ML20235A596
| ML20235A596 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1987 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235A045 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-737 NUDOCS 8801120345 | |
| Download: ML20235A596 (18) | |
Text
..
,d 4/
PREPARED TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING H.R. 2683 (NRC LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS) and H.R. 1570 (THE NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM ACT OF 1987)
H.R. 3025 (APPALACHIAN LOW-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL COMPACT CONSENT ACT)
PRESENTED BY
^
LANDO W. ZECH, JR.
CHAIRMAN SUBMITTED: OCTOBER 1, 1987 1
8801120345 880107
~
S00LL 7 737 PDR
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss H.R. 2683--which consists of four legislative proposals that the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) submitted to Congress this year, H.R. 1570--the " Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987", and H.R. 3025--the " Appalachian Low-Level Radioactive j
1 Waste Disposal Compact Consent Act."
The Comission is most appreciative of the Comittee's interest in these legislative proposals. Our testimony will begin with a discussion of H.R. 2683--the NRC legislative proposals.
i H.R. 2683--NRC's Legislative Proposals 1.
Section 1--Protection of Sensitive Generic Safeguards Information i
/
The first section of H.R. 2683 would amend section 147 of the Atomic t
Energy Act to provide that the Comission is authorized to protect from public disclosure sensitive generic safeguards information when disclo-sure could compromise or negate site-specific security measures required by the Comission to protect nuclear materials and facilities against theft, diversion or sabotage.
In 1980 Congress added section 147 to the Atomic Energy Act.
In that section Congress provided important projections against unauthorized disclosure of a Itcensee's or applicant's sensitive information related to the security of specific nuclear facilities and special nuclear materials. However, Congress did not enact a broadly written prevision
. for withholding generic information on safeguards matters from public disclosure.
As a result of its experience in implementing section 147, the Commission is aware of an ambiguity in that section relating to the Comission's authority to protect from public disclosure generic infonnation that would be likely to endanger specific safeguards measures implemented by NRC licensees.
In its Diablo Canyon operating license proceeding, the Comission concluded that certain generic information regarding the design basis threat, specifically, that part of the design basis threat relating to the number of armed adversaries against which security plan characteris-tics are developed was an integral part of the licensee's security plan.
The Comission determined that release of that information could reason-ably be expected to provide substantial assistance to a potential saboteur of the Diablo Canyon facility. The Commission further deter-i mined that the infonnation, although nominally generic, was properly considered a detailed portion of the applicant's plan and that the Comission was authorized under section 147 to protect that information from public disclosure.
The Comission believes that its interpretation of section 147 is correct. An interpretation contrary to the Comission's could negate the important projections provided by Congress for sensitive safeguards
__.___.____.____.___w
. information.
Accordingly, the Commission believes it would be desirable for Congress to codify its authority to withhold and protect generic information of the nature discussed.
The Commission's concern is not limited to the Diablo Canyon situation addressed above.
The Commission is also concerned that a court could find that section 147 does not provide a basis for withholding from public disclosure generic reports, studies and analyses of sabotage vulnerabilities.
Such a holding would be inconsistent with the national interest in preserving effective safeguards.
Moreover, it appears that without clarification of section 147, a federal court which disagreed with NRC's interpretation of section 147 could order the NRC to release security-related information similar to or identical to that being protected by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 14S of the Atomic Energy Act.
Even though it could be argued that NRC safeguards information is not as sensitive as DOE information because DOE facilities are of greater national security significance, public disclosure of certain sensitive generic safeguards information relative to NRC facilities could be of substantial assistance to one who contemplated sabotaging a DOE facility because the infomation might be identical. Accordingly, failure to amend section 147 could significantly negate the Congressional purpose underlying the enactment of section 148.
j
! This legislation, if enacted, would not significantly increase the scope of information which the Comission may withhold from the public. Yet, by explicitly authorizing the withholding of a small class of sensitive safeguards information, Congress could help prevent any possibility that an alternative interpretation of section 147 could result in the disclosure of information that could be of assistance to a saboteur.
2.
Section 2--Unauthorized Possession of Firearms Section 2 of this bill would authorize the Commissicn to promulgate regulations which would prohibit a person who has not obtained prior authorization to carry, transport, or otherwise introduce or cause to be introduced any dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument into any facility, installation, or real property regulated by the l
Commission. Violation of the regulation would constitute a federal crime j
punishable by a $5000 fine, imprisonment for not more than one year, or l
both. The Commission in promulgating irrplementing regulations would be authorized to determine the scope of the prohibition. The Commission's l
intent would be to limit the applicability of those regulations to those 1
licensed nuclear facilities and materials which must be protected against l
theft or radiological sabotage.
This provision is needed because there have been an increasing number of reported incidents where persons without authorization have brought firearms into protected areas of NRC regulated sites.
While the
. Cons.ich currently can and does impose sanctions against licensees for permitting unauthorized weapons or other dangerous instruments to enter i
the site, there is no federal law permitting the imposition of criminal l
sanctions against the person responsible for bringing the weapon or other dangerous instrument to the site.
1 I
We believe enactment of this proposal would assist our licensees in their efforts to safeguard those licensed nuclear facilities and materials i
i which must be protected against nuclear theft or sabotage.
In addition, enactment of this legislation would promote the national policy of I
l maintaining comparable safeguards for similar nuclear materials and f
facilities in the public and private sectors. Under section 229a. of the l
t Atomic Energy Act, unauthorized introduction of weapons or other j
dangerous instruments at nuclear facilities owned by the Departirent of I
l Energy would constitute a federal crime.
Enactment of this legislation l
would permit similar safeguards with respect to unauthorized introduction i
of weapons at NRC regulated nuclear facilities.
3.
Section 3--Sabotage During Construction of a Facility The third section of H.R. 2683 would amend section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act to make it a crime to sabotage or attempt to sabotage a nuclear production or utilization facility during its construction where the action, if it went undetected, could affect public health and safety.
Currently, section 236 covers acts of sabotage to a utilization facility only after it has received its operating license from the Commission.
i i i
l Sabotage during the iater stages of construction, particularly during :
l pre-operational testing, can be equally serious. For example,_in 1984 a bag containing some parts was found inside a pipe which had been welded closed after it had undergone several pre-welding checks at a plant under construction. While this incident was determined to be negligence rather l
than sabotage, it demonstrated that an act of sabotage during construction could potentially have an adverse effe:t on public health and safety.
Sabotage during the late stages of constructico is of special concern since most inspections which would have discovered the sabotage would have already occurred.
Therefore, there is the possibility that the sabotage might not be discovered prior to operation. This proposed legislation narrowly defines the type of sabotage which would constitute a federal offense. The sabotage or attempted sabotage must be serious enough to have a possible effect on public health and safety if not discovered prior to operation.
l We believe that enactment of H.R. 2683 is warranted to provide greater protection for the public health and safety by enacting criminal sanctions to deter such sabotage.
. 4.
Section 4--Reporting of Violations or Defects The fourth section of H.R. 2683 pertains to the Commission's ability to receive proper notice of defects or regulatory violations at nuclear power plants and other regulated activities, where such defects or l
violations could create substantial safety hazards.
Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provides that any individual director or responsible officer of a finn constructing, owning, operating, or supplying components of any facility or activity licensed or regulated under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorgani-ration Act must promptly notify the Comission of violations of the i
Atomic Energy Act or any applicable regulation, order or license condi-tion relating to substantial safety hazards or any defect which could i
create a substantial safety hazard. Any person who knowingly and consciously fails to provide notice is subject to a civil penalty.
Based on more than a decade of experience in implementing this statutory provision, we believe that some changes in section 206 are warranted.
First, we believe that the section should be revised to provide that the l
firm, as well as individual directors and responsible officers should be responsible for notifying the Comission. This assignment of responsi-bility would be more in accord with the general approach to regulation under the Atomic Energy Act, which imposes responsibility on the licensee, rather than individual corporate officers for compliance with l
regulatory requirements. Under our proposal the current provision that a
. civil penalty may be levied against individual directors and responsible officers for a krowing and conscious failure to notify the Commission would be retained. However, the proposed legislation would subject a firm to sanctions for any failure to notify, regardless of its intent or degree of negligence in failing to comply with the Connission's regulations. This would ensure that the failure to report violations or defects, regardless of the reasons for the reporting failure, would be subject to possible civil sanctions.
This approach is in accord with section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, which authorizes civil penalties for violations without regard to whether they are knowing and conscious.
1 H.R. 2683 would also clarify the Commission's authority to promulgate regulations, issue orders, and conduct inspections and investigaticos l
under section 206. These provisions would codify existing practice and l
remove any questions regarding the Commission's authority to take necessary actions to implement section 206.
l The proposed legislation would also clarify that a fim, whether it be a l
licensee or a non-licensee, may be subject to a civil penalty for violating Comission regulations or orders issued to implement and enforce section 206, as well as for violations of section 206 itself.
The current statute is ambiguous regarding the Commission's authority to impose sanctions against non-licensees, such as reactor vendors.
l
. Section 4 would also make other amendments to section 206.
The bill would clarify that the requirements of section 206 must be prominently posted on the premises of any firm affected by the section, and not simply at facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act. This would cover suppliers of components and other firms who are covered by section 206 but who are not regulated dir:.ctly under the Atomic Er.ergy Act.
Finally, the proposed legislation would subject the Department of Energy to the requirements of section 206 to the extent that the Department's activities, facilities or materials, are licensed by the Comission.
The Comission believes the Department of Energy, to the extent it is subject to NRC licensing, should be subject to the same regulatory requirements as our other licensees.
In conclusion, the Commission believes that the adoption of these amendments would clarify the scope of section 206 and thereby ensure that the Comission has sufficient authority to implement effectively the notification requirements mandated by Congress.
H.R.1570--The Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987 I
H.R.1570, as reported by the Comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, would require the creation of an Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).
This system would provide for direct electronic transmission of selected parameters from nuclear power reactors to the Comission.
)
. The Commission supports enactment of legislation for a system similar to that which would be required by H.R. 1570 as originally proposed because such legislation would substantially enhance our incident response capability.
The Commission has determined that NRC's primary role in an emergency is to monitor and advise. Our monitoring role is in two areas:
We monitor the licensee to assure that appropriate recommendations are made with respect to offsite actions.
We also monitor the licensee to assure they are taking the appropriate onsite actions to mitigate consequences of the incident.
Another aspect of our role is advisory:
We support both the licensee and the onsite NRC response team with technical analyses, advice and logistical support.
We also support offsite authorities including confirming licensee's recommendations for protective actions to offsite authorities.
1 l
. Agency advice will be made by the NRC's Ch&lrman (or his designee) to a licensee manager or the appropriate state or local decisionmaker.
In addition, NRC is the single Federal tocal point for keeping other Federal agencies and entities and the media infonned on the status of the j
incident.
i i
j The effectiveness of the NRC in performing its role is dependent on the i
quality and timeliness of the event information the agency receives. The types of informat~on the agency needs for er.ergency response are:
reactor systems conditions, containment building conditions, radio-i activity release rates, and the plant's meteorological data.
Currently, the data is transmitted to the NRC from the licensee by standard voice telephone communications. Two primary phone links are used. One is dedicated for reactor data; the other is primarily for radiological and ret. horological data. Our experience with voice-only emergency communications--starting with TMI and reinforced numerous times since then--is that it can be too slow and prone to error.
Information 1
may be miscomunicated, frequently creating false issues which can divert attention from the real problems.
Even worse, incorrect data can cause NRC to respond to the licensee or offsite officials with inaccurate or outdated advice.
s I
NRC's thinking of how to enhance its incident response capability has evolved over several years. The NRC has considered various options
1 l
l
' ranging from extensive continuous transmbsion of a large quantity of I
parameters from all facilities, to the current system in which we rely on i
telephone communications.
The Consnission has determfned that an emergency response data system will provide the data in an accurate, reliable, and 1
timely manner. We have successfully conducted tests of an ERDS concept l
with Duke Power Company at the McGuire facility and with Commonwealth 1
Edison at the LaSalle and Zion facilities.
Both tests confirmed the l
l advantages of having direct electronic transmission of a' selected set of parameters.
l Based on these successful tests of the concept, the NRC initiated an EROS Requirements Analysis.
The analysis consisted of visits to the licensees t
to determine the design of the site data systems and the availability of the data reouested by the NRC.
Based on the results of the surveys, the Comission believes an ERDS concept can be implemented with relatively little difficulty at essen-tially all sites.
Ease of implementation will vary depending on type and utilizatin of licensee equipment.
Implementation at some sites may require a delay until other equipment upgrades are completed.
In view of the large potential benefit to the NRC incident response capability from the ERDS and the results of the survey indicating the relative ease of implementation, the NRC currently plans to begin
i implementation of the system en a voluntary basis. While we expect the majority of licensees will see the benefits of the system and will participate, there is no guarantee.
H.R. 1570 would make implementation of a system mandatory for all licensees.
H.R. 1570, would require complete implementation within 3 years of passage. The current NRC implementation plan is phased over a longer period to accommodate current licensees' schedules for equipment upgrades. Passage of H.R.1570 would require some licensees to accelerate their current schedules.
However, there is one aspect of the bill against which we caution:
H.R.1570 would require the Emergency Response Data System to be activated upon implementation and, thereafter, to transmit data to the NRC continuously except during system maintenance outages. This goes well beyond the NRC's concept of a data system designed solely to enable the NRC to carry out its emergency response role. The NRC had envisioned a system activated by the plant operator upon recognizing an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency condition. Our estimate is that implementation costs for a system that continually transmits data might be five times that of the system envisioned by the NRC and because of its complexity might take an additional year to install.
H.R. 1570 thus would require installation of an emergency response data system that is more complex than we contemplated and would be considerably more expensive to operate. When compared to the system recommended by the NRC, it would not appreciably increase the NRC's capability to perform its proper role in an emergency.
.. Attached to this testimony is an analysis of the costs of u rious alternative approaches.
It is our understanding that the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee j
l adopted the continuous monitoring requirement because it believed that it would be useful to preserve certain pre-event data for NRC analysis. We believe this objective of transmitting to the NRC pertinent plant data, well in advance of the development of potentially serious plant conditions, could be achieved without continuously monitoring plant i
conditions. To accomodate the Congressional concern, we would recommend that the system be activated at the " unusual event" classification level.
This classification occurs approximately 200 times per year and is at a l
sufficiently low threshold that our experience shows that data transmission would begin, in all cases, well before any serious plant emergency cenditions develop.
I In conclusion, we strongly support legislation which would require expeditious implementation of an emergency response data or similar system. This would greatly enhance our incident response capability.
Of the possible approaches, we prefer the modified approach described above because we believe continuous transmission of data is unnecessarily j
costly and more difficult to implement.
If legislation is enacted, we will work closely with States to help assure that the Emergency Response Data System supports them in attaining our comon comitment to protect the health and safety of the public.
i 1
j
! i 1
l H.R. 3025--Appalachian Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact
)
i Consent Act H.R. 3025 is before Congress so that the States of Pennsylvania', Maryland, Delaware and West Virginia, may obtain Congressional consent as required by the Constitution to enter into an interstate compact i
regarding the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.
I We have reviewed the Compact and the proposed consent language and l
support enactment of H.R. 3025. Mr. Chairman, that completes my l
testimony.
l e
4 Background
On Wednesday, July 1,1987, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported H.R. 1570, the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) bill.
The bill was amended to require the EROS to be activated upon implementation and to function continuously except during maintenance.
The current NRC Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) concept is a direct electronic data line from the electronic data systems of nuclear power facilities to the NaC Operations Center for use only during emergencies at the facilities.
The data to be transmitted would be a limited set of parameters most likely available on the existing data computers at the sites.
NRC would accept the data in a transmission format and at an update frequency convenient to the licensee and the licensee would control activation of the system.
The amendment to the bill would require the continuous transmission of data from all sites to the NRC Operations Center at all times with the capability of being monitored at the Operations Center.
The following analysis provides cost estimates for the data transmission options described above.
The ERDS implementation cost estimate reflects the' current budgetary proposals.
The implementation cost estimate for H.R. 1570 ERDS is based on comparison estimates done in 1983 for the Commission and Congress.
As with any estimate of this type the larger and more costly the system the greater the margin for error.
Cost Summary NRC ERDS H.R. 1570 EROS Implementation
$5.7 Million
$25.0 Million 1 FTE 2-3 FTE Operation N/A
$3.0 Million/ Year N/A 7 FTE Maintenance
$570K/ Year
$2,500 K/ Year 4
Cost Estimate NRC ERDS:
The estimate for implementation of the NRC ERDS concept is $5.7 Million over a five year implementation period.
This includes NRC hardware, software, and contractor assistance.
This does not include the effort by the licensees to modify their systems to output a data stream of the selected parameters to a modem for transmission to the NRC.
This also does not include NRC FTE which is budgeted at one for the duration of implementation.
H.R. 1570 EROS:
An estimate for implementation of the H.R.1570 ERDS concept is $25.0 Million.
This includes NRC hardware, software, and contractor assistance.
This assumes continuous transmission from all the facilities with a processing, screening, storage, and display system for this data at the NRC Operations Center.
This does not include the effort by the licensees to modify their systems to provide a continuous data stream.
This does not include the NRC FTE required to monitor implementation which would probably be increased by one or two.
Operation:
NRC ERDS:
Normal operating costs of the NRC ERDS are expected to be minimal.
Data transmis-sion costs are anticipated to be able to be incorporated in the current NRC communications requirements.
No additional continuous staffing of the NRC Operations Center would be anticipated to be required.
ERDS activations would be expected to average ten or less per year (the number of declared Alerts at the facilities).
H. R.1570 ERDS:
Normal operating costs of the H.R.1570 ERDS would require significantly more communics.tions capability.
Data transmission costs for approximately 100 dedicated lines operating continuously would be about $3.0 Million per year.
Due to the continuous transmission of data in this system the on shift staffing of the Operations Center should be increased by one which requires an increase in FTE of seven.
Maintenance:
NRC ERDS:
System annual maintenance costs are estimated to be approximately 10% of implementation costs.
For the NRC ERDS concept this is $570K/ year.
H.R. 1570 ERDS:
$2,500K/ year.
- - - - - -