IR 05000412/1987010

Insp Rept 50-412/87-10 on 870202-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Program,Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Independent Insp,Qa/Qc Interface W/Preoperational Testing Activities & Plant Tours

ML20207T385
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	03/18/1987
From:	Briggs L, Eselgroth P, Denise Wallace NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T375	List: IR 05000412/1987010 ML20207T374
References
50-412-87-10, NUDOCS 8703230508
Download: ML20207T385 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

-Report No. -50-412/87-10 Docket N License No. CPPR-105 Category B Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit N Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: February 2-13, 1987 Inspectors: ,,cSc3

't'. Briggs,ge(d Reactor Engineer 8//8/87 date W/!n 3//e/e?

D. Wallace, Reactor Engineer date

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Approved by: -

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3-/8'87 date P.Eselg[roA, 08, DRS / Chief,TestProgramSection Inspection Summary: Inspection on February 2-13, 1987 (Inspection Report No. 50-412/87-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of the preoperational test program including review of licensee action on previous inspection findings, preoperational test witnessing, review of operating procedures in preparation for plant operation, independent inspection, QA/QC interface with preopera-tional testing activities and plant tour Results: No violations were identified Note: For acronyms not defined, refer to NUREG 0544, " Handbook of Acronyms and Initialisms."

R703230508 860319 PDR ADOCK 05000412 g PDR

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l Details 1.0 Persons Contacted T. Brown, Startup Engineer (Emergency Diesel Generators)

1. • N. Daugherty, Director Systems Testing

1. • J. Godleski, Senior Test Engineer

1. J. Johns, Supervisor, QA Surveillance

• A. Lerczak, Beaver Valley 2 Operations Procedures Supervisor J. Miller, QA Inspector

• T. Noonan, Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance

1. C. Schultz, Procedure Review Committee Chairman -

G. Schildt, Senior Test Engineer (High Head Injection)

1. L. Williams, Director, Startup J. Wolfe, Startup QC, Administrative Assistant US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• A. Asars, Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley 1

• J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley 2 The inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's operations, test and QA/QC staff during the inspectio # Denotes those present at the interim exit meeting held on February 6, 198 * Denotes those present at the exit meeting held on February 13, 198 .0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (412/86-11-02), Administrative problems with three procedure The licensee provided the inspector with a prepared package addressing each of the identified procedural problems. The inspector reviewed the stated corrective action and independently verified that corrective actions were complet (Closed) Violation (412/86-28-01) Design changes made to the system not reflected in the preoperational (PO) test procedur The inspector

verified that test deficiency 16 for P0 2.07.02 had been initiated and that Work Authorization Request (WAR) 5824 had been implemented and

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completec as stated in the licensee's response. These items were reviewed by the inspecto The inspector also reviewed the training given to

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personnel concerning the use of the drawing and document control system and the attendance list. The training was given on three different dates, December 6, 8 and 17, 198 The inspector found licensee corrective

action on this item to be acceptable.

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(0 pen) Violation (412/86-28-02) Failure to fully verify system prerequi-sites prior to test performance. Part of the licensee's stated corrective action was to advise all test engineers that the 45 VDC power supply has been returned to permanent vice temporary power and that components tested as operable by another group does not preclude verification by the test engineer prior to test performance. Through discussions with the licensee it was determined that the training had been conducted in conjunction with training on jumpers and lifted leads. This could not be verified since the training was conducted informally with no record of the scope of instruction. This item is open pending NRC review of records which will verify instruction and those receiving it.

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3.0 Preoperational Test Witnessing 3.1 Scope Testing witnessed by the inspector included the observations of overall crew performance stated in Paragraph 3.1 of Inspection Report 50-412/86-43, 3.2 Discussion P0 2.11A.03, Safety Injection Flow Test On February 2 and 3, 1987 the inspector observed portions of P0 2.11A.03 including time response testing of charging pumps (High Head Safety Injection Pumps), flow balance checks of 'C' charging pump through the normal and alternate hot and cold leg injection paths and determination of 'C' charging pump's head versus flow curv During the previous single point flow checks of the 'C' charging pump (February 1,1987) low discharge head at the desired flow had been experience During the February 2, 1987, run observed by the inspector, a six (6) point curve was obtained to determine overall pump performance characteristic Pump values for the first and third run were almost identical at runout. Run one was 548 GPM at 1162 feet of developed head, run three was 547.5 GPM at 1163 feet of developed head. Run two had a slightly lower head value. Values for the 'C' charging pump obtained during vendor testing were 552 GPM at 1623 feet of developed hea The inspector verified the correct curve by pump serial number. The licensee appropriately noted the

'C' charging pump deficiency and initiated a request for information No. 2397 for Westinghouse resolution. The A and B charging pumps were also below the vendors curve at runout. The ' A' pump appeared to be within Westinghouse acceptance criteria, the "B" pump accept-ability was questionable. Westinghouse resolution was also requested for the A and B pump All other parts of PO 2.11A.03 witnessed satisfied the stated accep-tance criteri __

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Resolution of the 'C' charging pump acceptability will.be followed by the. inspector during a subsequent routine inspectio P0 2.20.02, Spent Fuel Pool and Refueling Cavity Leak Test On February 4,1987, the inspector,. during a tour of the facility, visually observed the leakage collection arrangement on the reactor cavity tell tale drain The tell tale drains monitor for leakage through the cavity liner. At the time of observation, the cavity had been filled for greater than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and zero leakage was indicate .3 Findings No violations were identifie .0 Operating Procedures Review -

4.1 Scope The inspector reviewed selected operating procedures to determine compliance with requirements of the Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 12, 1986, and the BVPS Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Proof and Review Copy, 198 Procedures were reviewed for the following attributes:

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Proper review and approval

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Conformance to Technical Specifications

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Technical Accuracy

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Adequacy of prerequisites and precautions

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Stepwise instructions to ensure adequate procedure implementation

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Adequate valve lineups when applicabl The following procedures were reviewed:

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Operating Manual, Chapter 11, Safety Injection System, Revis-ion 1, 1987

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Operating Manual, Chapter 1, Reactor Control and Protection, Revision 0, 1986

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Operating Manual, Chapter 2.50, Station Startup, Issue 1, Revision 1, 198 .2 Discussion The inspector observed that the Recirculation Spray System Heat Exchanger Surveillance, OST 2.30.13, was not included in the Station l

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Startup Procedure Prerequisite checklist (OM Ch 2.50, Rev 1,1986).

The licensee stated that this omission was probably due to the surveillance being incorporated into the OST program after the Operating Procedure was issued. Because approximately 40 other OST's were verified by the inspector to be part of the check off list as required, and due to the licensee's quick response to rectify the omission, the inspector did not consider the problem to be a break-down in the control of procedure The inspector verified the entire valve lineup for the Safety Injection System Operating Procedure (OM Ch 11, Rev 1,1987) to be complete and adequat The procedure valve lineup was observed to rely on information from the latest piping diagrams as listed below:

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DWG No. 10080-RM-411-1, Valve Operation Diagram, Low /High Head Safety Injection, Rev 1, 1986

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DWG No. 10080-RM-411-2, Valve Operation Diagram, SI Accumulators / Nitrogen, Rev 1, 1986 The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the preliminary issue of the present Technical Specification (TS), and how changes in the T.S. would be incorporated into the operating procedures. The licensee stated that personnel are already assigned to ensure that changes are incorporated, and proceeded to show the inspector how the T.S. Matrix, Revision 1, 1987 can be used to obtain a listing of procedures that are used to satisfy each T.S. requirement. Once the list of affected procedures is compiled, the Operating Manual Deficiency Report (OMDR) can be used to provide the needed change The inspector had no further question .3 Findings *

No violations or deviations were observe .0 Independent Inspection Effort 5.1 Discussion The inspector noted via discussions with the licensee and review of Chapter 8 and 14 of the FSAR that the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Load Sequencers (a nuclear safety related piece of equipment)

were not required to be tested and were in fact hardly mentioned in the FSA Further inquiry concerning logic testing indicated that logic was tested as part of the various preoperational tests that interfaced with the sequencers. Timing of load energization would be accomplished during the Electrical AC Independence test

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. 6-The inspector noted .that complete logic testing of

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(PO-2.36A,02).

the sequencers did not appear to . be - accomplished;- such as, what actually happens if the sequencer is being . tested when a Loss of Power-(LOP) and a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurs or after a LOP and EDG's are supplying the emergency' buses and a LOCA occur These concerns -as well as complete logic -_ testing completed .or remaining are under evaluation by the -licensee and is - unresolved -

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(412/87-10-01) pending NRC review of that evaluatit In addition,- the inspector had a question concerning. equipment protection, specifically the charging pumps. The inspector asked the -

licensee what occurs on a loss of power if the charging pumps are lined. up for _ the long term recirculation , mode of core cooling, .then the _ emergency bus power *.s restored.' A brief review of_ the schematic indicates that the chargit g pumps and the recirculation spray- pumps would stop on the power los When power was restored, only the charging. pumps would restart causing pump damage L because _the recirculation spray pumps supply the suction to the charging pump This item is also being researched by the licensee to determine if-some protection or circuit interlock is provided to protect the charging pumps in the above situatio .2 Findings One unresolved item concerning logic. testing of EDG Load Sequencer was-identifie .0 QA/QC Interface with Preoperational Testing 6.1 Scope

'The inspector reviewed several recent QA Surveillance Reports (QASR)

and associated deficiency reports, if applicable, regarding different activities of the licensee's startup departmen .2 Discussion

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QASR POT-21-86, this QASR was previously reviewed during Inspection Report 50-412/87-04. During the previous report it was noted that the administrative aspects of the identified deficiencies were addressed in the startup department's response, however, the inspector had a followup question concerning circuit design due to the manner in which the QASR was written. Further review of test deficiency No. 37 to PO 2.07.01 and Startup Work Request No. 007133 indicated that the jumper referred to in the QASR deficiency was to override an interlock from 2 SIS *MOV 863B to allow valves 2CHS*MOV 380A and 2CHS*MOV 3838 to function. The jumper was placed because the limit switch in another system (safety injection) was not in the correct position to stroke the valve .

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QASR POT-23A-86, Surveillance of P0 2.06.06 Pressurizer Relief Tank and Power Operated Relief Valves, Section A, surveillance completed November 7,1986. The QA inspector stated that Test Change Notice No. 8 had not been incorporated-into P0 2.06.06 in accordance with the Startup Manua The Startup -department response stated that it had been .but it. had not : been stamped twith the red " Approved Copy" stamp. This QASR had not been closed by QA at the end of this inspection on February 13, 198 In addition, the inspector observed QA coverage during the testing of charging pump 'C' discussed in Paragraph 3.2 of this repor .3 Findings No violations were identifie .0 Plant Tours 7.1 Discussion The' inspector made several tours of the plant including the control building, auxiliary building, service building, turbine building, condensate- polishing building, safeguards building and reactor containment to observe the status of construction, work in progress, housekeeping, testing activities and cleanlines .2 Findings No unacceptable conditions were note .0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to determine whether they are acceptable, an item of noncompliance, or a deviatio The unresolved item identified in this report is discussed in paragraph .0 Exit Interview At the conclusion of the site inspection, on February 13, 1987, an exit interview was conducted with the licensee's senior' site representatives (denoted in Section 1). The findings were identified and previous inspection items were discussed. An interim exit meeting was also conducted on February 6,198 At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector. Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during this inspection, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.