCLUDES PARTICIPATION BY A REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (RAC), CHAIRED BY FBA, WHICH INCLUDES, AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL, THE SAME AGENCIES I MENTIONED AS BELONGING TO THE FRPCC. THE RAC REVIEWS THE STATE AND LOCAL PLAN, AGAINST PUBLISHED CRITERI A (NUREG-0654/ < FFJ1A-REP-1, REV.1), AND AGENCY REPRESENTAT!VES GIVE ADVICE ON THEIR PARTICULAR AREAS OF EXPERTISE. IHE PUBLISHED CRITERIA WERE DEVELOPED JOINTLY BY FBA AND NRC WITH FULL PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND CONTAINS ALL THE ESTABLISHED FEDERAL CRITERI A FOR DkVELOPING, REVIEWING AND EVALUATihG RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR A COMMERCI AL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY. THE PUBLISHED CRITERIA CONTAIN 16 MAJOR PLANNING STANDARDS, WHICH ARE FURTHER BROKEN DOWN INTO 196 EVALUATION CRITERI A ADDRESSING SUCH ELEMENTS AS EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC WARNING, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION. THE APPROPRIATE FBA REGIONAL OFFICE COORDINATES THE PLANNING REVIEW AND ASSURES THAT AN EXERCISE IS CONDUCTED TO ADEQUATELY TEST THE PLANS. IHE REGIONAL OFFICE OR STATE ALSO CONDUCTS A PUBLIC MEETING TO INFORM INTERESTED PARTIES OF THE CONTENT OF THE PLANS AND WHAT WOULD BE EXPECTED OF THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY AT THE PLANT. FEMA, THROUGH THE PUBLIC MEETING FORUM ENSURES THAT THE PUBLIC INPUT IS CONSIDERED AND INCORPORATED INTO THE DESIGN OF THE PLANS, WHERE APPROPRIATE. 1 e IN ADDITION, FEMA ALSO PROVIDES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO STATE AND LOCAL e 7 GOVERNMENTS TO ENHANCE THE OVERALL PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS EFFORT. AS AN EXAMPLE, FBA HAS FREQUENTLY PROVIDED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS PURSUANT TO OUR REGULATIONS. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THIS IS OUR TRAINING PROGRAM, WHICH INCLUDES COURSES IN RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING AND ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT AT THE FEMA RATIONAL EMERGENCY IRAINING CENTER IN EMMITSBuRG, MARYLAND, AND A COURSE TO TRAIN RADIOLOGICAL ' EMERGENCY RESPONSE IEAMS AT THE NEVADA NUCLEAR IEST SITE. IHESE COURSES ARE PRIMARILY FOR STATE AND LOCAL OFFICI ALS. ULTIMATELY, THE PLANS ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT FB4A HEADQUARTERS. FOLLOWI NG APPROVAL, FEMA NOTIFIES THE NRC AND THE COVERNOR AND PUBLISHES A NOTICE IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER. 'IHIS IS DONE ONLY JF A DETERMINATION IS MADE, FOLLOWING APPROPRI ATE PLAN EXERCISES, THAT THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CAN BE PROTECTED IN THE EVENT OF A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AT THE PLANT. HOWEVER, THE PROCESS DOES NOT END WITH THE INITI AL APPROVAL. THE STATE AND THE AFFECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MUST CONTINUE TO KEEP PLANS UPDATED AND THEY MUST ALSO PARTICIPATE IN PERIODIC EXERCISES WITH THE UTILITY AS A CONDITION OF CONTINUED FEMA APPROVAL. ! FEMA AND NRC HAVE ALSO SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU), MOST RECENTLY REV! SED IN APRIL, 1985 THIS M00 CALLS FOR FEMA TO SUPPLY NRC WITH ADVICE ON OFFSITE PREPAREDNESS ISSUES. IYP!CALLY, UNDER THE MOU; FEMA PROVIDES " INTERIM" 0FFSITE SAFETY FINDINGS THAT ARE USED IN LICENSING DECISIONS MADE BY THE NRC. THESE " INTERIM" FINDINGS ARE A SNAPSHOT IN TIME OF THE PREPAREDNESS o i I . s PobTURE AT A GIVEN SITE.IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT Fi41NGS MADE UNDER OUR REGULATION '(44 CFR.350) OR INTERIM FINDINGS UNDER THE l0U ARE MADE ON THE SAME BASIS, THAT IS, UNDER THE-PUBLISHED CRITERIA. El.M IN A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN THE SPRING OF ).986, FEr1A IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS. BASED ON ISSUES RAISED AT THESE MEETINGS, AND INFORMATION RECEIVED SUBSEQUENTLY, FEMA DECIDED TO CONDUCT A REVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS FOR THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION AND SO INFORMED THE COMMONWEALTH IN A LETTER TO THE MASSACHUSETTS civil UEFENSE AGENCY (MCUA) ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1986 ON DECEMBER 22,1986, THE SECRETARY OF PuBLIC SAFETY, CHARLES BARRYr F0 WARDED TO FEMA A COPY OF THE " REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON EMERGENCY PREPA' REDNESS FOR AN- ACCIDENT AT THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION" (HEREINAFTER CALLED THE BARRY REPORT). . IHIS REPORT STATED THAT THE MASSACHUSETTS PLAN AND ITS PREPAREDNESS ARE INADEQUATE TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT AT THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION. F BA WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAT THE GOVERNOR AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MASSACHUSETTS Civ!L DEFENSE AGENCY HAD ENDORSED THE 8ARRY REPORT. IN THE COURSE OF ITS SELF-INITI ATED REVIEW, FBA TREATED THIS REPORT AS THE AUTHORITATIVE AND 4 CURRENT POSITION OF THE COMMONWEALTH. 2 ON AUGUST 6,1987, FBA TRANSMITTED TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE NRC ITS REPORT ENTITLED "SELF,-INITIATED REVIEW AND INTERIM FINDING FOR THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION". THE REPORT WAS PROVIDED TO THE COMMONWEALTH AND NRC PURSUANT TO THE REGULATION AND IDENTIFIED SIX (6) AREAS OF MAJOR CONCERN: 4_ ~ LACK OF A RECEPTION CENTER FOR PEOPLE EVACUATING-TO THE NORTH. -* UCK OF EVACUATION PLANS FOR PUBLIC AND' PRIVATE SCHOOLS _AND DAYCARE CENTERS. ~ LACK OF IDENTIFI ABLE PUBLIC SHELTERS FOR THE BEACH POPULATION. - - INADEQUATE PLANNING FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE SPECI AL NEEDS POPULATION. INADEQUATE PLANN!'iG FOR EVACUATION OF THE TRANSPORT DEPENDENT POPULATION. DVERALL LACK OF PROGRESS IN PLANNING AND APPARENT DIMINU.It,N lh EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS. - BASED ON THE SELF-INITI ATED REVIEW AND INTERIM FINDING, FBA CONCLUDED THAT MASSACHUSETTS OFFSITE'RADl0 LOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS, WAS INADEQUATE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT AT PILGRIM. SHORpY THEREAFTER, NRC ~!NFORM,ED THE -BOSTON EDISON COMPANY .0F FBA'S FINDING. THEY ENCOURAGED THE UTILITY TO ADDRESS THE UNDERLYING ISSUES IN COOPERATION WITH THE COMMONWEALTH AND STATED THAT THE STATUS OF ALL ISSUES UPON WHICH THE FINDING WAS BASED WOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN DECISIONS ABOUT THE RESTART OF THE PLANT. NRC'S PROMPT NOTIFICATION TO THE LICENSEE ABOUT THE OFFSITE PROBLEMS AT THE SITE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE FBA/NRC POLICY OF COOPERATIVE EFFORT TOWARDS ADDRESSING ISSUES OF THIS SERIOUS NATURE. CURRENT STATUS MIEN WE TRANSMITTED THE SELF-INITIATED REVIEW TO MASSACHUSETTS WE SUGGESTED THAT THEY WORK WITH US TO DEVELOP A WORK PLAN AND SCHEDULE TO CORRECT THE INADEQUACIES"IN THE!R PLAN. THE COMMONWEALTH HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED SUCH A WORK PLAN OR SCHEDULEj HOWEVER, SINCE THE ISSUANCE OF THE NEW INTERIM FINDING 4 q . 4 ,l7 u ,AND THE PUBLICATION OF THE FBA SELF-INITI ATED REVIEW AND INTERIM FINDING , ON PILGRIM, THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. HAS TAKEN ACTIONS TO ADDRESS OUTSTANDING ISSUES: ON DECEMBER 17, 1987, IN A LETTER FROM GOVERNOR DUKAKIS TO QUR REGIONAL DIRECTOR, M't. II!NRY VICKERS, THE COMMONWEALTH INDICATED THAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE IN SEVERAL AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY INDICATED THAT DRAFT REVISIONS TO THE LOCAL PLANS' EXIST IN PART FOR EACH OF THE FIVE EPZ COMMUNITIES. IN SOME CASES THE DRAFT REVISIONS WERE INDICATED AS BEING UP TO-85% COMPLETE. THEY FURTHER STATED THAT WHEN OFFICIALS OF ALL OF THE COMMUNITIES AND STAFF OF.THE M SSACHUSETTS CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY /0FFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INDICATE THAT. THE.INITI AL DRAFTS ARE COMPLETED, THE DRAFTS WILL BE SUBMITTED' TO FBA FOR INFORMAL TECHNICAL REVIEW. IHE MASSACHUSETTS BUREAU OF RADI ATION PROTECTION, WHICH IS PART OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC IIEALTH, HAS SUBMITTED TO FB A A DRAFT 4F THEIR INGESTION PATHWAY PLAN WHICH THE RAC IS REVIEWING AT THIS TIME AND PLANS TO COMPLETE BY THE END OF JANUARY AT WHICH TIME THE RA,C'S COMMENTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE COMMONWEALTH. FmA LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON GOAL OF PROTECTING THE PUBLIC HEO.TH AND SAFETY. WE STAND READY TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE AFFECTED PARTIES 14 THE RESOLUTION OF OFFSITE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SITE. l WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. z . i
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- N $xcadh>e lyfu's o)#Nman Ankes l t)4ar$nted fh5 mishool s. oukakie Govergot /50 of d //w / j i Philip W. Johnston " O' II . 6}/-/ff-f/M ! l Deborah Prothrow Stith, M.D' TESTIMONY OF DEBORAH PROTHROW-STITH, commissioner , M.D. ' COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH JANUARY 7, 1988 j 1 J GOOD E V ?.N I N G MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. MY NAME IS DEBORAH PROTHROW-STITH AND I AM COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH. . ) THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC H E 7- UH HAS A TWO-NOLD RESPONSIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE OPERATIONS OF THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, , MONITORING, RADIATION EXPOSURE AND INVESTIGATING DISEASE OUTBREAKS. I -FIRST, WE ARE THE PRIMARY STATE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR RADIATION CONTROL. WE HAVE l CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE RADIATION MONITORING ACTIVITIES IN THE VICINITY OF THE PLANT SIN.CE THE MID-1970s.' THESE ACTIVITIES INCLUDE A NETWORK OF MdNITORING STATIONS, PERIODIC SURVEYS TO 4 1 DETERMINE THE EXTENT AND SERIOUSNESS OF RADIATION DOSES RECEIVED BY HUMANS AND ANIMALS AND PERIODIC INSPECTIONS OF THE POWER PLANT,ITSELF. i l -2 l I OUR MONITORING OF RADIATION INCLUDES DOSIMETERS LOCATED AT 46 SITES TO MEASURE GAMMA RADIATION, THE TYPE OF RADIATION WE WOULD FIND. THESE DOSIMETERS ARE CHECKED QUARTERLY, AND THEY WO'ULD' INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL EXPOSURE TO GAMMA RADIATION AMONG THE POPULATION WITHIN FIVE MILES : OF THE REACTOR. THROUGH A COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WE CONTINUALLY MONITOR AIRBORNE RADIATION AT THE PLANT. WATER, MILK, FOOD, FISH, AND SEDIMENT SAMPLES ARE TESTED REGULARLY. WE.A'LSO CONDUCT WEEKLY INSPECTIONS OF - ' T.H E PILGRJM PLANT,. CHECKING' INTERNAL,MONIT'ORING . AND SAFETY PROTOCOLS. I IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DOSE' ASSESSMENT AND FOR' RECOMMENDING APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. THE DEPARTMENT WANTS TO ESTABLISH A STATE OF THE ART COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING PROGRAM IN THE VICINITY OF PILGRIM THAT COULD SERVE AS AN EARLY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM AND INSURE PROMPT EMERGENCY . RESPONSE IN THE EVENT OF ANY RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVITY THAT,MIGHT PRESENT A THREAT TO - 1 4 PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND ALSO TO INSURE ADEQUATE MONITORING POINTS TO MEASURE RADIATION IN THE VICINITY OF THE REACTOR. THE DEPARTMENT ALSO WANTS A REAL TIME MONITORING SYSTEM WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE -' TRANSMISSION TO A STATE FACILITY OF ONGOING RADIATION LEVELS AT SELECTED LOCATIONS BOTH ~ WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES AND OFF-SITE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. THIS SYSTEM WOULD ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT TO KNOW INSTANTANEOUSLY WHEN RA,DIATION WAS RELEASED INTO THE ENVIRONMENT. IN ADDITION, 4 AN ON-LINE REAC< TOR PARAMETER DATA COMMUNICATION l ' LINK TO THE STATE FACILITY'S COMPUTER WOULD. BE INCLdDED IN THIS SYSTEM. THIS WOULD ALLOW US TO KNOW THE STATUS OF A REACTOR, i.e. TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, WATER LEVEL, etc. ON A REAL TIME BASIS, AS WELL AS FURTHER PROVIDE EARLY NOTIFICATION OF EVENTS TH5T COULD LEAD TO NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS. SECOND, WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING DISEASE OUTBREAKS IN THE COMMONWEALTH, INCLUDING THOSE THAT MAY BE CAUSED BY CONTAMINATION IN THE ENVIRONMENT. WE ARE CURRENTLY CONDUCTING A STUDY IN THE PLYMOUTH AREA INTO THE CAUSES OF ELEVATED RATES OF LEUKEMIA, A 4 TYPE OF CANCER THAT CAN BE CAUSED BY EXPOSURE TO ! IONIZING RADIATION. 9 TEN MONTHS AGO, THE DEPARTMENT CONCLUDED AN - ASSESSMENT OF ALL HEALTH RELATED DATA FOR THE AREA AROUND THE PLANT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE HEALTH OF SOUTH SHORE RESIDENTS MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY THE PILGRIM REACTOR. i THAT ASSESSMENT SHOWED NO UNUSUAL STATISTICAL TRENDS IN THE PATTERN OF CANCER. DEATHS OR IN THE FREQUENCY OF INFANT MORTALITY OR LOW-BIRTHWEIGHTS. WHILE SOME ANOMALIES IN INFANT MORTALITY AND LOW BIRTHWEIGHTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED, THE NUMBERS ARE SO SMALL THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DRAW ANY STATISTICALLY VALID CONCLUSIONS. WE DID FIND A STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT EXCESS.IN THE - INCIDENCE OF CANCERS OF THE BLOOD-FORMING ORGANS AMONG MALES IN THE FIVE COASTAL COMMUNITIES SURVEYED. THESE ELEVATIONS ARE AMONG THE TYPES OF LEUKEMIA THAT CAN BE CAUSED BY EXPOSURE To a RADIATION. THE INCIDENCE OF LEUKEMIA AMONG FEMALES WAS ALSO ELEVATED, THOUGH NOT To THE SAME SIGNIFICANT DEGREE. . THE CRUCIAL QUESTION, OF COURSE, IS WHETHER PILGRIM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRE HIGH RATE OF 4 LEUKEMIA. AT PRESENT, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION UNEQUIVOCALLY, BUT THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH IF CURRENTLY CONDUCTING TWO - _ - _ . . _ --_-__..----..--___-----.A SEPARATE INVESTIGATIONS THAT MAY BRING US CLOSER TO THE ANSWER. FIRST, WE ARE CONDUCTING A CASE-CONTROL EPIDEMIOLOGIC STUDY TO HELP US IDENTIFY THE POSSIBLE'CAUSES OF THE , EXCESS LEUKEMIA. IN THE COURSE OF THIS STUDY, WE WILL INTERVIEW ALL LEUKEMIA CASES DIAGNOSED SINCE 1982, OR THEIR FAMILIES, IN THE COMMUNITIES OF PLYMOUTH, KINGSTON, DUXBURY, MARSHFIELD AND SCITUATE. WE WILL TAKE DATA ON THEIR PLACES OF RESIDENCE, OCCUPATION, AND MEDICAL HISTORIES. THIS INFORMATION'WILL B E. C.OM P A RE D WITH SIMILAR~ ,, DATA FROM PEOPLE WITHOUT LEUKEMIA FROM THE SAME COMMUNITIES IN ORDER TO LOOK FOR ANY DIFFERENCES. THIS STUDY WILL HELP DETERMINE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN LEUKEMIA AND POSSIBLE SOURCES OF EXPOSURE SUCH AS CHEMOTHERAPY AND/OR RADIATION THERAPY. i 1 WE MUST BE VERY FRANK ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY. EPIDEMIOLOGY HAS ITS LIMITS, j ESPECIALLY IN CASES SUCH AS THIS WHEN WE ARE , DEALING WITH SMALL POPULATIONS, RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBERS OF CASES, SMALL DOSES, AND SMALL LEVELS l n . . OF EXPOSURE. BUT IF WE-DON'T LOOK, WE WON'T . LEARN ANYTHING AT ALL. SECOND, WE ARE,LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY-THAT COASTAL WIND PATTERNS MAY HAVE CONTRIB!?TED l TO THE DISPERSION OF RADIATION EMISSIONS FROM PILGRIM IN A WAY THAT BYPASSED EXISTING RADIATION MONITORING. THIS WORK, BEING CONDUCTED THROUGH A CONTRACT WITH THE HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WILL DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF i ESTIMATING THE LEVEL OF RADIATION REACHING THE GENERAL POPULATION. IT IS OUR OBJECTIVE THAT THE COMBINED RESULTS OF THESE INVESTIGATIONS WILL PERMIT AN INFORMED ESTIMATE OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF PILGRIM EHISSIONS TO THE ELEVATED INCIDENCE OF LEUKEMIA IN THE VICINITY 0,F PILGWIM. ' e G e 9 THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSt:. 4S ( EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT STATE HOUSE e EsSSTON 02133 f - l l . , EVELJN F. MURPHY LtEu?ENANT GOVERNOR det?! 727.7200 FOR IhMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact:
Carrie Kimball
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727-7200 LT. GOVERNOR MURPHY TESTIFIES BEFORE U.S. SENATE LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE Plymouth, Massachusetts... January 7, 1988... Lieutenant Governor Evelyn F. Murphy tonight said in her testimony before -
a U.S. Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee hearing on the Pilgrim nuclear power plant, chaired by Senator Edward M.'
Kennedy, that the state has sufficient energy resources and that the reopening of Pilgrim should be based solely on health and safety issues.
"Let'me be very clear: we have sufficient energy generating capacity for all but the moct unusual situations. As a matter of fact, Tuesday night, demand hit a record-breaking peak of 18,471 megawatts, and was met through contingency purchases and other standard operating procedures," Murphy said. "So, meeting even unusually high electricity demands is possible without Pilgrim, without Seabrook, and without crisis."
Murphy also criticized the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for being "u' unresponsive to the point of negligence," in regards to the Pilgrim plant. Specifically, Murphy stated that the NRC j has failed to respond to the state's request for an I adjudicatory hearing, a report on Pilgrim prepared for Governor
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Lt.fGovGrnor testifies.at Pilgrim hearing.
cpage two of two-
- j dukakis by Secretary of Public Safety Charles Barry, or a l
Jt equest' by Senator. Kennedy and Congressman Gerry Studds for a l
- formal hearing on Pilgrim.
"The citizens of.this' state have the right to see this case argued in a formal setting," Murphy said. "I would encourage
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you, Senator, to do everything in your power to see that this hoaring takes place. You will have the Governor's and my full support in you efforts."
Murphy opened her testimony by stating the three conditions o that Goyernor Dukakis bas set'for the. reopening of,the plant.
Those conditions are, dorrection of ' inadequate safety practices '
at the plant, a resolution of management problems and an adaquate evacuation plan.
I In 1975, when Murphy was' Secretary of Environmental l l
Affairs, she rejected the draft Environmental Impact Report for !
Pilgrim II because of waste disposal problems and plant safety questions, issues whien remain unresolved today.
Murphy-concluded by lending her strong support to Senator Kennedy's efforts to get legislation passed which would require the NRC to be bound by the recommendations of a Governor and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
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THE COMMONWEALTH ' OF MASSACHUSETTS
. c. EXECUTIVE CtEPARTMENT v STATE HOUSE e BOSTON 02133 EVELYN F. MURPHY
, UEUTENANT GOVERNOR TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR EVELYN F. MURPHY .
' UNITED STATES LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE JANUARY 7, 1988-SENATOR KENNEDY, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR'GIVING US ALL THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME HERE TONIGHT TO DISCUSS.THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND THE SERIOUS PUBLIC.
_, HEkLTHAND.SAFETYISSUESSURROUNDINGIT. ,
, THE TURNOUT TONIGHT, ON ONE OF THE COLDEST NIGHTS OF THE WINTER, IS TESTIMONY TO THE FEELINGS PEOPLE HAVE ABOUT THIS ISSUE.
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-I COME HERE TONIGHT AS ACTING GOVERNOR TO EXPRESS THE GOVERNOR'S AND MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE THREATS TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY POSED.BY THIS PLANT, AND TO, INSIST, ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, UPON TWO VERY REASONABLE, SPECIFIC ACTIONS. FIRST, THAT THE NRC HOLD AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING HERE, IN PLYMOUTH, BEFORE THIS PLANT OBENS. SECOND, THAT PILGRIM NOT BE ALLOWED TO REOPEN UNTIL THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION CONCERNS OF BOTH FEMA AND GOVERNOR DUKAKIS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED.
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IN JUNE 1986, THE NRC AND BOSTON EDISON ANNOUNCED THE q
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TEMPORARY CLOSING OF THE PILGRIM PLANT, BECAUSE OF SERIOUS I
- , CHARGES CONCERNING THE SAFETY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE FACILITY.
MR. AGNES, THE WILL NOT DWELL ON THE SPECIFICS OF THIS MATTER.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND DR. PROTHROW-STITH, THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH, ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE DETAILED DOCUMENTATION TO YOU AND THE COMMITTEE ABOUT THE CONCERNS GOVER00R DUKAKIS AND I SHARE.
SINCE THE CLOSING OF THE FACILITY, GOVERNOR DUKAKIS HAS LAID OUT THREE PRECONDITIONS FOR ITS REOPENING; PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY ARE AT THE CRUX OF THOSE CRITERIA.
FIRST, THE INADEQUATE SAFETY PRACTICES AT THE PLANT MUST BE CORRECTED; SECOND, THE MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED; AND THIRD, THE EVACUATION PLAN MUST BE ADEQUATE.
THESE THREE CRITERIA HAVE BEEN OFFERED AS REASONABLE DEMANDS FOR THE OPERATION OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN A HEAVILY-POPULATED AREA. AND THESE THREE CRITERIA HAVE NOT YET BEEN MET BY BOSTON EDISON. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS. OUR INSISTENCE THAT THE PLANT BE OPERATED WITH PROTECTION OF PEOPLE'S HEALTH AND SAFETY AS THE FOREMOST GUARANTEE Is ABSOLUTELY NON-NEGOTIABLE..
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MY OWN RESERVATIONS ABOUT PILGRIM AND NUCLEAR POWER IN GENERAL, DATE BACK TO 1975, WHEN I SERVED AS SECRETARY OF
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ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS IN THE FIRST DUKAKIS ADMINISTRATION. AT
, THAT TIME, I REJECTED THE DRAFT-ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT FOR PILGRIM II 'BECAUSE OF UNRESOLVED WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS ABOUT-PLANT SAFETY. THESE ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED TO ;
THIS DAY.
i SO, MY RESERVATIONS HAVE BECOME RESOLUTIONS: RESOLUTION TO PREVENT OUR SAFETY AND ECONOMIC HEALTH BEING HELD HOSTAGE TO ANY ONE POWER SOURCE; AND RESOLUTION TO- WORK TOWARD THE' DEVELOPMENT
, OF SAFE, RELIABLE, NON-NUCLEAR ENERGY.,
AS YOU DELIBERATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE PILGRIM PLANT, PLEASE DISREGARD THE ISSUES INVOLVING SUPPLY AND DEMAND ON THE j NEW ENGLAND POWER GRID. LET ME BE VERY CLEAR: WE HAVE SUFFICIENT ENERGY GENERATING CAPACITY FOR ALL BUT THE MOST UNUSUAL SITUATIONS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, TUESDAY NIGHT, DEMAND ,
l HIT A RECORD-BREAKING PEAK OF 18,471 MW, AND WAS MET THROUGH '
CONTINGENCY PURCHASES AND OTHER STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.
SO, MEETING EVEN UNUSUALLY HIGH ELECTRICITY DEMANDS IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT PILGRIM, WITHOUT SEABROOK, AND WITHOUT CRISIS.
I , .
TODAY'S PROBLEMS OF TIGHT ENERGY IN NEW ENGLAND DERIVE FROM , !
1 l LACK OF JUDICIOUS MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING AND PRACTICE; A LACK OF AGGRESSIVE PERFORMANCE TO EASE DEMAND THROUGH CONSERVATION AND LOAD MANAGEMENT: AND A LACK OF STRONG PURSUIT OF SMALL SCALE
___ \
l IN RECENT MONTHS THE STATE HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE. THE GOVERNOR HAS ASKED ME TO WORK WITH SECRETARY POLLARD, SECRETARY GO' L D, SECRETARY H0YTE, THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, THE DEPARTMENT OF CAPITAL PLANNING AND OPERATIONS AND THE GOVERNOR'S i ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFICE SO THE STATE CAN MOVE AGGRESSIVELY l ON THESE INITIATIVES TO AUGMENT SUPPLY AND DAMPEN DEMhND. AND l
WE ARE DOItG JUST THAT.
RAVIt0 EXPRESSED THESE CONCERNS TO YOU, SENATOR, I MUST SAY I REALIZE HOW DIFFICULT IT IS FOR YOU, GOVERNOR DUKAKIS, ME AND OTHER RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO MAKE ANY HEADWAY-AGAINST AN UNRESPONSIVE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY, A BUREAUCRACY THAT REALLY ,
DOESN'T SEEM TO CARE ABOUT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE CITIZENS !
0F THIS STATE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY NON-RESPONSIVE IN DEALING WITH THE MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC ABOUT THIS FACILITY.
LET ME BE SPECIFIC. IN JULY OF 1986, SENATOR WILLIAM GOLDEN, MYSELF, MASSPIRG AND MANY OTHERS SIGNED A SHOW CAUSE PETITION ADDRESSING THREE POINTS: REACTOR SAFETY; EMERGENCY PLANNING; AND MAINTENANCE. THE NRC RATHER CALLOUSLY DISMISSED THE FIRST TWO, AND DEFERRED CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRD POINT.
MASSPIRG HAS APPEALED THE DENIALS, AND ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES SHANNON IS NOW AN INTERVENER IN THE APPEAL; YET THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE. I FIND THIS VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.
'[ IN OCTOBER,1987, GOVERNOR DUKAKIS AND ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES SHANNON . FILED A SHOW CAUSE PETITION ASKING - FOR AN -*
ADJUDICATORY HEARING ON WHETHER THIS, PLANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO REOPEN. THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE.
NOR HAS THE NRC RESPONDED IN A SUBSTANTIVE MANNER TO THE -
I TWO REPORTS ON PILGRIM, PREPARED BY- SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY CHARLES BARRY AND SUBMITTED BY GOVERNOR DUKAKIS, THE FIRST IN I DECEMBER 1986, THE SECOND IN DECEMBER 1987. !
AND, SENATOR, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE NRC HAS DENIED THE REQUEST WHICH YOU AND CONGRESSMAN GERRY STUDDS. SUBMITTED ASKING FOR AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING ON pit. GRIM.
THE NRC HAS INDICATED THAT IT WILL MEET WITH THE PETITIONERS. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE. THE CITIZENS OF THIS STATE RAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE THIS CASE ~ ARGUED IN A FORMAL SETTING. I WOULD ENCOURAdE YOU, SENATOR, TO DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER TO SEE THAT THIS HEARING TAKES PLACE. YOU WILL HAVE THE GOVEPSOR'S AND MY FULL SUPPORT IN YOUR EFFORTS.
WHAT THE GOVERNOR AND THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS HAVE PUT j FORTH ARE SPECIFIC AND REASONABLE REQUESTS AND SUGGESTIONS. BUT WHEN CONFRONTED BY SUCH BUREAUCRATIC STONEWALLING, A VOICE OF REASON COULD BECOME TRANSFORMED INTO A VOICE OF OUTRAGE. IT IS.
AN UNCONSCIONABLE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF A PUBLIC AGENCY SUPPOSEDLY CHARGED WITH PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.
r . .
t IN CLOSIN7,.LET ME MAKE ONE FINAL POINT'REGARDING FEMA AND.
1 THE NRC. AS YOU KNOW, CURRENTLY FEMA'S ROLE IS STRICTLY hDVISORY. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HERE IS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF HOW THE NRC COULD OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF BOTH THE GOVERNOR l OF A STATE AND ITS OWN ADVISORY BODY BY ALLOWING PILGRIM TO q REOPEN DESPITE EXPERT OPINION TO THE CONTRARY. THIS IS AN ABSURDITY. THE -GOVERNOR AND I WOULD WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT ANY CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT TO GET LEGISLATION PASSED WHICH WOULD-REQUIRE THE NRC TO BE BOUND BY THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF A GOVERNOR AND FEMA.
'FOR MASSACHUSETTS, THIS. WOULD MEAN THAT PILGRIM"WOULD NOT
-/ , ,
RESTART UNTIL THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS' WERE SATISFIED WITH THE EMERGENCY PLANS.
THANK YOU.
l l l
a 6.
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