ML20151N912

Insp Repts 50-327/88-22 & 50-328/88-22 on 880319-0402.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Extended Control Room Observation & Operational Safety Verification,Including Operations Performance,Sys Lineups & Safeguards

ML20151N912
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/13/1988
From:	Branch M, Jenison K, Long A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151N905	List: ML20151N902 ML20151N912
References
50-327-88-22, 50-328-88-22, NUDOCS 8804260042
Download: ML20151N912 (19)

See also: IR 05000327/1988022

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@ "tGuq UNITED STATES

, .jog NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,E o.

( REGION il

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• .$ 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900

o f ATLANTA, GEORotA 30323

%, ,o

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APR 131988 -

Report Nos.: 50-327/88-22, 50-328/88-22

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

6N 38A Lookout Place

1101 Market Square

i Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

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Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Hos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79

Facility Name: Sequoyah Units 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: March 19, 1988 thru April 2, 1988

Project Engineers: O k b o o 'N kfM 8h

J. Brady, Proje'ct Engineer Date Signed

K. Ivey, Project Engineer

G. Hunegs, Project Engineer

A. Long, Project Engineer

W. Bearden, Project Engineer

Shift Inspectors: P. Harmon, Shift Inspector

D. Loveless, Shift Inspector

W. Poertner, Shift Inspector

G. Humphrey, Shift Inspector

K. Ivey, Shift Inspector

Shift Manager Approval: /3 h8

K. /enison, hift Manager Date Signed

aAm Ce %Am $lt3) W

M.' Branch, Shift' Manager Date ' Signed

8804260042

DR 880413

ADOCK 05000327

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Summary

Scope: This announced inspection involved onshift and onsite inspections by

the NRC Restart Task Force. The majority of expended inspection effort was in

the areas of extended control room observation and operational safety verifi-

cation including operations perf ormance, system lineups, radiation protection,

and safeguards and housekeeping inspections. Other areas inspected included

maintenance observations, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of

events, review of licensee identified items, and review of inspector follow-up

items. During this period there was extensive control room and plant activity

coverage by NRC inspectors and managers.

Results: No violations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons contacted

Licensee Employens

• H. Abercrombie, Site Diractor

J. Anthony, operations Group Supervisor

• R. Buchholz, Sequoyah Site Representative

• J. Bynum, Assistant Manager of Nuclear Power

• H. Cooper, Licensing Supervisor

H. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager

R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor

J. Hamilton, Quality Engineering Manager

• M. Harding, Licensing Group Manager ,

• G. Kirk, Compliance Supervisor

• J. La Point, reputy Site Director

L. Martin, Site Quality Manager

R. Olson, Hodifications

R. Pierce, Hechanical Maintenance Supervisor

R. Prince, Radiological Control Superintendent

R. Rogers, Plant Operations Review Staff

M. Skarzinski, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor '

E. Sliger, Manager of Projects

• S. Smith, Plant Manager ,

• J. Sullivan, Plant Operations Review Staff Supervisor

• B. Willis, Operations and Engineering Superintendent

NRC Employees

, *F. McCoy, Startup Manager

i *K. Jenison, Shift Manager

• Attended exit interview

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2. Exit In(prview  ;

, The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 7, 1988, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The Startup Manager described

the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding listed

below. The licensee acknowledged the inspection finding and did not >

identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors

during the inspection.

The following new item was, identified: ,

Unresolved (UNR) 327,328/88-22-01:

NOTE: A list of abbreviations used in this report is contained in

paragraph 11.

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3. S'ustained control Room Observation (71715L

The inspectors observed control room activities and those plant activi-

ties directed from the control room on a continuous basis for the entire

period of this report. The observation consisted of one shift inspector

per shif t supported by one shif t manager per shif t and other OSP manage-

ment. l

a. Control Room Activities Including Conduct of Operations

The inspectors reviewed control room activities to determine that

operators were attentive and responsive to plant parameters and ,

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conditione; operators remained in their designated areas and were

attentive to plant operations, alarms and status; operators employed

communication, terminology and nomenclature that was clear and

formal; and operators performed a proper relief prior to being

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i discharged from their watch standing duties. General improvements

have been identified by the inspectors in the conduct of operations.

The inspector had no further comments.

b. Control Room Manning

The inspectors reviewed control room manning and determined that TS i

requirements were met and a professional atmosphere was maintained '

in the control room. The inspectors found the noise level and

working conditions to be acceptable. The inspectors observed no l

horseplay and no radios or other non-job related material in the .

control room. Operator compliance with regulatory and TVA adminis- l

trative guidelines were reviewed. No deficiencies were identified.

The control room appeared to be clean, uncluttered, and well organ-

ized. Special controls were establiehed to limit personnel both in

the control room inner area and in the control room areas behind the

back panels.

The inspector attended operator training held on April 1, 1988 on

changes to AI-30 for operator /NRC interface in the control room.

c. Routine plant Activities Conducted In or Near the Control Room

The inspectors observed activities which require the attention and

direction of control room personnel. The inspectors observed that

necessary plant administrative and technical activities conducted in

or near the control room were conducted in a manner that did not

compromise the attentiveness of the operators at the controls. The ,

licensee has established a shift engineer office in the control room i

area in which the bulk of the administrative activities, including

the authorized issuance of keys, take place. In addition the

licensee has established hold order (HO), work request (WR), sur-

veillance instructions (SI), and modification matrix functions to

release the licensed operators from the bulk of the technical

activities that could impact the performance of their duties. These

matrixed activities were transformed into the WCC which is located

in the TSC spaces.

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These activities appear to have effectively reduced the activities

requiring direct control room support. The licensee's control of

keys still appears to be loose. However, no control issues have

been identified.

d. Control Room Alarms and Operator Response to Alarms

The inspectors observed that control room evaluations were performed

utilizing approved plant procedures and t hat control room alarms

were responded to promptly with adequate attention by the operator

l to the alarm indications. Control room operators appeared to

believe the alarm indications. No discrepancies were identified,

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As a result of a recent NRC/TVA enforcement conference and the

increased management attention applied by TVA, improvements have

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been apparent in this area.

e. Fire Brigade

The inspectors reviewed fire brigade manning and qualifications on a

routine basis. Both manning and qualifications were found to meet

TS requirements.

f. Shift Briefing / Shift Turnover and Relief

The inspectors observed that ROs completed turnover checklists, and

conducted control panel and significant alarm walkdown reviews and

significant maintenance and surveillance reviews prior to relief.

The inspectors observed that sufficient inf ormation was transf erred

on plant status, operating status and/or events, and abnormal system

alignments to ensure the safe operation of the units. Assistant

shift supervisor (SS) relief was conducted in the control room and

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sufficient information appeared to be transferred on plant status,

operating status and/or events, and abnormal system alignments to

ensure the safe operation of the unit. Assistant SSs were observed

reviewing shift logbooks prior to relief.

Shift briefings were conducted by the offgoing SS. Personnel

assignments were made clear to oncoming operations personnel.

l Significant time and effort were expended discussing plant events,

! plant status, expected shift activities, shift training, significant

l surveillunce testing or maintenance activities, and unusual plant

conditions,

j g. Shift Logs, Records, and Turnover Status Lists

The inspectors reviewed the RO and STA logs and determined that ts.ey

were completed in accordance with administrative requirements. The

inspectors ensured that entries were legible; errors were corrected,

initialed and dated; logbook entries adequately reflected plant

status; significant operational events and/or unusual parameters l

were recorded; and entry into or exit from TS LCOs were recorded

promptly. Turnover status checklists for Ros contained sufficient

required information and indicated plant status parameters, system

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alignments, and abnormalities. The following logs were also re-

viewed:

Night Order Log i

System Status Log

Configuration Control Log

Key Log (see comment about key control subparagraph 3d)

Temporary Alteration Log ,

SS Log - The SS log appeared to be kept on a more regular basis '

and detail of entries had increased since the last

inspection period.

As a result of a recent NRC/TVA enforcement conference and the

increased management attention applied ty TVA, improvements have

been observed in this area.

h. Control Room Recorder / Strip Charts and Log Sheets

The inspector observed operators check, install, mark, file, and l

route ror review, recorder and strip charts in accordance with the  ;

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established plant processes. There were no events that caused the

immediate control room review of recorder / strip chart peaks during

this inspection period. Control room and plant equipment logsheets I

were found to be complete and legible; parameter limits were speci-

fled; and out-of-specification parameters were marked and reviewed l

during the approval process.

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4. Manacement Activities _

TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the shift

inspectors and shift managers, and by the Startup Manager. The licensee

conducted a series of plant activities throughout each day to control

plant routines. These activities were referred to by the licensee as War

Room activities. War Room activities were observed by the shift managers

on a daily basis and were found to be an adequate method to involve upper

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level management in the day-to-day activities affecting the operation of

the units.

5. Chronoloav of Unit 2 Plant Ooerations

At the beginning of the the NRC Restart Task Force shift coverage, Unit 2

was in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) with tgree RCPs operating and the 2A-A RHR

pump in service. The RCS was at 180 F and 370 psig. Pressurizer level

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was at 26 inches. All SGs were filled to the operating range, the conden-

i sate system was on long cycle recirculation, and there was a vacuum in

l the main condenser.

On February 4, 1988, the NRC approved entry into Mode 4/3 (Hot Shutdown /

Hot Standby). The plant was heated using RCPs and entered Mode 4 on

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February 6, 1988.

On February 27, 1988, the unit entered Mode 3.

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' On March 22, 1988, the NRC Commissioners voted to allow Unit 2 to re-

start.

Cn. March 30, 1988, the NRC approved entry into Mode 2 (Startup).

During this inspection period the unit was maintained in Hot Standby

(Mode 3). A number of events occurred during this inspection period and

are listed below:

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March 19: While performing SI-67, Individual. Rod ~ position-Indication

Calibration, the group step counters for group I rods did not

operate pt.cerly. The operator manually opened the reactor trip

breakers ( tsTr } ac required by T.S. 3.1.3.3.

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March 20: Both main feed pumps received a trip signal due to low

injection water pressure. The low pressure resulted from the lineup

of feedwater heaters that had been isolated and drained. The feed

pump trip resulted in an ESFAS.

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March 20: All four high pressure fire pumps were declared inoperable

for the performarsce of SI-73, Fire pump performance Test.

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March 21: The licensee identified problems with RTB clearances and a

broken undervoltage (UV) assembly trip tab on one RTB.

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March 22: Letdown orifice isolation valve 62-73A became stuck in the

mid-position. A failed diaphragm was identified as the cause of

failure.

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March 22: MSIV #4 was shut to perform corrective maintenance on the ,

limit switches due to control room indication problems.  ;

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March 24: During the performance of MI-10.9.2, Reactor Trip Breaker ,

Switchgear Inspection, an "A" train feedwater isolation occurred .

The isolation resulted from a technician manipulating a cell switch

during the perf ormance of the MI.

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March 24: Unit i received a high steam flow coincident with low-low

Tave or lov steam pressure engineered safeguards feature (ESP)

signal. No safety injection occurred due to the auto block.

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March 25: The licensee identified excessive noise on source range

detector NI-31.

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March 28: The limitorque motor for balance of plant (BOF) feedwater

valve 2-FCV-3-81 separated from the actuator during valve stroking

due to a deteriorated spring pack.

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March 28: An inspector identified that the manual block valve for

the TDAFp header supply to the #2 steam generator (SG) was closed.

This was identified as unresolved item 327,328/88-22-01 (see para-

graph 9).

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March 29: During filling of the 1D lower compartment cooler, water

was observed to be pouring out of the 1B cooler flanges.

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March 31: Unit 1 received a containment ventilation isolation due to

a signal spike.

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March 31: Problems with pressurizer loop seals which were expected

to have been completed prior to releasing the licensee from Hold

Point #2 persisted. Troubleshooting and repair were initiated by

the licensee and continued through the end of this inspection

period.

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April 1: With source range detector NI-32 in test, a reactor trip

signal actuated due to high flux signal spike on source range

detector NI-31. The RTBs were open at the time so an actual trip

did not occur.

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April 2: Pressurizer safety valve setpoints were determined through

testing to be out-of-specification high and required readjustment.

A detailed discussion of these events is contained in paragraph 9.

6. Ooerational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2

a. Plant Tours

The inspectors observed control room operations; monitored conduct

of testing evolutions; reviewed applicable logs, including the shift

logs, night order book, clearance hold order book, configuration

log, and TACF log; conducted discussions with control room opera-

tors; observed shift turnovers; and confirmed the operability of

instrumentation. The inspectors verified the operability of select-

ed emergency systems and verified compliance with TS Lcos. The

inspectors verified that maintenance; Wos had been submitted as

required and that follow-up activities and prioritization of work

was accomplished by the licensee.

Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine l

buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, l

including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, !

and plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions. l

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No violations or deviations wt.re identified.

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b. Safeguards Inspection

In the course of the inspection activities, the performance of

various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of

daily activities, including: protected and vital area access ccn- l

trols; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors; )

badge issuance and retrieval; patrols; and compensatory posts. In

addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and

protect 2d and vital area barrier integrity. The inspectors verified

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Interfaces between the security organization and both operations and Ri

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maintenance..

No violations or deviations were identified.

c. Radiation Protection

The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation

of radiation protection controls. On a regular basis, RWPs were,  ;

reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the

activities were being conde.cted in-accordance with applicable RWPs. l

Selected radiation protection instruments were verified operable and  ;

within calibration frequency. j

The following RWPs were reviewed: .i

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RWP 88-0-04, Decontamination '

RWP 88-2-075, Remove & replace heat tracing

No violations or deviations were identified.  ;

7. -Surveillance observations and Review (61726)

The inspectors observed / reviewed TS required surveillance testing and

verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate proce-

dures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were satisfied; test j

results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by person-  ;

nel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were <

identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the

testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and  ;

system restoration was adequate. For completed tests, the inspector

verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by

qualified individuals.

The following sis were observed / reviewed:

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SI-11, Reactivity Control Systems Moveable Control Assemblies, was

observed. No deficiencies were identified.

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SI-43, Rod Drop Time Measurements, was observed. No deficiencies

were identified.

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, SI-67, Individual Rod Position Indication Calibration, was observed. l

! No deficiencies were identified. l

SI-SO, Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration and Functional

Test (quarterly), was observed. No deficiencies were identified.

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SI-93, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Functional Test (Conditional 7 I

Days Prior to Startup), was observed. No deficiencies were identi-

ficd.

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SI-93.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Functional Test - Turbine Auto

Stop Oli Dump and Throttle Valves (Conditional 7 Days prior to-

Startup), was. observed. No deficiencies were identified.

SI-128.4, RHR Pump 2A-A Performance Test, was observed. No defi-

ciencies were identified.

SI-166.1, Full Stroking of Category "A" and "B" Valves, was ob-

served. No deficiencies were identified.

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SI-166.6, Testing of Category "A" and "B" Valves, was partially

observed. No deficiencies were identified.

SI-188.2, Functional Test for Accident Radiation Monitoring, was

observed. No deficiencies were identified.

SI-196, Upper head injection (UHI) Instrumentation, was observed.

No deficiencies were identified.

SI-298.2, Calibration and Functional Test of Condensate Storage Tank

Suction Header Pressure Switch to Auxiliary Feedwater System, was

observed. No deficiencies were identified.

SI-744, Monitoring of UHI Isolation Valves Accumulator Pressure, was

observed. No deficiencies were identified.

SI-747, Pressurizer Safety Valve Test, was observed. No deficien-

cies were identified.

8. Shift Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)

a. Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and compo- l

nente were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted 1

in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry

codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.

The f ollowing items were considered during this review: LCos were

met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant

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components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiat-

ing the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures ,

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and inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to

control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and

the repair record accurately reflected what actually took place;

functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to

returning components or systems to service; QC records were main-

tained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts

and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls

were implemented; QC hold points were established where required and

were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside

contractor activities were controlled in accordance with the ap-

proved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.

The following in progress Maintenance Instructions (MI) was re-

viewed / observed:

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MI-10.9.1: Reactor Trip Breaker Type DB50 and Switchgear

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Inspection Associated with System 99. No deficiencies were-

identified.

b. Temporary Alterations (TACF)

The following TACFs were reviewed:

TACF 2-84-2039-3: This TACF replaced the manual controller for

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each startup bypass valve with an automatic level indicating

controller. No deficiencies were identified.

TACF 0-88-03-90: This TACF removed the control room radiation

monitor, 0-RE-90-105, from service. This required HP personnel

to periodically monitor the control room. No deficiencies were

identified.

No violations or deviations were identified.

c. Work Requests (WR)

The following WRs were reviewed:

WR 214037: The inspector observed follow-up work associated with the

installation of the fire protection system inside the Unit 2

annulus. The inspector reviewed the installation of drain valve

plugs and test line caps and found all drain and test lines capped

or plugged with one exception. A cap used as a double isolation on

the dry standpipe was missing on drain valve 2-26-1446. The

licensee stated that the missing cap would be replaced. The inspec-

tor noted during a subsequent tour of the area that the missing cap

had been replaced.

WR B215636: #1 RCP Balancing. No deficiencies were identified.

WR B262457: Electrical ground trouble shooting. No deficiencies

were identified.

WR B267403: Repairs to valve 2-LCV-3-164. No deficiencies were

identified.

WR 267484: This WR was initiated on March 23, 1988 to troubleshoot /

repair source range detector NI-31 (monitor 2-NISO92-0031). The

inspector reviewed the work in progress and the completed work

package. The effort was intende6 to correct continuous varying

indications apparently generated by an induced noise into the

instrument loop and included a search for a loop ground and the

elimination of various suspected noisc interference. Based on the

testing, a determination was made that the detector was grounded

inside the well housing. This accounted for the indicated varia-

tions. It was further decided that the noise level should be

evaluated to determine the operability of the instrument loop

without eliminating the background interference. Condition adverse

to quality request (CAQR) SQp880265 was generated for the purpose of

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evaluating the existing condition (i.e. noise). Disposition of the

CAOR provided a justification that determined the instrument was

operable with the existing background noise based on the following:

"The affect of the present noise will decrease by a factor of ten

for each decade increase in neutron flux. However, at all times the

protection setpoint will be conservative since the counts due to

noise are added to the counts due to neutrons." Further documenta-

tion was received from Westinghouse which stated that the source

range instrument could be declared operable provided that the count

rate could be determined with some degree of confidence and that any

change in the count rate can be determined with some degree of

confidence. In addition to NI-31, two additional source range moni-

tors are utilized to monitor neutron activity, NI-32 (monitor

2-NIS-092-0032) and the backup source range monitor in the auxiliary

control room.

On March 28, 1988, a review of the recorder charts revealed that the

noise level indications associated with NI-31 continued. A tempo-

rary recorder attached to the backup source range monitor was found

to be dry of ink during the inspector's tour of the area. This

condition was reported to the SS and the condition was be promptly

corrected.

WR B262445: This WR was initiated to replace the Unit 2 turbine

driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) room DC exhaust fan and

motor. The inspector reviewed the work package and work in

progress. No deficiencies were identified.

WR B26770: Repair hydraulic leak on 2-FCV-87-23. No deficiencies

were identified.

WR B271864: Accumulator pressure on 2-FCV-87-22. No deficiencies

were identified.

WR B271886: Accumulator pressure on 2-FCV-87-24. No deficiencies

were identified.

WR B279186: This WR was 'r.itiated to remove the Unit 1 TDAFP room DC

exhaust fan and motor f or use as a replacement for the Unit 2

equipment. The inspector reviewed the work package and did not

identify any deficiencies.

d. Hold Orders

The inspectors reviewed various H0s to verify compliance with AI-3,

revision 38, Clearance Procedure, and verify th&P the HOs contained

adequate information to properly isolate affected portions of the

system being tagged. Additionally the inspectors inspected the

affected equipment to verify that the required tags were installed

on the equipment as stated on the HOs. The following H0s were

reviewed:

Hold Order Eculoment

2-88-308 TDAFP Room DC Exhaust Fan

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2-88-288 Containment Air Purge Fan

No violations or deviations were identified.

e. Work Plans, Field Changes, Design Char.3es

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Event Follow-uo (93702, 62703)

On March 19, 1988, at 11:13 p.m., while stepping shutdown Bank 'B' rods

out per SI-67, Individual Rcd Position Indicator Calibrations, the group

step counter for the group 1 rods was not indicating properly. The

operator declared the step counter inoperable and immediately tripped the

rods by manually opening the RTBs per TS 3.1.3.3. All trip functions

were verified normal.

On March 20, 1988, at 7:03 a.m., while lining up feedwater heaters that

had been isolated and drained, both main feed pumps received a trip

signal due to low injection water pressure. The low pressure was due to

a rapid pressure drop when the feedwater heaters were unisolated. At the

time of the event, both MDAFPs were operating, the TDAFP was shut down,

and the main feed pumps were shut down with their trip mechanisms

latched. The feed pump trip initiated an auto start of all AFW pumps and

an ESF activation signal. Following the AFW activation, the operators

shutdown the TDAFP and re-latched the main feed pumps.

On March 20, 1988, at 12:00 a.m., during performance of SI-73, all four

fire pumps were declared inoperable and the licensee entered Action

Statement B of TS 3.7.11.1. Fire pumps 1A-A and 1B-B were removed from

service for routine testing of fire pump 1A-A. The system design is such

that testing either 1A-A or 1B-B fire pumps requires that the other pump

be inoperaole. The control handswitches for fire pumps 2A-A and 2B-B are

kept in the "stop" position because of a design deficiency. The design

deficiency is that during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) the fire i

pumps could start and potentially degrade the auxiliary power system and '

overload the standby emergency power source. The TS required action for ,

no operable fire pumps, in part, is to establish a backup fire suppres- 1

sion system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Prior to removing fire pumps 1 A-A and 1B-B l

f rom service, actions were taken to meet this requirement.  !

On March 21, 1988, problems were identified with RTB clearances and with

a broken tab associated with one UV trip assembly. The clearances were

determined by Westinghouse and the licensee to be acceptable as document- j

ed on CAQR SQP-88-0269. Further review of the broken UV trip assembly  ;

tab led to concerns with apparent indications on the tabs of several l

RTBs. The broken trip assembly was replaced and concerns with apparent

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trip assembly indications were satisfactorily resolved for startup as l

documented in CAQR SOP-88-0270.

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On March 22, 1998, letdown orifice isolation valve 62-73A became stuck in

the mid-position. A failed diaphragm was identified as the cause of

failure. The valve was repaired and tested on March 23.

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on March 22, 1988, MSIV #4 Indicated less than 90% open on the main

control board. The MSIV and bypass valve were shut to allow work on the

limit switches. The limit switches were adjusted and the valve returned

to service on March 23.

On March 24, 1988, a feedwater system isolation occurred due to an

electrician manipulating a reactor trip breaker (RTB) cell switch during

the performance of MI 10.9.2, Reactor Trip Breaker Switchgear Inspection.

This MI had been walked down in the field prior to its approval; however,

the walkdown was performed with only one RTB or bypass RTB in the racked

out position. During this performance of the MI both RTBs and bypass

RTBs were racked out. When a reset switch was cycled in conjunction with

RTB cell switch position, a reactor trip logic signal was initiated I

resulting in a feedwater system isolation. The licensee implemented ICFs

88-0655 and 88-0656 to correct this problem. The corrective actions

appeared to be adequate.

On March 24, 1988, at 10:21 a.m., Unit 1 (Mode 5) received a high steam

flow coincident with low low Tave or low steam pressure ESFAS signal. No

safety injection occurred at this time because the SI Auto Block inter-

lock was in. Initially the reactor was below low low Tave and low steam

pressure, with the high steam flow bistable for S/G loop three tripped

due to maintenance. At 10 : 21 a .m. a high steam flow bistable for S/G

loop two tripped without apparent reason. The ESFAS was reported by the

ENS within four hours. The licensee is currently investigating the cause

of the SG loop two steam flow bistable trip.

l

On March 25, 1988, the licensee determined noise on source range detector

NI-31 to be excessive. The noise was recurring intermittently. The

licensee evaluated the problem and concluded that the NIs were operable

in spite of the noise because (1) the noise affected the detector conser-

vatively with respect to trip function (2) the signal to noise ratio

would improve as flux increased during startup and, (3) the response of

the detectors to temperature change during heatup was appropriate.

However, to assure reliability of this channel during startup, the

licensee revised plant operating procedures to make use of the backup

source range monitor during startup with periodic reliability assess-

ments.

On March 28, 1988, the Limitorque motor for BOP feedwater valve  ;

2-FCV-3-81 separated from the actuator during valve stroking to the  !

closed position. The licensee attributed this to a deteriorated spring l

pack induced by moisture which prevented torque switch actuation, and to

inadequate bolt length for the motor to actuator coupling. The licensee I

has a MOVATS test program and valve failures have not been prevalent i

during numerous valve cycles throughout the plant. The licensee is l

repairing the valve on a schedule to support alignment of the feedwater i

system for power operation. The inspectors followed the work associated j

with the broken motor operator and noted that it was a Limitorque type

SMB-4. A review of the cond.'t;on revealed that only a 3 thread engage- ,

ment existed between the 1-1/4 inch bolts and the operator body. The l

bolts did not fail, but the operator housing failed such that housing i

!

metal separated and broke away from the housing at each bolt penetration

of a depth of approximately 3/8 inch. The licensee had evaluated the I

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condition and inspected other similar valve operators. The licensee did

not consider the condition to be a generic problem with Limitorque

valves,

on March 28, 1988, at 9:15 p.m., the inspectors reviewed the work assoc 1- ,

ated with the repairs performed on 2-LCV-3-173. This is the control valve

on the AFW header which is supplied from the TDAFP and is utilized to

i feed and maintain the water level in the #2 SG. The inspectors noted

that the manual block valve, 2-HCV-3-868, upstream of the LCV, was un-

,

locked and closed. An immediate review of the status of this equipment-

with the on-shift Assistant SS revealed that the work on valve

2-LCV-3-173 had been completed and the valve had been declared operable

, at 5:37 p.m. on March 28, 1988 and LCO 3.7.1.2, was exited. The LCO for

this LCV repair had been entered on March 27 at 8:09 p.m. per the LCO

i log. With the manual block valve in the closed position, the safety

"

system could not feed the 52 SG from the TDAFp in the event of an acci-

dent condition. Additional review of the LCO log indicated that the same

LCO, 3.7.1.2, had been entered on March 28, 1988 at 2:08 p.m. for repair

to the control / alarm instrumentation associated with the feedwater supply

,

to the TDAFp. Therefore, LCO 3.7.1.2 was in effect during the time frame t

that the manual valve was closed although it was not apparent to the

operator that any of f-normal conditions remained from the repairs to the l

LCV. A review of the Configuration Log revealed that the closed valve

configuration had been entered. This log is required by AI-5 to be

reviewed by the on-comming RO and the Assistant SS. However, the turn- ,

over between the day-shift and evening-shift on March 28, 1988 did not

l identify in Appendix Al of AI-5 any off-normal or unusual condition

- associated with having 2-HCV-3-868 in the closed position. The turnover

on the previous shift had identified that valve 2-HCV-3-868 was in the

,

closed position. Additionally, the inspector did not identify any ,

reference to the closure of 2-HCV-3-868 during a review of the Unit 2 RO ,

'

log between March 27, 1988, when the LCV failed its SI, through 9:30 p.m.

on March 28, 1988, when the inspectors notified the control room person-

.

nel of the problem. When notified, operations personnel took immediate

!

action and had the valve opened and verified locked open. This will be

considered an unresolved item pending licensee investigation and further

NRC review (327,328/88-22-01).

On March 29, 1988, a hydrostatic test was to be performed on the 1D lower

'

compartment cooler per SI-265.0, Hydrostatic Testing Following Repairs

and Modifications. The test director requested the operator to isolate

,

1-FCV-67-564D which was inside of the boundary for H0 1-88-367 (issued i

March 5, 1988, to isolate ERCW to the 1B and 1D coolers for Wp 7257-01 to

upgrade the coils to safety-related). During the initial fill of the

cooler, a pipe fitter noticed water pouring out of the 1B cooler flanges.

The fill was immediately stopped. An AUO was dispatched to the area and j

found that 1-FCV-67-564D was only about 3/4 closed even though it indi- I

cated fully closed. Check valve 1-FCV-67-562D in the line was back

l leaking and allowed water to flow to the 1B cooler, which was unisolated,

and out the flanges which had been loosened for the modifications.

As of March 31, 1988, the licensee was still experiencing problems with

establishing the required temperature with the modified instrumentation

on the pressurizer loop seals. Loop seal A flashed due to heater control  :

1

15

t

-,m,w-.-. -,., - - - - - - ---,e- - - - , -p--,m,g---g---,---,.,w.. .r ,w,, nmn,.,p. -m-,,m-p,vp.,.,,. --..,--rem,-..---,,,.-y- n,.,-.--..,m.,.,,w, v-w.e..,w-m,.e-.,,

.

• .

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.

,

problems which caused leakby of the relief valve. Entry into mode 2 was

delayed through the end of this inspection period due to troubleshooting

of these problems.

On March 31, 1988, at 7:46 p.m., a containment ventilation isolation

occurred in Unit 1. An AUO observed a "low flow condition" light on the

'A' containment purge radiation monitor and attempted to remedy it. A

spiking signal occurred resulting in a containment ventilation isolation.

On April 1, 1988, at 6:22 a.m., Unit 2 received a reactor trip signal

from high flux on source range detector channel NI-31. The RTBs were

open at the time of the event so an actual trip did not occur. While

performing troubleshooting of source range detector channel NI-32, it was

observed that the control power fuse for NI-31 did not appear to be fully

inserted and locked into place. When the Assistant SS attempted to fully

insert the control fuse, NI-31 spiked and generated the reactor trip

signal.

On April 2, 1988, at 5:23 p.m., setpoint testing on the pressurizer loop

seal "A" safety valve demonstrated it to be out-of-specification high (in  ;

excess if the TS limit of 2485 psig 11%). The setpoint was readjusted

and subsequently verified to be in specification. Consequently, setpoint

verification of the "B" and "C" safeties was deemed necessary and the

licensee proceeded to test the "B" safety valve. It too was found

out-of-specification high and had to undergo readjustmerlicetpoint

verification testing. Although the plant remained in Hodd 1, cooldown

towards Mode 4 (in accordance with TS) did take place U"e'rg testing of

both the "A" and "B" safety valves. An Unusual Event wa declared in

both cases as required by the site Emergency Plan. The Unusual Events

ware exited when the cooldowns were terminated. Additionally, the

generic aspects of the "A" and "B" safety valve initial

out-of-specification conditions was reported. Problens with the safety

valves continued through the end of this inspection period.

10. Shift Insoector Follow-uo Issues

Issue Number Descriotion Status / Resolution

2/26/88-2-1 Evaluate new Work Currently under NRC

Control Group's review,

effectiveness regard-

ing recognizing LCO

conditions

2/27/88-2-1 Review of improper Under NRC review.

operation of COPS

2/28/88-1-1 SIS check valve leakage Currently under NRC review.

3/8/88-1-1 Drawing control Under NRC review.

3/12/88-1-1 RCP #1 upper thrust Currently under NRC review,

bearing temperature alarm

problem

3/12/88-2-1 Determine that appropriate Resolved. Discussions with

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.

,

measures exist to protect the licensee covered HP con-

power plant personnel trols in place during RT.

during radiography. Wall with temporary lead

shielding and HP monitoring

1

will be provided for Unit 1

feedwater piping RT.

3/12/88-2-3 Evaluate PRO 2-88-81 Currently under NRC review.

dealing with no PMT being

performed after work on

2-FCV-67-67.

3/20/88-2-1 Review TS 3.7.11.1 Resolved. Discussions were

requirements concerning arranged among the

fire suppression systems inspector OSP fire pro-

tection personnel and TVA

personnel. TVA position was

that only 2 of the 4 pumps

be required for both units.

This position is consistent

with TVA's Fire Protction

Program Reevaluation dated

January 20, 1977.

3/20/88-2-2 Determine if TS 3.1.3.3 Resolved. TS 3.1.3.3 did

was adequately implemented not apply in that the step

for SI-11, Reactivity counters were operable.

Control System

3/23/88-2-1 Determine RTB trip bar Resolved. Gap measurements

gap requirements per were accepted by

MI-10.9.1, Reactor Trip Westinghouse and evaluated

Breaker and Switchgear by TVA (CAQR SQP-88-0269).

Testing

3/24/88-1-1 Check licensee use of SI Resolved. Test

as functional test without discrepancies were logged

treating test as an and treated as being

of ficial test perf ormance. official.

3/25/88-2-1 Resolution by Westinghouse Resolved. This item is the

on RTBs same as 3/23/88-2-1 which

was resolved.

3/25/88-2-2 Resolution of NI-31 Source Licensee is currently

Range Detector problem considering repairs to

remove channel noise and

this work and TVA's

monitoring of the backup

source range monitor during

startup will be reviewed

by the NRC.

3/26/88-1-1 Resolve procedural error Resolved. The procedure

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. O

,

I

in GOI-2 which requires was revised to correct i

i

performance of SI-78, this concern.

SI-79, SI-126, and SI-155

each of which required j

reactor to be at power.

I

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11. List of Abbreviations '

2 AI -

Administrative Instruction

AFW -

Auxiliary Feedwater

AUO -

Auxiliary Unit Operator

BOP -

Balance of Plant

'

CAQR - Conditions Adverse to Quality Report

1 -DC -

Direct Current

ERCW - Essential Raw Cooling Water

ESF -

Engineered Safety Feature

ESFAS- Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal

, GOI -

General Operating Instruction

HO - '

Hold Order

HP -

Health Physics

i

ICF -

Instruction Change Form

LCO -

Limiting Condition for Operation

LEV -

Level Control Valve

LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident

MDAFP- Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

MI -

Maintenance Instruction

MOVATS - Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System

l, MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve

a NRC -

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

4

OSP -

Office of Special Projects

! Quality Assurance

QA -

j QC -

Quality Control

RCS -

Reactor Coolant System

RCP -

Reactor Coolant Pump

RHR -

Residual Heat Removal

RO -

Reactor Operator

RT -

Radiograph Testing

RTD -

Reactor Trip Breaker

!

RWP -

Radiation Work Permit

SG -

Steam Generator

l SI -

Surveillance Instruction

SS -

Shift Supervisor

STA -

Shift Technical Advisor

, SRO -

Senior Reactor Operator

TACF - Temporary Alteration Control Room

TAVE - Average Reactor Coolant

!

TDAFP - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

TS -

Technical Specifications

TSC -

Technical Support Center

TVA -

Tennessee Valley Authority

'

UHI -

Upper Head Injection

UV -

Undervoltage l

WCC -

Work Control Center l

WO -

Work Order l

WP -

Work Plan

WR -

Work Request

i

$ 19

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