ML20205C964
Text
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W 81/94?
LIIli'A DATE:
ME.0RANDUM FOR:
essman, AD l-3 116 i
V. Nerses, A0 1-3 116 cc: B. Boger, ADR 1 544 S. Varga. DRO 528 l
FROM:
Wilda Mullinix, Management Analyst Document Control & Office Support Staff Planning. Program & Management Support Staff. NRR
SUBJECT:
FO!A 87-643 Request from D. Sergi for cyc of all records Documenting proposal by Boston Ed Co. for design & Installation of Direct torus Evnting System & NRC's re-view and/or disposition on the proposal Please respond to the attached request by 10/7/87 I have enclosed a fom memorands for your use.
If you expect your search tilne to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, please call x 24608 ASAP.
See the attached hereto for other pertinent instruc-tions.
Proprietary or privacy Act infomation is to be provided at all times. When only portions of a document are to be withheld, bracket in red; DO NOT DELETE!!
Documents which r.ay be contained in the Docket / Central Files are also to be considered.
If assistance is needed, contact me o-I. Sailey, x 27123.
This request has also been sent to OGC. REGION I Contact r.e irrediately if any other office should receive this request.
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Wilda Mullinix Management Analyst PMSB/NRR x 24608, Mail Stop 244 Attache,ents i
- 1. FO!A Request
- 2. Pertinent Instructions
- 3. Fom Memorandum for Staff response to FO!A l
i es10270030 000926
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-190 PDR
f DATE:
N/// 7 MDORANDUM FOR: Wilde inix. PMSB/NRR w
FROM:
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SUBJECT:
FOI A -
P7 6 d This office has no documents subject to this request.
_ _ ! have no documents subject to this request.
1 The enclosed documents listed at Appendix A are responsive to the subject request.
I recoenend release of these documents.
The speelfte documents enclosed and ilsted at Appendix B Aculd be.
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withheld from public disclosure for reasons discussed for each document.
[ 'this request.'PDR" availability accession numbers listed at Appendix C 1
Thefollowingoffices(orindividuals)mayhavedocumentssubjectto this request but were not notified by your correspondence to me.
j OTHERCOMENTS:a PD/ Branch Chief Signature FD/ Branch Chief Name (printed or typed) k Date CONTACT:
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. e EL 51'-0" RX BUILDING - AREA BEWEEN FIRE ZONES 1. 12 6 1.11 A.
Area Description 1.
Wall and floor construction is of masonary concrete.
4.
Ceilings are of.masonary concrete covered by metal Q decking.
2.
The ceiling height is 22 feet.
r 3.
Vencilation - see ventilation drawings.
l 4.
There is no congistion in the areas separating the two fire zones.
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B.
Safe Shutdown Equipment 1.
There are no redundant components in the area separating fire zones 1.9 & 1.10.
Safety related cables feeding components j
required for safe shutdown are being rerouted out of the area as part of the Appendix "R" modification.
After these modifications safety related cables and components will be separated by a distance of approximately 35 feet on the north sids of
'i elevation 51'-0" and approximately 50 feet on the south side of elevation 51'-0".
4 J
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The systems separated by this distance are required for hot and cold shutdown and involve cables, 4.astrumentation and valves for the RHR and Core Spray systems.
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Tabla C3 - Fire loa
- and severity tithts separction Zone Between Redundant Saf ty Rel:ted Equipment 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5
6 7
8 9
10 p r: tion Type of Quanity of Heat load Continuity Area of Maalaum (quivalent
- Fire Retard.nt Obstructions 2ne Com6ustibles Comemstibles Partial.
-te i Installed Transient Per Un t Total Stu per Total Combustible,s Zone Column 4be6 minutes per Comeustibles of Separation Heat toad Fire Esposure Protection (f.e. well.
. Jundant
! 'l Ibs/ft Ibs Unit Stu through sq. ft.
Stu/sq. ft.
floor, equlp-Volume Separatton ment) Setween 3
8tu/ft Zone Redundant R E actor Cables 6.6 133 13.464 269.280 Yes 260 2650 2.0 IEEE 383 Yes-l tiding Class 1 1 941 13.000 Cable
!!cv Sift i No Liquids non !((E 383 jtiseen Class 11 10 gal 294.000 '
Cable Coated No 91umns Liquids l with Fire
.).1 ts 13 Retardent M J to K Class III 10 qa1 204.000 Material 7,3o/4 The theoreticalI severity here is 1.o minutes. This is extremely low. The realistic evaluation of the I
susettons of these loads is also very low. interceding distances between the transient and flued fire loads conclu will reduce this probability still further. Addit.lonally, the fire retardant cables and/or cable coatings a con-Consideren, the a ve. sEC. beiseves that their enemption request is valid and should be granted.
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see Appendia A fx sore detailed discussion.
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fa612 C2 - Fire toad and Se:crity WIthia Seoaration Zone Between Redundant Safaty Reisted Equipment I
24 2b Ja 3b 4a 4b 5
6 7
8 9
10 Separ:tica Type of Qua :ity of Heat Load Continuity Area of Maalaus Equivalent Fire Retardant Obstructions-1 Zone Coatestibles Con 6vstibles per Combustibles of Separation Heat toad fire Exposure Protection (i.e. well.
Fertial
,Sct.een Installed Transient Per Unit Total Stu per Total Combustibles Zone Column 4be6 minutes floor, equip- -
Redundant lbs/ft3 lb.
Unit 8tu through sq. ft.
Stu/sq. ft.
ment) Setween SI'd Volume Separation 3
8tu/ft Zone Redundant SSE Restter Building
- Cables 16.3 326 33.252 665.049 Yes
!!40 2100 1.6 IEEE 383 Yes Cable
- El v. Slft.
Class 1 1 gal 13.000 No Liquids non IEEE 303
- Between Cable Coated Coluans Class II 13 gal 204.900 80 0 With fire 9.1 to 11' Liquids Retardant cnd L.5 Matertal la P Class Ill 10 gal 204.000 No r.g )( (
Liquids Class A 1750 1.400.000 ft)
Cond;ust-lbles I
The theoretica1 severity here is I.4 minutes. This is extremely low. The realistic evaluation of the I
laterceding distances between the transient and fixed fire loads concluded that probability of total con-sumptfor.s of these loads is also very low.
will reduce this probability still further. Additionally, the fire retardar.t cables and/or cable coatings t
Considering the above. SECo believes that their exemption request is valid and should be granted.
g see Appendia A for more detailed discussion.
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Fire Protection Existing 1.
Fire Detection Systems:
51 Photoelectric Smoke Detectors 10 Ionization Smoke Detectors 2.
Fire Extinguishing *ystems:
None 3.
Hose Stations / Extinguishers:
3 Aose Stations Portable Extinguishers 4.
Radiant Heat Shields: None 5.
Propagation Retardants:
Cables are coated with flamemastic
.or qualified to IEEE-383.
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Cost if Exemption is Denied
$257,000 I
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MAN-REM Impact if Exemption is Denied 45R f
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EVENT DESCRIPTION :
T-T j,_
T SEOJRITY REPORT.
coNOTIFIED REO 5(0. NELSON).
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?EL-ou Reportable Event number 04720.
Facility PILGRIM Date Notified
- y /19/S6 Time Notified ' 17:18 Unit i 1 Region : 1 Date of Event 05/19/S5 Vendor CE Time of Event 16:00 Operations Officer Bill Jones Classification : 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notified By : J.
MCCANN Catesory 1 : DESIGN PROBLEM Rad Release No Catesory 2:
Category 3*
Cause :
Catesorv 4 8 Component I EVENT DESCRIPTaQN *
/ PLANT COLD S/D REVIEW 0F IE INFC NOTICE 65-94 INDICATES THAT FSAR SECTION
- 7. 4.2.5.2 ON ;&D,,{GLXfAILURE _CRITERI A IS NOT. MET FOR_2_$WJTCHES. !N.THE.RHR f
_G RTEM.
REVIEW INDICATES WIREING CONFIGCRATION DOES NOT ENSURE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA.
THE 2 SWITCHES ARE DP FLOW SWITCHES FOR FLOW IN EACH RHR LOOP.
A SINGLE FAILURE OF EITHER SWITCH WOULD CLOSE DOTH VLVS IN RHR FMP MIN-FLOW RECIRC LINES ANO CAUSE PMPS TO OVERHEAT WITH NO FLOW AND FAIL.
THERE ARE 4 PMPS (2 PER LOOP). EACH LOOP HAS ONLY ONE RECIRC LINE.
LICENSEE INDICATES THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM IN COLD S/D.
FIX IS UNDER EVALUATION.
NRC RI INFORMED.
- NOTIFIED REO 1(WIGGINS).
\\s Reportable Event number 04721 Facility :
C WA Date Notified 05/19/G6 Unit 2
Time Notified I 17:34 Resion : 2 Date of Event 05/19/G6 Vendor : WEST WE$T Time of Event 8 14803 Operations Officer :
Bill Jones Classification i 10 CFR 50.70 NRC Notified By TOM BEADLE Cat very 1 : SCRAM
[/jh
UNIT 1 AT 100%. UNIT 2 AT 95Z.
DURING SURVEILLANCE ON CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSI'OE AIR CYSTEM (CRECAS) RAD MONITOR. RECEIVED CRE0AS ACTUATION.
AS PART LF ' SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE, TECHNICIANS INSTALLED JUMPER TO PREVENT START OF C'RE0AS FANS.
WHEN TRIP $10NAL WAS INSTALLED ON RAD MONITOR DURING TEST.
HOWEVER. FANS STARTED.
SURVEILLANCE WAS STOPPED AND CREOAS RETURNED TO NORMAL LINEUP.
INVESTIGATION OF CAUSE UNDERWAY.
LICENSEE SUSPECTS PROBLEM WITH CREOAS EQUIPMENT, VICE PROCEDURE OR PERSONNEL ERROR.
RESIDENT AND REGION 1 (DURR) INFORMED.
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/
/
Reportable Event number 04668.
Facility 8 TROJAN Date Notified 05/16/S6 Unit i 1 Time Notified,s 17451 Resion 5
Date of Even 95/15/86 Vendor I WEST Time of Ev nt '. 20:24 Operations Officer Kevin WolleY Classifi tian Phys.6eC./Saftsuard NRC Notified BY McPARTLAND Cateso t Security
/
Rad Release No Cato* Lev 2 Cause i Unknown Ca esory 3:
Component I atesory 4
/
EVENT DESCh!PTION UNIT IN COL D SHUTDOWN.
LOST DADOE.' SEE H00 LOO FOR DETAILS.
RESIDENT N01 INFORMED. l.EGION 5 NOTIFIED.
/
/
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ReportableEventnumberOd6p9.
Facility PILORIM Date Notified 05/16/86 Unit i 1 Time Notified 14:16
~~.
Reston i 1 Date of Eve Q _ 05/16/S6 3
Vendor I CE Time of Event i 14:03 Operations Officer Bill Jones Classification 10 CFR 50.72 NRC Notif.ed By J.
O!AR Catepory 1 :
Rad Releese No CatesorY 28
Ocuso : Procoduro Inndocuccv Catocory 38 Component :
Catesory 4 :
EVENT DESCRIPTION
- WITH UNIT COLD S/D. A QA AUDIT FOUND THAT THE SURV PROCEDURE WAS INADEQUATE AND DID NOT MEET TECH SPEC. REQUIREMENTS.
THE PROCEDURE IS FOR SIMULATED HPCI AUTO ACTUATION LOGIC.
THE DATE OF THE TEST AND POWER LVL WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO CALLER.
THE TEST WAS DONE AT POWER BECAUSE THE HPCI TURBINE IS REQUIRED.
THE PROCEDURE WILL BE REVISED AND TEST WILL BE REDONE WHEN AT FOWER.
NRC RI INFORMED.
- NOTIFIED REG 1(DURR).
N s
Reportable Event number 04670.
Facility :
FERMI Date Notified 05/'16/66
/
Unit 1\\
Time Notified
'14:19 Reston : 3
'x Date of Evey
- 05/16/86 Vendor
- .OE Time of, Event : 12:44
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Operations Of ficer
't.
Bill Jones Classification i 10 CFR 50.7 N
NRC Notified By i OEORC PIERCE Category 1 : ESF Actuation Red Release No
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Category 2
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Cause : Electrical Failure
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Catesory 3 Component TRAN5FORMER Category 4 t
/ 'N N
EVEtj DESCRIPTION
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IN REFUEL.
LOST SYSTE SERVICE XFORMER 65 WMICH CAUSED LOSS OF POWER TO DIV 2 BUSES (LOSS OF DI
'2 POWER SUPPLY).
THIS IP4 TURN CAUSED RWCU ISOLATION. RX BLDO HVAC TRIPPED.
BOT STARTED. CNTMT RM HVAC..!FTED TO RECIRC AND DOTH DIV 2 D/O STARTED AND LOADED.
THE D/Os ARE CARRYING'MVAC. LIGHTING, AND SOME AUX COOLING WATER SY3.
BOP BUSES STILL NOT POWERED.
DquSE WAS THAT THE XFORMER WAS BEING WAS% D DOWN (WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE OK) WHEN A BUSHING ARCED OVER.
PLAN IS TO IJ(SPECT BUSHING AND RE-ENERCIZE SY9 TEM.
THERE ARE NO OTHER FROBLEMS. $/tED PHONE STILL OUT ALSO).
- NOTIFIED REG 3tWARNICK)
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_1 51TINO CC CITIONS PCR 0?rRATION s'.RvrILLANCE 10UIPw.Ih"T 3.3.A Core Spray and t.PC Subsystt s 4.5.A Core Soray and LPCI Subsyste s
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(c ont' d)
(cont'd)
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Check Once/ day 1
Calibrate once/3 me:ths Tast onee/3 nonsts 2.
Tron and af ter the date that one 2.
Was it is deterzined tha* one core of the core spray subsystems is n.ade or found to be inoperable spray subsystem is inopet. ole, for any reason, continued reactor the operable core spray subsystas, operation is permissible during the 1.FCI subsysten and the diesel the succeeding seven days, pro-geneeators shall be demonstrated to vided that during such seven days be operable 1:=:ediately. The oper-all active ce=ponents of the other able core spray subsystem shall be core spray subsystes and active tenonstrated to be operable daily thereafter.
compenents of the t?CI subsyst e a=d the diesel generators are op-stable.
3.
The 1?c Subsystens shall be oper-3.
1.?CI Subsystem Testing shal.1 be as able whenever irradiated fuel is
((
follovet in the reactor vessel, and prior to reactor startup from a Cold a.
Simulated Auto a-Onc e/ Operating Condition, except as specified in 3.3.1.4, 3.3.A.5 and 3.5.F.5.
tit Actuation Tast Cyc.le b.
Pu=p Operability once/ month c.
!!ctor Operated once/Y.onth and valve operability once/ cycle frez the Alternate Shutdown Panel d.
Pump T1ov Once/3 months Three I.?CT pumps shall deliver
'.14,400 spa against a system i
bead corresponding to a vessel pressure of 20 psis
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i SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENT tmlTUG COMDfif 0NS FOR OPERATION 4.5.A Core Soray and LPCf Subsy' stems 3.5'.A C m Soray and LPCI Subsystems _ c (Cont'd)
(Con:'c) 4.
When it is determined that one of 4
Fron and after the date that one the RHR (LPCI). oumps is inoperable
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of the RHR (LPCI) pumps is made at a time when it is recuired to be or found to be inoperable for any operable, the containment cooling reason, continued reactor c iera-subsysten, the remaining active tion is oermissible only during components of the LPCI Subsystem, the succeeding thirty days pro.
both core spray systems and the vided that during such thirty days -
thecontainmentcoolingsubsystem,j diesel generators shall be demon-l strated to be operable imediately the remaining active components i
and the operable LPCI pumps daily of the LPCI Subsystem, and all I
I thereafter, active components of both cort; spray subsystems and the diesel l
generators ant operable.
4 5.
From and after the date that the 5.
When it is determined that the LPCI I
subsystem is inoperable, both core LPCI subsystem is made or found spray subsystems, the containment-to be inoperable for any reason, cooling subsystem and the diesel continued reactor operation is 9enerators required for operation pemissible only during the of such components if no external succeeding seven days unless source of power were available shall it is sooner made operable, pro.
be demonstrated to be operable I
vided that during such sevan immediately and daily thereafter, days the containment cooling q
subsystem (including 2 LPCI I
pun:os) and active compone.nts of i
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both core spray subsystems, and the diesel generators s
7 required for operation of such comconents if no external source of power were available shall 1
be operable.
)
6.
If the requirements of 3.5.A cannot be mat, an orderly shut-down of the reactor shall be initiated and the reactor shall i'
be in the Cold Shutdown Con-dition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, i
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SURV11Lt.A.NCE REQUIRD(ENT LIMITI)C CONDITION FOR OPERATION T?. W, l *3.5.5 containrient coolinz sub oya t es_
4.5 5 containaent coolina subsyat==
1.
Containment Cooling subsystem Tseeing -
Except as specified in,3.5.3.2, shall be as follows:
1.
and 3.5.7.3 below, 3.3.3.3, both containment cooling subsystem Trequency Ites_
loops shall.9 operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor Pump & Talve Operabilit.y once/3 months a.
vassel and reactor coolant temper-and ones/ cycle ature is greater than 212*f, and from the Alternate-prior to reactor startup from a Shutdown Station Cold Condition.
b.-
Pump Capacity Test After puep raintenance Each RBCCU pump shall deliver 1700 spin at and every 7 0 f t. TDH.
Eac.*.1 SSWS 3 months pump shall deliver 2700 spa at 55 f t. TDH.
1 Air test on dryvell and once/5 years c.
4 torus headers and nozzles t
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Conditional relief granted from this LCO
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- lJF or the period October 3L,1980 through O.
4ovember 7, 1980.
Amendment No. 44 NOV 171980 106 O
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEII,tANCE RIQUIRDENT f
l *3.5.3 Containment Coolins subsystes_
4.5.3 Containment coolins subsyste.
(Cont' d)
(Cont' d)
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2.
From and af ter the date that one 2.
When one containment cooling subsystes containment cooling subsysten loop loop becomes inoperable, the operable is made or found to be inoperable subsyssem loop and its associated for any reason, continued reactor dissal generator shall be demonstrated operation is permissible only during to be operable imunediately and the the succeeding seven days unless operable containment cooling subsystem such subsystem loop is sooner made loop daily thereafter.
j operable, provided that the other i
containment cooling subsystem loop, including its associated diesel i
generator, is operable.
1 3.
If tha requirements of 3.5.3 can-not be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated s.od the reac-tor shall be in a Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
C.
EPCI Subsystem l
C.
RPCI Subsystem
.=_
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1.
The HPCI Subsystem shall be oper-5 able whenever thes is irradiated 1.
HPCI Sadystem teating shall be per-fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor formed as follows:
pressure is granter than 104 psig, a.
Simulated Auto-Once/ operating and prior to reactor startup from a Cold Condition, except as speci,
matic Actuation cycle fied in 3.5.C.2 and 3.5.C.3 below.
Test b.
Pump Operability onee/ month and Once/ cycle from the Alternate Shut-down Station c.
Motor Operated Once/mor.th and Valve Oprability once/ cycle from the Alternate Shutdown Station d.
Flow Kate at once/3 months 1000 psig e.
Flow Rate at once/ operating 150 pois cycle onditional relief granted from this LCO M
r the period October 31, 1980 through
- .E-ovember 7, 1980.
haandment No. 44 NOV 171980 107
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'i a,tMATwo CONDITION FOR O W Tium
- eva v e,u.uu.vL n m u. --...
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3.).C HPCI 8ubsystes (Cont'd)
'4.5.c NPCI subsystem (Cont'd) o
(-
The HPCI pump shall deliver at least 4250 spe for a sysE tem head corresponding to a -
reactor pressure of 1000 to 150 psig.
'2.
From and after the date that the 2.
Wher it is determined that the HPCI HPCI Subsystem is made or found to Subsystem is inoperable the RCIC, the be inoperable for any reason, con-LPCI subsystem, both core spray sub-tinued, reactor operation is per-systems, and the ADS subsystem actus-missible only during the succeed-tion logic shall be demonstrated to ins seven days unless such subsys-be operable immediately. The RCIC tea is sooner made operable, pro-system and ADS subsystem logic shall viding that during such seven be demonstrated to be operable daily days all active components of the thereafter.
ADS subsystea, the RCIC systea, the LPCI subsystem and both core spray subsystems are operable.
3.
If the requirements of 3.5.C can-not be met, an orderly shutdova shall be initiated and the reac-tor pressure shall be reduced to or below 104 psig within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3 5.D Reaetor Core Isolation Coolira 4 5.D Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
_(RCIC) Subsystem
_(RCIC) Subsystem 1.
The RCIC Subsystem shall be oper.
1.
RCIC Subsystem testing shall be per-able whenever there is irradiated formed as follows:
fuel in the reactor vessel, the re-actor pressure is greater than 104 a.
Simulated Auto-Once/ operating psig, and prior to reactor startup natio Actuation cycle from a Cold Condition, except as Test spesified in 3.).D.2 below.
b.
pump Operability Oncs/asonth and once/ cycle from i
the Alternate Shutdown Station g
c.
Motor Operated once/ month and Valve Operability once/ cycle fron the Alternate Shutdown Etation 108 Amendment No.
42
. -....M.AY.12 19%
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3, p Feacter Core 1:elstion Coolinc 4.5.D ftenctor Core t:aisit en coolin-3, (gC c) t,ubsy: ten (Cont'd)
(RCIC) Sub:y: tem (Cont'd) d.
Tlev Rate at Cnct/3r.o.,th:
1C00 psig i
e.
Tlev Rate at Cnce/c;ersti..;
1)0 ;sig cycle ne RCIC ;u=p shall deliver at 1 cast.CO r,;= for a sy te h::.4 corres;cadir.; to a react y,res-sure of 1000 to 180 psig 2.
Trc= and af ter the date that the 2.
When it is deter =ined that the RCIC 3C:C3 is =ade or found to te inop.
subsyste= is ine;erable, the h.*C f, eratie for ar.y ressen, continued shall be de=enstrated to be operdle resctor ; ver c;erstien is ;ersis-ir..eiistely and veekly thereafter.
sitie cr.ly during the succeedir.g seven days ;revided that during such seven days the X?C 5 is oper-able.
3.
If the requirements of 3.3.D cannot be =st, an ords:1y shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pres-
'(*
sure shall be reduced to or belev 104 psig withis 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3 5.I Aute stie re n essuri:stien 4 5.E Autecatie Dettssruri:s. tier.
Syste: (ACS)
Syste= (ArS1 1.
The Aute=atic Depressuri:stion Sub.
1.
During each operatir.; eycle the systa= shall te o;ersble whenever folleving tests shall to ;erfarned there is irradiated fuel in the on the ADS:
reacter vessel and the reactor pres.
sure is greater than 104 psig and a.
A sir:1sted aute=stic cer.::. Lon prior to a startup f.en a Cold Coni test shs11 he ;erfor:ed prier to
~
dition, except as specified is
, startup af ter ear.h refuelit.; out-3.$.E.2 belev.
age.-
b.
With the reacter at pressure.
each relief valve phall be =an-
)
ually opened until a corresponding i
~
, change is reactor pressure or sain turbine bypass valve positions indicate that steam is flovine fica the valve i
Perform a test from the alternate c.
A=end= ant No. g 57 shutdown panel to verify that the relief valve solenoids actuate.
Test shall be perfomed after each refueling outage prior to startuo.
109
LTMITU:0 C0'*DITION FOR OpGATIC!!
SURVIILIA :C REUIJD's :
3 5.E Auto.atie De :ressurization 4 5.E Au amatic Depressurization System (ADS) (Cont'd)
' System (ADS)
(Cont'd) j
\\
2.
From and after the date that one 2.
When it is determined that pas valve valve in the automatic depressur-of the ADS is inoperable, the ADS ization subsystem is cade or found subsystem actuation logic for the to be inoperable for any reason, other ADS valves and the MPCI sub--
syste:s shall be demonstrated to be continued reactor operation is per-PeraMe Wiately and at least missible only during the succeeding weekly thereafter until the valv-seven days unless such valve is is repaired.
sooner =ade operable, provided that during such seven, days the HPCI subsystem is operable.
3.
If the requirements of 3.5.E can-not be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reac-l tor pressure shall be reduced to at least 104 psig within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
t 1.5.F Mini::um Low Pressure Cooling 3 5.F Mini =u: Im Pressure Cooling 4
and Diesel Generator Avail-and Diesel Generator Avail-(
ability ability 1.
During any period when one diesel 1.
When it is determined that one diese:,
generator is inoperable, continued generator is inoperable, all lo.i pre j reactor operation is permissible sure core cooling and containment only during the succeeding seven cooling subsyster.s shall be decon-days unless such diesel generator is sooner made operable, provided strated to be omaW iMM/
that all of the low pressure core and daily thereafter.
In addition, and containment cooling subsystems the operable diesel generator shall,
and the remaining diesel generator be demonstrated to be operable i=-
shall be operable.
If this re-medik.aly and daily thereafter untill quirement cannot be met, an order-the inoperable diesel is repaired.
lyshutdownshallheinitiated and the reactor shall be placed in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
Any co=bination of inoperable com-ponents in the core and contain-ment cooling syste=s shall not de.
(
feat the capability of the remain-ing operable co=ponents to fulfill the cooling functions.
110 Amendment No. 15 m
3
4 LDtITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVIILLANCE REQUIRDfENT 3.5.F Minimum _Lov Pressure Cooling r'
and Diesel Generator Avail-ability (Cont'd) 3.
When irradiated fuel is in the re-actor vessel and the reactor is in the Cold Shutdown Condition, both core spray systems, the LPCI and containment cooling subsystems may be inoperable, provided no work is being done which has the potential
.for draining the reactor vessel.
4 During a refueling outage, for a period of thirty days, refueling operation may continue provided that one core spray system or the LPCI system is operable or spec-ification 3.5.F.5 is set.
5.
When irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor is in the Refueling Condition with the torus drained, a single contro1 rod drive =echanism may be removed, if both of the following conditions are satis-fied
(
a) No work on the reactor vessel, in addition to CRD removal, vill be performed which has the po-tantial for exceeding the maximum leak rate from a single control blade seal if it became unseated.
I b) 1) the core spray systems are operable and aligned with a svetion path from the condensate storage tanks, 11) the condon-sate storage tanks shall contain at least 200,000 gu11ons of ussble water and the refueling cavity and dryer / separator pool shall be flooded to at leapt elsvation 114'-0".
l l
3.3.G
(,
(Intentionally left blank) 1 Amendment No.
39 111 JAN 8 1960
LIMITING CONDITION TOR OPERATION SURVEILI.ANCE REQUIREMDTT 3.5.H Maintenance of Filled Dis-4.5.H Maintenance of Filled Discharge charge Pipe Pipe Whenever core spray subsystems, LPCI The following surveillance requirements subsystem. HPCI, or RCIC are required shall be adhered to to assure that the to be operable, the discharge piping discharge piping of the core spray sub-from the pump discharge of these sys-systems, LPCI subsystem, KFCI and RCIC taas to the last block valve shall be are filled:
filled.
1.
Evety month prior to the testing of the LPCI subsystem and core spray subsystem, the discharge piping of these systems shall be vented from the high point and water flow ob-se rved.
2.
Following any period where the LPCI subsystem or core spray subsystems have not been required to be oper-able, the discharge piping of the inoperable Fystes shall be venteQ
(
from the high point prior to the return of the systaa to service.
3.
Whenever the HPCI or RCIC system is lined up to take suction from the l
torus, the discharge piping of :he RPCI and RCIC shall be vented f rom the high point of the system and water flow observed on a monthly basis.
4.
The pressure switches which monitor the dischargs lines to ensure that they are full shall be functionally tested every month and calibrated y
every thrie months.
C A=ettdnent No.
39 gg3 JAN B E00
BASES:
(
3 5.A Core Spray and LPCI Subsyste.m.
This specification assures that adequate emergency cooling capability is available whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.
b.e t.1 on the loss of coolant analysis performed by General Electric in accordance with Section 50.46 and Appendix K of 10CFR50, the Pilgrim I Emerger.cy Core Cooling Syste=s are adequate to provide sufficient cooling to the eve to dissipate the energy associated with the loss of coolant accident, es limit calculated fuel clad *emperature to less than 22000F, to limit calculated local =ctail water rqaction to less than or equal to 17%, and to limit calculated core vide metal water reaction to less thnn or equal to 15 22e limiting conditions of operation in Specifications 3 5.A.1 through 3 5.A.6 specify the co=binations of oper3ble subsystems to assure the availability of the mini =um cooling systens noted above.
No single fail-ure of CSCS equip =ent occurring during a loss-of-coolant accident under these li=1 ting conditions of operation will result in inadequate cooling of the reactor core.
Core spray distribution has been shown, in full-scale tests of syste=s similar in design to that of Pilgrim, to exceed the minimum require =ents by at least 2 %.
In addition, cooling effectiveness has been demonstrated at less than half the rated flow in simulated fuel asse=blies with heater
(
rods to duplicate the decoy heat characteristics of irradiated fuel.
The accident analysis is additionally conservative in that no credit is taken for spray conlant entering the reactor before the inter::al pressure has fallen to ICA psig.
The LpCI subsystem is designed to provide e=ergency cooling to the core by flooding in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. This system functions in co:;hination with the core spray system to prevent excessive fuel clad te=perature.
The LICI subsystem and the core spray subsystem provide adequate cooling for break areas of approximately 0.2 square feet up to and including the double-ended recirculation line bresk without assistance frem the high pressure emergen:y core cooling subsystess.
The allovable repair times are established so that the average a'isk rate for repair sculd be no greater than the basic risk rate.
The =ethod and concept are descrioed in reference (3).
Using the results devuloped in f
Amendment No. 15 113 m 211976
BASES:
3.5.A Core Opra; sni LPC: Subsy : ens (Cont'd) this reference, the repair ;eriod is fcund to be less than 1/2 the test in-tervsl.
This assumes that the core spray subsyste:s and LPCI constitute a 1 eat of 2 systet; however, tne combined effect of the two syste=s to li:1t excessive clad terperatures =ust also be consideted. The test interval spet-ified in Specification L.) was 1 conths. Therefore, an allovable repair period which tair.tains tr.e tasic risk considerinb sin 61e failures should be less tha:. ;0 cays and this specification is within this period. For cultiple failu es, a shorter interval is specified and to Jeprove the as-surance that the retainir.g systems vill function, a daily test is called for. Although it is recognized that the informacion given in raference (1) provides a quantitative method to estimate allovsble repair times, the la;k of operating data to support tr.e analytical approsch prevent.t ecm?lete ac-ceptance of this method at tnia time.
Therefore, the tires stated in the specific ite s vere established vitn due regard to judg=ent.
Should one core spray subsystem becoce inoperable, the remaining core spray and the LPCI syste: are available should the need for core coolir6 arise.
To assure that the re aining core spray and LPCI subsyste=s ar.d tne diesel generators are available, they are de=onstrated to be operable im=ediately.
This demnstratier includes a manual initiation of the pu:.ps and associatt.d valves and diesel generators.
Ba. sed on judgments of the reliability of the remaining syste:s; i.e., the core spray and LPCI, a seven-Cly repair pertod was obtained.
Should the loss of one LPCI pu:p occur, a nearly ot11 cocplenent of core and contain=ent cooling equi;:ent is available. Thrae LPCI rumps in conjuncfd2D
.vith t.he core cray subsys._ts._irill_Itr_ fog _the core cooling fanction.
Bo-cause of the availability of the Lajority of the core coolin.; equipeent, which vill be demonstrated to be operable, a 30-day repsir period is Justi-tied. If the LIMI suobyste: is not available, at least 2 LFCI pumps cust be asailable to fulfill tr.e contain:ent cooling function. The 7-day repsir period is set on this basis.
The LPCI Subsystem is not considered inoperable wnen the RHT System is operating in the shutdown cooling mode.
(1) Jacobs, I.M,, "Guidelines :or Ietermining Safe Test Intervals and Repair Tines for Engineerec f tteguards", General Electric Co.
A.F.E.D., April,1969 ( AFED 5736) e 114
l DEFINITIONS (Cont'd) 1.0 Instrumentation s the Instrument Calibration - An instrument calibratio T,
t it corres-adjust ent of an instru ent signal output so tha 1.
to a known j
and accuracy, I
within acceptatle rarge,which the instrument conitors.
- ponds, v1Llue(s) of the parameter entire instrument including Calibration shall encompass the actuation, alars or trip, instru ent channel ceans an arrarge-d to generate Ir.st m ent channel - An cent of a sensor and auxiliary equireent require 2.
l relatM to and transmit to a trip system a single trip signa nt channel, the plant parameter conitored by that instruze functional test An instrument I_nstrutent Functional Test -
h instrucent essns the icjection of a siculated signal into t e 3
l respor.se, prirary sensor to verify the proper instrument chenne a
alar: and/or initiating action.
deter-Instru.ent check - An instrument chsek is qualitative f instru-eination of acceptable operability by otse*vation oTris determ h.
during operation.
with where possible, co ;arison of the instrument cent behavior i ble.
other independent instruments =casurire the same var a
- include, l test IggSystem Functional Testi - A logic syste: functiona 35 cans a test of all relays to insure co:ponents are op-A fro: sensor to activated device *4here practicable, action will go d valves opened.
etable pe.- design intent.
to completion; i.e., pumps vill te started an zeans an arrangement of instru:ent ini-Trip Syste; - A trip systa trip signals and auxiliary equipment re 6.
channel i nals system cay require one or core instrument ch tiate action to c 3 re-of protective action cay related to one Initiatioa coincident trip system action.
sir 41e trip syste= or the quire the tripping of a tripping of two trip syste:s.
i sys-Protective Action - An action initiated by the prote 7
te: when a limit is reached.
channel or syste level.
i h results Protective Function A syste protective action wh cfrom th tic-8.
ular plant condition.
Atic actuation Dieniated Autoratic Actuation - Si=alated auto:
to actuate si=ulated signal to the sensor
- 7 9 means applying a
(
the circuit in question.
t d
,hb
___m__
m..
r'.
i INITI TAME. 4.2.B MINIMIM TEST AND CAI.IlflATION FRH4UENL7 FUR CSCS Remarks Ingic ystem Manctional ht (4) (6)
Frequency
([-
n_
$ 1) Core Spray Dubsystem once/6 months W) Imer Press. Coolant Injection Subsystem Once/6 months l
- 3) Containment spray Subsystem once/6 months
[ Once/6 months ]
-y) HFCI Subsystem
- 3) HITI Subsystem Auto Isolation once/6 months Once/6 months y 6) AIG Subsystem
- 7) RCIC Subsystem Auto Isolation Once/6 months
- 8) Diesel Generator Initiation Once/6 months
- 9) Area cooung ror sareguard System Once/6 months O
e
.'% g/
A
~
--.7
l NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2. A THROUGH 4.2.G Initially once per month until exposure hours (M as defined on Figure 4.1.1) is 2.0 x 105; thereaf ter, according to Figure 4.1.1 1.
with an interval not less than one month nor more than Functional tests, calibrations and instrument checks are not requ when these instruments are not required to be operable or are 2.
Functional tests shall be performed before each startup Calibrations with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.
tripped.
of IRMs and SRMs shall be performed during each startup or du controlled shutdowns with a required frequency no day during those periods when the instruments are required to per week.
This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definiti The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrica 3.
signal into the measurement channel.
These instrument channels will be calibrated using simulated j signals once every three sonths.
Simulated automatic actuation shall be perfort d once each ope Where possible, all logic system functional tests will be 4.
cycle.
performed using the test jacks.
Rasetor low water level, high drywell pressure 5.
are tested on Table 4.1.2.
The logic system functional tests shall include l> 6.
the trip systems.
Amendment No.
42 MAY 121980 67 t
3.2 BASES (Cont'd) dent. With th; established settir.g of ~ times normal tackgrour.d, and main steam li: e isolatior, valve closure, fission product release is limited so tha: 10 CTE 100 guidelines are not exceeded for this a:-
- ident. Iefera.:e Section 1-d.2 F2iJ.
iressure instr; ernatior. is provided to close tne main stea. isolhtio.
valve: tr. Fur kode vnen the tain stes:. line pressure crops below i psig. In the Eefuel and Ctartup Mode this Panction is re;1 aced by high reactor water level.
~his Panction is provided primarily to pro-vide protection agairst a pressure regulator calPanctior. wr.ich results ir. the contral and cr t: pass valves ope.ing, hith the trip settiras 0;ecified, inventory loss is limited so that fuel is r.o uncovered.
Tne HFCI high flow and te:perature instru:entation are provided to detect a break in the HPCI stea: piping. Tripping of this instra-centatien results in actuation of ::FC: isolation valves. Tripring logic for the high flow is a 1 out of 2 logic, and all senscrs are required to be operable.
Te ;erature is monitored at three (3) locations with four ( 1 tem-perature sensors at each location. Ivo (2) sensors at each loca-tion are povered by "A" direct current control bus and two (2)
"S" direct current c:ntrol tus.
by Each ; air of sensors, e.g.,
"A" or
"?",
at each location either "A" or "B" bus sens:r vill actuate H K:are physically separated and the tripp isolation valves.
he tri; settings of 6 30C4 of design flov for high flov and 20cor 0
or 170 F, de;eniing on sensor location, for high temperature are such that core uncovery is preventei and fission product release is with-in li its.
Tne PCIO high flow and tet;erature instrumentation are arranged the sa:e as that for the HPCI.
Tne trip setting of g 300G for higr flov 0
0 and 200 F, 170 T and 1500F, de;eniing on sensor location, for te:-
perature are based on the sa:e criteria as the HPCI.
The Feactor Water Cleanup Syste. high flow and terrerature instracer-tation are arranged similar as that for the HTOI.
The trip settings are such that core un:overy is prevented and fission ;roduct release is within limits.
The instrumentation which initiates C3CS a: tion is arranged in a dual bys syste:. As for other vital instrumentation arranged in this fash-ion, the Specification preserves the effectiveness of the systen even durin6 periods when maintenance or testing is being perforced. An ex-ception to this is when logi: fun:tional testing is being perforned.
70
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(*
)
3 5 '_CO?tE A'?D C0!!?A7!.tT':7 C001.2PC ls. $ CC?tE A'lD CMTAThW/? COOLT.NC i
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(
A;tli cability Aw11eability Applies to the operational status of Applies to the Surveillance pequirete....
i the core sat su;;tessica pool coolir.g subsystems.
of the core and suppression pool cooling subsyste=a which are required when the corresponding Limiting Condition for op.
erstion is in effect.
ct$eetive Objective To assure the operability of the core To' verify the operability of t'ha core ar.d and surpression rool cooling subsysta=s suppressica pool cooling subsyster.: unior under all conditions to-Wich this all conditions for which this cooling ca.
cooling capability is a: essential re.
pability is as essential respense to sta.
g sponse to station abnormalities.
tion abnormalities.
3;eeifleation specifiention A.
Core serav ud 7.7C7 Subsvete-s A.
Ce-e ?--ma* mad f*"
'^ tat * -
1.
Both core spray subsy:tems shall 1.
Core 3; ray 3 systar. Testing.
~
be c;e.-able Wenever irrat.iatei fuel is is the vessel est prior
(
Itea
)tosu er.:v to res:t:r startup from a Cold Cor.11 tier., except as specified
.a. Si.sdated Cnce/Operatir.g h
a in 3 5.A.2 below.
Auhtic Cyde s
3,,y,,g,, g,,g, b.
Px:p Cperability On=e/conth c.
Motor Operated Cece/ month and Talve Operability once/ cycle from j
i the Alternate Shutdown Panel d.
Pump flow rate Each pump shall deliver at least 3600 spa against a system head corresponding to a Tweetor veneel 1
pressure of 104 psis.
k e.
)
A p Instrumentation f
Amendment No.12, 62 4
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