IR 05000324/1987017
| ML20236H403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1987 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Garner L, Rutland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236H365 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-87-17, 50-325-87-17, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8708050172 | |
| Download: ML20236H403 (13) | |
Text
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _.
.. _ - - -
i 8 Rf o UNITED STATES
[4
%
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y"
REGION 11
'
,
g
,j 101 MARIETTA ETREET, N.W.
- i
'e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 33323
<<
,
.....
Report Nos.: 50-325/87-17 and 50-324/87-14
,
Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.:
50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.:
Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
June 1-30, 1987
)-
T. 2A O Inspector :/W. H.\\Ruland j
c Date Signed
, N d l'T)
)l27f8/
r y W. G rne D6te Signed
~
~7!>/ E7 Approved By: b<
/Lt.+
'C P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Ddte Signed i
Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine safety inspection involved the areas of followup on i
previous enforcement matters, maintenance observation, surveillance observation, i
operational safety verification, followup on inspector identified items, IE Bulletin followup, refueling startup inspection, Unit 1 Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System walkdown, onsite followup of events, Unit I drywell
,
inspections, Quality Check program, and Unit 1 forced outage.
I Results:
One violation was identified - Failure to follow procedure regarding completion of post-trip review documentation.
I i
0708050172 s{0
0 ADOCK O PDR
l POR f
G
!
!
,
i l
,
.
REPORT DETAILS
.
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Empicyees P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
)
C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project l
T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction l
G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control j
J. Holder, Manager - Outages R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support E. Bishop, Manager - Operations L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)
I R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP J
J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance l
G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control J. Smith, Manager - Administrative Support i
K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance j
A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations
'
W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor 8. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maint.rqance Supervisor (Unit 2)
R. Warden, I&C/ Electrical Mainte.iance Superviser (Unit 1)
W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security R. Kitchen, Mechanical Me.intenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist D. Novutny, Senior Regulatory Specialist included construction craftNn, Other licensee employees contacted engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force i
members.
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 1,1987, with the manager - technical support.
One violation - failure to fcllow procedure regarding completion of post-trip review documentation
,
(paragraph 11), was discussed in detail.
The licensee committed to
'
respond to the inspectors concerns as described in paragraph 12, The licensee acknowledged the findings without exception.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectorc during the inspection.
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ - - -
_.
- - _ - - - _ _ _
._
.
.
,
3.
Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(CLOSED)
Violation 325/85-22-01 and.324/85-22-01, Inadequate Corrective Actions Relating to Annunciator Procedures.
The licensee responded to the violation on September 12, 1985.
The inspector verified that selected j
Annunciator Par.el Procedures (APP) in the control room had been revised to include references to Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) instead of Emergency Instructions (EIs) and that real-time training had been
,
documented.
The inspector found that the A0P-EI cross reference was still
)
inserted in the APP books even though the EIs were superseded.
The licensee plans to remove the cross reference list.
The ' inspector j
conducted a review of the operator aids program based on the cross reference list (see paragraph 6).
The cross reference list was issued
.
prior to approval of 01-41.
(CLOSED)
Violation 325/85-40-01, Two Examples of Failure to Take Prompt Corrective Action:
Ground on 250 V Battery Bus A and Heat Tracing on Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Level Switches.
The licensee's response was
)
dated April 4,1986.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's closecut package, which contained documents supporting completion of their commitments.
The inspector visually verified that the CST level switch heat tracing had been replaced.
The licensee did not need to look for
)
grounds on Unit 1 DC bus 1A since the bus had no grounds at the end of the i
1987 refueling outage.
The licensee took ground readings for the j
inspector on June 26, 1987, and found low grounds.on the 2A battery bus
,
(Panel N).
The grounds should have caused an annunciation in the control room but did not.
The licensee wrote work request 87-AWEK1 to correct the problem.
The inspector discussed the battery ground detector problems with the system engineer.
The engineer reported that an upgrade for the detector was planned as well as the purchase of portable detectors.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's performance in this area has been acceptable.
,
(CLOSED)
Violations 325/85-40-02 and 324/85-40-02, Two Examples of Failure to Follow Drawings and Procedures, and 324/87-02-01, Failure to Have Control Rod Drive (CRD) Supports Installed per Specification.
These items are considered closed for administrative purposes (see paragraph 12).
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The inspectors alec varified that:
redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.
__
-
a
.
.
,
l
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.
The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance I
activities:
l 87-AJXT1 18 Conventional Service Water Strainer Leak.
l 87-AUBA1 H2 Leak in Turbine Building.
'
87-AUJT1 1-E11-F003A "305" Auxiliary Contact Block Failure.
)
l 87-AWDIl Diesel Generator (DG) No. 2 Relay Troubleshooting.
'
86-BDHX1 28-1 Battery Charger Floor Bolting.
No violations or deviations were identified.
q
,
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
I The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications.
Through observation and record review, the inspectors
!
verified that:
tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements; i
administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instru-i l
mentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete.
The
,
l inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return
,
to service of equipment.
'
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
IMST-RHR41R Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Low Pressure Coolant Injection i
(LPCI) and Primary Containment Isolation Cooling (PCIC)
!
Group 8 Isolation Logic System Functional Test.
PT-12.28 No. 2 Diesel Generator (DG) Monthly Load Test.
PT-12.8 Electrical Power Systems Operability Test.
l l
PT-14.1 Control Rod Operability Check.
2MST-BATT11W 28-2 Battery 125 V Weekly Operability Test.
While the inspector observed the conduct of procedure IMST-RHR41R, the licensee discovered two problems.
The procedure required verification of correct logic response by indicator lights.
However, the procedure i
referred to the lights by their circuit number, but the control board l
label hac a name.
Technicians suspended the test until proper indication l
could be rerified.
The root cause appears to be inadequate field I
verification during the review process.
The other item involved
'
'i a----__--.___--
-.-- - -. -
. -. - - - -. - - - - -. - - - - -
-.
-_ _ _ _ _ _.
_
.
.
l manipulation of the incorrect override switch, thereby resulting in the desired. logic response not being observed.
This section of the procedurc was immediately rerun correctly and satisfactorily.
These items meet i
the conditions of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V, and are therefore i
'
considered licensee identified violations.
A licensee identified violation and no deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that controi room manning requirements of i
10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met.
Control room, shift supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerniag operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operations.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
The inspector:. verified the status of selected control room annunciators.
Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) train was verified by insuring that:
each accessible valve in the flow path was in
,
its correct position; each power supply and breaker, including control room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from those ESF motor-operated ' valves, so identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or perfornnce was verified operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if accessible.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /
procedures were followed.
This included a review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified that:
the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized,. searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identifi-cation badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and effective compensatory measures were employed when required.
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
_-_ _____- -_-- _ __ - - - - _
- - _
_ - _ - -
i j
'
.
The inspectors also observed piant housekeeping controls, verified position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and i
verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.
On June 8, the inspector walked down portions of the ecuipment installed in the Unit 1 Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV) pit.
Instrument air lines between the MSIV accumulators and solenoids were not properly
'
supported in that some clamps and supports were loose or not attached.
In addition, three conduits to MSIV position junction boxes were loose from their supports.
These conditions did not affect the safety function of the MSIVs since the valves shut on loss of air.
The items were reported to the licensee for corrective action.
On June 10, 1987, an inspection of the Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) steamline room revealed that the limit switch cover on E51-F008, RCIC steamline outboard isolation valve, had not been properly installed..Only one bolt had been partially installed.
Ten other bolts I
were in a plastic bag with a work request that had been closed out.
i Maintenance management is conducting an investigation into the breakdown in work controls which caused the deficiency.
The condition did not render the valve inoperable.
The June 8 and 10 inspector identified items are considered as part of the workmanship issue discussed in paragraph 12.
The inspector reviewed 0I-41, Operator Aids, Rev.1, dated June 20, 1986, selected aids posted throughout the plant, and the OI-41 log.
The.
inspector noted several discrepancies.
Forty aids listed in the log had no posting date as required by the procedure.
A "For Information Only" copy of OI-41 was in the OI-41 log binder and the annual audit of the
)
operator aids was not performed.
0I-29, Operations Internal Audits, Rev.10, attachment 3, page 15, requires the annual audit of the operator
]
aids be performed during January.
Operations had performed an audit of
radwaste operator aids but not of the nuclear units.
The audit had not j
been rescheduled at the time of the inspection.
Operator aids consist of signs, placards or labels posted throughout the
plant that help the operators perform their job.
For example, a sign showing safety re~ief valve exhaust locations to the torus is posted on the main control board.
Neither the aids nor the operations internal audits are required by NRC.
Therefore, in this instance, the NRC chooses not to issue a notice of violation for the above failure to follow procedures.
However, the procedures should be followed since they are part of the licensee's administrative control system.
Accordingly, the licensee stated that the following would be accomplished:
(1) perform the missed audit of operator aids, (2) verify that no "Information Only" copies of procedures are maintained in logbooks, (3) review the control method that insures accomplishment of 0I-29 audits.
This is an Inspector Followup Item:
01-41, Operator Aids Discrepancies (325/87-17-02 and 324/87-17-02).
I No violations or deviations were identified.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
-_
__
_
-
-
. _ _
. _ _ _
-
--
--.
l
.
i
,
!
7.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)
.(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item 325/85-09-02 and 324/85-09-02, Method of Conducting Equalizer Battery Charges Varies from Vendor Manual Recommenda-tions.
The referenced report listed four recommendations that were not
!
being implemented by the licensee.
The inspector reviewed MI-10-2J, Revision 12, which implemented recommendation (1) concerning the conduct
!
i
'
cf the equalizing charge.
The licensee elected to not implement precisely l
the other three recommendations concerning when to conduct an equalizing
,
l charge.
The licensee conducts a routine quarterly equalizing battery
- l charge and md.itains float voltage at 135 volts plus/minus 1 volt.
This i
float voltage corresponds to 2.25 volts per cell plus/minus.017 volt.
$
i Per the vendor manual, these actions reduce the need to conduct equalizing charges.
The ' licensee also re-establishes a pilot cell every quarter, if necessary.
,
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 325/86-01-01 and 324/86-01-01, Minor l
Fastener Problems.
This item is considered closed for administrative purposes (see paragraph 12).
No violations or deviations were identified.
'
8.
IE Bulletin Followup (92703)
j (CLOSED)
IE Bulletin 325/86-80-02 and 324/86-BU-02, Static "0" Ring (SOR) Differential Pressure Switches.
The licensee stated, in their response dated July 28, 1986, that the Brunswick units do not utilize 50R, Inc. Series 102 and 103 differential pressure transmitters in
important to safety applications as defin9d by 10 CFR 50.49(b).
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's list of 50R switches.
No Series 102 or 103 switchas were installed at Brunswick.
Other series SOR switches were installed in various locations in both units.
The inspectors reviewed the i
Q-list and Environmental Qualification (EQ) list when the bulletin was issued and found no Series 102 or 103 switches on either list.
'
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Refueling Startup Inspection (61706, 61707, 61715, 71711)
The inspector verified that major equipment, components and safety related systems were operable and Technical Specification (TS) requirements were
'
met before, during and after startup from Unit 1 reload number 5.
These inspections consist of record reviews, observation of work in arogress and/or field walkdowns.
Items inspected include but are not 1 mited to j
the following:
j
_
o Visual inspection cnd verification of power availability was performed for containment isolation valves located in the drywell, the main steamline pit, the RCIC steamline room, the 66' penetration room and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) roof.
Valves l
w_______
_ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
____ _____
_
-_.
-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _
- _ -
_ _ - _.
,
,
I
],
visually inspected include but are not limited to the MSIVs, HPCI steamline isolation valves, RCIC steamline isolation valves, Reactor i
Water Clean Up (RWCU) suction line isolation valves, shutdown cooling i
isolation valves and drymil purge isolation valves.
One item concerning E51-F008, RCIC steamline outboard isolation valve, was noted (see paragraph 6).
o A visual inspection was performed of randomly selected safety related I
and important to safety pipe supports, snubbers and other structural I
components in the drywell and MSIV pit.
In addition, the inspector accompanied a regionally based Inservice Inspection (ISI) inspector on a similar inspection of portions of Division I Core Sp ly (CS),
Division I RHR, HPCI, RCIC and service water systems located on the
,
HPCI roof, the north -17' elevation overhead and the CS Division I injection valve area.
Minor deficiencies noted were reported to j
plant personnel.
In general, the inspectors concluded that the plant I
was structurally sound and ready for startup.
o TS instrumentation was verified to be operable.
This was accomplished by one or more of the following:
verification that instrumentation appeared to be properly valved into service (rack isolation and inlet valves open and equalizing, drain and test valves
?
closed), record review, or the displayed parameters responded to
,
plant conditions as expected during startup.
Visual verification was
!
performed on the instrumentation located on the main steamline, jet pump, HPCI and RCIC leak detection, CS, HPCI and RHR instrumentation panels.
No problems were noted.
i l
'
With the assistance of licensee personnel, the inspector examined the o
interior of control room panels associated with HPCI, RCIC, RHR, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS), and the Reactor Protection. System (RPS) for-loose wiring, unauthorized jumpers, blown fuses and cleanliness.
Some debris was observed but was immediately removed by the licensee.
o The inspector verified that mode changes were in accordance with TS requirements by either direct observation of equipment operability and/or review of outstanding limiting condition of operation, control operator and shift foreman logs and completed procedures.
The inspector verified via stem position, that all major flow path o
valves for RCIC, HPCI, RHR Division I, Standby Liquid Control (SLC),
and CS systems were in their correct position per the applicable operating procedures.
In addition, the inaccessible manual system isolation valves for RHR, CS and SLC, E11-F060 A and B, E21-F007 A and B and C41-F007, respectively, were verified to be locked open as required.
o The inspector observed successful completion of Surveillance Test PT-20.3C, Personnel Airlock Interior and Exterior Doors Local Leak Rate Test for Containment Isolation, ca Jece 6, 1987.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
__
_
-
.
-
o The following completed Core Physics Procedures were reviewed:
PT-01.80 Core Thermal Power Calculation.
PT-14.2.1 Single Rod Scram Insertion Time Test.
PT-14.3.1 In Sequence Critical Shutdown Margin Calculation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
i 10.
Unit 1 ESF System Walkdown (71710)
An inspection of the Unit 1 ADS was performed to verify operability of the system.
This verification included the following items:
o Initiation and permissive instrumentation were valved into service, o
Backup reactor building air compressors (air supply to ADS valves)
were energized and operable, o
Backup nitrogen supply system was pressurized and operable.
o Accumulators were properly valved into service.
Both temperature and acoustical monitors of the ADS valve discharge o
piping were operable.
o The ADS actuation logic was energized.
o ADS override switches were in the NORM position.
o The Safety Relief Valve (SRV) discharge piping major supports appeared operable.
i o
The SRV physical appearance including associated instrument air tubing, conduit, Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs), and acoustical monitors, show no sign of degradation which could impair operability.
o Surveillance testing was porformed at 200 psig reactor pressure to verify the SRVs opened and closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ -
-
.
_
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ ___
-
.
.
11.
Onsite Followup of Events (93702)
Unit 1 Scram The unit scrammed from 6% power with the generator off-line when an Auxiliary Operator (A0) opened a drain valve.
The licensee had been conducting PT-80.2, Class 1 Conditional System Leakage Test, Revision 2.
Step VII.B requires the A0 to open valve C32-PT-N008-6, to valve in a test gauge.
This action caused a level disturbance in the reference legs of level transmitters B21-LT-N025A-1 & B-1, and 821-LT-N0318 & D.
A momentary low level 2 signal occurred.
Group I and III isolation signals were momentarily present.
The MSIVs shut at 5:49 a.m.
The reactor did not scram immediately because the scram on MSIVs less than 90% open was bypassed since the mode switch was in startup, as required.
Thirty seconds after the MSIVs went shut the reactor scrammed on high pressure.
Several anomalies occurred in safety equipment operation during the event.
HPCI received a short duration start signal which was present only long enough to energize the HPCI initiation light, open the F059 valve, the auxiliary oil cooler valve, and start the auxiliary oil pump.
The steam inlet valve, E41-F001, did not open.
The licensee reviewed the logic prints with the inspector and showed that the observed actions were possible with a short duration signal.
An extra relay must energize the motor contactor to seal in the F001.
The G31-F004 valve, the Reactor Water Clean Up Outboard Isolation Valve, only went partially shut.
The operator had reset the isolation signals just prior to the scram, stopping the valve.
The inspector verified through review of the logic prints that the F004 valve worked as designed.
One high oressure instrument, 821-N023D, had failed to trip.
The licensee felt that reactor pressure had just grazed the trip setpoint (less than or equal to 1045 psig) and that the N023D failed to trip.
The licensee replaced and recalibrates the trip unit for channel D prior to startup under Work Request 87-ATQE1.
The inspector reviewed the completed calibration procedure, IMST-RPS23M.
The licensee failed to complete the 0I-22 attachment, as required, after the scram and before the startup.
01-22, Rev.14, dated November 24, 1986, Plant Incident and Post-Trip Investigation, establishes a systematic method for reviewing a plant incident.
Under Section 6.6, Plant Restart, if (1) the cause of the event was known and understood, (2) immediate corrective action has reduced the probability of recurrence, (3) no safety concerns exist, (4) all safety systems functioned as required, and (5) an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) event was not hidden, then immediate restart may be conducted if:
6.6.2.1, The Ope attons Engineer or Scram Incident Investigation Team (SIIT) shall ret f ew and ensure completion of Sections 1 through 9 of attachment _ - _ _ _ _
_
_
. _ _ _
I
.
l
-
The licensee indicated in attachment 1 that all five conditions listed above were satisfied.
However, the inspector reviewed the OI-22 attachment on June 17, 1987, after unit startup and found that Sections 7 and 8 were not completed.
Section 7 should have contained the plant incident summary and Section 8 should have contained the signatures of the l
Operations Engineer or Scram Incident Investigation Team Leader and the
Manager of Operations.
This is a Violation:
Plant Incident and Post-Trip
Investigation Form Not Completed as Required by 0I-22 (325/87-17-01).
A i
similar violation for failure to follow 0I-22 was issued in Inspection
-
Report 325/85-04.
The inspector reviewed the 0I-22 package, including personal statements and computer printouts, and concluded that the licensee had reviewed the
appropriate data and adequately resolved any pre-startup issues.
The
)
inspector reviewed the minutes of the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee meeting, for meeting 87-68, which reviewed the SIIT results and had no comments.
The licensee revised PT-80.2 prior to startup to eliminate the
,
use of the test gauge and to use installed instrumentation.
'
l One violation and no deviations was identified.
12.
Unit 1 Drywell Inspections (71707)
At the end of the outage (May 20 through June 2), a series of inspections were performed in the drywell by outage management, engineering, Quality
,
l Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC).
Because of the ' number of i
l deficiencies / deviations identified during the walkdowns, QA issued Non-conformance Report (NCR) S-87-037 on June 4,1987.
In part, the NCR addressed inadequate corrective action (10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI) in that, measures taken to determine cause and preclude repetition of similar type items as those identified at the end of the 1984 Unit 2 refueling outage, were discovered at the end of the current Unit 1 outage.
Examples of items identified are:
o Loose and/or missing hardware associated with unistrut supports, cable trays, conduit instrument lines and ventilation duct work.
o Loose lock nuts on supports and on a pipe whip restraint.
o Loose and missing U-bolts on air lines.
o Amphenol cable clamps to Source Range Monitor (SRM) and Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) modules not tight.
o A snubber installed without proper freedom of movement, o
Duct tape covering one of three drywell inlet ports to the post-accident oxygen and hydrogen analyzer, CAC-AT-4409.
o Housekeeping items.
{
.
1
.
,
On June 3 and 4, the inspector identified items other than those above.
These included:
o A missing snap ring to load rod pivot pin.on both B21-701CH174 and 821-.701CH176.
These are constant type supports for instrument line g
associated with remote shutdown vessel water level instrument
)
821-LT-3331 (TS Table 3.3.5.2-1).
o Loose lock nuts on main steamline supports PSN-D1VH74 and PSN-A4VH36.
!
o One of four bonnet to yoke studs loose on E11-F060A, a. manual j
maintenance valve on the RHR injection line.
,
o Two adjacent U-bolts on the Division 2 air header supplying the SRV i
acct ~nulators were loose, i
None of the licensee and inspector identified items were considered by the ifcensee as potentially preve> ting a successful completion of a safety function.
However, many of the items represent items which are not in accordance with drawings or specifications.
As such, those associated with safety releted componentt: constitute a violation of.NRC regulations.
i. e.,10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires activities affecting quality to be accomplished in accordance with drawings and procedures.
However, since these items are typical of those associated with violations issued in inspection reports 324 and 325/85-19, 85-22,. 85 40, 86-01 and 87-02, the real problem is a failure to take adequate corrective action to I
identify previously caused conditions and taks measures to prevent such problems from occurring in the future.
It is the inspector's'
that the items identified represent both type of items,1. e. judgment
, items I
associated with previous outage work and, to a lesser degree, work-l activities-during the 1987 outage.
Based in part upon the above-mentioned violations, the licensee undertook the inspections which discovered the items.
Based upon their findings of numerous items, the licensee identified that there had been a failure to take adequate corrective action, hence, the issuance of NCR S-87-037.
Therefore, in accordance -
with 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, the failure to take adequate corrective action as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, is being considered'
as a licensee identified violation.
No notice of violation is being-
issued.
The drywell items as well as those described in paragraph.6, and the-above-mentioned inspection reports reflect a problem with past:and present workmanship at the site.
Per conversations with Region II management, it is felt that continued accumulation of suc.h items, though individually insignificant, will eventually result in a safety problem. -Therefore, the licensee was requested and did commit during the exit, to address ^in
,
writing to the Regional Administrator this workmanship concern.
Specifi-i cally, the licensee was asked to submit the following:.
a.
Actioris to be1taken to identify and ' correct conditions such 'as.those i
discussed ~above.
l
h
.
.
-
-_ _ a
_
. _ _
--
I
.
A
i
!
b.
Actions to be taken to identify the root cause of the occurrence of the items-and to prevent future occurrence of similar items.
c.
A schedule for implementation and completion of corrective actions for items a. and b.
This is an Inspector Followup Item:
Workmanship Concerns (325/87-17-03 and 324/87-17-03).
]
Because this item will address the root cause of violations designated
!
as 324, 325/85-40-02 and 324/87-02-01, and inspector followup item 325, l
324/86-01-01, these items are considered closed for administrative i
purposes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Quality Check Program The licensee has established the Quality Check Program as "an additional j
measure to assure that nothing in the operation and maintenance of the plant has been overlooked, and that the plant will operate safely and reliably."
The program provides three ways to gather worker concerns:
(1) employee can fill out a Quality Check form and drop it in a box or mail it, (2) by phone, (3) exit interview.
Quality Check personnel
reported that 75 concerns have been received since inception; none have revealed violations of NRC regulations.
The program has identified 24 people at Brunswick who might have been involved with illegal drugs.
All individuals in question underwent urinalysis screening; nine turned up positive.
All nine resigned or were terminated.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's fitness for duty program has worked effectively in addressing the drug abuse concerns.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Unit 1 Forced Outage (71707)
The unit was shut down on June 17, 1987, for seal replacement on IB reactor recirculation pump.
The seal package was replaced and the rod withdrawal was started at 3:32 p.m. on June 19, 1987.
During the startup, rod 42-15 showed overtravel.
The unit was returned to cold shutdown.
Following replacement and testing of the drive mechanism, the unit was restarted and synchronized with the grid at 4:56 p.m. on June 22, 1987.
No violations or deviations were identified.
.