IR 05000254/1990008

Insp Repts 50-254/90-08 & 50-265/90-08 on 900429-0616.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items,Ler Review,Operational Safety Verification & Monthly Maint Observation

ML20044A993
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	07/11/1990
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20044A991	List: IR 05000254/1990008
References
50-254-90-08, 50-254-90-8, 50-265-90-08, 50-265-90-8, NUDOCS 9007170138
Download: ML20044A993 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10h REGION 111 Reports No. 50 254/90008(DM); LO-20E/90008(DRP)

Doc 6et Hos. 50 254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR 30 Lisensee:

Comunweelth Edison Con.pany Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 i

facility Nane: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, 1111nois

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Inspection Conducted: April 29 through June 16, 1990 Inspectors:

T. E. Taylcr J. M. Shine R. Bocanegra R. M. Lerch W. J. Kropp

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Approved By Irfds 90L 11 190

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Reactor Projects' $ection 1B Date I,spittjonSummer.y P

t 30-26 5 / 90DDh Dh>W " '" " "" g"'"'" ',"" " '(" p" '" "" """ /"90008 ( DR P);

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inspection fron, April 29 throu h June 16 1990 Re orts No. 50-254 Areal'Ei~pi~c}ted:

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Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident and-regionarliiifectors of licensee action on previcusly identified items; licensee event report review; cperational safety verification; nionthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; startup from.

refueling' activities; report review and. events.

Results:

During the' period, licensee managenent nainto1Md increased efforts To promote and achieve " error-free" perforn.ance.

Housekeeping efforts have i

received greoter managenient attention during the 'pericd, evidenced by'new i

initiatives in the areas of groundwater intrusion control and ECCS equipment

roone in.provements. Resolution of containment isolation valve testing and naintenance issues continues to be a weakness.

Technical staff experience and staffing levels-also continue to be a weakness, but management attention in this aree has_ been significant and staffing levels are beginning to increase.

Of the eight areas inspected, no violations were identified.

The resident inspectors continued to unitor pressure oscillations in the 28 reactor recirc pump outboard seal. Events followed by the residents included loss of control rod position indication and HDCI declared inoperable due to malfunctioning flow controller electronics.

9007170138 900711

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PDR ADOCK 05000254

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted CommonwealthEdiscnCompanyjCECo)

N. J. Kalivianakis, Vice President, BWR Operations

• R. L. Bax, Station Manager R. A. Robey, Technical Superintendent

• G. Spedi, Production Superintendent R. Stols, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

• J. Swales, Assistant Superintendent, Operations J. Fish, Master Mechanic J. Sirovy, Services Director D. Craddick, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance B. Tubbs, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 J. Kopact, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 B. Strub, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 M. Kooi, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 J. Wethington, Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Gibson, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor J. Dierbeck, Technical Staff Supervisor C. Smith, Quality Control Supervisor K. Leech, Security Administrator B. McGaffigan, Assistant Superintendent, Work Plat.ning D. Bucknell, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor

• T. Barber, Regulatory Assurance T. Lihou, Work Planning

• R. Hopkins, Engineer, Nuclear Quality Programs.

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on June 22, 1990, M

and at other times throughout the inspection period.

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The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shif t engineers and foremen, and electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract security personnel.

2.

Licensee Action on Previously_ identified Items (92701 92702)

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Viola t,i_ons (Closed) 50-254/90002-01:

This violation was issued for failing TU post a chiitiiiLBU's'TTFe wtch when combustibles were pretent in a fire zone. The licensee has revised two procedures to require stttion Fire Marshall approval prior to introducing transient comnustible material into the plant, and to require timely resolution of any unsatisfactory condition found in the plant. The corrective actions appear to be adequate to close this item.

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_1. E. Bulletin (Closed)89-02:

Stress Corrosion Cracking in Anchor Darling Model

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S350W Swing D eck Valves or Similar Yelves.

By letter dated January 17, 1990, the licensee responded that by reviewing plant docunentation, there are no swing check valves of this design installed in safety-related applications. The information search-method was discussed with the plant staff and there were no valves of this design installed in safety-related or balance of plant

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applications. This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3.

LicenseeEventRepott(LER) Review (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and'

review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective

' action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS):

a.

(Closed) 265/90006-LL:

Unit Two'RCIC Inoperable Due to New Flow controllir'TniliUlTHy Found During Initial Installation Testing.

The controller in question was installed during the recent refueling outage. The Instrument Mechanics (IM) who installed and programmed the controller, in an attemat to enhance the performance of the controller, adjusted down tle proportional band setting of the controller.

The device was bench tested with the-new setting prior to installation, and was also tested while in place during the normal RCIC ope..oility surveillance, both tests of which the controller performed adequately.

However, during the RCIC injection testing, flow oscillations occurred resulting in RCIC being declared

'noperable, and the NRC was notified. The IM reprogrentned the

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controllerwiththeoriginaldata(higherproportionalband)and the system was retested, performed adequately, and was returned to service. The IM postulated that the controller, during the injection test, was reacting too quickly to flow oscillations possibly caused by the discharge check valve, leading to erratic operation.

The licensee plans to perform further testing to establish a proper proportional band setting that will enhance controller performance yet will not overcon:pensate for minor inherent flow perturbations.

This item is closed.

In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's DeviationReports(DVRs)generatedduringtheinspectionperiod.

This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed for proper initiation and disposition as required by the applicable procedures and the QA manual.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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4.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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i Overview of Activities

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During this inspection period, Unit 2 came out of a refueling outage on

fuy 7, 1990. The unit operated at or near full power for the remainder L

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of the period.

Soon after coming out of the outage, the 2B Reactor

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Recirc pump outboard seal began experiencing pressure oscillations. At f

full: power the seal pressure stabilized and has oscillated intermittently

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through-the remainder of the report period. The resident inspectors

continued to monitor the licensee's actions.

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Unit 1 operated at full power or on EGC for the entire period with some

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L power reductions required by the Chicago Load Dispatcher and scheduled

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F surveillances.

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During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility

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was-being' operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory

requirenents and that the licensee's managenent control system was

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effectively carryino out its responsibilities for safe operation.

This

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r was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of t

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activities and equipnent, tours of the facility, interviews and

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discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety

system status and limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), corrective action, < and review of facility records.

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On a sampling basis the inspecters daily verified proper control room

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staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant i

activities with ongoing control rocm operations; verified operator t

adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities;

verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS);

including compliance with LCOs, with emphasis on engineered safety

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features (ESF) electrical alignment and valve positions; monitored

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instrunentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities;

. verified status of various lit annunciators for operato understanding,-

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off-normal condition and corrective actions being take ; examined nuclear instrumentation and other protection channels for proper

operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal

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conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as

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required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent,

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and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System

for operability..

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On June 13, 1990, while a resident inspector observed control room

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operations, with Unit 2 operating at about 95% power, operators entered i

p, a manual scram on the "A" channel of the reactor protection system.

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was required because a flow bias scram signal had alarmed and was found

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to be too high.

The operators concluded that the high bias signal adversely affected one channel of average power range monitors and took

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the action required by Technical Specifications, l

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Curing tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note-of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in

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progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers, general safety items, etc. The specific areas observed were:

a.

EngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF]_Sy,s, ten 3 Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignnent of

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f power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if g

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required by TS or FSAR; and the opt.rability of support systems essential to system actuation or performance through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication,.

cooling water supply, etc.

b.

Radiation P_rotection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrunentation for use, operability, and calibration.

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Security The inspect 6rs, by sampling, verified that persons in the protectcd area (PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if requirtd; vital areas were kept locked and alarmed, or guards posted if required; and personnel and packages entering the pA received proper search and/or monitoring, d.

-Housekeeppg and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fL protection,-protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign natter and; general protection.

The inspectors also monitored ver+.eus records, such as tagouts,, jumpers, shiftly logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance items, various chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and postings required per 10 CFR 19.11.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station mointenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted 'in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

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I-The following items were considered.during this review:

the limiting l.

conditions for operation were met'.while components or systems were p

removed from and. restored to service; approvals were obtained prior

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to initiating ~ the work; activities were accomplished using approved

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p procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing end/or k,

calibrations were perforned prior to returning components or systems

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l to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were bs

' accomplished by~ qualified personnel; parts and materials used were p

properly, certified; radiological controls were implenented; and fire prevention controls were' implemented. -Work requests were reviewed to F

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determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is

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assigned to safety-related equipn,ent maintenance which may affect system performance.

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. The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:

f Unit 1/2 1/2 "A": Fire Diesel Modification Unit 1-Preventive Maintenance Program - 250V DC Cutler Hammer Motor Control

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"B" RWCU Pump Overhaul.

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Unit 2 250V DC Battery Corrosion Control Maintenance RBCCW Expansion Tank Hi-Level Alarm.-

i HPCI Flow controller - Vendor Reconmended Repair i

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"A" Service Air Compressor Overhaul.

Essential Service Bus Uninterruptible Power Supply - Irve +.er-

. Troubleshooting and Repair-

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The inspectors monitored the licensee's work:in pt' ogress and verified:

that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and.

opproved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other applicable drawing

- updates were made and/or. planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of time.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Mon _t!Ly,SurveillanceObservation_(61726)

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The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing

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was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that t(st instrumentation was calibrated, thet LCOs were net, that removal and restoration of the effected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and

were reviewed by personnel other then the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management perconnel.

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During the current Unit 2 refueling outage (Spring 1990) the licensee

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performed LLRT on seven volumes that had never been tested before. One of the volumes (RBCCW) failed which delayed the Unit 2 startup. It subsequttitly passed af ter repairs.

In addition to the above concern, Region III Division of Reactor Safety L

(DRS) raised a concern that several paths for containment leakage,

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including RBCCW System, were also not tested during the last Unit I refueling outage (Fall 1989). Assuming that the Unit 1 RBCCW volume

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-leaks at the same rate as the Unit 2 RBCCW volume, when added to the previous ILRT leakage, would increase the total leakage to an

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unacceptable level.

On May 22, 1990, NRR granted the licerdee a waiver of compliance to allow operation of Unit I until October 1990 without performing Type C tests on the eight LLRT volumes of concern based on a

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determination that the added risk of operating the plant under these conditions was insignificant.

DRS is following this issue.

The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

Unit 1/2

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QOS' 9910-S1, Security Emet gency Diesel Generator Surveillance Test.

Temporary Procedure 6218, Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water

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System Capacity Test.

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'Q0S 2300-S2, HPCI Pump Operability.

QOS 2300-S3, HPC1 Valve Operability.

QOS 1300-S1, RCIC Pump Operability.

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-QOS 1300-S3, RCIC Valve Operability.

005 6600-51, Emergency Diesel Generator Load Test, Fuel Transfer

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Operability and Starting Air Operability, i

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"D" RHRSW Pump Vibration Surve111ances, b

QOP 700-6, Traversing Incore Probe Procedure,

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Q05.1400-53, Core Spray Purnp Operability,

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QOS 1400-S2, Core Spray Pump Operability.

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.QOS.1000-S2, Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Operability,

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Q05-1000-S3, Low Pressure Coolant Injection Valve Operability.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

'StgtupFromRefuelinglctiviti_es(71711)

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t The licensee began pulling rods on Unit 2 on May 7,1990, ending a l

refueling outage which had started on February 4.1990. Startup had been L

delayed since May'2,1990, due to maintenenre work being perfortned on an outboard isolation valve in the Reactor Building: Closed Cooling Water-(RBCCW) system which had failed a local leak rate test. Major work-and modifications.done during the outage included-refueling Unit.2, installing new "A" and "B" low pressure turbine rotors, removal of head o-spray piping, removal of the control rod drive (CRD) return line, and:

replacing Reactor Water Cleanup System piping due to-intergranular stress i

corrosion crackingL(IGSCC).

i The inspectors also. witnessed portions of the following outage and prior to startup test activities:

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,QlP 700-2, LPRM Cable Connection' Verification.-

QIP 730-4, Nuclear Tube Tip. Connection Verification.

Q15 130-4, Hot Scram Time Testing.

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-QTS'1104-01, Shutdown Margin Demonstration.

-QTS 110-3, ECCS-Simulated Automatic Actuation and Diesel Generator

~ Auto-Start Surveillance.

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' Pre-Startup Drywell Inspection.

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LQTS 150-1, Containnent Integrated Leak Rate Test.

Approach to and Achievenent of Criticality.

No violations or deviations were were identified.

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TraininLEEec_t_iveness_(41400.41701)

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The~ effectiveness of. training programs for licensed and non-licensed M

f personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of'

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the. licensee's performance of. routine surveillance, maintenance, and

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. operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response at to. events which occurred during the' inspection period.

personnel

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was observed which' indicated any ineffectiveness of training.

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Report Review n

During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's i

v,f Monthly Performance Report for April and May 1990.

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~ The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly platt Status Reports for March and April 1990.

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Egnts(93702)

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Loss of RpIS On_ June 1,1990, at approximately 4:00 p.m. with Unit 2 at 100%

power, a: blown fuse in the Control Rod position and Information System (RPIS) resulted in the loss of control rod position

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indication for control rods located in the lower half of the ful1~

-core display. ~0ther components rendered inoperative included the Rod Block Nonitor, Rod Worth Minimizer, and the OD-7 computer routine for control rod position verification.

The. licensee

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identified the cause to be a blown fuse, reset the associated alarms, and the affected systems were returned to normal operation

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in approximately 28 minutes. Power supply related failures on the RplS system have been a recurring. problem.

During the event the

licensee monitored the reactor operation utilizing the Neutron

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Monitoring system, diagnosed the failure, and consulted the TechnicalSpecifications(TS)fortheproperactionstatement. 'The TS did not: specifically address the event (simultaneous loss of multiple control rod position indications) so TS 3.0.A. " Limiting Conditions for 0peration (LCO) - General" ras properly entered at 4:00 p.m. and exited at 4:43 p.m., prior to being required to initiete a reactor shutdown.

The licensee was prepared to insert a

- manual' scram if the RPIS was not fully restored within I hour.

The licensee promptly notified the NRC and will submit 'an event report

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per 10 CFR 50.73.

The inspectors will assess the licensee's corrective actions pursuant to the event report.

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f b'. - - High pressure Coolant IQegion System Found Inoperable l

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On June 2,1990,- at approximately 5:23 p.m., the Unit 2 Nuclear

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. Station Operator (NS0) observed that the High pressure Coolant

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Injection (HPCI) flow ~ntroller had switched from the " Automatic"

-to " Manual" mode, the " Fail" light on the controller was lit, and'

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the setpoint was slowly drifting down (it had decreased to 3260 gpm

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from5600gpm).

The most recently docunented panel verification r

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SCRE at approximately 4:45 p.m..

The operator unable to return the

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controller-to " Automatic", but was able to operate the controller in

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the~" Manual" mode. The HPCI system was declared inoperable, the NRC

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t The HPCI flow controller manufactured by Yokogawa (model SLPC-271E),

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was installed in Unit 2 during the recent refueling outage and'in-

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Unit 1 in fall of 1989. No problems have been identified with the

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controller for Unit L

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The IMs found that the controller was indicating an "EpROM" error.

l The error indicated that the controller was unable to access the

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basic program, indicating that possibly the RAM chip contacts'had l

failed. However, the IMs were unable to completely verify that the

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error was due to the failed' RAM chip because the controller returned

-t to service during troubleshooting activities. The controller

returned to service by initiating and successfully running its i

diagnostic routine.

The controller was then returned to " Automatic" l

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and-the HPCI operability surveillance was run.

The'IMs postulated

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that the malfunction was possibly spurious, or might indicate a

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prob.lem with the microprocessor.

The vendor has indicated that -

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two similar feilures have occurred.

The vendor recommended s

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. replacement of the "EPROM" portion of the unit, and the licensee

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1s.taking steps to achieve this. The inspectors will verify the j

corrective maintenance activities pursuant to the 50.73 report..

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' ll. : Exit ' Interview Q0703)

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The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in J

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Paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the-q di inspection on June:22, 1990. The inspectors sumarized the sco)e and i

results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of tlis

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p inspection report.

The-licensee acknowledged the inforn;ation and did not

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could be considered proprietary in nature.

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