IR 05000334/2022001

Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2022001 and 05000412/2022001

ML22130A058
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/10/2022
From:	Matt Young NRC/RGN-I/DORS
To:	Grabnar J Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
Young M
References
IR 2022001
Download: ML22130A058 (20)

Text

May 10, 2022

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2022001 AND 05000412/2022001

Dear Mr. Grabnar:

On March 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On April 20, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Digitally signed by Matthew R.

Matthew R. Young Date: 2022.05.10 09:51:53 Young -04'00'

Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000334 and 05000412 License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000334 and 05000412 License Numbers: DPR-66 and NPF-73 Report Numbers: 05000334/2022001 and 05000412/2022001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-001-0053 Licensee: Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Shippingport, PA 15077 Inspection Dates: January 1, 2022 to March 31, 2022 Inspectors: G. Eatmon, Senior Resident Inspector R. Rolph, Resident Inspector C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Matt R. Young, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.

Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Not adhering to written procedure results in a manual reactor trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.12] - Avoid 71153 NCV 05000412/2022001-01 Complacency Open/Closed A self-revealed Green NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Administrative Controls,

Procedures, was identified when the licensee did not verify that the feed pump recirculating valves were locked open in accordance with plant startup procedures. This resulted in steam generator secondary side water level to increase and a manual reactor trip of Unit 2 on November 12, 2021.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000412/2021-004-00 LER 2021-004-00 for Beaver 71153 Closed Valley Power Station, Unit 2,

Manual Reactor Trip LER 05000412/2021-002-00 LER 2021-002-00 for Beaver 71153 Closed Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2, Unit 2, Automatic Reactor Trip and Automatic Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System LER 05000412/2021-003-00 LER 2021-003-00 for Beaver 71153 Closed Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2, Indications Identified During Reactor Vessel Head Inspection

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 25, 2022, the unit experienced a transient that reduced power to 97 percent due to a cooling tower pump over current trip. The unit was returned to rated thermal power later that same day and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of extreme cold temperatures for the following systems on January 19 through 20, 2022:

(1)

• Unit 1 reactor plant river water in the main intake structure

• Unit 2 service water in the main intake structure

• Unit 1 standby river water and the Unit 2 service water in the alternate intake structure

• Unit 2 demineralized water storage tank instrumentation enclosure

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1, steam driven auxiliary feed water system on February 16, 2022

(2) Unit 2, low head safety injection system, train 'B' on March 1, 2022

(3) Unit 1, auxiliary feedwater system, train 'A' on March 16, 2022

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the dedicated auxiliary feed water system in the turbine building of Unit 1 on February 8 and 9, 2022

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 1, Diesel Generator 2 Room on February 1, 2022

(2) Unit 1/Unit 2, main intake structure screen area on February 7, 2022

(3) Unit 1, AE and DF emergency switchgear rooms on February 15, 2022

(4) Unit 1/Unit 2, main intake pump cubicles for Unit 1 reactor plant river water, Unit 2 service water, and common fire pumps on February 28, 2022

(5) Unit 2, East and West 735 cable vaults, fire compartments 2-CV-1 and 2-CV-2 on March 10, 2022

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Unit 1, primary auxiliary building elevations 735'-6" flooding due to primary river water line break and impact on charging pump cubicles with access from the 735-6 elevation on February 22, 2022

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Unit 1 control room during flux mapping and '1C' reactor plant river water pump test on B header per 1OST-30.6B on March 11, 2022, and in the Unit 2 control room during

'21B service water pump test per 2OST-30.3 on March 11, 2022

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 2 operators on March 11, 2022, respond to:

• Multiple instrument failures, 'B' main feedwater pump trip, reactor trip and recovery actions to stabilize the unit in Mode 3

• Fire in the west communications room with spurious action of the 'B' quench spray system, the DF emergency bus de-energize, and emergency action level declaration of an Unusual Event

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 2, unexpected control room annunciator for diesel generator 1 electrical fault due to lockout relay, 86-ESGADX1, actuated due to differential current relay, 87-VE210, spuriously actuated, and classified as a functional failure of the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators and support systems (system 36A) on January 3, 2022

(2) Unit 2, deficient solder joints on universal logic boards for train 'A' of the solid state protection system that interrupted the power range neutron flux permissive and associated power range trip block signals, resulting in a reactor trip, and was classified as a condition monitoring failure of the universal driver card, and transitioned the system to maintenance rule (a)(1) on January 28, 2022

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 2, orange risk due to less than or equal to an 8-hour limiting condition for operation while the 2-1 battery charger was swapped out for the 2-7 battery charger on January 18 and 19, 2022

(2) Unit 1, emergent work control and risk management when diesel generator number 1 fuel oil transfer pump tripped twice on thermal overload on February 2, 2022

(3) Unit 2, 21A cooling tower pump motor emergent investigation and replacement due to motor fire during the week of March 7, 2022

(4) Unit 1 and Unit 2, auxiliary intake dredging, an infrequently performed test or evolution, upstream of the main intake with the most limiting contingency of river water/service water intake structure loss during the week of March 28, 2022

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1, quench spray pump 'A', 1QS-P-1A, increased outboard mechanical seal leakage on January 17, 2022

(2) Unit 2, steam generator A atmospheric steam dump valve discovered with 100 percent automatic demand setpoint and placed in remote manual control on January 28, 2022

(3) Unit 2, inflatable seal for inner-connecting flood door between pump bay C and pump bay D in the main intake structure was not able to maintain pressure during Flood Door Seal System Operability Check (1/2OST-30.21B) on February 23, 2022

(4) Unit 1, surveillance frequency exceeded the 92-day requirement for containment penetration verification identified on March 11, 2022

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Severe Accident Management Guidelines Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 committed to update the Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines when the pressurized water reactor owners group generic severe accident technical guidelines were issued in accordance with NEI 14-01, Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis Events and Severe Accidents, and the inspectors completed review of the validation and integration of severe accident guidelines in accordance with the process outlines in NEI 14-01 on March 4, 2022

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

(1) Unit 1, diesel generator 2 monthly surveillance after fuel oil transfer pump '1C' motor inspection and lubrication on January 4, 2022

(2) Unit 2, 2OST-13.3, test of the recirculation spray pump, '21A', after preventative maintenance on the pump motor on January 18, 2022

(3) Unit 1, 1OST-30.2, reactor plant river water pump '1A' test, after pump seal replacement on February 9 through 11, 2022

(4) Unit 2, diesel generator 2, lube oil sample Test Oil result evaluation from after planned surveillance on February 9, 2022

(5) Unit 2, diesel generator 2 rocker arm lube oil pressure switch calibration (2ICP-36-PS221-2) on March 8, 2022

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1, Manual Isolation and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)test, 1/2OST-44A.11A/B, train 'A' and train 'B', specifically the manual Control Room Emergency Air Supply Actuation Train 'A'/'B' push button test, on February 21, 2022 for 'A' train and March 7, 2022 for 'B' train

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1, 1OST-13.2, train B quench spray pump [1QS-P-1B] on February 28, 2022

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Red Team integrated drill major event sequence was loss of offsite power, dropped rod group with manual reactor trip, loss of coolant accident inside containment, containment radiation levels increase, then loss of containment and radiation release on March 10,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) ===

(1) Unit 1 for the period of January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021

(2) Unit 2 for the period of January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02)

(2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 for the period of January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021

(2) Unit 2 for the period of January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 for the period of January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021

(2) Unit 2 for the period of January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021

71152A - Annual Follow-Up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Reliability issues with Movable Incore Detector System at Unit 1 and Unit 2

71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000412/2021-003-00, Unacceptable Indications Identified During Reactor Vessel Head Inspection (ADAMS Accession No. ML21354A405). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.

(2) LER 05000412/2021-002-00, Unit 2 Automatic Reactor Trip and Automatic Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (ADAMS Accession No. ML21337A224). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.

(3) LER 05000412/2021-004-00, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip (ADAMS Accession No. ML22011A283). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153.

Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance during a Unit 2 transient that reduced power to 97 percent due to a cooling tower pump over current trip on February 25,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: Reliability issues with Movable Incore Detector System at Unit 1 71152A and Unit 2 The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Beaver Valley Power Station corrective actions to address reliability issues for the Movable Incore Detector System (MIDS) at both Beaver Valley Unit 1 and Beaver Valley Unit 2. The MIDS system is functionally the same at both Beaver Valley units, and utilizes five insertable fission chamber detectors to take axial neutron flux maps of the reactor core. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Licensing Requirements Manual specification 3.3.7 describes the functional characteristics for the system, which are during power ascension following a refueling of the reactor core, thirty-eight thimble tube locations are required to be accessible, with at least two locations in the same core quadrant. Following completion of power ascension to 100 percent full power, and once core conditions are stable, the number of required accessible thimble tube locations drops down to twenty-five, with at least three locations in the same core quadrant required to be accessible, for the system to be considered functional. Full core flux maps are required monthly by various technical specification surveillances during the fuel cycle. When a full core flux map is taken with less than thirty-eight core locations, a penalty is calculated by the core monitoring computer system, and applied to the thermal limit peaking factors specified in the Core Operating Limits Report for the current reactor fuel cycle. Non-functionality of MIDS during reactor startup has the potential to prevent completion of power ascension to 100 percent full power. Non-functionality of MIDS during fuel cycle operation has the potential for a technical specification surveillance for a full core flux map to not be completed within the specified time allowed by the surveillance frequency control program.

On March 11, 2022, the Unit 1 MIDS was functional with twenty-six core locations accessible for flux map readings including the "Calibrate" position, leaving a margin of two thimble tube locations before non-functionality of the system. The licensee has identified various causes for the reduction in the number of accessible thimble tube locations on Unit 1 during the current fuel cycle. The causes include failed fission chamber detectors, thimble tube leakage, and thimble tube blockage. Actions are ongoing to restore thimble tube locations to functional status on Unit 1. The Unit 2 MIDS was also functional on March 11, 2022, with forty-six thimble tube locations accessible. Eleven thimble tube locations were restored to functional status following thimble tube cleaning in the Unit 2 fall 2021 refueling outage. No performance deficiencies were identified by the inspectors.

Corrective Action References: CR-2021-04211, CR-2021-05894, CR-2021-08585, CR-2022-01246 Not adhering to written procedure results in a manual reactor trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.12] - Avoid 71153 NCV 05000412/2022001-01 Complacency Open/Closed A self-revealed Green NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Administrative Controls, Procedures, was identified when the licensee did not verify that the feed pump recirculating valves were locked open in accordance with plant startup procedures. This resulted in steam generator secondary side water level to increase and a manual reactor trip of Unit 2 on November 12, 2021.

Description:

On November 12, 2021, at 1007, during Unit 2 startup activities following the Unit 2 refueling outage (2R22), the reactor operator manually tripped the reactor due to secondary side high steam generator water level greater than 85 percent in accordance with BVPS-OPS-0024, "Transient Response Guidelines". Following the trip, operators recovered control of steam generator water level and stabilized the reactor in Mode 3.

Rising steam generator water level occurred due to main feed pump recirculation valves oscillating open and closed. The recirculating valves oscillated because they were not locked in the open position and moved on demand as the turbine valve testing caused the steam dump valves to oscillate open and closed. Each time the recirculating valves closed due to demand; the feed water pumps pumped more water into the secondary side of the steam generators. The plant startup procedure, 2OM-52.4A, Raising Power from 5 percent to Full Load Operation, steps 6.b. and 6.c, state to place the main feed pump recirculation valve key lock switches in the open position. These steps were initialed completed when in fact the key lock switches for 2FWR-FCV-150A and 150B were in the auto position and not in the open position as required by procedure.

The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program (CR-2021-08663 and CR-2021-08670). They conducted an initial investigation and review per NOP-LP-2601, Procedure/Work Instruction use and Adherence. Subsequently, an event review was conducted in accordance with 1/2-ADM-0703, Event Review. The licensee determined, based on its human performance investigation, that operators did not adequately use the human performance tools: self-checking, verify and validate, proper 3-way communication, and procedure use and adherence. The review and initial investigation concluded that the apparent cause was operators did not adhere to the plant startup procedure and the direct cause was leaving the feed water recirculating valves in the auto position instead of placing them in the locked open position. Licensee corrective actions included: change the procedure to include an action verb in the step and implementing an operations leadership plan.

Corrective Action References: CR-2021-08663, CR-2021-08670

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that not verifying the key lock switch for 2FWR-FCV-150A and 150B was placed in the locked open position, in accordance with 2OM-52.4A, Raising Power from 5 percent to Full Load Operation," was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, on November 12, 2021, the licensee failed to follow plant procedures and verify key lock switches were in the open position for the main feed pump recirculating valves before proceeding with turbine startup and valve testing during plant startup and lead to a manual reactor trip.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Based on the licensee's human performance investigation, operators used control board indication, which only provides the current position of the valves, to base a decision and sign off the procedure that the valves were in a locked open position. Operators did not use appropriate human performance tools during implementation of the of the applicable startup procedure.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1, Administrative Controls, Procedures," states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following activities:

a. The applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.

Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978, Section 3 lists procedures for startup.

Licensee procedure 2OM-52.4A, "Raising Power from 5 percent to Full Load Operation," was established to cover activities for startup. Procedure 2OM-52.4A directed that the key lock switches for 2FWRFCV-150A and 150B be verified in the locked open position.

Contrary to the above, on November 12, 2021, the key lock switches for 2FWRFCV-150A and 150B were not verified in the locked open position. This resulted in steam generator secondary side water level to increase above 85 percent and caused a manual reactor trip.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On March 11, 2022, the inspectors presented the Reliability issues with the Movable Incore Detector System at Unit 1 and Unit 2 inspection results to Mr. Mark Manoleras, Director, Site Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On April 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. John Grabnar and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Corrective Action 2021-01186

Documents 2021-02608

22-00519

Procedures U1/U2-OST-45.1 Extreme Cold Weather Protection Verification Revision

2dsssss

71111.04 Drawings RM-0411-001 Valve Oper NO Diagram Low/High Head Safety Injection Revision 23

RM-0424-001 Valve Oper No Diagram Feedwater System Revision 20

RM-0424-002 Valve Oper No Diagram Feedwater System Revision 20

RM-0424-003 Valve Oper No Diagram Feedwater System Revision 16

Procedures 1OM-24.4.W Emergency Use Of [1FW-P-2] Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Revision 3

Pump

1OM-53A.1.2-K Dedicated AFW Pump[1FW-P-4] Startup Revision 4

1OST-24.2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test [1FW-P-3A] Revision 58

1OST-24.3 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test [1FW-P-3B] Revision 55

1OST-24.4 Steam Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test Revision 65

1OST-24.7 Dedicated Auxiliary Feed Pump [1FW-P-4] Test Revision 18

1OST-24.9 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump [1FW-P-2] Operability Test Revision 63

2OST11.2 Low Head Safety Injection Pump [2SIS*P21B] Test Revision 34

RM-0424-002 Valve Oper No Diagram Feedwater System Revision 20

Work Orders 200618427 Inspection of chain operated handwheel

200640863 Retorque MOV packing

200798277 Install Safety Tether on Chainwheel Hub

200798278 Install Safety Tether on Chainwheel Hub

200819451 AFW Pump FW-P-4 Test

200825078 Dedicated aux FW panel 2 pb not working (to display the

motor outboard bearing temperature)

200851923 Threaded Operator Stripped

200852945 Template schedule Loop/Calibra/Check

200852956 Lubricate valve operator per PMP

200859369 Sample both pump oil reservoirs

200873583 Obtain oil sample from each motor lube oil reservoir

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.05 Corrective Action 2022-02256

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Procedures 1/2-ADM-1900 Fire Protection Program Revision 48

1/2-ADM-1901 Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plan Administrative Control Revision 4

1PFP-DGBX-735- Pre-fire Plan for Diesel Generator 2 Room Fire Compartment Revision 2

DG-2 1-DG-2

1PFP-INST-705- Pump Cubicles, Pre-Fire Plan Fire Compartment 3-IS-1, 2, 3, Revision 2

Pump 4

1PFP-INST-705- Pre-Fire Plan Fire Compartment 3-IS-6 Revision 2

SCREEN

1PFP-SRVB-713- AE Switchgear Room, Pre-Fire Plan Fire Compartment 1-ES-1 Revision 3

AE

1PFP-SRVB-713- DF Switchgear Room, Pre-Fire Plan Fire Compartment 1-ES- Revision 2

DF 2

BVPS FSA Beaver Valley Fire Safety Analysis Report Revision 2

U1/U2-ADM-1900 Fire Protection Program Revision 48

U1/U2-ADM-1905 Control of Transient Combustible and Flammable

71111.06 Miscellaneous Design Analysis PAB Flood Level Resulting from REJ-18 Failure 12/16/1987

Calculation 8700-

30-19

Procedures 1-MSM-M-33-300 Unit 1 Flood Seals Visual Inspection effective

4/9/2018

1/2-PIP-M16 Unit 1/Unit 2 Penetration Seals Revision 11

71111.11Q Miscellaneous BV2 Power Block Fire, Lesson Plan G-OTLC-22-2S- Revision 0

PBFIRE_BV2

Procedures 1OST-30.6B Reactor Plant River Water Pump 1C Test on Train 'B' Header Revision 48

2OST-30.3 Service Water Pump [2SWS*P21B] Test Revision 53

71111.12 Corrective Action 2021-07409

Documents 2021-08199

21-09369

Miscellaneous Maintenance Rule Failure Evaluation for CR2021-070409 11/4/2021

Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation for CR-2021-07409 1/28/2022

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Unit 2, Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Reactor 9/15/2021

Control and Protection System (01)

Unit 2 Westinghouse Solid State Protection System Technical Revised

Manual 2/19/2019

Maintenance Rule Failure Review Form for CR2021-09360

Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator & Support Systems, System 26A Revision 8

Maintenance Rule

System Basis

Document

Work Orders 2008

71111.13 Corrective Action 2022-00415

Documents 2022-00801

Miscellaneous Risk Management Plan 2/25/2022

Job Safety Analysis 3/7/22

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 1/31/2022, T-0 Rev1 ICDP Profile

2CWS-21A/B/C/D Allis-Chalmers Motor Lift Plan

2CWS-21A/B/C/D Westinghouse Motor Lift Plan

Procedures 1/2OM-30.4A.E Unit1/2 River Water and Service Water Operation While Revision 6

Dredging Near Intake and Alternate Intake Structures

1OM- River Water/Main Intake Structure Loss Revision 9

53C.4.1.30.2

2OM- Service Water/Main Intake Structure Loss Revision 9

53C.4.2.30.1

2OM.39.4.O Spare Battery Charger Operationx for BAT*2-1 Revision 6

NOP-LP-2601 Procedure/Work Instruction USE and Adherence Revision 6

71111.15 Corrective Action 2022-00357

Documents 2022-00430

22-00661

22-01425

22-02020

Miscellaneous Temporary Log for Seal Leakage for EER 601345084 once

per 8 hrs

Visual Examination System Leakage (VT-2) for System 13 4/15/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Engineering Evaluation Request Notification 601345084 1/17/2022

Email from Robert Garver to Gwynne Eatmon on 2/17/2022,

regrading Safety Bushing Controlled Leakoff

1OST-47.2 completed

surveillance

on

2/24/2021

Calculation 8700- BVPS Intake Structure Cubicles Internal Flood Analysis Revision 2

DMC-3443

Procedures 1/2OM-48.1I Technical Specification Compliance Revision 37

1/2OST-30.21B Group 2 Flood Door Seal System Operability Check Revision 16

1OST-13.1 Quench Spray Pump (1QS-P-1A) Test Revision 47

1OST-47.2 Containment Penetration Verification Revision 45

2OST-47.3M Containment Penetration and ASME Valve Test - Work Week Revision 43

Work Orders 200802193

71111.18 Miscellaneous Procedure Approval Form, Diagnostic Process Guidelines, effective

Tracking no. 18-00589 02/27/2019

Procedure Approval Form, Initial Response, Tracking no. 18- effective

00550 02/28/2019

Procedure Approval Form, Initial Response, Tracking no. 18- effective

00535 02/27/2019

Procedure Approval Form, Diagnostic Process Guidelines, effective

Tracking no. 18-00601 02/28/2019

71111.19 Corrective Action 2022-01044

Documents

Corrective Action 2022-01250 Two of the sealants to be used for the seal replacement were

Documents expired

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings RM-0413-001 Valve Poer No Diagram Recirculation Spray System Revision 12

Miscellaneous TestOil Industrial Analysis for 2EGS-EG2-2-ER 02/11/2022

Vender Manual Colt Industries, Operation and Maintenance Manual for dated

2502.190-230- Emergency Diesel Generators 08/7/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

001

Procedures 1CMP-M-30-001 River Water Pump Overhaul Revision 15

1MSP-36.32-E No 1C Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor and 12/27/2005

Linestarter Inspection

1OST-30.2 Reactor Plant River Water Pump 1A Test Revision 67

1OST-36.2 Operating Surveillance Test, Diesel Generator No. 2 Monthly Revision 86

Test

2ICP-36-PS211-2 Diesel Generator 2-2 Rocker Arm Lube Oil Pressure Switch effective

Calibration 1/31/2022

2OST-13.3 Recirculation Spray Pump[2RSS*P21A] Dry Test Revision 15

Work Orders 200812266

200870816 Reactor Plant River Water Pump 1A

71111.22 Corrective Action 2022-00314

Documents 2022-01563

Procedures 1/2OST-44A.11A Areas Ventilation System - Control Area Operating Revision 16

Surveillance Test, Train 'A' Manual Isolation/CREVS System

Test

1/2OST-44A.11B Areas Ventilation System - Control Area Operating Revision 16

Surveillance Test, Train 'B' Manual Isolation/CREVS System

Test

1OST-13.2 Quench Spray [1QS-P-1B] Test Revision 50

71114.06 Corrective Action 2022-01973

Documents 2022-01990

22-01996

71151 Corrective Action 2022-01595

Documents

71152A Calibration 1RST-49.2 Power Distribution Limit Check 01/20/2022

Records 1RST-49.2 Power Distribution Limit Check 01/06/2022

2RST-49.2 Power Distribution Limit Check 02/03/2022

2RST-49.2 Power Distribution Limit Check 03/03/2022

Corrective Action 2020-05984,

Documents 2020-06555,

21-03866,

21-04211,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

21-05205,

21-05894,

21-07339,

21-07881,

21-08585,

21-08943,

22-00841,

22-01246

Miscellaneous ITS Beaver Valley Power Station, Improved Standard Technical 04/20/20

Specifications

LRM Beaver Valley Unit 1 Licensing Requirements Manual Revision 105

LRM Beaver Valley Unit 1 Licensing Requirements Manual Revision 95

Procedures ISIE-ECP-3 Flux Thimble Examination Program Revision 8

ML-FOP-013 Beaver Valley Flux Thimble Tube Cleaning Revision 1

Work Orders 200543039,

200645597,

200701649,

200763754,

200763896,

200796262

71153 Corrective Action 2022-01512

Documents

17