IR 05000412/1987013
| ML20215K535 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1987 |
| From: | Kerch H, Lodewyk A, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215K513 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-87-13, NUDOCS 8705110242 | |
| Download: ML20215K535 (5) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAiORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-412/87-13 Cocket No. 50-412 License No.
CPPR-105 Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Unit 2 i
Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
February 17-19, 1987 i
JNpectors:
2 7, [ff Fl. K' ch, Lead Reactor Engineer
/ date
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b-W/b/98V Y.
Lo ewy, Reactor Engineer
/7 dats Approved by:, g,
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28,887 Strosnider, Chief, M & PS, DRS
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February 17-19, '1987 (Report No. 50-412/
87-13).
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Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection. conducted by two region based inspectors of activities associated with radiography of Regenerative Heat Exchanger Welds and reporting of Preservice Inspection identified deficiencies.
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Results: Based upon licensee actions on previous inspection findings and sub-sequent inspection follow-up, two outstanding NRC concerns were closed. Also, no violations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company (DLCo)
D. Claridge, Compliance Engineer, RAD C. Ewing, Manager, QA S. Fenner, Director, QC H. Good, ASME Consultant, Engineering T. Heimel, NDE Specialist, ISID J. Jaworski, Senior SQC Engineer G. Maksin, NDE Supervisor, SQC R. Perry, Supervisor NDE Services, ISI L. Rabenau, Lead Compliance Engineer, RAD C. Schultz, PRC Chairman, SVG W. Sikorski, Director, ISI G. Wargo, Asst. Director, SQC Stone and Webster Engineerino Corporation (SWEC)
R. Harris, Materials Engineer R. Walulik, Engineer R. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer USNRC H. Kerch, Lead Reactor Engineer, Region I A. Lodewyk, Reactor Engineer, Region I L. Prividy, Resident Inspector The above listed personnel attended the exit interview on February 19, 1987.
Other managers, supervisors, craftsmen and technicians were contacted during the course of the inspection as activities interfaced with their areas.
2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings 2.1 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (50-412/86-17) regarding regenerative heat exchanger (2*CHS-E23) welds.
During the licensee preservice ultrasonic examination of regenerative heat exchanger 2*CHS-E23 two ISI welds (numbers 8 and 11) were reported to have rejectable linear indications.
Subsequently, vendor radiographs for this heat exchanger were reviewed and disclosed linear indications in ISI weld numbers 2, 7, 8 and 11. These indications were classified as lack of fusion.
ISI weld Nos. 2 and 8 were reradiographed by the licensee. The reradiographs identified that weld No. 2 was acceptable and confirmed weld No. 8 contained lack of fusion.
ISI welds 7 and 11 were inaccessible for reradio-graphy due to interference with the heat exchanger tube I.
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The licensee dispositioned all indications " accept as is", with the exception of ISI weld No. 8.
This disposition was based on the ultrasonic re-examination and engineering analyses. Weld No.
8 is currently undergoing repair.
Twelve sets of vendor (Joseph Oats Corp.) radiographs for the Unit 2 regenerative heat exchanger (2*CHS-E23) girth welds were reviewed to assess the adequacy of the vendor's radiographic and welding quality control program.
The radiographs were previously accepted by the vendor and the heat exchanger had been "N" stamped on December 15, 1975. The radiographs listed below were the subject of this review:
Shell #1 Grith #1
- Shell #2 Grith #3 Shell #1 Grith #2 Shell #2 Grith #4 Shell #1 Grith #3 Shell #3 Grith #1 Shell #1 Grith #4 Shell #3 Grith #2 Shell #2 Grith #1 Shell #3 Grith #3 Shell #2 Grith #2 Shell #4 Grith #4 The inspector noted that radiographic reader sheets contained inconsistencies with the construction' radiographs. These discrepanices typically included omission of notes recording acceptable weld discontinuities. The licensee had previously investigated these discrepanices and had satisfactorily resolved the issues.
The licensee's resolution included re-review of the radiographs. The inspector found the licensee's final records to be complete and accurate for future reference.
Another sampling of radiographic film was reviewed for regenerative letdown heat exchanger 2*CHS-E22 which also had been constructed by the Joseph Oats Corporation.
This sample was found to be acceptable.
Closure of licensee reports FDR DMUM-10257, ND2/SI:03780, NCR 29618, and NCR 29986 requires all construction repairs and all ASME Section XI examinations to be satisfactorily completed.
The licensee stated NCR 29986 will be modified to include (a) the final acceptance of ISI weld #8 and (b) the results of the investigation of the inconsistencies found on the Joseph Oats radiographic reader sheets.
Based upon the radiograph film review, licensee documentation, and interviews with personnel, the inspector had no further concerns regarding this matter. This item is closed.
2.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-412/86-44-01) regarding the identifi-i cation and disposition of construction deficiencies under the licensee's QA Program.
The licensee has several ongoing activities which, as a whole, determine and document the acceptability of piping, supports and welds.
These activities include ASME S III review (N-stamp), ASME S XI preservice (PSI) inspection and system walkdowns.
During a
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previous inspection (50-412/86-44), a review of QA correspondence
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determined that certain safety-related system welds had been identified in April, 1986, as not meeting ASME S III construction requirements. The weld deficiencies had been identified and documented.
in memorandum by personnel responsible for completing PSI (ASME SXI)
baseline data. During a meeting with licensee management on December 22, 1986, the inspector requested the licensee to technically review the potential weld deficiencies and document each deficiency resolution for future NRC review.
A team of qualified NDE technicians representing PSI and the ASME S III group, re-examined the welds in question.
Subsequently, those weld deficiencies which were identified were documented for disposition or repair as necessary on nonconformance reports. NRC review of the documentation and discussions with cognizant licensee personnel indicated the following:
(1) not all of the areas initially identified by memorandum were in violation of ASME S III limits, (2) neither the PSI nor the ASME S III group personnel were inaccurate in examining weld defects. The discrepanices in reporting requirements were attributed to the variance in liquid penetrant examination results; and (3) all of the weids in question were appropriately re-examined, dispositioned and documented accordingly.
Of further' concern, was the timeliness of licensee activities to address the ASME S III discrepancies initially identified by the ISI group.
The suspected deficiencies had been initially identified by memorandum and not by means of an administratively controlled and traced document.
Through discussions with licensee representatives and review of procedures, the inspector established that no administrative document provided adequate guidance for reporting concerns of this nature under the construction Quality Assurance (QA) Program.
However, a controlled system for trans-
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mitting and resolving such information is available within the station Operating QA Program manual (QAM). A Notice of Violation has been issued in NRC Inspection Report 50-412/87-03 to resolve
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this and other QA Program concerns.
At the exit meeting conducted at the conclusion of this inspection, the licensee's representative informed those present that management had discussed and endorsed implementation of the Operating QAM. As j
stated within the BVPS-2 FSAR, the Operating QAM was to be implemented 90 days prior to fuel load. Thus, based upon the existing fuel load schedule, implementation of the Operating QAM should have begun in January of 1987. As licensee and NRC representatives were unaware of managements decision to implement the Operating QA Program, the licensee's representative agreed a document would be issued indicating the official date of implementation for the Operating QA manua.
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Persc..nel training, administrative policies and the effectiveness of the~ program implementation during the construction to facility operation transition period will be subject to further review as
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discussed in NRC routineL nspection report 50-412/87-03.
i Under the Operating QAM, an administratively controlled means-is provided in which ASME S III deficiencies identified during PSI /ISI examinations are dispositioned. As this program will address-items
.of this nature during future plant modifications'and construction, the inspector had no further questions regarding this matter.
This item is closed.
3.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved' items are matters about which more information is requiredLin order to ascertain whether they:are acceptable-items, violations or deviations.. Unresolved items addressed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 2.
4.0 Exit Interview An exit interview was held on February 19, 1987 with membersiof the licensee's staff and contractors as denoted in Paragraph 1.
The inspector discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. At no time'during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.
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