IR 05000254/1997020
| ML20217L017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217L003 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-97-20, 50-265-97-20, NUDOCS 9710300174 | |
| Download: ML20217L017 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION lil Docket Nos:
50-254;50-265 License Nos:
50-254/97020(DRS); 50-265/97020(DRS)
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
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Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 -
Location:
22710 200th Avenue North Cordova,IL 61242
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Dates:
Between September 29 and October 2,1997 Inspector:
T. Madeda, Physical Security inspector
Approved by:
James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety i
9710300174 971025 PDR ADOCK 05000254 G
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e EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspect!on Reports 50 254/97020; 50 265/97020 This inspection included a review of plant support activities relating to the physical protection of your facility. This report evaluated the quality of security related audits, reviewed the effectiveness of management controlo, verified the performance of protected and vital area control activities, evaluated the effectiveness of security testing and maintenance support activities, reviewed security training and qualification activities, and included follow-up on previous inspection findings. The inspection was conducted between September 29 and October 6,1997, Security performance was effective. Security force memisers demonstrated a strong
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working knowledge and implementation of security requirements. Security equipment performance was acceptable. Security manager's support and actions to address and resolve security related problems were Fmely and effective.
Maintenance activities relating to the repair and oversight of those repair activities for
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security camera wiper problems were neither effective not timely. Those deficiencies required the implementation of security compensatory measures to maintain surveillance program requirements. (Section S2.1)
The failure of an active security vehicle barrier to operate demonstrated an inadequacy
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in your security preventative maintenance program. The significance of the barrier's failure was that vehicle traffic to the protected area was impeded during that time period.
(Section S2.2)
The establishment and implementation of a program to reduce security force personnel
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errors was a strength. Errors related to security force performance have been reduced.
(Section S4.1)
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lit Rpd D.ftlails IV. Plant Support S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2,1 Closed Circuit Television Maintenance Activitists a.
Insoection Scorn (81700. 81042 ar_d 81066)
The inspector reviewed records and interviewed security poisonnel regarding the reliability and effectiveness of the security closed circuit teles tsion assessment system.
Inspector review included the review and evaluation of perfor. nance and maintenance records, observation of security cameras' performance, and interviewo with cognizant security and maintenance personnel, b.
Observations and Findings The inspector identified that maintenance repair activities related to security camera wiper failures were neither effective nor timely, Also, maintenance oversight activity that monitored wiper repair activities was not effective, During the extensive periods of wiper
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failure, compensatory measures were required to be implemented to maintain surveillance effectiveness.
Inspector review of security event logs showed that approximately 42% of the wipers installed on security cameras were not functional. Those cameras providod approximately 40% of the surveillance and monitoring activities for the protected area barriers and isolated zone. Review of those security maintenance logs also showed that three security camera wipers had been out of service for a year or longer and that the remaining out-of-service security camera wipers had been in that condition from two to eight months.
Inspector interviews of alarm station operators and review of records showed that when wiper failures occurred security compensatory measures were
,lemented in accordance with security plan requirements. The failures were t..so documented in security ma:ntenance work requests The wipers are designed to maintain adequate camera surveillance effectiveness during environmental conditions such as rain, snow, orice.
An interview with the licensee's Station Security Administrator and the cognizant maintenance manager showed that each was aware of the problem and its scope. This cognizant maintenance manager, whose department has the responsibility for maintaining the security cameras, did not appear to have detailed information regarding repair status, and agreed that oversight of this repair activity was not acceptable. The manager indicated that actions would be immediately taken to repair the wipers and to determine why the oversight activity was not effective.
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Our inspection activity confirmed that when failures occurred, compensatory measures were implemented in accordance with security plan commitments. The security plan also requires that security equipment be maintained to ensure operability and effectiveness. The cameras generally functioned adequately, except for the one component (wipers) noted above. The inspector's finding that addressed timeliness of repair and associated oversight activities was identified as an Inspection Follow-up item (IFl 50-254/97020-01; 50-265/97020-01),
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.Concluslom Tho inspector identified that maintenance activities to repair failed wipers on security cameras were not effective or timely and that maintenance oversight activities failed to monitor those repair activities. Those wiper failures required the security organization to implement additional compensatory measures to maintain security plan effectiveness.
Maintenance support activities for other security equipment were generally completed in a timely manner.
S.2.2 Vehicle Barrier Maintenance Activity Insnection Scoce (81700 and 81052)
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The inspector reviewed the effectiveness and performance of active and passive vehicle barriers. Inspector review included review of records and observation and evaluation of security and maintenance related activities, b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector identified that inadequate oversight of a security preventative maintenance procedure was a contributing factor to a failure of an active security vehicle barrier. The failure of that barrier reduced the licensee's ability to access vehicles, including potential safety related vehicles, to the protected area in a timely manner, inspector review of licensee security loggable events showed that on September 9, 1997, the main gate vehicle barrier failed to open. The vehicle barrier gate remained in the down position for approximately two hours. During that time, norma! vehicle traffic could not enter the protected area. (Note: This is the only vehicle barrier gate that provides access to the protected area.) Had emergency vehicle access been necessary, it would have been impeded by the barrier's failure to operate. This would have caused those vehicles to use attemate gates. The gate was opened when security management recalled an attemate method around the primary opening raethod.
The inspector determined by interviews with cognizant licensee security personnel and a review of a security event log that the gate failure was caused by low hydraulic fluid pressure. The inspector confirmed by interview and review of maintenance records that the hydraulic fluid had not been checked since the gate was installed in late 1995. The inspector determined through a review of the manufacturer's maintenance recommendations that hydraulic flu!d level should be regularly checked to maintain
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proper gate action operation. An interview with the Station Security Administrator showed that a maintenance procedure currently in the licensee's management review process contained a requirement to check tho hydraulic fluid level. This procedure has been in the development / review process for 19 months.
An Interview with the cognizant maintenance manager confirmed that his department is responsible for monitoring and implementing this procedure. He confirmed that if the procedure had been in effect, the gate failure may not have occurred. The manager bel;eved the review process was delayed because this type of gate is in use at all six licensee nuclear plants, and, therefore, each site took part in the review. However, the plant manager indicated that a review process of 19 months was not acceptable.
Inspector review also showed that security personnel were not familiar with the manufacturer's alternative method of opening the gate when hydraulic fluid is low. In response to the inspector's finding, all security supervisors were informed of the alternate opening methods.
Our inspection activities determined that hadequate oversight of a security maintenance procedure may have contributed to a failure of a vehicle security barrier gate to operate as designed. The inspector's finding was identified as an Inspection Follow-up Item (IFl 50 254/97020-02;50-265/97020-02).
c, Conclusions The inspector determined that Inadequate oversight of a security preventative maintenance procedure may have been a factor in the failure of a security vehicle barrier gate. The length of the failure was increased because security personnel had not been trained in an alternative opening method. During the period of the failure, vehicle access to the protected area could not be conducted.
S4 Stqurity and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance S4.1 Security Force Performance a,
insoection Scoce (81700 and 81022)
The inspector toured various security posts and observed officers' duty performance to determine whether they were knowledgeable of post requirements. Security event togs and other records to include incident reports and security equipment trending data pertaining to security force performance were also reviewed.
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Observations and Findings During our review of licensee's tracking and trending records and event logs for the months of January - September 1997, the inspector noted that few errors resulted from security personnel performance. Specifically, in the last three months only two errors had occurred. Interviews of twelve security officers and six security supervisors
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confirmed that secunty force errors have shown a significant performance improvement in the last nine months.
The inspector determined, through interviews of personnel within several organizational levels of the security force and review of past and current security event logs, that reporting requirements regarding security personnel errors had not changed, inspector interviews with the licensee's Station Security Adrr61strator and the contractor security site manager determined that in late 1996 and early 1997 security management established a program with the objective of reducing personnel errors Ottributed to the security organization. Program elements included increased involvement in operational activities by security supervisors, increased supervisor oversight activities, involvement of security o'ficers in conducting oversight activities, mentor and employee coaching programs, and incentives to maintain error free performance.
Program results showed that as of the onsite inspection ending date the day shift had 197 days of error free performance, the afternoon shift,43 days, and the midnight shift, 33 days.
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Conclusions The performance of security officers and supervisors has significantly improved as demonstrated by virtually error free performance.
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 (Closed) Insoection Follow-uo item (50-254/97012-01: 50-265/97012-01):
The licensee's practice of starting protected area patroit at pre-designated tirnes limited their effectiveness, inspector review showed that the licensee has established and implemented procedure requirements that vary the starting times of required protected area patrols. The inspector reviewed logs and interviewed security patrol personnel to confirm that the
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procedure requirement was implemented. This item is closed.
S8.2 (Ocen) Unresolved item (50-254/97004-02: 50-265/97004-02): The unresolved item involved the adequacy of security barriers that penetrated a vital aiea and the bullet-resistance of those barriers. This issue was referred to NRC Headquarters, Office of Nuclear Regulation, for resolution by memorandum dated April 22,1997.
Subsequent to our identification of the unresolved item, the inspector determined that the licensee had implemented compensatory measures until removed ceiling tiles were replaced that hide the barriers from view. This item will remain open pending NRC Headquarters' determination of the adequacy of the barriers.
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V. Management Meeting XI The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management at the.
conclusion of the onsite inspection on October 2,1997. However, our inspection findings required further NRC review. This was completed on October 6,1997. On October 6,1997, the Station Security Administrator was advised of NRC's action as described in this report. Actions agreed to by the licensee to address the inspection findings were also discussed.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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LiceDS92 K. Leech, Site Security Administrator L. Pecrce, Site Vice President C. Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager B. Rittmer, Assistant Site Security Administrator B. Sherer, Maintenance Manager Burns International Security Services. Inc.
M. Embree. District Manager K. Hungerford, Site Project Manager K. Lindley, Operations Manager lEC L. Collins, Resident inspector C. Miller, Senior Resident inspector K. Walton, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED g
IP 81700 Physical Security Program For Power Reactors g
IP 81042 Testing and Maintenance IP 81052 Physical Barriers - Protected Area IP 81066 Assessments Aids ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50 254; 265/97020-01 IFl Maintenance support activities to repair a piece of security equipment was not timely or effective.
50-254; 265/97020-02 IFl An inadequacy in the security preventative maintenance program.
CLOSAQ 50-254;265/97012-01 IFl Adequacy of probcted area patrols.
Discussed 50-254; 265/97004-02 URI Adequacy of a vital area barrier,
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