IR 05000155/1988016

Insp Rept 50-155/88-16 on 880718-21.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise of Key Functions & Locations During Exercise,Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items & Emergency Plan Activation

ML20151R265
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	08/03/1988
From:	Patterson J, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151R245	List: IR 05000155/1988016 ML20151R241
References
50-155-88-16, NUDOCS 8808120106
Download: ML20151R265 (18)

Text

2

,

. .

o

'

I U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'l REGION III'

Report No. 50-155/88016(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-155 License No. OPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Madison Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant l l

Inspection At: Big Rock Point Site, Charlevoix, Michigan j

^

Inspection Conducted: July 18-21, 1988  !

Inspectors: te S/3/88 Team Leader Date l l IP%

M. Smi 8/3/88 Date l w. SJ l Approved By: W. Snell, Chief 8/3/28 ;

Emergency Preparedness Section Date j Inspection Summary j Inspection on July 18-21, 1988 (Report No 50-155/88016(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the annual Big Rock Point Emergency Preparedness Exercise involving observations by three NRC inspectors of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301). Other areas of the program inspected were license actions on previously identified i items, emergency plan activation and a review of the current status of the licensee's meteorology and dose assessment programs as part of the Emergency '

Response Facilities (ERF) Appraisal (IP 82412). Section 8 of this report I provides an updated summary of THI Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) i items related to emergency preparednes I Results: No violations of NRC requirements were identified as a result of this inspection. The licensee demonstrated an adequate response to a simulated

accident scenario involving a potential large release of radioactive material to the environment. The meteorology and dose assessment programs as related to part of the ERF appraisal were evaluated and found to be satisfactory using the guidance of IP 8241 hg y 5 ,

Q

.

i

,

..

'

i l

l DETAILS 1 l

!

1. Persons Contacted NRC Observers-and Areas Observed E. Plettner, Control Room (CR)  !

J. :Patterson, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support i Centea (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) !

M. Smith, Security Event.and E0F Consumers Power Company (CPCo) Personnel D. Hoffman, Vice' President, Nuclear Operations (CPCo)

T. Elward, Plant Manager P. Loomis, Emergency Planning Administrator (CPCo)

A. Katarsky, Exercise Coordinator (CPCo)

, D. Fugere, Senior Emergency Planner (CPCo)

l M. Hobe, Emergency Planning Coordinator J. Brunet, Licensing, Palisades, EOF Lead Controller i J. Beer, Chemistry and Health Physics Superintendent, l TSC Lead Controller M. Hobe, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (EPC)

'

M. Dawson, OSC Controller, Palisades R. Beeker, Quality Assurance, Auditor G. Withrow, Engineering and Maintenance Superintendent G. MacInnis, Public Affair Director, Big Rock Point N. Brott, EPC, Palisades J. Ridley, Emergency Preparedness, Palisades D. Hughes, Quality Assurt,ce Director (CPCo)

R. Alexander, Technical Engineer, Site Emergency Director l L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent, Big Rock Point J. Fremeau, Director Nuclear Safety (CPCo)

K. Penrod, Emergency Planner (CPCo)

P. Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator '

W. Trubilowicz, Operations Supervisor D. Kelly, Maintenance Supervisor, OSC Lead Controller M. Van Alst, Property Protection Supervisor I M. Bielinski, Acting Superintendent, Production and Performance !

• R. English, Corporate Health Physicist (CPCo)

{

l All licensee personnel listed above attended the exit interview I on July 20, 1988, expect the one designated by an asterisk (*). I 2. License Action on a Previously Identified Item (Closed) Open Item No. 50-155/87900-01: This represented a follow-up on Information Notice 87-58, which concerns the capability of licensees to maintain continuous communications ~with the NRC in an emergenc The

,

..

.

inspector determined.that the Shift Supervisor will perform communications with the NRC until the arrival of the On Call Communicator as. described in EPIP-1, Activation of Emergency Plan, and EPIP-6F, Emergency Notifications. This item is close . Activations of the Licensee's Site Emergency Plan The licensee had activated its emergency plan twice since the last inspection. Both activations were Notification of Unusual Events which occurred on Febt'uary 7,1988 and June 28, 198 A review of licenset records of these events was conducted. The EP Coordinator maintained a file on each event. These files contained notification forms, plant status forms, Shift Supervisor's log of the-event and the EPC's review of the event. Corrective actions were taken on any items the EPC noted as problems. The events were correctly classified by the Shift Supervisor using the proper Emergency Action Level (EAL) and all notifications were timel . General An exercise of the Big Rock Point Site Emergency Plan (SEP) and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) was conducted on July 19, 1988. The exercise tested the response to a hypothetical accident scenario, which could have resulted in a potential major release of radioactive material to the environment. An attachment to this report includes the scope and objectives for the exercise and provides a narrative summary of the exercise scenario. This was an announced, daytime exercise which included participation by the licensee with some participation by the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Departmen . General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Big Rock Point SEP and associated EPIP Coordination The licensee's response was generally coordinated, orderly and timely. If these events had been real, the actions taken by the l licensee would have been sufficient to permit State and Local i authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public health I and safet l Observers l l

Licensee obse .+ nd three NRC observers monitored and critiqued l the exercis l l

.

'

. Exercise Critique The licensee held their critiques following the exercise on July 19, 1988 and also on July 20, 1988. The NRC critique and exit interview was conducted on July 20, 198 . Specific Observations Control Room (CR)

The.CR operating crew responded well to messages containing plant data including changing values on reactor parameters and other related information to the event. Communications and notifications for the Notification of Unusual Events (NUEs), both the security and the reactor related event, were correctly made. The Shift Supervisor officially decided not to declare the second NUE, but rather to include this information as an up-date to the prior security related NU Since this was a daytime, regular hours exercise, the designated Site Emergency Director (SED) was readily available and chose to take charge of the security event, at 0834, because of the uniqueness of this NUE. The SED had this latitude according to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 4A, Site Emergency Director, and Attachment 4A-1. This transfer of command and control from the Shift Supervisor (SS) was made on a face-to-face basis followed by a PA announcement. This PA announcement was not heard by everyone in the TSC or the NRC observe At 0840 the SS dispatched Auxiliary Operators (A0s) to look at the. vital areas. The Turbine Building was spacified as not to be looked at, only the sphere. The A0s should have been called ~out earlier for these surveillance type assignments. No communications back to the CR were made by the A0s until 0856 when they returne Two-way radios were not carried by the A0s on their mission for a quick feed-bac Several events occurred in a short time span which did not give much time for the SS and his crew to respond. These events (between approxthiately 0900 and 0920) were loss of condenser vacuum, reactor trip, turbine rupture diaphragm burst, and condensate and feedwater pumps trip. The crew responded satisfactorily to these event However, three minutes passed after the reactor trip before anyone in the CR asked if all the control rods were in place. At the exit interview the CR participants indicated that they were following normal reactor shutdown procedures which did include control rod insertion. Still, in an exercise or real emergency, vocalizing of key activities and decision making by the SS should be don .

,

No requests were made for radiation monitoring or to dispatch individuals to the turbine deck to determine if anyone was injured from the esceping steam due to the burst turbine rupture diagra Teams were dispatched later by the OSC but not in the early stagas of the steam releas The On-Call Technical Advisor (OTA) demonstrated good interaction with the SS and other CR personnel. He made positive contributions and was utilized more according to his responsibilities as defined in EPIP-4C, This was an improvement from the OTA's performance in the 1987 exercise. The SS did maintain a log of activitics throughout the exercis The Emergency Operating Procedures (E0Ps) and Emergency Action Levels (EAls) were used properly by the CR staff. Considering the confined area for the CR staff, approximately half the available space of the CR, the staff maintained their concentration and efforts to mitigate the acciden Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat Security Event j

The security scenario event was developed and conducted at the mquest of the County Sherif The scenario had been used at a drill prio' to this exercise, however, the players were differen This repelt scenarin was done to meet the request and needs of the Char?evoix County Sheri ff. Overall, the plant security force and management adequately demonstrated their security plan and procedures. Coordination with local law enforcement agencies was good and was adequately demonstrate The security event began with simulated shots fired at a security guard on rounds inside the protected fence at 0807. The guard

'

immediately notified security management who secured the sit A ,

clear description of the individual's attire, vehicle and escape '

direction was provided by the guard. The Charlevoix County ;

Sheriff's department was notified and a deputy arrived onsite l within 15 minutes. The deputy was provided easy access by plant ,

security personnel per security procedures. A Notification of I Unusual Event was declared due to a security event at 0828. The l IRC was notified at 0347, well within the one hour tir< licit, and I the State and counties were notified within 15 minutes of the l declaratio According to plant security procedures, at 0815 a plant PA l announcement was made directing plant personnel to assemble .it their accountability station Due to the type of security event, this order was immediately cancelled by the Plant Protection Supervisor (FPS), and a second announcement was made to cancel this order and directed plant personnel to remain where they wer ~ -

.

. , .

-

.

..

Although this caused some confusion later in the exercise when accountability was necessary, . plant' personnel were following their security plan and the PPS demonstrated awareness of plant personnel safet Goo'd coordination of efforts to apprehend the responsible individuaI was _ demonstrated by plant security and the county sheriff's department. Plant security management followed the plant security plan and procedures. Aerial photos and plant facility maps were used to track the individual. The deputy sheriff simulated calling for use of Coast Guard patrol boats and helicopter He also simulated calling for tracking dogs and local police' department assistance in securing main access roads. Radio contact was maintained with plant guards and the Charlevoix County sheriff's offic Telephone's were also used to notify and communicate with office personnel. A high level of professionalism was demonstrated throughout the exercise. The event ended with the apprehension of the individual at 090 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat c. Technical Support Center (TSC)

The TSC was activated and operational in less than 30 minute There was no PA announcement by the SED at that time. However, E very brief announcement was made earlier (0835) of the SED taking over command and control from the SS in the CR and the word

"activation" may have been used. This should have been done in a more forceful, distinctive manner. A formal announcement of the TSC's activation, should have been made but not until all required positions were filled and all required equipment including telephones were operationa Initial briefings by the SED were good; however, more frequent briefings to the TSC staff should have been given as the accident progressed, e.g., from approximately 1030. A_TSC log was adequately maintained and updated by the SED as the events occurred. ' Status boards were maintained and kept current. Notifications _and updates for the Alert were made to the State and local government agencies as well as to the NRC on a timely basis. This Alert was based on a sustained steam drum level < 17" below centerline which could result in a loss of coolant in excess of makeup capacity. This was the correct EAL. Some misunderstanding and confusion resulted when the evacuation / assembly two minute siren activated following the Alert notification (0929). Some of those responding did not appear to know where to go; while some in assembly areas weren't sure what to do next. This was mainly due to a similar evacuation request at 0815 resulting from the security event. This earlier announcement was cancelled a short time later as described in Section 6.b of this repor The accountability was completed in less than 30 minutes ;

with only two individuals missin These two individuals were soon !

identified as not being onsite at that tim I i

l

- .

,

..

.

The PA announcement of the Alert did not include a brief statement as to what justified this emergency classification. Last year's exercise in April 1987 (Report No. 50-155/87008) also did not include a statement with the Alert announcemen Dose assessment calculations were initiated in the TSC assuming a design basis leak rate. Real time meteorology data was used with these dose assessment projections. Forecast meteorology was obtained from Weather Service International. The EPZ map was utilized with as much information as was available. Projected plume directions were posted and kept timely. No actual release-ever occurred in this scenario. Dose assessment capability was adequately demonstrate By eliminating access to the TSC through the long-corridor leading to the Instrument and Control Shop, better access control was maintained in the TSC. Entrance and egress were limited to the Turbine Building and the normal entrances. This eliminated to a great extent the possibility of a participant carrying radioactive contamination into the TS Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequat However, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• All emergency classification announcements in all emergency response facilities should include a brief statement of the basis for the classificatio Also, the transfer of command and control from the CR to the TSC should be clearly stated in a PA announcemen d. Operational Support Center (OSC)

The OSC Director gave his initial briefing following activation of the facility. Within minutes the first maintenance team was dir. patched to the turbine floor area to assess damage to the turbine rupture diaphragm and consider a replacement for it. A radiation protection technician accompanied the maintenance personnel. Within 20 minutes after activating the OSC the status boards were up to date including key reactor parameters. Piping and_ instrument diagrams were retrieved and used by the teams before they were dispatched into other areas of the plan The use of a voluminous edition of a data based equipment maintenance list for various mechanical and other components which contained model number, manufacturer's name and other vital information was a great time saver and aid to OSC participants when looking for a replacement part or substitute for some damaged equipment. In a real event this should prove very helpful. Based on the limited time of evaluation, the OSC appeared to be functioning well. OSC staff knew their assignments and kept in good communication with the TS .

.

.~ l

.

'

l i

I Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program j is adequat !

e. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

EOF activation was started by' interim plant staff as required by the emergency plan implementing procedures. Personnel took over operation of the telephones, obtained plant procedures and other necessary plant system information. The Emergency Administrator provided personnel a thorough initial briefing on plant status and kept them informed as changes occurred. The Plant Engineering Support Group quickly established communication with their TSC counterparts and began to assist them. Offsite notifications and communicaticn was transferred to the EOF within 30 minutes of the decision to activate the EO Following the arrival of General Office personnel, the EOF assumed command and control of the accident at 1137 following the declaration of the Site Area Emergency (SAE). The E0F was ready to assume all authority at the time the TSC was about to upgrade the classificatio After consultation with the SED, the EOF Director decided to let the TSC complete the classification upgrade, accountability and plant announcements, prior to the turn over of authority to the EOF. The TSC made the notifications of the SAE to the State, counties and the NRC within the required time limit The EOF Director managed his staff effectively. At periodic intervals meetings were conducted with his support groups to discuss plant status, proposed actions and classification Communicators provided continuous (sinulated) contact with the State and NR Adequate status boards were available for each support group and were updated on a regular basis. Information was current on all status boards throughout the exercis The Health Physics (HP) Support Group demonstrated a coordinated effort throughout tne exercis Field teams were managed from the E0F with assistance from the TSC when field teams were in areas of low transmission capabilities. After air samples did not detect anything, the HP group concluded the high dose rates at the security building and "shine" from containment were the only radiation source Forecast weather data was obtained and considered by HP staff to anticipate the EPZ sectors which would be affected should a release occur offsite. The group was prepared to provide protective action 1 recommendations if they were require l Plant status forms for the State of Michigan were generated at I regular intervals by the HP Support group. Reactor status changes, radiological data, dose projections and protective action recommendations were completed on each form. The signature of the EOF Director was required prior to transmittal to offsite agencie )

l I

.

..

.

.

There was a good discussion between the E0F Director and his support group leaders on whether or not to escalate to a General Emergenc The consensus was to stay at the Site Area Emergency. Following the plant's ability.to switch over to the recirculation mode, the E0F Director suggested support groups begin to plan for recovery. The classification remained at a Site Area Emergency.

'

The SED from the TSC and his key . team support leaders met with their E0F counterparts for a face-to-face discussion of recovery / reentry activitie This provided a much better mechanism for interaction than telephone conversations. Areas discussed jointly included health physics; alerting contract personnel for additional site area monitoring and sample taking, communications, public affairs and logistic Input to each of these areas was meaningful and specifi However, some priorities should have been established among the many projected assignments and areas of concern. The discussion demonsttated good knowledge of necessary tasks and personnel needed to start plant system restoratio Overall, it was a much improved demonstration of recovery / reentry activities compared to last year's exercis Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat . Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Appraisal Based on the proposed July 1988 date for the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Appraisal, a review was conducted for the areas of computer systems, meteorology and dose assessment. The computer systems portion of the ERF Appraisal was determined to be not applicable at the Big Rock Point site due to the lack of computer systems. For meteorology and dose assessment, a review of existing documentation in conjunction with minimal additional discussions with licensee personnel were determined to be sufficient to address these areas. The sirgle remaining area of review is reactor systems, and this will be addressed in a future inspectio Meteorological Review for ERF Appraisal A review was performed of existing documentation associated with the meteorological system, observations of the system, and documentation from licensee submittals to the NRC. The primary documentation reviewed included:

January 1982 Licensee response to Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal (EPIA) findings which were issued as Confirmation of Action Letter in December 1981. Commitment was to identify meteorological (MET) capability as a backup system with MET data first received frcm the National Wealth Servic . . -

..

.

February 1982 Letter from NRC, Region III to NRC Headquarters describing the proposed meteorological system to be installed, maintained and calibrated by the license October 1982 Report closing of Open Item on MET by NRC, Region III from inspection in September 1982; which confirmed that revised MET system was acceptable now as the primary syste Based on the above review, which included a review of routine emergency preparedness inspections and exercise evaluations, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate, Dose Assessment Review for Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Appraisal The automated dose assessment program consists of a straight line gaussian model and a segmented gaussian mode The straight line-model is normally used to coincide with the one used by the-State of Michigan. Both whole-body and child thyroid doses can be calculated using the automated program with an IBM PC computer. If the automated program is not available, manual procedures can be used to complete the dose assessment functions. Procedure EPIP-5A, Estimation of Offsite Dose, contains the steps to calculate offsite doses with attachments for backup and forecast meteorology as well as manual methods. These manual methods include a determination for gamma E (average gamma energy per disintegration), a backup release rate determination for containment releases, and a fadckup release rate determination for stack relesses. Release rate calculations for onsite are determined by using the Containment High Range Monitors to calculate the noble geses concentration in the containment and then selecting an appropriate containment leak rate to calculate the noble gas release rat The iodine release rate is determined by multiplying the noble gas release rate by 1/100 Default isotopic mixes can be entered into the dose assessment model using a two hour default tim The stack monitoring system is identified as RGEM, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor. This manual system determined noble gas ;

and dose equivalent Iodine-131 release rates from the stack during high range or normal range operation of the RGEM system. RGEM uses i a Nal ion chamber with an Intrinsic Germanium Detector. This I combination allows analysis of all noble gases, particulates and I iodines. Curves are available to calculate decay rate Stack ;

monitor readings can be read in mR/ hour or microcuries/c I Hydrogen concentration is not considered for containment and fuel i clad failure for this small reacto An exemption for this i contingency has been approved by NRC. The affect on stack monitor l readings of gamma radiation shine from containment has been j considered by the licensee. The detector for the stack monitor is i located below grade away from direct gamma shine with four inches of l lead shielding in place, to protect the detector from this radiatio ,

!

j

,_

_ - .

_ ~ _ _ _ , _ - - - _ _ _ _ ,

_

E

. .

<

Area radiation monitors identify radiation levels in various plant locations which can then be compared to the containment high radiation monitor readings for further evaluation. The meteorology (MET) used with the automated dose assessment program is a Class A MET model which displays real time, site generated data on a digital display in the TSC and which data is also available on strip charts in the same are Backup MET data is obtained from Weather Service International, which obtains its local weather information from Pe11ston or Traverse City, Michiga Field monitoring data is used to correct or modify dose projection The manual backup dose calculation method was determined to be adequate based on inspector's review and interviews (in previous inspections) with those personnel having dose assessment responsibilities for emergencies or for routine condition Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat . Status of TMI Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) Items at Big Rock Point On October 31, 1980, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, which incorporated into one document all TMI-related items approved for implementation by the Commission at that time. On December 17, 1982, the NRC issued Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 to provide additional clarification regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2) - Application to Emergency Response Facilities, Emergency Response Facilities, and Meteorological Data, as well as other areas. The status of the completion of these TMI-related items are internally tracked by the NR The taale below lists each of the emergency preparedness related SIMS items, their status as tracked by SIMS on May 26, 1988, and comments in regards to each item. In some cases the status of the SIMS item is incorrect, while in other cases the items will need to be updated as a result of this inspectio Item N SIMS Status Comments 1 I Open This item refers to implementation of Chapter 8 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, and should be closed upon completion of all portions of the ERF Appraisa III.A. N/A The status of this item should be updated to indicate it is close !

This item involved short term 4 improvements to the emergency I preparedness program and was i closed at the conclusion of the l i

i j

]

- - - - - - - - - - _ - - - _ - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------_-----_--------------__--___-_-_A

x

"

e , .

.

Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: Report No. 50-155/81-17 dated January 28, 198 III.A.1. Closed This item involved interim upgrades to the ERF's and was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: Report No. 50-155/81-17 dated January 28, 198 III.A.1. Not Listed This item involved design criteria for upgraded ERF's, but was subsequently determined to be not applicable (N/A). This item should be added to the tracking system with a SIMS status of N/ III.A.1. Open The status of tnis it m should be updated to indicate 1% i .s closed. Because this item involved ERF modifications that were incorporated into MPA-F-63, 64 and 65, this item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:

Report No. 50-155/81-17 dated January'28, 198 III.A. N/A The status of this item should be updated to indicate it is close This item involved-the submittal of upgraded emergency plan This item was closed with the issuance of the emergency preparedness input to the SER:

Report No. 50-155/82-19(DRMS)

,

dated March 25, 198 III.A. N/A The status of this item should be !

updated to indicate it is close This item involved the submittal ,

of emergency procedure This )

item was closed at the conclusion l of the Emergency Preparedness i Implementation Appraisal: Report ;

No. 50-155/81-17 dated January 28, 1 198 l l

l

l

I

'

- _ _ _ _ _ _

.

, ..

.

III.A.2.3 Not Listed --The status of this~ item should be updated to indicate it is close This item involved an acceptable interim meteorologica1' progra This item was closed at the conclusion of Emergency-Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: Report No. 50-155/81-17 dated January 28,198 III.A.2.4 Open The status of this item should be updated.to indicated it is close This item involves an acceptable final meteorological progra This item is closed as a result of the review conducted as part of this inspectio III.A.2.5 Open The status of this item should be updated to indicate it is close This item involves an acceptable Class A meteorological mode This item is closed as a result of the' review conducted as part of this inspectio III.A.2.6 Open The status of-this item should be updated to indicate it is close This item involves a licensee's review of their Class A meteorological model. This item is closed as a result of the review conducted as part of this inspectio '

III.A.2.7 Not Listed This item required the licensee to provide a description of the Class B meteorological model to the NRC. Based on the-current structure of the ERF Appraisal program, the NRC is not reviewing these submittals of the Class B mode Therefore, the status of this item should be updated to indicate it is not applicable-(N/A).

III.A.2.8 Open The status of this item should be updated to indicate it is close This item involves an acceptable Class 8 meteorological mode _,

This item is closed as result of l the review conducted as part of l this inspectio ,

->

, . . . . . . _ . .

'

i

_

' "

n s .

(p , ,

,-

. - -

x ..

c -

_

4- >

. s-MPA-F-63 Open This items involves a review of-

-the TSC during the ERF' Appraisa This item will be closed at the conclusion of the as yet-unscheduled reactor systems portion' of the ERF Appraisal. ,

MPA-F-64 Open The status of this' item shoul'd be updated to indicate it is close This item involved a review of-the OSC, which was completed

'during the exercise addressed in -

this repor MPA-F-65- Open .This item involves'a review of the EOF during the ERF Appraisai' .

This item'will be closed at the

<

conclusion of the as yet unscheduled reactor systems portion of'the ERF Appraisa MPA-F-66 Open The. status'of this' item is incorrect. This item involved the Nuclear Data Link, which has been superseded by the Emergency ,

Response Data System (ERDS). +

ihis item should be updated to indicate it is not applicable ,

(N/A). l Exit Interview The inspector team held an exit interview on July'20, 1988 with those-licensee personnel identified in.Section 1. The Team Leader discussed i l

the-scope and preliminary findings of the inspection. The inspectors determined from the licensee that none of the information discussed was considered proprietar Attachments 1. Exercise Scope and Objectives Exercise Narrative Summary

l n

14 .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ----_--- : ____ _

.

____-u---__--

. .*

.

I p)

.

(

v 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES SCOPE BREX 88 is designed to meet exercise requirements specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section I It will postulate events which would require activation of major portions of the site emergency plan and response by local and state government. The exercise will be utility enly. The Charlevoix County Sheriff Department will also participate in security aspects. The Joint Public Information Center will not be activate .2 OBJECTIVES The exercise will demonstrate: Assessment and Classification Recognition of emergency conditions Timely classification of emergency conditions in accordance with emergency action levels Communication (O) Initial notification within specified time constraints (state and local - 15 minutes, NRC - I hour) Subsequent notification in accordance with procedure Notification and coordination with other organizations, as required (other utilities, contractors, fire or medical services) Provision of accurate and timely information to support news release activity Radiological Assessment and Control ,

i Calculation of dose projection based on sample results or monitor ,

readings I Performance of in-plant and offsite field surveys I Collection and analysis of a post-accident primary coolant sample Trending of radiological data Formulation of appropriate protective action recommendations J l Contamination and exposure control  !

t

/Ni

\s / l l

'

l

'

FH1086-0006B-TP11-TP02 .)

.

.

.-

.

.

O

' Emergency Response Facilities Activation. staffing and operation at appropriate classifications and within specified tima constraint i Adequacy of emergency equipment and supplies Adequacy of emergency communication systems Access control Emergency Management Command and control with transfer of responsibilities from Control Room to Technical Support Center to Emergency Operations Facility Assembly and accountability within approximately 30 minutes Coordination with State of Michigan emergency organization Mitigation of operational and radiological conditions i Mobilization of emergency teams

' Reentry and Recovery Assessment of damage and outline of reentry / recovery plans Identification of constraints, requirements and organization to implement the plan Exercise Control l Proviaf*o .:or maximum free play

.

' Accurate assessment of player performance

< l l

l mil 086-0006B-TP11-TP02 i

. . . _ , . - . .~

,

.*

", 1

.

O '

V BREX 88 - NARRATIVE SUMMARY At 0915 the presious day, the electric fire pump failed to operate during its monthly surveillance test. At 0915 today, a Technical Specifications LCO will-be met requiring initiation of plant shutdow The plant has been at steady-state power, equilibrium xenon, for 90 days. The daily reactor conlant system inventory check for July 19, 1988 has been performed satisfactoril Today at 0805, a guard making outdoor rounds hears gunshots and bullets whizzing. He immediately contacts the security building. The control room and Sheriff Department are notified. The Sheriff Department dispatches assistance to the plant. The shif t supervisor classifies the situation as an unusual event, then notifies the State and. local Sheriff deputies arrive onsite at approximately 0820. By 0915, the security event is terminate At 0915, loss of cordenser vacuum causes the reactor to trip. . Thirty seconds later, the turbine rupture diagram blows. Steam is seen on the turbine dec The turbine stop valve is open; it did not close on reactor scram. Steam drum level is dropping rapidly. Condensate and feedwater pumps trip. If the

[\~/) operator attempts to close the turbine stop valve, it will close. However, the diaphragm rupture will continue to spew steam. The operator should close the main steam isolation valve and initiate the emergency condenser. The emergency condenser, however, will fail to operate as MO 7053 and MO 7063 are stuck closed. Attempts to restart a condensate pump and a feedwater pump will succeed. They will run until water in the hot well is expended, approximately two and one-half minutes after start. Steam drum level will increase from-25 inches to -5 inches before the feedwater pump trips again. An alert should be declared which will result in activation of the TSC and OSC and partial activation of the EO Both Plant and General Office EOF staff will be prestaged to eliminate excessive exercise time. Plant personnel will be granted access to the EOF at 1000, General Office personnel at 110 At 3923, the steam drum relief valve lif ts, stays open for 15 to 20 seconds, then closes. Primary coolant system pressure drops from 1520 psig to 1490 psig. The relief valve cycles open for 16 to 18 seconds, then closes approximately every 80 seconds. Containment pressure rises approximately every 80 seconds. Containment pressure rises approximately 0.7 psi with each cycle; containment temperature increases with eac Shortly after 0927, the steam drum relief valve cycles for the fourth time and containment pressure reaches the set point for automatic containment spray actuatio Following actuation, containment pressure oscillates between 1.8 psig and 2.5 psig. Containment temperature fluctuates between 105'F and

{,

100* MIO488-0091A-TP20-TP12

. .-

'

'

.p .

.

At 0930, containment sprays are operating continuously. The steam drum relief valves are-cycling every 100 seconds. Both control rod drive pumps are operating. . Steam drum level continues to slowly increase with two control rod drive pumps runnin By 1030, reactor power has reached "0." Reactor vessel water level is off-scale high. Steam drum level is approximately +8 inche At 1045, containment pressure is being maintained at approximately 2.5 psi The steam drum safety valves are cycling to relieve excess pressure. Contain-ment sprays are operating continuousl .At 1115, containment pressure is approximately 2.5 psig. Steam drum level is approximately 17 inches above center lin At 1125, a steam drum relief valve opens to relieve pressure and sticks in the open position. Primary coolant level and pressure drop rapidl In 30 seconds, primary coolant is 2'9" above the core which triggers actuation of the reactor depressurization system following a two-minute safety delay. A site area emergency should be declare By 1130, both core spray systems are operating normally. Containment pressure is being reduced by containment sprays after peaking at 20 psi At 1140, steam drum level comes on scale and is increasing 6 inches per minut v By 1150, steam drum level is +30 inche At 1230, containment level reaches 587'. The post-incident system (recircula-tion) is put in servic At 1245, primary coolant is being recirculated from the encloser sump to core spray, out the reactor depressurization system valves and back to the sump. A post-accident chemistry sample may now be take By 1300, recovery planning should be underway. Notifications to the State will be closed out at this poin At 1315, a four-hour time jump will occur to allow formal reentry / recovery planning to occur. Approximately an hour and a half will be allowed for development of reentry and recovery outline The Site Emergency Director, EOF Director, Emergency Officer and ap; _icable support personnel will meet to outline reentry and recovery plannin /19/88

MIO488-0091A-TP20

._ - _ _ _ ~. - . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ - , . _ _ _ .~ _ ~ __ - - . .