IR 05000155/1990017

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Insp Rept 50-155/90-17 on 900904-1015.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Refueling Activities,Surveillance Activities,Maint of Various Components,Operational Safety Verification & Temporary Instruction Closure
ML20058G255
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/02/1990
From: Defayette R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058G247 List:
References
50-155-90-17, NUDOCS 9011130024
Download: ML20058G255 (7)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No.- 50-155/90-17(DRP)

' Docket.No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Fa cility_- Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant inspection At:

Charlevoix, Michigan Inspection' Conducted: September 4 through October 15, 1990

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l Inspector:-

E.A.-Plettner'-

J K. Heller-A.S. Masciantonio

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NOV0p1eno

~ Approved;By:

R.~ W DeFay te, Chief, Reactor. Projects'Section 2B DIIe lx pspection' Summary Inspection on September 4 through October 15, 1990:(Report No. 50-155/90017(DRP))

Areai Tii_pected: "The inspection was routine, unannounced, and con 3ucted

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.59 IF_5enTor Resident' Inspector Big Rock Point, Senior Resident Inspector Palisades,.and'the Project Manager. The functional areas inspected consist'ed of the following:

refueling activities; surveillance activities; maintenance-activities on-various components; operational safety. verification which

^7 included the liquid poison system; and a temporary. instruction closure.

Results:1 The licensee has res]onded in a timelyLmanner to issues and concerns J

preseiiledLto it by the NRC. T1e refueling and maintenance programs appeared

'to be implemented in a manner to ensure public health and' safety. One e"

violation concerninglthe completion of radiological. work permit documentation-was identified in the operational safety program. The temporary instruction

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inspection verified _the completion of TMI action' items at Big Rock Point.

Plant Operations LThe operations' staff performed in a conservative manner. The plant was shut down to begin a 60 day refueling / maintenance outage during the inspection period. The licensee took advantage of-the shutdown to

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D train-two reactor operator trainees for the plant's shutdown evolution.

. Refueling operations were performed in'a proper'and professional manner.

9011130024 901102 PDR ADOCK 05000155

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Radiological Controls Activities were conducted as required with adequate health physics coverage at various job sites involving radiological concerns. One

- violation was noted for failure to initial 1.he daily entry log of a

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radiation work permit. The violation was a repeat of two previously cited violations for inadequate completion of radiation work permit

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documentation.

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Maintenance / Surveillance Maintenance Department personnel had good coordination in completing activities to remain on the projected outage schedult. Surveillance activities were performed correctly and in a timely manner, except for one personnel safety issue involving an electrical device. That concern

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included a power supply that was being %d with exposed electrical wires

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that could have resulted in personnel injury. The SRI informed licensee management of the potential safety issue and a protective cover was installed on the equipment.

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EmerJency Preparedness No events occurred during the period for assessment of this area.

Secu rity'

' All security activities. observed were performed in a proper and timely -

manner.-

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Engheering/TechnicalSupport I

Daily' involvement of the engineering / technical staff in plant activities was observed, with continuous-coverage being provided during outage

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activities to resolve issues expeditiously.

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Safety Assessmentfguality VerificatM

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Daily involvement in plant activities was observed with continuous coverage being provided 'during outage activities.- Quality assurance

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- coverage of the work in progress appears to be adequate.

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r DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

  • W. Beckman', Plant Manager

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  • L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent

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  • H.,Hoffman, Maintenance Superintendent
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R. Garrett, Chemistry / Health Physics Supervisor

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  • W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent
  • G. Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent

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  • R. Alexander,-Technical-Engineer I
  • E. Zienert. Director Human Resources i

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  • P. Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent

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  • D. Lacroix, Nuclear Training Administrator
  • R. Burdette, Acting Chemistry / Health Physics Supervisor-l The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations, i

Maintenance, Engineering, Radiation Protection, and Technical Departments.

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  • Denotes those present at the exit interview on October 12, 1990.

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Refueling Activities (60710)

Preparations for refueling and refueling activities were observed / reviewed to' ascertain that the activities were. meeting approved

. procedures and were in conformance with Techniccl Specifications.

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The inspectors made periodic inspections of the fuel unloading conducted i

during-the period of September 25 through September 27, 1990.

The unloading was performed in-a proper and professional manner, using the following detailed procedures: No. 0-FFI-1, Fuel. Bundle Removal Procedure",

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Revision 12, dated March 13, 1990, and System O' erating Procedure (S0P)

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?44, " Spent Fuel Pool Operations and New Fuel Handling",' Revision 127,

dated October 4,1989. Status boards and records of fuel bundle location

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were verified to be in accordance with procedure-0-FF1-1, Attachment 1.

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No violations or deviations,were identified in-this area.

13.1 M_g thly Surveil, lance Observation-(61726)

On October 10, 1990, the station surveillance activity listed below was

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observed to verify that it was conducted in accordance with the Technical

' Specifications and surveillance procedures ~. The applicable procedures

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were reviewed for adequacy, test and process instrumentation were j,

verified to be in their current cycle of calibration, personnel performing the-tests appeared to be qualified,-and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness. The NRC inspector-ascertained that any deficiencies identified were reviewed and resolved.

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October 10: TR-101, " Reactor Depressurization System Valve Test,"

Rev. 37 June 12,1990. In conjunction with maintenance procedure MRDS-2

" Disassembly, inspection, Repair and Assembly of RDS Depressurization Valve" Rev.19, dated June 1,1990, and Work Order 90-RDS-0064 "RDS

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.Depressurization Valve," dated October 2, 1990.

The work was performed by

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skilled technicians with adequate quality control hold points. The test results'obtained met the established acceptance criteria. The Senior

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Resident Inspector (SRI) had.a personnel safety concern when he noted on October 10,-1990,; a power supply was being used with exposed electrical wires that could have resulted in personnel. injury. This condition had

.been allowed.to exist throughout the testing of all four valves for

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severaldays.Managementcommandandcontrol(supervisors)appearedtobe i

less than adequate by allowing the condition to exist for several-days. No

further tests were conducted using-the power supply.

The SRI informed-

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licensee. management of the potential safety issue which resulted in a

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protective covering.being= installed.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components; listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry.

codes-or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications, j

The following items were. considered during this review:

the Limiting-Conditions.'for Operation were met while components or. systems were removed from service;-approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities.were' accomplished.using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations-were

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performed priorDto returning components or systems to service; quality

control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by.

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. qualified personnel; parts and materials used were= certified; and'

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radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work (requests were reviewed to determi_ne the status of outstandingjjobs

and to assure _that priority was assigned to safety related equipment-

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maintenance which may affect system performance, i

LThe.NRC inspector observed the licensee's performance of the following.

maintenance. work orders'on the indicated dates:

Sep'tember 11:-- No. 90-SFP-0015 and -0016,(dated August aiid No. 2. Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger -

30, 1990, "No. 1 Replacement)" and tagging order

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-90-0505. :The spent. fuel pool heat exchangers were replaced because of-excessive tub'e leakage. Three maintenance personnel were. involved in the i

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, repair work with a. supervisor present.- A health physics technician was present'for the monitoring of radioactive material which had collected in i

the spent fuel' pool heat exchangers. The radioa'ctive materials that had collected in' the spent fuel pool heat exchangers had been there for many years as a ' result of fuel testing which was done in the early life of the plant. The decay heat-up rate for the spent fuel pool was very low and was monitored by the licensee.

No formal procedure was used with the

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repair work being performed within the skill of the craft, which appeared

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reconnecting of flanges end the removing and reconnecting of drain pipes.

Drain valve connections were verified by the maintenance supervisor using a controlled drawing. Af ter installation, post-mair.tenance testing was

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performed by_ the auxiliary oparator.

He was using a handwritten procedure'

to perform,the test in conjunction with System Operating Procedure 9,

" Fuel Pool. System", Revision 132, dated July 17, 1990. The auxiliary operator followed the procedure during the performance of the post-maintenance. test. When problems were noted; however, he appeared hesitant to contact the shift supervisor for guidance. When questioned by the. Senior Resident Inspector he contacted the shift supervisor and additional maintenance personnel were called to the job site to assist in the tasting. This occurred in two separate instances. The heat exchangers failed the post-maintenance test and additional corrective

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actions were needed. 0n September 18, a vendor representative was on site

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with a special machine to assist in the repair work of the shutdown heat i

exchangers. The repair work consisted of rerolling the tubes to the tube

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sheet bundles.

Repairs were completed and post-maintenance checks were again performed, this time using a tube sheet bubble test.

Post-maintenance tests were completed satisfactorily and the system was returned to service later in the day.

Performance tests were conducted with the equipment.in service to measure its heat _ removal capability.

The results indicated that improved heat removal capability had been

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achieved, mainly due to the fact that more tubes were available to remove the heat.

In the old heat exchangers many of the tubes had become plugged over the 28 years of use.

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s September 16:

No. 90-RDS-0054, dated September 16, 1990, "RDS Channel B",

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Hceived7Tiree ATL-ATO faults in actuation cabinet #2. The Instrument and Control (1&C) supervisor _ and technician were called to the plant to

- perform repairs since it was during backshift hours.

Surveillance test 0-RDS-6 " Reactor Depressurization System Cabinet Test" Revision 1 dated August 8,1990, was performed to prove system operability in the:other

channels:as required in the Technical Specification.

Repairs were-

-performed followed by appropriate post maintenance testing. The system-was returned to operation'later in the day.

October 3:

No. 90-EPS-0262, dated September 25, 1990, " Disconnect GeneraWfrom Emergency Diesel", in conjunction with tagging order

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-90-0608 and procedure MEPS 13.-" Remove and Install Electric Machinery Brushless Rotating Generator Unit", Revision 0, dated September 29,'1990.

The work was conducted by both the plant-personnel and by two vendor representatives in an attentive, detailed, and professional manner.

No noteworthy problems were identified during performance of the procedure.

October 4:

No. 90-RVG-0013, dated June 29, 1990, " Overhaul Valve Tperator" in conjunction with procedure MGP-27 " Inspection and Repair o

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of SMA-00 Double Torque Limitorque Valve Operators," Revision 1, dated

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September 18, 1990. The work was conducted by two contractor maintenance p.ersonnel who specialized in valve operator repairs. Quality Assurance oversight was provided throughout the repair process. A procedure change form was needed for minor changes to the procedure to identify valves that contained differences in some of the mechanical locking devices originally installed by the manufacturer.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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OperationalSafetLVerification(71_70d The NRC inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the I

inspection period.

Instrumentation and recorder traces were examined for abnormalities and discussed with the control room operators, as was the status of control room annunciators.

Reviews were conducted to confirm that.the required leak rate calculations were performed and were within Technical Specification limits.

It was observed that the Plant Manager a

and the Operations Superintendent were well informed on the status of the plant. They made frequent visits to the control room and toured the plant. The SRI performed a system walkdown of the Liquid Poison system and noted no abnormalities.

Tours by the Senior Resident Inspector of the containme.,t sphere and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.

Radiation protection controls.were inspected, including Radiation Work Permits, calibration of radiation detectors, and proper posting and observance of radiation and/or contaminated areas. The inspectors observed site security measures

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Lincluding access control of personnel and vehicles,-proper display of identification badges for personnel within the protected area, and site compensatory measures when security eauipment failed or became. degraded.

On September 18,- 1990, during routine inspection activities the Senior

_ Resident. Inspector noticed that three individuals had failed to initial the radiation work permit-(RWP) daily entry log prior to work entry to repair the fuel pool heat exchangers. This is identical to the problems

. discovered during the 1989 refueling and maintenance outage that resulted

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in-a Severity Level V violation documented in Inspectiom Report

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-(155/89013(DRP)) and a Severity Level IV. violation documented in InspectionReport(155/90002(DRP)). A fourth individual (who was a vendor representative) had initialed the RWP.. Two of the individuals were long time plant maintenance personnel.

The third individual was a contract

. health physics (HP) technician (who had successfully passed the training

= course for HP technicians during the same week) assigned to oversee the job. activity. There were high radiation areas inside the fuel pool heat exchanger room where the work was being performed. The workers were following good. radiation work practices and satisfying the other requirements of the RWP.

The individuals performing.the work were wearing

the appropriate anti-contamination clothing as stated in the RWP requirements thus ' minimizing the safety concern.

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Administrative Procedure Volume 1, Procedure 5.5 " Radiation Work Permit" Rev. 3, dated June 17, 1990, states in part, "The worker shall review the Radiation Work Permit package and/or be briefed on radiation protection requirements 'and survey data, then. initial the Daily Entry Log next to his

- name to indicate they understand and will comply with the stated requirements." Corrective actions taken in response 9 the prior violations involved notification of departmental supervision of the need for them to instruct their workers to complete all the requested information on the RWP. Also, the Health Physics Department revised the RWP system to ensure a more positive control of ingress and egress to

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the Radiological Controlled Areas. These corrective actions-appeared to be ineffective. The failure to compl apparent violation (155/90-17-01(DRP)y with the RWP procedure is an

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On September 21,1990, at 10:00

).m. (EDT) the Senior Resident Inspector observed a reactor shutdown whici commenced the start of a scheduled 60

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day refueling and maintenance outage. Besides the normal on-shift crew, j

an-extra reactor operator and two reactor operator trainees were present.

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The shutdown was performed in a proper and professional manner with detailed procedures.

Procedures used during the shutdown included System Operating Procedure -(S0P) 13, " Turbine Generator Sy(GOP) 6, " Plant stem", Revision 124, dated August 3, 1990; General Operating Procedure Shutdown to Hot Shutdown", Revision 116, dated October 11, 1989; GOP 7

" Plant Shutdown-to Cold Shutdown", Revision 107, dated October 25, 1989; S0P 16 "Feedwater System", Revision 122, dated August 1,1990; Technical i

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Data Book section 15.5.1.2, " Control. Rod Withdrawal and Insertion

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Sequence - Cycle 24", Revision 88, dated July-25,1989; and 0-TGS-1,

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" Master Check-Off Sheet", Revision 66, dated June 6, 1990.

The shutdown

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was completed with no problems on September 22, 1990, at 2:52 a.m.

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Cooldown continued and the reactor reached the cold shutdown L

condition later in the day.

Refueling activities are described in Paragraph No. 2 of this report.

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L One violation and no deviations were identified in this area, l

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Te_gtorary Instructions

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-(Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/065-01: TMI Action Plan Items

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which require inspection verification for closecut.

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All THI Action Plan' Items were verified complete on July 11, 1990, when

-the NRC -safety evaluation for the Safety Parameter Display System and j

Control-Room Design Review was completed and documented in a letter to the

licensee. This item is closed.

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Exit Interview

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'The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

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summarized the scope-and' findings of the inspection activities. The p

' licensee. acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the

.likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to;

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documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.

i The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as

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