ML20148H178
| ML20148H178 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1988 |
| From: | William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148H159 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-88-04, 50-369-88-4, 50-370-88-04, 50-370-88-4, NUDOCS 8803290336 | |
| Download: ML20148H178 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1988004
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UNITED STATES
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NUCf. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-369/88-04 and 50-370/88-04
Licensee: Duke Power Company
'422 Scuth Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
Docket Nos:
50-369 and 50-370
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License Nos:
Inspection Conducted: J uary 21, 1988 - February 26, 1988
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Inspector:
E Orders,~ Senior Res ent inspector
' Gate Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
D. Nelson
. Croteau
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Approved by:
T. 'A.7e'ebles, Seg< ion Chief
/ Vate Signed
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Division of React'or Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations
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safety verification,
surveillance testing, maintenance activities,
and
follow-up on previous inspection findings.
Results:
In the areas inspected, one violation was identified with two
examples involving a failure to follow procedures and an inadequate procedure
associated with performing equalizing charges on vital batteries and operating
the chemical and volume control system.
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8803290336 880310
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ADOCK 05000369
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
- 0. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance
B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services
- N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer
- M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
- L.
Firebaugh, OPS /NPE/MNS
- S. LeRoy, Licensing, General Office
D. Baxter, OPS /MNS/NPD
- S. Copp, Planning Engineer
R. Banner, Compliance
J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
- N. Athertor., Compliance
- W. Reesioe, Operations Engineer
- R. White, IAE Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection findings identified below were summarized on February 26,
1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
A violation,
described in paragraphs 9 and 11, was identified with two examples. The
following items we e discussed in detail:
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 369, 370/88-04-01, Long Term
Corrective Actions Associated With Nuclear Service Water Expansion
Joint Liner Failure (see paragraph 8).
(0 pen) Violation 369, 370/88-04-02, Failure to Follow Procedure and
Inadequate Procedure Associated with Battery Equalizing Charge and
Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System (see paragraphs 9 and 11).
(Closed) Licensee Identified Violation (LIV) 369/88-04-03, Inoperable
Gaseous Activity Monitor Due to Deficient Procedure (see paragraph
10).
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor
did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the
inspectors during the course of their inspection.
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3.
Unresolved Items
An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is
required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation
or deviation. There were no unresolved items identified in this report.
4.
Plant Operations (71707, 71710)
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'The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to
verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room
logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment
removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were
conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,
and performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at
shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as
prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement
of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required
by Technical Specifications.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2
electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the
station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
equipment status and radiation control practices were observed,
a.
Unit 1 Operations
Unit 1 operated at full power for the entire reporting period except
for a reduction to 30% on February 2 to correct high sodium levels in
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the steam generators.
The chemistry problem was corrected and full-
power was restored the following day.
The high sodium levels were
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attributed to a leaking turbine building heating water system (YH)
converter allowing sodium into the condensate makeup system.
b.
Unit 2 Operations
Unit 2 operated at full power for the entire reporting period with no
significant problems.
No violation or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
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Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance
with applicable Technical Specifications.
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Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved
procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was
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calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was
completed and test results were adequate.
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Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:
PROCE0VRE
EQUIPMENT / TEST
PT/2/A/4401/05A
KC Train A Heat Exchanger Perform Test
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PT/0/A/4350/28A
125 Volt Vital Battery Weekly Inspector
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PT/2/A/4201/01
Containment Sump Recirc Test
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PT/0/A/4350/28B
125 V0LT VITAL BATTERY Quarterly
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Inspection
PT/0A/4601/08B
SSPS Train B PT
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PT/2/A/4401/01A
KC Train A Performance Test
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PT/2/A/4350/04
4 KV Sequence Undervoltage
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PT/2/A/4252/01
Auxiliary Feedwater #2 Performance Test-
PT/2/A/4601/01
Protective System Channel 1 Function
Test
PT/2/A/4208/04A
NS Train 2A Heat Exchanger Test
PT/2/A/4401/05B
KC Train B Heat Exchanger Performance
Test
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PT/0/A/4601/078
Reactor Trip Breaker Response Time
Testing
PT/2/A/4403/08
RN Train A Flow Balance
PT/2/A/4252/01B
Motor Driven Aux. Feedwater Pump 2B Performance
Test
PT/1/A/4200/28
Slave Relay Test
PT/1/A/4601/02
Protective System Channel II
Functional Test
PT/1/A/4403/018
RN Train B Performance Test
PT/1/A/4150/17A
Unit 1 Pressurizer Heater
Capacity Test
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PT/1/A/4208/03A
Train A NS Heat Exchanger
Perf. Test
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PT/1/A/4403/02
RN Valve Stroke Timing
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PT/1/A/4206/01B
NI Pump 28 Performance Test
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PT/1/A/4350/23A
Hydrogen Mitigation Test
6.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
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resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy
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and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
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The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where
applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use,
that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and
maintenance results were adequate.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
The following previously identified items were reviewed to asccitain that
the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in
compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been
completed.
Selective verification included record revie.. . observations,
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and discussions with licensee personnel.
(CLOSED) Violation 50-369/86-08-02, Failure to follow procedures during
criticality and removal of equipment from service.
Adequate corrective
actions have been taken.
(CLOSED)
Violation 50-369/86-30-01, Failure to comply with TS 6.8.1 -
OP/1/A/6200/04-ND flow with no KC resulting in water hammers.
This
incident was discussed with licensed personnel stressing procedural
compliance and use of alternate methods to verify plant conrutions.
Safety related hangers were checked for damage by the licensee and no
damage was found. Adequate corrective actions have been taken.
(CLOSED) Violation 50-369, 370/86-04-01, Failure to have an operable ECCS
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flowpath. This violation involved inoperability of both safety injection
pumps since suction from the volume control tank would not automatically
transfer to the refueling water storage tank. Department Directive 2.8.2
(T) Rev. O and Station Directive 2.8.2 Rev. I were instituted prov ding
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guidance on determining operability. A functional review was performed to
determine the design purpose of each motor operated valve (MOV) which
receives an Engineerei Safety Features signal and the information was
incorporated in the Technical Specification Reference Manual as an aid to
determine operability.
A Technical Specification interpretation was
incorporated referencing the use of the Station Directive and Technical
Specification Reference Manual in determining operability. The Department
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Directive, Station Directive, Technical Specification Reference Manual,
and Technical Specification interpretation were reviewed by the inspector.
Adequate corrective actions have been taken.
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(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-370/84-32-02, Need for operational
procedure regarding degraded Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
The
licensee has attached a note to T.S. 3.7.14 which states the shift
supervisor is to ensure security is informed as SSF components are
declared
inoperable and also when those components are returned to
operable status.
(CLOSED)
Inspector
Followup
Item 369-84-17-01 and 370-84-14-01,
Environmental Qualification Requirement NM/ Duke Agreement. From July 28
through August 1,
1986 NRC representatives reviewed the
licensees
implementation of a program required by 10 CFR 50.49 for establishing and
maintaining the environmental qualification (EQ) of electrical equipment.
The findings indicated that a program had been implemented to meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 except for certain deficiencies documented in
Inspection Report 50-369, 370/86-20. These deficiencies are being tracked
as followup items to 50-369, 370/86-20. Based on the inspection findings
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and separate followup items being tracked, this item is c'osed.
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8.
Nuclear Service Water Pump Damage
On January 19, 1988 during the performance of PT/1/A/4403/08, Nuclear
Service Water (RN) Train B Flow Balance, it was detected that adequate
flow could not be achieved through the containment spray (NS) nor the
component cooling (KC) heat exchangers. The required flow rates were 6000
GPM for=the KC heat exchanger and 3800 GPM for the NS heat exchanger. The
actual flow rates were 5900 GPM and 3600 GPM respectively.
Based on the test results, site personnel requested that Corporate Design
Engineering provide a justification for continued operation (JCO).
The
JCO, which was provided that evening, justified continued safe operation
with flow rates of 5600 and 3500 GPM respectively.
The calculations
supporting the JC0 were reviewed by the resident inspection staff.
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In as much as the flow rates through the KC and NS heat exchangers had
dropped rather dramatically since the previous test perfermed on
October.29, 1987 at which time the respective flow rates were 6448 and
4001 GPM, the test group decided to perform a head curve test on the pun;p.
This took place on January 26, 1988. The results of the head curve test
indicated that the pump had lost a significant amount of capacity as can
be seen on the Attachment. Accordingly, the pump, associated train and
supported equipment were declared inoperable.
The pump was torn down for inspection and possible impeller replacement.
Upon disassembling the pump, the maintenance technicians found a large
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piece (approximately 1/8" x 8" x 36") of stainless steel sheet metal in
the pump throat.
The. metal was determined to be the liner from an expansion joint located
immddiately upstream of the putnp.
The expansion joint war repaired,
the pump impeller was replaced and the train was tested / returned to
service on January 29, within the allowed 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement time
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All other RN pumps were visually inspected to verify that the expansion
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joints were intact.
Longer term plans include inspection of the weld
attaching the liner to the expansion joint or replacement of the joint
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with piping.
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This issue will be carried as an inspector follow-up item (IFI 369,
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370/88-04-01).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Vital Battery Equalizing Charge
An assured vital 125 volt direct current (VDC) power supply is provided to
both units by four battery banks consisting of 59 lead-calcium battery
cells each. The batteries are continuously charged or "floated" on the
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Vital DC buses and assume load without interruption upon loss of a battery
charger or associated alternating current (AC) power source. The normal
float voltage is 2.23 VDC per cell or approximately 132 VDC for each bank.
Periodically, whenever battery parameters such as individual cell voltage
or specific gravity decrease to undesirable limits, an equalizing charge
is performed to return the bank to optimum condition. Vendor manual MCM
1356.01-3 recommends an initial maximum equalizing charge voltage of 2.39
VDC per cel'. (141 VDC per bank).
Instrumentation and Electrical (IAE)
procedure IP/0/A/3061/08, Water Addition and Equalize Charging for Vital
Batteries, appropriately states 141 VDC as the initial equalizing charge
voltage reduced by 2.39 volts for each jumpered cell.
Some individual
cells have retained undesirable low voltages following equalizing charge.
Therefore, the licensee, with verbal vendor concurrence, has increased the
equalize charge voltage up to 150 volts to correct the individual cell
problems.
However, the IAE procedure specifies 141 VDC not 150 VDC.
On February 10, 1988, the inspector observed an indicated voltage of 148
VDC during an equalize charge on battery EVCB that had been in progress
since February 9. When questioned about the increased voltage, the IAE
Technician
performing
the
charge
acknowledged
tne
procedural
non-compliance but stated that the IAE engineer authorized the higher
voltage.
The IAE engineer had been acting on the belief that the
procedure allowed him to specify a higher voltage.
IAE considers the
higher voltage justified based on verbal communication with the battery
vendor.
Several NRC concerns arise:
The IAE technician chose to ignore the procedure instructions based on
verbal instructions from the IAE engineer. The NRC considers this to be a
failure to follow the procedure; a change to the procedure should have
been made.
Whea warranted, methods are available to properly change
procedures.
Station Directive 4.2.1, Handling of Station Procedures,
contains detailed instructions on when and how to make major changes to
existing procedures.
This process includes a safety evaluation, second
review, and approval which was essentially short circuited by the IAE
personnel in this case. The practice of increasing the equalizing charge
voltage has previously taken place on other batteries thereby providing
ample opportunity for the need for a procedure change to be detected and
properly implemented.
This is violation 369, 370/88-04-02.
Other recent events were caused by licensee personnel not complying with
procedures.
On August 28, 1987, IAE technicians failed to return a
Residual Heat Removal Pump recirculation flow instrument to service due in
part to not following their procedure (Inspection Report 50-369,
370/87-41). On September 16, 1C87, technicians caused a Unit 1 blackout
due to testing of lockout relays beyond the scope of their procedures
(Inspection Report 50-369,
370/87-41).
On December 28,
1987, IAE
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technicians actuated a reactor trip signal while conducting a test in the
Solid State Protection System by performing a procedure step expressly
forbidden dt.e to the conditions of the system at the time.
(Inspection
Report 50-369/370-87-43). Although each event is unique with respect to
procedure compliance, collectively they raise concerns about the
licensee's procedure work ethic in general. Each of these events resulted
in an NRC violation, yet the procedure compliance problem persists.
Future NRC inspections will closely monitor licensee corrective actions
associated with these violations and performance in the area of auherence
to procedures.
10.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712, 92700)
The following LERs were reviewed to determine whether reporting
requirements have been met, the cause appears accurate, the corrective
actions appear appropriate, generic applicability has been considered, and
whether the event is related to previous events.
Selected LERs were
chosen for more detailed followup in verifying the nature, impact, and
cause of the event as well as corrective actions taken.
(CLOSED)
Inoperable gaseous activity monitor due to
defective procedure.
As corrective action, Procedure IP/0/A/3010/06,
Reactor Protection System Response Time Test, was revised to require
installing wiring and hardware to maintain the isolation capability of
gaseous activity monitor 1 EMF-39L with both trains of the Solid State
Protection System removed from service. TS 3.3.3.9 requires 1 EMF-39 to be
operable at all times but this monitor was inoperable on June 3,1986,
during performance of IP/0/A/3010/06.
This item is identified as a
Licensee Identified Violation (LIV 369/88-04-03) for violatior. of T. S.
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3.3.3.9.
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(CLOSED)
LER 369/86-11. D/G 1A auto-started due to a Unit 1 Train A
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blackout actuation caused by a design deficiency. Under-voltage relays in
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the blackout circuit were designed to pickup at a voltage which was too
high.
The licensee replaced the relays with relays of a icwer pickup
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voltage.
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11. Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System Operation
On February 3,1988, the Unit 1 diaphram on 1NV-474 ruptured causing a
spill when removing the cation bed demineralizer from service in the NV
system.
Investigation revealed that two steps had been reversed for no
apparent reason during the last procedure change of OP/1/A/6200/01,
Chemical and Volume Control System.
Reversal of the steps caused the NV
system flow to be totally secured while removing the cation bed from
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service causing possible overpressurization of the low pressure section of
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the NV system including the mixed bed demineralizers (300 psig design) and
letdown heat exchanger (600 psig design) and causing the 1NV-474 diaphram
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to rupture. The actual pressure applied to the system is not known. This
event constitutes a violation of TS 6.8.1. for an inadequate procedure and
is another example of violation 369,
370/88-04-02 discussed in
paragraph 9.
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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
RN PUMP 1B HEAD CURVES
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