IR 05000324/1990017
| ML20044B080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1990 |
| From: | Dance H, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044B079 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-90-17, 50-325-90-17, NUDOCS 9007170282 | |
| Download: ML20044B080 (18) | |
Text
,. __._..
__.
....
__
,;
gOm -
.n
,
,
,
p ;-N g6a nas.,
. UNITE 3 STATES l'.y P., [. 4 *f 'l l
'
REGION 11 1{ ---
NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION
"
.a
,
b t
H 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.Wi
[)j + 1 '
,
,
J
'
ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323 J
!
- g
- ...*
Report Nos.:' 50-325/90-17 and 50-324/90-17
,
-Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P.'O. Box 1551 -
Raleigh, NC 27602
,
l Docket (ios.:i 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: OPR-71 and DPR-62
.
Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2
' Inspection Conducted: May 1 - 31, 1990
,-
Lead-Inspector: [2 8~,
AA_
d/2//90
-
W.-H. Rula'nd
/ ~ //
D' ate Signed Other Inspectors: _ ' D.- J. Nelson W. Levis c
i m.
Approved By:
Y d'e Mgr 90
-
i.
H. ' C.
ence, Section Chief DpeJigned
, ',
React ' Projects Branch 1
'
'
Division of~ Reactor Projects SUMMARY ~
c
,
' Y
' Scope:
,
This' routine safety. inspection by the resident inspector involved the areas of'
,
maintenance. observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verifica;
'
,
'
tion,;2D residual heat removal' service water pump mechanical seal. degradation, loss of ~ offsite power to emergency bus E3, Licensed 0perator Requalification
-
' Program and Operational Evaluations, onsite Licensee-Event Report review, and action on previous inspection findings.
'
,
,
,
'
'Results:
i
.w y
,
'
'In the" areas inspected, one non-cited. violation was identified - failure to
- establish. adequate procedures for operating and surveillance of the diesel
,, ace generator' ventilation supply dampers pneumatic operating system (Paragraph
,5.a).
Two unresolved -items were identified.
The first involved the potential past inoperability' of the control building emergency air filtration system due to inaccurate differential pressure measurement in a surveillance test and the
. determination that a makeup damper would not fail safe upon loss of power
'(Paragraph 3).
The second unresolved item involved the inadvertent loss of 9007170282 900621
{DR ADOCK 05000324 PDC
<
,
'
UF
.,
Ll,
!
,
.. -
"
offsite power to emergency bus E3 and resultant emergency diesel generators and
, engineered safety features actuations.
The initiating event was caused by personnel.performingcorrectivemaintenance(Paragraph 8).
_,
An inspector identified deficiency on the 2D residual heat removal service water booster pump resulted in a mis-diagnosis of the problem and a communica-
~ tion problem within the maintenance organization (Paragraph 2).
Unst dactory results from Licensed Operator Requalification and Operational Evalutcion examinations resulted in a voluntary shutdown of both units (Paragraph 7).
,
,
-i i
\\
I
'
.' 4
,.:
i
,
REPORT DETAILS
'1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- K. Altman, Manager - Regulatory Compliance F. Blackmon, Manager - Operations
_
- S~. Callis,-0n-Site Licensing Engineer
T. Cantebury, Manager'- Unit 1 Mechanical Maintenance
.G. Cheathami Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control
,
M. Ciemnicki, Security
-
R. Creech,-Manager
. Unit 2 I&C' Maintenance
.
J. Cribb, Manager - Quality Control (QC)
V. Grouse, Employee Relations i
- J.. Harness, General Manager -. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant i
W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security
A..Hegler, Supervisor - Radwaste/ Fire Protection
- R. Helme, Manager - Technical Support J. Holder, Manager-OutageManagement&hodifications(0M&M)
L. Jones, Manager - Procurement M. Jones, Manager - On-Site Nuclear Safety - BSEP R. Kitchen, Manager - Unit 2 Mechanical Maintenance
- T. Kosmatin, Corporate QA J. Leviner, Manager - Engineering Projects
- W. Link, Senior Specialist Investigations - Regulatory Compliance
- L. Martin, Interim Manager - Training J. McKee, Manager - QA
- J.-Moyer, Technical Assistant to Plant General Manager
- P. Musser, Manager Maintenance Staff - Maintenance
- H Pollack, Corporate QA B. Poteat, Administrative Assistant to Plant General Manager R. Poulk, Manager - License Training
- W. Simpson, Manager - Site Planning and Control S. Smith, Manager - Unit 1 I&C Maintenance
- R. Starkey, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
- J. Titrington, Manager - Operations Support
- R. Warden, Manager - Maintenance
- D. Whitehead, Corporate QA B. Wilson, Manager - Nuclear Systems Engineering Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, enginet 3, Ee:hnicions, operators, office personnel, and security force members.
- Attended the exit intervi m i
Acronyms and initialisms used in the report are listed in the last paragraph.,
-
.
-
-
-
,
e 7 :,
"
.'
'
i
'
'
2.
MaintenanceObservation(62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications.: and applicable industry
,
codes and standards. The inspectors also _ verified that:
redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were
-
used;E radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were adequate and observed;. adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was-properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.
The inspectors observed / reviewed partions of the-following maintenance activities:
90-AECII EDG Exhaust inner Heat Shield Inspection
,
i 90-AFYC1 1A CSW Pump Motor Replacement 90-AIQZ1 2A CSW Pump Motor Troubleshooting 90-RIR211 Clean and -Inspect 2F-SF-CB, Control Room Supplj Fan i
89-ANPH1 PT-12.3.1, 18 Month EDG Inspection 89-ASTF1 Replace Drain Valve on B21-LT-N026B OPIC-0PT-004 Calibration of GE Type 555 Differential Pressure Transmitter On May 29, 1990, at approximately 9:30 a.m., the inspector noticed an unusual condition on RHR SW Pump 2D. On the painted white floor adjacent to the pump was a heavy coating of dry, black residue in a pattern that suggested it was sprayed from the pump's mechanical seal.
The pump was running at the time and had been running for approximately two days. The inspector _ suspected the residue to be graphite from the mechanical seal, but noticed no seal leakage.
The residue was previously wet as indicated by water drop patterns on the floor and surrounding structure. Therciore, the condition had existed long enough for the water to dry. The inspector questioned the Unit 2 Senior Control Operator who stated there were no known problems noted with that pump.
An A0 and subsequently, a mechanic were sent to investigate.
The mechanic reported that the condition was accumulated oil slung from the pump, which was a normal result of starting
- a pump after being idle for some time. Unaware of the mechanic's report, the inspector returned to the still running pump and observed the mechanical seal'.s rotating face assembly alternately stop and start rotating on the j
a
.
..
<
.
,
1 puro shaft.
(The assembly should be firmly secured to the shaft.)
The-inspector suninoned another A0 in the vicinity and pointed out the seal probl em.. The control room was contacted and the_ pump was secured af ter-
,
starting another pump to support shutdown cooling.
When the 2D pump motor was-de-energized, the rotating face assembly suddenly stopped and then moved axially along the shaft back and forth several times as the pump coasted down. Set screws on the rotating face were found loose and backed
,
out. Operations subsequently initiated LC0 T-2-90-1016 and WR/JO 90-AJPY1..
t The WR/JO explicitly described the observed mechanical seal problem. The next day, mechanical maintenance personnel met with the inspector at the pump.
They explained that the coupling-flinger ring (located opposite
,
from the mechanical seal) was found loose, which explained the sprayed oil.
The inspector noticed the set. screws on the mechanical seal were
,
still loose and-pointed this out to the maintenance personnel.
They then acknowledged that a mechanical seal problem existed.
The seal was
,
subsequently reset and the pump was run without any further problem.
-
This event has no safety significance since the pump remained fully capable with the degraded mechanical seal.
However, the NRC has several-concerns:
The existence of - the - graphite had been either -undetected or.
-
uninvestigated long enough for the water to completely dry out. The black residue on the white floor ".vuld have easily been detected and investigated by Operations pers nel on rounds.
Maintenance personnel drew the quick conclusion that since the seal
-
was not leaking, there could. be no seal problem;- therefore, the information _ from operations and on the WR/JO was considered to be.
inaccurate.
The graphite was clearly not oil, as reported.by maintenance, nor is
-
it normal for these pumps to spray anything upon starting after being
,
idle for some time.
The mis-interpretation of the problem persisted until Lthe inspector
--
pointed out-the-still loosened set screws on the seal a day later.
The Unit 2 maintenance supervisor acknowledged after-the fact that a communications break down occurred in this case.
Maintenance initiated a Maintenance Experience Report to learn from this event.
.i The inspector concluded that no violations occurred; however, this event illustrated the importance of accurate communications between plant organizations.
Maintenance personnel chose not to obtain first hand information from operators who observed the pump while running, but drew conciusions based on assumptions and after the' fact investigation.
Violations and deviations were not identified.
-
,
.
-
. :
,
,
'
L
.
3.
SurveillanceObservation(61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications.
Through observation, interviews, and record review, the inspectors verified that:
tests conformed to Technical Specification
-
requirements; administrative _ controls were followed; personnel were qualified;rinstrumentation was ' calibrated; and data was accurate and
'
complete._ The inspectors independently verified selected test results and
_
proper return to service of equipment.
T_he. inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test
!
activities:
)
IMST-RPS11W Main Steamline High Radiation Channel Functional Test IMST-RPS26M RPS High Drywell Pressure Trip Unit Channel Calibration
-
2MST-BATT11W 125_VDC Battery Operability Test 2MST-EFCV15R Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Instrument Penetration System Isolation Valve Functional Test
'
On May 11, 1990, during an engineering evaluation of the CBEAF System, the
!
licensee-determined that the normal air makeup damper, 2-VA-2L-D-CB, would not fail-safe upon a. loss of power to.its operating solenoid.
This condition is not in accordance with the required, design basis of the
.
' plant, and renders CBEAF IN0PERABLE.
In this condition the CBEAF outside air supply would not isolate when required coincident-with a loss of power to the - damper solenoid.
The licensee took compensatory action which-mechanically. disconnected the _ damper's. solenoid and secured the damper shut to; ensure that the system could perform its design function.
This
,
action was evaluated by EER-90-0118. The licensee made an appropriate NRC non-emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).
On May 26, 1990, during-the performance of Periodic Test OPT-46.4, Control
.
~
Building HVAC Auto Initiation, the air makeup damper described above was i
found approximately 30 degrees open instead of secured shut.
This condition rendered CBEAF IN0PERABLE without any coincident power loss.
'
The' licensee made another NRC non-emergency report and again secured the
-
damper shut. The licensee's investigation of how the damper came open was still under investigation at the close of the reporting period. The CBEAF test continued and, on May 29, 1990, was declared to have failed.
CBEAF could not establish a positive pressure relative to the outside atmosphere while operating in the recirculation mode as required by TS 4.7.2.d.4.
Based - on previous inspector's questioning of the accuracy of the differential pressure measurement (see Inspection Report 90-02), this performance of the test directly measured the differential pressura between the Control Building and the outside atmosphere.
Previously, the outside atmospheric pressure was measured in the Control Building stairwell just outside the control room.
The current test measured atmospheric p
l i
l l
p j
i
/*'
.....
,
\\
pressure via the control' room restroom plumbing vent which is connected i
' directly to the outside.
For comparison, measurements were taken from both locations simultaneously. The old method indicated positive pressure existed.
The new method failed.
Based on this, it is possible that previous successful tests were in error, a
a Subsequent to the failed test, the licensee discovered a leak path through-a restroom floor drain loop' seal.
After filling the loop seal, the test passed using the new measurement method. -The licensee is conducting an analysis to determine the impact on past operability of the CBEAF System
,
-
with - respect to the-flawed testing method.
Pending the outcome of-the licensee s analysis and results of the investigation of the damper re-positioning, this issue will be documented as an Unresolved item:
Potential Iraperability of CBEAF System (325,324/90-17-02).
>
Violations and deviations were not identified.
l 4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance with Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements by-direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
.The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control operator, shift supervisor, clearance, STA, daily and standing instructions, and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain.information concerning operating
,
trends and out of service. safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation, i
and recorder traces important to safety in order to verify operability and that operating parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system
- status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciators.
Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified weekly by ensuring that:
each accessible valve in the flow path was in its corract position; each power supply and breaker was closed for components that must activate upon initiation signal; the RHR subsystem
' cross-tie valve for each unit was closed with the power removed from the valve operator; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve i
lineup, if accessibl _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
>
.; y
-
.
.
6'
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health-physics policies / procedures were followed.
This included observation of-HP.
,
practices and a review of area surveys, radiation work permits, postings, and instrumerit calibration.
-The' inspectors verified that:
the secur'ty organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were chr.cked prior to entry into the protected area; vehicles were properly Guthorized, searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification
' badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and effective compeisatory measures were employed when required.
The inspectors also observed plant' housekeeping cor/.iols, verified -
position of certain containment isolation valves, che ked clearances, and
. verified tha operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.
The insrector noted in his review of the Unit 1 C0's log on April '30, 1990, that the bottom head drain to vessel dome differential temperature had not been recorded in'the operator's logs following restart of the A.
and B recirculation pumps on April 28, 1990. The pumps had been secured, one at a time, so that the motor generator exciter brushes could be replaced.
Further review showed that the applicable steps.in Section 5.2 of OP-2, Reactor Recirculation System Operating Procedure, Revision -20, which verified that this differential temperature was met prior to pump start, were marked as not applicable.
Technical Specification Surveillance 4.4.1.3 requires that the temperature differential be determined to be within the 145 degrees F limit 30 minutes prior to pump start.
The operators stated that they had verified the differential temperature requirement prior to starting the pumps, but. had misunderstood' the
-
cperating procedure regarding the necessity of recording the values in the procedure and in the C0's log. The inspector verified, through review of ERFIS data, that the differential temperature requirements were met prior to pump start.
The licensee has issued NCR S-90-029 to address the procedural problems ex 3erienced during this evolution.
Closeout of this NCR will be inspected n future routine inspections.
Violations and deviations were not identified.
5.
Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The below listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The verification included adequacy of event description and cerrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems, and the relati'.e safety significance of the event.
Onsite inspections were performed and
,
. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
- - - _ _ _ _ _ _
_-
_
_ _
__
_ _ _.
,
...
'
'.
.
concluded that necessary! corrective actions have been taken in accordance
-
with existing requirements, license conditions, and commitments, unless otherwise stated.
a.
(CLOSED). LER 1-86-33, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Design (Also Deficiency Identified During) Probabalistic Risk Assessment.
see Inspection Report 88-34.
The licensee found that instrument air for' each DG. cell supply damper would-be lost upon loss of off-site power.
The dampers would have then failed closed, reducing ventila-tion to all four diesel generator rooms.-
PM-86-084 was issued to-correct the design deficiency.
The supply dampers are now normally open and can be closed by manually applying' nitrogen pressure to the
.
. damper operators.
The nitrogen station, with two nitrogen bottles
'
and associated valves, is located in the AFFF room on the 50 foot
'
elevation in the DG building.
Several procedure changes were.made to accommodate the plant modifica-tion.
The. changes included adding certain new valves to the OP-37.4=
valve lineup, as well as adding operating instructions in the APP for the DG cell fire alarms, 0-APP-VA-27, Revision 12.
The inspector reviewed procedures, examined the new hardware, and interviewed personnel to determine if the new system was being.
operated and maintained correctly.
The inspector found that:
Each-APP required that an auxiliary operator be sent to the DG-
-
building when an alarm' occurs and,.once there, determine if a fire ' has occurred, perform five valve manipulations. and' have
.
the control room stop the supply fans if the-dampers ;cannot be-shut.
The inspector questioned whether the order-was correct.
Namely..should the fans be secured first, then shut the affected cell's dampers, then restart the fans.
The licensee agreed to re-evaluate the procedure.
The A0 at the - pneumatic nitrogen-station woulo not have a
-
procedure available for an evolution that had five steps.
No periodic surveillance test had been written for the 'new-
-
system.
The inspector found, on May 11, 1990, one nitrogen bottle at about 1000 psig and the other bottle had 0 psig. The
. licensee later confirmed that the bottle was empty.
OP-37.4, Diesel Generator Building Heating and Ventilation
-
System, Revision 14, dated April 23, 1990, did.not have the nitrogen bottle isolation valves or regulators in. the' valve lineup.
However, the annunciator panel procedure required the A0 to open the nitrogen bottle isolation valves, which implies that they are assumed normally shut.
The inspector found the bottle isolation valves open.
,
,
q
.-
,
.
The open and' closed' labels were missing on the nitrogen valve _.
-
Assuming the normal in-line convention (valve handle -
-
in line with pipe implies valve open), the operator could have still operated the system.
The above problems with the oper.iting procedure and lack of a surveillance test is a failure to establish adequate procedures.
,
This is a violation of TS 6.8.1.f, which requires that procedures be
-
'
established and _ implemented covering fire protection program-implementation.
The inspector was shown the licensee's'dordments that iniciated_the corrections'to the procedures.. The failure was an isolated occurrence.
The safety significance was minor since one nitrogen bottle was full
-
and the operators _could have secured the supply fans to help combat a-
,
A-fire.
Thus, the violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in section V.A. of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
Non-cited Violation:
Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures for DG Cell Supply Damper Operation (325,324/90-17-01)..
!
The inspectors concluded that the procedure review process by operations for this modification was inadequate.
The modification
'
did correct the initial design problem and, with the upgrade of the recirculation damper operation, should be fully functional.
b '.
(CLOSED)
LER 1-88-08, Fatigue Crack Failures of A and C Diesel Generator Building Ventilation ' Supply Fans.
The above failures occurred in the cast aluminum alloy blades of two of four DG supply fans. Liquid penetrant testing also showed linear indications on the B_ fan.
The D fan rotor had been previously replaced after 10 years service.
The licensee attributed the failures to excessive cycling of the fans.
This was caused by inadequate procedure-controls for fan operation and poor instrumentation. control of the ' fans.
The U
. licensee took adequate compensatory measures to provide: for DG
cooling during the fan outages.
At the time of the event, the inspector reviewed the licensee!s engineering evaluation for DG
,
operability and had no major concerns.
Permanent corrective actions instituted by the licensee included fan repair and replacement, a change to the control system to reduce fan cycles, and upgrading preventive maintenance.
The inspector found that current preventive maintenance for-the DG supply fans, while improved since the fe failures, had several deficiencies.
First, st4 ply fan vibration was not trended.
While maintenance was
obtaining vibration readings about every two months, the data was not forwarded to the engineering technician for entry into the computer trending system.
Second, the fan mounting was changed from spring vibration isolators to solid mounts under PM-88-018 without the change reviewed through the vibration monitoring program per ENP-2702.2. The system engineer, per ENP-2702.2, section 6.5, should i
<
d 0-
1--
'
9-j
"
have notified the predictive maintenance engineer or his designee of
'
the change in supports.
The inspector found no evidence of that notification.
Third, the licensee inadvertently deleted the route
,
'_
for NDE of the fan blades.
The licensee started the NDE as part of l!
.
the ' corrective action stated in the LER.
The route-had been
!
performed satisfactorily under procedure MI-10-502L.
That procedure' -
I
'
was upgraded to PM-FAN 502.
At about the time of the upgrade, the route that invokes the PM was deleted for yet unknown reasons. The licensee'has issued NCR-S-90-035 to resolve the issue.
<
Final corrective action for the fan control problem will be complete
'
upon implementation of PM-88-010, Diesel Generator Supply Fan Auto Actuation.-
That approved PM installs new temperature switches, relays', and pressure switches and changes the control of the fans,
,
all to reduce unnecessary cycling.
This modification will be I
installed after the DG building recirculation dampers get new
.i operators, which are on order.
The inspectors concluded that, while the VMP appears programmatically l
sound, in this case it was not implemented correctly. The fans have
!
been improved materially; however, had not been _ correctly monitored prior to the inspection, c.
(CLOSED)
LER 1-88-34, Loss of Secondary Containment During
!
Irradiated Fuel Sipping Due to Isolation of the Air Supply to the
!
-Reactor Building Isolation Dampers.
Inspection for the closecut of the violation that resulted from this issue is documented in Inspec-
!
- tion Report 89-20.
At that time, the only corrective action not in place was the installation of the modification on the Unit 2 dampers
,
that would divisionalize the air supply and allow the dampers to fail j!
closed on loss of air.
These features were installed by Plant Modification 89-004 during the last refueling outage and verified to a
be in place by the inspector.
k d._
(CLOSED)
LER 2-88-11, Failure of Residual Heat Removal / Primary Containment Isolation Inboard Isolation Valve E11-F009 to Open Due to
.
Failure of Reactor Pressure Switch B32-PS-N018A-1.
Inspection of i
'
this item is documented in followup to IFI 325/88-24-02, which is discussed in paragraph 8 of this report.
One non-cited violation was identified, i
6.
TMI Action Items (25165)
(CLOSED)
TMI Action Item II.K.3.28, Qualification of ADS Accumulators.
The NRC approved the design for the nitrogen backup system and the nitrogen pneumatic system in a letter and accompanying Safety Evaluation Report dated August 18, 1989.
Both systems are installed and operational in Units 1 and 2.
,
m
.ju
. #
'.
s'
"
g The purpose of the inspection was to verify that the appropriate l
procedures were developed / implemented and training was conducted to
!
ensure 'the proper operation of the system.
The inspector verified that '
j operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures and annunciator procedures included these systems and were readily available for the.
!'
operator's use.. Licensed operator requalification training also includes these two systems in their curriculum.
The inspector'also verified that
!
surveillance tests were developed and implemented to satisfy the
!
requirements of Technical Specification 4.6.4.2.2.
Based on these.
inspection results, the inspector concluded that' the necessary procedures-were developed and in place. Therefore, this item is closed.
Violations'and deviations were not identified.
7.
Confirmation of Action - Licensed Operator Requalification (92703)
The licensee and NRC conducted Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR)
)
~
testing on April 30 - May 11,1990.
The Requalification Program was evaluated to be unsatisfactory. The details are contained in NRC Examina-tion Report OL-50-325/90-1.
A CAL from NRC Region Il to the licensee
~
dated May 16, 1990, detailed actions to be taken by the licensee to assure the qualifications of reactor operators.
As specified in the CAL, the inspector verified that the licensee removed from licensed duties those-individuals who did not pass the LOR testing and that real time' training-to all licensed operators was given covering the major deficiencies noted
- during the LOR testing.
Subsequently, as -specified in the CAL, the licensee and NRC conducted Operational Evaluations on May 19 and 20,1990,-
of licensed operators not tested during the LOR testing.
The results.of this testing! are contained in NRC Examination - Report OL-50-324/90-2..
Based on unsatisfactory results, the licensee voluntarily brought both
' units to cold shutdown on May 21 and 22,1990.
Previously, both units
,
were at 100% pcwer.
A~second CAL dated May 21, 1990,1which superceded l-the May 16, 1990 CAL, confirmed the licensee's commitment to keep both L
units in cold shutdown until approval for restart is granted by the NRC Region-II Regional Administrator.
Also, the licensee committed to remove
'from licensed duties those operators who did not pass the Operational Evaluation, in addition to those previously removed as a. result of LOR testing..The licensee comenced a root cause analysis for the failures of the LOR and Operational Evaluation testing.
The-inspector verified that these actions were taken.
The inspector also verified that, at no time, l
L did the on-shift operating crew fail to meet the minimum TS manning requirements.
The units remained in cold shutdown at the close of the
'.
inspection period.
Currently, the licensee is conducting accelerated 1-training to requalify sufficient numbers of operators to enable both units to restart.
Testing for requalification is scheduled for June 9 and 10, 1990.
Further inspection will be conducted on this issue including determination of what enforcement action, if any, is appropriate, i
.
e t
,
-
. *
.
,
"
8._
Loss of Offsite Power to Unit 2 Emergency Bus E3 (93702)
,
, On May 30, 1990, with both units in cold shutdown, personnel were corrective maintenance on the SAT watt meter transducer to a
performing (The transducer was to be replaced.)
bus 20.
Transmission Maintenance l
c-Department personnel were assisting plant I&C personnel.
The transducer is located -in the Turbine Building 4160 VAC feeder breaker to bus 20 compartment.
An incorrect knife switch, one of several located in the:
- compartment, was opened to isolate the transducer from the 120 VAC control.
power.'
A voltage check revealed that voltage was still. present,-but the-i decision was made to proceed with the circuit energized.
Upon loosening
,
the first of six terminations on the transducer, a spark was seen which
'
resulted in the following:
s 120 VAC 5 amp fuse blew on secondary side of 2D potential
-
transformer. This de-energized the undervoltage relay for bus 20.
- Feeder breaker to bus 2D opened, de-energizing bus 2D and emergency l
-
bus E3.
All four EDGs started, t
-
The main stack radiation monitor trip circuit, powered from E3,
-
de-energized simulating a high radiation condition.
This caused Group 6 Primary Containment isolation, Secondary Containment isolation, and auto start of both trains of SBGT in both units.
Unit-2
"A" RPS bus de-energized causing A logic channel.to
-
de-energize, which caused RWCU suction isolation, redundant Primary and-Secondary Containment isolations including shutdown cooling -
isolation, and redundant single train SBGT start.
EDG 3 energized bus E3, remaining EDGs did not load since their -
-
respective emergency buses were still powered from offsite power.
-
After the initiating event, all of these actions occurred as designed.
Upon re-energizing E3 from EDG 3, the 2A NSW pump did not auto start as designed.
The instantaneous overcurrent relay was found tripped.
The relay was reset and the pump was started..The cause of this was still under investigation by the licensee at the close of the reporting period.
Unit 2 shutdown cooling was isolated for approximately 38 minutes during which time reactor vessel temperature rose from 120 to 126 degrees F.
Nonnal power was restored to bus E3 via bus 20 at 2:33 p.m.
Regardless of successful operation of EDGs, the NRC is concerned with all events of loss of offsite power.
In June, 1989, Brunswick Unit 2 suffered a loss of offsite power and manual SCRAM from 100% power due to a loss of the SAT.
During that event, offsite Transmission Maintenance personnel
.
-
-
-
-
I
'
^
.
.
12'
were also involved.
Pending completion of the licensee's investigation of I
the cause of this event-and cause of NSW pump 2A to not start, this issue
'
will-be documented as an Unresolved Item:
Loss.of Offsite Power to Unit 2 Emergency Bus E3 (325,324/90-17-03).
9.
l Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (92702)
[
'
a.
(CLOSED).
URI 325/88-15-02 and 324/88-15-02, Procurement ' of -
i Commercial Grade Items Intended for Safety-Related Applications.
Based on guidance provided in EGM90-03 dated April 23, 1990, no:
further inspection will _ be conducted in this area and this item.is, therefc,re, closed.
b.
(CLOSED)
IFI 325/87-42-09 and 324/87-43-09, Diesel Generator Building Supply Fan "A" Failure.
(Previously inspected in Inspection Report-88-01.)
The subject fan's blades failed by fatigue in December,
1987. - There are four supply fans and fan
"C" failed on March.1, 1988.
After the second failure, the licensee determined that the generic. problem was reportabl.e and submitted LER 1-88-08.
See paragraph 5.b for detail.s of the closeout inspection.
c.
(CLOSED)
IFI 325/88-24-02 and 324/88-24-02, ASCO Pressure Switch Failure.
The inspector reviewed the results of:the failure analysis conducted on the failed switch, ASCO model SC12CR/TG13A42R.
In addition another ASCO pressure switch of the same model, which'had
.
experienced a similar failure several months earlier, was examined.
The examination was performed by licensee personnel at the Harris E&E center and confirmed by an ASCO representative.
Inspection of the diaphragms did; not reveal - any ridge which was reported in the.10 CFR 21 report made by Yankee Rowe. The diaphragm did have a " dried out appearance and a-slight _ nipple in its center.-
This condition, however, was determined to be a type of compressive
>
set which occurs when an elastomer is pressurized and depressurized.
,
When the pressure switch was tested, it operated properly.
No root cause of the switch failure could be determined.
The licensee did find, however, a misapplication-of one of the range switches in one case.
This particular switch uses two snap switches with independently adjustable actuation setpoints. The switches have different ranges (0 - P38 psig vs. 0 - 200 psig) and the licensee found that, for one Unit 2 switch, the 0 - 188 range was used when an actuation pressure of 190 psig was required. The licensee corrected this situation by replacing i.ne switch with a single adjustment type with one adjustable range.
Other remaining dual adjustment applications were checked and no other discrepancies were found.
d.
(CLOSED)
IFI 325/88-29-01 and 324/88-29-01, Service Water Pump Motor Stator Temperature Resolution.
Inspections of this issue are documented in Inspection Reports 89-09, 89-12 and 89-14. As a result
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
. _ - _. _ - _ _ _ _
___
_
._-
__
,
- "
,
.
of-these inspections and others performed on the service water system,:a Notice of Violation and Imposition of Civil Penalty was sissued on January 26,.1990, for failure to take adequate corrective
. actions for identified service water deficiencies. The problem with high stator temperatures in the service water pump motors is listed as example "B" in the violation.
Further inspections of this issue will be performed in the closecut of violation 325,324/89-34-47, as discussed in paragraph 9.g.
e.
(CLOSED)
IFl 325/88-34-03 and 324/88-34-03, Incorporation of Maintenance Activities Affecting System Response Time Into Licensee.
'
Procedures.
The inspector reviewed-the revised operations and maintenance procedures which incorporated. Technical Support's.
recommended list of potential maintenance tasks which could affect system response time. - Section 8.4 of 01-39, Handling of Work Requests / Job Orders, Revision 11, and OMMM-13, Maintenance Surveillance Test User's Guide, Section 3.0 and Attachment 3, provide a list of systems which may require time response testing along with the appropriate guidance to determine what-testing shouldj be performed, f.
(CLOSED)
IFI 325/89-07-03 and 324/89-07-03, Provide Additional Guidance to Operators Concerning-Delta T Requirements. The inspector reviewed the operating' procedures for the recirculation system.. Unit 1 OP-02, Revision 20 and Unit 2.0P-02, Revision 67, were revised to provide necessary guidance to operators concerning the requirement to maintain the 145 degrees.F Delta T when increasing recirculation pump speed during single loop operation.
The inspector also reviewed documentation to-verify that appropriate training was conducted.
g.
(OPEN)
Violation 325/89-34-47 and 324/89-34-47,. Inadequate Design Control of Service Water System.
The inspector -reviewed the licensee s response to the Notice of Violation dated February: 26, 1990, along with the status of IAP Item D6, which addressed service water system design issues.
The following chart shows the status of the major corrective action items comitted to by the licensee along with identifying future NRC inspection areas.
Item Description IAP Item NRC Inspection Item Status Service Water TS Submitted to NRR Change Corrective Action D9, D10 89-34-23, 89-34-24 In Progress Program Enhancements 50.59 Review D11 89-34-25 In Progress Enhancements
!
. _.......
"
p:
'
.
,
,
,
L
- *
.
'
!
B
,
'1 Item Description.
IAP: Item NRC Inspection Item Status
,
'
.(Continued),
<
Improved Motor 6 Motors Replaced
.
Cooling _
with-Improved ~
- '
-
,
e Cooling Features Temperature D6(e)
SP-89-059 Monitoring Implemented.
!
Program
Established
'
Thrust Bearing /
Under Review Min. Flow Considerations SSFI Generic D7 89-34-05 Due-6/30/90 Issues Review Design D7 89-34-05 Due 12/91
.
Information i
Packages
Complete Install-D6(b)
Unit 2 Complete
'
ation of Unit 1 Scheduled Upgraded Upcoming Outage-
,
Crosstie Valves
!
Perform Service D6(g)
Completed Water SSFI
Issue Project D6(f)
Report Issued -
Report and Recommendations Implement Listed in Table 4 Recommendations of NOV Response Resolve SSFI E2 89-34-35 In Progress
Issues The inspector has verified, through review of documentation or direct inspection, that items stated as complete for examples A and B in the licensee's response have been accomplished.
Inspection reports 89-09, 89-12 and 89-14 also provide supporting' information detailing some modifications performed and any coinpensatory measures that were put in place until long term fixes were accomplished.
The following items require further inspection to close out this violation:
o Resolve thrust bearing / minimum flow issue.
o Install upgraded crosstie valves on Unit 1.
o Implementation of Project Report recommendations.
l
e
)
,..
3,
1 i
o Review Service Water SSFI results and.recomendations (may be
'
accomplished in part by IFI 89-34-35).
l Violations and deviations were not identified.
10.
ExitInterview'(30703)
,
'
The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on June 4,1990, with
.
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas-inspected and discussed in detail-the inspection findings listed
'
below and in the sumary of this report.
Dissenting coments were not
, received from the licensee.
Proprietary information is not contained in-
this report.
,
Item Number Description / Reference Paragraph,
,
325,324/90-17-01 Non-Cited-Violation - Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures for DG Cell Supply Damper
Operation, (paragraph 5.a).
325,324/90-17-02 URI - Potential Inoperability of CBEAF System, (paragraph 3).
..
325,324/90-17-03'
URI-Loss of Offsite Power to Unit 2 Emergency l
~
Bus E3, (paragraph 8).
{
\\
11.. Acronyms and Initialisms
!
ADS Automatic Depressurization System
AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam A0 Auxiliary Operator APP Annunciator Panel Procedures-ASCO Automatic Switch Company 3SEP Brunswick Steam Electric Plant-CAL Confirmation of Action Letter
..
CBEAF Control Building Emergency Air Filtration
~j CSW Conventional Service Water l
DG Diesel Generator
'DPT Differential Pressure Test E&E Energy & Environment
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EER Engineering Evaluation Report ENP Engineering Procedure ERFIS Emergency Response Facility Information System
,
ESF Engineered Safety Feature F
Degreo Fahrenheit GE General Electric
,
HP Health Physics HVAC Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning System i
-
,
_ _
_
_ _ - _ _ _ _ --
_ - _ _ _ - _ _ _
__
___ - _ __ _ - _ _
,
ef
-, 3
'
y.
- IAP Integrated Action Plan I&C Instrumentation and Control IE NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement j
IFI Inspector Followup Item
!
IPBS Integrated Planning, Budgeting and Scheduling j
LC0 '.
Limiting Condition for Operation
-
LER Licensee Event Report LOR.
Licensed Operator Requalification MI Maintenance Instruction MST Maintenance Surveillance Test NCR Non-Conformance Report
.
i NDE Non-Destructive Examination l'/./
!
NOV Notice of Violation NRCl Nuclear Regulatory Commission _
,
NSW Nuclear Service Water
!
-Operating Instruction OP Operating Procedure PA Protected-Area
!
PCIS Primary Containment Isolation System
PM:
.P1 ant Modification
,
PNSC-Plant Nuclear Safety Comittee i
PSIG Pounds per-Square Inch Gauge PT Periodic Test-
]
LQA Quality-Assurance
'
QC Quality' Control i
'RPS Reactor Protection System
,
RWCU.
i SAT Startup Auxiliary Transformer i
SBGT Standby Gas Treatment
-
.SSFI Safety System Functional Inspection
-
'
STA Shift Technical Advisor SW Service Water i
"
TMI Three Mile Island TS
. Technical Specification
-
URI Unresolved Item VAC.
Volt Alternating Current VDC Volt Direct Current
,.
(.
=VMP Vibration Monitoring Program
.WR/JO Work Request / Job Order
\\
l 4,
i
}
q+j-4q
>
k
'
- - - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _