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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217F8911999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Copy of FEMA Region IV Final Rept for 990623-24, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Exercise.Rept Indicates No Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action Identified During Exercise ML20216J8891999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Details of Existing Procedural Guidance & Planned Administrative Controls.Util Respectfully Requests NRC Review & Approval of Changes by 991020.Date Will Permit to Implement Changes & Realize Full Benefit During Refueling ML20217B0361999-10-0404 October 1999 Refers to Investigation Conducted by NRC OI Re Activities at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.Investigation Conducted to deter- Mine Whether Security Supervisor Deliberately Falsified Unescorted Access Authorizations.Allegation Unsubstantiated ML20212J8151999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-416/99-12 on 990725-0904.One Violation Noted & Being Treated as Noncited Violation.Licensee Conduct of Activities at Grand Gulf Facility Characterized by Safety Conscious Operations,Sound Engineering & Maint Practices ML20216J6811999-09-28028 September 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Transmitting Rev 31 to Physical Security Plan for GGNS Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p). NRC Approval Not Required,Based on Determination That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness & Limited Review ML20212J7361999-09-28028 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-416/99-11 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted.Purpose of Insp to Review Solid Radioactive Waste Management & Radioactive Matl Transportation Programs ML20212J5321999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-416/99-14 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted.Inspectors Determined That Radioactive Waste Effluent Releases Properly Controlled,Monitored & Quantified ML20216J7101999-09-26026 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536,in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator License Examinations ML20216J8141999-09-26026 September 1999 Forwards Proprietary Renewal Applications for Licensed Operators for Wk Gordon & SA Elliott at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.Proprietary Info Withheld ML20212F5521999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards SER Accepting Util Analytical Approach for Ampacity Derating Determinations at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1 & That No Outstanding Ampacity Derating Issues as Identified in GL 92-08 Noted ML20212D9211999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of GGNS on 990818 & Identified No Areas in Which Licensee Performance Warranted Insp Beyond Core Insp Program.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl ML20212A9331999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-416/99-15 on 990816-20 (Ref 10CFR73.21).One Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as Ncv,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20211P7631999-09-10010 September 1999 Discusses Staff Issuance of SECY-99-204, Kaowool & FP-60 Fire Barriers at Plant.Proposed Meeting to Discuss Subj Issues Will Take Place in Oct or Nov 1999 ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20211Q3471999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Federal Emergency Mgt Agency Final Rept for 990623 Plant Emergency Preparedness Exercise.No Deficiencies Noted & One Area Requiring Corrective Action Identified ML20211Q3091999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting BWROG Rept, Prediction of Onset of Fission Gas Release from Fuel in Generic BWR, Dtd July 1996 ML20211Q4861999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That Util Has Discovered Dose Calculation Utilized non-conservative Geometry Factor for Parameter.Calculation Error Being Evaluated in Accordance with Corrective Action Program ML20211Q0091999-09-0808 September 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Individual Plant Exam of External Events for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Unit 1. Response Requested by 000615 ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues ML20211P4171999-09-0707 September 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Which Transmitted Addendum to Rev 30 to Physical Security Plan for Ggns,Per 10CFR50.54(p).NRC Approval Is Not Required,Since Util Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20211K6061999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Plant Has No Candidates to Take 991006 Generic Fundamentals Exam ML20211K5641999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency Plan Non-Safety Related, IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section V. Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan & Continues to Meets Stds of 10CFR50.47(b) & Requirements of App E ML20211J2321999-08-26026 August 1999 Advises That Info Contained in to Support NRC Review of GE Rept, Prediction of Onset of Fission Gas Release from Fuel in Generic BWR, Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20211J3761999-08-25025 August 1999 Corrected Ltr Informing That Info Provided (on Computer Disk & in Ltr to Ineel ) Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of AEA of 1954,as Amended.Corrected 990827 ML20211F4881999-08-25025 August 1999 Advises That Info Submitted by 990716 Application & Affidavit Containing Diskette & to Ineel Mareked Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of AEA of 1954 ML20211F7751999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-416/99-10 on 990809-13.No Violations Noted.Insp Covered Licensed Operator Requalification Program & Observations of Requalification Activities ML20211C4381999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Rev 31 to Physical Security Plan for Protection of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Util Has Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan. Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20211B3761999-08-16016 August 1999 Submits Voluntary Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Actions Estimates, for Fys 2000 & 2001, ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20211A9481999-08-12012 August 1999 Informs of Completion of Analysis of Heat Transfer in Cooler During Fan Coast Down & Concludes That Potential Exists for Steam Foundation,Under Conditions Where Dcw Sys Flow Is Lost Prior to Full Isolation Valve Closure ML20210P8411999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-416/99-09 on 990613-0724.No Violations Noted.Activities at Facility Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations,Sound Engineering & Maint Practices & Careful Radiological Work Controls ML20210N6401999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That Eighteeen Identified Penetrations Will Be Restored to Conformance with Licensing Requirements Prior to Restart from RFO10,scheduled for Fall 1999,per GL 96-06. Example of Piping Analysis Being Performed,Encl ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210K1951999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-416/99-03 on 990405-08 & 0510-11.No Violations Identified ML20211K7491999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Ltr Rept Documenting Work Completed Under JCN-W6095,analyses Performed at Ineel to Calculate Minimum Time to Fuel Pin Failure in Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) ML20210K6661999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Program Performance six-month Rept for Period Covering Jan-June 1999,per 10CFR26.71 ML20210F3591999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Version & Redacted Version of Wyle Test Rept M-J5.08-Q1-45161-0-8.0-1-0,re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding Test Program.Proprietary Version Withheld ML20210E3251999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-416/99-07 on 990622-25.No Violations Noted.Emergency Plan & Procedures During Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise Was Conducted ML20210D2401999-07-21021 July 1999 Informs of Resignation of Operator WE Griffith,License OP-20806-1,from Entergy Operations,Inc ML20209J0311999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Info Supporting Review of Generic Alternate Source Term Request.Proprietary Info Withheld Per 10CFR2.790 ML20209G4791999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Proposed Emergency Plan Change as Addendum to Changes Previously Submitted Via GNRO-98/00028 & GNRO-99/00007,for NRC Review & Approval ML20210B1031999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-416/99-08 on 990502-0612.Determined That Three Severity Level IV Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20210H3211999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Info Supporting Review of 970506 Submittal of BWROG Rept, Prediction of Onset of Fission Gas Release from Fuel in Generic Bwr. Proprietary Info Withheld Per 10CFR2.790 ML20209D7511999-07-0909 July 1999 Responds to RAI on GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses,Info Revised in Rvid & Rvid Version 2 Will Be Released ML20209D7671999-07-0101 July 1999 Submits Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-416/99-02 on 990222-26 & 0308-12.Corrective Actions: Contractor Performance Has Been re-evaluated in Regards to UFSAR Reviews ML20196K4901999-07-0101 July 1999 Discusses Relief Requests PRR-E12-01,PRR-E21-01,PRR-E22-01, PRR-P75-01,PRR-P81-01,VRR-B21-01,VRR-B21-02,VRR-E38-01 & VRR-E51-01 Submitted by EOI on 971126 & 990218.SE Accepting Alternatives Proposed by Util Encl ML20196J5711999-06-30030 June 1999 Advises That Versions of Submitted Info in 990506 Application & Affidavit, Re Proposed Amend to Revise Ts,Marked Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of AEA 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20216J8891999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Details of Existing Procedural Guidance & Planned Administrative Controls.Util Respectfully Requests NRC Review & Approval of Changes by 991020.Date Will Permit to Implement Changes & Realize Full Benefit During Refueling ML20216J7101999-09-26026 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536,in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator License Examinations ML20216J8141999-09-26026 September 1999 Forwards Proprietary Renewal Applications for Licensed Operators for Wk Gordon & SA Elliott at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.Proprietary Info Withheld ML20211Q4861999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That Util Has Discovered Dose Calculation Utilized non-conservative Geometry Factor for Parameter.Calculation Error Being Evaluated in Accordance with Corrective Action Program ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20211K6061999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Plant Has No Candidates to Take 991006 Generic Fundamentals Exam ML20211K5641999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency Plan Non-Safety Related, IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section V. Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan & Continues to Meets Stds of 10CFR50.47(b) & Requirements of App E ML20211C4381999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Rev 31 to Physical Security Plan for Protection of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Util Has Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan. Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20211B3761999-08-16016 August 1999 Submits Voluntary Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Actions Estimates, for Fys 2000 & 2001, ML20211A9481999-08-12012 August 1999 Informs of Completion of Analysis of Heat Transfer in Cooler During Fan Coast Down & Concludes That Potential Exists for Steam Foundation,Under Conditions Where Dcw Sys Flow Is Lost Prior to Full Isolation Valve Closure ML20210N6401999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That Eighteeen Identified Penetrations Will Be Restored to Conformance with Licensing Requirements Prior to Restart from RFO10,scheduled for Fall 1999,per GL 96-06. Example of Piping Analysis Being Performed,Encl ML20211K7491999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Ltr Rept Documenting Work Completed Under JCN-W6095,analyses Performed at Ineel to Calculate Minimum Time to Fuel Pin Failure in Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) ML20210K6661999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Program Performance six-month Rept for Period Covering Jan-June 1999,per 10CFR26.71 ML20210F3591999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Version & Redacted Version of Wyle Test Rept M-J5.08-Q1-45161-0-8.0-1-0,re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding Test Program.Proprietary Version Withheld ML20210D2401999-07-21021 July 1999 Informs of Resignation of Operator WE Griffith,License OP-20806-1,from Entergy Operations,Inc ML20209J0311999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Info Supporting Review of Generic Alternate Source Term Request.Proprietary Info Withheld Per 10CFR2.790 ML20209G4791999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Proposed Emergency Plan Change as Addendum to Changes Previously Submitted Via GNRO-98/00028 & GNRO-99/00007,for NRC Review & Approval ML20210H3211999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary Info Supporting Review of 970506 Submittal of BWROG Rept, Prediction of Onset of Fission Gas Release from Fuel in Generic Bwr. Proprietary Info Withheld Per 10CFR2.790 ML20209D7671999-07-0101 July 1999 Submits Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-416/99-02 on 990222-26 & 0308-12.Corrective Actions: Contractor Performance Has Been re-evaluated in Regards to UFSAR Reviews ML20209B6081999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Encl ML20195J6351999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Addendum to Rev 30 of GGNS Physical Security Plan IAW 10CFR50.54(p).Addendum Is Submitted to Announce Relocation/Reconfiguration of Plant Central & Secondary Alarm Station Facilities.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20195G0281999-06-0909 June 1999 Submits Summary on Resolution of GL 96-06 Re Eighteen Penetrations Previously Identified as Being Potentially Susceptible to Overpressurization ML20207F5041999-06-0202 June 1999 Forwards Updated Medical Rept IAW License Condition 3 for DA Killingsworth License OP-20942-1.Without Encls ML20206P2981999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Responses to RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs, Cancelling 990402 Submittal ML20206N1921999-05-10010 May 1999 Provides Revised Attachment 2 for Alternative Request IWE-02,originally Submitted 990429 Re Bolt Torque or Tension Testing of Class Mc pressure-retaining Bolting as Specified in Item 8.20 of Article IWE-2500,Table IWE-2500-1 ML20206J0941999-05-0404 May 1999 Forwards Proprietary & Redacted ME-98-001-00,both Entitled, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding Test Program on Two Gate Valves with Limitorque Actuators. Rept ME-98-002-00 Re Flexible Wedge Gate Valves,Encl.Proprietary Rept Withheld ML20206E7811999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposes Alternatives to Requirements of ASME B&PV Code Section XI,1992 Edition,1992 Addenda,As Listed.Approval of Alternative Request on or Before 990915,requested ML20206D8171999-04-29029 April 1999 Informs NRC of Results of Plant Improvement Considerations Identified in GGNS Ipe,As Requested in NRC . Licensee Found Efforts Have Minimized Extent of Radiological Release in Unlikely Event That Severe Accident Occurred ML20206D7281999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards South Mississippi Electric Power Association 1998 Annual Rept, Per 10CFR50.71(b).Licensee Will Submit 1998 Annual Repts for System Energy Resources,Inc,Entergy Mississippi,Inc & EOI as Part of Entergy Corp Annual Rept ML20206C9551999-04-22022 April 1999 Forwards 1999 Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scenario. Without Encl ML20205M1311999-04-0202 April 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves. Info Was Discussed During Conference Call with NRC on 990126.Wyle Position Paper Encl.Subj Paper Withheld ML20205H5861999-04-0101 April 1999 Requests Relief from ASME B&PV Code,Section XI for Period of Time That Temporary non-code Repair Was in Effect,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(5)(iii) ML20205F1781999-03-31031 March 1999 Forwards Consolidated Entergy Submittal to Document Primary & Excess Property Damage Insurance Coverage for Nuclear Sites of Entergy Operations,Inc,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML20196K7101999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Reporting & Recordkeeping for Decommissioning Planning,Per 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML20205A6511999-03-25025 March 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-416/99-01 on 990201-05.Corrective Actions:Program Will Be Implemented to Ensure Accessible Areas with Radiation Levels Greater than 1000 Mrem/H ML20204E7391999-03-15015 March 1999 Forwards Objectives for June 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Plant.Without Encl ML20207H9291999-03-0404 March 1999 Submits Update to Original Certification of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Simulation Facility IAW Requirements of 10CFR55.45(b)(5) ML20207E3081999-03-0303 March 1999 Informs That GGNS Severe Accident Mgt Implementation Was Completed on 981223.Effort Was Worthwhile & Station Ability to Respond & Mitigate Events That May Lead to Core Melt Has Been Enhanced ML20207E3221999-03-0303 March 1999 Notifies of Change in Status of Mj Ellis,License SOP-43846. Conditional License Requested to Accommodate Medical Condition.Revised NRC Form 396 with Supporting Medical Evidence Attached.Without Encls ML20207A8161999-02-24024 February 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Operating Rept for Ggns,Unit 1. Listed Attachments Are Encl ML20207A9901999-02-24024 February 1999 Informs That Util Has No Candidates from GGNS to Nominate for Participation in Planned Gfes,Scheduled for 990407 ML20203A1551999-02-0101 February 1999 Forwards Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Fitness for Duty Program Performance six-month Rept for Reporting Period 980701-981231 ML20202G0791999-01-26026 January 1999 Informs That He Mcknight Has Been Permanently Reassigned from Position Requiring License to Perform Assigned Duties. License Is No Longer Needed,Effective 981231 ML20199K4151999-01-20020 January 1999 Forwards Proposed Addendum to Emergency Plan Changes Previously Submitted Via GNRO-98/00028 for NRC Review & Approval as Required by 10CFR50.54(q) & 50.4 ML20199K6771999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Notification of Planned ERDS Software Change Scheduled to Take Place on 990215 ML20199D8811999-01-11011 January 1999 Submits Response to SE JOG Program on Periodic Verification of motor-operated Valves,In Response to GL 96-05 ML20199D9521999-01-0808 January 1999 Informs That CE Cresap,License SOP-4220-4,has Been Permanently Reassigned from Position Requiring License & No Longer Has Need for License,Per 10CFR50.74 ML20199A6081999-01-0606 January 1999 Submits List of Plant Info Brochures Disseminated Annually to Public & List of Updated State &/Or Local Emergency Plan Info,Per NRC Administrative Ltr 94-07, Distribution of Site-Specific & State Emergency Planning Info ML20202B7531998-12-21021 December 1998 Submits Ltr Confirming Discussion with J Tapia,Documenting Extension for Response to NOV 50-416/98-13.Util Response Will Be Submitted by 990212 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARAECM-90-0169, Forwards Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedule for FY91 Through FY94,per Generic Ltr 90-071990-09-17017 September 1990 Forwards Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedule for FY91 Through FY94,per Generic Ltr 90-07 AECM-90-0172, Forwards Endorsement 67 to Nelia Policy NF-257 & Endorsement 46 to Maelu Policy MF-1061990-09-17017 September 1990 Forwards Endorsement 67 to Nelia Policy NF-257 & Endorsement 46 to Maelu Policy MF-106 AECM-90-0174, Forwards List of Submittals Pending NRR Review Re Grand Gulf Licensing Activities1990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards List of Submittals Pending NRR Review Re Grand Gulf Licensing Activities AECM-90-0165, Forwards Addl Info on NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount1990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Addl Info on NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount AECM-90-0158, Forwards Quarterly Status Rept for Reg Guide 1.97 Re Neutron Monitoring Sys for Period Ending 900630.Rept Includes Major Actions Completed to Date for Unit ex-core Sys.Estimated Milestone Schedule for Activities Also Encl1990-09-0808 September 1990 Forwards Quarterly Status Rept for Reg Guide 1.97 Re Neutron Monitoring Sys for Period Ending 900630.Rept Includes Major Actions Completed to Date for Unit ex-core Sys.Estimated Milestone Schedule for Activities Also Encl AECM-90-0163, Forwards Endorsement 61 to Nelia Policy NF-257,Endorsement 40 to Maelu Policy MF-106,Endorsement 62 to Nelia Policy NF-257,Endorsement 41 to Maelu Policy MF-106 & Endorsement 63 to Nelia Policy NF-2571990-09-0606 September 1990 Forwards Endorsement 61 to Nelia Policy NF-257,Endorsement 40 to Maelu Policy MF-106,Endorsement 62 to Nelia Policy NF-257,Endorsement 41 to Maelu Policy MF-106 & Endorsement 63 to Nelia Policy NF-257 AECM-90-0161, Forwards Quarterly Status Rept Re Degraded Core Accident Hydrogen Control Program, for Apr-June 19901990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Quarterly Status Rept Re Degraded Core Accident Hydrogen Control Program, for Apr-June 1990 AECM-90-0149, Forwards Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-June 1990 & Rev 3 to Process Control Program1990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-June 1990 & Rev 3 to Process Control Program AECM-90-0162, Forwards fitness-for-duty 6-month Rept for Period Ending June 1990,per 10CFR26.Success of Program Evident in Statistical Data Indicating Extremely Low Incident Rate1990-08-29029 August 1990 Forwards fitness-for-duty 6-month Rept for Period Ending June 1990,per 10CFR26.Success of Program Evident in Statistical Data Indicating Extremely Low Incident Rate ML20028G8591990-08-27027 August 1990 Forwards Updated Svc List to Be Used for Licensee Correspondence.Requests That Author Be Primary Addressee for All Correspondence Re Plant AECM-90-0144, Forwards Security Boundary Upgrade Bimonthly Status Rept for Period Ending 900731,per 900330 Commitment.Rept Covering Period 900801-0930 Will Be Submitted in Oct 19901990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Security Boundary Upgrade Bimonthly Status Rept for Period Ending 900731,per 900330 Commitment.Rept Covering Period 900801-0930 Will Be Submitted in Oct 1990 ML20056B3511990-08-20020 August 1990 Suppls Info Re 900806 Application for Amend to License NPF-29,changing Tech Specs on Alternate DHR Sys,Per NRC Comments.Proposed Tech Spec 3/4.5.2 Encl AECM-90-0147, Informs That Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Facility Scheduled for Wk of 9108261990-08-14014 August 1990 Informs That Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Facility Scheduled for Wk of 910826 AECM-90-0142, Forwards Supplemental Info Re 900705 Application for Amend to License NPF-29,revising Tech Specs Due to Addition of Alternate DHR Sys1990-08-0909 August 1990 Forwards Supplemental Info Re 900705 Application for Amend to License NPF-29,revising Tech Specs Due to Addition of Alternate DHR Sys AECM-90-0143, Notifies That Cd Bland No Longer Employed by Util,Effective 9007191990-08-0202 August 1990 Notifies That Cd Bland No Longer Employed by Util,Effective 900719 AECM-90-0139, Forwards Endorsement 68 to Nelia Policy NF-257,Endorsement 47 to Maelu Policy MF-106 & Revised Endorsement 35 to Maelu Policy MF-1061990-08-0202 August 1990 Forwards Endorsement 68 to Nelia Policy NF-257,Endorsement 47 to Maelu Policy MF-106 & Revised Endorsement 35 to Maelu Policy MF-106 ML20055J0551990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Summary of Environ Protection Program Re Const of Unit for 6-months Ending 900630,per Exhibit 2-A in Subsection 3.E.1 of CPPR-119 AECM-90-0136, Forwards Executed Amend 4 to Indemnity Agreement B-72,per NRC 891214 Request1990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Executed Amend 4 to Indemnity Agreement B-72,per NRC 891214 Request AECM-90-0130, Forwards Corrected Pages to Rev 17 to Physical Security Plan.Pages Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)1990-07-17017 July 1990 Forwards Corrected Pages to Rev 17 to Physical Security Plan.Pages Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20044A9251990-07-0909 July 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to Relief Request I-00018 Correcting Valve Number & Description of One Component.Review & Approval Requested Prior to 901001 ML20044A7861990-06-29029 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900601 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-416/90-08.Corrective Actions:Operations Superintendent Counseled Individuals Re Inoperable Reactor Water Level Transmitter & Met W/All Shift Senior Reactor Operators AECM-90-0121, Withdraws 880831 & 890324 Proposed Amends,Deleting Certain Test,Vent & Drain Valves from Tech Spec Table 3.6.4-11990-06-27027 June 1990 Withdraws 880831 & 890324 Proposed Amends,Deleting Certain Test,Vent & Drain Valves from Tech Spec Table 3.6.4-1 AECM-90-0115, Forwards List of Followup Actions as Result of NRC Requalification Reexam of Three Licensed Operators on 900531.Lessons Learned Guideline Will Be Prepared Re Ability of Training Personnel to Evaluate Simulator Crew1990-06-26026 June 1990 Forwards List of Followup Actions as Result of NRC Requalification Reexam of Three Licensed Operators on 900531.Lessons Learned Guideline Will Be Prepared Re Ability of Training Personnel to Evaluate Simulator Crew ML20044A2931990-06-22022 June 1990 Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Boraflex Gap Analysis.If Vibratory Ground Motion Exceeding OBE Occurs,Per 10CFR100,App a & as Previously Committed,Plant Will Be Shut Down.Listed Addl Surveillance Will Be Performed ML20043G6231990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Evidence That Cash Flow Would Be Available for Payment of Deferred Premium Obligation for Facility.Sys Energy Resources,Inc Responsible for Generating 90% of Required Cash Flow ML20043G3341990-06-11011 June 1990 Forwards Rev 9 to GGNS-TOP-1A, Operational QA Manual, for Evaluation ML20043G5861990-06-0808 June 1990 Forwards Bimonthly Status Repts Re Security Boundary Upgrade Project for Period Ending 900531 ML20043F5121990-06-0808 June 1990 Forwards List of Directors & Officers of Entergy Operations, Inc.Operation of All Plants Transferred to Entergy on 900606 ML20043E8011990-06-0707 June 1990 Forwards Nonproprietary ANF-90-060(NP), Criticality Safety Analysis for Grand Gulf Fuel Storage Racks W/ANF-1.4 Fuel Assemblies. ML20043E7831990-06-0707 June 1990 Forwards Updated Svc List to Be Used Re Plant Correspondence.Requests WT Cottle Be Primary Addressee for All Correspondence Concerning Plant ML20043E8161990-06-0606 June 1990 Informs That Sys Energy Resources,Inc Received Necessary Regulatory Approvals to Transfer Performance Activities for Facility to Entergy Operations & All Conditions in Amend 9 to CP CPPR-119 Implemented,Effective on 900606 ML20043F2061990-06-0606 June 1990 Forwards 1989 Annual Financial Repts for Sys Energy Resources,Inc & South Mississippi Electric Power Assoc ML20043E8111990-06-0606 June 1990 Informs That Sys Energy Resources,Inc Received Necessary Regulatory Approvals to Transfer Operating Responsibility for Facility to Entergy Operations & All Conditions in Amend 65 to License NPF-29 Implemented,Effective on 900606 ML20043C8611990-05-31031 May 1990 Forwards Preliminary Drafts of Plant Specific Tech Specs in Order to Facilitate NRC Validation of BWR Owners Group Improved Tech Specs,Per NRC Request.Understands That Util & NRC Will Meet During Wk of 900716 to Discuss NRC Review ML20043B6811990-05-24024 May 1990 Forwards Degraded Core Accident Hydrogen Control Program, Quarterly Status Rept for Jan-Mar 1990 ML20043B6021990-05-23023 May 1990 Confirms NRC Understanding That Safety Evaluation Will Be Written for Use of New Tech Spec 3.0.4 Flexibility Regardless of Plant Condition at Time Flexibility Required ML20043B2471990-05-18018 May 1990 Forwards Final Response to Generic Ltr 89-04, Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs & Rev 4 to Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program. ML20043A9651990-05-17017 May 1990 Forwards Draft Tech Specs for Power Distribution Limits,Rcs, ECCS & Plant Sys as Part of Util Involvement W/Bwr Owners Group as BWR-6 Lead Plant ML20042G6931990-05-0909 May 1990 Forwards Rev 4 to Fire Hazards Analysis. Design Changes Include Installation of Alternate DHR Sys & Access Hatch in Pipe Chase ML20042G8681990-05-0909 May 1990 Forwards Response to Recommendations Re Areas of Concern Noted in NRC SER Dtd 900316 & 900316 Request for Addl Info Re Design Criteria for Cable Tray Supports in Turbine Bldg ML20042G6731990-05-0909 May 1990 Notifies of Cancellation of Emergency Plan Procedure 10-S-01-13, Onsite Radiological Monitoring. Info Incorporated Into Procedure 10-S-01-14,Rev 13, Radiological Monitoring. ML20042F4891990-05-0404 May 1990 Requests Extension of 90 Days to Provide Addl Time for Securities & Exchange Commission Review Re Implementation of Amend 65 to License NPF-29 ML20042F4441990-05-0404 May 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re USI A-47, Safety Implications of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants. Plant Has Adequate Automatic Reactor Vessel Overfill Protection,Procedures & Tech Specs ML20042F1791990-04-30030 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900402 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-416/90-03.Corrective Actions:Valves Closed,Effectively Isolating Flow of Contaminated Water Into Makeup Water Sys & Demineralized Water Sys Flushed & Cleaned of Contamination ML20042F1811990-04-30030 April 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-15, Emergency Response Data Sys. Util Volunteers to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys ML20042F3711990-04-30030 April 1990 Forwards Certificate of Insurance for Nuclear Property Insurance Submitted by Nuclear Mutual Ltd for Policy Period 900401-910401 & Certificate of Insurance Evidencing Increased Excess Property Insurance,Per 900330 Ltr ML20042F1751990-04-30030 April 1990 Advises That Util Will Not Be Able to Provide Complete Supplemental Summary Rept on Dcrdr by 900430,as Indicated in Util 891221 Ltr.Supplemental Rept Will Be Submitted by 900930 ML20012F3311990-04-0202 April 1990 Forwards GE Affidavit Requesting That All Drawings Presently Denoted as Proprietary in Rev 4 to Updated FSAR Re Offgas Sys Should Remain Proprietary (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20012E2961990-03-26026 March 1990 Forwards Updated Svc List for NRC Correspondence to Util. Facility Fee Bills Sent to Wrong Primary Addressee ML20011F2171990-02-23023 February 1990 Responds to NRC 900131 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-416/89-30.Corrective Actions:Quality Deficiency Rept Initiated to Document & Resolve Incident & Incident Rept & Reportable Events Procedure Enhanced 1990-09-08
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O MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Afississippi P. O. B O X 16 4 0. J A C K S O N. MIS SIS SIP PI 3 9 2 0 5 April 7, 1981 _.
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huCLEAR PRooUCT1oM oEPARTMENT Mr. Robert L. Tedesco, - $' :
Assistant Director for Licensing ..
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j Division of Licensing f U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -. .,'
Washington, D.C. 20555 *l
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Dear Mr. Tedesco:
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SUBJECT:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Jocket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417 -
File 0260/0277/0755/L-860.0 TMI Action Item I.G.1, Training During Low Power Testing AECM-81/84 This letter is in reply to your letter, received January 26, 1981, which provided additional guidance in regard to NUREG-0737 Item I.G.1 as applied to BWR OL applications. That letter asked that we conduct during the Grand Gulf startup testing a simulated loss of AC power test.
We were also asked to commit to augmented operator training by their participation in the preoperational and startup test programs.
In regard to the proposed simulated loss of AC power test, the only significant experience to be gained over testing already planned and described to you in FSAR Chapter 14.2 is in the area of RCIC operation.
Therefore, for reasons provided below, extensive testing of RCIC under loss of AC power conditions is proposed as an alternative to your simulated loss of AC power test. .
Your letter suggests performing the loss of AC power test with a "real or simulated source of decay heat." In order to simulate decay heat, the reactor must remain critical at approximately 5 percent rated power. This would require that certain systems remain energized to assure the simulated decay heat can be generated. All other systems would be " blacked out" from loss of AC power (loss of offsite power and loss of emergency diesel generators).
The first point which should be made is that testing or operation in such a degraded operational state is beyond the scope of existing safety analyses and are not allowed by current Technical Specifications.
Thus, additional safety analyses and waivers of certain Technical bog)/
Specifications would be required.
.5 Second, despite the results of such safety analyses, we feel it would be difficult if not impossible to maintain the 5 percent power condition and simulate other relevant reactor and plant conditions under
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loss of AC power simultaneously. For example, on a loss of AC 100Qlg Member Middle soutn utilities system
MISSisslPPI POWER O LICHT COMPANY AECM-81/84 Page 2 condition, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) HG sets would trip on underv71tage resulting in a loss of power to the RPS trip circuitry which would cause a reactor scram. Power to the RPS would have to be maintained to prevent a reactor scram in order to maintain the simulated decay heat. Another normal and relevant action that would occur upon loss of RPS power would be the actuation of the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NS4) and the closure of the MSIV's. With the reactor mode switch in the Startup/ Hot Standby position a direct scram from MSIV closure would be avoided. However, upon closing the MSIV's there is no exit for the steam flow, and it is extremely likely that the resulting pressurization transient would cause a reactor scram on high reactor pressure arj/or high neutron flux resulting from void collapse (IRL' hi-hi). This scram would also terminate the " simulated decay heat" and make any further testing futile. Since the results of the test depend upon the continued generation of steam at 5 percent power, it appears that any attempt to conduct a test with " simulated decay heat" [s impractical and would not achieve the desired results.
The remaining proposed alternative is performing the loss of AC test with actual decay heat within the first 1500 MWD /T core exposure immediately following 7 days of operation at 80% rated power or above.
Initiation of a loss of AC from these conditions would result in a coast down of the RPS MG sets within a few seconds which would result in a reactor scram and loss of power to the NS4 which again results in MSIV closure. The decay heat causes rapid pressurization and subsequent actuation of safety / relief valves blowing steam to the suppression pool.
l From this point on, the transient is similar to a MEIV closure with no i loss of AC power. Steam blowdown to the suppression pool lowers reactor water level to level 2 initiating RCIC. The design basis for RCIC is that it be capable of recovering water level to normal from precisely I this condition. Therefore, RCIC would return reactor water level to level 8 and then trip on high level. This cycle (starting and tripping RCIC) would continue for several hours with adequate RCIC suction supply from the condensate storage tank backed by the suppression pool. The addition of heat to the suppression pool through the SRV's would be less than that assumed in the LOCA analyses since the initial tett power level would be less than or equal to rated thermal power. Thus, up to the point at which suppression pool cooling is established in an accident, the loss of AC test is essentially identical (from the reactor response standpoint) to the MSIV closure transient.
A review of plant instruments has established that reactor vessel l pressure and level instrumentation does exist which is powered from DC or uninterruptible AC power sources. This would allow adequate monitoring of reactor vessel conditions during the test. While a loss of AC power test represents an unanalyzed condition of operation, a preliminary assessment shows that expected plant response is within the design basis of key systems, e.g., RCIC and important reactor instrumentation. The only operation which is essential 13 responding to this transient is the injection of water to the reactor by RCIC with no AC power present. The operational characteristics and capabilities of l
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MisslSSIPPI POWER 8: LIGHT COMPANY AECM-81/84 Page 3 RCIC under loss of AC present the only operationally significant portion of this transient which is different from the MSIV full closure test
- already planned as part of the power ascension test program (see FSAR section 14.2.12.3.22.1). Therefore, the extended operational tests of RCIC included in Appendix C of the enclosure to this letter are proposed as an alternative to the loss of AC pover tes't.
These tests will be conducted in conjunction with the Integrated i ECCS testing and thus will be combined with the actual partial loss of AC power conditions which are effectively the sasa as a complete loss of
. AC power for RCIC.
Two additional tests, also described in Appendix C of the enclo'sure, are planned. The first is an integrated reactor pressure s
vessel level instrument functional test which will test the proper operation of all RPV level instruments during the preoperational test l phase. The second is an integrated drywell and containment pressure instrumentation test to be done in conjunction with the containment integrated leak rate test (ILRT). This test will prove the proper
- operation of all drywell and containment pressure instruments.
These new tests including the expanded RCIC tests will be l incorporated into existing detailed, written preoperational test procedures.
l The enclosure also describes MP&L's program for augmented operator training during the preoperational and startup test phases. This l
program is based on guidelines which were developed by the BWR Owners' Group in which MP&L actively participated. The Owners' Group guidelines have been specifically adapted for the GGNS startup and training l
programs.
As previously committed in FSAR Appendix 3A, the completed test procedures, data forms, graphs, photographs, etc. constitute the official historical record of the preoperational test program during which the additional tests reqaired by ites I.G.1 are conducted. Copies of this preoperational test documentation will be made available to the NRC for their review. A Startup Summary Report describing startup test phase activities will be submitted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.16.
We believe the program of additional testing and augmented operator i training which we have described constitutes a complete and satisfactory l response to ites I.G.1 of NUREG-0737.
l i Yours truly, jfY W
L. F. Dale f
Nuclear Project Manager MRW/CLT/JDR:Im I Enclosure cc: (See Next Page)
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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AECM-81/84 Page 4 cc: Mr. N. L. Staapley Mr. G. B. Taylor Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner Mr. Victor Stello, Jr. , Director Division of Inspec ion & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 1
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GRAND GULF NUCIE.AR STATION PROGRAM FOR TRAINING DURING LOW P0kT.R TESTING NUREG-0737, ITEM I.G.1 I
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GRAND GUIE NUCLEAR STATION PROGRAM FOR TRAINING DURING LOW POWER TESTING NUREG-0737, ITEM I.G.I INDEX SECTION TITLE PAGE INTRODUCTION 1 I PREOPERATIONAL TESTING 2 II COLD FUNCTIONAL TESTING 2 III HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING 3 IV STARTUP TESTING 3-4 V ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND TESTING 4 CONCLUSIONS 4 APPENDIX A COLD FUNCTIONAL TESTING 5-6 APPENDIX B HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING 7-9 APPENDIX C ADDITIONAL TESTING AND TRAINING 10 - 14
I INTRODUCTION The NRC has identified new requirements for GE BWR plant testfag and training. These requirements in NUREG-0737, ites I.G.1, are applicable to near-term operating license (NTOL) facilities. The following quotes are from the earlier NUREG documents addressing these requirements:
NUREG-0660 May, 1980 TASK I.G PREOPERATIONAL AND LOW-POWER TESTING
< A. OBJECTIVE: Increase the capability of the shift crews to operate facilities in a safe and competent manner by assuring that training for plant evolutions and off-normal events is conducted. Near-ters operating license facilities will be required to develop and implement intensified. training exercises during low-power testing programs. This may involve the repetition of startup tests on different shifts for training purposes. Based on experiences frce the near-term (perating license facilities, requirements may be applied to other new facilities or incorporated into the plant drill requirement (Item I.A.2.5). Review comprehensiveness of test programs.
NUREG-0694 June, 1980 I.G.1 TRAINING DURING LOW-POWER TESTING r
> Define and commit to a special low-power testing program approved by NRC to be conducted at power levels no greater than 5 percent for the purposes of providing meaningful technical information beyond that obtained in the normal startup test program and to provide supplemental training.
NUREG-0737 reiterated the requirements cet forth in NUREG-0694.
Review of the present BWR Preoperational and Startup Test Programs against the above listed requirements has identified a number of areas where increased emphasis on operator training can be beneficial.
Additionally, several new tests have been identified that are responsive
. to the NRC requirements. As a result of this review, a program Las been developed for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and is described herein.
The test program has been divided into five sections for purposes of this report. They are:
I - Preoperational Testing II - Cold Functional Testing III - Hot Functional Testing IV - Startup Testing V - Additional Training and Testing .
The first four sections briafly discuss the present test program and changes made to improve the training benefit. The last section contains new testing proposed te provide meaningful cechnical information and enhance training.
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I PREOPERATIONAL TESTING ,
The preoperational test program serves a two-fold purpose.
Primarily, it controls and documents the preoperational test effort. A secondary benefit of the program is that during the test phase, a detailed knowlege of the systems and their performance characteristics will be obtained by the plant operating personnel. ,
Plant operating personnel will obtain hands on experience by testing of these systems thereby helping to satisfy the training concerns of NUREG-0737. The preoperational test program described in FSAR Section 14.2.12.1 will be conducted by plant operations
- personnel where operation of plant equipment is involved and thus i
contributes significantly to operations personnel training on these I systems. The Integrated ECCS with Loss of Offsite Power test.is one of the more significant tests performed during the l
preoperational test phase which significantly supports operator training. FSAR Section 14.2.12.1.44 describes this test.
i To enhance the training benefit of this test, Integrated ECCS
- testing will be scheduled so that each shift will participate in at least one of these tests to obtain training. ' Operators will obtain
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an appreciation and feel for control room and plant conditions / limitations and will be required to resolve operational problems associated with the loss of emergency battery and diesel generators during a time when emergency equipment is required to operate.
II COLD FUNCTIONAL TESTING l
l Cold Functional Tests are performed on a plant for several rearons.
Some of the more important reasons are as follows:
A. Assure that plant systems are available to support fuel loading.
B. Assure that shift personnel have operating experience with plant equipment.
C. Assure that certain plant operating procedures and surveillance procedures have been tried and are usable.
D. Assure that each shift has functioned together to operate the l_ plant systems on sa integrated basis.
E. Assure that specified plant equipme. t has been tested and the plant and personnel are ready for f'.el loading.
The Cold Functional Tests are performes using plant procedures and are controlled and documented by use of checklists. The checklist provides a signoff sheet to assure that each shift has received training and cxperience on some of the specified systems. The Shift Supervisor will be responsible to ensure, by signing the checklist, that his shift has performed the operation specified.
Systems to be included are found in Appendix A.
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III HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING Hot Functional Tests are performed to assure that as much as possible the system, procedures, and personnel are ready for operativa at various power levels. This verification is done by operating systems in an integrated fashion at operating temperatures and pressures at the earliest opportunity for meaningful checks.
The Hot Functional Tests cover those areas of the plant systems which are not tested by the Startup Test Procedures, but where it is felt that additional data over and above the Cold Functional Tests is beneficial.
Typically, the Hot Functional Tests will begin after fuel is loaded when nuclear heat is available. Startup testing provides two phases which of fer Hot Functional Test opportunities. These phases are listed below:
A. During heatup from ambient temperature and 0 psig reactor pressure to rated reactor temperature and pressure.
B. After increase from rated reactor temperature and pressure to 30 percent reactor power.
The F;; Functional Tests are not intended to replace any of the startup test procedures, although there are portions which will be conducted simultaneously.
Those systems whose environment does not change during ascension to rated temperature and pressure will nct receive' additional testing.
Hot Functional Tests to be performed on systems are listed in Appendis B.
During the performance of this testing the Operations Superintendent shall cause a review to be performed of d2e applicable system operating procedures and ensure that necessary changes are made to these procedures as specified by admini:trative procedures. The Training Superintendent will additionally verify that operations personnel on each shift have been familiarized with the changes to procedures through the use of information acknowledgements.
IV STARTUP TESTING A typical startup test program is composed of phases characterized by differences in plant and test conditions. Startup tests are comorised of four phases which include fuel loading and subsequent tests:
A. Open Vessel Testing B. Initial Heatup C. Power Tests D. Warranty Tests Tests to be performed during open vessel, reactor heatup and power ascension are described in FSAR Section 14.2.12.3.
All manipulcticn of centrole fer startup tseting purp:Ocs will ba cerductsd by qunlifisd cparetiens per:cnn21. This tacting will provide many beneficial opportunities for operator training. In particular, this training shall verify that each operating shift observes or performs the following:
- 1. At least one reactor scram transient.
- 2. At least one pressure controller transient.
- 3. At least one turbine trip or load rejection transient.
- 4. Operation of the RCIC system.
- 5. At least one water level setpoint transient.
Since testing will, in general, be conducted on a round the clock basis, the other testing will be balanced as much as practicable to ensure even exposure to testing for all operating shifts.
V ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND TESTING Because of our efforts to provide as comprehensive a test program as possible several new tests will be added to the test program.
These tests will provide additional technical information to aid in system and plant operational readiness evaluations. ihe tests will also provide some operator training by the operator participation i in the conduct of the testing.
Appendix C contains test descriptions defining the scope of the new tests to be added to the preoperational test program. Detailed test procedures will be written from the scope of those
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CONCLUSIONS As explainea is this report, each phase of the testing program provides a building block for the next phase and provides the necessary oveelap and depth to ensure that the operating staff will obtain maximum meae.ingful inplant training to assure that crews will operate their facilities in a safe and competent manner and that all safety related systems are thoroughly tested. The increased emphasis on operator training, described in this l
submittal, and the addition of new testing, when coupled with the
! present testing and training programs, more than adequately l
satisfies the requirements of I.G.1 of NUREG-0737.
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APPENDIX A Systems to be included as part of this program are:
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Reactor Vessel & Auxiliary Systems Recirculation System Reactor Water Cleanup System Control Rod Drive System -
Reactor Vessel Level Instrumenta, tion Standby Liquid Control Remote Shutdown System ECCS System LPCS RHR (including LPCI, Shutdown Cooling, and Suppression Pool Cooling)
HPCS Emergency Electrical System i
Standby Diesel Generators and Emergency Buses Emergency Batteries Plant Support Systems Stcudby Service Water Component Cooling Water Turbine Building Cooling Water Make'ap Water Treatment System Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Condensate / Refueling Water Transfer System Instrument and Service Air Plant Service Water Circulating Water Auxiliary Steam System
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APPENDIX A 1
- other Systems Standby Gas Treatment Systen l Auxiliary Building HVAC 1
Fuel Handling HVAC i Control Room HVAC h
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APPENDIX B DURING HEATUP FROM AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND 0 PSIG REACTOR PRESSURE TO RATED REACTOR TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE SYSTEM MODE OF OPERATION AND HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTS CRD S,vstem In continuous normal operation, check each fully withdrawn CRD for coupling as it is
- withdrawn. Observe that temperatures are in limits. Observe proper position indication. Record rod . patterns.
Containment and Drywell Both should be in continuous operation Cooling per procedure.
Process Radiation Monitors In continuous operation. Check ier response to increasing power levels.
Ventilation Systems In continuous operation. Check that oteam tunnel temperature is within temperature limits at rated temperature and pressure.
Verify proper operation of leakage detection systems.
Turbine EHC Pressure Start heatup with pressure controller set Controls at 150 psig and by-pass opening jack at O.
When reactor pressure is greater than 150 pais check that controller responds to setpoint changes.
i Rod Pattern Controller In continuous operation. Verify proper operation as rods are withdrawn.
Main Steam Relief Valves Record the discharge thermocouple readings from recorder and determine that the valves do not have seat leakage.
- Condensate Cleanup System Verify performance of system to control l adequately water quality by observing that water quality stays within limits l
specified by plant chemist.
TIP System Make traces when flux level permits.
Verify air / nitrogen purge.
l Reactor Water Cleanup In continuous operation ;L approximately
! System 50 percent to 100 pa; cent flow. Place cleanup recirculation pumps in operation at pressure and operate in all modes.
Check that valves operate properly.
Reject reactor water back to condenser and radwaste to check reject valve for proper operation.
APPENDIX B Reactor Recirculation In continuous operation per operating System procedure. Check that seal cavity, bearing and winding temperatures are within limits. Check that cavity pressures follows heatup pressure.
Check that recire. loop temperature recorder indicates the proper temperature increase. ,
Condensate and Feedwater In continuous operation to maintain reactor level. Start standby feed pump turbine per procedure, place in service and remove replaced turbine from service.
SRM and IRM In continuous operation. Check for proper retract operation as they are withdrawn.
Insert and check for proper operation / indication.
Turbine Seal Place in continuous operation per operating prasedure. Check that seal steam regulator controls seal pressure.
Vacuus Pump Place in service per operating procedure.
Steam Jet Air Ejectors Place in service per operating procedure.
Place backup air ejectors in service.
Reactor Vessel Temps and Should be in continuous service. Head Head Leak Detection seal leak detector should be valved per operating procedure.
Circulating Water Continuous operation to maintain adequate condenser vacuum.
1 APPENDIX B AFTER INCREASE FROM RATED TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE TO 30% P0hT.R A few significant system environmental changes occur between arrival at rated temperature and pressure and completion of 30 percent testing which requires the following additional hot functional checks. )
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NODE OF OPERATION AND HOT FUNCTIONAL j SYSTEM CHECKS l Turbine Generator During this period the turbine generator will be placed in operation on nuclear steam for the first time and the following checks should be performed which are not !
part of the formal test program. Verify l procedure for turbine warmup and roll to )
1,800 rpm. Perform the turbine generator i
no-load tests. Check turbine vibration at '
critical speed and 1,800 rpm. Verify 1 proper operation of primary cooling system l (rotor and stator) and generator seal oil l systems. Verify operator familiarization j with turbine generator instrumentation and ,
controls both local and remote. Verify )
oil flow indication at each bearing i inspection spout. Verify that expansion ,
4 (stretchout) is satisfactory. Perform !
overspeed checks. ]
Feedwater Heater Controls Put feedwater heaters in service, and establish level control. Feedwater i
temperature will rise. Inspect feedwater ,
line and feedwater pump casings to assure thermal expansion has not opened flanges i or affected mechanical seal operation. i CCW System Check temperatures of cooled components.
Readjust as necessary to maintain proper temperature in components as specified in the operating procedures.
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t APPENDIX C TEST: Startup of the RCIC system after loss of AC power to the system.
PURPOSE: Verify the design basis ability of the system to start without j the aid of AC power with the exception of the RCIC DC/AC inverters.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
-o Preoperational test has been performed on RCIC system.
I o If test is performed prior to the availability of nuclear steam, sufficient auxiliary boiler capacity and piping to run the RCIC turbine / pump must be available, o System valves in normal standby lineup (suction from CST)
NOTE: 1) If the auxiliary boiler is used as the turbine steam supply, tag closed the steam supply isolation valves E51-F064 and E12-F052A & B.
- 2) Flow can either be directed to the reactor "
pressure vessel or back to the condensate storage tank.
, o Power to all RCIC components fed by site AC power shall be secured.
o Station batteries shall be fully charged.
o Instrument air shall be available for operation and control of applicable valves. L o Instruments shall be calibrated and setpoints, where i spplicable, shall be verified.
l l TEST DESCRIPTION: l l
o Perform a manual initiation of the RCIC system utilizing the manual i.sitiation switch and verify the proper operation of all components required for the RCIC startup tracalent to rated flow.
NOTE: Manual manipulation of some valves will be required if flow is returned to the CST or auxiliary boiler steam is used.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA:
o Proper operation of all components for the RCIC startup transient until rated flow is obtained. '
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APPENDIX C TEST: Operation of the RCIC system with a sustained loss of AC power to the system.
PURPOSE: To verify the operation of RCIC to evaluate the ILuits of system operation with extended loss of AC power to it and support systems with the exception of the RCIC DC/AC inverters.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
o Preoperational test has been performed on RCIC system.
o If test is performed prior to the availability of nuclear steam, sufficient auxiliary boiler capacity and piping to run the RCIC turbine / pump must be available.
o System valves in normal standby linerp (suction from CST).
NOTE: 1) If the auxiliary boiler is used as the turbine steam supply, tag closed the steam supply isolation valves, E51-F064 and E12-F052 A & B.
o Power to all RCIC components fed by site AC power shall be secured, including RCIC area coolers and battery chargers supplying the station battery from which RCIC DC loads are powered.
o RCIC batteries shall be fully charged.
o Instrument air shall be available for operation and control of applicable valves.
o Instruments shall be calibrated and setpoints, where applicable, shall be verified.
TEST DESCRIPTION:
o Start and operate the RCIC system with return to the CST and run for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or until aar system limiting parameter is approached (e.g. , ' sigh RCIC area temperature, low battery voltar,e, or high suppression pool temperature). During thf.s period of RCIC system operation, shutdown the system and restart two times to verify systes restart capability.
NOTE: Testing will be conducted in a manner such that equipment is not placed in Jeopardy of damage and such that equipment qualification is not degraded.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA:
o None
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APPENDIX C TEST: RCIC operation to prove DC separation.
PURPOSE: Verify proper operation of the RCIC DC components when non-RCIC station batteries are disconnected.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
o Preoperational test has been performed on RCIC system, o Test to be per2)rmed prior to fuel load, o This test is performed prior to the availability of nuclear steam, sufficient auxiliary boiler capacity and piping to run the RCIC turbine / pump must bc available.
o System valves in normal standby lineup (suction from CST).
o Steam supply isolation valves E51-F064 and E12-F052A & B-tagged shut.
o Station batteries shall be fully charged, o Instrument air shall be available for operation and control of applicable valves.
o Instruments shall be calibrated and setpoints, where applicable, shall be verified.
TEST DESCRIPTION:
o Start and operate the RCIC system with return to the CST.
During system operation disconnect, each non-RCIC station battery from its bus and verify proper operation of each RCIC DC component.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA:
o Proper operation of RCIC DC components with non-RCIC station batteries disconnected.
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APPENDIX C TEST: Integrated reactor pressure vessel level functional test.
PL1tPOSE: Verify that instruments connected to the RPV are tubed properly, that the tubing is not blocked and that instrument tracking is proper. .
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
o All instruments connected to the RPV have been calibrated and are operable.
j o RPV has been flushed and is clean.
o All RPV instrument tubing has been filled, all instruments are vented, and proper valve lineup verified.
o A source of desineralized water is available to fill the RPV.
o Fuel has not been loaded into the RPV.
o RPV head removed or adequately vented to prevent
. pressurization.
4 TEST DESCRIPTION:
o Raise and lower (or lower and raise, whichever is most convenient) the RPV water level through the range of RPV levels necessary to verify the proper operation and tracking of each RPV connected instrument.
NOTE: The temperature and pressure conditions at which this test will be performed are not the conditions for which the various instruments are calibrated. There will not be a one-to-one correspondence between actual reactor vessel level change and indicated level change.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA:
o Each affected RPV instruments operacion and tracking is satisfactory.
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APPENDIX C TEST: Integrated drywell and containment pressure instrumentation test (test to be performed in conjunction with containment integrated leak rate testing).
PURPOSE: Verify proper connection and tracking of drywell and containment pressure instruments and that the tubing supplying these instruments is not blocked.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
o All initial conditions for containment integrated leak rate testing have been established.
. o Drywell and containment press'are instruments have been calibrated and are valved into service.
TEST DESCRIPTION:
o As containment pressure is increased, during the containment integrated leak rate test, verify proper operation of specified drywell and containment pressure instruments.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA:
o Specified drywell and containment instruments perform their design function. ,
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