IR 05000155/1985019

Insp Rept 50-155/85-19 on 851015-18.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Finding, Refueling Preparations & Activities & Refueling Cavity Water Seal

ML20198B115
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	11/01/1985
From:	Guldemond W, Milbrot W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198B081	List: IR 05000155/1985019 ML20198B077
References
50-155-85-19, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8511060296
Download: ML20198B115 (5)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-155/85019(DRS)

Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-06 Licensee: Consumers Power Company-212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant-Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI

. Inspection Conducted: October 15 through 18, 1985

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Inspector: W. Milbrot . //-/- s fr-Date Approved By: . u demand, Section hief #-- /- / F'

Operational Programs Date

. Inspection Summary Inspection on October 15 through 18, 1985'(Report No. 50-155/85019(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of licensee actions on previous inspection finding; refueling preparations and activities; and refueling cavity water seal. The inspection involved a total of 33 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including six inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results: No violations or deviations were identifie (hbO296 851101 PDR G ADOCK 05000155'

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumer Power Company l

• R. Abel, Acting Plant Superintendent

• R. Alexander, Technical Engineer

• G. Withrow, Engineering and Maintenance Superintendent

• L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent W. Trubilowicz, Operations Supervisor C. Sonnenberg, Shift Supervisor

• J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent

• T. Dugan, Property Protection

• D. Lacroix, Training Department J. Kneeland, Reactor Engineering USNRC S. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspectio * Denotes personnel attending the exit interview held on October 18, 198 . Refueling Preparations The' inspector reviewed the refueling training for Senior Reactor Operators (SR0), Reactor Operators (RO), and Auxiliary Operators (A0) as covered in Training Lesson Plan, M-2000A, Revision 1, Fuel Handling and Core Parameters which is part of the operators' requalification progra Personnel performing core alterations satisfactorily completed the training course and written examination. The inspector also reviewed procedures, tests and surveillances covering the maintenance and check out of fuel handling equipment, new fuel inspection and refueling support systems to ensure that the applicable Technical Specifications and licensee procedural requirements had been satisfied. All of these requirements and any other activities that need to be completed prior to commencing with fuel loading were identified as prerequisites in Big Rock Point (BRP) procedure TR-46, Revision 23, Fuel Bundle Core Loadin As each prerequisite is satisfied a sign-off is made noting the completion of the requirement. The inspector verified that the following refueling activities were completed: TR-07, Revision 14, Fuel Handling Equipment Safety Check TR-02/T7-13, Revision 13, Refueling Interlock Test TR-19, Revision 6, Startup Channels No. 6 and 7 Operational Check i

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~ TR-20, Revisio'n'6, Fission Counting Instrumentation, Calibration and Neutron Response Check MFHS-1, Revision 18,-Transfer Cask Preparation for Fuel Movement = MFHS-2, Revision 13, Fuel Handling Cables Inspection / Testing (Prior to Refueling) T30-42, Revision 3, Fuel Pool Winch Inspection

. MCLP-3, Revision 6, Fuel Transfer Cask Inspection T30-09/T30.-07, Revision 12, Calibration of Area and Emergency Condenser Vent Monitors TGS-1, Revision 51, Master Check-Off Sheet (Check-Off List for Containment Isolation Surveillance, Revision 16)

,During the review of the above completed procedures several discrepancies were ncted that involved recording incorrect data, data recorded in the wrong mace and data not recorded. Following a discussion with the licenss it was deterwined that the incorrect datum of 101s cps for dunker channel 8 recorder (Procedure TR-20) should have been 105 cp The instrument will only read up to 1010 and the revised datum agreed with the indicated reading of 105 cps. The missing data and datum recorded in the wrong space involved the "as found" and "as left" readings for upper and lower limit switches on the transfer cask cable-(Procedures MFHS-2).

The "as found" data was not recorded and the upper limit switch reading of one inch was recorded as the lower limit switch reading for number of 4 cable wraps on the cable ~ drum. The above discrepancies were corrected by the-licensee to agree with procedure requirement The licensee conducted a 10 CFR 50.59 core reload safety evaluation and verified that the core reload does not involve a change to Technical Specification or'an unreviewed safety questio No violations or deviations were identifie . Refueling Activities i

Prior to performing refueling activities the fuel handlers established fuel accountability status boards in the Control Room (CR) and on the refueling floor and cleanliness and tool accountability controls to minimize the possibility of items falling into the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

, ar.d open reactor cavity. A " controlled tools" board and tool log was used i tu help control items used over the reactor cavity area; the boundary being the hand rail at the refueling floor level.

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The inspector witnessed several shifts of fuel handling operations involving the use of the Reactor Deck Gantry Crane and Transfer Cask. A shielded tansfer cask was used to move spent and reuse fuel as there is no direct water path between the SFP and reactor. The loaded cask is flooded with water for cooling purposes during the transfer. A red light mounted on the side of the cask alerts fuel handlers to loss of fuel cooling capability. An ample supply of reactor grade make up water was readily available by connecting a hose to the cask should a leak develope. None of-the transfers observed by the inspector required the use of make up wate During observation of fuel handling it was noted that equipment wrapped in yellow poly bags wac stored directly in front of the reac+ .tatus board making access very difficult. The operator had to wa er the poly bags to perform his status board duties. The inspec;'r spressed his concerns to the licensee regarding the potential for spreading radioactive contamination, equipment damage and personnel injury. The licensee responded by having the stored items moved to a more suitable locatio The movement of fuel was handled smoothly and in accordance with written procedures with continued communication maintained with the CR. Manning of the refueling floor met Technical Specifications and shift turnovers were conducted in an orderly fashion in accordance with BRP procedure T1-08, Revision 12, Shift Turnover. The required shift turnover sheets were prepared that provided entries on equipment status, status board and caution tag logbook review, review of critical plant parameters, and initials of the on duty and relieving superviso Radiation monitoring of the area was provided by a new fuel storage monitor, and a SFP monitor, and a neutron monitor located on the Gantry Crane ca All instruments were tested and within calibratio Actions to be taken in the event of a refueling emergency were covered in BRP operating procedure EMP 3.4, Revision 24, Fuel Damage While Refuelin This procedure was part of refueling personnel training progra No violation or deviations were identifie . Reactor Cavity Water Seal IE Bulletin 84-03 is not applicable to Big Rock Point because refueling does not involve the use of an inflated cavity seal as detailed in previous Inspection Report 84013(DRP). The extension tank is welded directly to the reactor vessel. A review was conducted to determine if other potential means for loss of water from the refueling system exis These potential leak paths consist of a two inch and three inch drain line from the bottom of the extension tank and a one-half inch Head Seal Leak Detection ~Line. The three inch line also serves as the extension tank overflow line and maintains water level during refueling. The time period that a spent or reuse fuel assembly could become uncovered from loss of water in the extension tank is while the assembly is in transit

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between the core and the transfer cask. Once the fuel assembly is inside the cask and the cask door is closed the water volume inside the cask is captured. Make up water is available should a cask leak develop Should the extension tank lose water level there would be ample time to either place the fuel in the core or pull it up into the cask and close the cask door. - Available make.up water to the extension tank would reduce the rate of. water loss. It was_ determined that none of the potential leak paths would ' lead to a catastrophic failure.resulting in uncovering the fue As-noted in paragraph 3, above, there is no direct water path between the SFP and the extension tank and therefore a leak.in the extension tank would have no-impact on the SFP water level. Any work that must be accomplisted on a reuse fuel assembly is performed in the SFP. Since the SFP.has no drain lines, loss of water level is not a credible even .No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

.on October 18, 1985, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector with respect to items discussed in the report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar