ML20238C115

Insp Rept 50-334/87-16 on 871030-1203.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Plant Operations,Physical Security,Radiological Controls,House Keeping & Fire Protection

ML20238C115
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/22/1987
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20238C117	List: IR 05000334/1987016 ML20238C115
References
50-334-87-16, GL-87-12, NUDOCS 8712300055
Download: ML20238C115 (11)

See also: IR 05000334/1987016

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Region I l

Report No. 50-334/87-16 i

Docket No. 50-334 i

Licensee: Duquesne Light Company )

One Oxford Center j

301 Grant Street i

Pittsburgh, PA 15279 _ _ .

l Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1

Location: Shippingport, Pennsylvania

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Dates: October 30, 1987 - December 3, 1987

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, Inspectors: F. I. Young, Senior Resident Inspector, BV-1

l S M. Pi dale, Resident Inspector, BV-1

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Approved By: _d*

Y

. M

L. E. Trib&, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A

l%[2ki?"/

Da'te

Inspection Summary: Inspection No. 50-334/87-16 on October 30, 1987 -

December 3, 1987

Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors (86 hours9.953704e-4 days <br />0.0239 hours <br />1.421958e-4 weeks <br />3.2723e-5 months <br />) of

licensee actions on previous inspection findings, plant operations, physical

security, radiological controls, housekeeping and fire protection, surveil-

lance testing, Generic Letter response review and Cold Weather Preparations.

Results: No viclations were identified. An unresolved item was identified

concerning implementation of changes resulting from review of Generic Letter

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No. 87-12. (Detail 6). Five previously open NRC items were closed during this

inspection. One was updated and remains open.

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8712300055 871222 '

PDR ADOCK 05000334

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

During the report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with

members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspec-

tion activities.

2. Summary of Facility Activities

At the beginning of the inspection on October 30, 1987, the plant was

operating at full power. On November. 11, 1987, the plant began coastdown

operations in preparation for the sixth refueling outage, scheduled to

begin on December 11. At the end of this inspection period, the plant was

operating at approximately 82 percent power and continuing to coastdown.

Continuous days of power operation had reached 177 days at the end of the-

inspection.

3. Followup on Outstanding Items

The NRC Outstanding Items (01) List was reviewed with cognizant licensee

personnel. Items selected by the inspector were subsequently reviewed

through discussions with . licensee personnel, documentation revieL and ,

field inspection to determine whether licensee actions specified in the '

OIs had been satisfactorily completed. The overall status of previously

identified inspection findings were reviewed, and planned / completed

licensee actions were discussed for those items reported below:

3.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (85-25-03): Combustible waste storage .in

the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). By letter dated August 8,1986,

the licensee provided long term corrective actions associated with

combustible waste storage in the PAB, which included the installation

of closed head sprinkler system and ' a fire detection system' to be

installed by the end of 1986. The NRC found the licensee's proposed

fixes to be consistent with NRC documented positions (letter dated

October 9, 1986). By _ letter dated January 13, 1987, the licensee

informed the NRC of the completion of the modifications. The.inspec-

tor independently verified the completion of the PAB fire detection

and suppression modifications. The' inspector elso verified that the

modifications were incorporated into the licensee's Fire Protection

Program, including implementation of _ surveillance testing require-

ments to ensure system operability. This item is closed.

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3.2 (Closed) Violation (85-25-04): The violation identified nonconform-

ances with portions of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R (Fire Protection) re -

quirements. Specifically, work areas were not . provided with emerg-

ency lighting units with eight-hour battery supplies. The licensee

responded to the violation as required by 10 CFR Part 2 requirements

and committed to install emergency lighting in one of the four areas.

The inspector verified the implementation of the licensee's commit-

ment. Additionally, an Appendix R exemption request was submitted to

the NRC on January 21, 1986, as supplemented on October 21, 1986, to

provide justification and to demonstrate that existing lighting

capability provides an acceptable margin of safety equivalent to the

associated Appendix R requirements. On July. 27, '1987, the NRC

granted the exemption from the. associated Appendix R requirements and

determined that the existing lighting systems are equivalent to. the

technical requirements of Section III.J of 10 . CFR 50 Appendix R.

Based on the above, this item is closed.

3.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (85-25-05): Emergency lighting was marginal

or insufficient in four areas. This item was opened to follow

licensee's actions to correct the potential weakness regarding emerg-

ency lighting in units located in areas that require operator ' action -

for safe shutdown. In response to the unresolved item, the licensee

conducted an Appendix R emergency lighting test in the areas ' in -

l question during the fifth refueling outage, and deternHned that some

l minor plant modifications would be . required to enhance lighting in

the areas. The licensee completed the modifications through imple-

mentation of a design change on March 19, 1986. Additionally, the

licensee identified that specific plant areas required the use of

portable lights and a two-hour battery powered emergency lighting

l unit to enhance permanently installed eight-hour lighting for alter-

nate shutdown. These proposed fixes were included in a ' .previously <

submitted Appendix R,Section III.J Emergency Lighting requirement'

exemption request for NRC approval. The NRC granted the exemption on

July 28,1987. The inspector verified that the associated equipment

was in place and that the licensee has implemented administrative

controls to maintain the above equipment operable. This item is

closed.

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3.4- (Closed) Unresolved Item (87-05-03): Inconsistencies were identified

regarding Station Administrative Procedure No. 10 (SAP 10), Onsite

Safety Committee (OSC), and Technical Specifications. Specifically,

. SAP 10 only charged the OSC with the ' responsibility for review of

changes to intent to procedures, while TS 6.5.1.6 required that the

OSC revie'w'all safety procedures and changes (intent and non-intent)

thereto. Also, TS 6.8.3 required that temporary procedure changes be

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reviewed by the OSC within 14 days, while SAP 10 did not charge the

OSC - with review responsibility of temporary changes. . The~ licensee

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submitted a TS change request to the NRC on January 15, 1986 to allow

the OSC to review only changes of intent to procedures. In the

-interim, the licensee committed to review all procedure changes

(intent and non-intent) and to incorporate the necessary OSC review

responsibilities for temporary procedure changes.

The licensee subsequently received Amendment No.110 to the TS which

modified TS 6.5.1.6 to charge the OSC with review responsibilities

for intent changes to procedures only. Additionally, TS 6.8.2 was

modified to specify .that non-intent procedure changes shall receive

an independent reviaw by qualified individuals and shall be approved

by the designated manager or director.

On November 13, 1987, a revised SAP 10 was issued'which reflected the

above TS changes and incorporated OSC review responsibilities for

temporary proceoure changes. However, the inspector determined -that

a program to ensure non-intent changes are independently reviewed by-

qualified individuals had not been fully developed. The licensee

stated that the individual station groups are responsible to develop

separate programs to implement the new SAP 10. Until- these programs

are in place, the OSC committed to continue to review all procedure

changes (intent and non-intent). The inspector will review the

licensee's implementation of SAP 10, including administrative con-

trols for independent reviews of non-intent changes'during a future

inspection. This item is closed.

3.5 (Closed) IFI (87-09-01): Measurement Control Evaluation - Nonradio-

logical Chemi stry. On completion of the analyses of water samples by

the licensee and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), a comparative

evaluation was to be made. The analyses were completed and an-

evaluation was performed.

Split Sample Comparison

Beaver Valley, Unit 1

Sample Chemical 1

Source Parameter BV #1 Value BNL Value

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Hot Well Chloride 20.0 24.2'

(ppb) Fluoride 5.4 ----

Sulfate 34.8 36.2 j

Hot Well Iron 83.3 <100

(ppb) Copper 79.6 <100

Hot Well Hydrazine 72.0 62.8 l

(ppb)

The analytical comparisons for the analyses were acceptable. This I

item is closed. 4

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3.6 (0 pen) Unresolved Item (86-15-04): A licensee QA procedure (OP-4)

allows the initiation of construction on safety-related systems up

to the point of post-modification testing without completing a 10 CFR

50.59 safety evaluation. In practice, the licensee does not initiate

work on modifications until the 50.59 review has been reviewed and

approved. The licensee was to evaluate the reasons for revisions to

OP-4, which incorporated the above provisions (March 1977), and to

determine if corrective actions are necessary. The licer,see deter-

mined that the revision was made to provide additional flexibility to

enable the performance of concurrent engineering and construction

activities in urgent and/or emergency situations. While the licensee

recognizes that additional risks are , associated with this flexi-

bility, tne inspector noted that no restrictions are provided in OP-4

regarding the type or nature of work involved. Specifically, the

licensee may initiate work on existing or new safety-related systems

and not address whether an unreviewed safety question exists until

after the modification is. installed. This concern was brought to the

licensee's attention. Pending further licensee evaluation / resolution

of this issue, this item remains open.

4. Plant Operations

4.1 General

Inspection tours of the following accessible plant areas were con-

ducted during both day and night shifts with respect to Technical

Specification (TS) compliance, housekeeping and cleanliness, fire

protection, radiation control, physical security / plant protection and

operational / maintenance administrative controls.

-- Control Room -- Safeguard Areas

-- Auxiliary Building -- Service Building

-- Switchgear Area -- Diesel Generator Builoings

-- Access Control Points -- Containment

-- Protected Area Fence Line -- Yard Area

-- Turbine Building -- Intake Structure

4.2 Operations

During the course of the inspection, discussions were conducted with

operators concerning knowledge of recent changes to procedures,

facility configuration and plant conditions. During plant tours, logs

and records were reviewed to determine if entries were properly made,

and that equipment status / deficiencies were identified and communi- i

cated. These records included' operating logs, turnover sheets, tag-

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out and jumper logs, process computer printouts, unit off-normal and

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draft incident reports. The inspector verified adherence to approved '

procedures for ongoing activities observed. Shift turnovers were i

witnessed and staffing requirements confirmed. In general, inspector J

comments or questions resulting from these reviews were resolved by

licensee personnel. Inspections conducted during backshifts and

weekends verified that plant operators were alert and displayed no

. signs of fatigue or inattention to duty. I

4.2.1 Unplanned Radioactive Gaseous Discharge

On November 10, an unplanned gaseous release occurred while I

performing a volume control tank (VCT) level transmitter

calibration in the VCT cubicle. Licensee personnel iso- y

lated the VCT level transmitter and then vented it per J

procedure prior to performing the calibration. The gases l

that were trapped in the isolated transmitter piping sec-  !'

tion were vented to the VCT cubicle atmosphere. -Control

room personnel immediately received a high alarm from the

ventilation exhaust radiation monitor. The control room

alarms were reset within 1-1/2 minutes. The licensee per-

formed a dose projection and completed an Abnormal Release }

Record, which indicated that no discharge dose action  ;

levels or Technical Specification limits were exceeded.

Immediately following the event, the. control room super-

visor placed the job on hold until more positive controls

could be established. A high-high signal on that same

radiation monitor causes a flow diversion of the Auxiliary

Building ventilation exhaust (ESF actuation). The. job was-

subsequently completed without further incident.

Previous occurrences have not resulted in gaseou.s releases

during this calibration as it is normally performed while

in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and radioactivity levels are sub-

stantially lower. However, the procedure allowed perform-

ance of the calibration while in all operational modes.

Licensee corrective action for this ' event included initia-

ting an Engineering Memorandum to -request that provisions

be provided for applicable transmitters to permit control-

led venting during calibration and repair evolutions. In

the interim, the licensee changed the associated procedures

to permit routine transmitter calibrations' while in Mode 5

only. The inspector will review the adequacy of licensee

corrective actions during subsequent routine inspections.

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4.2.2 Feedwater Regulating Valve Positioner Problem

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On November 15, the "A" feedwater regulating valve (FRV)

control system experienced an apparent feedwater flow

spike. This caused the associated steam generator (SG)

level to increase to its high level deviation alarm set-

point. A plant operator immediately placed the control

system in manual to restore SG level to normal. The system

was stabilized without further incident. A subsequent

physical inspection by operations personnel. did not iden-

tify any apparent valve problems. It was.also determined

that security force personnel did not make any radio trans-

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missions in the area that could have affected control sys-

tem components. The operators then selected a different 1

feedwater flow control channel and placed.the "A" FRV back

in automatic. The transmission from manual to automatic

was smooth. -

Further licensee investigation into the event determined

that the problem was associated with the valve positioner.

A roller bearing that normally rides on the positioner cam

plate had slipped off the cam so that the . roller bearing j

shaft was riding on the cam. The licensee determined that '

there was not - an i.mmediate operational problem since the

control system continued to control SG water level . The

licensee also determined that attempts to replace the

roller onto the cam was a very sensitive activity and could

potentially initiate additional plant transients. Conse-

q u e n tly ., the licensee elected not to perform the repairs

and planned to continue to monitor control of the "A" FRV

and routinely inspect the positioner.

To provide operational flexibility, on November 19, the

licensee installed a manual air supply regulator which by-

passes the valve positioner. The device is to be used as a

manual, local valve positioner for the FRV in the event

that valve control degrades such that erratic' FRV control

occurs. The temporary system provides a pressure gauge

that is to be used to match the regulator pressure indi-

cation with the existing positioner pressure indication to

input a constant air supply dire::tly to the valve actuator

manually. This action provides a fixed feedwater flow from

the main FRV. Feedwater flow would then be controlled from

the control room via the bypass FRV to maintain SG water

level. The inspector verified . that the jumper log docu-

mented the temporary system and that the . appropriate safety

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evaluation had been performed, reviewed and approved. Plant

operators were provided with instructions on how to use the

temporary system through onshift discussions / demonstrations.

Through the end of the inspection period, the FRV control

system did not exhibit any operational problems and the

temporary system was not required to be used. Feedwater

system control through the beginning of the refueling out-

age (scheduled for December 11, 1987), and the subsequent

repair of the valve pos'itioner will be reviewed during a

future inspection.

4.3 Plant Security / Physical Protection

Implementation of the Physical Security Plan was observed in various

plant areas with regard to the following:

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Protected Area and Vital Area barriers were well maintained and

not compromised;

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Isolation zones were clear;

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Personnel and vehicles entering. and packages being delivered .to

the Protected Area were properly searched and access control was

in accordance with approved licensee procedures;

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Persons granted access to the site were badged to indicate

whether they have unescorted access or escorted authorization;

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Security access controls to Vital Areas were being maintained

and that persons in Vital Areas were properly authorized.

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Security posts were adequately staffed and equipped, security

personnel were alert and knowledgeable regarding position

requirements, and that written procedures were available; and

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Adequate illumination was maintained.

A relatively high number of equipment failures have occurred over the l

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past several months, including security computer related probiems.

Many of these have resulted in extensive compensatory measures being a

implemented. NRC Specialist Report No. 50-334/87-17 reviewed - this

concern in greater detail. The resident inspectors will continue to-

monitor implementation of Security Plan and NRC requirements.

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4.4 Radiological Controls

Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas were

inspected. Radiation Work Permit compliance and use of personnel

monitoring devices were checked. Conditions of step-off. pads, dis-

posal of protective clothing, cleanliness of work areas, radiation

control job coverage, area monitor operability and calibration

(portable and permanent) and personnel frisking were observed on a

sampling basis. No concerns were identified.

4.5 Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection

Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness condi-

tions and control and storage of flammable material and other 'poten-

tial safety hazards were observed in various areas during plant

tours. Maintenance of fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations, and q

verification of posted fire watches in these areas were also observed.

The inspectors noted an increasing number of materials arriving on-

site in preparation for the upcoming refueling / maintenance outage

(scheduled December 11, 1987). Discussions were held with the licen- I

see regarding proper storage and control of these materials and  ;

equipment. The licensee acknowledged the ir :pector's comments. No )

significant deficiencies were identified.

5. Surveillance Testing

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The inspector witnessed / reviewed selected surveillance tests to determine

whether properly approved procedures were in use, details were adequate,

test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, technical specifi-

cations were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel and

test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.

The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed ,

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OST 1.7.2 Boric Acid Transfer Pump Operational Test I

OST 1.11.6 LHSI Loop A - ECCS Flow Path and Valve Position Checks

OST 1.44A.2 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Test - Train A

OST 1.47.1 Containment Air Lock Door Type B Leak Test

No deficiencies were identified.

6. Review of Generic Letter 87-12, Loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) While

The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is Partially Filled

Generic Letter (GL) No. 87-12, dated July 9,1987, requested licensees to

provide information to assess safe operation of Pressurized Water Reactors

when the RCS water level is below the top of ~ the reactor vessel. The GL

was to determine whether the RHR system meets the . licensing basis of' the

plant, whether there is a resultant unanalyzed event that may have. an

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[ impact upon safety and whether any threat to safety that warrants further

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NRC attention exists in the above condition. The licensee responded to i

the GL as requested on September 21, 1987, as supplemented on October 2,

1987. An additional response is planned pending issuance of a Westing-

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house Owner's Group final report from.which the licensee will develop a  ;

response to Generic Letter question No. 5. The licensee documented

several commitments in the generic letter response consisting primarily of ] l

procedure changes. Pending the licensee's response to Question No. 5 and {

implementation of the documented commitments, this issue will be tracked 3

as Unresolved Item No. 50-334/87-16-01. i

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7. Review of Periodic and Special Reports _ _ ,

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Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical -

Specification 6.9 (Reporting Requirements) were reviewed. The review -

assessed whether the reported information was valid, included the NRC j

required data and whether results and supporting information were consis- '

tent with design predictions and performance specifications. The inspec-

tor also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified

as an abnormal occurrence. The following reports were reviewed:

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BV1/BV2 Monthly Operating Report for Plant Operations from October 1 j

- 31, 1987.

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1986 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments

8. Cold Weather Preparations

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's cold weather preparations to ensure

that the licensee is maintaining effective implementation of protective 1

measures for extreme cold weather in compliance with the November 1,1979,

response to IE Bulletin 79-24. The Bulletin. required the licensee to pro-

vide adequate protection for safety-related process, instrument and sam-

pling lines to prevent freezing during extremely cold weather. The licen-

see completed operational surveillance test (OST) No. 1.45.11, Cold

Weather Protection Verification , on November 13, 1987. OST 1.45.11 is

performed once a year prior to the winter months to ensure that specified

areas are equipped with an operable means of freeze protection. Defici-

encies were identified during the OST, such as higher than required glyr.ol

freezing points on several heating systems, heating steam leaks and

several heating systems being out of service for miscellaneous reasons.

The OST either documented restoration of the affected systems and/or com-

ponents or documented the initiation of maintenance work requests (MWR) to

perform the required repairs. The OST was completed satisfactorily and

the necessary MWRs for corrective action of deficiencies were documented

in the test.

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f The licensee also periodically checks heat trace components and other cold l

weather protective components through operator check lists to verify that  !

the systems are maintained operable. The Operating Manual contains a Cold

Weather Log (No. L10-1) which is to be performed once a year around

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October 1. The inspector noted that the log was not performed this

October. Discussions with the licensee indicated that tne OST was to

replace the log. However, it was noted that only about 80*4 of the items {

covered in the log were included in the OST. The licensee committed to j

perform the remaining items on the Cold Weather Log to complete the cold 1

weather checks. Additionally, orocedure changes will be initiated to '

incorporate all required yearly checks in one controlling document. The j

inspector will review the remaining Cold Weather Log items whe_n performed

and the procedure changes during a future inspection. No further discrep-

anties were identified.

9. Unresolved Items j

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Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required in 1

order to determine whether they are acceptable items or violations. An

unresolved item idgntified during this inspection is discussed in para-

graph 6. 1

10. Exit Interview

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Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the

course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A

summary of inspection findings was further discussed with the licensee at

the conclusion of the report period on December 4, 1987.

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