IR 05000334/2023001
| ML23128A148 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/08/2023 |
| From: | Matt Young Division of Operating Reactors |
| To: | Blair B Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp |
| References | |
| IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23128A148 (1) | |
Text
May 8, 2023
SUBJECT:
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2023001 AND 05000412/2023001
Dear Barry Blair:
On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, and on April 20, 2023, discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000334 and 05000412 License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000334 and 05000412
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000334/2023001 and 05000412/2023001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-001-0032
Licensee:
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation
Facility:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Shippingport, PA
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2023 to March 31, 2023
Inspectors:
B. Towne, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Rolph, Resident Inspector
E. Brady, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Matt R. Young, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Untimely Corrective Action Resulting in Plant Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000334/2023001-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71153 A Green self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality with the heater drain tank level control valve in a timely manner as required by NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action Program.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000334/2022-001-00 LER 2022-001-00 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1,
Manual Reactor Trip and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation due to Heater Drain System Valve Failure 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On March 13, 2023, the unit was down powered to 69 percent due to a loss of the condensate flow to the heater drain system. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on March 15, 2023, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather for a high wind advisory on March 3, 2023.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2, 'A' closed cooling pump train while work is being performed on the 'B' train, January 10 and 13, 2023
- (2) Unit 1, auxiliary feedwater system in standby lineup at-power, February 2, 2023
- (3) Unit 2, 21C service water pump alignment while 21B service water pump is out for replacement and bay is out of service for cleaning, March 2, 2023
- (4) Unit 2, emergency diesel generator 2-1 air start system, March 3, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 2, 735' primary auxiliary building, 2PFP-AXLB-735, January 4, 2023
- (2) Units 1 and 2, guardhouse building, 1/2PFP-GRDH-GUARDHOUSE BUILDING, January 9, 2023
- (3) Unit 1, emergency switchgear room, elevation 713', fire areas 1-ES-1 and 1-ES-2, February 4, 2023
- (4) Unit 2, diesel generator 2-1 room, elevation 732', fire compartment 2-DG-2, February 23, 2023
- (5) Unit 1, safeguards building, auxiliary feedwater and quench spray pump rooms, elevation 735', fire area 1-QP-1, February 28, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on February 28, 2023.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed Unit 1 operations personnel during the emergency diesel generator monthly surveillance test while relay testing was being performed concurrently on March 1, 2023.
- (2) The inspectors observed Unit 1 operations personnel during an unplanned power reduction when they lost condensate flow to the heater drain system and steam generator levels decreased on March 13, 2023.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed a Unit 1 simulator evaluation that included a failed pressurizer pressure transmitter, a failed turbine governor valve and load reject, and a faulted steam generator with the steam leak outside of containment on February 7, 2023.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2, elevated risk and risk management actions during scheduled monthly operational test of the 2-2 emergency diesel generator, January 11, 2023
- (2) Unit 2, elevated risk and risk maintenance actions during scheduled loop 'C' steam line pressure protection channel IV test, February 6, 2023
- (3) Unit 1, elevated risk and risk management actions for repair of a steam leak on the 'A' heater drain pump seal return line, February 9, 2023
- (4) Unit 1, elevated risk and mitigating actions during scheduled monthly operational test of the 1-2 emergency diesel generator in conjunction with diesel start/loss of voltage relay testing, March 1, 2023
- (5) Unit 1, elevated risk during repair of RV-1SI-857, boron injection tank relief valve as allowed by License Amendment No. 319, March 7, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Main control room envelope habitability operability determination performed following a step increase in measured leakage from 1CH-306 seal injection filter 4B vent valve housing, January 19, 2023 (2)2SVS-PCV101A steam generator atmospheric dump valve operability determination following the failure of Prom Logic Card 2MSS-PX-101A during troubleshooting, January 24, 2023
- (3) Unit 1, control room emergency ventilation system operability determination following charcoal filter replacement based on lab test results for removal efficiency, February 6, 2023
- (4) Unit 1, 'B' auxiliary feedwater pump operability determination after the pump was declared inoperable based on failure of the quarterly test, February 8, 2023
- (5) Units 1 and 2, control room envelope operability determination performed following reactor coolant leakage from a cracked weld downstream of the boron injection tank relief valve, RV-1SI-857, February 12, 2023
- (6) Unit 2, service water pump 2SWS-P21A, B, C seal water and motor cooling water supply strainer, 2SWS-STRM48, operability determination and past operability review due to excessive oil leakage, March 9, 2023
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Unit 1, temporary modification for installation of temporary relief valve on boron injection tank vent line to support gagging existing relief valve (RV-1SI-857) to lower reactor coolant leakage, Design Equivalent Change Package 23-1015-002, February 13, 2023
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, 1B centrifugal charging pump post-maintenance test following motor and thermocouple replacements, January 6, 2023
- (2) Unit 2, post-maintenance surveillance test of the 'B' primary component cooling water pump following preventative maintenance and repair of flow indicator FI051A, January 18, 2023
- (3) Unit 1, comprehensive pump test on 1CH-P-2A boric acid transfer pump post-maintenance test following preventative maintenance, January 19, 2023
- (4) Unit 1, failed post-maintenance test of the fuel oil transfer pump (1EE-P-1A),
March 15, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, 1OST-36.2, No. 2 Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test WO200842836, January 4, 2023
- (2) Unit 1, 1OST-13.2, Quench Spray Pump [1-QS-P1B] Operating Surveillance Test, January 30, 2023
- (3) Unit 2, 2OST-24.4, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump [2FWE-P22] Quarterly Test, February 14, 2023
- (4) Unit 1, Surveillance SR 3.3.5.2, Perform Channel Calibration, March 1, 2023
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Unit 2, emergency preparation technical support center training exercise for a simulated accident due to loss of all AC followed by a stuck open pressurizer power-operated relief valve, January 26,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 1, January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022
- (2) Unit 2, January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022
- (2) Unit 2, January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022
- (2) Unit 2, January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022
===71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000334/2022-001-00, for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1, Manual Reactor Trip and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation due to Heater Drain System Valve Failure (ADAMS Accession No. ML22222A122). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153.
Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee actions surrounding Emergency License Amendment Request No. 319 (ML23062A521) to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-66 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1. The license amendment implemented a change to technical specifications to add a note allowing a one-time use of an alternate manual safety injection flow path to support the repair of a leak from boron injection tank relief valve, RV-1SI-857, which was issued on March 6,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Untimely Corrective Action Resulting in Plant Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green FIN 05000334/2023001-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71153 A Green self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality with the heater drain tank level control valve in a timely manner as required by NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action Program.
Description:
Per LER 05000334/2022-001-00, on June 15, 2022, at 0724, while operating at 100 percent power, operators manually tripped the Unit 1 reactor from approximately 100 percent reactor power in response to secondary system perturbations that caused the steam generator secondary side water level to lower. The licensee determined that the lowering of the steam generator water level was due to reduced condensate flow from the heater drain system to the main feed pumps when the heater drain tank level control valve [LCV-1SD-106B], experienced a valve plug to stem separation.
The licensee had a similar event occur in May of 2021 in which the same heater drain tank level control valve experienced a valve plug to stem separation. The reactor was down powered from 100 percent to approximately 26 percent to troubleshoot and repair the valve. Due to parts availability, the valve was reassembled with the used plug and a new stem and new locking pin. A new trim (valve plug, stem, pin) was ordered and received in March of 2022. Unit 1 was not down powered to install this new trim.
NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action Program, Revision 48, the revision in effect at the time of the 2021/2022 valve stem to plug separation, states that, CAP and Non-CAP actions are intended to minimize risk by reducing the chances or consequences of reoccurrence of the identified Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ). The inspectors determined that the plug to stem separation in June 2022 was an adverse condition that should have been corrected following the 2021 event. The loss of steam generator water level and subsequent manual reactor trip were a result of a precursor event where the level control valve was placed back into service in less than adequate condition with known risk.
Corrective Actions: The licensee installed a more robust valve trim in the fall outage, 1R28, to prevent reoccurrence of the plug/valve stem separation.
Corrective Action References: CR 2022-04399
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality in a timely manner, in 2022, when the level control valve exhibited degrading performance from January 2022 through June 2022, was a performance deficiency because it was within the capability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The heater drain tank level control valve plug to stem separation resulted in rapidly decreasing steam generator secondary water level, prompting operators to initiate a manual reactor trip.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip coincident with the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a reactor trip to a stable shutdown condition.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, site procedures did not reflect a consistent, systematic approach, and failed to incorporate risk insights into the process of using a used part to repair a valve.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Barry Blair, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
1/2OM-
53C.4A.75.1
Acts of Nature - Severe Weather
Drawings
RM-0415-001
Valve Oper No Diagram Primary Component Cooling Water
RM-0415-005
Valve Oper No Diagram Primary Component Cooling Water
RM-0430-001
Valve Oper NO Diagram Service Water Supply and
Distribution
RM-0436-003
Valve Operator N
- O. Diagram, Diesel Starting Air System
Procedures
1OST-24.10
Fire Plans
1-PFP-SFGB-
735-AUX
Aux FW & QS Pumps Fire Compartment 1-QP-1
1/2PFP-GRDH
Guardhouse Building
AE
Process
Fire Pre Plan for Fire Compartment 1-CR-4
Fire Drill Scenario Number
2/28/2023
2-PA-3, 2-PA-3A,
2-PA-3B, & 2-PA-
A3C
Fire Compartments
Auxiliary Building General Area
DG-2
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2023-01902
Miscellaneous
Failure Mode No. Condensate Discharge
Procedures
1-OST-36.2
Diesel Generator No. 2 Monthly Test
Miscellaneous
Amendment No. 319 to Renewed Facility Operating License
DPR-66 for Beaver Valley Power Station
Procedures
1-OST-36.02
Diesel Generator No. 2 Monthly Test
1MSP-36.46-E
1DF 4KV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage Relay [27-VF100]
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Functional Test
1MSP-36.48A-E
1DF Emergency Loss of Voltage Bus Separation Relay [27-
VF100] Calibration
1MSP-36.48B-E
1DF 4KV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage Time Delay Relay
[62-VF100] Calibration
1MSP-36.54B-E
1DF 4KV Em Bus Loss of Volt Diesel Start Time Delay Relay
[62-VF1100] Calibration
1MSP-36.56-E
1DF 4KV Emergency Bus Diesel Start Undervoltage Relay
[27-VF1100] Functional Test
1MSP-36.56A-E
1DF 4KV Emergency Bus Diesel Start Loss of Voltage Relay
[27-VF1100] Calibration
1MSP-36.82-E
Functional Test of Em Bus Loss of Volt Rel and Relay Diesel
Start Loss of Volt Rel
2MPS-21.09-1
Loop C Steamline Pressure Protection Channel IV Test
2OST-36.2
Emergency Diesel Generator [2EGS*EG2-2] Monthly Test
Corrective Action
Documents
23-00971
CR 2023-00405
01/19/2023
CR 2023-00625
01/30/2023
Engineering
Evaluations
EER 601390174
Engineering Evaluation Request to Evaluate ECCS Leak
Rate from RV-1SI-857
Procedures
1-MSP-M-44-300
Control Room Emergency Habitability System Flow and
Filter Efficiency Test
2-1M
Control Room Emergency Outside Air Filter Replacement
1OST-24.3
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test
2OST-21.8
Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Isolation Valve Strokes
2OST-47.3
Containment Penetration and ASME Valve Test
Work Orders
20089873
Control RM Emerg Outside Air Charcoal Filter
Miscellaneous
DECP 23-1014-
2
Temporary Modification to Provide Alternate Pressure Relief
Path
Work Orders
200902181
Corrective Action
Documents
22-01035
2FWE-P22 Turbine Driven Aux Feed Pump Steam Drain
Line - Steam Leak
23-01034
2FWE-P22 Turbine Driven Aux FWP - Possible Steam Leak
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
in Discharge Piping
Procedures
1MSP-36.48A-E
1DF 4KV Emergency Loss of Voltage Bus Separation Relay
[27-VF100] Calibration
1OST-13.2
Quench Spry Pump [1-QS-P-1B]
1OST-36.1
Diesel Generator No. 1 Monthly Test
LUC
PAF-23-
00091
1OST-36.2
Diesel Generator Monthly Test
1OST-7.1
Boric Acid Transfer Pump (1CH-P-2A) Operational Test
1OST-7.5
Centrifugal Charging Pump Test (1CH-P-1B)
2OST-15.2
Primary Component Cooling Water Pump (2CCP*P21B)
Test
2OST-24.4
Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump [2FWE-P22] Quarterly
Test
Work Orders
2008842286
Work Instructions for Calibration of the 1DF Emer Loss of
Voltage Relay
03/03/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
21-03999
22-00414
22-04858
22-09410
Miscellaneous
Amendment No. 319 to Renewed Facility Operating License
DPR-66 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1