IR 05000334/1990012

Insp Repts 50-334/90-12 & 50-412/90-12 on 900505-0622. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Protection,Surveillance & Maint,Emergency Preparedness,Security & Engineering & Technical Support

ML20056A354
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	07/24/1990
From:	Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20056A352	List: IR 05000334/1990012 ML20056A351 ML20056A353
References
50-334-90-12, 50-412-90-12, NUDOCS 9008070103
Download: ML20056A354 (16)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1

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' Report No /90-12 ' License Nos: DPR-66

, '50-412/90-12- NPF-73 Licensee: Duquesne-Light Company  ;

-One Oxford Center 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15279- ,

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Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 ,

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location:r 'Shippingport, Pennsylvania

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Dates: .May 5 - June 22, 1990 i Inspectors: J. E. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector P. R. Wilson, Resident Inspector A. A. Asars, Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck <

. P. Beaulieu, Reactor Engineer, Region I

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Approved by:

William Kuland, Chief 7f0 Date "

V Reactor, Projects Section No. 4B

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Inspection Summary This inspection report ' documents' routine and reactive inspections during day 1 and backshift hours of station activities _ including: plant operations; radiological protection; surveillance and maintenance; emergency preparedness; ,

security;_ engineering and technical support; and safety assessment / quality verificatio Results Overall, the facility was operated safely. One deviation was identified con- !

cerning the failure to meet a licensee commitment which resulted in the reactor:

cavity fuel-transfer canal drain line flange remaining installed during power !

operation (Detail 2.3.2). A non-cited violation was identified concerning failure to adequately measure certain containment isolation valve stroke times-in accordance with Technical Specifications (Detail 4.4). Minor deficiencies l were ' identified during a walkdown of the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators

_(Detail 2.2). The inspector found the Unit 1 Appearance Improvement Program to be a good' initiative; however, some minor concerns were identified in regard to

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this ef fort (Detail 4.2). Licensee actions concerning a Unit 1 overpower event-were-reviewe No deficiencies were identified (Detail 2.3.2). Weakness was identified in the completion of corrective actions-for a previously identified *

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violation (Detail 8.2). Six previous open NRC items were reviewed and four items were close PDR ADOCK 05000334 Q PDC

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page-

- Summary of Facility Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Plant Operations-(IP 71707,71710,93702) ......., 1 2.1 Operational Safety Verification . . . . . . .. . . . . 1 2.2 Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown ..... 2 2.3 Followup of' Events'0ccurring During the Inspection Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- 3 3, Radiological Controls:(71707) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Maintenance and Surveillance (61726, 62703, 71707) . . . . 5 4.1 Maintenance Observation . .........,.... 5 4.2 Unit 1 Appearance Improvement. ........... 6 4.3 -Surveillance Observation .............. 6 4.4 Chemical volume and Control System Slow Isolation . . 7 Emergency Preparedness (71707) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Security (71707) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Engineered and Technical Support (37700, 37828, 71707) . . 9 7.1 Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Improvements ... 9 7.2 Unit 1 Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Expansion Joints .................. 9 Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500, 71707, 90712, 92700) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.1 Onsite Review Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.2 Incomplete Corrective-Action. ............ 11- Followup of Previous Inspection Findings (IP 71707, 92702, 92701). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10. Meetings with Licensee Management (30703). . . . . . . . . 13 10.1 Management Meetings . ............... 13 10.2 Region Based Inspection Meetings .......... 14 l

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4 DETAILS

- l ', Summary of Facility Activities

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At the beginning of the period, Unit I was operating at full power and -l e Unit 2 was operating at approximately 87 percent power. During the month of May, Unit I reduced power to approximately 70 percent on weekends to-follow system load demand. For the remainder of the period, Unit 1 oper-ated at full powe On May 5, Unit 2 power was reduced to approximately 47 percent as part of core life extension schedule. On May 8, power was increased to approxi ~- ll mately 95 percent to allow for core physics testing and was then reduced :

to approximately 87 percent on May 9. For the remainder of the period, Unit 2 operated at 'approximately 87 percent power with the unit reducing -

power to approximately 47 percent on weekends as part of the core life

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extension schedule. The only exception to the above schedule occurred on June 14 and 15 when power was increased to approximately 100 percent due-to high system deman * Plant Operations -

2.1 Operational Safety Verification

The inspectors observed plant operation and verified that the plant '

was operated safely and'in accordence with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. Regular tours were conducted in the fol-lowing plant areas: l

-- Control Room -- Safeguard Areas j

-- Auxiliary Buildings -- Service Buildings  !

-- Switchgear Areas -- Diesel Generator Buildings ;

-- Access Control Points -- Intake Structure 1

-- Protected Area Fence Line -- Yard Areas  :

---Spent Fuel Building -- Containment Penetration l

-- Turbine Building Areas i

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During the inspection, discussions were conducted with operators concerning knowledge-of recent changes to procedures, facility con- ,

figuration and plant conditions. The inspector verified adherence to !

approved procedures for ongoing activities observed. Shift turnovers i were witnessed and staffing requirements confirmed. The inspectors found that control room access was properly controlled and a profes- -l sional atmosphere was maintained. Inspector comments or questions resulting from these reviews were resolved by licensee personne Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification (TS) requirements. Operability of engineered safety j features, other safety related systems and onsite and offsite power sources were verified. The inspectors observed various alarm a

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conditions and confirmed that operator response was in accordance with plant operating procedures. Compliance with TS and implementa-

, tion of' appropriate action statements for equipment out of service was inspected. Logs and records were reviewed to determine if entries-were accurate and identifi_ed equipment status or deficiencies. Thes records included operating logs, turnover sheets, system safety tags, and the jumper and lifted lead book. :The inspector also examined the

condition of various fire protection, meteorological, and seismic monitoring system !

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Plant housekeeping controls were monitored, including control ~and storage of flammable material and other potential safety hazard The inspector conducted detailed walkdowns of accessible areas, in-cluding normally locked of both Unit I and Unit Housekeeping at both units was goo .2 Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown The operability of selected engineered safety feature systems was !

verified by performing detailed walkdowns of the accessible portions l

'of the systems. The inspectors confirmed:that system components were -'

in the required alignments, instrumentation was valved-in with appro ' j lpriate calibration dates, as-built prints reflected the as-installed i systems and the overall conditions observed were satisfactory. The systems inspected during this period include the Emergency Diesel 3 Generator, Auxiliary Feed and Emergency Core Cooling system The inspectors conducted a detailed independent valve and breaker' :

alignment check of the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Genero rs (EDGs).

The inspectors found the Unit 1 EDGs and their e % ed support systems.to be properly aligned. Several minor deficiencies were j identified during the walkdown and discussed belo '

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Two clearance tags.on a No. 2 EDG air start system dryer were

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j not reflected on the Unit 1 control room status board prints as .[

required by Site Administrative Procedure (SAP) 41, " Clearance Procedure." Deficiencies with status board prints had been

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previously identified by the NRC in. Inspection Report 50-334/ ;

89-22; 50-412/89-21. The deficiency was immediately corrected by the license For additional discussion of this item, see :

Detail )

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The licensee's valve line up check list required that cooling }

water 3-way thermostatic valves for both EDGs be checked ope ;

The valves did not have any position indicator and therefore the i position of the valves could not be ascertained unless the asso- !

ciated EDG was operatin This discrepancy had been previously identified by the licensee during a valve lineup performed in November 1989; however, the current valve lineup check list had not been revise D

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.There were several valve.and breaker labeling . problems where.the description in the valve and breaker check lists did not match the labels on the components. The majority of these deficien-cies had been previously identified by the licensee. The li-censee prepared procedure ch'inge requests for the other defi-ciencie .3 Followup of Events Occurring During the Inspection Period i

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During the inspection period, the inspectors provided onsite coverage E and. followup of unplanned events. Plant parameters, performance of safety systems, and licensee actions were reviewed. The inspectors confirmed that the required notifications were made to NRC. The following events were-reviewed:

2. Unit 1 Overpower Event

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On May 31, 1990, while operating at 100 percent power, the No. 4 gov,ernor valve of the Unit I turbine generator (TG)

failed open from its normal full. shut positio This.re-suited in a reactor power increase above 100 percent that-was terminated approximately 25 seconds later by an over- .i power differential temperature TG runback. The runback lowered power to approximately 95 percent. . Control room 3 operators subsequently took manual control and reduced '

power to approximately 90 parcen Licensee calculations indicated that reactor power reached 105.6 percent power before the runback terminated the transient. Analysis of a reactor coolant sample taken f after the event indicated no increase in activity.

L The operators made several unsuccessful attempts to shut the failed governor valve. However, approximately thre hours af ter the initial event, the governor. valve failed closed. This resulted in a 170 MWE (20 percent reactor power) drop in power. The main condenser steam dumps miti-gated the load reduction and drop in power. The governor -

valve was defeated in the shut position and puwer was returned to 90 percen The licensee determined that the transient was due to the failure of a capacitor on a No. 4 governor valve servo control circuit card (Electronic Technologies Partial Arc Board). The capacitor had been installed backwards. The licensee inspected the same circuit boards for the other governor valves and found all the capacitors to be properly installed. Capacitors on spare circuit boards were also found to be properly installed. As a result of the failed l

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capacitor,'a signal lead was damaged which could not be repaired with the TG operating. The licensee intended to continue to_ operate the TG with the:No. 4 governor. valve-shut and isolated until an outage' occurred of sufficient length to repair the damaged lead. The inspectors had no-

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further questions concerning this even j

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2. Unit 2 Transfer Canal Drain' Isolation R On' June 22, 1990, while operating;at'85 percent power, the-licensee found the Unit 2 reactor cavity fuel transfer -

canal drain line isolated with a flange. _This drain line 1s-provided to drain the water (in the transfer canal)

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during operation of the Quench Spray and Recirculation

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Spray systems to the containment sump for use by the Re-circulation Spray (RS)' pumps, The licensee performed the inspection of the drain line in response to NRC Information

• Notice 90-19. lThe flange was subsequently remove The reactor cavity fuel transfer canal holds'approximately (

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25,003 gallons (approximately 3. percent of water projected to be at the bottom of the containment floor following a DBA). The' licensee's= preliminary analysis indicated that ,!

the above condition would have.-resulted in'a small, non- t safetyL significant reduction in the net positive suction head margin for the RS pump Unit l'is of similar design but was analyzed and licensed to operate with the transfer canal drain line isolate The licensee had procedural requirements in place to in-- 1

' stall the drain line flange prior to flooding the reacto '

cavity,for refueling operations, however_ there were no procedural requirements to remove the flange after the reactor cavity had been draine The licensee has sub-sequently. revised station procedures to require removal. of the flang ;

In 1984, the licensee made a commitment to the NRC in Amendment 5 of the Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report-

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(Question 480.13) stating that procedures would address controls that.would ensure that the flange would be removed

, during all operations other than refuelin The failure to i

meet this commitment is a Deviation (50-412/90-12-01).

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Radiological Controls-

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Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas were inspecte Radiation Work Permit compliance and use of personnel monitoring devices-

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were checke Conditions of step-off pads,- disposal of protective cloth-

ing, radiation control job coverage, area monitor operability and cali-bration (portable and permanent) and personnel -frisking were observed on a F sampling basis, i There were no noteable observation . Maintenance and Surveillance

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4,1, Maintenance Observation The. inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities to assure that:

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the activity did not violate Technical Specification Limiting h({

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.y Conditions for,0peration and that redundant' components were operable;

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required approvals and releases had been obtained prior to commencing work;

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procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the. skills of the trade;

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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; 4

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where necessary, radiological and fire preventive controls were-

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.-- QC hold points were established whers required and observed; I --

equipment was properly tested and returned to servic Maintenance activities reviewed included: ,

MWR 900890 -

Repair Individual Rod Position Indication i Rod M-4 MSP 1.2 Rod Position Indicator Calibration RMP 2-75-Motor-1E 480 V Pump Motor Inspection Test and Lubrication for 2QSS-P24B There were no noteable observation ,

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J- 4.2 Unit 1 Appearance Improvement Program j The licensee has initiated an extensive Unit 1 appearance improvement effort involving the cleaning and repainting of >

the plant components and structures. -During plant tours, the inspectors identified some concerns with' regard to this -j initiativ The inspectors found that paint had inadvertently been brushed on some valve stems, including the turbine driven a auxiliary feed pump trip . throttle valve. The licensee '

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promptly removed the paint from the valve stems. The trip

, throttle valve was successfully stroked several times to prove operability. Additional guidance was given to the i painters as to the importance of not allowing paint on valve '

stem On another occasion, the inspectors observed personnel climbing on safety related equipment to erect scaffolding in the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EpG) room. In the process of erecting the scaf-folding, an EDG air start receiver relief valve was inadvertently lifted resulting in a trouble alarm in the control roo The li-censee subsequently provided additional guidance to the personnel involved of the potential hazards in the EDG roo !

After-the scaffolding was erected in the No. 2 EDG room, the inspectors observed that there was little clearance between the scaffolding and the EDG fuel oil day tan The licensee subsequently rearranged the scaffoldin .

The ongoing. appearance improvement effort is considered by the in- l spector to be a good initiativ The inspector will continue to ,

follow the licensee's : activities during this projec .3 Surveillance Observation The inspector witnessed / reviewed selected surveillance tests to determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, details i were adequate, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, Technical Specifications were satisfied, testing was performed by -3 qualified personnel and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were. properly dispositioned. The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:

OST 1.2 Steam Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test OST 1.43.7A Alternate Noble Gas Monitors Functional Test

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OST 2,13.10B Chemical Injection = System Valve Position and Pump Operability Check

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OST 2.24.02- Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test (2FWE-P23A)

OST 2.30.17A Service Water Pump Seal Water Operability OST:2.36.01- Emergency Diesel Generator. Monthly Test (2EGS-FG2-1)

OST 2.36.02 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Test (2EGS-EG2-2)

OST 2.48.3A Control-Board Check List There were no noteable observation .4 Chemical Volume and Control System Slow Isolation

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The licensee, on June 4, 1990, determined that the three Unit 2 Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) valves would not stroke closed within ten seconds as required by the Technical Specifications (TS), The affected valves were the inboard letdown line orifice

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isolation valves which provide an isolation function for the letdown line inside containment. The licensee declared the valves inoperable the same day and isolated the normal letdown line in accordance with the T The licensee found that, for a containment isolation phase A (CIA)

signal, the valves stroked closed in approximately 35 seconds and,

when closed using control board switches, in approximately two sec-onds. The licensee had been demonstrating TS operability for the valves using the control board switches and therefore concluded that the valves had never met the ten'second stroke

time limit of TS. The single letdown line isolation valve outside containment was found to acceptably close in approximately four second The letdown line orifice isolation valves are fail shut, air operated valves (A0V) with each valve controlled by two solenoid operated valves (SOV). The electrical design has one SOV actuate on a CIA signal, while both actuate on a manual close signal. The licensee investigated the cause of the different stroke time The design basis for the isolation feature was 60 seconds. The faster closure time (10 seconds) for the inner valve was intended to sequence the valves' closure, rather than be a design requirement. On that basis, the NRC verbally granted the the licensee a Temporary Waiver of Compliance (TWC) to allow continued operation on June 6,199 The written TWC was issued June 8, 199 ....._... _ ._ _ ,3-n

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Because the valves closed within the design basis-interval, thei

% inspector concluded that the failure to adequately test the CVCS

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isolation function was, by itself, of minor safety significanc However, the licensees failure to properly insure compliance with a TS requirement revealed a weakness in their administrative control system. The-licensee reported the item to the NRC via telecon under-

' the provisions of 10 CFR 50.72. The licensee's' investigation'and corrective actions were thorough and timely. In addition, there were-no past similar occurrences identified where a TS requirement was not verified as met in. surveillance tests. Therefore, the failure to test the CVCS CIA isolation time is not being cited because the

> criteria specified in Section V.G. of the_ Enforcement Policy were met (Non-cited Violation NON 50-412/90-12-02). Emergency Preparedness The resident inspectors had no noteworthy findings during this inspection in this-are . Security .

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Implementation of the Physical Security Plan was observed in various plant areas _with regard to the following:

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Protected Area and Vital Area barriers were well maintained and not compromised;

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Isolation zones were clear;

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Personnel and vehicles entering and packages being delivered to the Protected Area were properly searched and access control was in accordance with approved licensee procedures;

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Persons granted access to'the site were badged to indicate whether they have unescorted access or escorted authorization;

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Security access controls to Vital Areas were being maintained and that persons in. Vital Areas were properly authorized;

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Security posts were adequately staffed and equipped, security personnel were alert and knowledgeable regarding position requirements, and that written procedures _were available; and

-. Adequate illumination was maintaine There were no noteworthy observation ;

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E Engineering and Technical' Support

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7.1 Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Improvements On two occasions in 1988, the No.1 EDG air start motors (ASMs)

failed to disengage, damaging the ASMs pinion gears. The licensee determined that the failures were due to residual rust in the air- ,

start system before_ the air dryers had been installed. The rust flaked off-and damaged the. air start solenoid valves or the ASM ,

Rust was found downstream of the air dryers from the air start banks i to the. engine skids of both EDGs. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee had replaced all the ASMs and cleaned the air start system piping. The inspector reviewed the licensee's long-term cor-

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rective actions. During the recent Unit 1 7R refueling outage, the

,' air banks were cleaned'and coated with oil to inhibit rust formatio *

The piping downstream of the air banks was replaced and also coated with oi In addition, the air start solenoid valves for both units were re-place The licensee intends to replace the above valves every 36 Tnon ths . The inspector verified that this requirement was included in-the licensee's preventive maintenance prograr As a'further enhancement, the licensee installed filters upstream of

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each air start solenoid valve to prevent any rust particles from damaging the valves. The routine cleaning of the filters and inspec-tion of the air start piping had also been added to the licensee's preventive maintenance program. There has not been any further fail-ures of the Unit 1 EDG: air start systems, The inspectors found that the licensee's long-term corrective actions appeared to be adequate and had no further questions regarding this concer .2 Unit 1 Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger (RSHX) Expansion Joints On August 24, 1988, the licensee had discovered that the documented design pressure for the four river water system metal expansion

, joints (MEJs) en the outlet of the Unit 1 RSHXs was lower than ex-

'pected. The design pressure specification for the four MEJs was 85

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psig; however, the installed MEJs were all rated for 50 psig. .Subse-quent correspondence and review with the manufacturer resulted in rerating three of the four MEJs to 85 psig. The remaining MEJ (for the "C" RSHX) could only be upgraded to 61 psi The inspectors reviewed the justification for continued operation (JCO), root cause determinations, and corrective action The licensee justified continued operation based on previous pressure I tests of the MEJs where the MEJ had been pressurized to approximately 95 psig without any distortion or leakage. The tests indicated ade-quate margin existed to prevent rupture. Therefore, the licensee concluded that continued operation was acceptable, provided that if the "C" RSHX had to be isolated, then the associated relief valve

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f r H 10 setpoint would be lowered to-69.psig. The inspector reviewed the licensee's basis for the JC0 and found it -to be adequat '

The inspector reviewed the licensee's root cause determinations for the above event. Apparent causes were that the manufacturer of the expansion joints was not provided with the correct revision of the design drawing and that the Quality Control receipt inspection failed to compare the correct drawing revision to the_ receiving documented packag As a final corrective action, during the recent 7R refueling outage, ,

the "C" RSHX river water MEJ was replaced with a joint rated to 85 psig. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item'.

I Safety Assessment and Quality Verification 8.1 Review of Written Reports q l

The inspector reviewed LERs and other written reports submitted t the NRC to verify t, hat the details of the events were clearly and accurately reported, including the cause description and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether-further infor- ,'

mation was required from the licensee, whether generic implications l l

were indicated and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed:

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l- LER 89-017-01 Feedwater Isolation - Engineered Safety Features (ESP) Actuation

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LER 89-017-02 Feedwater Isolation - Engineered Safety '

Feature (SEF) Actuation Unit 2:

LER 88-005-01 Overcurrent Relay Trip Leads to ESF Actuation LER 90-004-00' Inadvertent ESF Actuation During Safeguards 1 Protection Testing LER 90-005-00 - Inadvertent ESF Actuation During Quench Spray Flow Switch Testing

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The above LERs were reviewed with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and the guidance provided in NUREG 1022. Generally, the LERs were found to be of high quality with good documentation of event analyses, root cause determinations, and corrective action l l

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8.2 Incomplete Corrective Action The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and corrective-actions concerning a Unit 2 reactor trip for which the licensee received a Notice of Violation (50-412/89-13-02) due to the failure to follow a surveillance procedur ,

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On May 27, 1989, while performing monthly Maintenance Surveillance Procedure (MSP) 26.01-I, "2 MSS-P446 First Stage Pressure Channel-III'

Test," revision 4, in Hot Standby (Mode 3), an inadvertent low pres-sure reactor trip occurred resulting in inward movement of all con-

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trol rod Subsequent inspector review of the MSP revealed that the procedure should net have been performed for the given plant condi - .

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tion. 'The initial conditions given in the MSP were not met. A notice ,

of violation was issued due to the failure to follow the MSP as writ-te A Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES) review of the event was 4 conducted by the licensee as well as a separate evaluation conducted by the licensee's Independent Safety Evaluation Group. The inspector reviewed both evaluations and found the reports to be of high qualit Both evaluations were thorough and comprehensive. Several root causes were identified, including weaknesses in system design know-ledge by Instrument and Control (I & C) department personnel, proce- i dure weaknesses, excessive work hours of the I & C foreman, and in-adequate supervision of the test activities. Both reviews recom-mended corrective actions to remedy the identified deficiencie The two evaluations also provided the basis of the licensee's written reply to the Notice of Violation.(N0V). In the response, the li-censee committed to several actions to prevent recurrence. All a Unit I corrective actions were to have been completed by December 29, 198 In-the response,' the 'icensee stated that "all I & C surveil-lance procedures affecting tne Reactor Protection System (RPS) will be revised prior to use to require joint review by the I & C and Operations prior to performance for specific status light deviations."

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In Licensee Event Report (LER) 89-18-00, submitted in response to the event, the licensee stated that "the Turbine Impulse Pressure Test procedures are being revised to clarify their effects upon the sta-tion's protection system. Additional human factors information will be added concerning the consequences of actions not taken during unexpected plant conditions." The inspector found that all correc-tive actions to prevent recurrence had been fully implemented with one exception. No revisions to MSP 26.01-1 (or other Unit 2 RPS MSPs) had yet been made implementing the corrective actions. The MSP revisions were committed to in the LER and the NOV response, and also were the recommended corrective actions of the licensee's own inde-F pendent review . - - _ - _ _ - _

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1-In summary, the inspector found the licensee's evaluation.of the event to be of high quality and that most of the corrective actions had been fully implemented. The inspector found that the licensee had not yet revised the MSP as recommended by the licensee's evalu-ations and as committed to in the licensee's response to the NOV and i LE This item will remain open pending the implementation of the t remaining corrective action [ . Status of , Previous Inspection' Findings The NRC Outstanding Items List was reviewed with cognizant licensee per- -!

sonnel. Items selected by the inspector were subsequently reviewed through discussions with licensee personnel, documentation reviews and field inspection to determine whether licensee actions specified in the

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Ols had been satisfactorily completed. The overall status of previously identified inspection findings was reviewed, and planned / completed li-censee actions were discussed for-the items reported belo .1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-334/87-15-02): . Licensee review and  !

clarification of the containment isolation valve technical speci-fications (TS) for both units. The item resulted from the'identi-fication that the Unit'l TS for containment isolation valves in the Hydrogen Analyzer System-did not contain the provision for periodic opening of the valves for required surveillance testing. The li-censee has completed an extensive review of the containment isolation valves TS for both units. The resulting corrections cnd clarifica-tions to both operating licenses were forwarded to NRC on April 23, 1990. Additionally, a corresponding revision to the Unit 1 UFSAR was *

concluded. Completion of the TS review resolves this ite .2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-334/88-22-02): Develop long term cor-rective actions regarding degraded Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)

air start syste The inspector reviewed licensee activities associ-ated with improving the reliability of the Unit'EDG' air start sys-tems. 'The review is documented in Detail 7.1.

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9.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-334/88-23-02): Lower than expected design pressure for the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger (RSHX)

river water expansion joint The inspector reviewed the licensee's justification for continued operation root cause determinations and corrective action. This review is documented in Detail t I

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9.4 .(Open)' Violation (50-412/89-13-01): : Unit 2 reactor trip due to \

failure to follow Maintenance Surveillance Procedure (MSP) 26.01-I.as- ~!

. written. The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the i event and corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The review is-documented in section . (Closed) Violation (50-412/89-04-02): Personnel errors resulting in safety injectio The licensee conducted an evaluation via the Human Performance Evaluation System and.a rootca'use analysis by the Inde-pendent Safety Evaluation Group. From-these studies, the licensee identified several contributory factors, . including the procedure j deficiencies noted in the. Violation. Change's in work schedules, j revisions to certain surveillance procedures, and improvements in  ;

-pre-reviewing proposed tests were among the corrective actions im- *

.plemented by the. licensee. The inspector reviewed the licensee's r.tudies, procedure revisions, and other corrective actions and had no further questions on this even !

9.6 (0 pen) Violation (50-334/89-22-01): Failure to update control room k status boards as repuired by Site Administrative Procedure (SAP) 41, --

" Clearance Procedure." In November 1989, the. failure to' update the -

' control room status boards to reflect a clearance on the Reactor '

Coolant System (RCS) resulted in control room operators failing to recognize that a required channel of overpressure protection was .

p inoperable during a subsequent RCS pressurizatio f During a walkdown of the Unit 1 No. 2 Energency Diesel Generator Air Start System (see Detail 2.2), the inspector identified two clearance - 1 i

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tags associated'with the clearance of an air dryer that were not re-  !

flected on the control room status. board prints. The licensee im- -l mediately verified all'other active clearances were properly re '  !

flected on the status board prints. The' licensee investigated the {

cause of the deficiency and found that the clearance boundary on the -l associated -status board print had been mistakenly-erased eight hours prior to the identification of the deficiency. Two different work .l w activities had been using the same clearance and at the completion  !

of one work activity, an operator erased the status board anticipa- j ting the removal of the clearanc g a

The cause of the problem was personnel error as in the November 1989 incident. It appears that the licensee needs to continue to stress j

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the requirements of sap 41. This item remains ope [

t 10. Meetings with Licensee-Management ,

10.1 Management Meetings (

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Periodic meetings were held with senior facility management during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A, summary of inspection findings was further discussed

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1 with the licensee at the conclusion of the report-period on June 29,.

1990 'Also during this period were meetings with licensee senior management as part of site visits by NR_C Commissioner Remick and by Mr. Laverie, the Director of the French Central Service for the Safety of Nuclear Installation .2 Region Based Inspection Meetings Inspection Reporting Dates Subject Report N Inspector 5/29.- 6/7/90 Unit 2 Requal Exams 50-412/90-11 Silk 6/4 - 6/8/90 Occupational Exposure 50-334/90-16 ' O'Connell 50-412/90-16 6/11 - 6/15/90 Annual Quality 50-334/90-15 Finkel Assurance Review 50-412/90-15

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