IR 05000334/1987012

Insp Rept 50-334/87-12 on 870709-0817.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Plant Operations,Physical Security & Radiological Controls.One Unresolved Item Identified

ML20238D986
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/02/1987
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20238D969	List: IR 05000334/1987012 ML20238D967
References
50-334-87-12, NUDOCS 8709140031
Download: ML20238D986 (11)

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V. S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-12 Docket N Licensee: Duquesne Light Company One Oxford Center 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15279 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 Location: Shippingport, Pennsylvania

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Dates: July 9, 1987 - August 17, 1987 Inspectors: F. I. Young, Senior Resident Inspector, BV-1 S. M. Pindale, Resident Inspector, BV-1 Approved by: g- -

~ g7 t'. E. Triipp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A 'ddte Inspection Summary: Inspection No. 50-334/87-12 on July 9 - August 17, 198 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors (146 hours0.00169 days <br />0.0406 hours <br />2.414021e-4 weeks <br />5.5553e-5 months <br />) 1 of licer.see actions on previous inspection findings, plant operations, physical security, radiological controls, housekeeping and fire protection, maintenance, surveillance testing and in-office review of LER I Results: No violations were identified. One unresolved item was identified concerning a potential Westinghouse PWR generic issue in FSAR turbine trip analyses (Detail 7). Two previously open NRC unresolved items were reviewed and closed during this inspectio I

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted During the report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management.and staff as necessary to support inspection activitie . Summary of Facility Activities It the beginning of the inspection on July 9,1987, the plant was operating at 100% power. Full power operation continued until August 3, when power was reduced to 30% to repair damaged feedwater regulating valves (Detail 4.2.1). On August 5, following the repairs, full power operation was resumed and continued through the end of the inspection perio . Followup on Outstanding Items The NRC Outstanding Items (OI) List was reviewed with cognizant licensee personnel. Items selected by the inspector were subsequently reviewed through discussions with licensee personnel, documentation reviews and field inspection to determine whether licensee actions specified in the OIs had been satisfactorily completed. The overall status of previously identified inspection findings were reviewed, and planned / completed licensee actions were discussed for those items reported below:

3.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (85-09-01): The licensee was to delineate specific skill requirements and identify particular training needs for applicable non-license positions. The licensee's initial program to implement the above was found to be inconsistent with respect to training requirement A new program and implementing procedures were subsequently developed. The new program, called the Corporate Training Program (CTP), is currently implemented via Volume II, Chapter 15, of the Training Administrative Manual. The CTP requires that training checklists be developed, reviewed and approved for all unit non-licensed first and second line supervisory and professional positions related to safety-re'ated activitie The job incumbent for the associated position is required to complete the checklist within one year after being assigned. New or revised checklists are to be submitted when a new position is created or when a particular job description changes with respect to job responsibility or task description. The Training Administrative Manual specifies the CTP requirements, including applicability, responsibilities, instructions and revision The procedure was reviewed by the inspector, and no deficiencies were noted. The licensee currently maintains copies of approved training checkli.'

for applicable station personnel. Approved checklists were randons sampled by the inspector for which no unacceptable items were identified. This item is close ,

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l 3.2 (Closed) Inspector FoLiow Item (85-12-02): The licensee was to consider establishing a program whereby flanged connections are periodically checked for tightness at some predetermined interva The licensee stated that the reactor coolant system RTD manifold flanges were satisfactorily checked during the Fifth Refueling -

Outage. Since the primary coolant system leak from the pressurizer manway cover on April 23, 1985, more vigorous and specific instructions have been provided to plant maintenance personnel for closing both the steam generator and pressurizer manways. The licensee stated that additional controls are currently in place to prevent similar problems, and additional radiation exposures would be necessary to check'the manway/ flange tightness during plant operations. Therefore, no additional checks should be require However, the licensee committed to verify proper tensioning of the RTO manifold flanges during its Sixth Refueling Outage (currently scheduled for the end of 1987). The. bypass RTD manifold sections are planned to be removed during the Seventh Refueling Outage. The inspector will monitor the effectiveness of the licensee's current f

progra This item is close . Plant Operations 4.1 General 4. Inspector Tours Inspection tours of the following accessible plant areas were conducted during both day and night shifts with respect to Technical Specification (TS) compliance, housekeeping and cleanliness, fire protection, radiation control, physical security / plant protection and operational / maintenance administrative control Control Room -- Safeguards Area

-- Auxiliary Building -- Service Building

-- Switchgear Area -- Diesel Generator Buildings

-- Access Control Points -- Containment

-- Fence Line (Protected Area)-- Yards Area

-- Turbine Building -- Intake Structure 4. Onsite Safety Committee The inspector attended an Onsite Safety Committee (OSC) meeting on August 13, 1987. Technical Specification 6.5 OSC requirements were

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satisfied. The agenda items observed by the inspector included -

l procedure and incident review, NRC inspection review and various l miscellaneous issues. The meeting was characterized by frank l discussions. Dissenting opinions were encouraged. No NRC concerns were identified, l

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4.2 Operations During the course of the inspection, discussions were conducted with operators concerning knowledge of recent changes to procedures, facility configuration and plant conditions. During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to determine if entries were properly made, and that equipment status / deficiencies were identified and communicated. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and jumper logs, process computer printouts, unit off-normal and draft incident reports. The inspector verified adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities observe Shift turnovers were witnessed and staffing requirements confirme In general, inspector comments or questions resulting from these reviews were resolved by licensee personnel. In addition to normal working hours, plant operations reviews were conducted during midnight shifts and weekends on the following dates and times: July 11, 8:30 am - 11:30 am; July 14, 12:00 am - 6:00 am; July 16, 4:00 am - 6:00 am; July 21, 9:00 pm - 10:30 pm. The inspectors verified that plant operators were alert and displayed no signs of inattention to duty or fatigu . Feedwater Regulating Valve Failures

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On August 3, 1987, plant operators noticed that the C feedwater flow was operating erratically. The shift foreman was notified and immediately investigated the main feedwater regulating valve (FRV) room, and four.d that two of four actuator " top hat" to yoke stud bolts had failed on the C FRV. The nuclear shift supervisor subsequently directed a power reduction to commence repair work. Whea 30 percent power was reached, the power reduction was i terminated, the C FRV closed, and the C FRV bypass valve ,

was placed in servic The B FRV was also placed on bypass i flow due to slightly erratic behavior at the low power leve l A similar event occurred approximately two months ago l (June 8), as detailed in NRC Inspection Report  !

50-334/87-1 Due to the recurrent nature of this event, !

the licensee decided to inspect the C FRV internal i component Following load drag tests, maintenance I personnel were able to rotate the valve plug by hand. The licensee subsequently determined that the two internal, friction fit, anti-rotation pins had become loose and dislodged. The pins were installed during the last refueling outage (Summer 1986) which modified the FRVs to resolve steam generator loose parts concerns. The valve inspection was completed and the valve was repaired, tested and returned to service on August '

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The licensee subsequently attempted to place the main FRVs back in service for power escalation, however, plant operators were unablesto successfully switch to the B main FRV from bypass flo The 3 FRV was then reclosed and maintained on bypass flow operlation so that plant maintenance personnel could investigate. During attempts to perform load drag tests co'the valve, it was apparent that mechanical binding prevented mcyement of the valve seat (plug). The B FRV was subsequently disassembled, and maintenance personnel found that the mechanical binding had caused galling on the plu The anti-rotation pins in this valve were also fotnd to be loos Root cause determinations regarding the reason for the mechanical binding are currently being pursued by Maintenance and Engineering personnei. The defective parts were replaced by the licensee and the valve was reassembled and satis-factorily teste Full power operation resumed on August 5, 198 Excessive and continued problems with the feedwater system, FRVs in particular, continue to affect plant operation Plant engineering has been informed of these most recent problems, however, various plant design changes have been ineffective in eliminating FRV operational problems. Design studies have also been performed by the licensee, and further design changes to the feedwater system are planned for the next refueling / maintenance outage. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor associated licensee activitie .3 Plant Security / Physical Protection Implementation of the Physical Security Plan was observed in various plant areas with regard to the following:

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Protected area barriers were not degrac'ed;

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Isolation zones were clear; i

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Persons and packages were checked prior to allowing entry into the Protected Area,

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Vehicles were properly searched and vehicle access to the l Protected Area was in accordance with approved procedures;

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Security access controls to vital areas were being maintained )

and that persons in vital areas were properly authorize _ - _ - _ _ - _

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Security posts were adequately staffed and equipped, security personnel were alert and knowledgeable regarding position requirements, and that written procedures were available; and

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Adequate lighting was maintaine . Review of Security Event Reports Physical Security Event Reports No. 87-08 thru 87-13 were submitted to the NRC Region I Office during this inspection period. Both specialists and resident inspectors conducted followup inspections for the event Corrective actions were promptly taken by the license All NRC concerns have been adequately addresse The I inspector had no further questions at this tim . Inadequate Lighting Inadequate lighting was determined to exist at certain areas in the plan The inspector toured these areas with the licensee. The licensee subsequently instituted compensatory measures to eliminate the immediate concer Long term corrective actions will be reviewed during a

< subsequent inspectio "

4. Security Guard Asleep on Watch On August 1, 1987, at 3:00 a.m, a security guard who was posted inside the intake structure did not respond to a periodic radio chec The security supervisor was dis-patched to the guard's location. When the supervisor arrived, the security guard was found asleep. The security guard was immediately relieved of his responsibility and a different guard assumed the duties of that watch. The security guard that had been found asleep was assigned to that post at approximately 2:20 a.m. that morning. He had been on that watch approximately one hour and five minutes when he was found asleep. The licensee's security force immediately searched the intake structure and found no adverse conditions or any compromise of the security system for the intake structure. This information was conveyed to the resident inspectors the next mornin Senior security personnel immediately began an investiga-tion to determine the cause and corrective actions for this even The investigation consisted of interviewing the security guard involved. The licensee's evaluation of the situation determined that the employee in question should have been fresh (having worked no overtime during the a preceding 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> prior to coming on shift). Therefore, the individual should ' nave been capable of standing

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on watch. The licensee's final corrective action for this event was to terminate the individual's employ-men The resident inspector reviewed the details of the incident and the associated corrective action. The inspector also attempted to personally interview the guard that had been released, however, he was unable to be reached. The :icensee has determined that this was an isolated event and additional corrective actions are not necessary at this tim .4 Radiation Controls Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas were inspected. Radiation Work Permit compliance and use of personnel monitoring devices were checked. Conditions of step off pads, disposal of protective clothing, cleanliness of work areas,

radiation control job coverage, area monitor operability.and calibration (portable and permanent) and personnel frisking were observed on a sampling basi No concerns were identified 4.5 Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness

, conditions and control and storage of flammable mateeial and other potential safety hazards were observed in various areas during plant tours. Maintenance of fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations, and verification of posted fire watches in these areas were also observe . Maintenance Activities The inspector observed / reviewed various maintenance and problem identification activities for compliance with requirements and applicable codes and standards, QA/QC involvement, safety tags, equipment l

alignment /use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, radiological controls, fire protection, retest and deportability. The following activities were reviewed:

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MWR No. 865248, Repair / Repack FCV-FW-488

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MWR No. 870998, No. 1 EDG Air Starting Banks

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MWR No. 871010, AFW Pump Turbine Exhaust Monitor Spurious High and High-High Alarm MWR No. 875096, Replace Plug on FCV-FW-498

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PMP 1-36SS-BKR 1E, Air Circuit Breaker Inspection l

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. Surveillance Testing The inspector witnessed / reviewed selected surveillance tests to determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, details were adequate, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, technical speci-fications were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositione The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:

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MSP 43.19, Radiation Process Monitor RM-VS-107A Reactor Building /

SLCRS Particulate Calibration:.

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MSP 43.65, Radiation Process Monitor RM-MS-101, AFW Pump Exhaust Calibration

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BVT 1.3-1.47.8, Containment Air Lock Type B Personnel Hatch Leak Tes OST 1.36.1, Diesel Generator No. 1 Monthly Tes Na Deficiencies were note . Potential Generic Issue in FSAR Turbine Trip Analysis

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On July 9, 1987, the licensee received a formal notification from the Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor (Westinghouse) that identified a potentially generic issue with the previously analyzed loss of external electrical load / turbine trip event. The letter stated that a postulated y scenario represents a potential reportable event of 10 CFR 50.59 (Unreviewed Safety Question), although the Westinghouse Safety Review Committee (SRC) determined that this issue did not constitute a substantial safety hazar The results of the SRC review of generic Westinghouse plant transient, using conservative assumptions, showed that the FSAR complete loss of i flow analysis would not bound this event with respect to the minimum i departure from nuclear ratio (DNPR). The postulated scenario assumes that a reactor trip does not occur within 30 seconds following a turbine trip (this trip uses control systems not taken credit for in the i

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FSAR), and a concurrent complete loss of forced reactor coolant flow due to an assumed failure of the fast bus transfer to offsite power. The postulated loss of flow event would occur with the reacter at or near full thermal power with the reactor vessel exit temperature above nominal conditions due to the delay in the reactor tri The licensee reviewed the vendor's latter, and is currently investigating the applicability to Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2. However, the licensee noted that an immediete basis for concern, due to plant specific design features, was not apoarent. Additionally, while reported Westinghouse stuales have shown that the minimum DNBR may not be met, no fuel failures

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due to DNBR are expecte Licensee resolution of this issue will be 1 tracked during a future insoectio This is an Unresolved Item ;

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(50-334/87-12-01).

8. Employ 9e Concern on Use of Plant Exit Radiation Monitors i l

On July 14, 1987, the inspector received a concern from a new '

Duquesne Light employee concerning proper use of plant exit portal 4 radiation monitoring equipment. The employee noted that at 8:30 a.m., on I July 14, 1987, a female cmployee leaving the plant could not obtain a ;

proper scan from the portal radiation monitor as required by station procedures. The female employee had started the scan on a portal i radiation monitor; however, before the completion of the scan, the '

monitor alarmed, indicating that a recount was necessary. With the aid of a security guard, the female employee attempted to reset the alarm; the individual stepped through the monitor (to the exit side) while attempting to rese Eventually the alarm cleared, however, the employee did not re-enter the portal radiation monitor and was allowed to continue out of the plant without a proper sca The inspector questioned the new employee if he could recall the nam ^es of the individuals and he stated he could not. The inspector stated this information would be given to the licensee to allow the utility to ;

respond to the concern. The inspector presented the information to the '

senior manager of nuclear operations to allow him to assess the i situation. Discussions indicated that he was aware of the concern. This issue had been forwarded from the new employee's supervisor to the Radiation Control Department that same day. An interview of the new-employee was scheduled for July 15, 1987, to assess the concern directly from the individual. The licensee's representative stated that after the completion of their review, the resident inspector would be notifie The inspector independently witnessed.the use of the portal moni;,rs on July 14, 1987, to determine if the monitors were being properly use The period chosen was during shift change when there is high traffic exiting the plant. The inspector did not note any improper use of the monitors; however, during this period of time, no portal monitor alarms were received. Therefore, the inspector was unable to personally witness the resolution by security force personnel and/or the individual involved in the case of receiving portal radiation monitor alarm The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions and found them to be acceptable. The inspector also interviewed the new employee to assure that the licensee had resolved his concerns. The new employee stated that he had been informed that the female employee had performed a proper friskin He acknowledged that it was possible due to his location which limited his field of vision. He felt that the licensee management had properly resolved his concern. The inspector questioned the employee to ensure that he did not have any remaining questions or concern .

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The inspector noted that the. employee. stated that he had been instructed, in the licensee's General Employee Training (GET)., that if he had any concerns, to contact the NRC directl Discussions with the employee indicated that contacting the NRC fir st, and not attempting to resolve the issue within the company, was the information being presented in GE This information was discussed with the licensee who stated that this was not the information that was supposed to be taught and if this was indeed the case, the training would be correcte . Inoffice Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC Region I Office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of correctitc actio The inspector determined whether further information was required from )

the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether  ;

the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed: I

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LER 87-13, Reactor Trip Due to Rod Control Circuit Card Failuras i (Detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-334/87-11).

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LER 87-14, Spurious Actuation of Control Roca Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (Detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-334/87-11).

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LER 80-01/0IT-1, Inadequate Seismic Support on Containment Vacuum Pump Piping (Detailed below).

9.1 LER 80-01/0IT-1 updated a 1979 reportable event regarding the  !'

use of an inaccurate computer program for seismic re-analyses of safety-related piping systems. This update stated that on June 26, 1987, a section of the containment vacuum pump suction piping was determined to be not adequately supported for a

.tismic event. The updated LER further stated that the 3 conclusions derived from a seismic re-analysis required by NRC {

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IE Bulletin No. 79-14 were being re-evaluated based on the '

recent finding. The seismically inadequate section of piping has been replaced via implementation of an emergency design i change package during this inspection period. The licensee subsequently determined that the IE Bulletin 79-14 conclusions 1 were not in question based upon additional engineering '

evaluations. The licensee plans to issue an additional ,

supplement to the original LER to reflect current engineering l evaluation results. The additional LER supplement will be reviewed by the inspecto .2 The inspector noted that LER 87-13, Reactor Trip Due to. Rod Control Circuit Load Failures, actually described two separate operational events; (1) operation prohibited by plant Technical Specifications (TS) in that TS 3.0.3 was entered at 3:05 am on

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June 9, 1987, and (2) an Automatic Reactor Trip at 1:45 pm on June 9. Although the root cause was essentially the same for each event, and they occurred on the same day, the events are considered to be separate. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that further similar events >

will be reported separately. The inspector will continue to monitor the adequacy of LER . Review of Periodic Reports ,s i Upon receipt, periodic reports submitted. pursuant to Technical Spectf'ica--

tion 6.9 (Reporting Requirements) are reviewed. The review assessed'

whether the reported information was valid, including the NRC required data, and whether the results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications. The inspector "

also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence. The following periodic reports were reviewed!

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Monthly Operating Report for Plant Operations from June 1-30, 1987

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Monthly Operating Report for Plant Operations from Ju'> I-31, 1987 No deficiencies were note . , Unresolved Items <.

Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required in l order to determine whether they are acceptable items or violations. An '

unresolved item identified during this inspect. ion is discussed in paragraph . Exit Interview Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of inspection findings was further discussed with t

the licensee at the conclusion of the report period, I

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