IR 05000155/1987023

Insp Rept 50-155/87-23 on 870829-1019.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Maint & Surveillance Operations, Emergency Preparedness,Lers & Security

ML20236N304
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	10/29/1987
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236N293	List: IR 05000155/1987023 ML20236N289
References
50-155-87-23, NUDOCS 8711160109
Download: ML20236N304 (8)

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p U..S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS

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.. iL: -_ Report No.150-155/87023(DRP):

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. Docket No. 50-155- Q

$ License.No..DPR-6' ;

: Licensee: ConsumersPowerCompany-

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212-' West Michigan Avenue

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Jackson, MI 49201 L' '

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. Facility.Name: -Big Rock Point' Nuclear Plant-

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Inspection ~At:. Charlevoix, Michigan Inspection Conducted: ' August 29, through October 19, 1987-  ;

. .. - Inspector:- Stephen Guthrie-

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Approved By: . , C 1e '

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ojects ection 20

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cInspection Summary

' Inspection on August 29, through October 19, 1987 (Report No. 50-155/87023(DRP))'

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iAreas Inspected: Routine,: unannounced inspection conducted by the Senior-Resident Inspector of Licensee l Actions on previousL Inspection Findings,,: 'I Operational Safety, Maintenance Operation, Surveillance Operation,-Emergency  ;

Preparedness,' Licensee Event" Reports,fand' Securit f Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no' violations or' deviations were '

identified. .No significant safety items.were identifie .;

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8711160109 ADOCK O 87 ] 55 PDR PDR

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DETAILS l Persons Contacted

• T. E1 ward, Plant Superintendent

• Petitjean, Planning and Administrative Services Superintendent

. * Withrow, Engineering Maintenance Superintendent

• R. Alexander, Technical Engineer  ;

• R. Abel, Production and. Plant Performance' Superintendent

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• L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent R. Barnhart, Senior Quality Assurance Administrator P. Donnelly, Senior Review Supervisor, Nuclear Activities Dep j D. Swem, Senior Engineer G. Sonnenberg, Materials Services Supervisor D. Staton, Shift Supervisor

• Trubilowicz,.0perations Supervisor  !

• J.' Beer,- Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent E. Evans, Senior Engineer R. Brady, Senior Plant. Technical Analyst J. Tilton, General Engineer  !

D. Kelly, Maintenance Supervisor ,

D. Ball, Maintenance Supervisor  !

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W. Blosh, Maintenance Engineer M. Acker, Senior Engineer J. Toskey, General Engineer L. Darrah, Shift Supervisor J. Horan,' Shift Supervisor R. Scheels, Shift Supervisor  :

J. Warner, Property Protection Supervisor  ;

T. Fisher, Senior Quality Assurance Administrator  ;

R. Krchmar, General Quality Assurance Analyst G. Boss, Reactor Engineer The inspector also contacted other lice'nsee personnel' in the Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection and Technical Department * Denotes those present at exit intarvie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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(Closed) Violation Severity Level IV (155/87019-04), failure to analyze two independent samples and verify. calculations and valve lineup prior to j a planned release. This resulted in a planned release with the effluent 1 monitor isolated in violation of Technical Specification 13. The inspector determined that management involvement was extensive in event investigation and corrective action implementation. An Operations Memorandum was circulated'to operators requiring double verification of c radwaste valve lineups as an interim measure while Radwaste procedures l

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were being modified. Procedure 0-RWS-2, Liquid Radwaste Release to l Discharge Canal, Dirty Waste Receiving Tank, was revised to' require _ ,

verification of monitor flow and expected response and Shift Supervisor verification of valve lineup. The incident was immediately incorporated  ;

into requalification training and auxiliary operator training and  !

certification. Training was provided on LER 87009 which described'the 1 incident, and emphasized by lecture and classroom exercise the importance of operator anticipation of changes in plant parameters associated with '

any plant operating activit t 3. Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection-period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the containment sphere and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential l fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that j maintenance requests-had been initiated for equipment in need of 1 maintenanc The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with i the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and f verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Liquid Poison, Emergency Condenser, Reactor Depressurization, Post Incident, Core Spray and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit The inspector also witnesscd portions of the radioactive waste system controis associated with radwaste shipments and barreling, On September 4 'the inspector observed the posting of a security guard !

at a vital area door for which the card reader was defective, j i On September 8 the inspector reviewed with the licensee continued 4 high unidentified leakage that approached the administrative limit a of 0.8 gpm. During the period September 4-7 the unidentified leak '

rate increased steadily and the licensee voluntaril) elected to enter a brief- outage period to perform repairs to Reactor Depressurization 4 System (RDS) Valve Leakage through RDS depressurization valve l pilot valves have 'resulted in a long history of valve top assembly I replacements. The plant was reduced in power to approximately i 2-3 MWe to permit inspection at normal temperature and pressure of l those systems and components which are inaccessible at power due to 1 high radiation levels. No other sources of leakage were identified l and normal cold shutdown conditions were reached at 1:55 j September On September 26 operators performing daily control rod drive exercises discovered a malfunction in drive controls that caused a control rod being driven in to continue to insert if the switch was held in the insert positio During normal control rod insertion l

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foperations.the 4K3 relay preventsErod travel beyond one notch. ~Each' '

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, ~ control rod lwhich is~not fully inserted in the core'is driven lin

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one; notch'and returned tolits dssignated position;as aLdaily' Li surveillance.' In- addition, . a' control rod drive coupling' integrity.- :j

weekly? surveillance isiperformed. ;The' licensee determined that the'

, multiple' notching phenomenon did.not' occur during control-rod.

,: . withdrawal.and verified that the multiple notching occurred' randomly Lm"

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at'.different times and among different drives,7 ndicatingathat 1 the_

malfunction.was not associated with 'any given drive uni .

b ,1 During the! period September 28 through' October 12!the licensee I

,>< conducted an extensive. review of the' alignment and adjustment of the d

' hydraulic piping and components. associated with the system usin J Lvendor. assistance. No' deficiencies not previously known'were identified. 1Cause of.the' drive malfunction was determined to be '

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' defective, possibly overheating, 4K3 relay.1A replacement part was y obtained andiis scheduled.for installation during the next outage.-

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?: In'the interim, the licensee-'has altered.the daily drive. insert 3 exercise to terminate-the insert signal as soon as position . , 1-indication for the original' drive-position,is lost (indicating ~ that j-rod insertion has commenced) but before the drive unit undergoes _ .!

+ the " settle": function at the. new positio ,1

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Operators reduced the number'of multiple notchinglincidents by

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'taking periodic' breaks'.in the surveillance. performance to avoid '

o relay overheating. Operators can halt inward travel.by releasin thez reactivity control. switch and are often warned of relay-

_ g'f . malfunction by- paying close attention to the number of. audible clicks made by the relay during the exercis q l

LNo' violations or deviations were identified in this area, s . l Monthly Maintenance Observation i

Station maintenance. activities of safety related systems and components '

. listed below were-observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted 1 in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides'and industry 1 codes'or standards and,in conformance with technical specifications.-

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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting c'onditions_for operation were met while' components or systems were

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removed from' service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the 1 work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were _-'

inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were 7'

. performed prior to returning components 1or systems to service; quality

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Jcontroll records were maintained; activities were accomplished by

. . qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological ' controls were implemented; and, fire' prevention controls were implemente )

Work requests were ' reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and lto assure that' priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may ' affect system performanc ,

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4 < ,OnSeptember9thejinspecbor;ob' served' repair 1 activities.that-i $^ ," disassembled RDS.. isolation valve B to address leakage problemsLthat

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-pushed-leakage.to near' administrative limits. Appropriate procedural 9

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, -and. radiological controls were used during work activities. The 7 . inspector! observed a crack in:the main seat identified t'y. repairmen l '

and noted. apparent steam cuts in-the main disc's seating surfac During' reassembly the ninspector observed reconnection of electrical '

Lwires to termina? . Jocks for both' the coil.'which actuates the pilotL l '. valve- and the coil used for position indication. - The inspector -

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,  : expressed'a concern that the wire identifica. ion scheme-for the L

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position. indication wires, in'which four wires from the coi1Jjoin~at a terminal' block, four wires leading.to position indication circuitry:

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p 1 in the control room, makes it difficult to verify correct connectio '

The four wiresLleading from the coil to the terminal block are j numbered 1, 2,-3, and 3; while the wires coming from the control roo are' numbered 1,-2, 3, and 4. The electrical hookups are not

procedurally controlled and 'no written record is made' at. the - tine of '

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disassembl Disa'ssembly and reassembly were performed by different

. individuals.l In the case of the pilot: valve, actuating' coil wires were' reconnected white to white and black to black ooithe assumption f that the. configuration was1 correct. . Correct reconnection'of pos'ition-indication wires was confirmed by verification of control. room lights

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upon re-energization'and the reactor was returned to power with the ,,

confusing nurabering scheme installed.'

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The licensee committed to devise'a system for ensuringLthe accuracy

of the connections'during future maintenance activitie < .On September 8 the inspector o'bserved troubleshooting activities t diagnose problems ~with No. 2 enclosure clean sump pump located in ,

tho recirculation pump room. .The pump is one of two-100% capacity  !

sun.p pumps .and was found to- be vibrating and ' operating at reduced .d flow. 'The pump was' tagged for emergency use ocly'and scheduled for

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j y . future repai Ori September 9 the inspector observed portions of troubleshooting o .

.the Feedwater Regulating Valve CV-4012. During' shutdown the valve 1 had opened partially for no apparent reason. Technicians adjusted  ;

the valve actuator to' assure full seating pressure in order to' 3 prevent differential pressures or surges from lifting the valve' dis Operability cf the' valve was verified before and during startup on ~

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September 1 j d On. September 9 the inspector observed packing adjustment on B RDS isolation valve CV-4181. Packing on-CV-4181 had been observed to be '

leaking ' steam during the periori prior to shutdown on September Packing adjustment at zero pressure during cold shutdown did not-permit maintenance personnel to verify the effectiveness of adjustmeat or. assess the need for repacking. Stroke testing following adjustment

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L' indicated satisfactory valve stroke capabilit Following startup ,

and pressure increase ~to normal operating pressure on September 10 -l D  !

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Ethe_adjustmentpas1determinedto'beinsufficientlan'dwas'retightened

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and-strokeitested a second time. Thel inspector: discussed with the= .

11icensee1 the apparent change in approach"to performance of' packin T

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adjustments:and functional checks during shutdown. The licensee

Lindicated that although normal practice was not. adhered to in thi <

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. iinstance there has been no change in. policy and future packing! -)

adjustments and functional-checks will'be' performed duringfuhutdow ,

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• Some._ visible packing gland . steam leakage continued.through the end; ,

g of the perio t On September 9 the. inspector observed portions of repairs to thei

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EAlternate Shutdown Battery Charger that corrected problems.wit ; , ground detection: circuitr :On October 5)the ins'pector observed portionsLof workbench overhaul t

- activity on the . spare stack ventilation fan. The unit was overhauled in anticipation of replacement of'one of.the installed' units displaying signs of wear. Appropriate radiological controis were'in gl t evidenc .

No violations or-deviatiens were identified in this this are '

. Surveillance Observation.

e+  : On September 9 the inspector:ooserved performanceiof Surveillance '

TSD-03, Cold RDS Isolation. Valve Testing.. The test verifie< the

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operability, position-indication, and stroke timing of'the RDS ,

Isolation valve 'in each of the four'RDS trains. The test was

successfully performed.- The inspector.noted'that for testing of

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]4 three'of the four valves'no' safety' warnings were' announced prior to N '

valve -stroking.even though maintenance ' personnel were' known to be in

.the immediate vicinity of the valves. Tne; inspector noted that the 1 plant was in cold shutdown, thereby limiting personnel" safety hazard l to that associated with the physical movement of:the; valv 'On September 30 the inspector observed portions of monthly specific gravity checks on station batteries. Procedural guidance was.used  ;

and personnel demonstrated their familiarity with the' surveillance  !

requirements and enuipment characteristic No violations or deviations were identified in this are .)

' Emergency Preparedness-

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, On October. 7 the inspector observed the annual emergency medical drill  ;

performed- to satisfy the requirements of Section L1.2.e of Chapter 8 of

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the Site Emergency Plan. The drill was structured as both a teaching and I

. testing activity and simulated a physical injury to a contaminated ]

-individual that required participation of operations, radiation protection, 1 i ,

and security personnel. The drill was conducted twice to permit participation of hospital emergency room and ambulance staffs from both

. local hospitals.

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f K Site participants'were selected to include both experienced and newer j

' individuals. All site' participants functioned effectively with little -]

need for. coaching. ' Appropriate consideration was given to both the first )

aid and contamination. control aspects of the scenario. . Required j notifications'and the Unusual Event Emergency classification were made in j accordance with the Emergency Pla )

l Licensee Event Reports Followup l

Through direct observations,-discussions with licensee. personnel, and I review of . records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective ;

action wes accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had ,

been accomplished in accordance with technical specification By letter dated August 3, 1987 the licensee submitted Licensee Event

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Report (LER)87-005, Radiological Tech Spec Violation - Effluent Release '

Without the Radwaste Effluent ~ Monitor in Service. Details of the event l were presented in Section 7 of Report No. 155/87019(DRSS) and Section of Report No. 155/87016 (DRP). Licensee corrective action is discussed in Section 2 of this report. This LER is considered close .

i Security On September 21 during an inspection of fire barriers, the licensee discovered an access from the protected area to a vital area which was not monitored, guarded, or barriered. The access had apparently existed without licensee knowledge for the life of the facilit The licensee took-the appropriate compensatory measures and made the

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required notifications. The security breach was reviewed by Regional security specialists'during the week of September 26 and is discussed in Report N . 155/87025 (DRSS). At the close of the inspection period compensatory measures were in effect', but permanent corrective-measures were in the design analysis stag On October 13,'while conducting inspections of vital area barriers in response to the September 21 event, the licensee identified a second vital area breach. Compensatory measures were in effect until permanent repairs were completed the same da ' During the inspection period the inspector brought to the licensee's attention repeated observations of the security officer normally .

assigned to the access building lobby being absent from that pos .

Several observed absences were for personal reasons not related to security activitie The licensee responded by emphasizing to the security staff the requirement that the lobby be staffed full time, and continued observation by the inspector indicated compliance with i that requiremen f

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.i Exit Interview The inspector. met with_ licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

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throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope'and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed th likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to t

documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio ,

The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as

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