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Category:Meeting Summary
MONTHYEARML23157A3202023-06-26026 June 2023 Summary of April 26, 2023, Meeting with Duke Energy to Discuss a Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Planned License Amendment Request Related to Turbine Control System and Reactor Protection System Circuitry ML23151A1232023-05-31031 May 2023 Public Meeting Summary - 2022 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ML22167A1852022-06-30030 June 2022 Summary of June 6, 2022, Meeting with Duke Energy to Discuss Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Closeout of Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 191 ML22129A0062022-05-10010 May 2022 Summary of April 20, 2022, Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC, to Discuss Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve Operational Leakage Surveillance Requirement Frequency (L-2022-LRM 00 ML22130A0302022-05-0909 May 2022 Summary of Public Meeting on 2021 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324; and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Docket No. 50-400, Meeting Number 20220350 ML21341A5542021-12-29029 December 2021 Summary of November 29, 2021, Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC to Discuss a Planned License Amendment Request to Relocate ML21172A2672021-08-13013 August 2021 Regulatory Audit Summary Related to the Review of LAR to Revise 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors, Categorization Process to Reflect an Alternative Seis ML21131A1472021-05-11011 May 2021 Public Meeting Summary 2020 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324; and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Docket No. 50-400, Meeting Number 20210385 ML20136A2222020-05-15015 May 2020 Har - Bru 2019 Aam Meeting Summary ML19331A8062020-01-29029 January 2020 Summary of November 13, 2019 Closed Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, to Discuss Security-Related Information for Its Licensed Facilities ML19329A0232019-11-27027 November 2019 Summary of October 29, 2019 Conference Call with Duke Energy Progress, LLC Regarding the Fall 2019 Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML19241A2902019-09-24024 September 2019 Summary of August 22, 2019, Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC Proposed License Amendment Request to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times ML19220A6702019-08-26026 August 2019 Summary of August 7, 2019, Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC to Discuss a Proposed License Amendment Request for a Common Emergency Plan ML19113A0652019-05-14014 May 2019 Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy to Discuss Proposed License Amendment Request for Shearon Harris, Unit 1, Technical Specification Changes Associated with Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio Safety Limit ML19120A1342019-05-0606 May 2019 3/15/19 Summary of Public Meeting with Nuclear Entergy Institute, Duke Energy, and Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post-Pilot Implementation of Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Methodology at Vogtle, Units 1 and 2 and Shearon Harris, Unit ML19123A3522019-05-0202 May 2019 Public Meeting Summary - Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Docket No. 50-400 ML19087A0622019-04-11011 April 2019 Summary of March 25, 2019, Public Teleconference with Duke Energy to Discuss the Request for Additional Information Response Regarding the Proposed Alternative to the Depth Sizing Qualification Requirement (Duke Energy Fleet Relief Request ML18361A6712019-01-0808 January 2019 Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC to Discuss License Amendment Request for Shearon Harris Unit 1, Regarding 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, ML18352A3572019-01-0808 January 2019 Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC to Discuss Proposed License Amendment Request for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Plan Changes ML18355A8142019-01-0707 January 2019 Summary of December 20, 2018, Teleconference Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC to Discuss a Proposed License Amendment Request for Shearon Harris Unit 1, Regarding a Risk-Informed Essential Services Chilled Water System TS ML18094A2632018-08-17017 August 2018 Summary of 01/18/2018, Public Meeting with Nuclear Energy Institute, Duke Energy, Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Entergy Operations, Inc. to Discuss Development of Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Methodology ML18109A0912018-04-19019 April 2018 Summary of 2017 Annual Assessment Public Meeting Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Docket No. 50-400 ML18088A0732018-04-0303 April 2018 March 27, 2018, Summary of Presubmittal Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC to Discuss a Proposed Relief Request for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 ML18064A1332018-03-19019 March 2018 Summary of February 27, 2018, Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC to Discuss Proposed License Amendment Request for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Plan Emergency Action Level Scheme Changes (L-2017-LRM-00 ML17340A1302017-12-22022 December 2017 Summary of November 29, 2017, Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC to Discuss Proposed License Amendment Requests to Implement the Requirement of 10 CFR 50.69 at Brunswick, Shearon Harris, and H. B. Robinson ML17340A0612017-12-0808 December 2017 11/8/17 Summary of Teleconference with Entergy Operations, Inc., Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator with Applicability to Submittals from Duke Energy and Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc. ML17244A0742017-09-28028 September 2017 8/17/2017 Summary of Public Meeting with Nuclear Energy Institute and Licensees to Discuss the Tornado Missile Risk Evaluation Tool for Grand Gulf, Shearon Harris, and Vogtle, Units 1 and 2 ML17257A0992017-09-26026 September 2017 Summary of Public Meeting with Nuclear Energy Institute and Licensees to Discuss the Tornado Missile Risk Evaluation Tool for Grand Gulf, Shearon Harris, and Vogtle, Units 1 and 2 ML17223A1212017-08-17017 August 2017 Summary of August 3, 2017, Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, LLC on Proposed License Amendment Request to Implement Fuel Reload Design Methodology Reports for Shearon Harris and H. B. Robinson ML17145A3142017-05-25025 May 2017 EOC Meeting Summary ML16286A0152016-11-0101 November 2016 Summary Of September 29, 2016, Duke Energy Progress, LLC. To Discuss Proposed License Amendment Request Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, BWR Storage Rack Inserts And The Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis (CAC No. MF8327) ML16235A2382016-10-17017 October 2016 Summary of the July 12-13, 2016 Audit Supporting the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review of DPC-NE-1008-P, Nuclear Design Methodology Using CASMO-5/SIMULATE-3 for Westinghouse Reactors ML16125A0992016-05-20020 May 2016 Summary of May 2, 2016, Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, Inc. to Discuss Fuel Reload Design Methodology Reports and Proposed Supplement to a License Amendment Request Regarding Shearon Harris and H.B. Robinson ML16134A1552016-05-12012 May 2016 Public Meeting Summary - 2015 Annual Assessment Public Meeting Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ML16112A3772016-04-25025 April 2016 Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, Inc. to Discuss the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, TSTF-425 LAR Request for Additional Information Reponses ML16034A5242016-03-11011 March 2016 Summary of February 1, 2016, Pre-submittal Meeting with Duke Energy Regarding Consolidation of Emergency Operations Facilities ML16035A4802016-02-12012 February 2016 Jsc Meeting Summary Attachment ML15280A2532015-11-25025 November 2015 Summary of Mtg. with Duke Energy Progress Inc. to Discuss Fuel Reload Design Methodology Reports & Proposed License Amendment Request Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 and H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 (MF6701/MF6702 ML15202A4752015-09-24024 September 2015 Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, Inc. to Discuss Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Proposed License Amendment Request Regarding Technical Specifications for the Pressurizer and Main Steam Line Safety Valves (MF6233) ML14129A3352014-05-0909 May 2014 Summary of Category 1 Public Meeting - Annual Assessment of Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ML13312A9882013-11-0808 November 2013 Summary of Public Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Provide Opportunities to Discuss the Planned Fukushima-Related Modifications ML13204A2672013-09-27027 September 2013 07/09/13 Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy Regarding a Nonconservative Technical Specification Loss of Offsite Power Voltage Setpoint License Amendment Request ML13218B3692013-09-27027 September 2013 7/30/2013 - Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy Regarding a Change to the Emergency Response Facility Activation Timeliness and Criteria ML13225A2932013-08-12012 August 2013 7/23-24/2013, Summary of Meeting 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Initial Exam Writers' Workshop ML13171A3292013-06-20020 June 2013 Public Meeting Summary, Category 3, NRC Special Inspection on Reactor Vessel Head Nozzle Repair of Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ML13155A1052013-06-12012 June 2013 May 2, 2013, Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy Concerning the Relocation of the Emergency Operating Facilities ML13151A2262013-05-30030 May 2013 Meeting Summary - Category 1 Public Meeting Annual Assessment - Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Docket 50-400 ML12277A0252012-11-0202 November 2012 10/2/12 Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas to Discuss Nonconservative Technical Specifications License Amendment Requests ML12242A4322012-08-28028 August 2012 Summary of Category 1 Public Meeting - Regulatory Conference and Predecisional Enforcement Conference ML12107A0012012-04-16016 April 2012 Meeting Summary - Category 1 Public Meeting - Annual Assessment of Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant 2023-06-26
[Table view] Category:Memoranda
MONTHYEARML23151A1232023-05-31031 May 2023 Public Meeting Summary - 2022 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ML22130A0302022-05-0909 May 2022 Summary of Public Meeting on 2021 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324; and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Docket No. 50-400, Meeting Number 20220350 ML22075A3592022-03-17017 March 2022 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection ML22034A3932022-02-16016 February 2022 Calendar Year 2021 Security Baseline Completion Memo ML21131A1472021-05-11011 May 2021 Public Meeting Summary 2020 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324; and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Docket No. 50-400, Meeting Number 20210385 RA-21-0097, Notification of Permit Revision Request Regarding Copper and Zinc Limits2021-03-15015 March 2021 Notification of Permit Revision Request Regarding Copper and Zinc Limits ML20136A2222020-05-15015 May 2020 Har - Bru 2019 Aam Meeting Summary ML19113A0652019-05-14014 May 2019 Summary of Meeting with Duke Energy to Discuss Proposed License Amendment Request for Shearon Harris, Unit 1, Technical Specification Changes Associated with Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio Safety Limit ML19123A3522019-05-0202 May 2019 Public Meeting Summary - Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Docket No. 50-400 ML18109A0912018-04-19019 April 2018 Summary of 2017 Annual Assessment Public Meeting Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Docket No. 50-400 ML18074A0202018-03-20020 March 2018 Fpra FAQ 16-0011 Closure Memo ML17145A3142017-05-25025 May 2017 EOC Meeting Summary ML16300A1802016-10-27027 October 2016 Verbal Authorization of Relief Request I3R-16, for Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Nozzle Repair Technique, Inservice Inspection Program -Third 10-Year Interval ML16138A0502016-05-24024 May 2016 Audit Report - Application For Amendment Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 - The Proposed License Amendment Revises The As-Found Lift Setting Tolerance For Main Steam Line Code Safety Valves In Technical Specifications (TAC No. MF7195) ML16134A1552016-05-12012 May 2016 Public Meeting Summary - 2015 Annual Assessment Public Meeting Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ML16103A2552016-04-14014 April 2016 05/02/2016 Notice of Forthcoming Closed Pre-Submittal Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, Inc., to Discuss Fuel Reload Design Methodology Reports and Proposed LAR Re. H. B. Robinson and Shearon Harris Plants (CAC Nos. MF7443 and MF7444) ML15149A3222015-05-29029 May 2015 2014 Harris Annual Assessment Meeting Summary ML15107A4252015-04-17017 April 2015 4/20/2015, Forthcoming Closed Meeting with Duke Energy Progress, Inc. to Discuss Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Relief Request I3R-15 Revision and Supplement, Reactor Vessel Closure Head Nozzle Repair Technique, Inservice Inspe ML13330B6392013-11-27027 November 2013 Verbal Authorization of Relief Request 13R-13 for Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Nozzle Repair Inservice Inspection Program - Third 10-Year Interval ML13295A3062013-10-22022 October 2013 Meeting Notice with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Discuss the Planned Modifications Related to the Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluations for the Sites Operated by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ML13150A0712013-05-31031 May 2013 Verbal Authorization of Relief Request I3R-11 for Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Nozzel Repair Inservice Inspection Program - Third 10-Year Interval ML13142A4672013-05-22022 May 2013 Special Inspection Charter to Evaluate Harris Reactor Vessel Head Nozzle 49 Flaw Issue ML13120A1372013-05-0202 May 2013 Notice of Forthcoming Meeting with Duke Energy, Inc. Regarding a Non-Conservative Technical Specification Loss-of-Offsite Power Voltage Setpoint License Amendment Request for Shearon Harris, Unit 1 ML13106A3372013-04-17017 April 2013 Notice of Forthcoming Meeting with Duke Energy, Inc. Concerning the Relocation of the Emergency Operating Facilities ML12300A4032012-10-26026 October 2012 11/8/2012 Meeting Notice with Duke Energy to Discuss NRC Order on Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-design-Basis External Events ML12284A4612012-10-12012 October 2012 Forthcoming Meeting Notice with Duke Energy to Discuss NRC Order on Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events ML12261A0992012-09-17017 September 2012 10/2/12 - Notice of Forthcoming Public Conference Call with Duke Energy Carolinas Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 ML12249A1702012-09-0606 September 2012 Notice of Forthcoming Conference Call Public Meeting with Duke Energy Regarding the Non Conservative Technical Specifications License Amendment Requests for Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ML1219805572012-09-0505 September 2012 Close-Out of National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Frequently Asked Question 12-0062: Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Content ML12144A4402012-05-24024 May 2012 Verbal Authorization of Relief Request I3R-06 for Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Nozzles Repair Inservice Inspection Program - Third 10-Year Interval ML1127300822011-09-30030 September 2011 Request for Additional Information Regarding Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate ML1103804972011-02-0808 February 2011 Notice of Forthcoming Preapplication Meeting with Carolina Power & Light Company and Representatives Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 ML1024301722010-10-0505 October 2010 Trip Report on Observing the National Fire Protection Association 805 Readiness Self Assessment Performed at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ML1015805092010-06-0808 June 2010 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Spot-Check Review of North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency'S Ownership Interest of Shearon Harris, Unit 1 and Brunswick, Units 1 and 2 on May 21, 2010 - Finding of No Potential Issues in Bank ML1015901992010-06-0808 June 2010 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Spot-Check Review of Progress Energy Carolina'S Ownership Interest of H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2 & Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit ML1015900142010-06-0808 June 2010 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Spot-Check Review of North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency'S Ownership Interest of Shearon Harris, Unit 1 and Brunswick, Units 1 and 2 on May 20, 2010 - Finding of No Potential Issues in Bank ML1005702002010-02-26026 February 2010 Notice of Closed Meeting with Progress Energy to Observe a Live Test Fire of Mackenzie River Partner'S Remotely Operated Weapon System at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ML0936406952010-01-0707 January 2010 Notice of Meeting with Carolina Power & Light Company to Discuss Requests for Additional Information Associated with Generic Letter 2004-02 ML0916605042009-06-24024 June 2009 04/21-22/2009 Summary of Category 2 Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss Topics Involving the License Amendment Requests to Transition Shearon, Unit 1 and Oconee to NFPA 805 ML0909604362009-05-28028 May 2009 Lessons from Regulatory Audits of the Pilot Plants That Are Transitioning to a Fire Protection Licensing Basis Based on the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard NFPA 805 as Allowed by 10 CFR 5.48 (C) ML0909905052009-04-29029 April 2009 03/20/09 Summary of Site Audit to Support the Review of a License Amendment Request for Shearon Harris to Transition to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Fire Protection Licensing Basis ML0909900182009-04-10010 April 2009 04/21-22/2009, Notice of Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss Topics Involving the License Amendment Requests to Transition the Shearon, Unit 1 and the Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 ML0829501872008-09-0909 September 2008 DHS Shearon Harris Consultation Report Cover Letter ML0814002922008-08-20020 August 2008 Close-out of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Frequently Asked Question 07-0032 ML0818302602008-07-0101 July 2008 Meeting Minutes of the ACRS Plant License Renewal Subcommittee Regarding Shearon Harris, May 7, 2008 ML0816901212008-06-17017 June 2008 Forthcoming Closed Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., to Discuss the May 29, 2008, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Transition the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (Harris) to National Fire Protection Association (Nfpa).. ML0808501922008-03-26026 March 2008 Forthcoming Meeting with Cp&L to Discuss an Open Item Related to the License Renewal Review for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 ML0807400842008-03-14014 March 2008 Draft Regulatory Guide for Comment ML0807203352008-03-0303 March 2008 Comment (7) of Chatham County Board of Commissioners Opposing Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for License Renewal of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant ML0735205132007-12-19019 December 2007 01/07-08/2008 Pilot Observation Visit with Duke Energy and Progress Energy Regarding Oconee and Harris Transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 2023-05-31
[Table view] Category:Note to File incl Telcon Record
MONTHYEARML0732410442007-11-15015 November 2007 Summary of Conference Call Held on 10/25/2007, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Carolina Power & Light Company, Concerning Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Tube Inspection ML0716500652007-07-27027 July 2007 Summary of Clarification Telephone Call with Progress Energy Regarding Pilot Plant (Shearon Harris) Transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 ML0702605162007-02-0707 February 2007 January 24, 2007, Summary of Teleconference Regarding Shearon Harris Transition to NFPA 805 ML0335604262003-08-26026 August 2003 Handwritten Notes of Conversation Between NRC and Progress Energy on Manual Returns ML0335604092003-02-13013 February 2003 Notes of Phone Call, Dated 02/13/2003 ML0335604492002-08-26026 August 2002 Handwritten Notes on Conversation Between Charlie Ogle and J. Caves 2007-07-27
[Table view] Category:Verbal Comm
MONTHYEARML0732410442007-11-15015 November 2007 Summary of Conference Call Held on 10/25/2007, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Carolina Power & Light Company, Concerning Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Tube Inspection ML0716500652007-07-27027 July 2007 Summary of Clarification Telephone Call with Progress Energy Regarding Pilot Plant (Shearon Harris) Transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 ML0702605162007-02-0707 February 2007 January 24, 2007, Summary of Teleconference Regarding Shearon Harris Transition to NFPA 805 ML0335604262003-08-26026 August 2003 Handwritten Notes of Conversation Between NRC and Progress Energy on Manual Returns ML0335604092003-02-13013 February 2003 Notes of Phone Call, Dated 02/13/2003 ML0335604492002-08-26026 August 2002 Handwritten Notes on Conversation Between Charlie Ogle and J. Caves 2007-07-27
[Table view] |
Text
July 27, 2007 MEMORANDUM TO: Sunil D. Weerakkody, Chief Fire Protection Branch Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Paul W. Lain, Senior Fire Protection Engineer /RA/
Fire Protection Branch Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MAY 21, 2007, CLARIFICATION TELEPHONE CALL REGARDING PILOT PLANT (SHEARON HARRIS) TRANSITION TO NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805 On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff from Headquarters participated in a telephone call with Progress Energy to discuss Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant transition to the National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805. The subjects of the discussion were the analyses, procedures, and methodology for performing fire safe shutdown analyses, circuit analysis, non-power operational modes analysis, and NFPA 805 Chapter 4 Fire Area Transitions.
Progress Energy recorded the NRC comments, answered some of them, and retained the remaining ones for subsequent disposition. All of the comments will be discussed at the next observation visit and will be documented in the associated trip report.
Enclosed are a list of the teleconference participants (Enclosure 1) and the NRC staff clarification questions (Enclosure 2). The publically available documents discussed during the telephone call are available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML071650197.
Enclosures:
As stated CONTACT: Paul Lain, NRR/DRA 301-415-2346
MEMORANDUM TO: Sunil D. Weerakkody, Chief Fire Protection Branch Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Paul W. Lain, Senior Fire Protection Engineer Fire Protection Branch Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MAY 21, 2007, CLARIFICATION TELEPHONE CALL REGARDING PILOT PLANT (SHEARON HARRIS) TRANSITION TO NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805 On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff from Headquarters participated in a telephone call with Progress Energy to discuss Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant transition to the National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805. The subjects of the discussion were the analyses, procedures, and methodology for performing fire safe shutdown analyses, circuit analysis, non-power operational modes analysis, and NFPA 805 Chapter 4 Fire Area Transitions.
Progress Energy recorded the NRC comments, answered some of them, and retained the remaining ones for subsequent disposition. All of the comments will be discussed at the next observation visit and will be documented in the associated trip report.
Enclosed are a list of the teleconference participants (Enclosure 1) and the NRC staff clarification questions (Enclosure 2). The publically available documents discussed during the telephone call are available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML071650197.
Enclosures:
As stated DISTRIBUTION: DRA R/F PLain TDinh EMcCann SLaur RGallucci JSHyslop HBarrett SWeerakkody JCircle SWilliams CPayne WRogers ADAMS Accession # (Package): ML071650197 ADAMS Accession # (Cover memo with encl.): ML071650065 ADAMS Accession # (FPIP-0126): ML071630512 ADAMS Accession # (FPIP-0106): ML071630505 ADAMS Accession # (EGR-NGGC-0102): ML071630478 ADAMS Accession # (Table B-2) : ML071630517 ADAMS Accession # (FPIP-0127): ML071210335 NRC-001 OFFICE AFPB/FPE BC:AFPB/FPE NAME PLain SWeerakoddy DATE 7/ 27 /07 7/ 27 /07 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
CLARIFICATION TELEPHONE CALL REGARDING PILOT PLANT (SHEARON HARRIS) TRANSITION TO NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805 List of Participants U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff E. McCann P. Lain R. Gallucci T. Dinh H. Barrett JS. Hyslop Pacific Northwest National Laboratory T. Blackburn*
Progress Energy R. Rishel*
T. Maness*
R. Rhodes*
S. Hardy*
J. Ertman*
- participated via telephone ENCLOSURE 1
NRC Questions for the May 21st Clarification Conference Call FPIP-0126 (Non-Power Operational Modes Transition Review)
General question: Assuming OMP-003 is the governing procedure for Outage Risk Management during Shutdown at Harris, how is this modified to include the effects of fire?
Should this be discussed in detail in FPIP-0126, assuming it is not done so specifically in OMP-003? If this is done specifically in OMP-003, we would need to review. (RG) 3.6: Consider using definitions from ASME RA-Sb-2005 (RG) 9.6.1: Why is the "pinch point" search limited only to areas that might damage ALL credited paths? Should not damage to ANY credited path be identified as well, since outage management "risk" usually considers various degrees of redundancy loss, not just total loss?
(RG) 9.6.6: Related to the above, this seems to indicate that compliance strategies will only be instituted when ALL redundancy is lost, not just partial loss. Plant conditions can be >Green with only partial loss, and do not these usually require some sort of compensatory measures?
(RG)
How is "increased potential for fire" addressed in OMP-003? (RG)
Based on the above, we need to review OMP-003, at least the outage management "risk" evaluation portion. (RG) 9.7.3 Document outage activities which may lead to failure of KSF, including length of time condition in effect, type of outage activity, amount of combustibles added (if appropriate), etc.
For example, bringing in a load of combustibles for some outage maintenance activity would include documentation on the amount of combustibles, length of time they were there, type of combustible, etc. (JSH)
FPIP-0106 (Validate Fire Area SSD Strategies) 3.1: Consider using definitions from ASME RA-Sb-2005 (RG) 3.13: Recovery action definition: This definition identifies a recovery action as an action taken away from the primary control station, where the primary control station is not necessarily in the control room. If this primary control station is outside the control room due to fire damage, why shouldnt an action at this primary control station be considered a recovery action? (JSH) 9.1.7: Independent events: An earthquake inducing a fire is accounted for in fire PRA (i.e. the Standard) as well as licensing basis (i.e. SSD earthquake hose stations). Dont see why it should be excluded here. (JSH) 9.1.10: Why the single spurious restriction? Is not the purpose of transitioning to NFPA 805 the establishment of a new licensing basis that includes multiple spurious? [Since this ENCLOSURE 2
2 "deficiency" is rectified in Section 9.6, consider mentioning that here.] (RG) 9.1.12: Statement made that consideration should also be given to the possibility that total failure of the electrical component may not be the worst case failure. Does this mean that the failure mode of spurious operation will be taken for the analysis, if it is the worst case failure?
(JSH) 9.2: According to 9.2, a manual action is a sufficient strategy for being the sole mitigation means for safe shutdown. 9.2.9 says that Recent NRC positions on manual actions shall be considered when evaluating...... Shouldnt it say that Recent NRC positions on manual actions shall be followed when evaluating....... (JSH) 9.2: Saw no discussion about red box vs. blue box. Section 9.2 should go into the colored box that represents the licensing basis. (JSH) 9.2.9: The NRC references for manual actions need to be updated to include NUREG-1852. In addition, manual action feasibility AND RELIABILITY must be addressed. Likewise, referenced EGR-NGGC-0102 may need updating to the latest NRC guidance on manual actions.
(RG) 9.3: Again, multiple and potentially concurrent spurious, not just single and only sequential, should be considered. [Since this "deficiency" is rectified in Section 9.6, consider mentioning that here.] (RG) 9.6: Is intercable multiple spurious restricted to two components while intracable has no such restriction? What is the basis - RIS 2004-003, Rev. 1? Presumably, this restriction does NOT carry over into the Fire PSA. (RG)
EGR-NGGC-0102 (SSD/FP Review) 9.2.1, Note: The appropriate reference for manual actions taken as compensatory is RIS 2006-10. (RG) : This needs to be updated to the latest NRC guidance, including NUREG-1852 (draft for review in August 2006, final to be issued soon) and RIS 2006-10. Also, both feasibility AND RELIABILITY need to be considered. (RG)
Att. 3, 2.1: Historically, manual actions have never been part of III.G.1 compliance (ADAMS #
ML050140123, below). Change this statement. (RG)
It was stated that in fire areas for which alternative safe shutdown has not been provided, an exemption for Section III.G.2. of Appendix R is required if the separation features of Section III.G.2 are not provided. This statement was challenged with the line of reasoning that if Section III.G.1.a. of Appendix' R is satisfied,Section III.G.2 need not be satisfied. ELD [now OGC]
provided the following resolution to this question: Interpretation Three of Appendix R (which defines the term "free of fire damage" in Section III.G.1.a) was provided to clarify Section III.G.1(a), during the exemption process, for licensees attempting to Justify the lack of I1I.G.2.
separation features for redundant trains within a single fire area. It was never intended that "other methods proposed by licensees" would be reviewed and approved at the Appendix R validation inspection.
3 Att. 3, 4.2: Brigade members may NOT be credited later in the timeline unless all Brigade duties have been completed and the Brigade members have replacements on the Brigade, thereby freeing them for only manual action operations in case of subsequent fire (i.e., they would no longer be considered Brigade members at that time - no collateral duties). (RG)
Att. 3, Table 4-1: References to "within/after the first hour or before/after the fire is extinguished" should include the caveat "whichever is later." (RG)
Att. 3, 4.7: This should also include intermittent communication, or communication after an action is completed to verify its completion. The communication need not be "continuous" only.
(RG)
Att. 3, Table 5-1: While it is true that the likelihood of two spurious FOR THE SAME CABLE TYPE AND FIRE SIZE is less than that for one, the likelihood for multiples is not necessarily "low." The distinction between priority Medium and Low with regard to spurious should be based on the likelihoods of the specific types of spurious, not just the number. E.g., one spurious in a conduited cable may be less likely than two in a non-conduited cable (0.15 vs.
0.36, without CPT, as per NUREG/CR-6850, Table 10-2 or 10-4, M/C Intracable). (RG)
Att. 3, 5.3: Why are multiple spurious "not expected to occur concurrently unless...?" Since each circuit tends to affect a different component, would not fire-induced failures in "circuits" (plural) normally be expected to affect multiple components? (RG)
Att. 3, 5.3.2, Event Timeline: Tsp can occur before Tal or may actually constitute Tal. Likewise, Tglst can occur before Tor. Are these, as well as other possible permutations considered?
(RG)
Att. 3, 5.3.2: "The determination that the time to perform an operator action is acceptable will be based on successfully reaching Tgr prior to reaching Tun." This should be conditioned on inclusion of uncertainties, etc., in the timeline. such that acceptability includes an appropriate time margin between Tgr and Tun, not just that Tgr < Tun. (RG) : This needs to address considerations beyond those of RIS 2004-03, Rev. 0 (and even beyond Rev. 1), since the RIS is only inspection guidance and not limiting.
NUREG/CR-6850 would be a better governing document. It also needs updating to reflect caveated NRC endorsement of NEI 00-01. (RG)
Table B-2 (Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment)
Why is this Table keyed to NEI 00-01 instead of NEI 04-02, or some other National Fire Protection Association Standard 805(NFPA-805)-related guidance? (RG) 3.5.1.1: The risk-informed inspection process will focus NOT ONLY on failures with relatively high probabilities, BUT ALSO on failures with special consequences, even if low probability, such as ISLOCA via high/low-pressure interface spurious opening. (RG) 3.5.1.5[A]: The multiple spurious review should not be restricted to the guidelines of RIS 2004-03, but should include considerations from NUREG/CR-6850. (RG)
4 3.5.1.5[C]: Same comment as above [A]. (RG)
Table B-3 (Fire Zone 12-A-BAL)
Since it references CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.c as the pre-transition regulatory basis and NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3.2 as the post-transition regulatory basis, it appears that Fire Area 12-A-BAL is transitioning from an alternative shutdown area to the NFPA 805 equivalent of a III.G.1 area.
Is this a correct interpretation? (PF)
It appears that the concept of the section on performance goals is to discuss specific systems being credited to accomplish a performance goal when there is a choice of systems that could be used. An example of this is using the normal charging path for RCS inventory control. The table does not mention equipment used to accomplish a function when there is only one way of accomplishing the function. For example, RCS pressure boundary isolation, which is a sub-goal of inventory control is not mentioned because there it is not a matter of choice of systems, but rather just a function that must be accomplished. From the other hand, RCP seal integrity is a sub-goal of inventory control, where there is a choice of methods to use, namely seal injection or thermal barrier cooling, but these are not mentioned. So please clarify the underlying principle which determines the level of detail needed for the B-3 table. In this example if one wanted to get this kind of detail where will it reside in the documentation?
PF)
NEI guidance document for the B-3 table has a column headed exemptions/deviations, but the example does not appear to have such a column. The exemption/deviation column appears to be desirable from the viewpoint of reviewing a transition submittal and as program record. Is the licensing action section intended to be a substitute for the exemptions column? (PF)
Performance Goal Section: It appears that there is very little equipment that can be damaged in fire area 12-A-BAL because virtually every function lists two trains in the method of accomplishment column. Is this a correct interpretation? When the table says CSIP A or CSIP B is the method does that mean that both trains are analyzed to be undamaged and the procedures give the operator a choice of which one to use? (PF)
The B-3 table does not discuss area wide automatic suppression or detection in terms of a requirement for the area. Does this information reside in another part of the documentation?
(PF)
The B-3 table for fire area 12-A-CR, control room, does not list a post-transition regulatory basis. Is this just an oversight? (PF)
- The questions by Paul Fillion (PF) listed above pertain to the April 19, 2007, clarification telephone call (ADAMS Accession No. ML071590154). Table B-3 is withheld from public availability under 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1) as Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information.
5 Clarification questions by Edward McCann Procedure Section Comment EGR-NGGC- General Manual actions to be in accordance with NUREG 1852 0102 9.2.5.1 This section stated These coordination studies analyzed the largest feeder protective device on each common power supply. Once coordination of this feeder with the upstream protective device(s) was established, it was assumed that all other feeder protective devices on the same common power supply were coordinated. How do you know that the other breaker coordination curves all have the same shape, coordination curves may not be similar and one would not know if one does not check it?
General The idea that III.G.1 compliance means free of fire effects is too simplistic and leads to misconceptions. For III.G.1 there are two alternative ways to be free of fire effects and that is either from the Control Room or at the Emergency Control Stations. Being free of fire effects at the emergency control station, which is a dedicated (shutdown panels) or alternate (manual actions) method to shutdown, III.G.3 and III.L apply since the provisions III.G.2 could not be satisfied. If III.G.2 could have been satisfied, one would be free of fire effects from the control room.
Attachment 3 Item 3: NRC will not revise Appendix R or NUREG 800 for Section 3.0 manual actions.
General Will concurrent or in rapid succession multiple spurious operations be analyzed during the transition to NFPA 805?
Attachment 4
- Make definitions in accordance with RG 1.189 Rev 1.
Section 2.0
- Required safe shutdown circuits definition: RG 1.189 uses words like required to operate or systems required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe-shutdown conditions rather than credited. May want to change to: circuits that support a component/system that is required to operate for safe shutdown after a fire or something similar.
- Ensure other procedures like FPIP-0104 and 0105 use similar definitions.
Attachment 4 Item 3 needs to be updated for NEI 00-01 NRC approval.
Section 3.3 Attachment 4 Will thermoset intercable faults be analyzed during the Section 3.3 transition to NFPA 805?
6 Attachment 4
- This criteria uses unrecoverable plant condition as a Section 5.3 condition to follow to incorporate new FICF while Appendix R uses III.L requirements. Why is this discrepancy acceptable?
- Will multiple concurrent spurious operations be analyzed during the transition to NFPA 805?
Attachment 4
- Item 1: Open circuits can cause spurious operations Table 1 and these will in general not clear without an action.
How are you capturing these spurious operations?
- Item 4: Will three phase proper polarity faults for power cables to MOVs be analyzed during the transition to NFPA 805?
- Item 5 and 8C: Multiple concurrent Intercable and intractable hot shorts will need to be considered for high risk scenarios for ungrounded DC circuits. This is a possible backfit issue for Appendix R/NUREG 800 plants but must be considered if high risk. Will concurrent intercable and intractable hot shorts for ungrounded DC circuits be analyzed during the transition to NFPA 805?
- Item 6: Will multiple high impedance faults be analyzed during the transition to NFPA 805?
- Item 7B and 8B: Will multiple concurrent spurious operations for these scenarios be analyzed during the transition to NFPA 805?
- Item 9 and 10: Will multiple concurrent spurious operations for intercable faults between thermoset and thermoplastic cables be analyzed during the transition to NFPA 805?
Table B-2 General Similar comments apply here as in EGR-NGGC-0102 above.
3.5.1.1 Will cable to cable (intercable) faults between thermoset and Page 47 thermoplastic cables be analyzed during the transition to NFPA 805? Will you bring forward this Prior NRC Approval for cable for cable faults during the transition to NFPA 805?
3.5.1.5 RIS 2004-03 risk informed inspection guidance applies for Page 51 your plants but it does constitute compliance. All cable failure modes need to be considered during the transition to NFPA 805 and these failure modes must not be limited by the RIS.
Will you consider all failure modes during the transition to NFPA 805? What does not applicable mean for the applicability of RIS?
FPIP-0106 Attachment 3 Will you ensure that the IN 92-18 issue is addressed outside of the Control Room including inside the MCC and at the valve during the transition to NFPA 805?
7 Legend:
RG: Ray Gallucci JSH: JS. Hyslop PF: Paul Fillion KSF: Key safety feature SSD: Safe-shutdown OGC: Office of the General Counsel NEI: Nuclear Energy Institute ISLOCA: Interfacing-systems loss-of-coolant accident RIS: Regulatory Issue Summary RCS: Reactor coolant system RCP: Reactor coolant pump CSIP: Containment safety initiatives program MCC: Motor control center