IR 05000412/1987029

Insp Rept 50-412/87-29 on 870406-24.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Licensee Const Deficiency Repts & Preservice Insp Activities Including Observations of Work in Progress

ML20214R842
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/18/1987
From:	Mcbrearty R, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214R841	List: IR 05000412/1987029 ML20214R838
References
50-412-87-29, NUDOCS 8706090022
Download: ML20214R842 (8)

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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-29 Docket N License No.' CPPR-105 Licensee: Duquesne Light Company P. O. Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: -April 6-24, 1987 Inspectors: h kag /d', /9f6 R.A.McBrearty,ReactorEgneer- pdatd Approved by:

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J. R. Strosnider, Chief, Materials and date Processes Section, EB, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 6-24, 1987 (Inspection N /87-29)

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection by one regional-based inspector was conducted of licenseee action on previous inspection findings, licensee Construction Deficiency Reports, and Preservice Inspection (PSI)

activities including observations of work in progress and review of PSI dat Results: No violations were identifie PDR 870526 G

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DETAILS 1.0 -Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company P. A. Cadelia, Principal Engineer

• D. L. Claridge, Compliance Engineer N.J. Daugherty, Director Systems Testing

• J. J. Dusenberry, Assistant Director Quality Assurance Surveillance

• J. P. Godleski, Senior Test Engineer H. R. Good, ASME Consultant

• T. C. Heimel, NDE Specialist

• D. C. Hunkele, Director Quality Assurance Operations J. D. Johns, Supervisor Quality Assurance Surveillance

• S. Lacey, PLT Manager R. Martin, Manager Regulatory Affairs

• F. P. Noonan, Assistant PLT Manager

• R. A. Perry, Supervisor NDE Services

• L. M. Rabenau, Lead Compliance Engineer R. Reba, Principal Engineer (PSI Group)

• H. Sikorski, Director Inservice Inspection J. Szyslowski, Regualtory Affairs

• G. R. Margo, Assistant Director Quality Control D. P. Weakland, Supervisor ISI Services

• L. P. Williams, Director Startup Stone & Webster Engineering Company

• P. J. Bienick, Assistant Superintendent Engineering

• G. M. Byrnes, Assistant Project Manager

• R. C. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• L. J. Prividy, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meetin .0 Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (83-16-01): ISI inspectability of weld buildup

, and corrosion related problems attributable to corrodants other than

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oxygenated borated water.

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. Ultrasonic examination techniques for the examination of weld overlay and the underlying material have been developed and demonstrated as effective at the EPRI NDE Center at Charlotte, North Carolina, and have been used at various nuclear facilities including Hope Creek and the Perry Nuclear Plant.

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The Nuclear Energy Services (NES) individual who supervised the examinations i

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at Beaver Valley Unit 2 performed the examinations at the Perry facility prior to the Beaver Valley examinations.

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An analysis by the licensee Engineering Group determined that the Quench Spray System and the Safety Injection System are the only systems that have stainless steel lines with stagnant water containing corrodants other than oxygenated borated water. Operating Surveillance Test (OST) Procedures for the periodic recirculation of these systems have been established by the licensee and were determined to be sufficient to deter corrosion related problem Based on the above this item is close (0 pen) Unresolved Item (86-13-03): Ultrasonic examination data sheets do not indicate the acceptability of the associated item. The inspector reviewed licensee memorandum ND 3 ISI: 0495 dated April 24, 1987 which describes licensee actions intended to resolve this item.~ Changes to the Ultrasonic Examination Record form are proposed to identify the acceptability of results. A copy of the proposed form was provided to the inspector for his review. The inspector stated that the new report form would provide the required acceptability information for future examination results. He further stated that the PSI final report should contain information regarding the acceptability of each weld or componen The question raised at Beaver Valley Unit 2 has been raised at other facilities in Region I and the licensee's proposed action to resolve the question is similar to actions taken at the other facilitie This item will remain open pending completion of the licensee's action and subsequent NRC revie (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-26-01): Rejectable liquid penetrant indication During the performance of a PSI Section XI liquid penetrant examination of a weld in the Reactor Coolant System, linear indications were detected in the base material. The weld was found to be acceptable per Section XI, since the indications found in the base material were outside of the Section XI area of interest. They were noted on the report form, but were not evaluated. In response to the inspector's questions the licensee re-examined the base material and documented the results. The inspector reviewed documentation which confirmed that the source of the penetrant indications was removed by grinding, the surface was re-examined and found to be free of indications, and the grindouts were ultrasonically measured

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and found to not violate the minimum wall requirement Based on the above this item is closed.

1 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (84-00-05): Misapplication of Solenoid Operated Valves in Certain Safety Related Applications. The licensee found that certain in-line Target Rock solenoid operated valves may open when downstream pressure increases above upstream pressure allowing flow in the direction opposite of normal. Actions taken by the licensee included the following:

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Twenty-two SOVs were replaced with pressure balanced valve *

Twelve ASME II check valves were added to various piping systems to eliminate back pressure concerns for 17 S0V *

One SOV was replaced with an M0 The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed documentation to confirm that the licensee's proposed corrective action was complete This item is close (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (84-00-06): Removed, dismantled, or partially dismantled pipe supports. The licensee found that 44 pipe supports which were originally installed and inspected were removed, dismantled, or partially dismantled. The licensee attributed this to a lack of adequate control over the rework or removal of various pipe support Corrective actions which were taken by the licensee included the issuance of Field Construction Procedure (FCP)-41 and the assignment of a QC Inspector to perform surveillance of the activity to provide assurance that the intent of the program is being met. FCP-41 was issued to govern the dismantling or partial dismantling of previously accepted pipe supports to allow other work to proceed. The inspector reviewed the following to ascertain that the licensee's proposed corrective actions were initiated and carried out: Field Construction Procedure (FCP) 41, Change 7, " Rework Control Program" IP-7.45, " Surveillance of Rework Notification" which delineates a program for surveillance by DLC/SQC to assure that the requirements of FCP-41 are being implemented by the respective construction organization . OLC/SQC Inspection Reports covering the period from February 4,1985 to February 4,1986 regarding surveillance of the rework control progra The inspector's review confirmed that the licensee's corrective actions were complete Findings documented by the inspection reports were properly closed out and indicated that the assigned QC inspector effectively fulfilled his assigned responsibilitie Based on the above this item is close (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (87-00-09): Reactor Vessel Weld Indications. During the performance of preservice inspection (PSI)

automated ultrasonic examination of reactor vessel welds, an indication

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was detected on the 0.0. of longitudinal weld number 6 located above the Loop 1 inlet nozzle. Subsequent magnetic particle examination of the suspected surface confirmed the presence of a crack running parallel to the weld axi The licensee proposed to remove the source of the indication in a boat sample, blend the excavation in accordance with ASME code requirements and verify defect removal with manual ultrasonic method The ASME code Section XI requires that defect removal be verified with the technique which was used for the initial detection. The defect was initially found by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation automated in vessel ultrasonic inspection tool which subsequently was removed from the vessel and taken off site. The licensee advised the inspector that it intended to use manual ultrasonic examination methods to verify defect removal. To qualify the method, prior to excavating the defect the licensee scanned the vessel from the inside surface in the area of the defect. The scan was witnessed by the inspector and the results were found to be essentially equal to the results provided by the automated equipment. The signal amplitude, defect through wall dimension and length were found to be the same in both cases. The inspector stated that, based on the observed results, the manual technique would provide valid confirmation of defect remova The inspector reviewed documentation of the ultrasonic examination which was performed subsequent to removal of the boat sample and blending of the excavation. Additionally, surface contour sketches and photographs of the excavation, and ultrasonic thickness measurements made from the inside surface to determine that the minimum wall of the vessel was not violated were provided to the inspector for his review. The information provided confirmation that minimum wall was not violated, the final contour was in accordance with code requirements and the defect was no longer presen The licensee's contractor, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, is performing a metallurgical examination of the removed sample and will publish a report at the appropriate time. The inspector requested a copy of the report when it becomes availabl Based on the above this item is close (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (87-00-10): Reactor Vessel I Closure Studs Indications. During the performance of the PSI magnetic '

particle examination of RPV studs numerous circumferential1y and axially oriented linear indications were detected, and were found to exceed the ASME Section XI acceptance criteri Actions taken by the licensee included sending one stud to the Westing-house Electric Corporation for metallurgical examination, removing, by surface flapping, the source of indications on the remaining studs, and re-examination to confirm that the defects were removed. A spare stud was substituted for the stud which was subjected to examination by Westing-

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house. The licensee prepared a comprehensive tabulation identifying each of the 58 studs, the fluorescent magnetic particle surface examinations (by report number and date) that each was subjected to, the number of indications which were recorded, and the orientation of the indication In each case a report was identified which confirmed that the stud was subsequently found to be free of indications, and was acceptable in accordance with ASME XI standards. The inspector selected for review reports of studs number 4, 37, and 43. These studs required three examinations to clear indications and exhibited originally a relatively large number of indications. The inspector's review, including his review of the licensee's tabulation, confirmed that the studs are free of rejectable indications, and are acceptable for their intended us The report by Westinghouse of the metallurgical examination it conducted was not completed at the conclusion of this inspection. The inspector requested a copy when it becomes availabl Based on the above this item is close .0 Observations of PSI in Progress The inspector observed the manual ultrasonic examination of the reactor pressure vessel in the area of the linear, rejectable indication which was reported in longitudinal weld number 6. The examination was done to ascertain that the technique was capable of detecting the defect and to qualify the technique for verifying defect removal at the appropriate tim The inspector found that the manual technique produced results which were comparable to the results obtained by the automated equipment with which the defect was originally detected. Based on this the equipment was judged to be qualified for defect removal verification at the appropriate tim In addition the inspector observed a demonstration of the ultrasonic technique which will be used for the examination of the RPV closure studs from the center hole. The examination includes 70* shear waves in two opposing axial directions, and a Rayleigh wave (surface wave) examination in one axial direction. The demonstration showed that the technique was capable of detecting the calibration reflectors in the calibration stu The inspector found that the technique was capable of meeting ASME volumetric examination requirements regarding the RPV closure stud No violations were identifie .

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4. Review of Preservice Inspection Data The inspector reviewed selected data to ascertain compliance with ASME Code and regulatory requirements. Data associated with the following welds were included in the inspector's review:

RPV Weld #5, Lower Head circumferential weld RPV Weld #6, Upper Shell longitudinal weld at 95* azimuth

RPV Weld #12, Lower Shell longitudinal weld at 315* azimuth

RPV Weld #1, Upper Shell to Flange weld

RPV Weld #11, Lower Shell longitudinal weld at 135* azimuth The above listed welds were examined using the Westinghouse in-vessel automated inspection tool, and the data were recorded by the automated syste Weld #6 was found to contain an indication which analysis showed exceeded the ASME Section XI acceptance criteria. The source of this was determined to be a crack starting at the 0.D. of the vessel with a calculated through wall depth of approximately 0.6". The crack was contained in a boat sample which was removed with a maximum cut of 0.75".

Indications which were detected in other welds were recorded with enough information to' properly evaluate and disposition each indicatio Indication analysis records confirmed that each indication, with the exception of indication number 42 in weld #6, was acceptable, and provided the basis for the evaluatio No violations were identifie . Calibration of RPV Examination Equipment Westinghouse Electric personnel routinely perform the initial calibration of their automated ultrasonic inspection tool at the Westinghouse Waltz Mill site. The equipment is then transported to the site where the vessel examination is to be performed, and subsequent to completion of the vessel examination the equipment is returned to the Waltz Mill site for the final calibration chec The final calibration of the equipment used at Beaver Valley Unit 2 was witnessed by a licensee Level III inspecto The inspector reviewed licensee records of the final calibration and compared the data with the licensee's records of the initial calibration dat The records indicated that significant changes had taken place in the interim between initial and final calibration. The final calibration check indicated that the equipment sensitivity had increased from the

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initial sensitivity by approximately 6'to 8 dB. The licensee Level III who witnessed the calibration check was unable to explain the difference, but he pointed out that because the sensitivity showed an increase rather than a decrease, the change was less significant to the validity of the vessel examination. The inspector agreed with the licensee and had no further questions regarding this ite No violations were identifie .0 Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives, denoted in paragraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection on April 24, 1987, The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. At no time during this inspection was written material provided by the inspector to the licensee.