ML20247K950
| ML20247K950 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1989 |
| From: | Anderson C, Paolino R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247K945 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-89-07, 50-334-89-7, 50-412-89-07, 50-412-89-7, IEIN-86-053, IEIN-86-53, NUDOCS 8906020056 | |
| Download: ML20247K950 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000334/1989007
Text
__
. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
.
..
'
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
'
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-334/89-07
50-412/89-07
Docket Nos.
50-334
50-412
License Nos. DPR-66
NPF-73
Licensee:
Duquesne Light Power Company
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
Facility Name:
Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 & 2
Inspection At:
Shippingport, Penrisylvania
Inspection Conducted: April 17-21, 1989
Inspectors:
zu> b f
5// 6 !E ')
R.J./faolino,SeniorReactorEngineer,
Idatd
l
PSS7EE/DRS
Approved by:
/
4~
I"
7
,
C. JVAnderson, Chief, Plant Systems
date
Section, EB/DRS
' Inspection Summary:
Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-334/89-07 and
50-412/89-07
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by regional personnel of
licensee activities in response to Information Notice 86-53 regarding Heat
'
Shrink Tubing.
Review and closecut of previously identified open issues that
have been determined to be in conformance with NRC requirements.
Results:
No deficiencies were identified,
Four previously identified open
'
items were closed.
r
0
t-
-
,
_
_
_
_
. - - - _ - - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ij ;
s
1
,
.
,
t
.
V
i
Details
4:
?1.0 Persons' Contacted
' 1.1 Duquesne Light Power Company
k
JG. Caccianni' Electrical Engineer
,
L
- J. Carretta, EQ Engineer
- J.'Crockett, General Manager-Corp.
<
,
C. Haney, Director, Technical & Crafts Training
M.-Johns, I & C Engineer-
.
,
G.;Kammerdeiner, Director, Materials Engineering
L
- C. Kirschner, QA- Supervisor
'
W. Lolcher, Operations & Maintenance Instructor
- F. Lipchick, Senior Licensing Supervisor
- K. Lynch, Engineer
- T. Noonan, General Manager, Nuclear Operations
- F. Oberlitner, EQ Engineering Supervisor
- M. Pergav',.QC Suoervisor
B. Sepelak, Licensing Engineer
- D. Szucs~,. Senior: Engineer
- N. Tonet, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
.
1.2 Consultants
E. Chapman, Schneider Engineering
R. Rutherford, EQ Engineer
D. Suhan,.Schneider Engineering
1.3
U.S. Nuclear Regu' story Commission
- J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Pindale, Resident Inspector
- Denotes personnel present at the on-site exit meeting on April 21, 1989.
2.0. Purpose
The purpose of this inspection was to: 1) review and evaluate licensee
activities in addressing NRC Information Notice 86-53 regarding " Improper-
Installation of Heat Shrinkable Tubing" and 2) review the status of pre-
viously identified open items and close out those items which have been
corrected in accordance with NRC requirements.
3.0 Background
Several licensees discovered in 1986 that a substantial amount of Raychem
cable splices installed previously at their facilities did not conform to
the vendor's installation requirements in one or more of the following
ways:
_i_ L _- _ ___
- - _ - _ _ .
.
l.
.
-
.
3
.
Improper sizing of splice diameters
Improper overlap seal length on wire insulation
,
Use of Heat Shrink Tubing directly over fabric braiding or wire
'
Improper bending of Heat Shrink Tubing placed in junction
i
boxes and motor lead enclosures
On June 26, 1986 Information Notice 86-53 was issued to alert licensees
to this potential generic safety problem and to inform them to consider
<
appropriate actions, if applicable, to prevent similar problems at their
facilities.
4.0 Licensee Action
In response to the NRC Information Notice (IN) 86-53, the' licensee
reviewed the applicability of the notice to Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2
(BVPS 1 and 2).
Engineering Memos EM-30537 and EM-74081, for BVPS-1 and
BVPS-2, respectively, were issued with instructions to review and evaluate
the applicability of IN-86-53.
To ensure that these problems did not exist at BVPS-1, the Nuclear
Engineering and Records Unit (NERU) reviewed in-house documents and
maintenance training programs.
Upon completion of the review, the
licensee concluded that the correct installation instructions had been
issued to maintenance personnel and that proper training in maintenance
and construction was provided.
For BVPS-2, adequate instructions and inspection of heat shrink tubing
installations were provided by maintenance procedures, detailed drawings
and special instructions. The NRC inspector reviewed installation pro-
cedures and instructions for installing heat shrink tubing and performed a
visual inspection of safety related heat shrink tubing installations
verifying conformance to established work procedures and instructions.
Documents examined by the NRC ir.3pector include:
Special Instructions 2BVM-931
Internal memos 2NCD-07883, EM-74081 and EM-30537
Raychem Test Report EDR-5037
Site Administrative Procedures - Chapter 24 (SAP-24)
Maintenance Assessment Procedure Nos. 30, 2025 and 2403
Environmental Qualification Files 2011, 2045 and 2047
Raychem Installation Procedure CMP-1-75-189 and CMP-2-75-HS-15E
Visual inspection of heat shrink tubing in select equipment included:
Electrical Penetration Nos. ZRCP*05A/C, ZRCP*05B/C and ZRCP*038/C
Pressure Transmitter Nos. 2CCP*PT-107A and 2CCP*PT-107C
Flow Transmitters No. 2CCP*FT-107A
Motor Operated Valve Nos. 2CCP*MOV-151-2, 2CCP*MOV-156-2,
2SWS*MOV-15-2 and 2CCP*MOV-157-2
Solenoid Operated Valve Nos. 2SSR*SOV-100A-1, 2SSR*S0V-109A-1 and
2SSR*S0V-112A-1
No deficiencies were identified.
____ _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
- _ _ - _ _
_
-
.
4
5.0 Status of Previously Identified Items
(Closed) Unresolved Item 412/87-50-05 pertaining to the PASS
in-containment valves, currently considered by the licensee as not
requiring environmental qualification.
The subject valves, Primary
Coolant Hot leg Sampling Valve Nos. 2SSR*S0V-121A, B, C & D and RHR Heat
Exchanger Sampling Valve Nos. 2SSR*SOV-123A & B were purchased as QA
Category 1 valves per specification 2BVS-719 for use in containment
accident conditions. The valves do not perform any safety related
fur.ction as defined under the Equipment Qualification rule 10 CFR 50.49
criteria.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 334/88-21-02 pertaining to unidentified, unqualified
wire jumpers in MOV-RW-1050.
In later inspections of MOV's, in response
to Information Notice 86-03, similar deficiencies were identified by the
licensee in 20 MOV's added to the EQ Master List to satisfy Regulatory
Guide 1.97.
The deficient MOV's were reworked.
The Corrective Mainte-
nance Procedure for Limitorque MOV's was revised to include a matrix with
EQ approved conponent parts and a requirement for engineering approval
for deviations from the instructions. A checklist, data sheet was added
to the Preventive Maintenance Procedure (FMP) to be completed when PMP is
performed.
Training was provided to the electrical maintenance personnel regarding
environmental qualification and requirements for placing and maintaining
equipment on the EQ Master List.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 334/88-21-01 pertaining to an unqualified wire nut in
Motor Operated Valve No. MOV-SI-8858.
The wire nut was replaced with a qualified compression type crimp
connector on May 12, 1988.
To determine the extent of wire nut usage, the
licensee reviewed maintenance work requests and inspected an additional
43 operators for the presence of unqualified splice connectors. As a
result of these efforts one other installation was found with an
unqualified wire nut (MOV-SI-864A).
This was replaced with a qualified
crimp connector on May 13, 1988.
To preclude future misapplication, wire nuts were removed from stock for
applications in safety related systems.
Training was provided for electrical maintenance personnel on August 16
and September 1, 1988 emphasizing environmental qualification and the
importance of maintaining qualified equipment. An 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> EQ seminar for
quality control inspectors and supervisors was given on August 17
i
and 18, 1988.
,
This item is closed.
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
_ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
r; -~~;
j
l
!
.
.
l
5
.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 412/88-03-01 pertaining to the annunicator cabinet
fire of January 28, 1988. A complete system check was performed by the
licensee and no abnormalities were observed.
The system was checked for
grounds and input voltages. The input and output voltages of the invertor
and power supplies were tested and found to be within limits.
Fuse
ratings were examined.
It was noted that the breakers have a higher
continuous rating (30 amps) than the fuses (10 amps).
However, the
breakers are magnetic, while the fuses are dual-element time-delay
devices.
This explains why the fuses did not fail following the incident.
The licensee did a comparison of other fuses in similar type equipment.
.
No deficiencies were identified.
The licensee concluded that this fire
at BVPS was an isolated incident caused by random equipment failure. Cor-
rective actions by the licensee included the addition of fault protection
through supervised fusing at the card group level to limit the maximum
fault current on a card, and providing ionizing-type smoke detectors
inside the cabinet bays which will be interlocked with fans and provide
remote indication in the control room.
This item is closed.
6.0 Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or a violation.
Unresolved items are
discussed in details, Paragraph 5.0.
7.0 Exit Meeting
The inspector met with licensee representatives at the site on
April 21, 1988. The scope of the inspection and the inspection findings
were discussed at this meeting.
The licensee did not identify as pro-
prietary any of the material provided to or for review by the inspector
I
during the inspection. At no time during this inspection was written
material given to the licensee or his representative.
(
_ _ _ _-- - _ -