ML20043A535
| ML20043A535 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043A534 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-90-13, 50-325-90-13, NUDOCS 9005220211 | |
| Download: ML20043A535 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1990013
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UNITED STATES -
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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MAY i 4 B90
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Report Nos.: 50-325/90-13 and 50-324/90-13
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Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
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Raleigh, NC -27602
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Docket Nos.:
50-325 and 50-324
License Nos.:
,
Facility Name:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Inspection Con u ted: . April 2-
and 23, 1990
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Inspector:
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E~K.~$artor, Team Leader
Date Signed
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' Team Members:
K.' Clark, NRC
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W. Ruland, NRC
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. Testa, NRC
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. Haagensen, PNL
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Approve by:
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-( W.Eerg)encyPreparednessSection
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E. rgency Preparedness and Radiological
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Protection Branch
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Diviston of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
.;
This . routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
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the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Selected staffing and response of
the- emergency organizations 'in the Control Room, Technical Support Center,
Operational Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and Joint
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Inforn'ation Center were observed.
The exercise was initiated at 6 p.m. on-
April. 3,1990, and was full participation by the 10-mile emergency planning
zone (EPZ) counties, and partial participation by the State of North Carolina.
Results:
The111censee's scenario was difficult and challenging.
Licensee performance
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' observed was satisfactory regarding the identification and _ classification of
the simulated events, as well as accident mitigation. The significant problems
-that were identified by the licensee as well as the NRC addressed notifications
.of local response organizations and accountability of onsite personnel
(Paragraphs 6 and 11, respectively). The notifications and accountability
issues were identified as exercise weaknesses to which the licensee conanitted
to demonstrate early corrective actions. The strength of the exercise was the
,
9005220211 900514
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< areas; asr requir.ing; corrective , actionn - The11mplementationtofc the; corrective? 'e
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
,
- C. Blackmon, Jr. , Manager Operations
- T. Dunn, Communications Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
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- H. Goodwin, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- J.. Harness, Plant General Manager
- J. Harrell, Manager, Projects
- R. Helme, Manager, Technical Support
- M. Highsmith, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
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- B. Houston, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- R. LaBelle, Shift Operating Supervisor
- B. McFeaters, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- J. Moyer, Technical Assistant
- T. Pierce, Controller / Evaluator, Corporations Support Center
- W. Simpson, Manager, Control and Administration
- S. Smith, Operations Support Center Leader
- R. Starkey, Vice President, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
- R. Warden,-Emergency Repair Director
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
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engineers, operators, security force members,
technicians, and
administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- W. Ruland, SRI
- Attended exit interview
- 2.
Exercise Scenario (82301, 82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, state and
local emergency plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed
with licensee representatives on April 2, 1990. The exercise scenario was
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challenging and provided for the demonstration of exercise objectives that
fully exercised the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the
licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to the state and
local governments for their participation in the exercise.
The scenario
included a small-break LOCA into containment, the failure of the drywell
vacuum breaker, the failure of all high-pressure emergency core cooling
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systems and- the failure of normal and emergency depressurization
capability resulting in significant core damage.
The exercise was
terminated when the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) were opened to
allow emergency alternate depressurization and low-pressure emergency
,
coolant injection to reflood the vessel and cover the core.
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No violations'or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibility for
emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and
that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A. and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made
for the licensec's emergency response organization and there were adequate
staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial
response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives
from-the emergency organization notification checklist contained in the
Plant Emergency Procedure 2.6.21
Emergency Consnunicator.
Although the
emergency communicator in the Control Room demonstrated procedural
adherence, considerable problems were encountered in eugmenting the
emergency organization with the notification checklist.
On numerous
occasions, a responder designated to fill an emergency _ position _ would
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inform the emergency connunicator that they were not participating in the
exercise and 'the connunicator should call someone else who had been
designated as an exercise participant.
The next telephone call-to the
referenced participant often went unanswered because that individual was
prestaged.
As a result, the Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated
with the designated participants in the TSC, while the emergency
communicator in the ' Control Room was still attempting to locate some of
these participants to tell them to _ respond.
The licensee critique
identified the prestaging as a deficiency, stating that the exercise
objective to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures. for alerting,
notifying, and mobilizing the emergency response personnel could not be
effectively demonstrated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and
effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements to
accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency
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Operations Facility (E0F) had been made, and that other organizations
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capable of augmenting the planned response had been identified as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific
criteria in'NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
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~ Representatives from the State of North Carolina were accommodated at the
near-site E0F. Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt and
assistance resources from various agencies were available in the simulated
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emergency.
The exercise included a medical drill requiring the simulated
transport of a contaminated injured worker to Dosher Hospital.
Although
the phone call and transport to Dosher Hospital were simulated, the
Southport Rescue Squad responded to the site and assisted in the simulated
emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
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-This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency
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classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility
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licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
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Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An inspector observed that the emergency classificatiom system was in
effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the
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Implementing Procedures.
The system appeared to be adequate for the -
classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures
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provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the
simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)-
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established
for notification by'the licensee of State and local response organizations
and emergency personnel; that the content of initial and follow-up
messages to response organizations had been established; and that means to
provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure
pathway had been - established, as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix
E,
Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been
established 'to provide information concerning the simulated emergency
conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations; however,
the offsite notification messages contained numerous inaccuracies- and
confusing narrative descriptions of the emergency.
For example, the
inaccuracies and confusing narrative of the initial notification message
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for the site area emergency (SAE) resulted in numerous message readbacks
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and a message transmission time of approximately twenty minutes. This may
have contributed to the failure of the emergency communicator to follow
procedures and use an alternate phone system to notify Brunswick County of
the SAE when they failed to answer the roll call on the selective
signaling system.
As a result, the official notification of the SAE from
the licensee to Brunswick County was not made until 40 minutes after the
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emergency classification.
This licensee-identified deficiency and
NRC-identified exercise weakness requires early demonstration of
corrective action.
The licensee indicated their corrective action would
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include numerous communication drills as well as a limited exercise that
would _ emphasize' the management of offsite notifications to ensure timely
notifications- that were correct, concise, and transmitted to all required
agencies.
This limited exercise will be conducted to support the
FEMA-required remedial exercise for offsite agencies to correct the FEMA.
deficiency addressing the inadequate affected geographic zone descriptions
contained in the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) message.
Exercise Weakness 50-325, 324/90-13-01:
Failure to provide clear,
concise, and correct initial and follow-up notifications to offsite
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agencies, and-failure _to ensure all required offsite agencies receive the
notifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
~7.
_ Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications among. the licensee's emergency response facilities and
emergency organization and between the' licensee's emergency response
organization and offsite authorities were good with the exception of the
selectiv- signaling telephone to Brunswick County as noted in Paragraph 6.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Public Education and Information (8?301)
This area was observed to determine that information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public-as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Paragraph IV.D and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654 Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the
exercise.
The information included details on how the public would be
notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergency.
A
rumor control program was also in place.
An Emergency News Center (ENC)
was established and was well equipped and coordinated.
'No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency f acilities and
equipment to. support an emergency response were provided and maintained as:
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and
specific criteria.in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
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The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of the
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emergency response facilities, and evaluated equipment provided for
emergency use during the exercise.
a.
Control Room - An inspector observed that control room personnel
acted promptly to initiate response to the simulated emergency.
Emergency _ procedures were readily available and the response was
effective.
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b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and staffed-
upon notification by the Emergency Coordinator of the simulated
emergency conditions leading to an Alert classification.
However,
some personnel prestaging caused confusion to the emergency
communicator performing callout notifications as previously discussed
in Paragraph 3.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was staffed promptly
upon activation by the Emergency Coordinator.
An inspector observed
that teams were formed promptly, briefed and dispatched efficiently,
d.
Emergency Operations Facility - The E0F is located onsite in
the Training Center.
The facility appeared to be adequately
designed, equipped and staffed to support an emergency response.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. 'AccidentAssessment(82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and
equipment _for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program includes both an engineering assessment of
plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and
offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
The TSC staff aggressively pursued accident mitigation actions in response
to scenario challenges. They attempted parallel path repairs and creative
fixes that demonctrated the technical staff's ability to identify
alternative system configurations and emergency actions to mitigate
consequences.
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No violations or deviations were identified,
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11. Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions
during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and
in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including
evacuation of nonessential
implemented promptly 'as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(personnel, were10) and specific criteria in NUREG-0654
Section II.J.
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'An inspector verified the licensee had and used emergency procedures for
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formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations
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within the 10-mile EPZ.
The licensee's protective action recommendations
-(PARS) were consistent with the EPA and other criteria, and notifications
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were made to the appropriate State and local authorities within the-
required 15 minutes.
The inspector observed the accountability of onsite personnel and noted
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that an adequate system to account for the personnel in the protected area
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did not exist.
The security officers never checked the list of personnel
in the protected area against the actual personnel who were in the
emergency response facilities or assigned to in-plant repair-teams.
The
plant procedure relied on work center supervisors to conduct a sight check
of all personnel reporting to the parking lot.
This relied on the
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supervisors to recall from memory all personnel who were at the site on
this particular day and report any exceptions to security.
The licensee
acknowledged the area as a deficiency requiring corrective action.
Exercise- Weakness 50-325, 324/90-13-02:
Failure to demonstrate an
adequate system for accountability of personnel during an emergency.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. ExerciseCritique(82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and
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weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization -were
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formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.E,
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and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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A ' formal licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was held on
April 5, 1990, with exercise controllers, key exercise participants,
licensee management and NRC personnel attending.
A total of twelve
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deficiencies were identified as a result of the challenging scenario and
aggressive observations of their exercise staff.
Follow-up of the
corrective actions taken by the licensee to correct the identified
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deficiencies will be accomplished through subsequent NRC inspections.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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13.
Federal Evaluation Team Report
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee
and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the
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activities of the offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded
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by separate correspondence.
14. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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a.
(Closed)InspectorFollow-upItem(IFI) 50-325, 324/88-37-01-
Failure. to meet TSC exercise objective.
The TSC adequately
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demonstrated the capability of providing accident assessment and
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mitigation.
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b.
(Closed) IFI 50-325, 324/88-37-05:
No timely posted RAD status
boards. The RAD status boards were posed timely and correctly during
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the exercise.
c.
(Closed) IFI 50-325, 324/89-13-01:
Failure to conduct an 'off-year
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exercise with 'a scenario which permitted an improved emergency
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response capability.
The scenario developed for this exercise was
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innovative and' challenging, fully demonstrating the licensee's
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ability to conduct an exercise which leads to an improved emergency
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response capability.
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15.
Exit Interview (30703)
Subsequent to the licensee's critique, but prior to the team leader's exit
interview, licensee management committed to demonstrating early corrective
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action for two deficiencies.
The two deficiencies were:
(1) the failure
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to demonstrate adequate onsite accountability- and (2) the failure to
demonstrate the capability to notify offsite authorities of an emergency
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classification within 15 minutes.
The team leader acknowledged the
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commitment and then summarized the inspection scope and findings on
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April 5,1990.
The licensee was informed that the challenging scenario
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and aggressive self-evaluation was a significant improvement over the
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previous year's exercise.
The team leader also acknowledged that an
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improved emergency preparedness program should result from the licensee's
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corrective actions taken in response to their identified deficiencies.
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The team leader discussed numerous observations by the inspection team,
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and discussed in detail the two exercise weaknesses described below. The
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licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to
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or reviewed by the inspectors during this exercise.
No dissenting
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comments were received from the licensee.
Item Number
Description / Reference
50-325,324/90-13-01
Exercise Weakness - Failure to provide
adequate
offsite
notifications
(Paragraph 6).
50-325,324/90-13-02
Exercise Weakness - Failure to conduct an
adequate ar. countability (Paragraph 11).
16.
Post-Exercise Meeting Summary
On April 23, 1990, the State of North Carolina hosted a Brunswick Task
Force Meeting at the New Hanover County Public Library in Wilmington,
The meeting agenda included a discussion of the April 3
Brunswick exercise activities, a review of the FEMA critique of the
exercise, and a discussion of the deficiencies and remedial actions
required to demonstrate corrections.
a.
Remedial actions agreed on to demonstrate corrections ' to FEMA
deficiencies addressed a limited communications exercise of
approximately three hours duration on June 23, 1990.
representatives indicated that would support the exercise from the
Brunswick Steam Electric- Plant with objectives to demonstrate
adequate notification message formulation, approval, transmittal and
verification of receipt.
Notifications will progress through a
General Emergency with PARS so the' corrective action to the FEMA
deficiency addressing the adequacy of EBS message geographic
boundaries could be demonstrated.
It was also agreed that at least
one of the notifications to a county via the selective signaling
system would be locked out such that the licensee would be required
to use an alternate means to make the notification to that county,
b.
Additional discussions concerning the Brunswick County E0C and
dosimetry mix availability to offsite responders were also discussed.
These issues are FEMA-related and no further discussion is provided
in this report.
c.
Meeting attendees included:
E. Wathen, Lead Planner, State of North Carolina Division of
Emergency Management
D. Summers, Director, New Hanover County Department of Emergency
Services
J. James, Radiation Emergency Coordinator, State of North Carolina
Radiological Protection Section
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T Dunn,' Comunications Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness,
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H. Goodwin, Project Specialist, Corporation' Emergency Preparedness,-
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B. Houston, Emergency. Preparedness Specialist,-Brunswick' Steam
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. Electric. Plant CP&L;
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T. Hawkins, Technical Hazards Program Specialist, FEMA-Region.IV.
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'W. Sartor; Senior Radiation Specialist, NRC Region.II
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' Attachment: .
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Scope;and'0bjectives,and-
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. Narrative. Sumary --
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
PLAN FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT EMERGENCY _ EXERCISE
-)
APRIL 3, 1990
1
1.
MISSION AND PURPOSE OF EXERCISE
To
activate
and
evaluate
major
portions
of
emergency
response
capabilities and other elements of the CP&L Brunswick Steam Electric
)
Plant Plan, associated implementing procedures,' and the CP&L Corporate
Emergency Plans in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Regulation 10CFR50.47(b).
,
II. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
,
A.
Scope
A simulated accident at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP)
wnich could escalate to a general emergency and will involve planned
response and recovery actions to include: emergency classification;
notification of off-site organizations and plant personnel; actions
to correct the emergency conditions; and initiation of' accident
assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the
accident.
The exercise will simulate an emergency that results in
off-site radiological releases which require responses by state and
local government pftrsonnel (state participation will _ be limited to
those functions necessary to support implementation of county
plans).
B.
Objectives
The 1990 Brunswick Emergency Preparedness Exercise will provide an
opportunity for emergency response personnel to:
1.
Demonstrate _ the capability of on-site personnel to effectively
utilize'the emergency' action level scheme.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the control room staff in control
and
accident
mitigation
activities
along
with
accident
assessment.
% 3.
Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting, notifying,
and mobilizing emergency response personnel (some individuals
l
will be pre-stated within the local area).
- 4.
Demonstrate that communications capabilities exist to accomplish
notification of off-site agencies.
- 5.
Demonstrate the capability to notify off-site authorities within-
15 minutes of the emergency classification.
1
l
_ 6.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the information provided in the
i
initial notification, as well as follow-up notifications to the
'
state and counties.
-1-
(90-002HRG/ebc)
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l:
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. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - - - - - _
--
- _ - -
- - - - - _ - - - - - _ _
- _ - - - _ - - _ _
h , '
,
.-
7
,
'7.
Demonstrate -the
capability of. personnel
to
activate
the
Technical
Support
Center.
Operations Support
Center,
and
Emergency Operations Facility as described in the emergency- plan -
and procedures.
8.
Demonstrate the transfer of responsibility between emergency
'
response f acilities as described in the plan and procedures.
9.
Demonstrate the capability to communicate between emergency
response facilities.
10. Demonstrate the adequacy - of the Operations Support Center in
providing manpower support and coordination.
11. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in
providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment,
and communication / notification activities.
-12. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Operations f acility in
coordinating off-site utility activities.
13. Demonstrate recordkeeping requirements as described in the plan
l
and procedures,
i
14. Demonstrate that status boards are maintained and updated,
j
15. Demonstrate
the
capability
to
provide
adequate
radiation
protection
services
such
as
dosimetry
and
personnel
monitoring.
16. Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring
activities and assessments.
17. Demonstrate the capability to support the radiological assessment
process while maintaining personnel radiation exposure as low as
reasonably achievable.
% 18. Demonstrate the capability to perform on-site accountability
within
30
minutes
from
the
time
of v the
order
for
accountability.
19. Demonstrate the capability to provide safe on-site access to off-
site
emergency
services - and/or
support personnel
(normal
security access procedures will be adhered to).
20. Demonstrate those NRC identified open items resulting from the
1989 BSEP exercise.
-2-
(90-002HRG/ebc)
1
1
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..
,
Narrative Summary
The initial conditions for this drill ar' " nit I at 100% power with
i
no equipment out of service.
Unit 2 la a refuel with CRD removal in
progress for rebuild. During *veo*43 cf the control rod drive one of
the maintenance workers is injured, requiring transport to Dosher
.
hospital. An UNUSUAL EVENT will be declared due to transport of a
potentially contaminated person off site.
The first hour of this-
drill will focus on transport of the individual and installation of
the control rod drive. One hour into the drill the main breaker for
480V motor control center ITK will trip due to a fault on the bus
bars of MCC 1TK. MCC 1TK feeds 120V distribution panel 1D-TB2 which
will f ail three out of four Turbine Building supply f an exhaust
dampers to the common supply plenum. The main steam tunnel will
begin to heat up due to loss of ventilation flow until a main steam
line isolation and reactor scram occur to the operating unit.
Reactor water level will drop to 112 inches and HPCI and RCIC will
automatically start and recover water level to normal.15 minutes
after the reactor trip the high side tap for the HPCI steam line high
1
flow detection device will break causing HPCI to isolate and creating
an unisolatable small break LOCA.
The small break LOCA will require
an ALERT to be declared and activation of the TSC. This small steam
line leak will erode the piping and steadily grow larger as the event
progresses, but will remain within the capacity of CRD and~RCIC.
When suppression pool cooling is placed in service,a gasket _ leak will
develop on the RHR heat exchanger outlet valve E11-F002B, forcing
this loop to be secured. The drywell temperature and pressure will
slowly increase for the next hour and 30 minutes until suppression
chamber pressure exceeds 13 psig where the emergency operating
procedures will require initiation of drywell sprays. When drywell
L
sprays are initiated the Reactor Building to suppression chamber
vacuum breakers (CAC-X-20A and CAC-X-20B) will open to relieve the
negative pressure. These vacuum breakers function similar to check
valves and upon opening the hinge pin breaks on CAC-X20A and the
valve disk is wedged under the setting surface of the inboard
MSC/90-0010
i
i
r.
I
'-(l*;-;.
..
?
Narrative Summary (Cont'd)
isolation valve CAC-V16. This-results in a loss of primary
containment integrity which is the second fission product barrier to
,
- be breached and the event should be upgraded to a SITE EMERGENCY.
The Control Room indications of this failure will be fire alarms,
high temperature alarms, high radiation alarms, and drywell pressure
'
remaining low even though the steam leak still exist and drywell
,
sprays were secured.
During the next hour CRD and RCIC will maintain
vessel level but RCIC flow will have to be increased, despite the low
levels of decay heat, as the steam break size increases. The RCIC
oil cooler develops a tube leak which is not indicated in the Control
Room. Af ter one hour at- 2215 the RCIC turbine will seize. This will
be indicated by high turbine and bearing temperature alarms and low
pump discharge flow. The steam leak is getting larger and vessel
level rapidly falls. When ADS is manually or automatically initiated
all SRVs fail to open due to a common mode solenoid failure. With no
way to depressurize the reactor to inject with low pressure ECCS
pumps (core spray and LPCI) a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared. The
emergency operating procedures will-direct that the main steam line
isolation be bypassed and the reactor depressurized to the main
condenser.
When the bypass. jumpers are installed and the MSIVs are asked to go
open, fuses will blow to the AC and DC solenoids on the inboard
MSIVs. The cause of the fuse blowing will be a ground on the inboard-
'MSIV 1-B21-F022C, with its AC and DC solenoids seeing moisture
accumulation generated from the steam leak and drywell sprays. While
the cause of the HSIV failure to open is being repaired, vessel level
decreases to the bottom 1/3 of core causing significant fuel damage.
The ground fault will be removed and some MSIVs will then open,
allowing low pressure ECCS to reflood the core.
The drill can be
terminated when shutdown cooling is placed in service, thus
A
terminating the release.
MSC/90-0010
,
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_ - _ ------_-_ _ _
_
-
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT
-
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..
ANNUAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
APRIL 3,1990
UNIT 1
ME
CLASS
UNIT 2
RELEASE
_
CONTAMINATED
.
-
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IN.7URY
-
~~
SUPPLY FANS
-
1900
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2000
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TORUS VACUt28
~l SITE EMERGE 55Y]
BREARER FAILS
-
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l RCIC TRIP
GENERAL EMERGENCY l
fADSFAILS
D Ott T
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2300
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