ML20151N912
| ML20151N912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1988 |
| From: | Branch M, Jenison K, Long A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151N905 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-88-22, 50-328-88-22, NUDOCS 8804260042 | |
| Download: ML20151N912 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000327/1988022
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION il
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
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ATLANTA, GEORotA 30323
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APR 131988
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Report Nos.:
50-327/88-22, 50-328/88-22
Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Square
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Chattanooga, TN
37402-2801
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Docket Nos.:
50-327 and 50-328
License Hos.:
Facility Name:
Sequoyah Units 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
March 19, 1988 thru April 2,
1988
Project Engineers:
O k b o o 'N
kfM 8h
J.
Brady, Proje'ct Engineer
Date Signed
K.
Ivey, Project Engineer
G.
Hunegs, Project Engineer
A.
Long, Project Engineer
W.
Bearden, Project Engineer
Shift Inspectors:
P.
Harmon, Shift Inspector
D.
Loveless, Shift Inspector
W.
Poertner, Shift Inspector
G.
Humphrey, Shift Inspector
K.
Ivey, Shift Inspector
Shift Manager Approval:
/3 h8
K. /enison,
hift Manager
Date Signed
aAm Ce
%Am
$lt3) W
M.' Branch, Shift' Manager
Date ' Signed
8804260042 880413
DR
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ADOCK 05000327
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Summary
Scope:
This announced inspection involved onshift and onsite inspections by
the NRC Restart Task Force.
The majority of expended inspection effort was in
the areas of extended control room observation and operational safety verifi-
cation including operations perf ormance, system lineups, radiation protection,
and safeguards and housekeeping inspections.
Other areas inspected included
maintenance observations, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of
events, review of licensee identified items, and review of inspector follow-up
items.
During this period there was extensive control room and plant activity
coverage by NRC inspectors and managers.
Results:
No violations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons contacted
Licensee Employens
- H.
Abercrombie, Site Diractor
J. Anthony, operations Group Supervisor
- R.
Buchholz, Sequoyah Site Representative
- J.
Bynum, Assistant Manager of Nuclear Power
- H.
Cooper, Licensing Supervisor
H. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager
R. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor
J. Hamilton, Quality Engineering Manager
- M.
Harding, Licensing Group Manager
,
- G.
Kirk, Compliance Supervisor
- J.
La Point, reputy Site Director
L. Martin, Site Quality Manager
R. Olson, Hodifications
R. Pierce, Hechanical Maintenance Supervisor
R. Prince, Radiological Control Superintendent
R. Rogers, Plant Operations Review Staff
M.
Skarzinski, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
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E.
Sliger, Manager of Projects
- S.
Smith, Plant Manager
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- J.
Sullivan, Plant Operations Review Staff Supervisor
- B.
Willis, Operations and Engineering Superintendent
NRC Employees
- F.
McCoy, Startup Manager
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- K.
Jenison, Shift Manager
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit In(prview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 7,
1988, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The Startup Manager described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding listed
below.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection finding and did not
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identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors
during the inspection.
The following new item was, identified:
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Unresolved (UNR) 327,328/88-22-01:
NOTE:
A list of abbreviations used in this report is contained in
paragraph 11.
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3.
S'ustained control Room Observation (71715L
The inspectors observed control room activities and those plant activi-
ties directed from the control room on a continuous basis for the entire
period of this report.
The observation consisted of one shift inspector
per shif t supported by one shif t manager per shif t and other OSP manage-
ment.
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a.
Control Room Activities Including Conduct of Operations
The inspectors reviewed control room activities to determine that
operators were attentive and responsive to plant parameters and
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conditione; operators remained in their designated areas and were
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attentive to plant operations, alarms and status; operators employed
communication, terminology and nomenclature that was clear and
formal; and operators performed a proper relief prior to being
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discharged from their watch standing duties.
General improvements
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have been identified by the inspectors in the conduct of operations.
The inspector had no further comments.
b.
Control Room Manning
The inspectors reviewed control room manning and determined that TS
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requirements were met and a professional atmosphere was maintained
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in the control room.
The inspectors found the noise level and
working conditions to be acceptable.
The inspectors observed no
horseplay and no radios or other non-job related material in the
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control room.
Operator compliance with regulatory and TVA adminis-
trative guidelines were reviewed.
No deficiencies were identified.
The control room appeared to be clean, uncluttered, and well organ-
ized.
Special controls were establiehed to limit personnel both in
the control room inner area and in the control room areas behind the
back panels.
The inspector attended operator training held on April 1, 1988 on
changes to AI-30 for operator /NRC interface in the control room.
c.
Routine plant Activities Conducted In or Near the Control Room
The inspectors observed activities which require the attention and
direction of control room personnel.
The inspectors observed that
necessary plant administrative and technical activities conducted in
or near the control room were conducted in a manner that did not
compromise the attentiveness of the operators at the controls.
The
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licensee has established a shift engineer office in the control room
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area in which the bulk of the administrative activities, including
the authorized issuance of keys, take place.
In addition the
licensee has established hold order (HO), work request (WR), sur-
veillance instructions (SI), and modification matrix functions to
release the licensed operators from the bulk of the technical
activities that could impact the performance of their duties.
These
matrixed activities were transformed into the WCC which is located
in the TSC spaces.
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These activities appear to have effectively reduced the activities
requiring direct control room support.
The licensee's control of
keys still appears to be loose.
However, no control issues have
been identified.
d.
Control Room Alarms and Operator Response to Alarms
The inspectors observed that control room evaluations were performed
utilizing approved plant procedures and t hat control room alarms
were responded to promptly with adequate attention by the operator
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to the alarm indications.
Control room operators appeared to
believe the alarm indications.
No discrepancies were identified,
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As a result of a recent NRC/TVA enforcement conference and the
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increased management attention applied by TVA, improvements have
been apparent in this area.
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e.
Fire Brigade
The inspectors reviewed fire brigade manning and qualifications on a
routine basis.
Both manning and qualifications were found to meet
TS requirements.
f.
Shift Briefing / Shift Turnover and Relief
The inspectors observed that ROs completed turnover checklists, and
conducted control panel and significant alarm walkdown reviews and
significant maintenance and surveillance reviews prior to relief.
The inspectors observed that sufficient inf ormation was transf erred
on plant status, operating status and/or events, and abnormal system
alignments to ensure the safe operation of the units.
Assistant
shift supervisor (SS) relief was conducted in the control room and
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sufficient information appeared to be transferred on plant status,
operating status and/or events, and abnormal system alignments to
ensure the safe operation of the unit.
Assistant SSs were observed
reviewing shift logbooks prior to relief.
Shift briefings were conducted by the offgoing SS.
Personnel
assignments were made clear to oncoming operations personnel.
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Significant time and effort were expended discussing plant events,
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plant status, expected shift activities, shift training, significant
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surveillunce testing or maintenance activities, and unusual plant
conditions,
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g.
Shift Logs, Records, and Turnover Status Lists
The inspectors reviewed the RO and STA logs and determined that ts.ey
were completed in accordance with administrative requirements.
The
inspectors ensured that entries were legible; errors were corrected,
initialed and dated; logbook entries adequately reflected plant
status; significant operational events and/or unusual parameters
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were recorded; and entry into or exit from TS LCOs were recorded
promptly.
Turnover status checklists for Ros contained sufficient
required information and indicated plant status parameters, system
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alignments, and abnormalities.
The following logs were also re-
viewed:
Night Order Log
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System Status Log
Configuration Control Log
Key Log (see comment about key control subparagraph 3d)
Temporary Alteration Log
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SS Log - The SS log appeared to be kept on a more regular basis
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and detail of entries had increased since the last
inspection period.
As a result of a recent NRC/TVA enforcement conference and the
increased management attention applied ty TVA, improvements have
been observed in this area.
h.
Control Room Recorder / Strip Charts and Log Sheets
The inspector observed operators check, install, mark, file, and
route ror review, recorder and strip charts in accordance with the
established plant processes.
There were no events that caused the
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immediate control room review of recorder / strip chart peaks during
this inspection period.
Control room and plant equipment logsheets
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were found to be complete and legible; parameter limits were speci-
fled; and out-of-specification parameters were marked and reviewed
during the approval process.
4.
Manacement Activities _
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TVA management activities were reviewed on a daily basis by the shift
inspectors and shift managers, and by the Startup Manager.
The licensee
conducted a series of plant activities throughout each day to control
plant routines.
These activities were referred to by the licensee as War
Room activities.
War Room activities were observed by the shift managers
on a daily basis and were found to be an adequate method to involve upper
level management in the day-to-day activities affecting the operation of
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the units.
5.
Chronoloav of Unit 2 Plant Ooerations
At the beginning of the the NRC Restart Task Force shift coverage, Unit 2
was in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) with tgree RCPs operating and the 2A-A RHR
pump in service.
The RCS was at 180
F and 370 psig.
Pressurizer level
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was at 26 inches. All SGs were filled to the operating range, the conden-
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sate system was on long cycle recirculation, and there was a vacuum in
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the main condenser.
On February 4,
1988, the NRC approved entry into Mode 4/3 (Hot Shutdown /
Hot Standby).
The plant was heated using RCPs and entered Mode 4 on
February 6,
1988.
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On February 27, 1988, the unit entered Mode 3.
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' On March 22, 1988, the NRC Commissioners voted to allow Unit 2 to re-
start.
Cn. March 30, 1988, the NRC approved entry into Mode 2 (Startup).
During this inspection period the unit was maintained in Hot Standby
(Mode 3).
A number of events occurred during this inspection period and
are listed below:
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March 19: While performing SI-67, Individual. Rod ~ position-Indication
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Calibration, the group step counters for group I rods did not
operate pt.cerly.
The operator manually opened the reactor trip
breakers ( tsTr } ac required by T.S.
3.1.3.3.
March 20: Both main feed pumps received a trip signal due to low
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injection water pressure.
The low pressure resulted from the lineup
of feedwater heaters that had been isolated and drained.
The feed
pump trip resulted in an ESFAS.
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March 20: All four high pressure fire pumps were declared inoperable
for the performarsce of SI-73, Fire pump performance Test.
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March 21: The licensee identified problems with RTB clearances and a
broken undervoltage (UV) assembly trip tab on one RTB.
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March 22: Letdown orifice isolation valve 62-73A became stuck in the
mid-position.
A failed diaphragm was identified as the cause of
failure.
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March 22: MSIV #4 was shut to perform corrective maintenance on the
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limit switches due to control room indication problems.
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March 24: During the performance of MI-10.9.2, Reactor Trip Breaker
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Switchgear Inspection, an
"A"
train feedwater isolation occurred
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The isolation resulted from a technician manipulating a cell switch
during the perf ormance of the MI.
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March 24: Unit i received a high steam flow coincident with low-low
Tave or lov steam pressure engineered safeguards feature (ESP)
signal.
No safety injection occurred due to the auto block.
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March 25: The licensee identified excessive noise on source range
detector NI-31.
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March 28: The limitorque motor for balance of plant (BOF) feedwater
valve 2-FCV-3-81 separated from the actuator during valve stroking
due to a deteriorated spring pack.
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March 28:
An inspector identified that the manual block valve for
the TDAFp header supply to the #2 steam generator (SG) was closed.
This was identified as unresolved item 327,328/88-22-01 (see para-
graph 9).
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March 29:
During filling of the 1D lower compartment cooler, water
was observed to be pouring out of the 1B cooler flanges.
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March 31: Unit 1 received a containment ventilation isolation due to
a signal spike.
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March 31: Problems with pressurizer loop seals which were expected
to have been completed prior to releasing the licensee from Hold
Point #2 persisted.
Troubleshooting and repair were initiated by
the licensee and continued through the end of this inspection
period.
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April 1: With source range detector NI-32 in test, a reactor trip
signal actuated due to high flux signal spike on source range
detector NI-31.
The RTBs were open at the time so an actual trip
did not occur.
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April 2: Pressurizer safety valve setpoints were determined through
testing to be out-of-specification high and required readjustment.
A detailed discussion of these events is contained in paragraph 9.
6.
Ooerational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2
a.
Plant Tours
The inspectors observed control room operations; monitored conduct
of testing evolutions; reviewed applicable logs, including the shift
logs, night order book, clearance hold order book, configuration
log, and TACF log; conducted discussions with control room opera-
tors; observed shift turnovers; and confirmed the operability of
instrumentation.
The inspectors verified the operability of select-
ed emergency systems and verified compliance with TS Lcos.
The
inspectors verified that maintenance; Wos had been submitted as
required and that follow-up activities and prioritization of work
was accomplished by the licensee.
Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine
buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations,
and plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions.
No violations or deviations wt.re identified.
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b.
Safeguards Inspection
In the course of the inspection activities, the performance of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of
daily activities, including: protected and vital area access ccn-
trols; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors;
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badge issuance and retrieval; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In
addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and
protect 2d and vital area barrier integrity.
The inspectors verified
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Interfaces between the security organization and both operations and
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No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Radiation Protection
The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation
of radiation protection controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs were,
reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the
activities were being conde.cted in-accordance with applicable RWPs.
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Selected radiation protection instruments were verified operable and
within calibration frequency.
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The following RWPs were reviewed:
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RWP 88-0-04, Decontamination
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RWP 88-2-075, Remove & replace heat tracing
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
-Surveillance observations and Review (61726)
The inspectors observed / reviewed TS required surveillance testing and
verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate proce-
dures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were satisfied; test
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results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by person-
nel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were
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identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the
testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and
system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector
verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by
qualified individuals.
The following sis were observed / reviewed:
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SI-11, Reactivity Control Systems Moveable Control Assemblies, was
observed.
No deficiencies were identified.
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SI-43, Rod Drop Time Measurements, was observed.
No deficiencies
were identified.
SI-67, Individual Rod Position Indication Calibration, was observed.
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No deficiencies were identified.
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SI-SO, Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration and Functional
Test (quarterly), was observed.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-93, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Functional Test (Conditional 7
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Days Prior to Startup), was observed.
No deficiencies were identi-
ficd.
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SI-93.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Functional Test - Turbine Auto
Stop Oli Dump and Throttle Valves (Conditional 7 Days prior to-
Startup), was. observed.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-128.4, RHR Pump 2A-A Performance Test, was observed.
No defi-
ciencies were identified.
SI-166.1, Full Stroking of Category
"A" and
"B" Valves, was ob-
served.
No deficiencies were identified.
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SI-166.6, Testing of Category
"A" and
"B" Valves, was partially
observed.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-188.2, Functional Test for Accident Radiation Monitoring, was
observed.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-196, Upper head injection (UHI) Instrumentation, was observed.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-298.2, Calibration and Functional Test of Condensate Storage Tank
Suction Header Pressure Switch to Auxiliary Feedwater System, was
observed.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-744, Monitoring of UHI Isolation Valves Accumulator Pressure, was
observed.
No deficiencies were identified.
SI-747, Pressurizer Safety Valve Test, was observed.
No deficien-
cies were identified.
8.
Shift Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and compo-
nente were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
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in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry
codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The f ollowing items were considered during this review:
LCos were
met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant
components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiat-
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ing the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures
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and inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to
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control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and
the repair record accurately reflected what actually took place;
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
returning components or systems to service; QC records were main-
tained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts
and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls
were implemented; QC hold points were established where required and
were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside
contractor activities were controlled in accordance with the ap-
proved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
The following in progress Maintenance Instructions (MI) was re-
viewed / observed:
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MI-10.9.1:
Reactor Trip Breaker Type DB50 and Switchgear
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Inspection Associated with System 99.
No deficiencies were-
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identified.
b.
Temporary Alterations (TACF)
The following TACFs were reviewed:
TACF 2-84-2039-3:
This TACF replaced the manual controller for
each startup bypass valve with an automatic level indicating
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controller.
No deficiencies were identified.
TACF 0-88-03-90:
This TACF removed the control room radiation
monitor, 0-RE-90-105, from service.
This required HP personnel
to periodically monitor the control room.
No deficiencies were
identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Work Requests (WR)
The following WRs were reviewed:
WR 214037: The inspector observed follow-up work associated with the
installation of the fire protection system inside the Unit 2
The inspector reviewed the installation of drain valve
plugs and test line caps and found all drain and test lines capped
or plugged with one exception.
A cap used as a double isolation on
the dry standpipe was missing on drain valve 2-26-1446.
The
licensee stated that the missing cap would be replaced.
The inspec-
tor noted during a subsequent tour of the area that the missing cap
had been replaced.
No deficiencies were identified.
WR B262457: Electrical ground trouble shooting.
No deficiencies
were identified.
WR B267403: Repairs to valve 2-LCV-3-164.
No deficiencies were
identified.
WR 267484: This WR was initiated on March 23, 1988 to troubleshoot /
repair source range detector NI-31 (monitor 2-NISO92-0031).
The
inspector reviewed the work in progress and the completed work
package.
The effort was intende6 to correct continuous varying
indications apparently generated by an induced noise into the
instrument loop and included a search for a loop ground and the
elimination of various suspected noisc interference.
Based on the
testing, a determination was made that the detector was grounded
inside the well housing.
This accounted for the indicated varia-
tions.
It was further decided that the noise level should be
evaluated to determine the operability of the instrument loop
without eliminating the background interference.
Condition adverse
to quality request (CAQR) SQp880265 was generated for the purpose of
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evaluating the existing condition (i.e. noise).
Disposition of the
CAOR provided a justification that determined the instrument was
operable with the existing background noise based on the following:
"The affect of the present noise will decrease by a factor of ten
for each decade increase in neutron flux.
However, at all times the
protection setpoint will be conservative since the counts due to
noise are added to the counts due to neutrons."
Further documenta-
tion was received from Westinghouse which stated that the source
range instrument could be declared operable provided that the count
rate could be determined with some degree of confidence and that any
change in the count rate can be determined with some degree of
confidence.
In addition to NI-31, two additional source range moni-
tors are utilized to monitor neutron activity, NI-32 (monitor
2-NIS-092-0032) and the backup source range monitor in the auxiliary
control room.
On March 28, 1988, a review of the recorder charts revealed that the
noise level indications associated with NI-31 continued.
A tempo-
rary recorder attached to the backup source range monitor was found
to be dry of ink during the inspector's tour of the area.
This
condition was reported to the SS and the condition was be promptly
corrected.
WR B262445: This WR was initiated to replace the Unit 2 turbine
driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) room DC exhaust fan and
motor.
The inspector reviewed the work package and work in
progress.
No deficiencies were identified.
WR B26770: Repair hydraulic leak on 2-FCV-87-23.
No deficiencies
were identified.
WR B271864: Accumulator pressure on 2-FCV-87-22.
No deficiencies
were identified.
WR B271886: Accumulator pressure on 2-FCV-87-24.
No deficiencies
were identified.
WR B279186: This WR was 'r.itiated to remove the Unit 1 TDAFP room DC
exhaust fan and motor f or use as a replacement for the Unit 2
equipment.
The inspector reviewed the work package and did not
identify any deficiencies.
d.
Hold Orders
The inspectors reviewed various H0s to verify compliance with AI-3,
revision 38, Clearance Procedure, and verify th&P the HOs contained
adequate information to properly isolate affected portions of the
system being tagged.
Additionally the inspectors inspected the
affected equipment to verify that the required tags were installed
on the equipment as stated on the HOs.
The following H0s were
reviewed:
Hold Order
Eculoment
2-88-308
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2-88-288
Containment Air Purge Fan
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No violations or deviations were identified.
e.
Work Plans, Field Changes, Design Char.3es
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Event Follow-uo (93702, 62703)
On March 19, 1988, at 11:13 p.m.,
while stepping shutdown Bank
'B'
rods
out per SI-67, Individual Rcd Position Indicator Calibrations, the group
step counter for the group 1 rods was not indicating properly.
The
operator declared the step counter inoperable and immediately tripped the
rods by manually opening the RTBs per TS 3.1.3.3.
All trip functions
were verified normal.
On March 20, 1988, at 7:03 a.m.,
while lining up feedwater heaters that
had been isolated and drained, both main feed pumps received a trip
signal due to low injection water pressure.
The low pressure was due to
a rapid pressure drop when the feedwater heaters were unisolated.
At the
time of the event, both MDAFPs were operating, the TDAFP was shut down,
and the main feed pumps were shut down with their trip mechanisms
latched.
The feed pump trip initiated an auto start of all AFW pumps and
an ESF activation signal.
Following the AFW activation, the operators
shutdown the TDAFP and re-latched the main feed pumps.
On March 20, 1988, at 12:00 a.m.,
during performance of SI-73, all four
fire pumps were declared inoperable and the licensee entered Action
Statement B of TS 3.7.11.1.
Fire pumps 1A-A and 1B-B were removed from
service for routine testing of fire pump 1A-A.
The system design is such
that testing either 1A-A or 1B-B fire pumps requires that the other pump
be inoperaole.
The control handswitches for fire pumps 2A-A and 2B-B are
kept in the "stop" position because of a design deficiency.
The design
deficiency is that during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) the fire
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pumps could start and potentially degrade the auxiliary power system and
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overload the standby emergency power source.
The TS required action for
,
no operable fire pumps, in part, is to establish a backup fire suppres-
sion system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Prior to removing fire pumps 1 A-A and 1B-B
l
f rom service, actions were taken to meet this requirement.
On March 21, 1988, problems were identified with RTB clearances and with
a broken tab associated with one UV trip assembly.
The clearances were
determined by Westinghouse and the licensee to be acceptable as document-
j
ed on CAQR SQP-88-0269.
Further review of the broken UV trip assembly
tab led to concerns with apparent indications on the tabs of several
RTBs.
The broken trip assembly was replaced and concerns with apparent
trip assembly indications were satisfactorily resolved for startup as
documented in CAQR SOP-88-0270.
l
On March 22, 1998, letdown orifice isolation valve 62-73A became stuck in
the mid-position.
A failed diaphragm was identified as the cause of
failure.
The valve was repaired and tested on March 23.
13
',
.
.
on March 22, 1988, MSIV #4 Indicated less than 90% open on the main
control board.
The MSIV and bypass valve were shut to allow work on the
limit switches.
The limit switches were adjusted and the valve returned
to service on March 23.
On March 24, 1988, a feedwater system isolation occurred due to an
electrician manipulating a reactor trip breaker (RTB) cell switch during
the performance of MI 10.9.2, Reactor Trip Breaker Switchgear Inspection.
This MI had been walked down in the field prior to its approval; however,
the walkdown was performed with only one RTB or bypass RTB in the racked
out position.
During this performance of the MI both RTBs and bypass
RTBs were racked out.
When a reset switch was cycled in conjunction with
RTB cell switch position, a reactor trip logic signal was initiated
resulting in a feedwater system isolation.
The licensee implemented ICFs
88-0655 and 88-0656 to correct this problem.
The corrective actions
appeared to be adequate.
On March 24, 1988, at 10:21 a.m., Unit 1 (Mode 5) received a high steam
flow coincident with low low Tave or low steam pressure ESFAS signal.
No
safety injection occurred at this time because the SI Auto Block inter-
lock was in.
Initially the reactor was below low low Tave and low steam
pressure, with the high steam flow bistable for S/G loop three tripped
due to maintenance.
At 10 : 21 a .m.
a high steam flow bistable for S/G
loop two tripped without apparent reason.
The ESFAS was reported by the
ENS within four hours.
The licensee is currently investigating the cause
of the SG loop two steam flow bistable trip.
l
On March 25, 1988, the licensee determined noise on source range detector
NI-31 to be excessive.
The noise was recurring intermittently.
The
licensee evaluated the problem and concluded that the NIs were operable
in spite of the noise because (1) the noise affected the detector conser-
vatively with respect to trip function (2) the signal to noise ratio
would improve as flux increased during startup and, (3) the response of
the detectors to temperature change during heatup was appropriate.
However, to assure reliability of this channel during startup, the
licensee revised plant operating procedures to make use of the backup
source range monitor during startup with periodic reliability assess-
ments.
On March 28, 1988, the Limitorque motor for BOP feedwater valve
2-FCV-3-81 separated from the actuator during valve stroking to the
!
closed position.
The licensee attributed this to a deteriorated spring
pack induced by moisture which prevented torque switch actuation, and to
inadequate bolt length for the motor to actuator coupling.
The licensee
has a MOVATS test program and valve failures have not been prevalent
i
during numerous valve cycles throughout the plant.
The licensee is
repairing the valve on a schedule to support alignment of the feedwater
i
system for power operation.
The inspectors followed the work associated
j
with the broken motor operator and noted that it was a Limitorque type
SMB-4.
A review of the cond.'t;on revealed that only a 3 thread engage-
ment existed between the 1-1/4 inch bolts and the operator body.
The
bolts did not fail, but the operator housing failed such that housing
i
!
metal separated and broke away from the housing at each bolt penetration
of a depth of approximately 3/8 inch.
The licensee had evaluated the
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condition and inspected other similar valve operators.
The licensee did
not consider the condition to be a generic problem with Limitorque
valves,
on March 28, 1988, at 9:15 p.m.,
the inspectors reviewed the work assoc 1-
,
ated with the repairs performed on 2-LCV-3-173. This is the control valve
on the AFW header which is supplied from the TDAFP and is utilized to
i
feed and maintain the water level in the #2 SG.
The inspectors noted
that the manual block valve, 2-HCV-3-868, upstream of the LCV, was un-
locked and closed.
An immediate review of the status of this equipment-
,
with the on-shift Assistant SS revealed that the work on valve
2-LCV-3-173 had been completed and the valve had been declared operable
at 5:37 p.m. on March 28, 1988 and LCO 3.7.1.2, was exited.
The LCO for
,
this LCV repair had been entered on March 27 at 8:09 p.m. per the LCO
i
log.
With the manual block valve in the closed position, the safety
system could not feed the 52 SG from the TDAFp in the event of an acci-
"
dent condition.
Additional review of the LCO log indicated that the same
LCO, 3.7.1.2, had been entered on March 28, 1988 at 2:08 p.m.
for repair
to the control / alarm instrumentation associated with the feedwater supply
to the TDAFp.
Therefore, LCO 3.7.1.2 was in effect during the time frame
t
,
that the manual valve was closed although it was not apparent to the
operator that any of f-normal conditions remained from the repairs to the
l
LCV.
A review of the Configuration Log revealed that the closed valve
configuration had been entered.
This log is required by AI-5 to be
reviewed by the on-comming RO and the Assistant SS.
However, the turn-
,
over between the day-shift and evening-shift on March 28, 1988 did not
l
identify in Appendix Al of AI-5 any off-normal or unusual condition
- associated with having 2-HCV-3-868 in the closed position.
The turnover
on the previous shift had identified that valve 2-HCV-3-868 was in the
closed position.
Additionally, the inspector did not identify any
,
,
reference to the closure of 2-HCV-3-868 during a review of the Unit 2 RO
,
log between March 27, 1988, when the LCV failed its SI, through 9:30 p.m.
'
on March 28, 1988, when the inspectors notified the control room person-
.
nel of the problem.
When notified, operations personnel took immediate
!
action and had the valve opened and verified locked open.
This will be
considered an unresolved item pending licensee investigation and further
NRC review (327,328/88-22-01).
On March 29, 1988, a hydrostatic test was to be performed on the 1D lower
compartment cooler per SI-265.0, Hydrostatic Testing Following Repairs
'
and Modifications.
The test director requested the operator to isolate
1-FCV-67-564D which was inside of the boundary for H0 1-88-367 (issued
i
,
March 5,
1988, to isolate ERCW to the 1B and 1D coolers for Wp 7257-01 to
upgrade the coils to safety-related).
During the initial fill of the
cooler, a pipe fitter noticed water pouring out of the 1B cooler flanges.
The fill was immediately stopped.
An AUO was dispatched to the area and
j
found that 1-FCV-67-564D was only about 3/4 closed even though it indi-
cated fully closed.
Check valve 1-FCV-67-562D in the line was back
l
leaking and allowed water to flow to the 1B cooler, which was unisolated,
and out the flanges which had been loosened for the modifications.
As of March 31, 1988, the licensee was still experiencing problems with
establishing the required temperature with the modified instrumentation
on the pressurizer loop seals.
Loop seal A flashed due to heater control
1
15
t
-,m,w-.-.
-,., - - - - - - ---,e-
- - - ,
-p--,m,g---g---,---,.,w..
.r
,w,,
nmn,.,p.
-m-,,m-p,vp.,.,,.
--..,--rem,-..---,,,.-y-
n,.,-.--..,m.,.,,w,
v-w.e..,w-m,.e-.,,
.
.
-
.
,
problems which caused leakby of the relief valve.
Entry into mode 2 was
delayed through the end of this inspection period due to troubleshooting
of these problems.
On March 31, 1988, at 7:46
p.m.,
a containment ventilation isolation
occurred in Unit 1.
An AUO observed a "low flow condition" light on the
'A'
containment purge radiation monitor and attempted to remedy it.
A
spiking signal occurred resulting in a containment ventilation isolation.
On April 1, 1988, at 6:22
a.m.,
Unit 2 received a reactor trip signal
from high flux on source range detector channel NI-31.
The RTBs were
open at the time of the event so an actual trip did not occur.
While
performing troubleshooting of source range detector channel NI-32, it was
observed that the control power fuse for NI-31 did not appear to be fully
inserted and locked into place.
When the Assistant SS attempted to fully
insert the control fuse, NI-31 spiked and generated the reactor trip
signal.
On April 2,
1988, at 5:23
p.m.,
setpoint testing on the pressurizer loop
seal
"A" safety valve demonstrated it to be out-of-specification high (in
excess if the TS limit of 2485 psig 11%).
The setpoint was readjusted
and subsequently verified to be in specification.
Consequently, setpoint
verification of the
"B" and
"C" safeties was deemed necessary and the
licensee proceeded to test the
"B"
safety valve.
It too was found
out-of-specification high and had to undergo readjustmerlicetpoint
verification testing.
Although the plant remained in Hodd
1, cooldown
towards Mode 4 (in accordance with TS) did take place U"e'rg testing of
both the
"A" and
"B" safety valves.
An Unusual Event wa declared in
both cases as required by the site Emergency Plan.
The Unusual Events
ware exited when the cooldowns were terminated.
Additionally, the
generic aspects of the
"A" and
"B" safety valve initial
out-of-specification conditions was reported.
Problens with the safety
valves continued through the end of this inspection period.
10.
Shift Insoector Follow-uo Issues
Issue Number
Descriotion
Status / Resolution
2/26/88-2-1
Evaluate new Work
Currently under NRC
Control Group's
review,
effectiveness regard-
ing recognizing LCO
conditions
2/27/88-2-1
Review of improper
Under NRC review.
operation of COPS
2/28/88-1-1
SIS check valve leakage
Currently under NRC review.
3/8/88-1-1
Drawing control
Under NRC review.
3/12/88-1-1
RCP #1 upper thrust
Currently under NRC review,
bearing temperature alarm
problem
3/12/88-2-1
Determine that appropriate
Resolved.
Discussions with
16
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.
,
measures exist to protect
the licensee covered HP con-
power plant personnel
trols in place during RT.
during radiography.
Wall with temporary lead
shielding and HP monitoring
will be provided for Unit 1
1
3/12/88-2-3
Evaluate PRO 2-88-81
Currently under NRC review.
dealing with no PMT being
performed after work on
2-FCV-67-67.
3/20/88-2-1
Review TS 3.7.11.1
Resolved.
Discussions were
requirements concerning
arranged among the
fire suppression systems
inspector OSP fire pro-
tection personnel and TVA
personnel.
TVA position was
that only 2 of the 4 pumps
be required for both units.
This position is consistent
with TVA's Fire Protction
Program Reevaluation dated
January 20, 1977.
3/20/88-2-2
Determine if TS 3.1.3.3
Resolved.
TS 3.1.3.3 did
was adequately implemented
not apply in that the step
for SI-11, Reactivity
counters were operable.
Control System
3/23/88-2-1
Determine RTB trip bar
Resolved.
Gap measurements
gap requirements per
were accepted by
MI-10.9.1, Reactor Trip
Westinghouse and evaluated
Breaker and Switchgear
by TVA (CAQR SQP-88-0269).
Testing
3/24/88-1-1
Check licensee use of SI
Resolved.
Test
as functional test without
discrepancies were logged
treating test as an
and treated as being
of ficial test perf ormance.
official.
3/25/88-2-1
Resolution by Westinghouse
Resolved.
This item is the
on RTBs
same as 3/23/88-2-1 which
was resolved.
3/25/88-2-2
Resolution of NI-31 Source
Licensee is currently
Range Detector problem
considering repairs to
remove channel noise and
this work and TVA's
monitoring of the backup
source range monitor during
startup will be reviewed
by the NRC.
3/26/88-1-1
Resolve procedural error
Resolved.
The procedure
17
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.
s
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.
.
O
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,
I
in GOI-2 which requires
was revised to correct
i
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performance of SI-78,
this concern.
SI-79, SI-126, and SI-155
each of which required
j
reactor to be at power.
I
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11.
List of Abbreviations
'
Administrative Instruction
AI
-
2
-
Auxiliary Unit Operator
-
Balance of Plant
-
CAQR -
Conditions Adverse to Quality Report
'
1
-DC
-
Direct Current
ERCW -
Essential Raw Cooling Water
Engineered Safety Feature
-
ESFAS-
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal
GOI
-
General Operating Instruction
,
HO
- '
Hold Order
Health Physics
-
Instruction Change Form
i
ICF
-
LCO
-
Limiting Condition for Operation
LEV
Level Control Valve
-
LOCA -
Loss of Coolant Accident
MDAFP-
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
MI
-
Maintenance Instruction
MOVATS -
Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System
l,
MSIV -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC
-
a
-
Office of Special Projects
4
!
Quality Assurance
-
j
-
Quality Control
-
-
Reactor Coolant Pump
-
Reactor Operator
-
Radiograph Testing
-
Reactor Trip Breaker
-
!
Radiation Work Permit
-
-
l
-
Surveillance Instruction
-
Shift Supervisor
-
-
Senior Reactor Operator
,
TACF -
Temporary Alteration Control Room
TAVE -
Average Reactor Coolant
!
TDAFP -
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
TS
Technical Specifications
-
-
Tennessee Valley Authority
-
UHI
-
Upper Head Injection
'
-
-
Work Control Center
Work Order
-
WP
-
Work Plan
-
Work Request
i
$
19
4
-