IR 05000324/1987003

Safety Insp Repts 50-324/87-03 & 50-325/87-03 on 870201-28, 0303-04.Violation Noted:Failure to Maintain Unit 2 PWR Fuel Storage Capacity

ML20206D280
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	03/26/1987
From:	Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206D205	List: IR 05000324/1987003 ML20206D201 ML20206D241 ML20206D280
References
50-324-87-03, 50-324-87-3, 50-325-87-03, 50-325-87-3, NUDOCS 8704130291
Preceding documents:	ML20214V702 (20 May 1987)
Download: ML20206D280 (11)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  !

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, REGION 11 I g ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET. .

• t ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 a

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Report Nos. 50-325/87-03 and 50-324/87-03 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: February 1 - 28, 1987 and March 3-4, 1987 Inspectors:

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, H. Ruland 3/16/f7 Date Signed 9. @ LM W. Garner ,

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Approved by: . . 3 /2(> [87 g P4 Division E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Date Signed of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine safety inspection involved the areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verification, onsite Licensee Event Reports (LER) review, in-office LER review, followup on inspector identified and unresolved items, Limitorque Operators, spent fuel storage capacity, and refueling activitie Results: One violation - failure to maintain Unit 2 PWR spent fuel storage capacity, paragraph 11,

0704130291 870330 PDR ADOCK 0D000324 0 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS l

i 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project l C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project

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T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction J. Holder, Manager - Outages R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support E. Bishop, Manager - Operations l L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)-

R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control J. Smith, Manager - Administrative Support K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations

, W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor l B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor l B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor R.Creech,I&C/ElectricalMaintenanceSupervisor(Unit 2)

R. Warden, ISC/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA W. Hatcher Supervisor - Security R. Kitchen,MechanicalMaintenanceSupervisor(Unit 2)

! C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit

Otiler licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

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engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force members.

2. ExitInterview(30703)

l The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 3,1987, with

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the general manager and vice-president. The violation, excess capacity in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool (paragraph 11), was discussed in detail. The i inspector stated that the item was unresolved pending inspector discussion with regional managemen On March 4, 1987, the licensee was informed by

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the inspector that the spent fuel pool issue was a violatio The i licensee agreed to address the issue of board walkdowns/ reviews (paragraph 6) along with the response to the violation. The licensee l acknowledged the findings without exception. The licensee did not l identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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3. Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Not inspected.

4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that: redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were implemente The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to servic Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.

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The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities:

MP-09 Dryer / Separator, Cattle Chute, and Fuel Pool Gates Removal and Installatio OLP-NVT001 Topaz Static Inverter and Lambda Power Suppl WR&A-87-AGEB1 Repair of Unit 2 Annunciation Horn Circui During performance of work request 87-AGEB1, the inspector observed a communication problem between operations and maintenance personnel. At

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first, the annunciator horn being repaired, could not be silenced. Later, j the horn stopper' continuously sounding and would not sound when another

! annunciator came in. Operations was aware of this and took proper compensatory actions, e. g., assigned sections of the board to individuals to note when a new annunciator came in. The first problem was correctly conmunicated to maintenance; however, the change in symptoms was no Operations assumed the change was due to Instrumentation and Control (I&C)

trouble shooting activitie The inspector informed the maintenance personnel of the second item approximately 30 minutes after it happene Although the inspector was confident that the problem would have been fixed, the failure of operations personnel to recognize that a new condition existed versus a condition induced by I&C personnel performing trouble shooting or repair, was a concern. Inadequate communication can noticeably increase the length of time an unsatisfactory condition exist This matter was discussed with cognizant supervisio No violations or deviations were identifie <

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3 SurveillanceObservation(61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications. Through observation and record review, the inspectors verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complet The inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to service of equipmen The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

IMST-DG12R Diesel Generator DG-2 Loading Tes MST-APRM12 Average Power Range Monitor (APRM), (Ch. 8, D & F)

Channel Functional Test (Reactor Protection System (RPS) Inputs].

2MST-ATWS22M Anticipated Transcient Without Scram (ATWS) Reactor High Pressure Trip Instrument Channel Calibratio MST-RHR21M Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), Core Spray System (CSS) and HPCI Hi Drywell Pressure Trip Unit Channel Calibratio PT-1 Electrical Power Systems Operability Tes During performance of IMST-DG12R on February 17, 1987, the licensee identified that step 7.4.30 had not been performed correctly. The step requires stopping of the core spray pump while supplying rated flow to verify that the DG does not tri This is a surveillance requirement specified in Technical Specification (TS) .4.8.1.1.2.d.2. The operator reduced the flow prior to stopping the pumb. This is the method normally used to stop the pump as required by either the quarterly required Surveillance Test Procedure PT-07.2.4b, or the Operating Procedure OP-1 The licensee verified that during another performance of MST-DG12R, the step was satisfactorily performed. This item meets all the requirements to be considered as a licensee identified violation. The licensee is preparing an Operating Experience Report (0ER) to address the root cause of the communication failure between the I&C personnel in charge of the test and the control operator. The inspector plans to review the OER when issue This is an Inspector Followup Item: Review of IMST-DG12R ProcedureViolationOER(325/87-03-03).

One licensee identified violation and no deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707) )

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The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct

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. observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records and independent-verification.of safety. system statu ! The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR

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50.54 and the Technical Specifications were-met. . Control room, shift

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supervisor, and clearance logs were reviewed to obtain information-j concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure

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that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting

Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of control

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room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to a verify operability and that parameters were within~ Technical Specification

] limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity

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The' inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciators.

i Operability of ' a selected Engineered ' Safety Feature (ESF) train was -

i verified by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in

its correct position; each power supply' and breaker,. including control room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiation

signal; removal of power from those - ESF motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was. no

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1 leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling i water available; and a condition did. not exist which might prevent

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fulfillment of the system's functional requirements. Instrumentation i essential to system actuation or performance was. verified operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if

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j accessibl The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics J policies / procedures were followe This includod a review of area

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surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.

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The inspectors verified that: the security. organization was properly

{ manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned

functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the

! protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and

escorted within the PA; persons within the PA ~ displayed photo

identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and effective compensatory measures were employed when required.

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i On February 1, -1987, the inspector found a vital area door closed but !

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unlatche While an unauthorized person could have opened the door, the l i

security computer would have detected the intrusion, enabling the security j

> force to respond. The inspector reported the condition to security. A

{ security member responded in a timely manner, verified the condition and took action as require .

i The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified

! position of certain containment isolation valves, and verified ' the i operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.-

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On February 2,1987, the inspector observed the Unit 2 A and 6 trains of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system with loose blower and motor pedestal mounting rubber bushing retaining bolts. The licensee issued work requests 87-ADJIl and 87-ADJJ1 to correct the deficiency. The licensee inspected Unit I and issued work requests ADJK1 and ADJL1 to correct similar deficiencies on Unit 1 SBGT trains A and B. Technical support reviewed the "as found" condition and determined that the condition had not rendered the SBGT trains inoperabl On February 12, 1987, at 7:50 a.m., the inspector found valve 1-E11-F007B, the Division II RHR minimuni flow valve, open instead of closed. The valve had remained open after the licensee had performed OP-17, RHR Operating Procedure Section 8.7, draining the suppression pool to radwast Valve]-Ell F007B auto-opened when the RHR pump was started, but no procedure step existed to manually reshut the valve. Thus, the valve was in the position required by the last procedure performed on the RHR syste However, the licensee reported that the evolution had occurred two shifts prior to discover Therefore, three shifts and two shift turnovers failed to identify the mi:; positioned valv The Plant General Manager agreed to address this issue, weakness in board walkdowns and board review after valve manipulations, when responding to the violation issued with this repor This is an Inspector Followup Item: Inadequate Board Walkdown and Review (325/87-03-04).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)

The listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to verify that the inforr.ation provided met NRC reporting requirements. The verification included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of the even Onsite inspections were performed and concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitment (CLOSED) LER 1-86-13, Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System Start Due to Corrosion on Radiation Monitor Sensor Converter. The inspector verified that the applicable Maintenance Procedure, MI-26-11A, was revised July 29, 1986, to include inspection for corrosion as comitted to in the LE A sign-off on the data sheet was also provided to document the revie (OPEN) LER 1-87-01, Failure of Unit 1 HPCI System Turbine Steam Supply Valve E41-F002 to Open. The licensee discovered a failed auxiliary contact adder block assembly during the followup to the valve failur The auxiliary contact block assemblies are attached to the main contactor in each breaker compartment, with from one to six auxiliary blocks per breaker. There are over 3000 auxiliary contact blocks on site in both Q and non Q app'eications. The licensee sent several auxiliary contact blocks to General Electric (GE) for failure analysis. GE reported to the

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licensee that the supplied blocks (CR205X100E) failed because dimensional problems caused excess wear of the movable plunger, allowing the plunger to eventually stick inside the block, preventing the contact and thus the valve from movin Further licensee investigation revealed a potential generic problem with the auxiliary cor. tact adder block. Maintenance record searches by the licensee turned up over 50 potential auxiliary contactor problems since 1982. GE has redesigned the auxiliary contact adder block (new part N CR305X100E) and it appears that the new design is not susceptible to the binding problem. Further inspection of this item will be conducted after the licensee issues an LER supplement due May 22, 198 (CLOSED) LER 2-86-13, Failure to Prcperly Verify Reactor Protection System (RPS) Shorting Links Installed During Testing Causes Full RPS Trip During Refueling. The in5pector verified via the training report that members of the I&C crews were trained on proper verification of installation of the RPS shorting link The training class syllabus adequately addressed the item. It required class participants to field verify that the shorting links were in plac (CLOSED) . Level Scram During Pipe Flushing Due LER to 2-86-16, PersonnelAutomatic Error. TheLowinspect Water,'or verified that the lesson plan associated with the committed real time training satisfactorily discussed the circumstances surrounding the event and the lessons which can be learne (CLOSED) LER 2-86-24, Inadvertent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Actuation During Refueling Outage Due to Personnel Error. The inspector reviewed the documentation which demonstrated that new tags were installed. The inspector visually verified that the tags were in place on the Unit 1 Division ECCS inverters and power supplies on February 24, 198 No violations or deviations were identifie . In Office LER Review (90712)

The listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The verification included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existance of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of the aven (CLOSED) LER 1-86-17, Late Performance of Required Hourly Fire Watche (CLOSED) LER 1-86-18, Output Breaker EPA-2, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator 1A, Tripped Unexpectedly to De-energize RPS Bus A; Cause - Undetermine .

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(CLOSED) LER 1-86-23, Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperability of the Unit 1 Reactor Core Spray Subsystem B and RHR Low Pressure Coolant Injection Loo (CLOSED) LER 1-86-32, Failure to Functionally Test Relay TR/2 in Logic Channels A2, A4, B2 and B4 Primary Containment Isolation Instruments B21-TS-3229-3232; Procedure Deficienc (CLOSED) LER 2-86-04, Primary Containment Group 6 Isolation / Automatic Isolation of Reactor Building Ventilation System and Automatic Starting of Standby Gas Treatment System Occurred; Cause - Electrical Shortin (CLOSED) LER 2-86-07, High Radiation Alarm Trip of Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor D12-RM-N010B; Due to Electrical Grounding of the Monitor Power Lea (CLOSED) LER 2-86-09, Upscale Trip of Instrument Trip Unit to Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation Monitor D12-RM-N010B: Cause Could Not Be Determine (CLOSED) LER 2-86-11, Reactor Water Cleanup System Inlet Primary Containment Outboard Isolation Valve, Automatically Closed; Cause - Fuse F18 Ble (CLOSED) LER 2-86-14, Upscale Trip of Reactor Power Intermediate Range Monitor D Occurred When Control Rod 02-19 Was Selected in Reactor Manual Control System While Performing PT-18.1; Cause - Electronic Noise Spik (CLOSED) LER 2-86-22, Unit 2 Shutdown in Accordance With TS 3.4.1.1 Due to a Lockout / Trip of the Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Se No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Inspector Identified and Unresolved Items (92701)

(OPEN) Inspector Followup Item, (325/84-04-01 and 324/84-04-01), Licensee to Identify and Repair Cab *ie Tray Raceway Z Clamps Problems. The I clamps secure the tray to the horizontal tray suppor The inspector reviewed completed work requests 1-E84-1658 and 2-E84-2009 which documented completion of this particular inspection and repair. The inspector '

performed an inspection of safety related cable trays 50F/DA and 50M/DA in the Unit 2 control room on February 22. Of twenty four Z clamps installed on these trays, five were bent such that they were not engaged with the tray top, four others had loose I clamp nuts, and three others were turned to the side. In addition, two Z clamps were missing. The inspector also observed several tray covers which were not in their proper place. Based on discussions with the architect / engineer, the licensee determined that the "as found" condition of these two trays would not render the raceway inoperble or adversely effect the cables in the tray _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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Discussion with Quality Assurance (QA) personnel revealed that an outstanding non-conformance report (NCR), number E-86-002, involving cable tray covers had been issued on July 1,1986, but a review of the NCR responses by the QC supervisor and the inspector showed that poor work control practices which allowed the 2 clamp problems to occur had not been specifically addressed. Hence, both the licensee and the inspector have determined that the responses were inadequate. On February 27, 1987, licensee QA issued a Notice of Deficiency against this NCR in accordance with QA procedure 0QA-104, which required correction of the inadequate response within seven day This item will remain open pending final resolution of NCR E-86-002 and the Notice of Deficiency and subsequent review by the inspecto No violations or deviations were identifie . LimitorqueOperators(71707)

The licensee has recently procured information from Limitorque Corporation concerning actuator sizing and settings on both safety and non-safety related valves. The data was recently reviewed (December - January) and compiled from original design documents into a new format at the licensee's request. Review of the data sheets showed that Limitorque was now recommending upgrade of some actuator motors to a larger siz Apparently, Limitorque had used 100% full voltage to size the motors, instead of the currently specified degraded supply of 85%. Reviews of documents between the licensee, the valve manufacturer and the valve manufacturer's subcontractor (Limitorque), has not been able to determine what was specified to Limitorque (or by whom) when the original plant equipment was procured. The licensee has evaluated this condition on the applicable safety related valves and has determined that these valves would function under design condition The affected valves are:

E41-F002, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inboard steam line isolation valve; E41-F004, HPCI condensate storage tank suction valve; E41-F008, HPCI full flow test isolation valve; E11-F017A and B, RHR system outboard isolation valves; and E11-F024A and B, suppression pool test return isolation valve. The inspector has reviewed the justification for continued operation for Unit 2 contained in Engineering Evaluation EER-87-0088. In summary, the evaluation concludes that no safety problem exists based upon either application and/or electrical distribution voltage studies. The voltage studies determined that the degraded voltage of some of the valves would not drop below 85%. Under these anticipated voltages, there is no motor sizing concern. In addition, contact with the applicable valve vendors, Anchor Darling and Rockwell, revealed that they perfonn their own sizing and setting calculation Of three valve reviewed by Anchor Darling, a degraded voltage of 85% was used. A list of the other valves has been supplied to the vendors to verify exactly what

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value was use The licensee has contracted with B&W to review the Limitoroue data sheets, calculations and generally assist in resolving the concerns. Their review

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has indicated potential problems with Limitorque data sheet Two DC motor powered actuators had been treated as AC powere In addition, one of these had the wrong pull-out efficiency used for the overall unit ratio (motor design speed-RPM / actuator speed RPM). Apparently the wrong value had been taken from the Limitorque Gate and Globe Valve Efficiency Char The actuators involved were SMB-3 and SMB-000. Another valve with an SMB-5T actuator also had the wrong pull-out efficiency used in the torque switch calculation. This was attributed to using the wrong motor speed when obtaining values from the Gate and Globe Valve Efficiency Char The licensee is continuing his review. This is an Inspector Followup Item: Potential Problems with Limitorque Data Sheets (324/87-03-02).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Spent Fuel Storage Capacity (59095)

The inspectors reviewed the available storage capacity in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent fuel storage pools to determine if full core offload capability existed for each uni Based on discussions with licensee personnel and review of the licensee's fuel map, full offload capability (560 assemblies) existed. Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) has room for 566 more BWR assemblies:

1839 allowed by TS

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36 displaced by a PWR rack

- 36 rack not installed

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2 boral sample stations

- 442 not yet installed 1322 available spaces

- 756 assemblies in pool

~566 BWR spaces available Unit 1 SFP has room for 925 more BWR assemblies:

1803 allowed by TS

- 36 rack not installed

- 2 boral sample stations T7EE available spaces

- 840 assemblies in pool 975 BWR spaces available The above data is as of February 15, 198 The inspector noted that each SFP contained 10 PWR spent fuel modules each capable of storing 16 assemblies for a PWR capacity in each pool of 160 PWR assemblies. The Unit 1 SFP contained 160 assemblies while the Unit 2 pool contained 144 assemblies. However, Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.6.3 states that, "the fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 144 PWR fuel

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I assemblies and 1839 BWR fual assemblie The extra 16 storage locations in the Unit 2 SFP pose no safety problem since the Unit 1 SFP has been reviewed and approved by NRR, contains 160 PWR assemblies and locations, also contains additional high density racks, and is essentially identical to the Unit 2 SFP. The excess storage capacity in the Unit 2 SFP is a violation of TS 5.6.3: Failure to Meet TS 5.6.3 Regarding Spent Fuel Pool l PWR Capacity (324/87-03-01).

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j One violation and no deviations were identifie . RefuelingActivities(60705)

Selected refueling activities were witnessed and reviewed by the inspector. These included verification that:

- The fuel pool gates were removed per MP-09.

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Surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.9.6 associated l

with refueling bridge interlocks were performed prior to fuel movemen Number of operable SRM's per Technical Specification 3.9.2.a. and were maintaine Continues communications between the refueling bridge and the control room were established per Technical Specification 3. Fuel movements were conducted in accordance with operating procedures and the Fuel Movement Sheet The last activity was performed during a two hour inspection conducted on the refueling bridge during fuel movement No violations or deviations were identified.

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