IR 05000324/1990014

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Insp Repts 50-324/90-14 & 50-325/90-14 on 900402-30. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint/Surveillance Observation,Operational Safety Verification,Rhr Pump 2C motor,10CFR21,LER Review & QA Program Implementation
ML20042G748
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/1990
From: Dance H, Ruland W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20042G740 List:
References
50-324-90-14, 50-325-90-14, NUDOCS 9005160040
Download: ML20042G748 (14)


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- UNITED STATES o

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION ll

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o 101 MARIETTA STRE ET, N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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.....f Report No. 50-325/90-14 and 50-324/90-14 j

i Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company j

P. 0.: Box 1551 i

Raleigh, NC 27602

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Docket Nos. 50-325~and-50-324

' License No. DPR-71 and-DPR-62~

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Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2

_j Inspection Conducted: April 2 - 30, 1990-j

~/!76 Lead Inspector:

h R. H. Ruland

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Date S99ned

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Other Inspectors:

W. Levis

'i D.'J. Nelson Approved By:

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H. C. Dance, Section Chief Eate Signed

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Division of Reactor Projects

.i SUMMARY

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Scope:

This routine safety inspection by the resident inspectors involvsd 'the areas of

maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verifica-tion, 2C RHR pump motor,10 CFR Part 21 inspection, in office Licensee Event Report review, Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation, and. integrated action olan (IAP) followup, action on previous inspection findings.

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Results:

In the areas inspected, one violation was-identified. A junction box cover was not replaced following maintenance resulting in the environmental qualification of two components being. voided, (paragraph 4.a).

An improvement was noted in the Tevinical Support area involving two items that were inspected.

More rigorous than had occurred in the past, (questioning and evaluation was noted to occur paragraphs 5, and 10.c).

F 9005160040 900507

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PDR ADOCK 0500

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An Inspector Followup Item-was identified to followup'and assess the licensee's-independent IAP Audit process, (paragraph 8).

Difficulties were experienced in Unit 2 when removing the 2B reactor feed pump'-

turbine from service.- Further inspection of this item will be performed ir, the nextreport,(paragraph 4.b).

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • K. Altman,--Manager Regulatory Compliance

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F. Blackmon, ManagerL-Operations.

  • S. Callis, On-Site Licensing Engineer

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T. Cantebury, k nager Unit 1 Mechanical Maintenance

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  • G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control

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M. Ciemnicki, Security _

R._Creech, Manager - Unit 2 I&C Maintenance J. Cribb,. Manager -' Quality Controlf(QC)

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  • W._Dorman, Manager - Quality. Assurance (QA)/(QC)

V. Grouse, Employee Relations j

J. Harness, General Manager - Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

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  • W.- Hatcher, Supervisor - Security

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A. Hegler, Supervisor - Radwaste/ Fire' Protection

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  • R. Helme, Manager - Technical Support J. Holder, Manager - Outage Management & Modifications-(0M&M)

k L. Jones, Manager - Procurement M. Jones, Manager - On-Site Nuclear Safety;- BSEP-R. Kitchen, Manager - Unit = 2 Mechanical Maintenance R

J. Leviner, Manager _- Engineering Projects i

  • W. Martin, On-Site Nuclear Safety

J. McKee, Manager - QA

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  • J. Moyer Technical Assistant to Plant General Manager i
  • J. O'Sullivan, Manager --Training-l
  • B. Poteat, Administrative Assistant to Plant General Manager a

R. Poulk, Manager - License Training- _

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  • W. Simpson, Manager Site Planni.or and Control

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S. Smith, Manager.- Unit 1 I&C Maintenance

  • R. Starkey, Vice President - Brunswick' Nuclear Project-

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  • J. Titrington, Manager - Operations
  • R. Warden,. Manager'- Maintenance-B. Wilson, Manager'- Nuclear Systems Engineering

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Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, i

engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel.: and security: force-

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-members.-

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  • Attended the exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used in the report are listed in the last paragraph.

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'i 2.

MaintenanceObservation(62703)

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The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and -

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reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes - and standards.

The inspectors also verified that::. redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts

were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were

.l used; radiological controls were proper;; fire protection was adequate;L quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification'

requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.

Outstanding work requests.were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave

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priority to safety-related maintenance.

The inspectors observed / reviewed oortions of _the following~ maintenance activities:

90-AGKE1 Rebuild 2B Nuclear Service Water Pump 90-AGMP1 0Ci4-FLT506 - Maintenance Instruction for SBGT and Control

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Building Filter System; SBST Carbon. Filter Replacement

90-AHFT1 Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor _K603C Low Voltage Power Supply Replacement

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The inspectors noted that both Unit-1-and Unit 2 were ableito obtain a'

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" blackboard" for their annunciator' windows in the control room on April'25,

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1990. This condition resulted from_ increased management awareness in this

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area and an aggressive program to track and repair lit annunciators.

Violations and deviations were not identified.

3.

SurveillanceObservation-(61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications.

Through observation, interviews., and record review, the j

inspectors verified that:

tests conformed to Technical Specification i

requirements; administrative controls were' followed; personnel-- were l

qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and

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complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test results and

proper return to service of equipment. The inspectors witnessed / reviewed i

portions of the following test activities:

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IMST-PCIS25M High Main Steam Line Flow

. Trip. Unit Channel A Calibration 2MST-HPC114M HPCI Steam Leak Detector Channel Functional Test 2PT-8.2.2C LPCI/RHR Operating. Test

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2PT 11.1.2 Safety Relief Valve Operating Test. A s A'and C.

l SP-89-049 c it 2 Maximum Extended Operating Domain Testing i

SP-89-049'was reviewed in detail in Inspection Report 325,324/90-15. _ The.

' t inspector observed the portion of this test that requires retirculation i

flow to be increased to approximately 104 percent of rated flow. Several; minutes after obtaining the high flow. a control room annunciator alarmed-indicating high temperature (greater than 210 degrees F) in one recircula-

tion pump n!otor generator' set.

However, temperature recorder,2-B32-TR-R626 i

. located in the control room back panel' area was not functioning and' had been out of= service-for some time'

This prevented the actual temperature

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from.being determined and the test was aborted.

.(A recirculation pump.

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trip occurs at 260 degrees F.) This: recorder is specified in SP-89-049 as.

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one whose data will be saved for the duration of the high flow portion of-i the test, since temperatures are expected to increase. at greater-pump _

speeds.

The. temperatures are not required for test acceptance criteria'..

Although not required by any licensee procedure, proper testing practice

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dictates that required / pertinent instrumentation should; be verified

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available prior to testing commencement. ' This was not 'done inythi' case.

Violations and deviations were not ~ identified.

4.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance l

with Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements:by. direct I

observations of activities, facility tours,. discussions with personnel,

reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.

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The inspectors verified that control room manning. requirements ' of-

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l 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control operator, I

shift supervisor, clearance, STA, daily and standing -instructions, and

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jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating l

trends and out of service safety systems to ensur_e that there were-no

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conflicts with Technical Specification Limiting Condi_tions'for Operations.

Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability and' that.

operating parametcrs were within Technical Specification limits.

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inspectors observed _ shift turnovers to: verify that continuity of system

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status was maintained.

The inspectors verified the status of-selected-

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control room annunciators, l

L Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified weekly by ensuring that:

each accessible valve in= the flow path was in its i

correct position; each power supply and breaker was closed for components.

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that'must activate upon initiation signal; the RHR : subsystem cross-tie valve for each-unit was closed with the power removed from the valve

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operator; there was no.e kage of major components; there was proper

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lubrication and. cooling

.cer available;- and a condition did not exist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.

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Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified

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operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument vaive.

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lineup, if accessible.

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The inspectors verified that-the licensei s health physics.

policies / procedures were followed.-

This included ~ observation of. HP practices and-a review of area surveys, radiation work permits; posting,

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and instrument calibration.

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The inspectors verified that:

the security organization was properly

manned and' security-personnel-were capable of performing their assigned

functions'; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the-

PA; vehicles were properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo : identification / badges; and

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personnel in vital ~ areas were authorized.

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The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position of certain containment isolation valves, checked clearsnces, and verified

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the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.

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a.

Junction Box Cover Open

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The inspector found the cover for junction box ESS-PN2 on instrument

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rack H21-P022 open during an inspection in the south RHR; room'in Unit 1 on April 12,1990.

This bn is used as a -termination point for IB32-PS-N018B and 1-CAC-PT-1257-28. The terminations are made on a GE model CR151D terminal block.

Coth.the pressure switch and the

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pressure transmitter are required. to be environmentally qualified.

The pressure switch isolates: the E11-F008, RHR -shutdown' cooling

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suction valve, on high pressure.

It is required by Technical ~

Specification 3.3.2 to be' operable in m des is 2 or 3.

The pressure-

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transmitter ~ measures suppression pot) nressure and is a Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrument.

During thf u time, the shutdown ' cooling suction valve was shut with the-power removed' as required by the

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licensee's prefire rackout procedures.

Additionally, the redendant-pressure transmitter was operable.

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The qualification' of the terminal block is documented in.QDP ' 71.-

Qualification of the block requires that it-be installed inia NEMAL3

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cr better enclosure.

With the junction-box cover open, the' qualifi-

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cation of the. terminal block-and, hence, the-pressure switchiand '

pressure transmitter are voided.

Initial licensee investigation revealed that the cover was opened as of' April. 10 1990, to perform 1MST-RHR27M.

The licensee theorizes that the cover was not-closed-

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and fastened following the MST.

The actual: safety significance of -

this event is minimal.

The shutdoon cooling suction. valve was

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already in its isolated position with its. power removed. The pressure.

transmitter is not in the licensee's Technical Specifications and the redundant channel'was operable..However, the inspector noted that

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four shift changes had occurred from the time that the cover was opened until. the1 inspector found? 1t. open.

Routine-tours by the-

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F operations staff and other licensee personnel-should have-found this.

't condition.

The failure to close the cover is a violatica of:10 CFR

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50.49 which rNuires that equipment impo. tant to' safety be qualified for the envi)onmental conditions for which it must perform;

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Violation: JunctionBoxCoverOpen,.(325/90-14-02).-

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_ Automatic Control: of the.2B Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Lost-

While* reducing power on April 15 -1990 to shift heater drain pumps on-Unit 2, the licensee lost auttmatic control-of-the 2B RFPT. Attempts;

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to gain manual control of the pump via controls on the RTGB were also..

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fhe licensee then chose to further reduce pump speed of-a the 28 RFPT and remove the pump from service by using-the local. speed; j

controller at the, pump.

In the. process-.of reducing RFPT speed, the'.

t pump's recirculation valve opened on low flow resulting in: a reactor

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vessel level pertubation.

The' momentary ;10w level. signal combined j

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with a low feed flow condition-resulted in a. runback of the reactor'

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recirculation pumps.

The runback condition was recognized : and.

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acknowledged by the operators.' Approximately.11 minutes after"the

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runback, the operatersDnoted that core flow had decreased such that

flow was in instability region C.

Flow had decreased to L.5.MLB/hr.

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Region C begins at 35-MLB/hr.

Oncet recognized, the operaturs took-

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-immediate action to-exit the region by increasing recirculation pump

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speed.

The licensee referenced their. appropriate' A0P and no -

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L instability indications were noted.

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The inspector's initial review of the above event revealed. the

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following discrepancies:

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No procedure existed 'to take local manual control of the feed

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pump.

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o A recirculation pump-runback should not' place core flow in the y

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instability region.

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s A plant incident report is being prepared to address these and Other -

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items concerning this event. The inspector will review this incident

report when issued and document.results in Inspection Report 90-17.

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l One violation was identified, k

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5.

2CRHRPumpMotor(62703)

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The-2C RHR pemp motor was overhauled oy a vendor (GE) during the recently

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completed Unit 2 outage.

On April 11.-1990, after being returned to,

service, an oil leak-in the vicinity of the motor upper bearing was.

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identified and documented on WR/JO 90-AHDU1.

The licensee's inspection

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revealed that the upper oil reservoir was: cracked with oil leaking.through the. crack at a rate of approximately one drop every' ten minutes.

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crack is:approximately four inches long on the bottom of the oil reservoir,

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below.the drain. plug. 'The inspector's review of previous WR/J0s revealed.

that this motor has had:a' history of oil leaks dating back to 1986.' WR/JO

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86-AJZS1 first-documented oil leaks on July ~31, 1986.- (This WR/JO was tne

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subject of'a' violation in Inspection Report 89-01.) -Followup inspection on September-30,.1987, resulted in the documentation of.three. cracks in j

the reservoir.

A Technical Support memo dated September:30, 1987, stated e

that no operability concerns existed, since the oil 11eakage: had existed-for some time without degradation to the. motor.

On November 16 1987, WR/JO 87-BJIU1'was written documenting the oil leakage'again. -This. time

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pinhole leaks in the. reservoir were' described..Another Technical. Support-

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memo-dated Notember 16, 1987, was issued stating that no short term-

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i liabilities ' existed.

The pinhok leaks were apparently. in: the same

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l locatior, as :the previously identified cracks. 'The crack. identified; on April 11,1990, appears to be the same defect as previously documented.

Technical Support again issued a memo to adoress this! issue.

Technical Support Memorandum 90-0226, dated April 13,.1990, evaluated the' condition

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in much greater depth than in the previous cases.

Specifically, seismic-concerns, '30-' day operability, fire hazard, and degradation - to windings-were considered -_ without prompting from the inspector.

The licensee-concluded that the motor was operable,: but recommended that the motor be r

operated as little as possible ' to minimize thelpotential forJ oil contamination of the windings.

Further, Technical _ -Support requested l

Operations to notify them whenever the motor is operated so that_ followup:

a inspections can be perforitad. - Reservoir repair / replacement' is being-

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planned.

The inspector found no discrepancies in-the licensee's

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evaluation.

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This case, with the same condition'being documented and evaluated on three-l p

occasions, enables a comparison of Technical Support response. _-The April J

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13, 1990 evaluation demonstrates more thorough.and aggressive participation:

than was apparent several years ago.

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'The inspector reviewed the motor rebuild' Specification No. 128-011._(ECCS, I

RHR, and CS Pump Motors Maintenance and Rework).- The specification required

that there be no leakage' from oil : reservoirs: following. rebuild.

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licensee stated that this requirement was based solely on the history of.

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oli leaks evident on.the _2C RHR motor, although a description of the

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documented cracks / pinholes was not included.

The licensee is currenfly l

~ negotiating with GE for additional motor repair.

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During the review of this item, the inspector utilized the' licensee's computerized Automated Maintenance Management System.(AMMS). This system

provides - access < to -hardware information and material: history.

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case, the inspector accessed previous WR/J0s on the 2C RHR motor which

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revealed the history 'of oil-leaks.

Although Technical Support was well

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' aware of the. oil leakage,. AMMS-was ' not employed' during preparations _for

'i the motor' overhaul for historical. perspective. Therefore, the documenta.

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tion of cracks / pinholes was overlooked. Thc inspector. concluded that this'

had no bearing on the eventual ortcons but observed that the capabilities'

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of AMMS may not be ful_1y utilized by the licentee,

Violations and deviations were not identified.

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10 CFR Part-21 Inspection (36100)

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An inspection was performed to -verify'that the licensee has established a=

i program,l procedures,"and controls implementing the regulations of 10 CFR-Part 21..

The 11r:ensee's program is' established and implemented by Regulatory-Compliance Instruction RCI-06.4~,-' Revision -4, BSEP Compliance -

with 10'CFR 21.

The inspector reviewed RCI 06.4 and~ determined.that the

regulations of.10 CFR 21 were fully implemented. - Site entrances:were'

observed for required posting of-requisite documents.

2 Procurement

documents were randomly reviewed for specification of. the application of'

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10 CFR 21 provisions.

No discrepancies were noted.

Two records were -

reviewed _ of an evaluated non-conformance not resulting in a 101CFR 21-

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report to the Commission to verify the conclusion:that'a' reportable; evont

did not occur.

No' discrepancies were noted.- The reviewed' records.were:

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'89-025 Diesel Generator Engine Driven Jacket Water Pump Failures e

90-008

. Class 1E and Non-1E Equipment' Associated-with-RCIC System

l Not Fully HELB Qualified Violations and deviations were not identified.

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InOfficeLicenseeEventReportReview(90712).

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l The below listed LER was re ewed to verify that the information provided met NRC reporting requirements._ The verification included ahquacy of n

l event description and corrective action taken or planned..'existance of

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potential generic problems, and the relative safety significance of the event.

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E-(CLOSED) LER 2-90-02

'roup 1 Isolation on Low Condenser Vacuuai, a

Violations and deviatioru were not identified, hp

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-IAP Followup (92701).

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In. response to questions concerning the licensee'sz method to ensure adequacy and effectiveness of closed IAP items (Inspection Report 90-11),

l the licensee is developing independent' audit processes.. By using both onsite and offsite personnel the licensee will conduct-periodic' reviews to ensure that the IAP items are actually-completed and that--their' related

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programs / procedure-are effective in bringing about intended improvements..

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The inspectors will continue'to followup en these audit processes; IFI:

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Followup on Implementation anu Effectiveness of Licensee's Independent IAP l

AuditProcesses,(325/90-14-01.and324/90-14-01).

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. Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35592)

An internal office evaluation was conducted on April 26, 1990,;of the

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licensee's. quality assurance program ' implementation ~ by reviewing' recent

inspection reports, SALP reports,- open item:;. licensee corrective actions-

~for NRC inspection findings, and licensee event reports.-Particular i

emphasis was placed on all new - items or. Tindings. since' thel last SALP

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report period (September '1,1998 through August ' 31, ~ 1989)~

It was-

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recogniz"d that a significant number ofilAP followup inspections are currently scheduled during this' SALP period.

Recommendations were made

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to maintain inspection efforts at the current level.

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10. ActiononPreviousInspectionFindings(92701)

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(CLOSED)

IFI' 325/87-17-03 'and 324/87-17-03, Workmanship Concerns.

-l Prior workmanship concerns resulted in the licensee-responding to the

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NRC' in letters dated August-27 ~, 1987,- September ~29, 1988, and February 14,'1989, concerning initiatives-undertaken by the licensee

'to improve the quality of workmanship at JBrunswick. ' Training,

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procedural enhancements, 'and increased management presence in the power block were among the corrective actions:put in. place to resolve f

this issue. Based on routine inspections such as those documented in

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Inspection Report 90-07, the above-measures = have not been. totally -

effective in improving workmanship.

This report provided numerous

. examples where work activities were not properly completed the first time, resulting in a large number of deficiencies identified by both

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licensee inspection personnel and NRC inspectors.

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This area is inspected'on a routine' basis.'during the rarmal inspection process.

As problems are found, they 'are documented ' and the

appropriate enforcement action is taken. :The junction box cover-left i

open in Unit 1 following an-MST is an ' example of 'such a case in'which poor workmanship practices' resulted in the issuanx of-a violation.

(See paragraph 4.a for further details.)' Accordingly, this inspection 1.

item is closed, as further inspection in this area w11,1 be performed in future routine inspections.

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(CLOSED)

IFI 325/87-36-06-and 324/87-37-06, Complete Implementation of SDV Operability Test.

This' item concerned. remaining actions:

i necessary to complete. licensee-comittr#.s related to-IE Bulletin j

80-1/, Failure of Control Rods to Inst i t Ouring a SCRAM lt a BWR.

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TI-2515/90, ulnspection of Licensee's. Implementation of v'ltiplant-Action Item B-58, S RAM Discharge' Volume. Capability, was' inspected in-Inspection Report 50-325,324/87-29l and subsequently closed in LInspection. Report 50-325/87-36, 50-324/87-37.

When close",1 the -

i licensee committed to making several: procedure revisions which ~were specified in Inspection Report 50-325/87-36, 50-324/87-37.. Operating Instruction 01-22~ : Plant Incident and: Post Trip Investigation,J was

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revised October 23,1987 (Revision 015),' as comitted. The inspector reviewed the = revision and - current 1 revision -(Revision- 021). and verified completion of the: licensee's comitment.

Based on the

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inspector's review of h' toric : files, standing Instructions and Temporary Caution Tags: a s implemented as-comitted.

These were-subsequently. deleted foll-ing completion of the final comitment, implementation of Revisioc O to the'E0Ps, April 4,:1988.

The inspector verified that. E0P instructions currently exist to

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ensure-that after' a SCRAM, closure of SDV vent and' drain valves -is verified prior.to bypassing the SDV high level trip. - Permanent

. caution tags have been_ placed to ensure this action.in cases _of SCRAMS not resulting in E0P entry (i.e., outage testing),

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(CLOSED)

URI 324/87-43-06,. RHR Service Water _ Gasket Leak. - Previous i

inspection results and other information related to RHR service water gasket failures are contained in. Inspection. Reports 88-24 and 89-12.

After the latest gasket failure, the licensee performed a comprehensive design review to determine =the design. parameters for the high pressure flanged joints in the system and the appropriate materials that would satisfy these parameters.

The licensee's evaluation, which-is documented in EER 89-0199, dated Septenber 21, 1989, included calculations to determine' maximum and average tensile stresses for different joint sizes, examination and testing cf gasket materials by the Harris ~ E&E Center, discMsions with

.several vendors, and actual pressure testing of differentLgasket-l types.

The evaluation ' concluded that the EPDM gaskets in the.,high pressure portion of the RHR Service _ Water-System may ' not. have.

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sufficient tensile strength at the system's maximum design operating

pressure.

Furthermore, the use of nylon reinforcement material in the

EPDM had little effect an gasket performance because of the compressive

, j stresses that exist in the.-joints. The failure of these gaskets was also determined to be' time dependent and the failure would ocar

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gradually as the gasket extrudes from the joint.

The failure of j

the gasket should be predictable by monitoring the leakage from the

joint.

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Based on'this information, the licensee replaced the gaskets in the high pressure portion of the RHR Service Water System in Unit 2.during-the last outage with gaskets constructed of-Kevlar with an EPDM binder. This material is rated at 2500 psi tensile stress and~has an internal pressure rating of 1200 psi at 291 degrees F.

The gaskets-for the high-pressure joints in the Unit 1 RHR-service ~ water system-are-. scheduled for replacement during the upcoming refueling outage l

scheduled to begin September 8, 1990.

The licensee concluded that operation of the unit in the interim time period was acceptable based-orimarily' on the time c'opendency of the gasket's-failure. mode.

The-psket is expected to leak before it fails.

In addition,'although the.

material has a 150 psi internal pressure rating, the rating. includes the time-dependency of the materia 11(material degrades.with age) and i

its potential application in h%her temperature-systems. -In addition :

I the gaskets used in the high: pressure portion of_the system'in-Unit 1-are relatively new having been. replaced during the'last refueling outage.

!

The licensee is also monitoring; the1high pressure joints during the operation of the; system and noting any leaks that are found.

The j-leaking gaskets are evaluated by' the system; engineer and replaced

with the new gasket type, if necessary.

Since this monitoring was

' initiated, 5. joints have been idantified as leakingL resulting in

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replacement of 2 of the gaskets.

j The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions following:the

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latest gasket failure were prudent.

The: % sign'was challenged and i

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testing, analysis, and evaluation of existit g conditions was performed Gaskets were replaced in one, unit 'and reasonable - compensatory

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I measures were put in place in the:other unit until the remainder. of '

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.the gaskets can be replaced.

d.

(CLOSED)

IFI 325/88-39-02, HPCI Steam Exhaust Line CheckoValve Performance.

The ILRT was completed -cn; Unit 2 without any: repairs -

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necessary for the HPCI steam exhaust line check valve.

In addition, the HPCI steam admission valve was replaced during the last: outage

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which should prevent me pressurization'and subsequent banging of the

valve. Direct inspections have shown no further. problems in this area.

j e.

(CLOSED)

IFI 325,324/90-11-01, Seismic' Qualifications of Misaligned-I Contacts.

This-item. concerned misaligned contacts in DC.MOV MCCs.

The licensee concluded that seismic qualification is not hampered by:

the contacts being mi.saligned.

In fact, the misalignment results'in increased contact pressure and, hence, improved current carrying capability.

The licensee conducted. bench testing utilizing a used contactor previously removed..from an MCC.

With the contacts-in the.

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correct position, they' did-not become misaligned: through 14,400 cycles.

While misaligned in each ' position, tne contactor was '

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The licensee concluded that the only adverse affect of misaligned contacts

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is to somewhat reduce contact life ~ due to the_ slight' change.in geometric. relationship between the. movable and stationary contacts.

A revision to OPM-BKR005, Preventive Maintenance of GE 125/250 VDC--

MCC and' Switchboard Components. was made -to ensure proper: contact

i alignment-is maintained.

Violations-and deviations were not identified.

11. ExitInterview(30703)

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The inspection-scope and findings were summarized en April 30, 1990, with those persons-indicated in paragraph,1. ' The inspectors described the -

areas inspected and discussed'in deta_il the. inspection findings listed below and in the report summary.- Dissenting comments were not received'

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from the licensee. - Proprietary information. is not contained in-this;

report.

Item Npher Description / Reference Paragraph

'325,324/90-14-01 IFI - Followup on Implementation and Effectiveness of Licensee's' Independent IAP Audit

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Processes,(paragraph 8).

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325/90-14-02 VIOLATION - Junction Box Cover 0 pen, (paragraph-4.a).

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11. Acronyms.and Initialisms

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AMMS Automated Maintenance Management Systems

A0 Auxiliary Operator

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A0P Abnormal Operating Procedure BSEP

' Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

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BWR Boiling Water Reactor.

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CS Core Spray

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DC Direct Current E&E Energy & Environment ECCS Emergency Core -Cooling System EER Engineering Evaluation Report c

l E0P Em v;nacy Operating Procedure l.

EPDM-Ethjlene Propylene-Dipolymer

l ESF Engineered Safety Feature

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'F Degrees Fahrenheit e

t GE General Electric HELB'

High Energy Line Break HP Heaith Physics HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection

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IAP Integr6ted Action Plan l

I&C Instrumentation and Control

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NRC Office of-Inspection and Enforcement IFI Inspector: Followup Item

ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test i

IPBS-Integrated Planning,-Budgeting _and Scheduling

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LER Licensee-Event Report

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LPCIs Low Pressure Coolant Injection MCC'

Motor Control Center J

MLB Million Pounds

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M0V Motor Operated Valve

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MST.

Maintenance Surveillance Test

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i NEMA National Electrical Manufacturer's Association

.NRC'

. Nuclear Regulatory Commission r

'01 Operating-Instruction OPM Operating Procedure Manual

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PA Protected Area PSI Pounds per. Square: Inch PNSC Plant Nuclear Sefety Coniittee QA Quality' Assurance QC Quality Control

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QDP Qualification Data Package j

RCI Regulatory Compliance Instruction

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RCIC Reactor Core Isolation' Cooling

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RFPT Reactor Feed Pump Turbine RHR Residual Heat Removal RTGB Reactor Turbine Gauge Board

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SBGT Standby Gas Treatment SDV

. Scram Discharge-Volume

SRV Safety Relief. Valve.

STA Shift Technical: Advisor

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TI Temporary Instruction

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TS Technical ' Specification URI Unresolved Item

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'VDC Voits Direct Current

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'WR/JO Work Renuest/ Job Order

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