IR 05000155/1987016

Insp Rept 50-155/87-16 on 870617-0828.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety, Maint Operation,Surveillance Operation & LER Followup.Safety Significance Item Re Electrical Splices Discussed

ML20235E074
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	09/16/1987
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235E065	List: IR 05000155/1987016 ML20235E063
References
50-155-87-16, NUDOCS 8709250472
Download: ML20235E074 (12)

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.( .y V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSIO .!

1 ,9 REGION.II Report No. 50-155/87016(0.RP)

Docket No. 50-15 License ~ No. DPR-6!

Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue

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, , Jackson,.MI '49201 '

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Facflity Name: -Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: .Charlevoix, Michigan e , .,

i lispection Conducted: June,17.through August 28,-1987

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l g Inspector: .S. Guthrie Approved By: b8-M-ecty$ection2C Date Inspect!on Summary Inspection on June 17 through August' 28, 1987 (Report No. 50-155/87016(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by the Senior

Resident' Inspector of.0perational Safety, Maintenance Operation, Surveillance-Operatior.1 and Licensee Event Report Followu Resulta Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. One item of safety. significance dealing with: environmentally qualified electrical splices, is discussed in Section 2.a..

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DETAILS-

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'1. Persons Contacted o

lj T. E1 ward, Plant Superintendent

• G.;PetitJean,. Planning and Administrative Se'rvices Superintendent >

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• R. Alexander, Technical Engineer R. Abel, Production and Plant Performance Superintendent 'l R.'Barnhart, Senior Quality Assurance Administrator' H P. Donnelly, Senior Review Supervisor, Nuclear Activities. Department

.. l D. Staton, Shift Supervisor 1"

'W;;Trubilowicz,. Operations Superviso '

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• Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent

._ E. Evans,' Senior Engineer.

l D. Kelly,-Maintenance Supervisor D. Ball, Maintenance. Supervisor W. Blosh, Maintenance Engineer J. Toskey, General Engineer G.. Boss, Reactor Engineer L. Darrah, Shift Supervisor J. Horan, Shift Supervisor R. May,' Shift Supervisor

'R. Scheels,-Shift Supervisor =

J. Bradshaw, Property Prote iion Supervisor E. Raciborski, Planning'and Scheduling Administrator J. Werner, Chem / Rad Supervisor

• Bielinski, Senior Engineer R. Buckner, Nuclear Plant Training Administrator

• D. Moeggenberg, Engineering Superviso *R. Krchmar, General QA Analyst The inspector also contacted other licensee' personnel in the Operations ~, ,

Maintenance, Radiation Protection and Technical Department * Denotes those present at exit intervie . Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs )

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of 1 affected components.. Tours of the containment sphere and turbine building j were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of- ,

maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified ,

that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with j the station security pla '

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The inspector observed. plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation.of radiation protecti.on controls; During the'

inspection period, the inspector walked down_ the' accessible portions;of the Liquid Poison,. Emergency Condenser,. Reactor Depressurization, Post'

Incident, Core Spray and Containment Spray l systems to. verify operabilit The inspector also' witnessed portions of the. radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and. barrelin ' On June 19, licensee personnel conducted a walkdown of Environmentally

. Qualified Electrical' Equipment (EEQ) cables in'the outside' cabl ~

penetration area for purposes .of verifying accuracy of: thefcable-

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identification' numbering scheme.. During the walkdown, seven cable were identif_ied which were on the EEQ list, but which contained 23'

non qualified. splices. The. splices and cables were original plant equipment and had not been. updated using qualified tape or splice-insulating ~ material. Eight of.the. splices were'in< cables feeding-reactor protection circuitry that provides for reactor trip on 50%

closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). . The remaining 15:

splices were in cables'providing. position. indication for containmen isolation valves. At the time of the discovery, the reactor was-being prepared for startup from a 21 day outage to. replace.certain unqualified EEQ cable within containment. ,The' reactor,startup was

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placed in a-hold status and appropriate notifications to NRC were-mad Licensee investigation determined that the eight splices associated with the MSIV were added to.the EEQ' list by virtue of the method by which computer searches of circuit schemes was conducted. -The licensee informed the inspector that the eight splices'were added when the computer identified all butyl rubber or polyethylene (PE)

in specific circuit schemes and were never deliberately added to the EEQ list as a result of an engineering judgement. A' review of the function of the trip based on 50% closure of the MSIV,

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including the time in any proposed accident sequence the function I would be required, indicates the cable may be a candidate for-future engineering evaluation for possible removal from the EEQ lis Licensee investigation further revealed that the remaining 15. splices were added to the EEQ list in 1984 after a-system walkdown. During the 1985 refueling outage, the cabling and components located inside containment for the containment isolation valves involved were replaced with qualified material. The licensee at that time made the erroneous assumption that since the cables had a qualified splice at the inside penetration they must also.have qualified splices at the outside penetration. A review on June 19, 1987, of drawings and circuit schemes indicates those documents accurately reflect the as-built conditio The inspector expressed to the licensee his concern over the accuracy of the EEQ program, raising the question wh'a t else may be deficient -

l and unidentified because of assumptions made over the last several years. The licensee concurred with the need to perform a

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comprehensive review of the EEQ list to address.the inspector's concern. The~ licensee voluntarily committed to (1)'immediately~  !

repair all 23 splices with qualified materials;-(2) perform a hand-over-hand walkdown- of all EEQ components and cables in the outside. cable penetration room; and1(3) perform.whatever reviews were necessary to' provide assurance that no_other assumptions were made and no other deficiencies existed. The first two. actions were-

. completed late June 19.-

The licensee resolution of the third task' involving. verifWtion 1-reviews took until late June 20 to. complete. The approaci involved: j using the EEQ master list, a' computer maintained list of a.ll EEQ >

'i items in the facility, and: reviewing each item on the list line by "

-line to' verify the existence of at least one means of documentation that the' component is. correctly qualified. . The analysis relied-hea'vily on the circuit schedules,'a living document in existence for

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-l the life of the plant. ' Other acceptable' documents .for ' verification '

purposes included (1) walkdowns performed.in 1980 by Bechtel and in-1985 and 1987 by the licensee; (2) facility changes (FC) and specifications changes (SC) which would include certification by Quality. Control (QC) Inspectors; (3) Qualification-files for penetrations which were audited by.the NRC inspection team.in 1986; (4) photos-and documentation associated with FC-610 which performed EEQ modification during the May,1987 EEQ outage;-(5) specific maintenance orders (MO) for EEQ components showing material control'

tags and QC verification, and (6) the Deficiency Report (DR)

documenting the corrective action for the 23 splices discovered ~and repaired June 19. In addition, the licensee'on June 20 inspected ~

43 EEQ splices on the inside cable penetration area for which documentation was in question. The licensee informed the inspector that the methodology left nothing to assumption or personal recollection. Finally, to verify the master list as comprehensive the licensee performed a line-by-line comparison'of the list to the submittals sent to NRC over the course of the several years of EEQ related correspondence, and to the equipment data base. Th inspector's review indicated the verification ~ effort was extensive and detaile By participation with licensee management and staff in the resolution of the defictency, the inspector observed that the licensee clearly understood the serious implications of the deficiency and took appropriate conservative measures to address the inspector's concern Licensee management took steps to address the questions of accuracy..of the EEQ list and submittals to NRC and the importance of prompt notification of any additional deficiencies identified during th review. At the successful completion of the verification review, the reactor startup was resumed, reaching criticality at.1:55 June 2 The reactor was returned to service on June 21 af ter completing the EEQ outage lasting 22 days. The startup was routin >

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.. - On June. 23 at 3:21 a.m. , operators were alerted by the fire detector i

system of a' fire in the outside cable. penetration room locate adjacent to and outside the containment rphere. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures specify that a fire. in that area' receives-an Alert Emergency' classification and notification of that-classification was made at.3:25 a.m. Fire brigade response' revealed an overheated plug and cord on one of two household type dehumidifier operating in'the room. -Cause~of the overheating could not be determined but.resulted in melting of the cord.and disintegration of. . l the plug. 'Because of the cause and short' duration of the fire, which '1 was extinguished promptly by disconnecting what remained of.the plug

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and industria1' extension cord, the full activation of.the site-

. emergency plan.normally associated with an Alert > Classification was j i not performed by the Shif t Supervisor in his role as Site Emergency l Di rector.- The Technical Support Center was not. activated.and n I personnel were called in except the.0perations Supervisor and an additional security officer while other officers participated in' ;

the brigade response. The local municipal fire department.was placed l on standby and fifteen minute updates were provided to the Sheriff's -1 Department until the alert was terminated at 4:40 a.m.~after all smoke had been exhausted from the room. Required Emergency. Notification System calls to NRC were completed. The inspector toured the room and found no damage from smoke or heat to cables, trays or structural- ,

component I On June 25, during a normal plant tour, the inspector observed-welding activities being performed in an old storage building situated approximately 100 feet from the turbine building and containment i sphere. The building is not regularly occupied or utilized except j by contractors during outages, but lately has been used regularly ;

as a welding area for prefabrication. The inspector expressed concern that the activity was being conducted in an area not suited for hot work. Specifically,'the. heat source was'approximately eight. feet from the wooden walls of the structure. One wooden partition approximately four feet from the heat source had an open area approximately two feet from the floo Paper debris and cardboard l were observed in the open area. 'A wooden support structure surrounded l

the blower installed above the work area. No portable curtains or '

l' flash shields were observed. The table supporting the work was constructed of wood. The licensee had installed hardboard-covering the first eight' feet of the estimated fourteen foot.high exterior wooden walls of the structure and painted the hardboard with fire !

l resistant paint. A fire watch with a readily available extinguisher y I

was presen The inspector reviewed with the licensee the requirements of Administrative Procedure 4.4.7, Fire Protection Activities, which details precaution and preparations which must be taken for hot work in any plant area. The procedure requires a minimum cf 35 feet between the hot work and any combustible material, and specifically prohibits the deficiencies noted abov The licensee committed to suspend welding operations in the building'until the area could be

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upgraded. The inspector reviewed'with the licensee.the guidance provided by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) for designated welding areas. The licensee's original proposed corrective action fell short of that required to meet the NFPA guidance or the procedural requirements. The inspector informed the licensee that full compliance with the procedural requirements was the minimum acceptable corrective action necessary to resolve the potential violation. At the close of the inspection, the renovation was complete and satisfied all requirements. No violations are being issued because of the prompt and thorough corrective action by the '

licensee and the. minimal safety hazard that results from the buildings relatively distant proximity from the containment and the area's infrequent use, d. On June 30, the licensee informed the inspector of the discharge of approximately 500 gallons of slightly radioactive water to the site sanitary sewer septic system. The water was inadvertently drained

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from the plants heating boiler in preparation for maintenance on the l boiler. The boiler's interior surfaces are slightly contaminated l from a valve alignment error several years ago. Additionally, the demineralized water source used to fill the boiler is contaminate The licensee's sample of water remaining in the boiler indicated l Cesium 137 at 1.6 x 10 6 uc/m1, below the limits established by 10 CFR 20, Appendix B. Samples of septic system water, which

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handles an estimated 2800 gallons per day, indicated no detectable i radioactivity. The licensee stated their intention to classify the discharge as an abnormal release and add the quantity released to effluent discharge totals. The licensee committed to establish a permanent posting indicating the contaminated tank interio e. On July 5, the licensee violated Technical Specification 13.1.1.1, Table 13-1, when a batch release of contaminated water was conducted without required flow through the Radwaste Process Monitor. Radwaste monitors are used during discharge to verify the accuracy o calculations performed prior to discharge in an effort to prevent releases that exceed regulatory limits. Review indicated that the requirements of procedure 0-RWS-2, Liquid Radwaste Release to Discharge Canal from the Dirty Waste Reserve Tank (DWRT), were met,

but operator error left the monitor isolate The operator reportedly checked the isolation valve, but because it was shut very tightly it was mistaken for ope After the batch discharge was commenced at 10 gpm, flow through the monitor was not visually verified using the monitor sightglass. The Control Room Operator noted on the Process Monitor Response Check Sheet RCP-7-3 that monitor readings did not

' change from beginning of release through the end of the release while the canal monitor indicated a steadily increasing count rate consistent with expected response for the precalculated activity contained in the batc The licensee's Correction Action Review Board (CARB) concluc'ed that the root cause of the violation was personnel error resulting from poor judgement on the part of both the operator who incorrectly determined the monitor was valved in and the operator who concluded

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there was no significance' associated with thel unchanging monito readings throughout the' discharge. The inspector's. review concluded-

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that the. personnel error in this instance.were not rooted in inattentiveness, but'rather'in poor., judgement in not. verifying the operability of the monitor using the sightglass, not questioning the <

unchanging monitor readings.throughout the discharge,L and not taking l the extra time to verify position of a valve-found to be unusually

~ difficult to operate. The: licensee verified through additional-sampling and analysis of DWRT water remaining after release that:the 1 original calculation were accurate and that the actual discharge sent {

a' maximum of 0.26 maximtm permissible concentration.(MPC) to. Lake

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Michigan. Through'the use of an 0perations! Memorandum'to operators: :

'the licensee instituted double verification of radwaste valve lineups 1 pending review and revision of procedures. At the close of.the

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. inspection period, Procedure 0-RWS-2.was being revised to. require verification of monitor. flow and expected response. prior to an during release. The incident'was incorporated into requalification training and initial auxiliary operator training and certificatio This incident was reviewed in Inspection Report No.:155/87019 and -

resulted in a Severity Level IV violation-(155/87019-04(DRP)). On July 8, the licensee informed the inspector of an incidenicof J contaminated carpeting in the front lobby of the administrate'on I building. A one foot square section of carpet located directly in front of the stairway was found to be 200 cpm above backgroun *

The carpet, which recently replaced lobby carpets contaminated earlier this year, was removed. Lobby carpets are. cleaned and maintained by the licensee and do not-leave the sit The licensee was unable to determine a specific source of the contamination, but speculates that the contaminated spot, which i in a position where most persons descending the stairs would likely place their foot, results from cumulative' buildup of very small levels of contamination not detected during the frisking proces The licensee proposed no specific corrective acti.on beyond continued emphasis on thorough frisking by all plant personnel. In an attempt {

to control contamination incidents, the licensee earlier this year restricted access to the radiologically controlled area to a single location. The inspector's observation generally supports the .

licensee's position that this tighter control has 'significantly 4 improved overa'il personal monitoring performance. However, the inspector continues.to note some members of the licensee staff regard the access control restriction as a punitive inconvenience- !

and some few individuals occasionally. perform only cursory personal '

monitoring. During interview with several plant workers from various departments, the inspector concluded'much confusion exists over the treatment of the orange lines used to mark radiologically controlled ,

areas. The licensee committed to provide clarificatio 'i During the period July 8-12, the inspector observed licensee activities in response to unseasonably high temperatures that l

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reached the 92-95 F range during daylight hours and cooled to !

approximately 75 F at night. General humidity levels were up l

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significantly at all times. No electronics. equipment failed as a result of the high temperatures, although one offgas' flow'

transmitter required troubleshooting..to remedy erratic spikin Area temperatures throughout the plant increased to the alarm point-in many areas. Dew point readings: increased throughout the plan The pipe tunnel steam leak alarm, containment high temperature alarm, and emergency condenser area temperature alarm were all received. Operators observed cooling water temperatures to and from plant components such as air compressors and heat exchangers increase as Lake Michigan temperatures increased. Condenser vacuum I reached 27.5 in/hg, but vacuum did not approach the 22 in/hg scram setpoint. Recirculating pump alarms were received at 210 Procedures require the pump be idled at 220 In each instance, temperature was kept low enough to prevent power reduction'or equipment shutdown. Operators followed the requirements of Alarm Procedures No. 1.4 and No. 1.5 to increase ventilation supply to affected areas and components. Ventilation distribution within the sphere was redirected to improve flow to the pipe tunnel and recirculating pump room. Portable fans and ducting were placed to direct flow to specific components and direct heat away from the emergency condenser level near the top of the. sphere. Additional service water pumps and well water cooling supplies were established-to ventilation unit Steam to the air ejectors was increased to i 250 psig from 200 psig to boost air ejector efficiency as required t by Off Normal Procedure No. 2.2 The inspector verified.that the ;

l electronic security surveillance equipment was not affecte The inspector noted the ingenuity of operators and their knowledge of plant systems and components in avoiding power reductions during the high temperature period. Operators, in addition to detailed log entries, established a record of abnormal equipment lineups to ensure proper restoratio The inspector reviewed licensee action in light of high temperature problems experienced at another facility. The inspector concluded that permanently installed temperature monitoring equipment and alarms are adequate to monitor plant and component performanc Major components, such as feed and recirculating pumps, are equipped with temperature indicators, alarms, and specific procedural guidance on operator actio Major electronic systems are in air conditioned spaces within the control room and adjacent areas. The inspector concluded there is no apparent need for licensee action on this issu No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification '

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The following items were considered during this' review: thel limiting conditions for operation were met while. components orLsystems were removed from service; approvals' were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were. inspected'

as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were_ performed prior, to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;

. parts and materials. used were properly certified; radiological controls :

were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemente Work' requests.were reviewed to determine status of outstanding. jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance, On June 25, the inspector toured all-licensee' storage areas for both Quality (Q) and non quality (Commercial) controlled materia The inspector was concerned that-the licensee's failure to act on concerns about material control that were first expressed in Report No. 155/83004(DRP). That report. cited the licensee's failure.to establish measures to control handling,. storage, preservation and identification of materials, parts, and components. Eight separate site Quality Control activity inspections reviewed by the inspector detailed repeated instances of inadequate cleanliness and housekeeping, mixing of Q and commercial grade . goods in all plant storage areas, failure to control non-conforming items awaiting disposition, failure to control flammables, failure to control material with proper. tags, and failure to document conversion of old equipment and-parts to-Q-listed stock. The QC inspections' repeatedly documented unsuccessful-efforts to involve licensee management in the resolution of the man deficiencies. The inspector's tour confirmed that no progress has been made in gaining control over material handling and storag The inspector observed that stock items were stored under unacceptable conditions where housekeeping and cleanliness control was often not in evidence. Stock was scattered through several different buildings, only one of which, the main stockroom, provided appropriate protection from the element Commercial grade items were mixed with Q-listed ..

items in all areas, and flammables were stored with regular stock in all areas. Storage facilities were found to be physically inadequat In all areas items were piled on the floor, many subject to leaking rain water. Boxes on shelves contained up to fifteen separately numbered items piled in at random. Ready access without risk'of damaging parts and equipment from excessive handling was out of the-

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question. Hundreds of stock items were piled on shelves and on the floors pending a decision to salvage or retain. In summary, the licensee's material handling / storage violated virtually every

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requirement of Administrative Procedure 4.2.1.7.1, Storage.and j Handling of ANSI N45.2.2. (1972), Section 6, as endorsed by .

Regulatory Guide 1.3 The licensee informed the Commission as early as 1984 of their intention to construct adequate warehousing facilities. In the May 1984, Big Rock Point Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program (NUREG-0828), Item 5.3.12, the licensee proposed a

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project to expand stock storage capacity to make qualified replacemen parts more accessible and complete. The proposal was accepted by the  ;

staff of NRR and the. project was ranked 19th in the Technical Review i Group's (TRG) list of priorities. Since that time, licensee management has on several occasions refused to provide funding for the projec The last fundino request was denied in May of this year. The item no longer has a priority ranking by the TP On June 30, the inspector toured the storage areas again with the  !

Plant Manager. Dozens of examples of potential violations were identified and the various managerial, financial, and logistical factors affecting material storage were reviewed in depth. The  ;

inspector' informed the licensee that whereas the unacceptable 1 condition had been allowed to continue without enforcement action 1 because a warehouse project was actually in the plarning stages, thct regulatory position changed when the project funding was cancelled. The licensee committed to provide by August 15 a comprehensive plan with firm and realistic commitment dates j for bringing the facility into complianc a

, On July 24, the inspector met with the Plant Manager to discuss l specific plans for expansion and refurbishment of existing warehouse i facilities to qualify as a ANSI approved warehouse. The proposed 1 schedule calls for construction, salvage, and material identification l to be completed by January 1988. The inspector will observe licensee )

action in future report On July 14, the inspector observed portions of rebuild activities of a Reactor Depressurization System Top Assembly in the. shop are Quality Assurance documentation for parts drawn from stock and completion of quality control hold points were verified. The rebuild was procedurally controlled.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this this are . Surveillance Observation On July 2, the inspector observed performance of weekly Surveillance l Test T7-28, Automatic Start of the Emergency Diesel Generator. The test was successfully conducted following the procedure. The T7-28 test results in the automatic start of the generator by deenergizing Bus 2B and is run with no electrical load. Once per month the generator is loaded with the electric fire pump and the July 2 test performed that loading. The inspector also observed quarterly collection of vibration data gathered as part of the plants'

predictive maintenance program, On July 14-15, the inspector observed portions of Surveillance TR-47, Inspection of Accumulator . Switches on all 32 Control Rod Drives (CRD)

Accumulators. Accumulators are divided into two cylinders, water above and nitrogen below, and serve to direct high pressure hydraulic energy to the associated control rod drive during a scram operatio <

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The surveillance'ch'ecked the calibration of the pressure.~ switch, .,

pressure gauge, and level switch associated with each accumulato !

The pressure gauge provides local indication,- the~ pressure switch i generates a control room alarm if accumulator pressure falls below .. :J 750 psig, and. the 1evel switch alerts ' operators to water leakage into the gas cylinder. The inspector verified that only one accumulator- g was removed'from service at a time and that the scram discharge ~ valve- ;

was available to function on a plant scram. In the event'~of a scram 1 while a single accumulator and its associated scram. inlet valve were-tagged out, the control rod drive would.still insert using normal control rod drive system' pressure. Also, operators would still.-have-the option of selecting the drive and driving the rod in the normal d fashion. The inspector observed the'use of' mobile tagging and verified appropriate record keeping.of tag locatio The surveillance; j took three days to complete and'all normal valve lineups wer established at the end of the workda Permission from the' Shift 1 Supervisor was required prior to' commencing each day's activitie Operators verified the operability of all other accumulators prior ] a to tagging out on On July 15, an Auxiliary 0perator (AO) performing a TR-47 procedural step that disab.les the scram inlet valve for' Drive A-4 experienced i difficulty in separating-the jam nut from the stop nut in a double 1 nut arrangement on the actuator ste The stop nut, once loosened, is run up to the top'of the actuator stem to butt up against the actuator body to prevent upward movement of the actuator stem, thus disabling the valve. The' actuator stem is not directly. connected to the valve disc, but rather_to a bolted coupling that connects the actuator stem to the valve stem in a manner that permits adjustmen of valve stem travel. Attached to the coupling is a lever that actuates a microswitch which provides control. room indication of scram inlet valve position. In this-instance, the A0 loosened the unusually tight nuts and in so doing rotated the actuator stem slightly, causing the microswitch operating lever to move and give control room indication of inlet valve opening. . Water. flow through the inlet valve was audibly observed'by the A0 who notified.the control room and successfully rotated the stems to close the valve by repositioning the leve Flow through the inlet valve resulted ,

in insertion of Drive A-4 from the full out Position 23 to '

Position 1 i Control room operators responded in accordance with Off Normal i Procedure (ONP) 2.7, Mispositioned Control Rods. 'Becsuse the reduced ~

power in the area of the core around Control Rod A-4 was closest to the nuclear detector for power range Channel 3, a power decrease of approximately seven percent was observed,in Channel 3, but no decrease l was observed in Channels 1 and 2. The difference in indicated. power i

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between Channel 3 and that indicated by Channels ~1 and.2 prompted-operators to insert'a high flux trip signal on Channel 3. No decrease in indicated electrical output was observed. The Reactor Engineer immediately analyzed the incident, determined no thermal limits were approached and authorized return of A-4 to the full out' positio The licensee after analysis by the Reactor Engineer conservatively

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elected to fully insert Ro! A-4 to the "00" position and verify-operability of the inlet valve. After maintenance, the inlet valve was declared operable following stem coupling adjustment and stroke test, verification of scram function using individual rod toggle ,

switches in the control room, and administrative resolution of the Deviation Report. Operators returned the A-4 drive to the: full out position at a rate consistent with power escalation limit The licensee at the close of the period was fabricating a clamping device .

to disable the scram inlet valve during subsequent performances of this procedure, thus avoiding potential stem rotation during jam and stop nut separatio . Licensee Event Reports Followup l

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and !

l review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective '

action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification By letter dated June 17, the licensee submitted LER 87-007, Reactor . ;

Trip - Upscale /Downscale. The trip occurred during normal plant shutdown on May 18 from approximately 40 x 10 5% power. The trip was caused by the <

sensitivity of the picoammeters to electrical noise at low power level, f and is discussed in detail in Section 5 of Report No. 155/87011(DRP).

The LER is close By letter dated July 14, the licensee submitted Revision 2 to Licensee Event Report (LER) 87-00 The LER provided new information on reactor safety valves discovered during the 1987 outage. Details of the new information were presented in Section 4.a of Report No. 155/87011(DRP).

The LER is closed.

l By letter dated July 20, the licensee submitted LER 87-008, Non-Qualified -

EEQ splice This event is detailed in Section 3 of this repor This LER is closed, c

6. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar