IR 05000334/1987019

Insp Repts 50-334/87-19 & 50-412/87-69 on 871121-1231.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Plant Operations,Physical Security, Radiological Controls & Fire Protection

ML20196C967
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	02/08/1988
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196C926	List: IR 05000334/1987019 ML20196C922
References
50-334-87-19, 50-412-87-69, NUDOCS 8802160297
Download: ML20196C967 (12)

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~U.' S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I'

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Report Nos.: 50-334/87-19 License Nos.: DPR-66 50-412/87-69 NPF-73 Licensee: Duquesne Light Company One Oxford Center 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15279 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station,. Units 1.and 2 Location: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Dates: Uait~1: December 4, 1987 - December 31, 1987 Unit 2: November 21, 1987 - December 31, 1987 Inspectors: J. E. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector S. M. Pindale, Resident Inspector A. A. Asars, Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck D. F. Limroth, Project Engineer f

Approved By: 8 - .

? [8 U. E. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section / /date No. 3A Inspection Summary: Combined Inspection Report No. 50-334/87-19 on December 4-31, 1987 and 50-412/87-69 on November 21-December 31, 1987 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors (190 hours0.0022 days <br />0.0528 hours <br />3.141534e-4 weeks <br />7.2295e-5 months <br />)

of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, plant operations, phys!, cal security, radiological controls, housekeeping and fire protection, maintenance activities, and review of periodic and licensee event report 'Results: No violations or unresolved items were identifie Six NRC open items were closed during this inspection. An NRC followup item was opened to track licensee resolution of IE Bulletin 87-02, Fastener Testing (Details Section 3.7).

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DETAILS

'1, Persons Contacted During the report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspec-tion activitie . Summary of Facility Activities At the beginning of the inspection period, Unit I was operating at approx-imately 80% power in coastdown and Unit 2 was preparing to startup follow-ing a November 17, 1987, trip and brief loss of all offsite power. Unit 2 returned to power operations on November 22, 1987, escalated to 100% power and remained at power throughout the rest of the period. Unit I continued coastdown operations until December 11, 1987, when the unit conducted a controlled shutdown and entered the sixth refueling outage. The currently scheduled startup date for Unit'l is February 5, 198 . Followup on Outstanding Items The NRC Outstanding Items (01) List was reviewed with cognizant licensee personnel. Items selected by the inspector were subsequently reviewed through discussions with licensee personnel, documentation reviews and field inspection to determine whether licensee actions specified in the OIs had been satisfactorily complete The overall status of previously identified inspection findings were reviewed, and planned / completed licensee actions were discussed for those items reported below:

3.1 (Closed) Violation (50-334/86-06-04): Licensee evaluation of vendor-performed testing to assure procedure adherence: Due to inadequate testing, fire detector D100 was inoperable between January 7,1985, and March 26, 1986, as the result of a contractor's failure to per-form testing in accordance with the appropriate operational surveil-lance test. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action which included a procedure revision to clarify testing procedure requirements and also administrative action to assure that contractor technicians have been trained in the appropriate procedures. The inspector reviewed other procedures recently performed; no discrep-ancies were noted. This violation is close .2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-334/87-11-02): The licensee was to determine whether surveillance testing on the containment liner bulges can be discontinued safel The licensee has tracked and evaluated the containment liner bulge issue since 197 Various tests have been performed over the years, the most recent of which concluded that there were neither new bulges appearing in the liner

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l nor propagation / deterioration on the existing bulges over; a three year period (July 1983 to July 1986). Further, the function of the -

containment' liner.is to act as a gas tight membrane. Primary struc-tural support for the containment building and associated -equipment is provided through the reinforced concrete structur Recent succes's ful performances of the containment integrated leak rate test confirmed the leakLtightness of .the containment liner. Based on the above, this. item is close .3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-412/00-00-15): Operator training during low power testing (NUREG-0737, Action Item I .G.1) . NRC Inspection Report No. 50-412/87-62 opened this item and identified that while the licensee provides operator training on natural circulation in the classroom and on the Unit 1 simulator (which adequately simulates the Unit 2 response with regard to natural circulation), the licensee has not yet incorporated startup test data into the existing simulator training. The licensee subsequently reviewed Unit 2 test results and concluded that the simulator adequately duplicates the test result The inspector reviewed the test resul ts and compared them to the results obtained on the Unit 1 simulator. No significant discrep-ancies were identified. This item is close .4 (Closed) Violation (50-412/87-20-01): Failure to implement Quality Control procedures affecting safety-related inspections: Ouring Inspection 50-334/87-20, numerous examples of unrelated failure to implement quality control procedures affecting operation of safety-related installations were identified. These items were noted to be minor in nature, did not present a significant safety concern, and l were reportedly completed prior to completion of the inspection. The l inspector reviewed several of the identified discrepancies to verify

'their correction and conducted additional inspections for further

examples of those types identified; none was found. The inspector l also reviewed the licensee's permanent corrective actions which con-

! sisted of training to increase QC inspectors' awareness for greater i reference to and compliance with QC inspection procedures. It was further noted that these violations occurred under the construction QC program which encompassed more large scale repetitive inspections of similar work tasks whereas, under the Operational Quality Assur-ance program, QC requirements are usually limited to a specific ite The inspector had no further questions. This violation is closed.

l 3.5 (Closed) IFl (SG-412/87-49-02): Emergency Preparedness Implementing l Procedure: Inspection Report 50-412/87-49 identified an error in the

, identificatica and nomenclature of 2 ARC-RQI-100, Air Ejector Dis-

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charge, in EPP Implementing Procedure EPP/I- The inspector ,

reviewed Revision 2 to the applicable procedure and verified that the error had been corrected. This item is close .

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3.6 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-412/87-50-04): Review station. proced-ures 'to assure that a power feeder failure for PASS can be easily detected, traced and repaired: The inspector verified that the licensee had reviewed station operating procedures as committed and independently reviewed applicable sections of the BVPS-2 Operating Manual to assure. that the matter of recovery from loss of power '

source conditions when automatic transfer to alternate source does not occur has been adequately addressed. ~- The inspector had no further questions. This unresolved item is close .7 (0 pen) 50-334 & 50-412/87-80-02: IE Bulletin 87-02, "Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications." _ .

This bulletin required licensees to review their receipt inspection requirements and internal controls for fasteners, select a sample of fasteners, test the festeners, and submit test results. The Beaver Valley Senior Resident Inspector discussed the sampling methodology with the licensee and participated in obtaining the sample .from' the stocks of the various site warehouses. The inspector _noted that one non-safety nut of material type A194 grade 2H had no manufacturer's mark and the licensee agreed to add the identified nut to the sampl In another instance, the inspector _noted two different markings present in one purchase order lot and the licensee agreed to _ include one of each type in the sampl As of the close of the inspection period, the licensee had not yet received the test results. This item remains open pending review of the licensee's response to this bulleti . Plant Operations 4.1 General Inspection tours of the following accessible plant areas were con-ducted during both day and night shifts with respect to Technical Specification (TS) compliance, housekeeping and cleanliness, fire protection, radiation control, physical security / plant protection and operational / maintenance administrative control Control Ruom -- Safeguard Areas

-- Auxiliary Building -- Service Building .-

-- Switchgear Area -- Diesel Generator Buildings

-- Access Control Points -- Containment

-- Protected Area Fence Line -- Yard Area

-- Turbine Building -- Intake Structure

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4.2 Operation During the course .of the inspection, discussions were conducted with operators concerning knowledge of recent changes to procedures, facility con figuration and plant condition During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to determine if' entries were properly I made . and that equipment status / deficiencies were identified and I communicate These records included operating logs, turnover i sheets, tagout and jumper logs, process computer printouts, unit off-normal and draft incident report The inspector verified ad-herence to approved procedures for ongoing activities observed. Shift turnovers were witnessed and staffing requirements confirmed. In general, inspector comments or questions resulting from these reviews were resolved by licensee personnel. Inspections conducted during backshifts and weekends verified that plant operators were alert and displayed no signs of fatigue or inattention to dut . On December 9,1987, with the plant operating at 58% power, an ESF actuation occurred as the Fuel Building (FB) exhaust ventilation automatically realigned to divert its flow through the main filter bank. On December 8, a routine calibration was performed on the "A" Train FB Ventilation Exhaust Monitor (RM-VS-103A). Following the calibration, a radiation source check of the monitor was performed, how-ever, the results were unacceptable. The instrument was removed from the rack in order to troubleshoot the circui-tr Upon removal, the loss of power and control room alarm relays were pulled by the technicians in order to reduce the number of alarms present in the control roo No instrument problems were identified during the trouble-shooting activities and the monitor was subsequently restored on December A radiatior, sourco check was then completed satisfactorily. The licensee performs an Opera-tions Surveillance Test (OST) prior to declaring equipment operable following equipment replacement and/or repai Before the OST was performed, the control room received reports that the FB evacuation alarm had annunciated. Plant operators then noticed that the FB exhaust ventilation had automatically realigned to the main filter ban Further investigation identified that RM-VS-103A appeared to fail high, which would have c'aused the FB evacuation alarm and ventilation realignmen No alarms were received in the control room to alert tiie operators to the event initia-tion because the control room alarm relays, previously

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pulled to perform troubleshoot 49 g activities, had not been

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replaced when the monitor was reinstalle The licensee verified from the redundant monitor- (R8-VS-1038), that an-actual high radiation condition did not exist . in . the 1 FB; de-energized RM-VS-103A; manually realigned the FB exhaust -

ventilation and silenced the FB alar The ltcensee reported this. event to the NRC in accordance with.10,CFR-50.72 reporting requirement Licensee investigation into the 'cause for the instrumarit h

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failure determined that power supply capacitors ,werei degraded. The licensee also determined that a procedural-inadequacy contributed to the failure to replace the en-trol room alarm relays in that the procedure did not pre vide a verification step to ensure that the relays had been l replaced. The inspector noted that, since plant procedures do not encompass all troubleshooting activities and some technician activities are bounded by their knowledge ;ob- t tained through training and experience, the cause for this event might also be attributed to personnel error. .The inspector brought this concern to the licensee's attention who stated that the Licensee Event Report details a.szoci-ated with thir, event will be discussed with techniciars and '

attention to detail during troubleshooting activities will be stresse The planned procedure , change includes' a verification step for the reinstallation of relays prior to procedure signoff and before returning the monitor to ser-vice. The licensee reviewed other procedures thaf., address

, similar instruments for applicability -to this potential problem and determined that additional procedures will also require revision. Action on this item is being tracked by an internal licensee tracking syste The insrector will review the implementation of the procedure changes during a subsequent routine inspection. No additional concerns i, were identifie '

4. On December 23, 1987, at about 11:30 p.m., the Unit 1 Con-trol Room received an alarm that radiation monitor RM-VS-103B had failed low. This monitor is one of two

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gross activity radiation monitors required by Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring,, for the Fuel a

Storage Building. At the time, RM-VS-103A was operable. A maintenance work request was issued for the necessary

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troubleshooting and any necessary repairs. On the after-noon of December 30, 1987, technicians performing trouble-shooting identified a clean cut in the power cable to this monitor. This cable was located in a cable tray in the Cable Mezzanine, Elevation 722' in the Service Buildin ,

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The area was cleared of personnel until an investigation could be conducted. The' fire watch for the Mezzanine Area

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watch was posted on Elevation 718' of the Service Building until the morning of December 31. Discussions with per-sornel concerning the nature of the activities in the Mezzanine revealed that old cabling was being removed from the cable trays to reduce the tray heat loads. The nature of this job sometimes requires that cable tie wraps be cut to facilitate removal of the old cables. The licensee has determined that -during the process of_ cutting tie wraps, the cable for RM-VS-1038 was inadvertently _ cut.. The___

inspector examined the damaged cable and noted that. the small diameter cable'was located at the lower portion -of the tray and was relatively exposed in .the tray which has .

no bottom cove The licensee conducted an inspection of the area and found no other cables cu The licensee also planned a more detailed inspection to identify any additional equipment in the affected cable trays which may also have been inadver-

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tently cut. No other damage was identified at the close of F the inspection perio The licensee has . suspended all  ;

cable removal activities pending further evaluation of the need for removal and/or to make any necessary changes to the procedure. The licensee is also pursuing the justifi-cation for QC coverage of cable remova The inspector reviewed the licensee's investigation activities; no deficiencies were identifie Resolution of this issue will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

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4.3 plant Security / Physical Protection Implementation of the Physical Security Plan was observed in various plant areas with regard to the following:

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Protected Area and Vital Area barriers were well maintained and not compromised;

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Isolation zones were clear;

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Personnel and vehicles entering and packages being delivered to the Protected Area were properly searched and access control was in accordance with approved licensee procedures;

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' Persons granted access to the' site were, badged to indicate whether they- have unescorted acce'ss or escorted authorization;

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Security access controls to Vital Areas were ~ being maintained and that persons in Vital Areas were properly authorize Security posts were . adequately staffed and equipped, security personnel were alert and knowledgeable regarding position requirements, and that written procedures were available; and

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Adequate illumination was maintaine A relatively high number of equipment problems have occurred during this inspection period, including access control related problem The resident inspectors will continue to monitor the effectiveness of the Security Pla .4 Radiological Controls Posting and control oc rediation and high radiation areas were inspected. Radiation b ork 3ermit compliance and use of personnel monitoring devices were checked. Conditions of step-off pads, dis-posal of protective clothing, cleanliness of work areas, radiation control job coverage, area monitor operability and calibration (portable and permanent) and personnel frisking were observed on a

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sampling basis. The refueling outage on Unit 1 marks the first time that the newly installed automatic whole-body friskers (installed November 1987) will be used extensivel The monitors are installed at the radiologically controlled area exit point, and the use of_the upgraded equipment is expected to provide thorough and efficient whole body frisking of personnel and to introduce state-of-the-art equipment into the station. Additionallv, to reduce the potential of

hot particle contamination during the outage, the licensee set -up a portal monitor adjacent to the containment exit are No concerns were identifie .5 Plant Housekeeping and Fire protection

, Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness condi-tions and control and storage of flammable material and other poten-tial safety hazards were observed in various areas during plant tours. Maintenance of fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations, and verification of posted fire watches in these areas were also observe The inspectors conducted a detailed walkdown of the accessible areas of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 including locked high

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radiation areas. The' inspectors noted that_ Unit 1.has continued.to reduce. the area of floor space which is. contaminated. Large quan-

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tities of low level waste and other materials were observed in -tem-porary storage areas, but this'is a- normal outage: condition. Unit 2 continued -to benefit from the high material condition inherent in a new plant. Ladders a'nd scaffolding were still present in areas .such ,

-as the cable: vault due to fire protection systems testing. Individ-ual' deficiencies were identified to the cognizant supervisors for-resolution. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's activities in this are . Maintenance- _ _ _

The inspector reviewed selected maintenance a'ctivities to assure that:

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the. activity did not violate _ Technical Specification Limiting Condi-tions for. Operation and ._ that redundant components were operable;

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required approvals and releases had been obtained prior to commencing work;

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procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the skills of the trade;

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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;

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where necessary, radiological and fire preventive controls were adequate and implemented;

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QC hold points were established, where required, and observed;

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equipment was properly tested and returned to service, j Maintenance activities reviewed included:

MWR M872834, Repairs to charging pump-2CHS-P218, replacement of motor -

bearing; i MWR M874935, Inspect welds and linkage of reactor trip breaker pur-suant to_NRC Information Notice 87-35; loop Calibration Procedure 2LCP-6-T453 for pressurizer liquid line .

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temperature loop; '

Maintenance Surveillance Procedure 2MSP-39.04-E, Quarterly inspection  ;

of station battery No. 2-4;

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MWR 872495, Replace stem in 2RCS*MOV-536, PORV block valve;

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. MWR 878244L and 878245, Remove Furmanite clamp and repair. or replace valv All questions by the inspector were satisfactorily answere No. viola-tions or deviations were note . Unit 2 Steam Generator Level Indication Variance During a review of steam generator (SG) level traces of recent Unit 2 startups, the licensee identified that_ certain level channels appeared to vary with small changes in steam pressure at power levels above 45%. In one case,-during a power reduction from 79% to 68%, one C SG channel (FWS LT495) indicated a level change from 43.5% to 33.3% while a companion channel (FWS LT 494) indicated a drop from 50.2% to 41.7%. The remaining '

channel (FWS LT 496) showed a much smaller change, from 44.7% to 42.1%.

The other SGs showed smaller changes for each of.their channels, but the disagreement between SG level instruments also exceeded ~10% at time Unit I has not experienced similar SG level indication problem The NSSS vendor (Westinghouse) attributed the patterr. of SG level indica- ,

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tions to the piping geometry from the SGs to the condensing pot at the top of.the level instrument reference leg. The Unit 2 piping geometry differs

'from Unit 1 in that the piping to the condensing pot includes a 45 degree ,

upward leg. The sloped line includes a packless valve oriented with the disk horizontal. The vendor indicated that similar level problems have '

been observed at other sites. In particular, Millstone 3 (DN 50-423)

recently replaced the same piping, the condensing pot and the level instruments; these modifications were designed to correct similar SG level oscillation The vendor's conclusion is that water buildup in the sloped line can occur, especially due to the horizontal surface presented by the valve even with the valve ope Small steam pressure changes would then cause flashing or condensation in the small tubing with consequent pressure changes in the reference leg. As an interim measure, the Beaver Valley 2 SG level trips were increased to compensate for the water in the tubing ,

which, if water filled would reduce the affective height of the reference leg and give inaccurately high indication. The inspector reviewed the

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proposed setpoint changes and noted that the new setpoints conservatively assumed that the entire sloped line was filled, even that portion below the valve. The new values were also reviewed by NRR. No deficiencies were identifie ,

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The licensee is currently operating with- the higher setpoints and plans to use ' the new values whenever exceeding 45% powe Licensee plans for -

long . term corrective action - will be reviewed in a future inspection.

v No violations were' identifie . Review of Periodic Reports Upon receipt, periodic reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specifica-tion 6.9 (Reporting Requirements) are reviewed. The review assessed whether the reported information was valid, included the NRC required data and whether results and supporting information were consistent with design ____

predictions and performance specification The inspector also ascer-tained ' whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrenc The following report was reviewed:

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BV1/BV2 Monthly Operating Repprt for Plant Operations -from November 1-30, 198 . Inoffice Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC Region I office to verif that the details of the event were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followu The following LERs were reviewed:

Unit 1

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LER 87-15-00: Inoperable Chlorine Detectors

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LER 87-16-00: Failure to Analyze Diesel Fuel Oil for Water and Sediment

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LER 87-17-00: Inoperable Fire Barriers

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LER 87-18-00: Vital Bus Spike Results in ESF Actuation

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LER 87-18-01: Revision 1 to LER 87-18 Unit 2

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LER 87-32-00: Reactor Trip Due to 100% Load Rejection Tes LER 87-33-00: Failure to Perform Surveillance Test Within Required Frequenc _ _ _ _ __ - .

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LER 87-34-00: Reactor T' rip Due to a Lo-Lo Level Condition in the 218 Steam Generato ' .LER 87-35-00: Low-Low Steam Generator Reactor . Trip -.' Loss o Condensate Pressur LER 87-36-00: Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip due t6 Thrust Bearir,- l Trip Caused by Personnel Erro The above LERs were reviewed with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and the guidance provided in NUREG 1022. Previous inspection

. reports had identified certain weaknesses in the preparation and complete-ness of LERs. Current .LERs were noted to document _ good event analyses, root cause determinations and corrective actions implementatio . Exit Interview Meetings were h' eld with senior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of inspection findings was further discussed with the licensee at the conclusion of the report period on January 13, 1988.

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