ML081830260

Meeting Minutes of the ACRS Plant License Renewal Subcommittee Regarding Shearon Harris, May 7, 2008

ML081830260
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	07/01/2008
From:	John Stetkar Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Wen P
References
Download: ML081830260 (13)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001 July 1, 2008 MEMORANDUM TO: ACRS MEMBERS FROM: Peter Wen, Sr. Staff Engineer /RA/

Reactor Safety Branch - A Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

SUBJECT:

CERTIFICATION OF THE MINUTES OF THE ACRS PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING REGARDING SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ON MAY 7, 2008- ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND The minutes of the subject meeting, issued on June 27, 2008, have been certified as the official record of the proceedings for that meeting. A copy of the certified minutes is attached.

Attachment:

As stated cc via e-mail: ACRS Staff Engineers S. Duraiswamy J. Flack

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001 June 27, 2008 MEMORANDUM TO: Peter Wen, Senior Staff Engineer Reactor Safety Branch - A ACRS FROM: John Stetkar, Chairman, Plant License Renewal Subcommittee

SUBJECT:

CERTIFICATION OF THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL REGARDING SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ON MAY 7, 2008, IN ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND I hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the minutes of the subject meeting on May 7, 2008, are an accurate record of the proceedings for that meeting.

__/RA/_____________________6/27/2008____

J. Stetkar, Date Plant License Renewal Subcommittee Chairman

Certified By: J. Stetkar Issued on: July 1, 2008 Certified on June 27, 2008 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL REGARDING SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT MAY 7, 2008, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND INTRODUCTION On May 7, 2008, the ACRS Subcommittee on Plant License Renewal held a meeting regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP) in Room T-2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the HNP application for license renewal and NRC staff review of it. In addition to the NRC staff, representatives from Carolina Power & Light (CP&L) (the HNP operator and the licensee) made presentations to the Committee. The meeting was convened at 10:30 a.m. and adjourned at 3:08 p.m.

ATTENDEES ACRS Members John Stetkar, Subcommittee Chairman Otto Maynard, Member William Shack, Member Mario Bonaca, Member Said Abdel-Khalik, Member John Sieber, Member John. Barton (Consultant) Christopher Brown (DFO)

Peter Wen, Cognizant Staff Engineer Principal NRC Speakers S. Lee, NRR L. Lund, NRR M. Heath, NRR K. Chang, NRR C. Julian, Region II HNP Presenters C. Burton J. Caves R. Stewart C. Mallner D. Corlett Other Attendees NRC Staff HNP OTHER R. Hsu B. Rogers R. Reynolds A. Saunders S. Sakai L. Lake M. Heath W. Lunceford R. Matthew S. Jones M. Fletcher J. Hilbish Y-K Chung B. Parks P. Ghosal G. Cheruvenki Z. Xi OTHER L. Bohn K. Green F. Saba S. Kim J. Tweddell D. Nguyen K. Howard M. Fallin C. Myer J. Fair M. Sayoc C. Custer R. Gullucci Q. Gan K. Putnan

The presentation slides and handouts used during the meeting are attached to the office copy of these minutes. The presentations to the Subcommittee are summarized below.

OPENING REMARKS BY CHAIRMAN STETKAR Chairman Stetkar convened the meeting by introducing the ACRS members present.

Chairman Stetkar stated that the purpose of the meeting was to review the HNP license renewal application, the draft safety evaluation report and associated documents. He stated that the Subcommittee would hear presentations from representatives of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and the applicant, CP&L. He said the Subcommittee would gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate proposed position and action, as appropriate, for deliberation by the Full Committee. The rules for participation in the meeting were announced as part of the notice of the meeting previously published in the Federal Register. Chairman Stetkar acknowledged that the Committee had received no written statements or requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public.

DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEMS Staff Introduction Dr. Samson Lee, Acting Director of Division of License Renewal in NRR, introduced the principal staff members present. He then called upon the applicants presenter, Chris Burton, to begin the applicants presentation.

Applicant Presentation Mr. Chris Burton, Site Director for CP&L, introduced the Shearon Harris team present at the meeting to support their presentation to ACRS. Mr. Burton then started his presentation by describing the general information related to plant location, design, plant status, licensing history and major upgrades made to the plant over the years. He also highlighted the planned future improvements, which include transition to NFPA-805, installation of digital control systems, and implementation of power uprates.

Mr. Roger Stewart, CP&L Project Manager for License Renewal, described the license renewal project and license renewal scoping for the Shearon Harris license renewal application (LRA). He pointed out that the Shearon Harris LRA was prepared to address Revision 1 of the Standard Review Plan for License Renewal and the NRCs Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) report, in addition to in-house and industry lessons learned findings. Out of the 40 aging management programs (AMPs), 12 new programs are required to be developed before the period of license renewal. He stated that HNP has made 37 commitments in support of license renewal. These commitments were tracked by HNPs commitment tracking process and were captured in the plants corrective action program to ensure implementation.

NRC Staff Presentation Mr. Maurice Heath, the NRR License Renewal Project Manager for Shearon Harris, provided an overview of the staffs license renewal review. He stated that the staff found the applicants scoping and screening methodology meeting the requirements pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4 and 54.21(a)(1). As a result of the staffs review of LRA Section 2.2, the

staff has identified an open item (discussed further below). The staff believes that the feedwater regulating and bypass valves should be included in the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), because Chapters 10 and 15 of the HNP FSAR credit these valves for redundant isolation function in the event of main steam line break. For LRA Sections 2.3 and 2.4, relative to mechanical systems and structures, the staff identified a number of components, such as insulation on low temperature and small diameter containment penetrations that were later brought into the scope of license renewal by the applicant. For LRA Section 2.5, relative to electrical and instrumentation

& control systems, the staff concluded that there were no omissions of electrical and instrumentation & control system components within the scope of license renewal.

Mr. Caudle Julian, Team Leader of the Region II inspection team, provided a summary of Region II inspections regarding the license renewal scope and screening, and implementation of the AMP. For scoping and screening inspection, he stated that the inspection objective was to confirm that applicant has included all appropriate SSCs in the scope of license renewal as required by the rule. The inspection team focused its inspection on the nonsafety-related SSCs that could effect safety-related equipment. He concluded that these SSCs were implemented as required by the rule, 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). For AMP implementation inspection, Mr. Julian stated that the inspection objective was to confirm that existing AMPs are working well and to examine the applicants plans for establishing new AMPs and enhancing existing AMPs. He stated that the applicants license renewal activities were conducted well as described in the LRA and the on-site processes. He stated that the applicant had established implementation plans in the plant Action Request System to track the committed future actions for license renewal. Therefore, he concluded that these AMPs would be able to manage the effects of aging.

Mr. Maurice Heath also presented the staffs review results of LRA Section 3, Aging Management Review Results and Section 4, Time-Limited Aging Analyses (TLAA). He stated that as a result of the staffs onsite audit, the applicant added one new AMP, the Oil-Filled Cable Testing Program. The applicant will periodically test the cable to determine the conditions of the cable insulation properties. For LRA Section 4.2, relative to reactor vessel neutron embrittlement TLAA, he stated that the analyses met the review criteria in the Standard Review Plan. For LRA Section 4.3, relative to metal fatigue TLAA, he stated that as a result of the staffs audit and review, one confirmatory item was identified (discussed further below). He stated that the applicant has amended its LRA (Amendment 7) to include Commitment 37, which states that HNP will update the piping design specification to reflect the current design basis operating transients.

This LRA amendment also states that the FSAR will be updated to reflect HNP crediting fatigue monitoring program AMP to manage aging for reactor coolant pressure boundary components according to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii ).

SER Open Items There is only one open item in the staffs safety evaluation report (SER). Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff discussed this open item, which is related to the scoping classification of feedwater regulating valves and bypass valves. Mr. Stewart stated that these valves in HNP are located in the turbine building and are nonsafety-related, and therefore, were identified as being in-scope for license renewal per the criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). He also pointed out that these valves were designated as non-safety valves in the original SER for HNP (NUREG-1038). However, as described by Mr. Maurice

Heath under NRC Staff Presentation, the NRC staff believes that these valves fulfill a safety-related function and should be scoped under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1).

Chairman Stetkar asked the status of resolving this open item. Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff replied that the progress is being made. They are discussing the issue with the staff and they have a path to resolution.

SER Confirmatory Items There are two confirmatory items (CI) in the staffs SER. An item is considered confirmatory, if the staff and the applicant have reached a satisfactory resolution but the applicant had not formally submitted the resolution when the draft SER was prepared.

• CI 3.4-1: (SER Section 3.4 - Steam and Power Conversion Systems)

Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff discussed the first CI which was related to the applicants use of the External Surfaces Monitoring Program for aging management of elastomeric and thermoplastic components in the Steam and Power Conversion Systems. The NRC staff questioned the specifics of inspection method, acceptance criteria, and the GALL Reports application of this AMP.

Mr. Stewart stated that HNP has responded by amending the LRA to (1) include the condensate storage tank diaphragm (thermoplastic elastomer) in the Inspection of Internal Surfaces in Miscellaneous Piping and Ducting Components Program and (2) replace other elastomeric and thermoplastic components, prior to the period of extended operation and add them to the Preventive Maintenance Program.

Chairman Stetkar asked about the applications of these elastomeric and thermoplastic components. Mr. Stewart replied that these components in Steam and Power Conversion Systems included: hydraulic fluid hoses and breather caps associated with PORV actuators, tubing associated with sample station flow indicators, and instrument air hose in the turbine building.

• CI 4.3: (SER Section 4.3 - Metal Fatigue)

Mr. Roger Stewart discussed the second CI which was related to the TLAA Metal Fatigue Section. He stated that the operation transients for HNP fatigue analyses were redefined in consideration of pressurizer insurge/outsurge and thermal stratification. However, as described by Mr. Maurice Heath under NRC Staff Presentation, during the audit, the NRC staff expressed a concern that the design specification had not been updated to reflect these redefined operational transients. Mr. Stewart stated that HNP has responded by amending the LRA to include a commitment to update the design specification prior to the period of extended operation. He also stated that HNP would update its FSAR supplement description to reflect environmentally-assisted metal fatigue TLAA comply with either

- 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii) - the analyses have been projected to the end of the extended period of operation, or

- 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii) - the effects of aging on the intended functions will be managed by the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Fatigue Monitoring Program.

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS Manholes and Cabling

• Mr. Barton of the ACRS asked whether HNP has a program to inspect manholes.

Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff replied that HNP relies on the preventive maintenance program to perform the inspections either quarterly or semi-quarterly. The frequency of inspection is based on manholes categorization:

safety-related or nonsafety-related, energized or non-energized. He stated that HNP also separately performs a manhole inspection as part of the structure monitoring program.

• Member Sieber asked if HNP routinely found water in the manholes. Mr. John Caves of HNP staff replied that HNP did find water in the manholes occasionally.

He described HNPs manholes and cabling configuration: HNPs manholes are typically 10 feet from the manhole cover down to the floor and the cables normally start about three feet above the floor. He stated that among HNPs 180 manholes, they frequently find water accumulated in six manholes, with water levels about two to three feet deep. Therefore, these cables are not always dry.

• Member Abdel-Halik asked if there were any problems with cables that were normally energized when they were submerged and what systems could be affected with a cable failure as a result of cable submerging in water. Mr. Barton of the ACRS asked what HNP was doing to eliminate the water found at the manholes. The applicant did not have complete answers to these questions during the meeting. Mr. Caves of HNP staff stated that the applicant will come back to the Committee with a complete response and will tell the Committee what systems are affected by potential manhole cable failures.

Containment Spray Valve Chambers

• Chairman Stetkar asked about the general location of the containment spray valve chambers and why they were more susceptible to corrosion than other containment locations. Mr. Bob Reynolds of HNP staff replied that these chambers are located in the lowest level of the reactor auxiliary building, adjacent to the containment. He described the chamber inspection result under the IWE program and stated that the inspection is being performed every other refueling outage. He stated that in 1993, HNP identified an indication on the outside of A containment spray valve chamber, due to the ground water intrusion. He also stated that in 2000, HNP again found some rust and pitting in the inside A containment spray valve chamber. HNP took corrective actions by repairing and recoating the affected areas. He stated that the inspections performed in 2004 and 2006 did not identify any recordable indications.

• Member Sieber asked whether ground water or condensation was found in the chambers. Member Abdel-Khalik asked what was the extent of the corrosion of

these chambers and if any root-cause analysis had been performed to determine the source of water intrusion and the cause of degradation. The applicant did not have a complete answer for these questions. Mr. Caves of HNP staff stated that the applicant will come back to the Committee with a complete response.

Ultimate Heat Sink

• Members Sieber and Maynard asked the questions related to HNPs ultimate heat sink capacity and the water sources. Mr. Chris Burton of HNP staff replied that HNPs ultimate heat sink utilized cooling water from Harris Lake which consists of two reservoirs: the Main Reservoir and the Auxiliary Reservoir. He stated that the Main Reservoir was originally designed to provide cooling water for four units, but the Main Reservoir was completed before a decision was made to reduce four units to one. He stated that the Harris Lake is fed from four creeks, and the lake with the rainwater and the runoff from these creeks are sufficient to provide the needed water for normal and emergency operations. He stated that under emergency conditions, the service water supply is switched from the Cooling Tower to the emergency service water pumps with preferred suction from the Auxiliary Reservoir via the Emergency Service Water Intake Channel.

• Chairman Stetkar asked where the Auxiliary Reservoir water comes from. Mr.

John Caves of HNP staff replied that both the Main Reservoir and the Auxiliary Reservoir are fed from the same creeks. He also provided the information regarding the size of the lake: Main Reservoir - 4,000 acres and the Auxiliary Reservoir - 317 acres.

• The presentation slide provided by the applicant did not show clearly the cooling system and ultimate heat sink complex. Members Maynard and Sieber and Chairman Stetkar expressed interest to have the information on the HNP cooling system diagram, visual images of the Main and Auxiliary Reservoirs and a description of the cooling system to be discussed in the full committee meeting.

Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff stated that the applicant will come back to the Committee with a complete response.

Flow-Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Program

• In the Operating Experience Section of the LRA FAC AMP, the applicant stated that HNP has experienced through-wall leakage in high-energy carbon steel pipes. Member Shack asked when the leakage was observed and what was the cause of the leakage. Mr. John Caves of HNP staff replied that over the last 10 years, HNP has experienced six through-wall leaks in small-bore carbon steel piping that is monitored for FAC. He stated that erosion was the primary degradation mechanism of these through-wall leaks. He stated that these degraded piping had been repaired and replaced with FAC-resistant material, typically chrome-moly alloy.

• Members Sieber and Shack asked applicants experience in using CHECWORKS software and why HNP did not mention it in the LRA. In response, Mr. John Caves stated that in the past, HNP did not take full

advantage of this software, but now HNPs use of CHECWORKS is actually expanding. He explained that when the LRA was submitted to the NRC for review, HNP might not have fully implemented it, and that was the reason why the LRA did not mention it.

• In response to Member Bonacas follow-up question, regarding the location of the small-bore piping that was replaced, Mr. Caves stated that these small-bore piping is in the extraction steam system. He also stated that CHECWORKS is not recommended by EPRI to be used for monitoring small-bore piping and at HNP, CHECWORKS is used for monitoring the large-bore (three inches or greater) piping only. Member Sieber asked about the methodology used by HNP to monitor small-bore piping due to FAC degradation. Mr. Caves replied that HNP relies on operating experience by performing measurement to detect such degradation for the small-bore piping.

Thermal Aging Embrittlement of Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel

• Member Shack asked which components are covered under Thermal Aging Embrittlement of Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel (CASS) AMP. Mr. Chris Mallner of HNP staff replied that the applicant evaluated the in-scope components following the screening criteria set forth in the May 19, 2000 NRC letter (Chris Grimes Letter), and concluded that the applicable CASS components, such as, pressurizer spray head and reactor cooling loop elbows are not susceptible to thermal aging. For this reason, the HNP determined not to have an AMP corresponding to the GALL Report, XI.M12, Thermal Aging Embrittlement of Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel.

One-Time Inspection of ASME Code Class 1 Small-Bore Piping Program

• Member Bonaca asked how the inspection sampling was selected for the one-time inspection. Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff replied that the sample was selected based on its susceptibility.

• Chairman Stetkar asked what systems contain the Class-1 small-bore socket welds and how many are there. In response, Mr. Chris Mallner of HNP staff stated that HNP has approximately 150 small-bore socket welds that are within the scope of the one-time inspection program. He stated that these socket welds are mainly in the RCS, with minimal use in SI, CVCS, and RHR systems.

He also stated that HNP performs pressure test and VT-2 inspection on these small-bore socket welds at every refueling outage.

Switchyard Circuit Breakers and Oil-Filled Cable Testing Program

• Chairman Stetkar and Mr. Barton of the ACRS asked who owns the circuit breakers and the oil-filled high voltage cables in the switchyard and who is going to implement the aging management program on those oil-filled high voltage cables. Mr. Roger Stewart replied that CP&L owns the plant, the switchyard, the transmission, and the oil-filled high voltage cables in the switchyard. He also stated that there is an interface agreement between the plant and the transmission department in terms of how they do work in the switchyard. Mr.

John Caves of HNP staff added that the transmission department actually performs the maintenance work and is responsible for implementing the AMP, with the watchful oversight from the Plant Transmission Activities Coordinator and the plant system engineer. Member Sieber cautioned that, in general, the transmission department is not attentive to the paperwork. Mr. Caves replied that, for the last several years, HNP has diligently worked with the transmission department on the issues of compliance with procedures. He stated that the HNP has the ultimate responsibility.

Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring

• Chairman Stetkar asked why some heat exchangers, such as component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers and spent fuel pool heat exchangers, are not monitored for flow and temperatures. Mr. Chris Mallner of HNP staff replied that the CCW heat exchangers and spent fuel pool heat exchangers are designed for accident-level heat loads which are much greater than their normal heat loads.

This is the reason why test results taken from normal performance is deemed unreliable. Mr. Mallner, however, pointed out that the functionality of these heat exchangers is verified by activities outside the Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Program. For examples, the spent fuel pool has alarms on the pool water temperature. If plant personnel notice a rise in pool temperature, while the spent fuel pool heat exchangers are in operation, they will take corrective action to investigate what cause the temperature increase.

• Member Abdel-Khalik asked whether HNP had operational problems in controlling letdown temperature. Mr. Dave Corlett of HNP staff replied that at HNP, the letdown temperature is automatically controlled by the temperature control valves. He further stated that HNP has not experienced any operational challenges in controlling letdown temperature.

Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program

• Member Bonaca asked whether HNP has any buried tanks which are covered under the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection AMP. Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff replied that HNP has no buried tanks in the program. He further stated that the closest thing to a buried tank would be the diesel fuel storage that is concrete and steel-lined, but it is not subject to the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection AMP.

• Member Bonaca asked the buried piping inspection to be performed under this AMP. Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff replied that HNP did not take any exception to the GALL Report recommended inspection practice. HNP will perform opportunistic inspections when the lines are uncovered, but no more than 10 years.

Refueling Water Storage Tank

• Mr. Barton of the ACRS asked how to inspect the refueling water storage tank under the one-time inspection program. Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff described the configuration of the tank. He stated that the tank is an outdoor

stainless tank, sits on a concrete platform, and there is an enclosure around the tank. The one-time inspection program will be implemented to perform the aging management-related inspection. Mr. Dave Corlett added that HNP operators perform the normal rounds of looking into the enclosure area at least once per day.

AMP Exceptions

• Member Bonaca asked the applicant to characterize the nature of exceptions that the HNP are taking in its AMPs. Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff replied that the majority of HNPs exceptions to the GALL Report were due to either ASME Code edition or revision of EPRI guidelines or in one case, due to the revision of NEI 97-06. Mr. Chris Mallner of HNP staff added that in a few cases, some exceptions were taken because of the GALL Reports inadequate, prescriptive description. He gave an example of the Brinell hardness testing, which was specifically recommended in the GALL Report XI, M33, Selective Leaching Program. He pointed out that almost all the applicants took this exception because the Brinell hardness testing could be problematic. Mr. Roger Stewart of HNP staff briefly discussed the other exceptions contained in the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program, the One-Time Inspection of ASME Code Class 1 Small-Bore Piping Program, and the Electric Cable Connections (E-6) Program.

Metal Fatigue TLAA

• Member Maynard asked the applicant to discuss metal fatigue issues that were identified in recent staffs review of several other LRAs. Mr. Chris Mallner of HNP staff replied that those technical issues are centered around the 1-D stress methodology, which was adopted by one vendor, used in its on-line fatigue monitoring software, and was used in some plants LRAs. The staffs concern is that the simplified 1-D stress methodology may not provide conservative results consistently. Mr. Mallner stated that the HNP uses Westinghouses WESTEMS for the fatigue analysis software, which is different from the 1-D stress methodology. This WESTEMS software uses six stress tensors to calculate the stress intensity for the fatigue evaluation, which is consistent with the methodology described in the ASME Code. Therefore, the metal fatigue issue discussed in the previous reviews of other plants LRA does not apply to the HNP license renewal.

• Mr. Robert Hsu of NRC staff described the benchmark of the software (WESTEMS) used by the HNP. He presented a slide (Slide #30) which showed excellent agreement of calculated stresses at one node between the results from WESTEMS and ANSYS, a well-known stress analysis computer software.

Member Abdel-Khalik asked why showing agreement at one node location was a representative of all other locations. Mr. Chris Mallner of HNP staff replied that HNP generated not just one, but about 18 different plots to benchmark the WESTEMS results. Member Maynard asked whether the other plots also showed good agreement. Dr. Ken Chang of the staff replied that all plots showed good agreement of WESTEMS and ANSYS results, with the calculated component stress intensity comparison within plus/minus half a percent.

Other

• Member Abdel-Khalik asked whether the applicant can still obtain spare parts for its emergency diesels. Mr. Chris Burton of HNP staff replied that HNP did not have any problems yet. Mr. John Caves added that HNP is implementing the spare parts upgrades. For examples, if some of the components became obsolete, HNP would replace them with a design change upgraded component.

• Member Maynard asked about the reactor vessel head inspection, performed in 2007. Mr. John Caves of HNP staff replied that HNP did not identify any significant issues with the reactor vessel head inspection. He also stated that the calculated susceptibility category of reactor vessel head to PWSCC-related degradation is considered to be low.

• Chairman Stetkar asked what is the basis of selecting masonry wall inspection frequency. Mr. Bob Reynolds of HNP staff replied that HNP prioritized masonary wall inspection based on whether it is safety-related or nonsafety-related. The prioritization has no relation with the risk ranking.

• In response to questions of Members Shack, Sieber, Maynard and Consultant Barton, Mr. Chris Burton provided the following information:

- The temperature of reactor vessel head will rise as a result of T-hot increase. The current design T-hot is 621O F. The plant is operating below the design T-hot with a slight variation from loop to loop due to actual heat transfer characteristics across the various three steam generators.

- HNP replaced steam generators in 2001 with Model D-75.

- Regarding the mitigation of pressurizer Alloy 600 issue, HNP went straight to install the pressurizer weld overlays; no inspection on the welds was performed.

- The total planned power uprate could be anywhere between 8 and 20 percent, and it is associated with turbine generator rewinding. But the uprate for the flow measurement uncertainty recapture, it would be only 1 to 2 percent.

SUBCOMMITTEE DECISIONS AND ACTIONS Following the staff and applicant presentations and discussions, Chairman Stetkar asked members if they had additional issues and concerns that needed to be discussed.

Members were asked for their overall observations from the presentations. Other than those issues described above, no additional issues were identified. He then adjourned the meeting by thanking everyone for attending the meeting.

BACKGROUND MATERIALS PROVIDED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE

1. CP&L License Renewal Application for Harris Nuclear Plant, dated November 14, 2006.

2. Draft NRC Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items, dated March 2008.

3. NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2007007, dated September 10, 2007.

4. NRC Staff Audit Summary Report, dated March 26, 2008.

NOTE:

Additional details of this meeting can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD, (301) 415-7000, downloading or view on the Internet at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/ can be purchased from Neal R.

Gross and Co., 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 234-4433 (voice), (202) 387-7330 (fax), nrgross@nealgross.com (e-mail).