ML20238C115
| ML20238C115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1987 |
| From: | Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238C117 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-87-16, GL-87-12, NUDOCS 8712300055 | |
| Download: ML20238C115 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000334/1987016
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Region I
Report No.
50-334/87-16
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Docket No.
50-334
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Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company
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One Oxford Center
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301 Grant Street
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Pittsburgh, PA 15279
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Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1
Location:
Shippingport, Pennsylvania
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Dates:
October 30, 1987 - December 3, 1987
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Inspectors:
F. I. Young, Senior Resident Inspector, BV-1
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M. Pi dale, Resident Inspector, BV-1
Approved By:
_d* . M
l%[2ki?"/
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L. E. Trib&, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A
Da'te
Inspection Summary:
Inspection No. 50-334/87-16 on October 30, 1987 -
December 3, 1987
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections by the resident inspectors (86 hours9.953704e-4 days <br />0.0239 hours <br />1.421958e-4 weeks <br />3.2723e-5 months <br />) of
licensee actions on previous inspection findings, plant operations, physical
security, radiological controls, housekeeping and fire protection,
surveil-
lance testing, Generic Letter response review and Cold Weather Preparations.
Results:
No viclations were identified.
An unresolved item was identified
concerning implementation of changes resulting from review of Generic Letter
No. 87-12. (Detail 6). Five previously open NRC items were closed during this
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inspection. One was updated and remains open.
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8712300055 871222
ADOCK 05000334
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
During the report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with
members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspec-
tion activities.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities
At the beginning of the inspection on October 30, 1987, the plant was
operating at full power. On November. 11, 1987, the plant began coastdown
operations in preparation for the sixth refueling outage, scheduled to
begin on December 11. At the end of this inspection period, the plant was
operating at approximately 82 percent power and continuing to coastdown.
Continuous days of power operation had reached 177 days at the end of the-
inspection.
3.
Followup on Outstanding Items
The NRC Outstanding Items (01) List was reviewed with cognizant licensee
personnel.
Items selected by the inspector were subsequently reviewed
through discussions with . licensee personnel, documentation revieL and
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field inspection to determine whether licensee actions specified in the
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OIs had been satisfactorily completed.
The overall status of previously
identified inspection
findings were
reviewed,
and planned / completed
licensee actions were discussed for those items reported below:
3.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (85-25-03):
Combustible waste storage .in
the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). By letter dated August 8,1986,
the licensee provided long term corrective actions associated with
combustible waste storage in the PAB, which included the installation
of closed head sprinkler system and ' a fire detection system' to be
installed by the end of 1986.
The NRC found the licensee's proposed
fixes to be consistent with NRC documented positions (letter dated
October 9,
1986).
By _ letter dated January 13, 1987, the licensee
informed the NRC of the completion of the modifications. The.inspec-
tor independently verified the completion of the PAB fire detection
and suppression modifications. The' inspector elso verified that the
modifications were incorporated into the licensee's Fire Protection
Program, including implementation of _ surveillance testing require-
ments to ensure system operability.
This item is closed.
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3.2 (Closed) Violation (85-25-04):
The violation identified nonconform-
ances with portions of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R (Fire Protection) re -
quirements.
Specifically, work areas were not . provided with emerg-
ency lighting units with eight-hour battery supplies. The licensee
responded to the violation as required by 10 CFR Part 2 requirements
and committed to install emergency lighting in one of the four areas.
The inspector verified the implementation of the licensee's commit-
ment.
Additionally, an Appendix R exemption request was submitted to
the NRC on January 21, 1986, as supplemented on October 21, 1986, to
provide justification and to demonstrate that existing lighting
capability provides an acceptable margin of safety equivalent to the
associated Appendix R requirements.
On July. 27, '1987, the NRC
granted the exemption from the. associated Appendix R requirements and
determined that the existing lighting systems are equivalent to. the
technical requirements of Section III.J of 10 . CFR 50 Appendix
R.
Based on the above, this item is closed.
3.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (85-25-05): Emergency lighting was marginal
or insufficient in four areas.
This item was opened to follow
licensee's actions to correct the potential weakness regarding emerg-
ency lighting in units located in areas that require operator ' action -
for safe shutdown.
In response to the unresolved item, the licensee
conducted an Appendix R emergency lighting test in the areas ' in -
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question during the fifth refueling outage, and deternHned that some
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minor plant modifications would be . required to enhance lighting in
the areas.
The licensee completed the modifications through imple-
mentation of a design change on March 19, 1986.
Additionally, the
licensee identified that specific plant areas required the use of
portable lights and a two-hour battery powered emergency lighting
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unit to enhance permanently installed eight-hour lighting for alter-
nate shutdown. These proposed fixes were included in a ' .previously
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submitted Appendix R,Section III.J Emergency Lighting requirement'
exemption request for NRC approval. The NRC granted the exemption on
July 28,1987. The inspector verified that the associated equipment
was in place and that the licensee has implemented administrative
controls to maintain the above equipment operable.
This item is
closed.
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3.4- (Closed) Unresolved Item (87-05-03): Inconsistencies were identified
regarding Station Administrative Procedure No. 10 (SAP 10), Onsite
Safety Committee (OSC), and Technical Specifications.
Specifically,
. SAP 10 only charged the OSC with the ' responsibility for review of
changes to intent to procedures, while TS 6.5.1.6 required that the
OSC revie'w'all safety procedures and changes (intent and non-intent)
thereto. Also, TS 6.8.3 required that temporary procedure changes be
reviewed by the OSC within 14 days, while SAP 10 did not charge the
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OSC - with review responsibility of temporary changes. . The~ licensee
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submitted a TS change request to the NRC on January 15, 1986 to allow
the OSC to review only changes of intent to procedures.
In the
-interim, the licensee committed to review all procedure changes
(intent and non-intent) and to incorporate the necessary OSC review
responsibilities for temporary procedure changes.
The licensee subsequently received Amendment No.110 to the TS which
modified TS 6.5.1.6 to charge the OSC with review responsibilities
for intent changes to procedures only.
Additionally, TS 6.8.2 was
modified to specify .that non-intent procedure changes shall receive
an independent reviaw by qualified individuals and shall be approved
by the designated manager or director.
On November 13, 1987, a revised SAP 10 was issued'which reflected the
above TS changes and incorporated OSC review responsibilities for
temporary proceoure changes.
However, the inspector determined -that
a program to ensure non-intent changes are independently reviewed by-
qualified individuals had not been fully developed.
The licensee
stated that the individual station groups are responsible to develop
separate programs to implement the new SAP 10.
Until- these programs
are in place, the OSC committed to continue to review all procedure
changes (intent and non-intent).
The inspector will review the
licensee's implementation of SAP 10, including administrative con-
trols for independent reviews of non-intent changes'during a future
inspection. This item is closed.
3.5 (Closed) IFI (87-09-01): Measurement Control Evaluation - Nonradio-
logical Chemi stry. On completion of the analyses of water samples by
the licensee and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), a comparative
evaluation was to be made.
The analyses were completed and an-
evaluation was performed.
Split Sample Comparison
Beaver Valley, Unit 1
Sample
Chemical
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Source
Parameter
BV #1 Value
BNL Value
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Hot Well
20.0
24.2'
(ppb)
Fluoride
5.4
Sulfate
34.8
36.2
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Hot Well
83.3
<100
(ppb)
79.6
<100
Hot Well
Hydrazine
72.0
62.8
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(ppb)
The analytical comparisons for the analyses were acceptable.
This
item is closed.
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3.6 (0 pen) Unresolved Item (86-15-04):
A licensee QA procedure (OP-4)
allows the initiation of construction on safety-related systems up
to the point of post-modification testing without completing a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation. In practice, the licensee does not initiate
work on modifications until the 50.59 review has been reviewed and
approved.
The licensee was to evaluate the reasons for revisions to
OP-4, which incorporated the above provisions (March 1977), and to
determine if corrective actions are necessary.
The licer,see deter-
mined that the revision was made to provide additional flexibility to
enable the performance of concurrent engineering and construction
activities in urgent and/or emergency situations. While the licensee
recognizes that additional risks are , associated with this flexi-
bility, tne inspector noted that no restrictions are provided in OP-4
regarding the type or nature of work involved.
Specifically, the
licensee may initiate work on existing or new safety-related systems
and not address whether an unreviewed safety question exists until
after the modification is. installed. This concern was brought to the
licensee's attention. Pending further licensee evaluation / resolution
of this issue, this item remains open.
4.
Plant Operations
4.1 General
Inspection tours of the following accessible plant areas were con-
ducted during both day and night shifts with respect to Technical
Specification (TS) compliance, housekeeping and cleanliness, fire
protection, radiation control, physical security / plant protection and
operational / maintenance administrative controls.
-- Control Room
-- Safeguard Areas
-- Auxiliary Building
-- Service Building
-- Switchgear Area
-- Diesel Generator Builoings
-- Access Control Points
-- Containment
-- Protected Area Fence Line -- Yard Area
-- Turbine Building
-- Intake Structure
4.2 Operations
During the course of the inspection, discussions were conducted with
operators concerning
knowledge of recent changes to procedures,
facility configuration and plant conditions. During plant tours, logs
and records were reviewed to determine if entries were properly made,
and that equipment status / deficiencies were identified and communi-
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cated. These records included' operating logs, turnover sheets, tag-
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out and jumper logs, process computer printouts, unit off-normal and
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draft incident reports. The inspector verified adherence to approved
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procedures for ongoing activities observed.
Shift turnovers were
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witnessed and staffing requirements confirmed.
In general, inspector
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comments or questions resulting from these reviews were resolved by
licensee personnel.
Inspections conducted during backshifts and
weekends verified that plant operators were alert and displayed no
. signs of fatigue or inattention to duty.
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4.2.1
Unplanned Radioactive Gaseous Discharge
On November 10, an unplanned gaseous release occurred while
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performing a volume control tank (VCT) level transmitter
calibration in the VCT cubicle.
Licensee personnel iso-
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lated the VCT level transmitter and then vented it per
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procedure prior to performing the calibration.
The gases
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that were trapped in the isolated transmitter piping sec-
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tion were vented to the VCT cubicle atmosphere. -Control
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room personnel immediately received a high alarm from the
ventilation exhaust radiation monitor.
The control room
alarms were reset within 1-1/2 minutes. The licensee per-
formed a dose projection and completed an Abnormal Release
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Record, which indicated that no discharge dose action
levels or Technical Specification limits were exceeded.
Immediately following the event, the. control room super-
visor placed the job on hold until more positive controls
could be established.
A high-high signal on that same
radiation monitor causes a flow diversion of the Auxiliary
Building ventilation exhaust (ESF actuation).
The. job was-
subsequently completed without further incident.
Previous occurrences have not resulted in gaseou.s releases
during this calibration as it is normally performed while
in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and radioactivity levels are sub-
stantially lower.
However, the procedure allowed perform-
ance of the calibration while in all operational modes.
Licensee corrective action for this ' event included initia-
ting an Engineering Memorandum to -request that provisions
be provided for applicable transmitters to permit control-
led venting during calibration and repair evolutions.
In
the interim, the licensee changed the associated procedures
to permit routine transmitter calibrations' while in Mode 5
only.
The inspector will review the adequacy of licensee
corrective actions during subsequent routine inspections.
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4.2.2
Feedwater Regulating Valve Positioner Problem
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On November 15, the
"A" feedwater regulating valve (FRV)
control
system experienced an apparent feedwater flow
spike.
This caused the associated steam generator (SG)
level to increase to its high level deviation alarm set-
point.
A plant operator immediately placed the control
system in manual to restore SG level to normal. The system
was stabilized without further incident.
A subsequent
physical inspection by operations personnel. did not iden-
tify any apparent valve problems.
It was.also determined
that security force personnel did not make any radio trans-
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missions in the area that could have affected control sys-
tem components.
The operators then selected a different
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feedwater flow control channel and placed.the "A"
FRV back
in automatic.
The transmission from manual to automatic
was smooth.
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Further licensee investigation into the event determined
that the problem was associated with the valve positioner.
A roller bearing that normally rides on the positioner cam
plate had slipped off the cam so that the . roller bearing
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shaft was riding on the cam.
The licensee determined that
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there was not - an i.mmediate operational problem since the
control system continued to control SG water level .
The
licensee also determined that attempts to replace the
roller onto the cam was a very sensitive activity and could
potentially initiate additional plant transients.
Conse-
q u e n tly ., the licensee elected not to perform the repairs
and planned to continue to monitor control of the "A"
and routinely inspect the positioner.
To provide operational flexibility, on November 19, the
licensee installed a manual air supply regulator which by-
passes the valve positioner. The device is to be used as a
manual, local valve positioner for the FRV in the event
that valve control degrades such that erratic' FRV control
occurs.
The temporary system provides a pressure gauge
that is to be used to match the regulator pressure indi-
cation with the existing positioner pressure indication to
input a constant air supply dire::tly to the valve actuator
manually. This action provides a fixed feedwater flow from
the main FRV. Feedwater flow would then be controlled from
the control room via the bypass FRV to maintain SG water
level.
The inspector verified . that the jumper log docu-
mented the temporary system and that the . appropriate safety
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evaluation had been performed, reviewed and approved. Plant
operators were provided with instructions on how to use the
temporary system through onshift discussions / demonstrations.
Through the end of the inspection period, the FRV control
system did not exhibit any operational problems and the
temporary system was not required to be used.
system control through the beginning of the refueling out-
age (scheduled for December 11, 1987), and the subsequent
repair of the valve pos'itioner will be reviewed during a
future inspection.
4.3 Plant Security / Physical Protection
Implementation of the Physical Security Plan was observed in various
plant areas with regard to the following:
Protected Area and Vital Area barriers were well maintained and
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not compromised;
Isolation zones were clear;
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Personnel and vehicles entering. and packages being delivered .to
the Protected Area were properly searched and access control was
in accordance with approved licensee procedures;
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Persons granted access to the site were badged to indicate
whether they have unescorted access or escorted authorization;
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Security access controls to Vital Areas were being maintained
and that persons in Vital Areas were properly authorized.
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Security posts were adequately staffed and equipped, security
personnel
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alert and
knowledgeable
regarding position
requirements, and that written procedures were available; and
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Adequate illumination was maintained.
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A relatively high number of equipment failures have occurred over the
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past several months, including security computer related probiems.
Many of these have resulted in extensive compensatory measures being
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implemented.
NRC Specialist Report No. 50-334/87-17 reviewed - this
concern in greater detail. The resident inspectors will continue to-
monitor implementation of Security Plan and NRC requirements.
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4.4 Radiological Controls
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Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas were
inspected.
Radiation Work Permit compliance and use of personnel
monitoring devices were checked.
Conditions of step-off. pads, dis-
posal of protective clothing, cleanliness of work areas, radiation
control job coverage, area monitor operability and calibration
(portable and permanent) and personnel frisking were observed on a
sampling basis.
No concerns were identified.
4.5 Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection
Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness condi-
tions and control and storage of flammable material and other 'poten-
tial safety hazards were observed in various areas during plant
tours. Maintenance of fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations, and
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verification of posted fire watches in these areas were also observed.
The inspectors noted an increasing number of materials arriving on-
site in preparation for the upcoming refueling / maintenance outage
(scheduled December 11, 1987). Discussions were held with the licen-
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see regarding proper storage and control of these materials and
equipment.
The licensee acknowledged the ir :pector's comments.
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significant deficiencies were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testing
The inspector witnessed / reviewed selected surveillance tests to determine
whether properly approved procedures were in use, details were adequate,
test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, technical specifi-
cations were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel and
test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed
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OST 1.7.2
Boric Acid Transfer Pump Operational Test
OST 1.11.6
LHSI Loop A - ECCS Flow Path and Valve Position Checks
OST 1.44A.2
Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Test - Train A
OST 1.47.1
Containment Air Lock Door Type B Leak Test
No deficiencies were identified.
6.
Review of Generic Letter 87-12, Loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) While
The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is Partially Filled
Generic Letter (GL) No. 87-12, dated July 9,1987, requested licensees to
provide information to assess safe operation of Pressurized Water Reactors
when the RCS water level is below the top of ~ the reactor vessel. The GL
was to determine whether the RHR system meets the . licensing basis of' the
plant, whether there is a resultant unanalyzed event that may have. an
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impact upon safety and whether any threat to safety that warrants further
NRC attention exists in the above condition.
The licensee responded to
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the GL as requested on September 21, 1987, as supplemented on October 2,
1987.
An additional response is planned pending issuance of a Westing-
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house Owner's Group final report from.which the licensee will develop a
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response to Generic Letter question No.
5.
The licensee documented
several commitments in the generic letter response consisting primarily of
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procedure changes.
Pending the licensee's response to Question No. 5 and
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implementation of the documented commitments, this issue will be tracked
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as Unresolved Item No. 50-334/87-16-01.
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7.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports
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Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical
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Specification 6.9 (Reporting Requirements) were reviewed.
The review
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assessed whether the reported information was valid, included the NRC
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required data and whether results and supporting information were consis-
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tent with design predictions and performance specifications. The inspec-
tor also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified
as an abnormal occurrence.
The following reports were reviewed:
BV1/BV2 Monthly Operating Report for Plant Operations from October 1
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1986 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments
8.
Cold Weather Preparations
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's cold weather preparations to ensure
that the licensee is maintaining effective implementation of protective
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measures for extreme cold weather in compliance with the November 1,1979,
response to IE Bulletin 79-24. The Bulletin. required the licensee to pro-
vide adequate protection for safety-related process, instrument and sam-
pling lines to prevent freezing during extremely cold weather. The licen-
see completed operational surveillance test (OST) No.
1.45.11,
Cold
Weather Protection Verification , on November 13, 1987.
OST 1.45.11 is
performed once a year prior to the winter months to ensure that specified
areas are equipped with an operable means of freeze protection.
Defici-
encies were identified during the OST, such as higher than required glyr.ol
freezing points on several heating systems, heating steam leaks and
several heating systems being out of service for miscellaneous reasons.
The OST either documented restoration of the affected systems and/or com-
ponents or documented the initiation of maintenance work requests (MWR) to
perform the required repairs.
The OST was completed satisfactorily and
the necessary MWRs for corrective action of deficiencies were documented
in the test.
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The licensee also periodically checks heat trace components and other cold
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weather protective components through operator check lists to verify that
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the systems are maintained operable. The Operating Manual contains a Cold
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Weather Log (No. L10-1) which is to be performed once a year around
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October 1.
The inspector noted that the log was not performed this
October.
Discussions with the licensee indicated that tne OST was to
replace the log.
However, it was noted that only about 80*4 of the items
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covered in the log were included in the OST.
The licensee committed to
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perform the remaining items on the Cold Weather Log to complete the cold
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weather checks.
Additionally, orocedure changes will be initiated to
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incorporate all required yearly checks in one controlling document.
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inspector will review the remaining Cold Weather Log items whe_n performed
and the procedure changes during a future inspection. No further discrep-
anties were identified.
9.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required in
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order to determine whether they are acceptable items or violations.
An
unresolved item idgntified during this inspection is discussed in para-
graph 6.
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10.
Exit Interview
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Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the
course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A
summary of inspection findings was further discussed with the licensee at
the conclusion of the report period on December 4, 1987.
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