IR 05000412/1987021

Insp Rept 50-412/87-21 on 870309-13 & 0323-27.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Findings,Nrc Bulletins & Info Notices & Corrective Action on Limitorque Valve Operator Jumper Wires

ML20214V115
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/26/1987
From:	Shaun Anderson, Chaudhary S, Cheung L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214V110	List: IR 05000412/1987021 ML20214V109
References
50-412-87-21, IEB-77-05, IEB-77-5, IEB-86-016, IEB-86-16, IEIN-83-63, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-3, NUDOCS 8706110455
Download: ML20214V115 (11)

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U.S. NUCLE!,R REGULATORY COMMISSIGN

,a REGION I Report N /87-21 Docket N License No. CPPR-105 Category B Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4

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Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 _

Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: March 9-24, 1987 Inspectors:

. Cheung, Reactor Ter date A L Ru

.'Chaudh ry Lead Re g Efgineer r/xdv datt I Approved by: C /)

C. Knderson, Plant System Section, f (/W

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Engineering Branch, DRS

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Inspection Summary: Inspecticn on March 9-13, and March 23-27, 1987

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Area's ' Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of licensee's action on

, previous findings, and NRC Bulletins and Information Notices, and their e . corrective action on Limitorque Valve Operator jumper wire Results: No violations were identifie '

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Details 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Duquesne Light Company (DLC0)

D. Carey, SQC Inspector D. Covington, Supervisor, Electrical QC

1. D. Claridge, Compliance Engineer E. Eilmann, Lead Environmental Qualification Engineer

• J. Godleski, Sr. Test Engineer C. Majumdar, Assistant Director, Q #*T. Noonan, Superintendant, Operation and Maintenance

• L. Rabenan, Lead Compliance Engineer

1. • G. Wargo, Assistant Director, QC 1.2 DLCO Contractors

• G. Byrnes, Assistant Project Manager, Stone & Webster Engineering Cor L. Dubois, Sr. QC Inspector, Sargent Electric

1. J. Wolf, Coordinator, QC, EC In .3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• A. Asars, Resident Inspector

• J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector

• denotes those personnel present at the March 13 exit meetin # denotes those personnel present at the March 27 exit meetin .0 Follow-up of Previous Inspection Findings 2.1 (Closed) SDR-85-03: significant deficiency pertaining to the West-inghouse supplied Core Exit Thermocouple System (CETS). On May 9, 1985, Westinghouse reported to NRC under 10 CFR Part 21, that excess-ive instrument errors were detected on their thermocouples during environmental qualification testing. These excessive errors could lead to unacceptable system performance following a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) accident. The CETS provides inputs to the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) for temperature compen-sation, and the Reactor Coolant System for Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) information. On January 27, 1987 the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC outlining their corrective actions to resolve the defi-ciency as follows:

a) The RVLIS temperature input has been changed from the CETS to the loop RTDS (the loop RTOS is not affected by this deficiency).

b) The ICC'setpoint of 700 F has been increased to 729 F to incor-porate the actual worst case post-accident errors of the CETS (for temperature reading only).

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c) The CETS revised system accuracy has been incorporated into the Emergency Operation Procedure The inspector reviewed the licensee's correspondence and records, and Westinghouse documentation (We!,tinghouse file No. FCN-DMWM-10649) for implementing these corrective actions, and has no further concern This item is close .2 (Closed) SDR 87-01: significant deficiency pertaining to the poten- ,

tial premature failure of cables installed in proximity to hot piping due to accelerated thermal aging of the cables. On January 12, 1987, the licensee reported to the NRC that this potential problem could occur if corrective action was not taken. The hot pipe issue had been identified in NRC inspection report 85-16, dated September 10, 1985. To deal with this problem, the licensee performed calculations of the cables and developed a field procedure entitled " Hot Pipe Criteria, 28VM-237."- The licensee conducted a field walkdown and identified 270 pipe / cable clearance deficiencies based on these criteria. Resolution of these deficiencies included the following:

a) Installation of localized thermal pipe insulation (39 pipes required this modification);

b) Physical relocation of conduit (6 conduit.were relocated);

c) Installation of heat shielding curtains (one pipe required this installation).

The inspector reviewed Procedure 2BVM-237 dated November 27, 1985 and a random sample of 4 inspection reports (Nos. 2149, 2150, 2CC004PA, 2CL004PA).

The inspector also physically observed the reworked condition of two affected pipes and 2 affected conduit and'has no more concern This item is closed 2.3 (Closed) Violation 86-46-01: pertaining to damaged cable splices. The Raychem splices of cable 2 SIS-A0H301 were found to be damaged by the sharp edge of housing backplate. The licensee issued Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&DR 38725), dated December 12, 1986 to re-solve this problem. The resolution included:

a) Retraining the cables to increase the bending radius to greater than 4 inche b) Replacing the damaged Raychem splices with new one c) Increasing the size of the termination box to 16"x14"x24".

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d)- Installing edge trim at the knockout opening to provide a protec-tive cushion for the penetrating cable The inspector reviewed the working record of N&DR 38725 and physi-cally observed the reworked condition of cable 2 SIS-A0H301 and had no further concern. The licensee has developed a program to review all similar field installations to verify the absence of damage in other installations. This program is expected to be completed by March 16,'1987. As a part of this program, the licensee has revised its inspection plan IP-8.5.2.2 (paragraph 5.7.4) to include an attri-bute for verifying that windlacing is installed at all large motor terminal box openings to provide a protective cushion for the penetra-ting cable This item is considered close .4 (Closed) Unresolved item (86-02-01): pertaining to the environmental qualification (EQ) of electrical equipment in submerged location During inspection 86-02, the NRC inspector identified that 3 junction boxes (2JB*0883, 0884, 0886) were installed at an elevation subject to potential flooding following a LOCA. The licensee performed an evaluation on this situation and the results were documented in a letter from Stone & Webster to DLC0 dated August 25, 1986. The licensee recalculated the maximum flood level (calculation 12241-ES-123-2) in the containment to be elevation 708'-1" instead of 708'-2". FSAR paragraph 6.2.2.3.1 had been revised accordingly. The installed elevation of 2JB*0866 was measured by the licensee to be above the maximum flood level. Junction boxes 2JB*0883, *0884 are measured to be below the maximum flood level. However, these junction boxes are used for the narrow range containment sump level indicatio This equipment is not required to provide a safety function when the containment sump level approaches the maximum flood level. Therefore, this equipment is not required to be qualified for submerged opera-tio The licensee stated that this evaluation will be included into their program (EQ files) to provide justification for not qualifying this equipment for submergence applicatio The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation and has no further question This item is considered close .5 [ Closed) SDR 86-04: significant deficiency pertaining to unqualified jumper wires in Limitorque valve actuator Information Notice 86-03 was issued by the NRC to alert licensees of potential unqualified jumper wire in the Limitorque valve actuators. Accordingly, the licensee conducted an inspection of their valve actuators and identified a substantial amount of jumper wires whose qualification .

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status could not be determined. Subsequently,_on May 15 and October 15, 1986, the licensee submitted to the NRC significant deficiency report (SDR-86-04) in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

There were 192-Limitorque actuators requiring qualification. As of March 13, 1987, 189 of these actuators had been inspected (jumper wire qualification is only one part of the inspection program). The results of the inspections are documented in "IP-8.5.8, NOV Inspec-tion Status." One hundred and twenty of the 189 inspected had jump-er wire problems. As of March 10, 1987, 110 have been corrected and verified by the licensee's QC to be satisfactory, six have been cor-rected,.but had not been verified. Based on the licensee's work pro-gress and the records they had maintained, the inspector considered this item close See section 3.0 for more detail on this topi .6 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Item 85-00-07 pertaining to poten-tial damage to Brown Boveri Company (BBC) circuit breakers auxiliary switches control wiring which may be cut or damaged by the top edge of the breaker dust shield when the breaker is racked out with the compartment door closed. This problem was initially identified by a part 21 report submitted by BBC to the NRC on March 19, 198 Since the subject circuit breakers are used in safety systems circuits and damage to the auxiliary switches wiring could result in misoper-ation of the circuit breaker, it was determined that it could have affected the safe operation of the plant. Accordingly, the licensee notified the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e) on November 22, 198 The BBC provided details of this deficiency in their part 21 report including the corrective actions required by the licensee to resolve the problem. The inspector confirmed that the licensee had taken the appropriate actions to correct the deficiency by a review of DLC0 Engineering Field Action Report (EFAR-681A) dated September 2,1986; by a review of completed close-out report of EFAR-681A dated December 24, 1986; by a review of DLC0 Operations Start-up Engineers Acceptance Report dated January 13, 1987; and by a physical inspec-tion of the following modified circuit breakers in 480V Substation 2-9(P):

Breaker N Service

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Breaker 3C Spare Breaker 10B Mainstream fan 2HVR*FN206B Breaker IOC Leak collection system electric heater 2HVS*CH219B Breaker 11B Containment Air recirc. fan 2HVR*FN201C Breaker 70 Hydrogen recombiner 2 HCS*RBNR21b This item is considered close l

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2.7' (Closed) 86-00-15: significant deficiency pertaining to class 1E circuits routed through non-class IE auxiliary relay racks. On January 2,1987, the licensee submitted to the NRC significant deficiency report SDR86-15 stating that they had identified the above mentioned problem. The two racks involved are RK*ZAUX-REL A'and B, located in the main control and computer room at elevation 707'. The licensee elected to upgrade these two racks to Class IE qualifica-tion. Since these.two racks are located in a non-harsh environment, 10 CFR 50-49 does not apply. The licensee's evaluation of electrical separation and seismic qualificat, ion issues are documented in Attach-ment I to Westinghouse letter DMW-D-5486 dated May 6, 1986, which also contains Westinghouse document EQ&T-EQT-3555 " Seismic Qualifi-cation of Auxiliary Relay Rack for Beaver Valley Unit 2 (Structural Integrity)" dated April 198 This item is. considered close .8 (Closed) 78-HQ-00: This item concerns two IE Bulletins, 77-05 and 77-07.Bulletin 77-05 was issued to alert licensees to the potential-failure of certain electrical connector assemblies whenLsubjected to  :

a LOCA environment. This bulletin requires licensees to determine  !

whether their facilities utilize or plan to utilize these types of'

connectors. The licensee responded on January 4,1978~ stating that no electrical plug-type connectors of any kind located inside the containment are required to function during or after a LOCA. The inspector determined by a discusssion with one of the licensee's environmental qualification engineers that the above statement is still true. No further action is required by the licensee on thi .

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Bulletin 77-07 was issued to alert licensees that some types of' con-tainment electrical penetrations.similar to GE Series 100, may fail to function because of moisture intrusion through cracks developed in the epoxy sealant. This bulletin requires that either the manufac-turer or the licensee must determine whether pressurized nitrogen environment should be maintained for the penetration assemblies dur-ing the storage stage or operation stage. .The licensee responded to this bulletin on January 25, 1978 stating that Beaver Valley Unit 2

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uses Westinghouse electrical penetrations which also use epoxy seal ~The manufacturer had determined that there is no need to maintain pressurized nitrogen for the penetration assemblies during storage <

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and operation stage. However, to be more conservative, the licensee requires pressurized dry nitrogen be maintained to keep moisture out

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of the penetration and to provide a continuous means of leak detec-tion. The inspector randomly selected 5 penetrations for physical i observation and verified the presence of pressurized nitrogen. The pressure gauges in these penetration units showed that the nitrogen l pressure is at approximately 45 psi These items are considered closed.

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2.9 (Closed) SDR 85-06: Significant deficiency pertaining to Westing-house Type SA-1 differential relay In response to Information Notice 83-63, the license identified that two safety-related SA-1 relays failed their acceptance tests. These defective relays were returned to the vendor (System Control Inc.) for repair / modification and shipped back to Beaver Valley 2 for testing and acceptance. One of these two relays again failed the tes The licensee submitted to the NRC on December 6,1985 a significant deficiency report (SDR No. 85-06) stating these deficiencie The twice failed defective relay was again returned to the vendor for repair and shipped back to Beaver Valley 2 for test (this time the relay test was successful) and installation. The inspectors verified the completed test and installation through a review of the test record dated March 4, 1986 and an installation inspection record dated October 10, 198 This item is close .10 (Closed) SDR 87-02: pertaining to significant deficiency of-certain HVAC systems after a loss of offsite power. The licensee submitted to the NRC on February 13, 1987 a significant deficiency report SDR 87-02, identifying problems with the existing design of the following HVAC systems:

a) Control Room HVAC system; b) Control Room Emergency Pressurization System; c) Control Building Air Conditioning System; d) Cable Vault and Rod Control Area Air Conditioning System; e) Emergency Switchgear Ventilation Syste The required corrective actions are described in Advance Change Notice ACN No. D-0015. These involve a change in the control logic of the HVAC fans and control dampers, adding and relocating instru-ments and sensing lines, and revising drawings to incorporate the changes. As of March 25, 1987, all installations have been completed with the exception of two 125VDC time-delay relays. The affected drawings have been revised and issued. The installations and QC inspection activities are documented in Work Authorization Request WAR No. 584 The inspector reviewed the records in ACN D-0015 and WAR-5847, and four QC inspection reports (ME-MR9270, 9282,13630,13677) and has no further question This item is administrative 1y closed although the licensee identified other problems which are described in NRC inspection report 50-412/87-18.

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2.11 (Closed) 80-BU-16: pertaining to IE Bulletin 86-16, issued by the NRC on June 27, 1980 to alert the licensee to a potential misapplication problem on Rosemount Model 1151 and 1152 pressure transmitters with

"A" or "D" output code. The licensee responded to NRC on August 27, 1980, stating that they had reviewed the IE Bulletin and conducted an investigation to determine if there was any potential adverse impact on Beaver Valley Unit 2. The results indicated that Beaver Valley Unit 2 did not use Rosemount 1151 or 1152 pressure transmitters for safety-related application. The inspector verified through discus-sion with a licensee engineer and a review of Purchase Specification 2BV-648A that no Model 1151 or 1152 pressure transmitters were used for safety-related applicatio This item is close .12 (Closed) 84-10-04: unresolved item pertaining to the maintenance of qualification status of Rosemount transmitters before qualified life ends. This item was identified in NRC Report 84-10 and was updated in NRC Report 85-26. The maintenance of qualification status of equipment is achieved through replacement of the equipment before the end of the qualified life. This is part of the licensee environmen-tal qualification program. All items with a qualified life less than 40 years are identified in the licensee's document entitled " System /

Component Consolidated Scheduled Maintenance / Calibration Evaluation".

The inspector reviewed this document and verified that Rosemount transmitters are included in this document. A review of the licen-see's generic maintenance program will be covered as a part of the Environmental Qualification audit to be conducted by the NRC in the futur This item is close .13 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-30-01: concerning cable separation of less than 1" inside Westinghouse Cabinet RK*2PRI-PROC-3. The quali-fication and cable separation requirements of this cabinet are des-cribed in Westinghouse document WCAP8892A dated June 1977. WCAP8892A is applicable to Beaver Valley 2 and several other Westinghouse plants. Page 28 of this document indicates that qualification tests were conducted with all field cables bundled together for a total length of 20 feet with 10 feet of these cables internal to the cabi-net. This demonstrated that cable separation is not required inside the Westinghouse Cabine The inspector has no more concern on this issue and this item is close ~

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2.14 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-31-06: This item pertains to lack of proper clearances and sign-offs on temporary operating procedure The inspector verified .that Temporary Operating Procedures, TOP 6-10 and TOP 6-14 had been re-revised and proper clearances and sign-offs obtair.ed for applicable requirements. The preparation and approval of TOPS are controlled by the Start-up Manual, chapter 3.4.6. The inspector verified that the procedure established in this chapter is adequate to control the TOPS, and the licensee has re-emphasized the importance of attention to procedural details to personnel engaged in this activit This item is close .15 (Closed) Violation 86-47-01: This item pertains to deficiencies in protection of electrical cables stored outside. Cable reels stored outside had exposed cut-ends without any protective covering to pre-vent moisture intrusion. The licensee has demonstrated that moisture intrusion is detrimental to aluminum conductor cables only. They have identified such cables and provided engineering dispositio The cable ends that are affected by moisture are removed before the cable is terminated. This disposition is acceptable. This item is close .16 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report 86-00-11: The deficiency pertained to Steam Generator PORV's failure to close when pressure decreased.below the set point. The logic of hydraulically operated and Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves has been modified to allow valves to modulate close when a high pressure set point is no longer exceeded. The above modification is documented in change assessment package #38, and the implementation and verification of this work is documented in package WAR *7504. This item is resolved and close .17 (Closed) Unresolved Item 84-17-01: This item pertains to adequacy of methods to assure that replacement parts and equipment meet workmanship standards. The licensee has revised applicable procurement specifications and issued Engineering and Design Coordination Reports (E&DCR) amending such specification to assure that the replacement of class 1E' electrical equipment meets wiring workmanship requirements, and these criteria are included in their purchase orders via procurement specifications. The action is acceptabl This item is close .18 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-31-05: This item pertains to the failure of emergency diesel generator injectors. The failed fuel injector #5 on the emergency diesel generator EDG#1 was shipped to the manufac-turer for failure analysis and repair. An engineering report by Colt Industry /Fairbanks Morse Division indicated that the failure of the injector pump was most likely caused by a foreign particle entering a small clearance between the plunger and the barrel. The manufacturer repaired the injector pump, and the licensee has implemented proced-ures to minimize contamination of fuel and the equipment. The EDG#1 has been routinely exercised satisfactorily. This item is closed.

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2.19 (Closed) Unresolved Item 83-10-03: This item was related to the requirements of IEEE-336 for a post-construction-verification program-

-to assure that installed electrical equipment and systems were not damaged during the installation phase. The inspector verified tha the licensee initiated a construction completion inspection program in early 1985(2/28/85). The program was further expanded to include -

area turnovers in 198 This item is close .20 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report 86-00-13: The deficiency involved an excessive number of failures in Westinghouse 7300 Process-Control System Printed Circuit Cards provided on 2BV-001, 2BV-723, and 2BV-724 process racks. The licensee's engineering analysis determined that the failures were related to handling damage and heat sensitivity of the. cards. The licensee implemented an improved system to handle.the cards during installation which is documented in memorandum 2BVM-3807. Heat' sensitivity probler was mitigated by~

activating instrument. room air-conditioning: system. The above steps have noticeably decreased the Printed Circuit card failure ,

This item is close .21 (0 pen) Construction Deficiency 85-00-04: This item pertains to inad-equate connections in electrical raceways. The inspector reviewed this item and determined that work on electrical . raceway support longitudinal base connection' replacement was still continuing. This item remains open pending completion of the work and further review by the NR E

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3.0 Licensee Corrective Actions on Limitorque Valve Actuators i 3.1 Purpose This part of the inspection was to evaluate the licensee's corrective

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actions on the Limitorque Valve actuator jumper wires resulting from

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IE Information Notice 86-03 " Potential Deficiencies In Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring".

3.2 Background Several licensees had discovered in 1985 many Limitorque valve actu-ators with. jumper wires different from those tested by Limitorque in

!- its environmental qualification (EQ) program and internal wiring of

. the Limitorque operators that either could not be identified or.

! qualification could not be established. On January 14, 1986, the NRC i issued Information Notice 86-03 to alert licensees to potential-

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problems regarding the EQ of electrical wiring used in Limitorque valve actuators and to inform them that they should consider appropri-

. ate actions, if applicable, to preclude similar problems from occur-ring at their facilities.

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' Licensee Corrective Actions In response to NRC Information Notice 86-03, the licensee had re-viewed its applicability to Beaver Valley 2, and established an in-spection plan for all Limitorque valves requiring EQ. The inspection is described in Procedure IP-8,5.8, which covers not only jumper wire qualification, but also terminal blocks, limit switches, cotter pins and lubricant, et There are 192 Limitorque valve actuators requir-ing qualification, 37 are located inside the Containment, and 155 outside. As of March 13, 1987, 187 actuator have been inspecte The inspection results were tabulated in "Limitorque Operator Inspec-tion Status" dated March 10, 1987. More than 90% of those inspected exhibited some sort of deficiencies (incorrect terminal blocks, vent plug missing, cotter pins not adequately bent, etc.) with jumper wire qualification being the most common deficiency (applicable to 120 actuators). As of March 10, 1987, 161 actuators had been corrected and verified by the licensee's QC to be satisfactory As a result of this inspection program, the licensee submitted two Significant Deficiency Reports (2NRC-049 and 2NRC-6-109) to the NRC on May 15, and October 15, 198 The inspector randomly selected 5 valve actuators for physical obser-vation. The actuators selected are: 20SS*M0V100B located in the Safeguard Building at elevation 730'; 2CCP*MOV112B, 2CCP*MOV103A, B, and C, all located in the reactor containment annulus at elevation 718'. During this physical observation the inspector identified that the insulation of one of the three motor lead wires in 2CCD*MOV1038 had been cut circumferential1y. The licensee initiated corrective action promptly. This lead wire was reterminated and inspected by their QC on March 12, 1987. It appeared that this cut was not severe enough to cause a safety concern related to the operation of the valve. The inspector considered this an isolated case and did not have any further question The inspector reviewed the inspection records of the 5 valve actua-tors mentioned above, and did not identify any deficienc .0 Exit Meetings The inspector met with licensee and contractor representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on March 13 and on March 27, 198 The inspector summar-ized the scope and findings of the inspection as described in this repor At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.