IR 05000254/1990012

Safety Insp Repts 50-254/90-12 & 50-265/90-12 on 900617- 0804.No Violations Noted.Two Unresolved Items Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items,Ler Review,Regional Requests & Testing of Mods

ML20028G773
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	08/22/1990
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20028G772	List: IR 05000254/1990012 ML20028G771
References
50-254-90-12, 50-265-90-12, NUDOCS 9009040096
Download: ML20028G773 (15)

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-U.S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y

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REGION III'

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Reports'No,' 50-254/90012(DRP); 50-265/90012(DRP)

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Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30-a-

Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company

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Post Office Box 767 i

Chicago, IL 60690'-

Facility Name:

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Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

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Inspection At:

Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois

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Inspection Conducted: June 17 through August 4, 1990

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Inspectors:

T..E. Taylor

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J. Shine R. Bocanegra

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Approved By kin AUG 2 21E e

'~Resctor Projects Section 18 Date Inspection Summary Inspection from June 17 through August 4, 1990 (Reports No. 50-254/90012(DRP);

50-265/90012(DRP))

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident and regional inspectors of licensee action on previously identified items;

. licensee event report review; regional requests; installation and testing of-

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modifications; operational safety verification; followup of events; monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; training

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effectiveness; report review; and meetings and other activities.

'Results: During the inspection period, licensee management continued their efforts to promote " error-free" performance.

Technical staff staffing levels have been increased to help improve technical staff performance.

Housekeeping issues continued to receive increased management attention during this

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inspection period.

Events and activities reviewed / observed by the residents included effects of recent lightning,trikes, ECCS-room check valves, H addition modification, and the dr?,well sampling system manifold.

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areas inspected, no violations were identified, however, two unresolved items r

were identified. One unresolved item relates to the removal of a pilot valve from the wrong electromatic relief valve, while the second item deals with

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primary containment isolation capability during monthly drywell sampling, utilizing the drywell manifold sampling system.

9009040096 900823 PDR ADOCK 05000254 O

PDC

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

N. J Kalivianakis,'Vice President, BWR Operations

• R. L. Bax, Station Manager

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• R. A. Robey, Technical St.perintendent j

• G. Spedl,, Production Superintendent

• R. Stols, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

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J. Swales, Assistant Superintendent

.0perations-J. Fish, Quad Cities Project Manager, BWR Projects Department

• J. Sirovy, Services Director

• T. Tamlyn, ENC Site Manager D. Craddick, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance

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-B. Tubbs, Operating Engineer - Unit 1

• J.'Kopacz, Operating Engineer - Unit 1 B. Strub, Operating Engineer - Unit 2 M. Kooi, Operating Engineer - Unit 2

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J. Wethington,-Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Gibson, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

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J. Dierbeck, Technical Staff Supervisor

- 3 C. Smith, Quality Control Supcrvisor

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K. Leech, Security Administrator

• B. McGaffigan, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning and Startup

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• D. Bucknell, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor

• A' Scott, Quality Nuclear Programs

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• T. Barber, Regulatory Assurance t

T. Lihou, Work Planning R. Hopkins, Engineer - Nuclear Quality Programs

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on August 4, 1990, and at other times throughout the inspection period.

i The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee

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employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, and electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contrac: security personnel.

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l 2.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702)

a.

Open Items (0 pen) 254/90002-01:

" Unit 1 Feedwater Transient." This item was inadvertently closed in Inspection Report 90008 due to an error concerning the item's title.

This item is open.

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Violations (Closed)L265/90002-01: This item was previously closed in c; -

Inspection Report 90008 under open item tracking number

254/90002-01.

This-item is-closed.

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s violations or deviations were identified.

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3.

LicenseeEventReports(LER) Followup (90712,92700)

-Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports.were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS):

a.

(Closed) 254/86-021LL, L1:

Unit 1 Reactor Scram Due to Low F_ low Feedwater Regulator Valve Leakage.

On April 5, 1986, a Unit I startup was in progress. The reactor was in the startup mode operating at approximately 3 percent power and 300 psig, At 8:20 a.m., the IB Reactor Feed Pump was started in accordance with the startup procedure.

Reactor water level, which was being controlled by the Low Flow Feedwater Regulator Valve A0-1-643, began to increase..The operator closed the feedwater inlet valves and reactor water level began to decrease.

The operator tried to reopen the feedwater inlet valves to restore reactor level, but the valves would not open due to the high differential pressure across them.

The reactor

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scrammed at 8:36 a.m. due to low reactor water level.

The cause of the reactor level increase was failure,of the low flow regulator.

valve to control feedwater flow.

The low flow regulator valve was repaired and the controller was recalibrated.

In_May of 1986:the close limit switch for the feedwater inlet valves (1-3205A and B)

l was properly adjusted to prevent premature opening of the limit i

switch during valve opening.

In September 1987 the 1-3206 A and B

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operators were greased and rebuilt as a preventive maintenance activity. The inspector has no further concerns. This item is considered closed, i

b.

(Closed) 254/87007-LL:

1/2 B Diesel Fire Pump Inoperable Due to Protective Relay Design Deficiency Repair.

As discussed previously in NRC report 254/90002 the corrective

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actions for this item have been completed. Also as discussed as part of the corrective actions the licensee has generated a modification (87-4) to further reduce the voltage in the over crank protective circuit.

In its present condition the pump is considered operable.

This item is considered closed.

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(Closed) 254/89001-L1: One RCIC Valve M0-1301-48 Failure to Open Due to Binding of the Torque Switch of the Motor Operator.

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At 5:20 PM. on' January 6,1989, Unit-I was at 96% power.' At this time the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pump discharge inboard isolation valve', 1-1301-48, failed to open from the full

closed position when given an open signal from control room panel 901-3.

This would have prevented a RCIC injection and therefore made the. system inoperable.

The.cause of this' event was equipment failure. The torgee switch cam'on the valve operator was binding, which caused the switch contacts to remain open.

The torque switch:was replaced and the valve successfully tested

'l and. returned to service at 12:35 a.m. on January 7,1989, and RCIC was declared operable.

The torque switch cam material was melamine which was identM1ed in a 10 CFR Part 21 notification as having a binding problem. As part of the corrective action for the Part 21 and this LER the licensee

has removed melamine torque switches from the store room, and replaced the melamine torque switches on valve operators with a-fiberite material switch. The inspectors have no further concerns.

This item is considered closed.

d.

(Closed) 254/90013-LL: A0-1-220-45 Valve Closure Believed to Be Due te Lightning Strike.

On June 26, 1990 with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, lightning struck-the 345 kV line 0405. Various annunciators were received and the reactor recirculation (RR) ioop sample valve closed.

This is a Group I primary containment isolation (PCI) valve and its closure

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constituted an ESF actuation, a

The root cause of the ESF actuation was a momentary power loss

to the valve solenoid causing it to close in the " safe" position.

~The PCI logic signal'was not. received and the valve was reopened from the control room. The cause of the momentary power loss is j

attributable to the coincident. lightning strike. The ensuing

corrective actions performed by the licensee appear to be adequate, i

This item is closed.

In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period. This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc.

DVRs were also reviewed for proper initiation and disposition as required by the applicable i

procedures and the QA manual.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Regional Requests' (92701)i a.

Drywell Manifold Sampling System

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Due to similar system. configurations, Technical Specification (TS)

requirements, and problems recently identified at Dresden station.

concerning the~ drywellLmanifold sampling system the resident;

inspectors conducted a review of the Quad Cities drywell sampling

system. The'results of the inspectors' review are as follows:

The Quad Cities sampling system and TS requirements are similar to Dresden's. TS section S.6/4.6.0.1 requires that drywell air samples be.taken daily.

Daily samples are taken by chemistry personnel per QCP 1300-1, using an in-line continuous air

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monitor (CAM). =The sampling system is equipped with dual inlet and outlet automatic isolation valves in series.

The valves receive a close signal on a Group II isolation.

The problem at Dresden related to concerns associated with use of a temporary.

sample pump. The system at Qued Cities does not use a temporary sample pump, therefore, there is no concern with this portion of the system operation.

Station procedures require a drywell sample be taken once' per month using the sampling manifold system.

Procedure QRP 1610-1 is used by Rad Protection personnel to pull this sample. Air samples are drawn simultaneously from the 22 available sampling.

points and discharged back to the drywell through a common discharge header shared with the daily sample station which has

auto isolation.

Each of the 22 sample lines are equipped with two inlet manual isolation valves which remain open during sample collection.

Records show that for the last 12 months, collection times ranged from 42 minutes to 124 minutes with an average time of 73 minutes. Although procedure QRP 1610-1 does not specify or require the technician to be present during

sample collection, the Rad Protection Supervisor stated that technicians do not remain at the panel while the sample is collecting,- The concern here is that like at Dresden, there is

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an unattended path from the drywell to secondary containment through non-safety related piping and hoses. The difference between the sampling method is that at Dresden, only one sample a

line is opened at a time versus the simultaneous sampling method i

used at Quad Cities.

Subsequent to the inspector's inquiries the licensee at Quad Cities hung out of service tags on the 22 sample lines.

Discussions with NRR representative,s have resulted in a verbal agreement allowing samples to be taken from these lines one line at a time, with a technician present during sample collection and in continuous communication with the control room. This situation is being reviewed further for regulatory impact and will be followed by the resident inspectors as unresolved item (254/90012-01).

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Control' Rod Scram Time Testing

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On July 16, 1990, the inspectors responded to'a regional inquiry concerning Control Rod (CR) scram time testing and the adequacy of the testing method.

The inspectors verified that the-licensee's technical specifications (TS) incorporated the vendor

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recommendations.

A review of the CR scram timing procedures

indicated that theJTS surveillance requirements were adequately addressed.

.No violations Jr deviations were identified.

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Installation ano is ting of Modifications (37828)

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Hydrogen Water Chemistry

' The purpose of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) system is to inject i

Hydrogen (H) into the Reactor Coolant System to reduce the concentration of free oxygen in the primary system. By scavenging free oxygen in the system, a decrease-in the susceptibility of reactor materials to

intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) should result. The licensee currently employs this type of HWC system at the Dresden station.

The final phase of the HWC system modification testing at Quad Cities, injection of H into the Unit 2 feedwater system, was completed on June 28, 1990.

Approximately 46.5 SCFM of H were required at 100% power, in order to achieve a dissolved oxygen concentration of 10 ppb. Continuous monitoring of the changing radiological conditions during the test was provided by the Radiation Protection department, including access control measures which appeared to be adequate. Anticipated increases in radiation levels occurred, resulting in the institution of tighter access control on and around the main turbine.

Radiation levels in general access areas did not appear to increase.

'The licensee is currently finalizing preparations to inject H into Unit 1, which is expected to occur by the end of August. Upon successful completion of testing, the HWC system will be put into operation for both units.

Further additions to the HWC system will include an autoclave device.

This will be used to monitor crack propagation in the primary systea, which is required to validate the effect of the HWC system on IGSCC of reactor materials. The scheduling for the t

autoclave modification is tentative but is anticipated to be in place approximately six months af ter HWC system operation in Unit 1, with

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Unit 2 to follow later in 1991.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Operational Safety Verification (717071 During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe

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operation. This' was done'on a sampling basis-through routine direct

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Jobservation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting _ conditions for

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operation action requirements (LC0ARs), corrective action, and review

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of facility records.

On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room

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staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS); including i

compliance with LC0ARs, with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF)

-and ESF electrical alignment and valve positions; monitored instrumentation

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recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status

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of various lit annunciators for operator understanding, off-normal condition, and corrective actions being taken;. examined nuclear instrumentation (NI) and other protection channels for proper operability;

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reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for operability. '

o i During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers, general safety items, etc.

The specific areas observed were:

a.

Engineered Safety Feateres (ESF) Systems Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses (if-visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if required by TS or FSAR; and the operability of support systems

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essential to system actuation or performance through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, etc.

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b.

Radiation Protection Controls i

The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, i

L etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibration, c.

Security Each week during routine activities or tours, the inspectors monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were being imp'emented according to their approved r ecurity plan.

The inspector acted that persons within the protected area

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requiring escorts were properly escorted.

The inspectors also verified that checked vital areas were-locked and alarmed..

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d.

Housekeeping and plant Cleanliness

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The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant clesnliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related

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g equipment ' rom intrusion of foreign matter and general protection.

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The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts,

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jumpers, shiftly logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance-items, various chemistry and radiological sampling

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and analysis, third party review results, overtime records, QA_

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and/or QC audit results and postings required per 10 CFR 19.11.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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7.

Followup of Operations Events (93702, 92701)

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Steam Leak in Unit 2 Steam Tunnel On June 19, 1990, the resident staff was informed by the licensee that a 1-2 gpm through packing steam leak had been discovered from the safe shutdown (SS) system injection check valve 2-2901-10 located in the Unit 2 steam tunnel.

The SS system utilizes a motor driven centrifugal pump to provide approximately 400 GPM of makeup water to either reactor vessel over a pressure range of 50 to J

1250 psi. The SS system was installed to comply with Quad Cities Station's commitment to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

The injection check valve is located just upstream of the SS system discharge into the high pressure coolant injection system discharge line, upstream of the containment isolation valves.

The shift foreman reported approximately 2 inches of water standing on the floor of the steam tunnel room.

The licensee determined.that the check valve was unisolable at

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power and required an outage, which was scheduled for the following weekend.

The licensee performed a safety evaluation documenting the station's justification for continued operation, accounting for the impact of a steam leak and standing water on the safety-related i

equipment in the steam tunnel.

Included by the licensee as an I

interim measure was enhanced monitoring of the water level in the room, which-remained constant.

The resident inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation and adequacy of the-interim measures, l

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concluding that each appeared adequate. The unit was brought to L

cold shutdown on June 23, 1990.

During the short maintenance outage the licensee completed repairs on the check valve, replaced the 2B2 recirculation pump seal and plugged several condenser tube leaks.

The unit was made critical at 11:23 PM on June 24, 1990, and connected to the electrical grid on June 25, 1990.

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1 "B" Recirculating Pump Motor Generatar Set Trip

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On July 2,1990, with both units at full pwer the Unit 1 "B" recirc motor generator (MG) set tripped wheh the field breaker

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openeda Maintenance mechanics were in the pr0 cess of changing-out brushes in the MG set at the time of ~the esent when a mechanic accidentally shorted one of the brush's' pig tails.

The-mechanics routinely' change out brushes _at power about once per month and the process requires protective gloves be worn. The glove worn by the mechanic was grazed by moving fan blades of-

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the MG set causing the mechanic to retract his hand quickly, thereby causing the short.

J Nuclear Station Operators (NS0s) in the control room *esponded to the loss of one recirc pump by driving in control rods ta avoid entering the region of potential instabilities on the power to flow map.

The remaining recirc pump maintained r

r sufficient flow to avoid entering the region. The MG set was-repaired, the recirc pump restarted, and the unit was back at full load within six hours after the event.

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Feedwater/ Reactor Power Transient I

On July 24, 1990 at 9:18 a.m., a small feedwater/ reactor power

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. transient occurred on Unit 1.

While the NSO was performing a-

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surveillance on the RHR system a reactor low water level alarm annunciated.

The NSO immediate1" adjusted feedwater flow to the.

vessel to clear the alarm condition. As a result of the feedwater adjustment a small power transient occurred.

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power went from approximately 98% to 100.5% as indicated by the APRM's.

The licensee's review of the event identified the cause of the power increase to be the erratic operation of the IB

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feedwater regulating valve, leading.to the injection of a large quantity of colder feedwater into the vessel. Shortly after the plant was stabilized,-the NSO, with maintenance troubleshooting personnel-in attendance, returned the IB feedwater regulating valve to the automatic mode.

Normal valve operation was

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observed and the valve has continued to operate properly.

The NRC staff's review of a computer point _ trend for the reactor vessel water level identified that for approximately 15 minutes the vessel water level was erratic and slowly trending down from 27 inches to the 24 inch alarm point.

Normal operating vessel

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water level is about 29 to 30 inches at 98% power.

It appears that the NS0's attention to the plant parameters was diverted by

the RHR surveillance activities.

During subsequent discussions with the licensee the Resident Inspectors emphasized to the licensee the importance of attentiveness to planc parameters by

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operations personnel in order to professionally execute their l

duties.

The licensee is implementing training sessions for operations personnel to emphasize the importance of attention to detail and the Shift Control Room Engineer's responsibility to ensure that operations personnel are assigned to maintain adequate control of plant operations.

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The licensee has determined that the erratic valve operation was caused by either failure'of the valve position controller circuitry or by the valve positioner mechanism. The licensee has-decided to-leave the IB feedwater regulating valve in' service since it has continued to operate satisfactorily. The licensee plans to' perform comprehensive troubleshooting activities either during the next-outage, or if further erratic valve operation occurs, i

The inspectors will monitor the maintenance activities concerning this. valve as open item-(254/90012-02).

d.

Effects of Lightning Strikes

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During the period of June 26 through June 29, 1990, the Quad Cities station received several lightning strikes to the 345 kV switchyard and outgoing power lines. The resident staff responded to the-control room at 8:36 a.m. on June 26, 1990, due to a strike which'

caused a fault en transmission line LO405.

Unit I was at-100% power

and Unit 2 was at approximately 23% power.

As a consequence of the hit, the "B" feedwater regulating valve on Unit 2 locked up, causing a minor perturbation in reactor water level.

During the transient the "B" recirculation pump flow limit picked up and ran the "B" pump-back to minimum speed. The operators reset the locked up feedwater regulating valve and returned the system to automatic. The cause of the "B" recirculation pump runback was a failed relay, 202-60-1358.

It exhibited a burned contact and was. replaced.

Unit I suffered two consequences as a result of the lightning. -A rod block alarm was received, due to the refuel bridge, which would not reset from the

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control room. The alarm relay was reset in the auxiliary electric room.

Consequence two of the hit resulted in the closure of A0-1-220-45 (Recirculating System Sample Valve Group I Primary Containment Isolation, Table 3.7-1 of Quad Cities Technical Specifications) and was subsequently classified as an ESF actuation.

LThe four hour notification was made and the inspectors assessed the

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actions pursuant to the LER. (See paragraph 3.d).

Further lightning hits occurred, one on June 27, 1990, and three on June 29, 1990.

The impact of these strikes was minor, as various alarms came in on each unit but were immediately reset.

The licensee concluded that the general impact of the lightning strikes warrants no further actions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

l Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related systems l

and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications. Any discrepancies identified during the review are included with the activity description.

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The following' items were considered during this. review:- the limiting conditions for' operation were met while. components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior

.to initiating the work;- activities were accomplished using approved

_ procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional _ testing.

and/or calibrations were performed prior to' returning components or systems.to service; quality control records were maintained;

-activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materf als used were properly certified; radiological controls were

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implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that' priority is assigned to safety-related equipment

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maintenance which may affect system performance.

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The following maintenance activities were reviewed / observed:

a.

Unit 1/2 i

"1/2 A Standby Gas Treatment System Flow. control Valve Maintenance" b.

Unit 1

"1D RHR Service Water Pump Inboard Seal Maintenance" c.

Unit 2

" Removal and Installatica of Electromatic Relief Pilot Valve" (Q83600)

On June 23, 1990, station maintenance mechanics in d vertently-removed the pilot valve on the wrong electromatic relief valve.

The~ mechanics, using their rad protection survey map to locate

valve 3B, apparently became confused due to the congestion

. caused by the large number of pipes and other components in the a ywell.

The mechanics did not notice any identification tag on'

the valve, and failed to notice white paint' lettering identifying tho valve as 3E before removing the pilot. The error was found

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when contractor mechanics assigned to remove the 38 electromatic valve noticed that 3B still had the pilot in place.

The station was notified and the error was corrected. The apparent cause was inattentiveness on the part of the station mechanics.

Pending further review by the resident inspectors this item will remain open as an unresolved item (265/900]2-01).

" Inoperable Floor Drain Check Valves in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Rooms" On July 7, 1990, while investigating a plugged floor drain in the Unit 2 "B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system corner room in

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the reactor building basement, the licensee discovered that all

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the floor drain check valves in the emergency core cooling system l

(ECCS) rooms were inoperable.

The floor drain check valves are l

provided to protect the ECCS rooms from simultaneously flooding l

should a pipe break occur in one of the rooms.

There are two types

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of floor drain check valves... Some drains' have a fla'p type. val' vel.

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'whose flap had become st

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ath ball and basket severely l corroded.

The check' valves were no luded in the licensee's maintenance program. The licensee installed temporary plugs in the drains.

Flood watches were performed every two hours in. the ' interim.

The resident inspector conducted an inspection of the corner rooms on July 7,1990 and-notified station = management when it was discovered that several of the temporary plugs were: loose or; ii

' improperly installed. The licensee responded by inspecting and -

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reinstalling the drain plugs. - The-faulty installation'was

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attributed to poor communications between oncoming and offgoing operations personnel. On July 8,1990, new check valves were installed and tested.

(See paragraph 12.)

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"2C RHR' Service Water Room Cooler Repair' (Q84441)

" Reactor Feed Pump mechanical seal replacement" (Q74853)

The inspectors monitored the licensee's ongoing work activities and verified that with the exception of the faulty-installation of the drain plugs, activities were being performed in accordance with proper procedures, approved work packages, adequate 10 CFR

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50.59 reviews were conducted, applicable drawing updates were made

and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a.

reasonable period of time..

No violations or deviations were identified.

9..

Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

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The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing

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was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibre.ted, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical

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Specifications and proceduce requirements and were reviewed by

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personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

a.

Unit 0

QOS 6600-1, " Diesel Generator Monthly t.oad Test" QOS 7500-5, "1/2 A Standby Gas Treatment Monthly Operability Test"

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Unit 1-

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QIS 60-1 Revision 5, " Weekly Power Operation Functional Test R

Procedure"

-005 5600-1,." Turbine Control Valve _ Fast Closure Scram Instrument V

Functional Test" i

While conducting 005 5600-1 " Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram _ Instrumentation Functional Test" on July-15, 1990, the licensee found that Unit 1 Control Valves (CVs) No. 1, 2, and.4

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failed to fast close and give a 1/2 scram during the surveillance q

test, _ The licensee initiated a load drop _to below the power level

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where the scram function is not required.

Upon investigating, the licensee' determined that the cause was a stuck plunger in the fast

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acting solenoid valves (FASVs) on the control valves..The FASV on the No.1 CV became unstuck after the CV was stroked several times.

The FASVs on the No. 2 and 4 CVs were worked loose by-mechanics.

.The CVs were then successfully tested several times. Technical

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Information Letter (TIL) No. 848-3a issued in 1977 described the FASV problem experienced by the licensee and recommended replacement of the " dry type" FASV used by. the licensee with a " wet type" FASV

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(Parker-Hannifin model 101) if a history of sticking FASVs was

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indicated.

Previously, on May 28, 1990, the No. 2 CV had failed to fast close and provide a 1/2 scram during a surveillance test and the cause was also identified as stuck FASV.

Because of the two FASV failures the. licensee plans to replace FASVs on both units with " wet type" FASVs as recommended in the 1977 TIL during their next refueling outages.

In the interim, the licensee will

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perform QOS 5600-1 on a weekly basis and if further problems are-encountered, the unit will be shut down to overhaul the FASVs.

The resident inspectors performed an independent review of the i

FASV problem and the corrective actions taken by the licensee appears to be adequate. The resident inspectors will also monitor-the weekly surveillance results.

Q0S 6600-1, " Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test" T.P. 6224, "HPCI Cold Quick Start Test" c.

Unit 2 QOS 2300-1, "HPCI Monthly and Quarterly Test" QOS 200-1 Revision 12, " Manual Operation of Electromatic Relief Valves" T.P. 6224, "HPCI Cold Quick Start Test" QOS 202-6, " Jet Pumo Tests for Dual Recirc Loop Operation" QOS 202-3, " Jet Pump Integrity and Operobility Surveillance" QOS 6600-1, " Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test"

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.No violations or: deviations were identified'.

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L10) Training Effectiveness (41500).

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The. effectiveness of' training programs for licensed and non-licensed

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personnel.was reviewed:by the inspectors'during-the witnessing of the.

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llicensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and

operational activities and during the' review of the licensee's

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response to events which occurred during thejinspection period.

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Personnel appeared-to'be knowledgeable of thel tasks being performed,.

and!nothing was observed which indicated any ineffect 4 ness of.

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training.

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On. June 21, 1990,. the licensee dedicated its'new on-site training

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' facility,"which includes a site specific plant simulator and control

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It is antici)ated that the simulator will improve the training i

effectiveness for-tle perators and lead to. improved performance, i

No violations or da iations were identified, f

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Repo'rt Review t

During-the inspection period, the inspector' reviewed the licensee's

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' Monthly Performance Reports for May and June,1990. - The inspector confirmed that tLt information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide.1.16.

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The. inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status

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. Report for May and June, 1990.

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.No violations or deviations were identified.-

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'12.

Meetings and Other Activities (30702)

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Management / Plant Status Meeting A' meeting was held on July 12, 1990 between the' Station Manager, the

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Manager, BWR Operations, the Region III Branch Chief, Division of. Reactor Projects, Branch 1, and members of each of their staffs.

The purpose of'

thetmeeting.was'for the licensee to provide an update on'the status of Units-I and 2, and to discuss the details concerning information supplied g

to' Region III relative to the status of repairs on the ECCS room check.

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va.lves.

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No violations.or deviations were identified.

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'13. -Unresolved items An-unresolved item is a~ matter about which more infunnatina is required in order to ascertain whether it is an accep+>bie item, an open item, a deviation, or a violation.

Unresolved items disclosed

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during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 4.a and 8.c.

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'14.

Exit Int'e:ylww (30703)

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The inspectors met with the licensee representatives' denoted-in

. Paragraph I during the inspection period and at'theLconclusion of the

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-inspection period.: The irispectors summarized the scope and results

of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection-

report. The licensee acknowledged the-information and did not indicate that any_of,the information disclosed during~the inspection

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could be considered proprietary in nature.

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