IR 05000254/1990002
| ML20033G977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1990 |
| From: | Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033G974 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-90-02, 50-254-90-2, 50-265-90-02, 50-265-90-2, IEB-83-07, IEB-83-7, NUDOCS 9004130234 | |
| Download: ML20033G977 (17) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
REGION 111 Reports No. 50-254/90002(DRP): 50265/90002(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-254; $0 205 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 j
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
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Chicago, IL 60690 l
Facility Nane: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 i
Inspection Att Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois
Inspection Conducted: January 28 through March 17, 1990 (
Inspectors:
R. L. Higgins R. M. Lerch T. M. Ross J. M. Shine D. E. Jones R. Bocanegra L. N. 01shan
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Approved J
M. Hi APR 0 41933 eactor Projects Section IB Date Inspection Sunrnary i
Inspection on January 28._ through March 17,1990(ReportsNo. 50-254/90002(DRP);
l No. 50-265/90002(DRP))
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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident, regional and headquarters inspectors of licensee actions on previous items, plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance / surveillance, emergency preparedness, security (including Tl 2515/104, fitness for Duty Training),
engineering / technical support and safety assessment / quality verification.
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Resu_1ts: One open item (refer to Paragraph 3.c.(8)) and one violation (refer to Paragraph 3.c.(2)) for which a Notice of Violation is being issued was
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identified in the functional area of operations. Additional violations were
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identified in the functional areas of radiation control (refer to Paragraph 4),
emergency preparedness (refer to Paragraph 6.a), and security (refer to
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l Paragraph 7.b), which satisfied the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, for which no Notice of Violation will be issued.
Despite the afore-nentioned
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violation in operations this functional area was generally strong and improving.
Because of violations / incidents which have occurred during the inspection period, additional management attention may be needed in the
functional areas of radiation control, emergency preparedness and security.
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9004130234 900404 FDR ADOCK 05000254 O
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted
'R. Bax, Station Manager
- R. Robey, Technical $uperintendent
- J. $ wales, Assistant $vperintendent for Operations
- J. Wethington, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- T. Barber, Regulatory Assurance
' Denotes those present at the exit interview on March 16, 1990.
The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspection.
2.
Action on previous Items (92701 and 92702)
(Closed)Bulletin 83-07, "Apparently Fraudulent Products Sold by a.
Ray Miller, Inc.
This bulletin was originally closed in Inspection Report 254/84011; 265/84010. A letter referencing this balletin was issued by the licensee subsequent to the inspection report. This letter deletes four 10-inch, 900 pound, schedule 80 flanges from the list of components sold by Ray Miller, and does not add any additional components to the list.
Bulletin 83-07 remains closed.
b.
(Closed) Part 21 Report 87012, Houghto 620 Lubricant During the inspection period the inspectors investigated a Part 21 report concerning the use of Houghto 620 Lubricant, which attacks and degrades aluminum in valves. The licensee does not use this lubricant at Quad Cities, c.
(Closed) Regional Request:
Safety Relief Valves During the inspection period the inspectors examined licensee maintenance and operational experience concerning safety and relief valves in response to a request from Region III based on an event which occurred at LaSalle on November 2, 1989. The questions asked and answers elicited are contained in the following paragraphs.
(1) Are all the safety relief valves ($RV's) removed each refueling outage for testing / maintenance?
Maintenance of the nine SRV's is performed in accordance with Technical Specification 4.6.E which requires that "a minimum of half of all safety valves be bench checked or replaced with a bench checked valve each refueling outage."
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The setpoint of the SRV's is checked per Technical S>ecification 4.6.E which requires that "All relief valves siell be checked for set pressure each refueling outage." The current station maintenance schedule requires two of the four electromatic relief valves to be replaced or rebuilt each
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refueling outage and the Target Rock safety / relief valve to l
be replaced or rebuilt every refueling outage.
(2) Are blank flanges used when the SRV's are removed?
Blank flanges or plugs are installed whenever the safety or relief valves are removed for a significant length of time.
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In situations where the valve is removed and a rebuilt one is immediately installed, a plastic bag may be used in place of a blank flange to prevent contaminents from entering the piping,
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Q) When are 'hr 49V's reinstalled in reference to the end of the outage?
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The safety or relief valves may be removed at any time during
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a refueling outage and the exact dates for removal and t
re-installation may vary with each outage.
Huwever, all safety and relief valves are normally installed prior to the reactor vessel hydrostatic test which is performed two to four weeks before the end of the outage.
(4) What. precautions are taken to ensure contaminants are not
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introduced into the SRV's if the vessel water level is raised
above the main steam line nozzles when the plugs are not installed?
Vessel level is normally raised above the main steam line nozzles, when the plugs are not installed, near the end of each refuel outage during reactor reassembly. Reactor water is
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cleaned prior to this time so that no contaminants should be present that would affect safety or relief valve actuation.
(5) Have there been any related problems at your site?
Since 1984, there have been a total of 25 Deviation Reports written on the safety and relief valves; 9 on Unit I and 16 on Unit 2.
Of the total 25 reports written, 13 involved a failure of the temperature indication installed on the discharge piping of the safety or relief valves.
Four of the reports involved a pressure switch on a relief valve being out-of-tolerance.
Three of the reports involved a failure of an acoustic monitor
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installed on a relief valve and five of the reports involved j
isolated events; safety valve setpoint out-of-tolerance, broken drain line on a relief valve, leaking pilot valve on relief i
i valve, relief valve stuck open during testing, and relief valve
failure to open during testing.
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(6) What types of f ailures of SRV's to Nnction properly have taken place at your site?
From the documents discussed in Part 5, only one relief valve has failed to open during a test and one has stuck open during a test. Also, only one safety valve has been found out-of-tolerance.
3.
Plant Operations (71707)
The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined plant operations.
The inspectors verified that all activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; and that procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from~ service; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning
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con.ponents or systems to service; and independent verification of equipment lineup and review of test results were accomplished. Also verified were quality control records for being properly maintained and reviewed, and parts, materials and equipment for proper certification, calbration, storage, and maintenance as applicable. The inspectors conducted frequent tours of plant facilities to observe any adverse plant conditions such as equipment malf unctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors. The inspectors' review ensured that any such issues were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personnel.
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Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710J a.
During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down some of the accessible portions of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Core Spray (CS),
Residual Heat Removal (RHR), RHR Service Water, Standby Liquid Control (SLC), and Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Systems.
The inspectors also walked down the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) and the Station Batteries.
No violations or deviations were noted.
b.
Summary of Operations Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at power until March 10, 1990, when a generator trip due to a lightning strike caused a reactor scram (refer to Paragraph 3.c.(6) of this report).
The reactor restarted on March 12, 1990, and operated at power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
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Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at power until it was shutdown on February 4, 1990, for a scheduled maintenance and refueling outage at the end of operating Cycle 10.
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c.
Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
(1) Unit 1 Loss of Feedwater Heater Transients On January 28. 1990, and again on January 29, 1990, feedwater i
heaters tripped while the reactor was near full power. On both occasions opet ator response was prompt and proper; reactor i
power was immediately reduced, reactor vessel level maintained, and the feedwater heaters returned to service.
The cause of the feedwater heater transients is under investigation.
(2) Transient Combustibles in a Red Floor Area On February 3,1990, the Senior Resident Inspector discovered I
transient combustibles (paper and hoses) stored in red floor Area 6, the Unit 2 South Control Rod Drive Bank area on the 595 foot elevation, without a continuous fire watch being present even though the reactor was operating.
Storage of transient combustibles in a red floor area without a continuous fire watch being present while the reactor is operating is contrary to the Transient Combustible and Water Protection Surveillance Procedure, 005 4100-15, Revision 9, and is considered to be a violation (265/90002-01).
(3) Unit 2 Shutdown for a Refueling Outage
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On February 4, 1990, Unit 2 shutdown in order to begin a scheduled maintenance and refueling outage at the conclusion of operating Cycle 10.
The scheduled restart date is
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Aptil 25, 1990. Among the tasks planned to be accomplished during the outage are:
replacement of two main turbine low pressure rotors, weld overlays on primary piping, repair of the "C" feedwater heater nozzle, replacement of reactor water cleanup piping, refueling of the reactor, control room modifications (DCRDR), chemical decontamination of the recirculation and the reactor water cleanup systems, removal
of the reactor head spray piping and the control rod drive return piping, replacement of the core spray penetration bellows assembly (X-16B), inspection of the 2B reactor recirculation pump motor, in-service inspection and erosion /
corrosion inspection, painting of the underwater portion of the torus interior, mechanical stress improvement of welds, replacement of one of the recirculation system's ring header end caps, and replacement of the leaking RCIC inboard i
containment isolation valve packing with live-load packing.
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(4) Unusual Event Due to Commencement of Reactor Shutdown
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At 7:54 AM on February 4,1990, Unit I was at 92% power when
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the licensee determined that the plant had failed the
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secondary containment leakage test required by Technical Specification 4.7.C.1.c to be performed each refueling outage prior to refueling.
The test acceptance criteria is.25 inches
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of water vacuum in secondary containment at a Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) flow rate of 4000 GPM; only a
.24 inch vacuum could be maintained.
The licensee immediately j
commenced a reactor shutdown and declared an unusual event.
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Initial investigation by the licensee determined that there
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were defects on the SBGTS access doors, the MSIV vent duct to
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the reactor building, and the Unit 2 steam line penetrations, which caused the failure.
Temporary repairs were made.
The test was performed successfully at 4:00 PM and the unusual i
event was terminated at 4:42 PM on February 4,1990.
Further
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review by the licensee determined that the failure was due to temperature induced differences in the pressure gradients
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between the inside and outside of Secondary Containment (refer to Paragraph 9.b.(3) of this report).
Power had been reduced to 21% during the shutdown, but after termination of the unusual event power was raised to 100%.
I (5) Water Spill in the Unit 2 Drywell from the Recirculation Ring Header End Cap On March 5, 1990, with the end cap on the recirculation system
ring header removed, it was decided to refill the piping
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between the 2A recirculation pump suction and discharge valves
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in order to perform weld overlays.
Initially an attempt was t
made to refill the piping by manually opening the recirculation pump suction valve by hand 60 turns. When no level increase was noticed, it was assumed that the suction piping upstream of the suction valve was dry,. so a different technique using demineralized water was employed.
Since it was desired to refill a portion of the recirculation piping both upstream of the suction valve and downstream of the discharge valve, both of these valves were opened using their respective control switches. Water immediately started flowing out of the open
end cap into the Unit 2 drywell.
The suction and discharge valves were shut at once to stop the leak, and the spill was cleaned up.
No one was contaminated.
(6) Unit 1 Reactor Scram and Subsequent Restart At 1:14 AM on March 10, 1990, Unit I scrammed from 98% power due to a negative sequence relay trip caused.by a lightning strike.
Subsequent to the scram the reactor vessel water _ level decreased and then increased above the high level reactor feed pump trip setpoint, tripping both the IB and 10 reactor feed pumps.
The reactor operator then shut the discharge valves for
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both the IB and IC reactor feed pumps. When the reactor vessel water level began to decrease, the reactor operator restarted the IB reactor feed pump and attempted to open its discharge valve. Though the discharge valve displayed dual indication,
water level continued to decrease.
RCIC was started manually to maintain reactor vessel water level. The reactor operator noticed that the IB reactor feedwater pump discharge valve had
not opened, so he started the IC reactor feedwater pump and opened its discharge valve, thereby restoring feedwater flow
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to the reactor vessel.
RCIC was then secured.
The reactor was placed in cold shutdown, and minor maintenance
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was performed. Among the maintenance completed was a repair of the IB reactor feed pump discharge valve and renovation of the negative sequence relay to provide greater lighting protection.
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The reactor was restarted on March 12 and reconnected to the electrical grid on March 13, 1990.
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(7) Unusual Event Declared Due to Tornado Touchdown
At 4:25 PM on March 13, 1990, with Unit 2 in day 38 of a refueling outage and Unit I at approximately 55% power, the licensee received weather reports of a tornado warning in
effect for areas including the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. 'At 5:04 PM the tornado was sighted south of the plant-moving north, directly toward the plant. At 5:06 PM, as the tornado approached, Unit 1 quickly dropped load to 40% to avoid
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a reactor scram should the turbine trip on a load reject.
An Unusual Event was declared at 5:08 PM, and at 5:10 PM the tornado struck inside the protected area on the west side of the plant, demolishing two contractor trailers and inflicting i
light to moderate damage to about 9 other trailers on-site.
i Other buildings received minor roof damage.
One contractor received cuts and bruises, but no broken bones, and was taken by ambulance to a local hospital where he was held overnight for observation. The licensee activated the TSC and a call for assembly found all plant personnel present and accounted for.
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Damage to the actual plant itself was light with the only reported damage being the rad-waste exhaust ventilation duct to the main chimney.
Licensee's surveys of the damaged rad waste ductwork found no radioactive contamination.
The duct
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has been temporarily repaired and the fan has been tagged out-of-service until permanent repairs are made. The perimeter fence received damage at three locations and has since been repaired.
Off-site, the Visitor Center observation tower was heavily damaged.
The licensee temporarily halted Unit 2 outage work to concentrate on cleanup and repairs.
The station switchyard, being located on the east side of the plant, was not touched by the tornado. Unit-1 remained on-line throughout the event, with no alarms or annunciators activated.
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The Unusual Event was terminated at 10:36 PM.
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(8) Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Transient On March 14, 1990, Unit I was at 70% power and increasing to full load when the 101, 102, and 103 feedwater heaters experienced high levels followed quickly by moisture separator drain tank high levels. Power was reduced to 45% and feedwater
heater level control was regained.
During the outage of
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March 10 - 12, 1990, the D feedwater heater level sensing taps
had been moved from the flash side to the drain cooler side of the heaters. The level sensing taps were moved back to the
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flash side and power increased to full load without incident.
This event is still under investigation (0 pen Item 254/90002-01).
One violation was identified in this area.
4.
Radiological Controls (71707)
Observations by the inspectors indicated that the licensee's performance
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in the area of radiological controls was satisfactory but deteriorating.
Though management remains committed to an aggressive ALARA program, an excessive number of-personnel contaminations have occurred, including several internal contaminations.
In response to these increased number of contaminations the licensee has instituted a more rigorous personnel contamination accountability program, including review of the circumstance by radiological control supervision, the contaminated -
individual's supervisor, and licensee management.
Though results are preliminary, the frequency at which personnel contaminations have occurred has reduced.
Despite a very successful chemical decontamination of the Unit 2 recirculation system, personnel exposure was higher than budgeted, though this may be due to the accomplishment of much of the work inside high dose rate areas, and the additional work required by the recirculation systems ring header end cap replacement.
Even with the addition of temporary radiation control personnel, the average amount of overtime which licensee radiation control personnel have been required to work during the Unit 2 outage (32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> per week)
remains high.
Door to a High Radiation Area Discovered Unlocked
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During a routine tour of the turbine building on March 5,1990, the Senior Resident Inspector discovered the door from the Unit I condensate pit to the high radiation area below the Unit I condenser hotwell to be open. This is contrary to 10 CFR Part 20.203(c)(2)(iii) and to
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Step F.1.b of QRP 1130-1, Revision 4, the Radiation Protection Signs and
Markers Procedure, and is considered to be a Severity Level V violation (254/90002-02). The cause was due to an auxiliary operator not verifying that the door had latched after he exited the high radiation area.
The auxiliary operator has been counseled, and all personnel have been
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reminded to check that doors to high radiation areas are properly shut and locked after they have been used.
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Because this violation satisfied the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V, Paragraph A (it was an isolated Severity Level V violation and corrective action has been initiated prior to the end of the inspection period) no Notice of Violation will be issued, i
This item is considered closed.
5.
Maintenance / Surveillance a.
Monthly Mejppnee Observation (62703)
1 Station maintenance activities of safety related and nonsafety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in
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accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and l
industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable.
Additional items reviewed included verification that functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified personnel. Also, the inspectors verified that parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention procedures were followed. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to the maintenance of safety related equipment which may affect system performance.
(1) Cracked Battery Cell On November 1, 1989, Unit I was in the Shutdown mode at zero percent power in a scheduled maintenance and refueling outage, when an electrolyte leak through a hairline crack developed in the lower back section of cell Number 69 of the Unit 1250 volt battery.
The battery was declared inoperable, placing Unit 2 in a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
per Technical Specification 3.9.C.3.
On November 2, 1989, all of the Unit 2 250 VDC loads were transferred to the
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Unit 2 battery. On November 3.,1989,. af ter Cell 69 had been replaced with a new cell, the DC lineup was returned to its normal configuration and the battery system was declared operable. The total time the battery was inoperable was less than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
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r (2) Portions of the following Activities were Observed / Reviewed
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(a) Painting and labeling of plant components (b) Weld overlays on the Unit 2 recirculation system piping I
(c) Mechanical Stress Improvement Program
Reviewed the work package and observed the mechanical squeezing of a weld joint on shutdown cooling piping.
The process mechanically compresses a pipe in a weld area to apply compression stress to the inside surface i
of the pipe. This prevents or reduces the potential for intergranular stress corrosion cracking of the joint.
(d) RHR Pump Motor Maintenance
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Reviewed work packages and observed workers cleaning
exterior motor services prior to changing out bearing oil in top and bottom. This work will also take oil samples
and open pump to examine for unusual wear or other degradation.
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(e) Annunciators Modifications Observed crew making cable terminations and reviewed the work packages. This mod provides for individual computer printouts of elarms feeding a single annunciator.
(f) Butyl Cable Inspection Reviewed a work package. This work inspects cables in harsh environments for deterioration.
(g) Replacement of the Unit 2 recirculation system ring header
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end cap.
(h) Replacement of the Unit 2 mode selector switch.
(1) Sealing of Unit 2 core spray 6A valve with latex-like coating.
(j) Repair of the IC reactor feed pump mechanical seal.
I (k) Welding of the end cap for the Unit 2 control rod drive return line nozzle end cap.
(1) Removal of fuel from the Unit 2 reactor vessel.
- No violations or deviations were identified in this area, i
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b.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by the Technical Specification and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, and that limiting conditions for operation were met.
Additionally, the inspectors observed / verified the removal and restoration of the affected components, and that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements.
Also, the inspectors verified that the results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
Portions of the Following Activities were Observed / Reviewed i
(a) New fuel receipt inspection.
(b) Shipment of damaged unirradiated fuel.
(c) Unit 2 RCIC steam supply isolation valves operability test.
(d) Ultrasonic testing of welds.
(e) Radiographic examination of the end cap replacement.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Emergency Preparedness (71707)
During the inspection period three situations occurred which required the declaration of an Unusual Event.
One concerned the failure of the secondary containment leak rate. test on February 4,1990, and the required commencement of a reactor shutdown on Unit 1 (refer to Paragraph 3.c.(4) of this report); the second concerned I
the inoperability of both the Unit I and common (1/2) diesel generators while Unit I was at power on February 13, 1990, a situation which required the declaration of an Unusual Event but which was not identified
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until February 16, 1990; the third concerned a tornado which touched down inside the protected area (refer to Paragraph 3.c.(7) of this report),
a.
Failure to Classify an Unusual Event The failure to promptly classify the inoperability of both the Unit I and common (1/2) diesel generator while Unit I was at power is contrary to QEP 200-T1, Quad Cities Nuclear Station Boiling Water Reactor Emergency Action Levels, Revision 16, Condition 3.e and is considered to be a Severity Level IV violation (254/90002-03).
The cause was due to personnel unfamiliarity with some of the details
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of the Emergency Action Levels. As a result of this failure to properly classify this unusual event, additional training will be given to licensee operations personnel on the selection of the appropriate Emergency Action Level,
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Because this violation satisfied the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1 (it was licensee-identified, was promptly i
reported and corrected, was Severity Level IV or V, and could not have prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation) no Notice of Violation will be issued. This item is considered closed.
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b.
Tornado Licensee response to the tornado was exemplary, as evidenced by the fact that only one individual was injured and repairs to damaged components were expeditiously accomplished.
However, this event did reveal deficiencies which could be improved. Among the deficiencies identified were the inability of many personnel in the reactor and turbine buildings to clearly understand the messages broadcast on
the page; the lack of pagers in the trailers; and the failure to keep contractor personnel informed of the status of the emergency while they were assembled in the Unit I trackway.
The Resident Inspectors also inspected the Quad Cities Technical Support Center (TSC) and monitored a test of the Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone.
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One violation was identified in this area, but since it satisfied the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1 no Notice of Violation will be issued.
7.
Security (71707)
During the inspection period the inspectors toured the plant and the Central Alarm Station to assure that security programs were being properly implemented.
The inspectors verified that security barriers were in place, security doors were operable, the security force was alert, personnel correctly displayed their identification badges and visitor access was being properly controlled.
The Senior Resident Inspector toured the Fitness for Duty testing trailer.
a.
Fitness For Duty Training (TI 2515/104: 255104)
Inspectors observed the " fitness for duty" portion of one session of Nuclear General Employee Training (N-GET) which was given to new contractor and licensee employees. This training covered policy awareness training and duty training for escorts. An inspector i
also viewed a video tape of training for supervisors and reviewed handout materials.
Questionnaire results requested by the Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/104 were forwarded to NRR for assessment.
The results were also reviewed with the licensee's services director, b.
Unescorted Visitors On February 13, 1990, two visitors were left unescorted.
This event was investigated by a region-based inspector and is discussed in Inspection Report 254/90004; 265/90003.
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Accidental Weapons Discharg
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On February 20, 1990, while returning a firearm to its storage rack
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in a security vehicle, a security guard accidently discharged
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the weapon.
The cause was failure to follow procedures and
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unfamiliarity with the weapon.
Disciplinary measures were taken and the licensee has enhanced weapons training.
I d.
Tornado Response A tornado touched down inside the protected area on March 13, 1990.
The security force responded to warn personnel outside the main
buildings of the tornado's approach, thereby minimizing personnel injuries.
Security personnel also took measures to compensate for damaged security equipment after the tornado had passed.
8.
Engineering / Technical Support Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)
The feedwater hydrogen addition modification for both units is continuing. The licensee continues to remedy problems with the offgas oxygen and hydrogen flow meters, the offgas oxygen analyzer, and the reactor water oxygen analyzer (orbisphere).
These problems are anticipated to be resolved in May, at which. time feedwater hydrogen injection tests are scheduled to begin.
9.
Safety Assessment /0uality Verification a.
Evaluation of Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation
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(35502)
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During the inspection period the inspectors met frequently with members of the licensee's Quality Assurance staff to discuss the licensee's Quality Assurance program.
The inspectors also reviewed the findings of a Quality Assurance Radiation Protection audit.
Among the findings were the use of an incorrect source for source checking the Eberline PM-7 monitors, improper whole body surveys by individuals, and the failure to always obtain air samples when work is in progress, b.
In-Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
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Reactor Facilities (90712) and Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (92700)
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During the inspection period the resident inspectors reviewed incidents such as scrams, ESF actuations and component failures which occurred at other plants.
The inspectors informed the licensee of the details of all events which potentially had applicability to components or activities at Quad Cities.
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LER Review (1) (0 pen) LER 254/87007, Revision 00:
1/2 B Diesel Fire Pump Inoperable Due to Protective Relaying Design Deficiency.
This LER concerns the 1/2 B Diesel Fire Pump being inoperable in excess of the seven day reporting criteria on April 14, 1987.
The cause for this out-of-service can be attributed to design deficiency. This deficiency existed because the size and length of cable associated with the fire pump overcrank protection circuitry caused an excessive voltage drop. The fire pump was taken out-of-service to repair this deficiency.
The automatic start capability of the 1/2 B Diesel Fire Pump was unaffected by this design deficiency.
Corrective action for this problem included utilization of spare 14 gauge conductors that paralleled the existing conductors to reduce the voltage drop to one half the original amount. This was completed on April 23, 1987 resulting in the 1/2 B Diesel Fire Pump being declared operable. All corrective actions have been completed, except for the incorporation of a design change to further reduce the voltage drop through the cable and control switch circuits.
This design change will be completed under modification request 4-0-87-4, and this LER will remain open pending its completion.
(2) (0 pen) LER 254/89024, Revision 00:
Unit 1 Turbine Trip Due to High Reactor Water Level Signal (Voluntary LER)
This event is discussed in Inspection Report 254/89027.
It will remain open pending the completion of the specified corrective actions.
(3) (0 pen) LER 254/90002, Revision 00:
Inability to Maintain
.25 Inches of Water During Secondary Containment Test.
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This event is discussed in Paragraphs 3.c.(4) of this report.
The licensee attributes the cause of this event to temperature l
induced differences in the pressure gradients between the inside and outside of Secondary Containment for which the test
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procedure did not compensate.
The licensee therefore believes
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that secondary containment integrity was satisfied throughout
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This LER will remain open pending evaluation of the licensee's analysis by region-based specialist inspectors, and t
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completion of the corrective actions.
l (4) (0 pen) LER 254/90003, Revision 00:
Unit 1 Diesel Generator
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Inoperable with 1/2 Diesel Generator Out-of-Service (Voluntary l
LER),
l On February 13, 1990, Unit I was at 99 percent of rated core l
thermal power with the 1/2 diesel generator out of service. At l
7:45 PM the Unit I diesel generator tripped on overspeed upon
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manual startup for testing.
This caused Unit 1 to be in an Unusual Event, however an event declaration was not made (refer to Paragraph 6.b of this report). The equipment was reset and a second start attempt made at 8:29 PM, with the same results.
The equipment was again reset, and the diesel generator speed control lowered.
The diesel generator was successfully started at 8:48 PM.
The cause of the overspeed was misadjustment of the diesel generator governor.
Detailed steps will be added to
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surveillance procedures to check governor settings, and personnel involved in GSEP declarations will be trained on this event.
This LER will remain open pending. completion of the corrective actions.
(5) (0 pen) LER 265/88022, Revision 01:
Loss of Chimney Monitors When Power Supply Deenergized.
This revision updates an LER which concerned the inoperability of noble gas monitoring equipment on May 31, 1988, for a time period in excess of Technical Specification requirements without compensatory grab samples being taken. The operation outside of the Technical Specifications was realized on July 18, 1988, during a review of the event by the licensee.
The cause of this event was due to the failure of the battery backup to power the Separate Particulate Iodine and Noble Gas Monitor. A contributing cause was the inadequacy of the electrical feed reference document and the Off Normal Instrument Status procedure.
Corrective actions included the development of a preventive maintenance procedure for the battery backup and other procedure development and revisions.
Also, the power supply will be rerouted to improve reliability.
This revision reflects the results of research into the operation of the equipment referenced in the original report, which was closed administrative 1y in Inspection Report 254/89022; 265/89022.
It will remain open pending completion of the corrective actions.
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(6) (0 pen) LER 265/90002, Revision 00:
Missed Technical
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Specification Fire Valve Surveillance.
On January 2,1990, during a review of QOS 4100-S12, Annual Suppression Systems Valve Operability Checklist, the licensee determined that in-line sprinkler system Valve 2-4199-72 had not been hand cycled to verify operability within the frequency required by Technical Specification 4.12.
Valve 2-4199-72 was successfully cycled on January 2,1990.
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This LER will remain open pending the revision of QOS 4100-2, Annual Water Sprinkler System Valve Position Inspection, and QOS 4100-S12, to clearly designate that all valves are to be cycled within the appropriate time, regardless of the location or mode of operation.
(7) (0 pen) LER 265/90003, Revision 00:
Exceeding Technical Specification Leakage Limit for Containment Isolation Valves.
On February 5,1990, with Unit 2 shutdown for the end of Cycle 10 refueling and maintenance outage, the HPCI steam exhaust check valve failed its local leak rate test, e,tceeding the Technical Specification limit for all valves and penetrations excluding the MSIVs.
This item will remain open pending the issuance of the supplemental report.
(8) (0 pen) LER 265/90004, Revision 00:
Loss of Emergency Bus 23-1 Due to a Shorted 2 Conductor Cable While Performing Wiring Verification.
On February 13, 1990, Unit 2 was shutdown and defueled with a scram signal inserted. An electrical contractor, while performing a wiring verification inside a control room panel, laid on a board at the bottom of the panel. The board pinched a 2 conductor cable, shorting the 2 conductors, resulting in an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation due to loss of Bus 23-1 and 28.
The root cause of this event is a combination of personnel error and improper installation.
Immediate corrective action j
was to lift the cable leads and recover the electric power supplies.
Further corrective actions will consist of proper installation of new cable, training, and periodic checks of the control room panels to ensure that tools and materials are not left in the panels.
This event will remain open pending the completion of the specified corrective actions, c.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
During the inspection period the inspectors attended an Onsite Review Committee meeting concerning the Unit I turbine trip which
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occurred on December 14, 1989.
The meeting was properly staffed and conducted in a professional manner.
10. Open Items
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i Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which
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will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some actions on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 3.c.(8).
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11. Management Meetings - Entrance and Exit Interviews (30703)
On February 22, 1990,- NRC personnel, including the Region III Deputy.
Regional Administrator and Deputy Director of the Division of Reactor Projects, met with licensee personnel in a public meeting at the. Quad Cities Information Center to discuss the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) report for the period of October 1,1988, through November 10, 1989.
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on March 16, 1990, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee-did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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