IR 05000254/1997015

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Insp Repts 50-254/97-15 & 50-265/97-15 on 970811-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Station Chemistry & REMP
ML20216C841
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/03/1997
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216C680 List:
References
50-254-97-15, 50-265-97-15, NUDOCS 9709090150
Download: ML20216C841 (16)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION ll!

Docket Nos:

50-254;.50 265 License Nos:

DPR-29; DPR 30

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Report Nos:

50-254/97015(DRS); 50-265/97015(DRS)

Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company Facility:

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Location:

22710 206th Avenue North Cordova, IL 61242 Dates:

August 11-14,1997 Inspector:

N. Shah, Radiation Specialist Approved by:

Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2'

Division of Reactor Safety h[

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-254/97015;50 265/97015 This inspection included a review of the station chemistry and radiological environmental

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monitoring (REMP) programs. Additionally, station radiological performance and a

radioactive, resin spill event occurring in September 1996, were reviewed. The report covered a four day inspection concluding on July 14,1997.

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A lack of significant emergent or contingent work and improvements in as-low-as-

l reasonably-achievable (ALARA) controls have resulted in lower than expected dose

since the completion of the Unit 2 refueling outage. However, there continued to be problems with rework and/or work planning which accounted for about 11 rem

of the total dose as of August 12,1997 (section R1.1).

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Reactor water chemistry was excellent and the Unit 2 fuelleakage was well

controlled. Chemistry technician aggregate and individual dose totals were low and j

consistent with the activities performed (section R1.2).

The REMP program was implemented as required by station procedures. One

l weakness was identified in that station personnel were not performing self-assessments of contractor activities. A similar observation was made during an

April 1996 station audit. Additionally, the inspector identified a REMP sample point

that had been removed in 1994, but was stillindicated as active in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manua! (ODCM). This discrepancy had not been identified by the

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licensee during a recent review of the REMP documentation (section R1.3),

i Chemistry in-line and laboratory analysis instrumentation were operable and well

maintained. One problem was identified with an inconsistency with the calibration

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frequency for the germanium detectors and other non-technical specification required instruments (section R2.1).

The High Range Sampling System panel was maintained operable, but several

problems were noted. Two discrepancies were identified in that the panel

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procedures did not refer to the appropriate section of the Final Safety Analysis

Report (FSAR) and that a recent modification to the system was not in accordance

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with the FSAR. One v'eakness was identified in that panel maintenance work requests were not being timely addressed, forcing technicians to rely on alternate, non-preferred sampling paths. 8n one case, the failure to address a work item

increased the possibility of damage to the panel. A technician was observed to use good ALARA controls and proces si adherence during sample collection (section R2.2).

Radiological housekeeping was acceptable with some improvement noted in

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contaminated area control. Radiological postings reflected actual area conditions and workers were observed using good ALARA practices. Continued examples of problems with radiological labelings were identified on the Units 1 and 2 refueling

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problems with radiological labelings were identified on the Units 1 and 2 refueling floors and on portable radiation detection instrumentation. These examples wore

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similar to those discussed in section R4.1 (section R2.3).

Che' mistry technicians used effective ALARA controls and exhibited acceptable

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sample collection and analytical technique during performance of routine chemistry

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activities. The inspector identified that radioactive materiallabels on the Reactor and Turbine Building sample panels needed to be replaced, noted excessive water

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intrusion in the Unit 2_ Suppression Pool and Drywell Continuous Air Monitor, and identified two examples of chemistry procedures that incorrectly referenced the

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FSAR (section R4.1).

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Chemistry management was implementing an effective self assessment program.

  • Routine surviellances by the station audit group indicated that chemistry performance was good, but the inspector noted relatively few observations of

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I radiochemistry sampling and analysis activities (section R7.1).

A resin spill which occurred during the filling of a high integrity container, resulted

  • from poor oversight of contractor activities by licensee personnel (section R8)

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Report Details

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IV. PLANT SUPPORT l

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Routine Radiological Performance a.

Inspection Scope (IP 83750)

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The inspector reviewed station radiological performance as of August 11,1997, including recent significant activities, dose attributed to rework and the as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) planning for the fall 1997 Unit 2 maintenance outage. The inspection consisted of interviews with Radiation Protection (RP) and ALARA planning staff and a review of records.

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Observations and Findinas As of August 11,1997, the total station dose was approximately 566 rem. The majority of the dose (463 rem) was attributed to the Unit 2 refueling outage

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(O2R14). As stated in inspection Report No. 97007, a lack of emergent or q

contingent work resulted in the actual outage dose being significantly lower than LJ estimated. This resulted in the license revising the 1997 station goal from 1260 rem to 720 rem.

Radiological pt. formance during the non-outage period has also been better than expected. Ir< partic Jlar, the total dose for June 1997 (25 rem) was the lowest in the licensee's i.; story, given comparable activities. The everall improved dose performance was attributed to the longer full power operation of both units and to

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improvements in ALARA controls (use of lead shielding and cameras, smaller crew size, etc) from lessons learned during past refueling outages.

However, the licensee was still encountering problems with rework and work planning. Two recent examples provided by the ALARA staff were:

On August 8,1997, the licensee accrued 1 rem exposure from an at-power

entry (about 97% power) into the Unit 2 drywell, to inspect leakage from a low pressure core injection check valve (no. 2-1001-68a). The leakage ceased after an associated leak off line drain valve was closed. Both the Units 1 and 2 low pressure core injection check valves were inspected during the last, respective refueling outages, but only the Unit 1 valve had its associated drain valve closed. The licensee was reviewing this job to

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determine why the Unit 2 drain valve was not closed during the outage.

On July 2,1997, the licensee performed wok on a Unit 1 Condensate

Demineralizer valve (no.1-5501-R-12) to correct instrument air line leakage.

Subsequent to the work, licensee RP staff identified that the work should have been scheduled during a condensate domineralizer filter changeout

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which occurred on June 25,1997. Had the work occurred during the

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changoout, the area dose rates and the associated dose would have decreased from 300 to 30 millirem per hour (mrem /hr) and from 11 to about 3-4 mrem, respectively.

Both of these jobs were documented in station Problem Identification Forms and were being reviewed by the licensee. As of August 12,1997, a total of 11 rem was attributed to rework and/or work planning issues.

The licensee planned a short duration (i.e.<;. 30 days) Unit 2 maintenance outage in the fall of 1997. The focus of the outage was to identify and remove the leaking fuel element (section R1.2). Other significant activities include'i reactor vessel disassembly / reassembly, routine snubber inspections, and saNy elief, reactor water cleanup and high pressure core injection valve work. Ahb.., ugh the ALARA planning was ongoing, the total dose was expected to be under 20 rem. This was well within the 32 rem forced outage contingent dose incorporated into the revised 1997 goal.

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Conclusions A lack of significant emergent or contingent work and improvements in ALARA controls have resulted in lower than expected dose since the completion of the Unit 2 refueling outage. However, there continued to be problems with rework and/or work planning which accounted for about 11 rem of the total dose as of August 12,1997.

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R1.2 Reactor Water Chemistry and Fuel Leakage a.

Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed reactor water chemistry trend charts and the Ucensee's investigation of Unit 2 fuelleakage indications. Additionally, the aggregate and individual dose totals for 1996 and 1997, from routine chemistry activities, was reviewed.

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Observations and Findinos Station procedure OCCP 100-02 (revision (rev,) 7) " Laboratory Analysis Schedule" describes the reactor water chemistry sampling program and action levels. This procedure was recently revised to include the recommendations in the 1996 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) boiling water reactor chemistry guidelines. The

- inspector reviewed water chemistry performance data from January 1996 to August 11,1997. With the exception of the Unit 2 fuelleakage indicators discussed below, observed trends were consistent with the associated plant operating condition and significantly below the action levels. Although the 1996 EPRI guidelines did not list achievable levels for water chemistry parameters, chemistry management indicated that the measured values were at or below industry values.

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On July 14,1997, the licensee observed an increase in Steam Jet Air Elector activity from 550 to 8210 microcuries per second (uCi/sec.) A similar increase was seen in reactor water iodine-131 and neptunium-239 levels, from 1.8E-4 to 2.1E 3 microcuries per milliliter (uCi/mt) and from less than the lower limit of detection to 2.4E-4 uCi/ml, respectively. Based on the magnitude of the increased air ejector and reactor water radioactivity, the licensee suspected a pinhole leak in a fuel element and commenced flux tilt testing between July 15-16,1997.- Power around the suspect fuel bundle was subsequently suppressed to below 5 kilowatts per hour, by the insertion of three control rods, in accordance with vendor recommendations. After the suppression, air ejector and reactoi water iodine levels decreased to 1,792 uCi/sec and 1.4E-4 uCi/mt, respectively: no change was observed in the neptunium levels. The licensee plans to remove the fuel bundle durbg the Unit 2 maintenance outage (section R1.1).

Continued progress was noted in the licensee's condensate demineralizer filtration project. The project consisted of installing several 4-20 micron filters in the Units 1 and 2 condensate demineralizer systems, to reduce feedwater iron levels. Industry studies have shown that high levels of feedwater iron may increase the buildup of activation and corrosion products on piping and associated contact dose rates.

After installation, feedwater iron levels (both units) declined to 1-2 parts per billion (ppb) from 2-4 ppb. Filter run times have also increased to 30-40 days from 15-16 days. Recently, chemistry management observed an increase in Unit 2 feedwater iron levels to 5 6 ppb, which they attribute to possible breakthrough in a 10 micron filter. The chemistry group plans to continue monitoring the project performance and to evaluate the higher Unit 2 iron levels.

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l The boron concentration in the Units 1 and 2 Standby Liquid Control System was determined and maintained in accordance with the Technical Specifications (TS 4.4(2)(b)). Additionally, the inspector verified that the recently installed Unit 2 depleted zine injection system was operated in accordance with station procedure l

QCCP 500-06 (rev. 0) " Zinc Injection System Operation." Chemistry management had instituted a revision to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to include a description of this system. A similar system (and applicab!e FSAR revision) was planned to be installed in Unit 1 during the next refueling outage.

Total dose accrued by the chemistry technicians performing routine activities was approximately 2 rem as of August 12,1997, compared to about 2.5 rem in 1996.

The higher 1997 total was attributed to the technician support of RP job coverage activities (primarily in the drywell) during the Unit 2 outage. This was also the basis for several technicians having 1997 individual dose totals between 150-560-mrem, significantly higher than the 1997 average individual dose total of 90 mrem.

The aggregate and individual dose totals for the remainder of 1997 (i.e. after the outage), were consistent with the 1996 results. Additionally, the inspector noted that the chemistry department radiation work permit (no. 970009, rev.1)

referenced lessons learned from past chemistry events and was well understood by the technicians.

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Conclusions

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Reactor water chemistry was excellent and the Unit 2 fuelleakage was well controlled. Chemistry technician aggregate and individual dose totals were low and consistent with the activities performed.

R1.3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)

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Insoection Scope The inspector reviewed the implementation of the REMP program. The inspection consisted of a review of records and interviews with personnel, b.

Observations and Findinos The REMP program was implemented as described in station procedure no. OCAP 0610 (Rev. 2) " Environmental Monitoring Program" and in chapters 11 and 12 of the ODCM. The program was implemented by a contract vendor and overseen by the RP staff. The station planned to implement the corporate Unified Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program in 1998, pending ongoing revisions to station l

procedures and the ODCM.

As stated in the 1996 annual REMP report, there have been no significant trends or abnormal radiation readings from station cperatiun. Required sampling (including collection of thermoluminescent dosimeters) were conducted as stated in the ODCM. The inspector reviewed monthly environmental sample reports and routine audits /surveillances performed by the contract vendor implementing the program; no problems were identified. However, the inspector noted a weakness in that station personnel responsible for the program had not performed a self-assessment of the contractor activities. A similar observation was made during an April 1996, station audit (no. 4-96-03) associated with the meteorological tower. This was recognized by the RP staff, who planned to observe contractor field activities.

In response to a recent NRC inspection finding at the Byron station, the licensee was reviewing the REMP program as implemented and as described in the ODCM.

The licensee recently completed this review and was updating the applicable REMP documents and was planning to verify the physicallocation of the sampling stations and the thermoluminescent dosimeters. During the inspection, the inspector identified a discrepancy that was not identified by the licensee's review.

Specifically, a REMP sample point (No. 31) that had been removed in 1994, was stillindicated as active in the ODCM. The licensee planned to correct the discrepancy and to further review the documentation to identify other errors, c.-

Conclusions The REMP program was implemented as required by station procedures. One weakness was identified in that station personnel w9re not performing self-assessments of contractor activities. A similar observation was made during an

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April 1996 station audit. Additionally, the inspector identified a REMP sarnple point

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that had been removed in 1994, but was stillindicated as active in the ODCM.

This discrepancy had not been identified by the licensee during a recent review of the REMP documentation.

R2-Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Chemistry in-line Instruments and Laboratory Analytical Equipment a.

Inspection Scope The inspector observed the operability of the Reactor and Turbine Building sample panelin-line instrumentation and laboratory analytical equipment. Associated control charts and maintenance history records were also reviewed during this inspection, b.

Observations and Findinas Sample panels were well maintained with no notable degraded equipment.

Chemistry technicians stated that chemistry management promptly responded to panel problems and were receptive to technician identified concerns. Additionally, the panels were of a simplified, modular design which allowed for relatively easy maintenance. The inspector reviewed selected in-line instrument maintenance histories and identified no significant operability trends.

Performance check standards were run penodically before and after each analysis on the laboratory analytical equipment. The standards were prepared using samples traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Testing. The performance check results were documented on control charts maintained for each analyticalinstrument. These control charts were in place and had appropriately labeled upper and lower acceptance criteria in accordance with sections H.1-H.2 of OCCP 900-04 (section R4.1). The charts were reviewed by chemistry supervision f

and notable trends were well documented. The inspector also reviewed associated maintenance histories and identified no problems.

One problem was identified during the inspector's review of the High Purity Germanium Detector calibration records. Per QCCP 800-05 (rev. 2) " Efficiency Calibration of CRU Gamma Spectrometer Multichannel Analyzer System" (section B)

this calibration is performed annually. Since these instruments were not specifically discussed in either the station TS or Radiological Effluent TS (RETS), the chemistry department had interpreted annually to mean once per calendar year. However, these instruments were only used to perform RETS required analyses, and

" annually" was defined in the RETS (table 12.1-10) as once per 366 days.

Additionally, other plant departments (such as RP), having instruments not defined in either the TS or RETS, defined calibration frequencies consistent with the TS or RETS definitions. The inspector was concerned that the inconsistent' definition for non-TS or RETS required instruments may lead to maintenance and surveillance

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scheduling problems. This was discussed with licensee management who planned to evaluate the matter.

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Conclusions Chemistry in-line and laboratcry analysis instrumentation were operable and well maintained. One problem was identified with an inconsistency with the calibration frequency for the germanium detectors and other similar non-technical specification required instruments.

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- R2.2 High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS)

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Inspection Scoce The inspector reviewed the operability of the HRSS system through a review of applicable records, a walkdown of the system, and discussions with chemistry staff. The performance of station procedure OCHRSS 0500-05 (rev. 3) "ESS Fill Pump Diluted Sample" was also observed during the inspection.

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Observations and Find:nas The inspector's review identified two discrepancies in that the appropriate section of the FSAR (section 9.3.2.1) was not referenced in HRSS procedures (section R4.1) and that a recent modification to the system was not in accordance with FSAR section 9.3.2.1.3.3, pertaining to liquid sampling. The modification consisted of securing the HRSS recirculation system sample lines, which had been welded to the panel, with compression fittings. Although the change was appropriately accounted for in a licensee safety evaluation, the FSAR, which still required that all connections be welded, was not revised. Chemistry management was in the process of reviewing the HRSS system requirements and planned to revise the-FSAR.

Although the HRSS was observed to be operable, there were numerous outstanding maintenance work requests, some dating back to 1992, for various minor problems

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identified by the chemistry group, in some cases, these problems resulted in chemistry technicians having to rely on an alternate pathway for sample collection.

These alternate pathways were designed into the HRSS panel, but were not the preferred method of collection. One of the outstanding requests (dated 1995), was for four demineralizer supply and flush valves, which a technician indicated were difficult to move. During the performance of the above procedure, the inspector observed a technician using considerable force to manipulate these valves. The inspector was concerned that by not timely correcting these outstanding work requests, the licensee may discourage technicians from identifying problems and, in particular, that the failure to repair the supply and flush valves may result in damage to the panel given the manipulative force needed. Licensee management agreed with the inspector's assessment and planned to develop corrective actions.

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No other problems were observed during the performance of the above procede -

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The technician displayed good knowledge of system operation and used good ALARA controls in collecting and handling the sample, c.

Conclusions The HRSS panel was maintained operable, but several problems were identified.

Two discrepancies were identified in that the panel procedures did not refer to the appropriate section of the FSAR and that a recent modification to the system was not in accordance with the FSAR. One weakness was identified in that panel l

maintenance work requests were not being timely addressed, forcing technicians to

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rely on alternate, non-preferred sampling paths. In one case, the failure to address a work item, increased the possibility of damage to the panel. A technician was observed to use good ALARA controls and procedural adherence during sample collection.

R2.3 Plant Walkdowns a.

inspection Scope The inspector performed a walkdown of the general areas of the Reactor, Turbine and Laundry-Tool-Decon buildings including the Units 1 and 2 corner rooms and torus genera! areas.

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Observations and Findinos Radiological housekeeping was observed to be acceptable with some improvement noted in control of contaminated areas. For example, the inspector observed that contaminated hoses were secured inside floor drains and that housekeeping in the Units 1 and 2 High Pressure Core injection Rooms (posted contaminated areas) had improved since previous inspections. Although there wss little ongoing work in the radiological posted areas, workers were observed to use good ALARA practices (standing in low dose areas, etc) and were cognizant of area dose rates and radiation work permit requirements. The inspector also independently verified that radiological postings reflected the actual area conditions.

There continued to be examples of problems with radiological labelings. For example, on the Units 1 and 2 refueling floors there were several " internally contaminated" labels located on new fuel storage vaults, which were either partially torn or were not well secured. Additionally, there were several radioactive material labels on portable radiation detection instrumentation that while legible, were badly faded. Other examples were discussed in section R4.1. Although none of the observed examples constituted a regulatory violation, their presence indicated a continuing weakness in this area.

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Conclusions

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Radiological housekeeping was acceptable with some improvement noted in contaminated area control. Radiological postings reflected actual area conditions

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and workers were observed using good ALARA practices, Continued examples of problems with radiologicallabelings were identified on the Units 1 and 2 refueling floors and on portable radiation detection instrumentation. These examples were similar to those discussed in section R4.1.

R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C R4.1 Routine Chemistry Sampling and Laboratory Activities a.

Inspection Scoce

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The inspector observed routine sampling and laboratory activities as performed by the chemistry technicians. The inspector focused on use of good ALARA controls during sample collection, sample tracking and analysis, preparation and storage of chemical analysis standards and laboratory housekeeping. Specific activities observed included:

OCCP 130016 (rev. 6) " Reactor / Turbine Building Sample Panet Sample

Collection;"

OCCP 1300-1 (rev. 7) "Drywell and Suppression Pool Sampling and

Purging;"

QCCP 100-12 (rev. 4) " Radioactive Liquid Discharge Batch Analysis;"

QCCP 1300-11 (rev. 9) "Radwaste System Sampling;"

QCCP 1300-19 (rev. 3) " Sampling Miscellaneous Plant Systems and

Equipment;"

OCCP 1300-25 (rev. 6) " Service Water Residual Heat Removal Service

Water Vault Composite Flushing;"

OCCP 600-39 (rev 3) " Microwave Digestion of Feedwater Samples;" and

600-04 (rev.1) " Low Levellon Analysis Using Dionex lon Chromatograph"

The inspector also reviewed the results of inter-and intrataboratory comparison checks performed in 1996 and 1997 per step H.3 of QCCP 900-04 (rev. 2)

" Chemistry Analyses Quality Control Program" and OCCP 900-7 (rev.1)

" Chemistry Technician Proficiency Testing Program."

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Observations and Findinos The technicians used effective ALARA controls and sample collection techniques during sample panel activities. For ext.mple, the technicians were familiar with sample panel dose rates and wore gloves to minimize contamination. Current copies of applicable procedures were located at the sample panels and the technicians were observed to properly adhere to procedural requirements. Other specific observations made by the inspector were:

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Radioactive materiallabels on the Units 1 and 2 Reactor and Turbine Building

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Sample Panels were legible, but badly faded. These labels warned workers of potentially contaminated conditions inside the sample panel sinks.

During the change out of the particulate filter paper in the Unit 2

Suppression Pool and Drywell Continuous Air Monitor, the inspector noted that the filter media was saturated. The saturation resulted from water condensing and/or intruding in the monitor's sample line. The monitor's operability was not affected by the water intrusion and this problem was not observed on the Unit 1 monitor.

QCCP 1300-16 incorrectly stated that there was no applicable section in the

FSAR for the Reactor and Turbine Building sample panels. The inspector ideni.iied that the FSAR section 9.3.2.2 discussed these panels and should have been referenced in the procedure. An additional example was identified with the HRSS campling procedure, QCCP 500-05 (section R2.2), which failed to reference FSAR section 9.3.2.1. These discrepancies had not been identified by the licensee during previous procedural revisions.

The licensee planned to replace the labels on the sample panels, was evaluating the use of additional heat tracing to remove moisture from the Unit 2 Suppression Pool and Drywell Continuous Air Monitor and planned to review (and revise as necessary) the other chemistry procedures to verify the applicable FSAR sections were referenced.

Reactor water samples were appropriately logged and tracked in laboratory sample

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notebooks. Analytical standards were prepared in accordance with procedures, stored appropriately, and were logged in the chemicalinventory list. There were no expired analytical standards evident in the storage areas and laboratory housekeeping was good.

Chemistry technicians demonstrated good analytical technique during performance of laboratory activities. During interviews with the inspector, the technicians were knowledgeable of procedural requirements and management expectations.

Luboratory analytical capability and technician performance was good, as indicated by the above inter-and intralaboratory comparison results. Based on selected technician logbook entries between March and August 1997, communication witn other plant departments (particularly operations) was acceptable.

During a review of selected chemistry sampling logbook entries from March to August 1997, the inspector identified no instances where samples had not been collected or analyzed as required by QCCP 100-02 (section R1.2).

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Conclusions Chemistry technicians used effective ALARA controls and exhibited acceptable sample collection and ant.lytical technique during performance of routine chemistry activities. The inspector identified that radioactive materiallabels on the Reactor

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and Turbine Building sample panels needed to be replaced, noted excessive water

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intrusion in the Unit 2 Suppression Pool and Drywell Continuous Air Monitor, and identified two examples of chemistry procedures that failed to reference the FSAR.

j R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities R7.1 - Chemistry Self Assessments and Audits a.

l_nspection Scope The inspector reviewed recent self assessments and Field Monitoring Reports (FMRs) performed by the chemistry and station Quality and Safety Assessment groups, respectively, between April and August 1997. This inspection consisted of a review of records, interviews with workers and observations during plant walkdowns.

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Observations and Findinos Chemistry technicians stated that chemistry supervision had increased oversight of routine activities and was responsive to identified problems. During the walkdowns, the inspector observed chemistry managers overseeing technician activities and providing feedback as necessary. In a staff memorandum dated November 27,1996, the Chemistry Supervisor required that supervisors -

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periodically observe and document routine activities. The inspector noted that these assessmentt were frequently performed, were reviewed by the Chemistry Supervisor and that corrective actions for identified problems were timely and appropriate.

Under the existing program, the Quality and Safety Assessment group does not

perform a formal audit of the chemistry program. Instead, FMRs were periodically

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performed and if a negative trend was identified, then a formal audit may be initiated. The last such audit was performed in April 1996 (no. QAA 4-96-07) in response to NRC inspection findings (Report Nos. 50-254/265 96002 and -96005).

Although no significant findings were documented in the station audit report, the number of FMRs had increased to provide better oversight of chemistry activities.

Chemistry performance was good, based on a review of the above FMRs.

However, the inspector noted relatively few FMRs on radiochemistry sampling and analysis. This was discussed with station audit supervision who planned to increase FMR coverage of these activities, c.

Conclusions Cliemistry management was implementing an effective self-assessment program.

Routine surviellances by the station audit group indicated that chemistry performance was good, but the inspector noted relatively few observations of radiochemistry sampling and analysis activities.

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R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues

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The following items identified in previous inspection reports wore reviewed by the inspectors:

(Closed) URI 50-254/265 970012-10: Resin spill during fitPng of a high integrity container (HIC). A licensee investigation concluded that pooi oversight of a vendor modification to the HIC fill head resulted in the spill Specifically, the vendor had added a T fitting to the fill head to facilitate the resin loading. However, this fitting was not described in the vendor drawings nor did tne vendor procedures describe how to perform this modification. The licensee believed that the fitting impinged on a rubber gasket encircling the upper portion of the HIC, resulting in wear and eventual failure. A total of one gallon of resin was spilled and there were no significant radiological consequences.

Corrective actions included eliminating the T-fitting and instituting a program to have the gasket inspected monthly and replaced biennially. The vendor procedutas and drawings were also revised to reflect the current equipment condition and a procedural requirement was instituted to disallow any changes to the system without license concurrence. These actions were reviewed during an NRC inspection documented in Report No. 50-254/265-97009(DRS). In that report, the NRC also identified another problem with the licensee's oversight of vendor procedures which the licensee continued to address. This item is considered closed.

X" E.-Jt Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee managerrant at the conclusion of the inspection on August 14,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented and did not identify any of the documents listed as proprietary. A partiallisting of those attending the exit included:

M. Hayse, Quality and Safety Assessment, Audit Supervisor T. Kirkham, Lead Health Physicist, Technical E. Kraft, Station Vice-President L. W. Pierce, Station Manager G. Powell, Radiation Protection Manager R. G. Svaleson, RP/ Chemistry Superintendent M. B. Wayland, Maintenance Manager R. Weibenga, Lead Chemist

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INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED

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IP 83750

~ OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE IP 84750 REACTOR WATER CHEMISTRY AND GAGEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENT RELEASE PROGRAMS ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED or DISCUSSED Open None closed

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50-254/265-97003-01 URI Resin spill during filling of HlC (section R8)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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-ALARA

- As Low As-Reasonably Achievable FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

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rev, revision RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup mrem /hr millirem per hour

RP&C Radiation Protection and Chemistry L

REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program l

ODCM-Offsite Dose Calculational Manual uCl/mi microCurles per milliter ppb parts per billion l

TS Technical Specification

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RETS Radioactive Effluent Technical Specification

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. HRSS High Range Sampling System

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uCi/s microcuries per Second 16-

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