ML20207T202

Testimony of TE Murley on 870309 Before State of Ma Special Joint Committee on Investigation & Study of Pilgrim Station Nuclear Generating Facility at Plymouth

ML20207T202
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	03/09/1987
From:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
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ML20207T198	List: ML20207T197 ML20207T202
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NUDOCS 8703230304
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5 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF THE PILGRIM STATION NUCLEAR GENERATING FACILITY AT PLYMOUTH 4

THOMAS E. MURLEY, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS PARCH 9, 1987

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l9 I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. I understand that many of you have concerns about the safe operation at Pilgrim and we want to be responsive to your concerns. We share the same goal of safe operation of Pilgrim.

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We in the NRC recognize that times are changing with regard to States' interest in nuclear regulation. We want to work with Massachusetts in a cooperative way and to be responsive to your concerns and those of the Governor.

To begin, I would like to discuss how we got where we are today with l

Pilgrim. With the Committee's indulgence, I will go back several years.

Boston Edison ordered the Pilgrim plant in the late 1960's. They received a construction permit in August 1968 and an operating Ilcense in September 1972.

If one looks back, we can see that the seeds of many of their current problems were sown in those very early days. The design, construction and operation of Pilgrim was treated much like any other fossil-fired plant in the Boston Edison system. That is, they had a nuclear plant being operated in a fossil plant environment. One can contrast that situation with the Yankee plant, where the plant was operated within a nuclear corporate ethic from the very beginning. The demands, the training, and the attitudes are much different for operating a nuclear plant than for a fossil plant.

9 2-In 1980 and 1981, there were management problems at Pilgrim that led to a

$550,000 fine. BECo responded positively by creating a separate nuclear organizatiqnwithaSeniorVicePresidentincharge. During 1980 to 1964, we started to see improvements:

they invested millions of dollars in plant hardware, improving condition of the plant they increased spare parts inventory they began to clean-up the radioactive contamination in the plant that was caused by fuel failures in the 1970's j they replaced some large diameter pipes that had become cracked During this same period, the NRC was issuing a flurry of new requirements in the aftermath of the TMI accident. Thus, we saw a paradox. While there were visible signs of improvement, the workload was growing too fast, and the management systems at Pilgrim were being overloaded.

That brings us to 1986. Early that year, we issued a Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) review covering a 12 month period from October 1984 to October 1985. That report brought into focus a number of problem areas:

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• a shortage of licensed operators causing excessive operating over- I time i

1 a large maintenance backlog with a number of management vacancies  :

in the maintenance area

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l radiological protection program weaknesses emergency preparedness program weaknesses  ;

• instances of poor procedural adherence and administrative [

practices at the plant ,

t too frequent failure of managers to ensure proper planning and scheduling of required surveillance tests and maintenance [

l These problems were compounded by a lack of critical self-assessment on the  !

l part of Boston Edison and a tendency toward superficial corrective action.  !

l l I talked with the senior management of BEco in January 1986 and forcefully [

t told them of NRC's concerns, In February 1986, I sent in a special team of l inspectors for a few weeks of round the-clock inspection coverage in order to obtain a more complete understanding of the underlying reasons for the poor i

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performance. This team confirmed the SALP conclusions. 'In April 1986, .

a series of plant hardware problems caused the plant to shut down. At that time, I issued a Confirmatory Action Letter keeping the plant shut down and I sent in another NRC inspection team. Later in the summer of 1986, I revised .

-and extended the Confirmatory Action Letter to assure that BEco would keep Pilgrim shut down until those management deficiencies identified in the SALP and the diagnostic team inspection were resolved. The plant has since -

remained shut down for refueling and modifications. BEco subsequently decided to make additional safety improvements to the plant, including their Mark I containment structure. In this safety initiative, they are leading the rest of the industry.

Two specific questions can be asked:

(1) What is the adequacy of BECO's actions? I believe they are clearly on the right track. We see signs of improvement at the plant.

There is a new Senior Vice President in charge of the nuclear j program who has extensive experience in the nuclear Navy. A recent emergency preparedness exercise showed better planning and senior management involvement in that program. I L

However, out in the plant the workers are still struggling to get their arms around the problems. The management team has not yet

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jelled. There is still-a large work activity backlog and still a shortage of reactor operators. In addition, the security, fire grotectionandradiologicalprotectionprogramsarenotaseffective as they need to be. The organization has to overcome the legacy of years of fossil plant type of operation that mere words at the top cannot change overnight.

In the past, we in the NRC mistook good intentions and management assurances for real, fundamental changes in performance. We will not fall into that trap again. NRC has been giving enhanced inspection coverage and oversight at the plant and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. We are having bi-monthly senior management meetings to assess their progress. There are now three NRC Resident Inspectors assigned to the site.

(2) Will the plant be ready to return to full power operation safely?

The plant remains shut down. NRC will not permit its restart until we make a finding that it can be operated safely. We will require a comprehensive report from Boston Edison that describes the improvements that have been made in the plant, personnel, programs, l and in their management systems. This report will be made public.

In addition, NRC will conduct a readiness team inspection and will also make public the team's inspection report. This inspection will i

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i be similar to the special diagnostic assessment team inspection which was conducted at Pilgrim in February 1986 and will. focus on thegeneralreadinessoftheplantwithspecificemphasisonthose problem areas which have been identified at Pilgrim. Finally, there will be a public meeting with the NRC Commissioners before NRC makes a decision to allow restart of the reactor.

If a restart is authorized, NRC would augment its inspection coverage for the startup program. This coverage will be like that which we applied during the Three Mile Island Unit 1 startup and will provide around-the-clock coverage of startup and site activities.

i There will be a number of " hold points" beyond which BECo would not be permitted to proceed without NRC authorization. These decisions "

would be based upon the evaluation of the plant's operation by the on-site inspection team.

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V What will we look for to see that the situation has improved at Pilgrim in preparation for restart?

l In general terms, we will look for:  !

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1. A stable and effective management team at the plant. l

2. Management vacancies are filled and licensed reactor operator and senior reactor operator positions are filled. l

3. The work backlog is under control and a system is in place to track the backlog.

4. Solid improvements have been made in long-standing problem areas such as radiation protection, fire protection and plant security.

5. Solid improvements have been made in the offsite emergency planning weaknesses.

Finally, we will expect to see that BEco is developing its own internal high standards of performance and the means for self-critical analysis relative to those standards. Of course, there will be detailed inspections of many specific issues within these general areas.

That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman.

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