IR 05000412/1987024

Insp Rept 50-412/87-24 on 870323-27 & 0330-0403.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Program,Including Witnessing of Tests,Review of Test Rept & QA Interface & Status of MSIV Replacement Project

ML20214Q126
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/19/1987
From:	Briggs L, Florek D, Vankessel H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214Q118	List: IR 05000412/1987024 ML20214Q115
References
50-412-87-24, IEB-80-12, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8706040241
Download: ML20214Q126 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-24 Docket N License No. CPPR-105 Priority -

Category B Licensee: Duquesne Light Company P. O. Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 i

Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: March 23-27 and March 30-April 3, 1987 Inspectors: . M72 -

H. vanKessel, Reactor Engineer b

datd TPS, OB Division of Reactor Safety

, h- D L. Eriggs, [eid Reactor Erigin'eer l

date/

TPS, 08, Division of Reactor Safety h

Approved by: t

// M s D. Tlorek, Chief, Test Programs Section

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Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary: Inspection on March 23-27, and March 30-April 3, 1987 (Inspection Number 50-412/87-24).

i Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of the Preoperational Test Program, including the witnessing of preoperational tests, the review of pre-l operational test reports, the status review of test deficiencies, the review

) of activities in the QA interface, and the review of unresolved items

identified by the inspector in previous inspections. The status of the MSIV replacement project and the schedule for its completion was also reviewe Results

No violations were identifie NOTE: For acronyms not defined refer to NUREG 0544, " Handbook of Acronyms and Initialisms".

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8706040241 870S21 j PDR ADOCK 05000412 O PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company (DLC)

C. Callaway, Test Supervisor, Phase-2

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1. • D. L. Claridge, Compliance Engineer

1. • N. J. Daugherty, Director S" stems Testing

1. • J. P. Godleski, Senior Test Engineer

1. • J. D. Johns, Supervisor QA Surveillances F. R. Michael, Test Coordinator

• T. P. Noonan, Superintendent Operations and Maintenance

• L. M. Rabenau, Lead Compliance Engineer

1. • R. J. Swiderski, Startup Manager

• G. R. Wargo, Assistant Director SQC

1. • L. P. Williams, Test Director, Phase-1 R. G. Williams, Software Development Supervisor

1. • T. G. Zyra, Director, Site Testing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• A. Asars, Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley 2 J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley 2

• J. P. Durr, Chief Engineering Branch, DRS

• Denotes those present at interim exit meeting of March 27, 198 # Denotes those present at the exit meeting on April 3, 1987 Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 412/86-43-02, "Possible damage from water hammer during performance of P0.2.04.0 Scope

Water hammer was experienced in the component cooling water piping connected to the RHR Heat Exchanger during the test of the Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASP) as performed under Procedure P0 2.04.02. A report was requested on the possible damage caused by the experienced water hamme i Reference Interoffice Correspondence from H. W. Durkin to R. J. Swiderski, " Report of Inspection of RHS Train "A" pipings, dated December 11, 198 Discussion

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A Stone and Webster (SWEC) inspection team was formed to inspect the pertinent piping for evidence of large movements and damage. (see Ref.1)

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. 3 The inspected piping consisted of all train "A" RHR piping including the 18 inch diameter component cooling piping. Inspection continued beyond the containment penetration to the main headers at Elevation 718'-6" in the Auxiliary Building. There was no evidence of any damage or large motions of these pipe line Conclusion The response to this NRC inquiry is satisfactor This unresolved item is hereby close (Closed) Unresolved Item 412/86-43-01), " Excessive relative humidity in turbine room of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.'-

Scope Relative humidity in the turbine room of the turbine driven auxiliary

, feedwater pump exceeded the allowable value for most of the test period of procedure P0 2-24B.0 The effect of this excessive humidity on the qualified instruments located inside the turbine room was questioned by the inspecto References Stone and Webster's Request for Information RI-SUG-2268, " Accept-ability of high humidity in Safeguards Building", dated December 9, 198 . Stone and Webster's Advance Change Notice (ACN) No. D-5186, Rev. O,

" Governor Valve Steam Leakoff for Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine 2FWE*T22", dated February 24, 198 <

Oiscussion The humidity readings taken during the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> endurance test of the turbine, as performed in procedure P0 2.248.02, indicated readings as high as 100% close to the pump and west of the pump and 93% for areas east of the pump. (ref. 1)

All category 1 equipment inside the turbine room, was reviewed for the acceptability of the experienced high humidity conditions. It was considered that these conditions are acceptable and will not affect the qualification status of said equipment. (ref. 1)

A positive step will be taken to reduce the high humidity level in the immediate environment of the turbin ,

This positive action consists of J

the installation of a valve stem leak off connection to the floor drai (ref. 2) The new leak off connection will also help to prevent the  :

deterioration of the insulation of the steam piping and the turbine l housing, j i

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- 4 Conclusion The response to this NRC inquiry is satisfactory. This unresolved item is hereby close (Closed) Unresolved Item 412/86-25-02, " Deficiency No. 3 of P0.2.39.01,

~2-1 and 2-2 Batteries, Inverters and Charger Test".

Scope A breaker trip was experienced during the test for P0.2.39.01 following the instructions in the procedure. An explanation was sought under test deficiency No. References Stone and Webster Request for Information SVG-1933, " Breaker trip during P0.2.39.01 Inverter Test", dated July 17, 198 Discussion It was found during the performance of P0.2.39.01, Step VII A.13, that the 2-1 inverter, UPS*VITBS2-1, was fully loaded with the preferred source, MCC*2.E13, supplying the load and the breaker tripped. The test engineer did not understand why this would happen. An RI was issued (ref.1) to investigate the reason for the tri It was found that the UPS system was designed for 20KVA at .8 power factor and should be tested at 16KW and not 20 KW. The 20KW load application will cause the breaker to trip on overloa ,

The procedure was changed, Change No. 08 (ref. 2) to apply the proper i test loa l l

Conclusion The response to this NRC inquiry is satisfactory. This unresolved item is hereby closed.

l (Closed) Violation 412/86-28-02, Failure to fully verify system prerequi-sites prior to test performanc Scope During performance of P0.2.07.03 valve No. 137 could not be stroked because the circuit breaker for power to the valve operator had not been closed as part of the test prerequisite. During retest of valve 2CHS*LC4608 it failed to stroke from the alternate shutdown panel because the circuit breaker that supplied power to the other valve operator had not been closed prior to attempting to test the valve.

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. 5 Reference System Testing Section On-Going Training Sign Off Shee Discussion The inspector reviewed the above reference and the highlighted Notice of Violation that was distributed to all startup and test personnel. All personnel had signed as having read and understcod the distributed materia '

Conclusion This action combined with that discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-412/87-10 satisfactorily closes this ite .0 Preoperational Test program 3.1 Preoperational Test Witnessing

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Scope Testing witnessed by the inspector included the observations of overall performance stated in Paragraph 3.1 of NRC Inspection Report 50-412/86-4 Discussion PO 2.01A.04, Safeguards Test Cabinet Actuation Test On April 2, 1987 the inspector witnessed the testing of Slavo Relay K6078. This relay controls the safeguards function (isolation) of 2CHS*MOV 381, Reactor Coolant Pump seal water return containmtnt

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. isolation valve. The inspector noted that testing was proceeding in a controlled manner in accordance with the procedure and that (A was providing continuous test activity coverage. The inspector also noted that there were no required QA witness points identified in this particular part of the procedure yet QA was presen Findings i

No unacceptable conditions were note .2 Preoperational Test Result Evaluation

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The Test Results Reports (TRRs) for the test procedures listed in Attachment A were reviewed to verify that adequate testing was accomplished in order to satisfy regulatory guidance and licensee

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. 6 commitments and to ascertain wether uniform criteria were being applied for evaluating completed preoperational tests in order to assure their technical and administrative adequac Discussion

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The TRRs were reviewed for the attributes listed in Inspection Report 50-412/87-19. Each TRR was reviewed together with the file containing the completed original of the procedure and the correspondence associated with completed work and retesting for identified test deficiencie It was noted that many of the test deficiencies (TDs) had been processed satisfactorily prior to the completion of the test report. The work orders and retest information for these TDs were

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all included in the file for the procedure. As a result few TDs need to be tracked for adequate completion and retes The review generated some questions but all of these questions were answered satisfactorily. The inspector has no further questions on the TRRs as listed in Attachment A. It should be noted that some of the listed TRRs are reports for distinct sections of the procedure The inspector accepted these TRRs for review because each of these sections of procedures had been approved by the JT During the review of P0 2.01A.06 the inspector noted that Test Deficiency (TD) No. 3 discussed stray voltage, 41 to 52 volts alternating current, on terminals 5 and 1 of relay TD1. The test engineer had issued Request for Information No. 2343 on January 16, 1987. The vendors response (R1452) stated that, although not desirable, the stray voltage was acceptable and would not affect system operation. The TD was closed. The inspector discussed this iteth with the test engineer and reviewed Solid State Protection System (SSPS) schematic diagram 1083H85, Sheet 20. The points in

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question were observed to be across open contacts of the relay in series with a reset switch (normally open) and a 118 VAC Manual Safety Injection Reset relay coil. The inspector was satisfied that

! the stray voltage was not observed in the sensitive solid state l portion of the syste i r Finding l No noncompliances were identified by the inspector .3 Test Deficiencies j Scope

A number of test deficiencies (TDs) were identified in the TRRs discussed under paragraph 3.2 above. These TDs will be tracked by

the NRC to completion.

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• 7 Discussi_on The TDs, identified in the TRRs discussed under paragraph above, have been listed in Attachment B. It lists only the TDs requiring a retes The inspector will followup routinely on the listed TDs of Attachment B but will not assign an Unresolved Item Number to these TDs until the preoperational test phase nears completion (prior to Core Loading).

Findings No noncompliances were identified by the inspecto .0 Independent Inspection Effort 4.1 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

Scope '

The status and schedule for the replacement of the MSIVs (3) was determine Discussion Alternate plans to solve the experienced development problems with the Crosby ball valves had been formulated in late 198 These plans included the replacement of the ball valves by another type of valve proven to be adequate for the intended service. When the decision was made to replace the ball valves, the available plan was put into actio Replacement valves had been found. A replacement schedule was issued promptly. The impact of the replacement effort on the overall preoperational test (P0T) schedule also has been assessed. A revised POT schedule is planned for issue in late March. The replacement schedule was one week ahead of itself in the third week of Marc The replacement valves s.re Atwood and Morrill valve The inspector witnessed ongoing weld end preparations. All of the Crosby ball valves had been removed. Weld procedures are being prepare Spool pieces (32 inches) are being fabricate Electrical testing requirements are being determine Findings No noncompliances were identified by the inspector.

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4.2 IE Bulletins Scope The status of the following IE Bulletins was determined:

IEB 80-12: " Decay Heat Removal System Operability" IEB 84-03: " Reactor Cavity Seal Leakage"

Discussion It was determined that IEB 80-12 was sent to Beaver Valley-2, a PWR without an operating license, for information onl IEB 84-03 was closed out previousl Conclusion The inspector has no further questions on IEB 80-12 and 84-0 .0 QA/QC Interface Scope The participation of the Duquesne Light QA Surveillance Group in the preoperational test program was evaluated by the inspector. Response by startup management to Surveillance Deficiency Reports (SDRs) were reviewe Discussion A response by the startup management to the following SDR was reviewed:

SDR N Def. N Description 50V 36-86 1 6.25 inch test Aux. Switch Actuator (ASA) installed instead of a 3 inch AS No entry made in Jumper and Lifted Lead Lo The response produced by startup management was that it was "the opinion of the Startup Group that no deficiency existed" (internal memorandum BVPS:RJS:12241:3810, dated January 14,1987).

This response was rejected by QA because the deficiency in documentation existed for approximately 2 days and was included 2 days after the fac A response to this rejection by QA is being prepared.

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Findings No unacceptable conditions were identified. The inspector will followup 1 on this discovered DLC/QA deficiency in a future inspectio _ __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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. Exit Interview At the conclusion of the site inspection, on April 3, 1987, an exit interview was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives (denoted in Section 1). The findings were identified and previous inspection items were discusse At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector. Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during this inspection, it was determined that this report does not contain infor-mation subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.

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ATTACHMENT A Test Results Evaluation Approval Date Proc. N Title Rev. No. TRR by JTG P0 2.47.02 Containment Type B Leak Rate 0 03-09-87 Test for Electrical Penetrations PO 2.24B.02 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed- 0 03-04-87 (VII A-D) water Pump Test P0 2.13.04 Refueling Water Storage Tank 0 03-02-87 (VII E)

P0 2.06.10 Pressurizer Continuous Spray 0 01-30-87 (VII A) Flow P0 2.03.01 Incore T/C and RTD Cross Cali P0 2.36A.03 Emergency Bus Voltage Analysis 0 02-06-87 Test P0 2.07.02 Boric Acid Transfer System Test 0 02-13-87 (VII C) l P0 2.39.01 2-1 and 2-2 Battery Inverters and 0 08-26-86 (VII A,B,E,F) Chargers Test PO 2.39.01 2-1 and 2-2 Battery Inverters and 0 02-17-87 (VII C,0,G,H,I) Chargers Test P0 2.01A.01 Reactor Trip Switchgear and Control 0 03-04-87 Rod Drive Motor P0 2.11A.03 Safety Injection Flow Test 0 03-27-87 P0 2.01A.06 Solid State Protection System 0 03-17-87 Cabinet Test Panel Logic P0 2.11A.01 Low Head Safety injection Pumps 0 03-27-87 and Controls

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ATTACHMENT B Open Test Deficiencies (TD) Requiring Retest Proc. N TD N Remarks P0 2.248.02 1 Stroke time for Steam Supply valves to be taken (as part of Phase 1)

P0 2.39.01 6 Phase-1 tests + construction to be completed C,D,G,H,I Retest Log #388-001

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P0 2.03.01 4 - Need to formulate new acceptance criteri Will replace the 3 TEs of TD #4

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- Will redo the test during next heat up to ,

provide calibration coefficients for new RTDs and to verify remaining RTDs

- Retest Log #3-001 Y

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