IR 05000155/1985015
| ML20206T695 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1986 |
| From: | Axelson W, Christoffer G, Kniceley J, Pirtle G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206T668 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-85-15, NUDOCS 8607080209 | |
| Download: ML20206T695 (25) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/85015(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Safeguards Group II Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Big Rock Point Site, Charlevoix, MI Inspection Conducted: August 13, 1985 through March 14, 1986 At facility and Region III Office Inspectors: /. v{ -
G M G. M. Christoffer Dhte Physical Security Inspector A.4 LM o-W J. R. Kniceley 9 /2 / s ._ Date Physical Security Inspector SR G. L. PTrtle 911Itk Date Physical Security Inspector Reviewed By: Q- 7/1/ %
G. L. Pirtle, Acting Chief
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Date Safeguards Section Approved By: ,h # 3L WV L.-Axelson] Chief
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Dath Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Inspection Summary Inspection on August 13, 1985 through March 14, 1986 (Report No. 50-155/85015))
Areas Inspected: Special inspection of allegations pertaining to the security i progra Results: Although some allegations were substantiated, the licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examine Enclosure Contains 8607080209 860703 5 i PDR ADOCK 0500 Upon Seppration This '
G Page is Decentrolled
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b DETAILS 1. Key Persons / Organizations Contacted D. Hoffman, Plant Manager, Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant (BRPNP),
Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
H. Cooper, Corporate Security Director, Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
R. Krisch, Licensing Administrator, CPCo
- +J. Warner, Site Security Director, BRPNP
- +S. Kiss, Nuclear Security Operations Supervisor, CPCo
+ Abel, Production and Performance Supervisor, BRPNP
- G. Withrow, Engineering and Maintenance Superintendent, BRPNP
- T. Dugan, Property Protection Operations Supervisor, BRPNP
- B. Alexander, Technical Engineer, BRPNP
- T. Fisher, Senior Quality Assurance Consultant, CPCo
- Pettijean, Planning and Administrative Superintendent, BRPNP
- L. Wilds, Operations Manager, BISSI
+D. Zastrow, District Manager, BISSI Post Commander, BISSI, BRPNP Captain, BISSI, BRPNP Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulation (Telephone Contact)
Dr. D. Johnston, Clinical Director, Behavior Analysts and Consultants, Palm City, Florida (Telephone Contact)
- +S. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Region III
+R. Landsman, Project Manager, USNRC, Region III
- Denotes those present at the Exit Meeting on February 21, 198 + Denotes those present at the Exit Meeting on March 7, 198 In addition to the key personnel noted above, members of the security force were interviewed during the inspection effor . Followup on Allegations (Background Information)
The alleger initially contacted the NRC Region office by telephone on August 13, 1985. The information provided then covered a wide range of subjects, including: alleged violation of civil rights; alleged corruption within a local law enforcement agency; inappropriate personnel related actions pertaining to the alleger; and security weaknesses in the security program for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant (BRPNP).
The alleger stated that other state and federal agencies had also been contacted in reference to the allegations and a personal attorney had been contacted. The alleger was advised that several of the matters, such as potential civil rights violations, were beyond the scope and statutory responsibility of the Commissio The alleger was told that allegations regarding protection of the facility and compliance with license requirements would be addressed by the NR The alleger did not request formal confidentiality from the NRC and stated that the alleger's identity did not have to be withheld from the licensee because the licensee was aware of the alleger's concerns. The allegations
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which were gleaned and summarized from the large amount of information provided were specifically described to the alleger and an agreement was reached regarding the matters the NRC would review. We again advised the alleger that other agencies appeared appropriate to address the other allegations outside of the responsibility of the Commissio Since the initial call on August 13, 1985, the alleger contacted the NRC i Region III office on many occasions to provide additional informatio During these contacts, different and new information was provided. Conse-quently, in a letter dated October 18, 1985, the alleger was requested to pr(vide NRC Region III, in writing, by November 4,1985, the details, focus, and substance of the exact concerns. The requested letter from
, the alleger was not provided. During telephone contact on November 13,
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1985, the alleger stated that certain documents would be sent to the NRC in the near future. No further information or documents were received by the NRC. The alleger was again contacted by telephone on December 5, 1985 and advised that a inspection would be completed pertaining to the-allegations that had previously been specifically outlined to the alleger
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by the inspectors. The alleger was also advised that the NRC would review any additional and relevant information submitted in the future to determine if further action was necessary and appropriate for NRC involvemen During the period of August 13 - November 29, 1985, a special in-office inspection was conducted of the allegations specifically discussed with and agreed upon by the alleger pertaining to: alleged inadequate responses by the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department; inappropriate delay by the licensee in suspending employment for an individual suspected of aberrant behavior; and the alleged inappropriate influence of the Charlevoix County Sheriff in potential hiring / termination employment decisions at BRPNP. The inspection consisted of a review of documents requested from the licensee and telephone interviews with licensee persons. No violations or unresolved items were noted and the allegations could not be substantiate These allegations are addressed in Section 3 of the Report Detail Subsequent to that inspection effort, a decision was made to interview the alleger with a court reporter present in order to ensure the complete -
ness of information being received and to provide a framework in which to conduct further revie On January 10, 1986, the alleger was interviewed by two NRC representatives. A court reporter was present during this interview and ,
the transcript was received by NRC Region III on January 21, 198 The alleger contacted NRC Region III several times in early February 1986 and wanted to know the status of the transcript of the January 10, 1986 interview. The alleger was informed that upon deleting safeguards information from the transcript, a copy would be maile .
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On February 4, 1986, a copy of the transcript was mailed to the allege Portions of the transcript which contained safeguards information pertaining to the Big Rock Point Plant Security Program were delete That information is required to be protected in a specified manner and is exempt from public disclosure under NRC regulations (10 CFR 73.21).
The alleger was also advised that a copy of the inspection report would be furnished when complete After the alleger had reviewed the transcript, a telephone call was made to NRC Region III. The alleger wanted to point out typographical errors and corrections, and the alleger was upset that the NRC did not proofread the transcript. The alleger was informed that it was NRC Region III's intent to issue the transcript as quickly as possible and did not review the transcript for typographical errors. The alleger was informed that corrections provided in writing would be addressed. The alleger agreed to submit corrections in writing; however, no written corrections have been receive On February 10, 1986, the alleger telephoned NRC Region III to inform us that the alleger " heard", second hand, that others knew that the NRC had conducted an interview of the alleger and was going to conduct another investigation into the alleger's concerns. The alleger wanted to know
if NRC Region III had told anyone about the interview, or had released the alleger's identit Region III's response was no to both question (Note: The alleger did not request confidentiality during initial contacts with NRC Region III and a formal grant of confidentiality was not provided).
On February 12, 1986, the alleger telephoned NRC Region III and requested the date we had been given regarding when the Sheriff contacted Burns International Security Services, Inc. (BISSI) about the alleger's incident at the Sheriff's Department. (Refer to Chronology of events on page 7).
On February 13, 1986, the alleger was telephonically contacted and was told that date given was July 18, 1985. In response to the information, the alleger said that BISSI representatives had lied. The alleger was informed that NRC Region III would consider the information as part of the inspection effort which was to take place at a later date. The alleger was advised that further contact with the NRC should be in written form, and the alleger agree During the weeks of February 18 and March 4, 1986, an inspection was conducted at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant to collect facts regarding the allegations, and also to review the current implementation of the required security program. The inspection consisted of: interviews with approximately thirty Consumers Powers Company and Burns International Security Services persons, several local law enforcement agency represen-tatives, a review of pertinent records and documentation, and observation of security activities involving independent verification of complianc i
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During the inspection on February 19, 1986, representatives of the guard contractor declined to provide some requested relevant documents to the inspectors. These documents included records of guards terminated and suspended during October 1982 - January 1986 and the reasons for the termination. The contractor contended that the release of the information would be in violation of the Michigan statute known as the "Bullard -
Plawecki Employment Right to Know Act." The state statute indicates that:
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"17.62(6) [ Disclosure of disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other disciplinary action, limitations.] Sec. 6. (1) An employer or former employer shall not divulge a disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other disciplinary action to a third party, to a party who is not a part of the employer's organization, or to a party who is not a part of labor organization representing the employee, without written notice as provided in this sectio .62(11) [ Violation, action to compel compliance; jurisdiction; contempt; damages.]
Sec. 1 If an employer violates this act, an employee may commence with an action in the circuit court to compel compliance with this act. The circuit court for the county in which the complainant resides, the circuit court for the county in which the complainant is employed, or the circuit court for the county in which the personnel record is maintained shall have jurisdiction to issue the orde Failure to comply with an order of the court may be punished as contemp In addition, the court shall award an employee prevailing in an action pursuant to this act the following damages:
(a) for a violation of this act, actual damages plus costs; (b) for a willful and knowing violation of this act, $200,000 plus costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and actual damages."
During the exit meeting on February 21, 1986, Consumers Power Company (CPCo) representatives stated that their position regarding the denial of records was that the licensee reviewed the regulations identified to them by the Chief, Safeguards Section, NRC Region III. They could find no basis to require CPCo to provide the information, which they believed belonged to BISS Also, CPCo representatives indicated they did not have legal authority to go into the personnel disciplinary records of individual security officers employed by the contractor since they are private records of the contracto Finally, the licensee indicated they would encourage BISSI to assist, within the legal limits of the law, in providing the requested information to the NRC to close out the allegation During that meeting, the onsite BISSI representatives stated that the matter had been referred to their Division Office in Lisle, Illinois, and that the BISSI Vice President and BISSI Division Labor Relations Officer had conversations with NRC Region III Chief, Safeguards Section in reference to the issue. During a telephone conversation on February 24, 1986, the BISSI Vice President and the Division Labor Relations officer
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agreed to provide, during the week of March 3,1986, documents regarding suspensions, terminations, reprimands, or other disciplinary actions for current or former security officers employed at the Big Rock Point facility for the period January 1,1984 to February 24, 1986. BISSI agreed to provide the information after NRC provided a BISSI staff member a copy of the relevant sections of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Also provided was Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, that describes the NRC's authority for requesting the information and the NRC's responsibilities regarding the protection of information exempt from public disclosure as defined by the Freedom of Information Act and implemented in 10 CFR 9.5(a)(6).
A letter from NRC Region III, dated February 26, 1986, was sent to the BISSI Vice President and the Vice President, Nuclear Operations, CPCo, stating the the NRC's request met the provisions of Section 17.62(a)
[Exclusitivity] of the Michigan Statute known as the "Bullard - Plawecki Employment Right to Know Act" (SLL 32:204) which provides that the section precluding disclosure of disciplinary information shall not apply if the information is requested by a government agency as a result of a claim or complaint by an employee.
d On March 7, 1986, during the exit meeting with licensee and BISSI repre-sentatives, the inspector explained that the onsite review of the
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inspection regarding the allegations was completed, and that the information the inspectors received would be reviewed by NRC Region III management. Also, no immediate security issues or apparent violat ions were identified. The licensee representatives stated that this inspection appeared different from other allegation inspections because they were not givem the specific allegations and their final resolution at the time of the exit interview. CPCo wanted to comment on any violations, observations, and concerns before the report was released. Additionally, they wanted a copy of the allegations as soon as possible. They also felt that the allegations had been closed previously. (Note: This was based on a December 3, 1985 telephone exit meeting with NRC Region III security representatives and the Corporate Security Director for Consumers Power Company. The licensee was told at that time that the preliminary findings indicated that the allegations were not substantiated but the findings still required NRC Region III management revie Subsequent contact by the alleger with NRC Region III included additional allegations and required additional inspection effort).
The inspector stated during the March 7, 1986 exit meeting that the licensee's expressed concerns would be brought to NRC Region III management attention. The inspector also stated that a followup telephonic exit meeting may be conducte In addition to the comments made by the licensee's representatives, BISSI representatives also stated that they were not sure what the allegations were. They felt the inspection was different from previous allegation inspections, and they wanted an opportunity to make comments about the situation.
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3. Allegation Review l
Below are listed twenty-three allegations which were both summarized and taken directly from the transcript of the NRC interview with the alleger '
on January 10, 1986. Allegations where specific individuals or time frames were not identified by the alleger were addressed on a programmatic or general basis. Names of individuals who allegedly violated security requirements have been omitted from this report to protect their privac Allegation The Charlevoix County Sheriff improperly influenced CPCo plant personnel to have the alleger's employment with BISSI terminated and as such, was subverting the plant security system. A psycho-logical test was administered based on the Sheriff's complaint.
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NRC Review .
In addition to interviewing CPCo security persons and members of the BISSI management and the guard force, the inspectors reviewed documentation such as: the State of Michigan Standard Crime Report, Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department Case Supervision Sheet, BISSI memorandum, letters, procedures, disciplinary policy, and personnel records. Review of these documents and interviews indicated the following sequence of events:
July 12, 1985 The alleged incident (intimidation of a Friday clerk) involving the alleger occurred at 4:30 the Sheriff's Departmen (State of Michigan Standard Crime Report)
July 14, 1985 The Sheriff made contact with the Sunday BISSI Security Supervisor. (Charlevoix (Time Unknown) County Sheriff's Department Case Supervision Sheet). The exact content of the contact could not be determine July 18, 1985 The Sheriff contacted the BISSI Captain Thursday regarding the conduct of the alleger, 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br /> who was in a BISSI uniform while at the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Departmen (BISSI document).
1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> The BISSI Captain reported details of the complaint to the BISSI Post Commande (BISSI memo to File). They discussed the situation and decided to suspend the alleger pending further investigation for conduct unbecoming an officer in unifor The Post Commander advised the licensee Plant Protection Supervisor of the situatio ,
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1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br /> Alleger was suspended pending (approximately) investigatio Sometime after July 18, 1985, BISSI received a copy of the report of the incident from the Sheriff's Department. Attached to this report was a statement, dated July 18, 1985, indicating that the alleger supposedly made threats against another person. Addi-tionally, it was indicated in a BISSI letter to the alleger, dated July 26, 1985, that after the alleger was suspended, the alleger's behavior while attempting to gain documents /information from BISSI was considered coercive or intimidatin On July 30, 1985, the alleger was telephonically notified by the BISSI Post Commander that the alleger would have to take the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) Psychological test before returning to work. BISSI management had made the determination that the MMPI had to be taken because, as a result of the incident in the Sheriff's office and subsequent behavior, the alleger's supervisors were unable to certify the alleger's emotional stabilit Conclusion The alleger was suspended because of the incident at the Sheriff's office, even though the incident was not immediately reported. As a result of the alleger's actions after the incident in the Sheriff's office, the alleger's supervisors were unable to certify emotional stability as required by the security plan and the alleger was requested to take a psychological test before being allowed to return to work. There were no indications that the Sheriff improperly influenced termination of the alleger's employment. Nor were there indications that the Sheriff's involvement in the incident had any subversive affect on the plant security system. This allegation was not substantiate Allegation The Sheriff and his Department could not or would not respond to security events at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant in the time specified in the Security Plan because the security plan is set up on perfect conditions in Charlevoix County and there is a potential problem for responding in adverse weather situations. Also, it is questionable if the Sheriff would honor his response agreement with the Statio NRC Review During the in-office inspection of August 13-November 29, 1985, the Consumers Power Company corporate security director was contacted by telephone and requested to review security plan and safeguards contingency plan requirements as they pertain to local
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law enforcement agency (LLEA) response capability. Additionally, he was requested to contact the appropriate Michigan State Police Department and the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department to update, if necessary, existing written support agreements between these police agencies and the license The licensee's and NRC review of LLEA response capability requirements identified in the security plans, showed that the required LLEA support met security plan criteri LLEA response capabilities are identified in Section 1.5.3 of the licensee's security plan for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant. NRC review of written support agreements from the Michigan State Police and the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department confirmed that the required LLEA support was availabl AGditionally, on February 18, 1986, the inspectors interviewed'the Post Commander, Michigan State Police, and the Undersheriff of Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department. Both individuals verified their written support capabilities and stated that they would respond to the BRPNP as necessar The LLEA representatives agreed that the LLEA response agreements (letters dated September 6, 1985 and January 28,1985) are written for perfect weather conditions and in the case of " Acts of God,"
no one can guarantee their response. However, if the need arises, the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department has a mutual support pact with surrounding departments and the Michigan State Police can call on other posts for assistanc Conclusion The Sheriff's Department would respond to security events at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant in accordance with the Security Pla Response times during " Acts of God" cannot be guaranteed. .However, the Sheriff's Department and the Michigan State Police can call for assistance from other surrounding law enforcement agencies if the 4 need arises. This allegation was not substantiate C. Allegation Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department was " slow" in responding to an exercise at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plan j NRC Review
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A Region III Emergency Preparedness Inspector reviewed the NRC inspection report (50-155/85004) pertaining to the Big Rock Point Emergency Preparedness exercise conducted in May 1985. He also contacted a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) representative in reference to the exercise. Neither the NRC nor FEMA had concerns l
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pertaining to inadequate or slow response by local law enforcement agencies involved in the Emergency Preparedness exercis Performance by the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department was considered adequate during the exercis The CPCo Corporate Security Director stated during a June 26-27, 1986 telephone interview that, to his knowledge, no corporate security audits or site security drills conducted in 1985 required a timed
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response from the local law enforcement agency. Additionally, a corporate emergency preparedness representative stated that no drills conducted in preparation for the May 1985 emergency preparedness exercise resulted, to his knowledge, with a local law enforcement agency's response being considered as slo Conclusion According to NRC and FEMA reports, the Charlevoix County Sheriff Department was not slow in responding to the May 1985 exercise at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant. Licensee corporate security and emergency preparedness representatives could not recall an occasion in 1985 when the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department was evaluated as slow in response to a drill. No evidence was noted that would conclude that the Sheriff's Department could not meet response time commitments identified in the security plan. This allegation was not substantiated (refer to Allegation B for related information).
D. Allegation The suspension of the alleger was mishandled because: (1) BISSI thought the alleger had aberrant behavior for a long period of time even though the alleger's performance reviews did not point to this.
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The alleger was not told this until the suspension that occurred after the Sheriff's Department incident. (2) The Sheriff's call regarding the incident was in the morning, but the alleger was allowed to work the entire shift, even though the alleger contends that the suspension should have been initiated immediately.
NRC Review The inspector reviewed documents such as BISSI memorandums and personnel records, and interviewed CPCo and BISSI individuals ,
regarding this allegatio The alleger was initially suspended pending investigation on July 18, 1985 when BISSI management learned of the incident involving alleged conduct unbecoming a BISSI supervisor in uniform, after working hours in a public place on July 12, 1985 (alleged intimidation of a clerk).
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A special BISSI report dated August 27, 1985 showed that the alleger had been informally counseled regarding job related problems (e.g.,
coming to work late) in early May 1985 by the Post Commander and Captain. This document did not mention indications of aberrant behavior. A review of the alleger's personnel file also indicated no incidents of " aberrant behavior."
The inspectors compiled the following chronology of events based on interviews and document review:
July 12, 1985 The incident involving the alleger occurred Friday at the Sheriff's Department. (State of 4:30 Michigan Standard Crime Report)
July 14, 1985 The Sheriff made contact with a BISSI Sunday Security Captain (Sheriff's Department (TimeUnknown) document). The exact contents of the contact are not know July 18, 1985 The Security Captain reported details 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> of the complaint to the BISSI Post Commander. (BISSI document). They discussed the situation and decided to suspend the alleger pending further investigation for conduct unbecoming an officer in uniform. The Post Commander advised the Plant Protection Supervisor of the situatio '
July 18, 1985 Alleger was suspende (Approximately 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br />)
It should be noted that there were discrepancies between documents that the inspector reviewed. In one case, the Sheriff's document showed that a BISSI supervisor had been contacted on July 14, 198 However, the BISSI documents stated that the BISSI supervisor was notified of the incident on July 18, 198 During a telephone interview on May 20, 1986, the BISSI supervisor (Captain) indicated that although the apparent discrepancy could not be resolved, he stated that he did not work at the site or at the Sheriff's Department as a part-time deputy on July 14, 1985. Further, he did not remember receiving a telephone call at home on that da He stated that the first time he was contacted by the Sheriff's Department was on July 18, 198 There was another discrepancy which was found in the BISSI employee disciplinary report. The date appearing in the signature block was July 17, 1985. The alleger was suspended on July 18, 1985. This discrepancy may have been an error on the part of the individuals signing the document.
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Documents and interviews indicated that after the alleger was suspended, BISSI received information that the alleger had threatened another person, and that the alleger had attempted to gain information from BISSI by " coercion and intimidation" (BISSI letter to alleger, dated July 26,1985). BISSI management made the determination that because of the alleger's conduct, they were unable to certify the alleger's emotional stability. On July 30, 1985, they requested the alleger to take a psychological tes On August 8,1985, the alleger took the initial psychological tes The results of that test were inconclusive and a recommendation for unescorted access to the BRPNP could not be made. The alleger was administered the psychological test a second time, on August 13 or 14, 1985, and was interviewed by a psychologist on September 17, 1985.
The findings of the test and interview identified concerns regarding the alleger's ability to discharge duties in a competent, responsible manner. The psychological consulting firm recommended that the alleger not be granted unescorted access to the nuclear plant. On October 9, 1985, the alleger's employment was terminated with BISS Conclusion There was no indication in the available documents or from information received during interviews that the alleger had demonstrated aberrant behavior for a long length of time before being suspended.
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There is a discrepancy in the information provided as to the exact time that BISSI was notified of the incident that occurred at the Sheriff's Department. It appears, however, that on July 18, 1985, BISSI suspended the alleger within a reasonable amount of time after notification. The reason for the suspension (pending investigation)
was because it was reported that the alleger was involved in conduct unbecoming a Supervisor in uniform after working hours in a public place on July 12, 1985.
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The inspector concluded that BISSI management's determination that
, they could not certify the emotional stability of the alleger was made because of the alleger's actions after the suspension and the
incident at the Sheriff's office. They requested the alleger again to take a psychological test after the first test results were i
considered inconclusive. As a result of the second psychological i test, and interview findings, BISSI determined that the alleger did
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not meet the qualifications required in the licensee's security plan and the alleger's employment was therefore terminated. This allegation was not substantiate E. Allegation
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The psychological test given to the alleger was improperly administered, graded, reviewed, and handled and therefore the
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, results of that test were not valid. This was demonstrated by the fact that the test was administered twice.
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Specifically, the alleger stated that there was a conflict of interest within the grading and reviewing of the test because the named doctor works for the county, has a great deal of interaction i with the Sheriff's department, and is not a licensed psychologist.
'- The. alleger also questioned the validity of the administration of the tests by BISSI~and their contractor, the named doctor. The j alleger stated that BISSI provided a predetermined conclusion which they wanted for the test. The test was not immediately sent to be scored and once the test was completed, it was not a controlled
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NRC Review
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The inspectors interviewed appropriate employees of CPCo, BISSI security personnel, and a telephone interview was held with the Director of the psychological assessment firm used by BISSI.
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letters) and contacted, by telephone, the State of Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatio The alleger stated in the January 10, 1986 interview with NRC 1 Region III personnel that a complaint was going to be filed with
- the appropriate state regulatory agency in reference to alleged improper grading, review, and handling of the MMPI test administered to the alleger and the alleged qualifications and conflict of interest of the psychologist named by the alleger as conducting a
, clinical interview. These issues deal with professional and ethical standards beyond the purview of the Commission's authority 4 and are regulated by the state NRC Region III did verify that the psychologist that signed the alleger's clinical review results was fully licensed by the State
! of Michigan. The psychologist named by the alleger as allegedly j conducting the clinical interview was not licensed by the State of Michigan. The ethical and professional aspects of this finding
, should be addressed by the appropriate state regulatory agency as
- a result of the alleger's stated intent to file a complaint with j such an agenc NRC Region III did review the issues pertaining to the manner in which MMPI test booklets are administered by the licensee and the l potential for tampering with completed MMPI test results.
, A BISSI-document dated August 13, 1985, stated that the first psychological test that the alleger took was invalid because 35 questions were not answered. The psychological screening summary for the test taken August-8, 1985, stated that further psychological
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evaluation be conducted prior to the final assessment for eligibility
. for unescorted access authorization. The psychological screening j ' summary for the test taken on August 13 or 14,1985 and the clinical
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interview on September 17, 1985 indicated concern regarding the alleger's ability to discharge duties in a competent, responsible manner, and the alleger could not be recommended for unescorted acces Interviews by the inspector showed that a consultant firm is contracted by CPCo and BISSI to handle the analysis of the psychological tests. The consulting firm has a network of psychologists in the Michigan area who are used to conduct clinical interviews for candidates whose test results indicate a potential for behavioral unreliabilit The practice for administering the psychological test is for BISSI management or supervisor representatives to administer the test to the Security officers. They receive the test booklet, directions, and release form from the CPCo personnel department. The security organization individuals interviewed indicated that when they administer the test, they read verbatim the cover sheet instructions, and instruct the individual taking the test to sign the release for <
The tester is in the room from start to finish. Once the test is completed, the person that administers the test hand delivers the test back to the Personnel Office usually on the same day. The inspectors were informed that the Plant Human Resource Director or his Secretary send the tests to be scored, usually the same day they were administere The BISSI post commander stated that he administered the MMPI to the alleger on August 14, 1985 and stayed with the alleger while the test was being completed. In a telephone interview with the Clinical Director of Behavior Analysts and Consultants, he stated that there are few national prescribed standards for the control of the MMPI
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test booklet but his firm would expect the person controlling the
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MMPI test to know or confirm the identity of the parson the MMPI was
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given to, and to provide some level of control while the test was
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being completed. In his judgement, the circumstances described above for the alleger's test conditions would be considered adequate by
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professional standards. (Note: The Clinical Director was not provided the identity of the alleger, date of testing, or name of the licensee during the telephone interview).
In reference to potential tampering with completed test results, the behavioral analysis firm's Clinical Director stated that tampering may be possible but that such tampering would very likely result in an inconclusive test result because of the several cross check portions of the MMPI to address potential carelessness on the test taker's part and other technical parameters. Such tampering to make a person appear unreliable from an unescorted access perspective would result in a clinical interview being requested. As a rule,
, unescorted access would not be denied based only on the MMPI test results. Such actions would be considered based on both.the test and interview result .l
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The inspectors were unable to confirm the date when the alleger's MMPI test was mailed from the BRPNP to the consulting firm because the licensee's records only list the date the MMPI is administere Interviews with a licensee representative showed that the MMPI test results are normally mailed the same day the test is administere The licensee's log showed the MMPI test was administered to the
, alleger on August 13, 1986. Other documents indicate the test was given on August 14, 1986. This administrative deficiency is not considered significan Conclusion The alleger was requested to take the psychological test twice, because not enough questions were answered on the first test. The manner in which the second MMPI test was administered to the alleger appears to conform to acceptable professional standards for such tes administratio r Undetected tampering with the alleger's MMPI test results appear i unlikely because of the cross-check precautions incorporated into
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the MMPI test. The other aspects of the allegation appear
, appropriate for review by the state regulatory agency responsible l for such regulation. The alleger stated that a complaint was going i to be filed with the proper state agenc The inspectors determined that conditions under which the MMPI-was l
administered at the site were acceptable and did not constitute a programmatic weaknes F. Allegation Three named BISSI and a Consumers Power Company employee used alcohol on the plant propert (See Allegation W for a related issue.)
NRC Review The inspector interviewed members of the security organization i regarding this allegation. Additionally, a decision was made by NRC Region III management to refer the allegation to the licensee for their review in accordance with existing commission policy for such issue The inspector gave the licensee the names of the individuals the alleger said used alcohol on plant property. The licensee reviewed their site records and determined that out of the four individuals two were not listed as being employed at the site; one was no longer employed onsite but the reason for leaving was not related to alcohol use. The remaining individual still works onsite but there were no
, instances where the individual was observed consuming alcohol on I
site propert i
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The licensee stated that in February 1984, an allegation was made by the alleger to the Post Commander that guards were " imbibing" on duty during the midnight shift. However, the alleger did not observe this activity. The Post Commander stated that he conducted an inquiry into the allegation and determined that there were no guards drinking during the midnight shif It was CPCo's position that the actions taken by BISSI were adequate. The inspector reviewed a handwritten memo dated February 8,1984, signed by the Post Commander, which stated that the alleger had talked to him about people on the midnight shift sleeping as well as " imbibing." The alleger stated that this was brought to a Lieutenant's attention but no apparent actions were taken. The Post Commander and Captain discussed the problem with the Lieutenant, who stated he had no knowledge of individuals either sleeping or drinking during his shift. He stated that no one had approached him about these problem The Lieutenant suspected a
" catnapping" problem, but was unable to catch or prove that it was occurring. Additionally, the alleger told the Post Commander it was good that the individual (one of the named individuals who no longer works onsite) was leaving because she was a bad influence on the midnight shif Conclusion There was no evidence to conclude that the named individuals had consumed alcohol on plant property. This allegation was not substantiate G. Allegation (1) Guards are inattentive while on duty (e.g., do crossword puzzles, read, sleep, make personal telephone calls) and, a guard was suspended for reading while on post.
, (2) The Post Commander and the Captain were aware of guards being inattentive to duty but did nothing about the situation; and,
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the alleger told the Post Commander that the alleger believed that guards were being inattentive while on duty but was told that BISSI managers would do nothing unless the guards were caught being inattentiv NRC Review The inspector interviewed members of the security organization regarding this allegation and reviewed disciplinary documentatio There were two documented cases where guards were caught being inattentive while on duty. One involved a guard reading while on post and the guard was suspended. The other case involved a guard making personal telephone calls and the guard received a documented verbal warnin __
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The inspector reviewed a handwritten memo written by the Post Commander, dated February 8,1984 (see Allegation F), which states that the alleger told the Post Commander that people on the midnight shift had been sleeping as well as drinking. However, the alleger did not observe this activit Conclusion Part (1) of this allegation was substantiated. There were two documented cases where guards were inattentive while on duty and one of the cases did involve a guard being suspended for reading while on pos Part (2) of this allegation was not substantiate In two documented instances, management observed guards being inattentive while on duty and took disciplinary action against the individual It appears that BISSI management took adequate action in response to incidents.
- Security at the plant was not significantly jeopardized by the actions of the two guard H. Allegation Guards did not respond to alarms requiring a guard respons NRC Review The inspectors reviewed documents and interviewed members of the security organization. The only incident that was mentioned during interviews or in documentation occurred on September 24, 1985, when tornados were sighted in the general area of the facility. Alarms were not responded to due to safety concerns for the response individuals. An NRC Region III safeguards analysis document states that the licensee telephonically contacted the NRC Region III Safeguards Section Chief and informed him of the situation. During the storm an assessment system was used to assess alarms. After the storm, the containment and protected area were searched and no evidence of unauthorized entry or tampering was found. The licensee was advised by the NRC Region III Section Chief to log the event and a written security event report was not required. The licensee's actions were reviewed during a later inspection and the actions taken were determined to be adequate and appropriat .. _ - . -
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Conclusion This allegation was substantiated. Guards did not respond to alarms in one instance and this was due to safety concerns. This one time occurrence, which was reported to the NRC, is not considered to be a significant deficiency in the security progra It appears that in all other cases when alarms were generated, the guards responded to the alarm I. Allegation Documents are altered if an alarm station operator does not want to send a responder to an alarm or if the response time is not me NRC Review The inspectors reviewed documents, (such as logs) and interviewed members of the security organization regarding this allegatio Individuals interviewed stated that responders are sent to all alarms (except as indicated in Allegation H). Additionally, all response times were met. However, they stated if alarms were not responded to or if response times were not met, it would be documente Documents reviewed did not show any signs of being altere Conclusion The allegation that documents were being altered to indicate acceptable response times was not substantiated. The one instance where responders were not dispatched to alarms is described in Allegation H. That event was properly documente J. Allegation It is standard practice for the Post Commander and the Captain to shred documents (such as incident reports) in order to cover up mistake NRC Review
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I The inspectors interviewed members of the security organization, including the Post Commander and Captain, regarding this allegatio Individuals interviewed indicated they did not know of any instances
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where documents were destroyed in order to cover up mistakes.
, However, individuals indicated that after documents are microfilmed, they are routinely shredded. Additionally, when revisions are made to the Security plans and procedures, the old copies are destroye Conclusion This allegation was not substantiated. There were no indications that security documents were shredded to cover up mistake .-_
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l- . Allegation ,
' Compensatory measures'are not adequately implemented because guards-
- do not put an area under compensatory measures.when required.
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NRC Review
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) The inspectors-interviewed members of the security organization'and i reviewed NRC security inspection reports for the timeframe of i November 1984 to February 1986. Inspection reports indicated there j were no violations regarding compensatory measures. Individuals
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interviewed indicated that they' follow security procedures in j- reference to implementation of compensatory. measures, t
i Conclusion l Interviews and documents reviewed indicated that security procedures
{ concerning compensatory measures were being implemented and the j licensee was meeting Security Plan commitments. This allegation was j not substantiated.
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j Allegation j
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Nonfunctional closed circuit television cameras are not logged out l of. service. The Post Commander and the Captain specifically
} instruct or imply to the alarm station operators' not to log out .
i a nonfunctional camera if there is a manpower shortage.
- NRC Review i
! The inspectors interviewed members of the security organization and
} reviewed documentation (logs, maintenance records). Documentation
! review indicated that nonfunctional cameras were documented and i repaired. Alarm station operators stated that whenever they determine j that a camera is nonfunctional, they log it out of service. The i individuals interviewed indicated no knowledge of any instances
} where-the Post Commander or Captain instructed them not to log out a *
l nonfunctional camera.
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Conclusion f
! Based on interviews and document review results, this allegation l could not be substantiated.
j Allegation It is-standard practice for supervisors to review logs'and then
- require the guard to add or delete information.
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NRC Review The inspectors interviewed members of the security organization regarding this allegation. Those individuals interviewed indicated that supervisors review logs. If the supervisor determines as a result of those reviews that the information provided is not adequate, the guard is requested to make changes to the document in order to clarify the informatio Conclusion This allegation was substantiated. Supervisors review logs and require guards to revise the document if the information provided is considered not to be adequate. However, there were no indications that supervisors were attempting to compromise the security system or falsify documents.
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N. Allegation The alarm at a location identified by the alleger was on " bypass" status because the alarm does not wor NRC Review The inspectors interviewed members of the security organization, reviewed documents, and inspected the location identified by the alleger. Through these reviews, the inspectors determined that the alarm was on bypas Individuals interviewed indicated that the locking mechanism was malfunctioning and the area in question was secured with a lock and chain. The Security Plan does not require the area to have the alarm capability, but allows it to be secured with padlocks. It should be noted that in the November 1984 security inspection report, the inspectors noted a similar problem at another locatio (Details of specific security measures for a specific location are considered unclassified Safeguards Information in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and exempt from public
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disclosure. See attachment to this report for the specific location identified by the alleger.)
Conclusion The allegation that the identified portal was on " bypass" status was substantiated. However, it was on " bypass" because the. locking mechanism malfunctioned, not because the alarm did not work. The licensee was in compliance with their security plan in that the area was secured in a manner allowed by the security pla ,
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O. Allegation The plant security system in a location identified by the alleger is designed in such a way that would allow an individual to get on a building roof and walk in the back portion of the plant in ten minutes. .The surveillance CCTV system was considered inadequate by the alleger to provide coverage of this are NRC REVIEW The inspectors interviewed members of the security organization, reviewed documents, and conducted observations of the area identified by the alleged. The fence in that location met security plan criteri Previous inspection findings determined that the alarm in the desig-nated area functioned adequately. Additionally, guard patrols and surveillance coverage of the designated area comply with security plan criteria. (Details of specific security protection measures in the area identified by the alleger are considered unclassified Safeguards Information in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and exempt from public disclosure. See attachment to this report for the specific location identified by the alleger).
Conclusion This allegation could not be substantiated. The licensee was in compliance with their security pla P. Allegation A named individual brought pieces of guns or gun kits into the plant within the last year and a hal NRC Review The inspector interviewed the named individual and other members of-the security organization regarding this allegation. Through interviews, the inspectors determined that the former (now retired)
Property Protection Supervisor (PPS) had dealt with the incident and the current PPS did not know what action had been take The inspectors received the following information from a Lieutenant (former Post Commander) who was involved in the incident. Approxi-mately four years ago, rather than within the past year and a half, the named individual, who is a plant employee, had purchased a flintlock gun kit for the Lieutenant. The named individual brought the kit into the gatehouse to give to the Lieutenant. The Lieutenant brought the kit into the security office, which is within the protected area boundary, and put it on his desk. When the former PPS observed the kit on the desk, he instructed the Lieutenant to take the kit out of the office. The Lieutenant removed the kit from the protected area. The former PPS issued instructions to the security organization that no gun parts / pieces were allowed onsit *
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Conclusion This allegation was substantiated in that an individual brought a gun kit into the protected area. However, this action posed no immediate threat to the facility since the weapon was disassembled and under control of the security force. The incident did show significant misjudgement on the part of the Lieutenant involve Q. Allegation An unnamed individual put a gun kit together onsite. The CPCo Property Protection Department, the current Post Commander, and the Captain told anyone that was involved in or knew of the incident to keep quiet about the inciden NRC Review The inspector interviewed members of the security organization regarding this allegation. Individuals interviewed indicated that they knew of no cases where a gun kit was put together onsite. - They further stated that they were never instructed by management or anyone else to keep silent about such an inciden Conclusion This allegation was not substantiate R. Allegation Guards are not trained to recognize weapon images on the x-ray machin NRC Review The inspector interviewed members of the security organization regarding this allegation. Additionally, the inspector reviewed Lesson Plans pertaining to the identification of objects through
- use of the x-ray machine. The individuals interviewed stated that they were trained to recognize weapons going through the x-ray machine. The identification of objects by use of the x-ray machine is a 10 CFR 73.55, Appendix B task requirement; therefore, the guards must be trained annually. The inspector determined through interviews that the guards are requalified on use of the x-ray machine at the required frequenc Conclusion The allegation was not substantiated. Guards were trained to recognize weapon images on the x-ray machin *
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S. Allegation
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Security management's method of correcting a problem with guard performance is to have everyone read a piece of paper and sign i j NRC Review The inspector interviewed members of the security organization regarding this allegation. The individuals interviewed stated that when an officer makes a mistake they can either be pulled off the job and retrained, and/or a document with instructions (referred to as DJT) would be sent around and all the guards would be required to read and sign the document. The "0JT" is also used to notify the guard force of any procedure revisions. The training department decides which retraining method to use on a case-by-case basis. Those individuals interviewed that had been retrained stated that the retraining methods used were effective. Additionally, the individual being retrained would not be allowed to return to their duties in the questionable area until the training department determined that the individual was qualifie Conclusion This allegation was partially substantiated. However, guards are qualified to perform their required tasks. The method of retraining identified by the alleger was not considered a regulatory concern since other adequate methods to determine guard performance are use T. Allegation Sensors near a location identified by the alleger are not as sensitive as at other locations so it takes more to set them of NRC Review The inspector interviewed members of the security organization, i reviewed documents, and conducted tests of the alarm system. The inspector determined that the sensors at the location identified by the alleger were no less sensitive than sensors in other area (Details of specific security protection measures at a specific location is considered unclassified Safeguards Information in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and exempt from public disclosur See attachment to this report for the specific location identified by the alleger.)
Conclusion This allegation was not substantiated. The licensee was in compliance with their security pla , _ , _ _ , -
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U. Allegation There have been times when guards have opened or closed areas identified by the alleger and alarms have not been generate NRC Review The inspectors interviewed members of the security organization and reviewed documents (e.g., alarm logs, corporate audits). Through these interviews / reviews, the inspectors found no evidence that alarms were not generated under circumstances identified by the alleger. During the February 1986 NRC security inspection, no violations were noted regarding the Protected Area detection system or the physical barrier (Details of specific security measures for a specific location are considered unclassified Safeguards Information in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and exempt from public disclosure. See attachment to this report for the specific location identified by the alleger.)
Conclusion This allegation was not substantiated. The licensee was in compliance with their security plan. (Refer to Allegation N for related information.)
V. Allegation Control room operators watch television and read newspapers in the control roo NRC Review During the Senior Resident inspector's tour of duty at Big Rock Point, there have been regular observations of operator behavior and control room discipline. Previous reference to this topic can be found in i Inspection Report No. 50-155/84011(DRP). At various times, the
inspector has observed the presence of newspapers and technical or trade journals, which are permitted by administrative procedures as examples of materials considered pertinent to maintaining knowledge of the industry and regulatory climate and requirements. On occasion, the Resident Inspector has observed magazines on subjects clearly unrelated to the nuclear industry and completed crossword puzzles from newspapers. In 1984, the Resident Inspector observed the presence of a radio in the control room, usually not playing, but when in use always at a volume too low to interfere with plant
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public address speakers or annunciator alarms. While the control i room contains a television monitor, its use is limited to observation !
inside containment using closed circuit television cameras. The set is not capable of receiving commercial television signals.
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The inspectors reviewed Big Rock Point administrative procedure
. ADO 584-2515 A-BA01, Chapter 4, dated August 6, 1985, which states in part, " Activities prohibited include use of radios, television and reading that is not directly job related. . . . Technical and trade journals as well as the daily newspaper are examples of materials that can be considered pertinent to maintaining knowledge of the industry and the regulatory climate / requirements and falls within the shift's responsibilities " category." As of July 1985, radios were no longer authorized or used in the control roo Conclusion This allegation was substantiated in reference to newspapers and radio use in the control room. However, while in the control room, operators were not observed in activities which would prevent them from safely carrying out their assigned duties and responsibilitie Allegation Some unnamed CPCo employees (control room operators) came to work with general symptoms of alcohol use (odor of their breath and their actions when coming to work). The alleger brought it to the BISSI Post Commander's attention and no action was take NRC Actions The NRC Resident Inspector stated that he has not observed control room operators under the influence of alcohol during his frequent tours of the plant and the control room. The Resident Inspector did state that some licensee employees had told him that in years past (indicating several years past, in his judgement) some control room operators did have various degrees of alcohol abuse problem The licensee personnel stated that those control room operators have since been " weeded out" and peer pressure from other control room operators was a major factor in them leavin Conclusion The licensee will be requested to initiate action in reference to this allegation in accordance with the current Commission policy for such issues. A written response will be requested from the licensee and reviewed by NRC Region III managemen .
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