IR 05000155/1996007

Insp Rept 50-155/96-07 on 960909-12.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Plan & Procedures

ML20135D988
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	12/06/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135D976	List: IR 05000155/1996007 ML20135D972
References
50-155-96-07, 50-155-96-7, NUDOCS 9612100295
Download: ML20135D988 (12)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Docket No:

50-155 License No:

DPR-06 Report No:

50-155/96007(DRS)

Licensee:

Consumers Power Company Facility:

Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Location:

10269 U.S. 31 North Charlevoix, MI 49720 Dates:

September 9-12,1996 Inspectors:

R. D. Jickling, EP Analyst J. E. Foster, Senior EP Analyst R. J. Leemon, Senior Resident Inspector Approved by:

J. R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

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9612100295 961206 i

PDR ADOCK 05000155 G

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Big Rock Nuclear Power Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-155/96007 This announced inspection included evaluation of the licensee's performance and capabilities during the offyear exercise of the emergency plan and implementing procedures. This offyear exercise was evaluated by the NRC because of two exercise we@nesses and other issues identified during the 1995 full participation exercise. The inspection teain observed activities in the control room simulator, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.

Plant Sucoort Overall performance during the 1996 EP exercise was very good.

• Three Inspection Followup Items were identified during the exercise related to slow

initial notification of offsite agencies from the Technical Support Center (TSC),

delayed dispatch of Operations Support Center (OSC) emergency response teams,

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and the inability to locate Operations Support Center status boards for tracking Technical Support Center priorities and for staff sign in (Sections P4.3 and P4.4).

The shift supervisor maintained effective command and control in the control room

simulator. Emergency classifications, offsite notifications and offsite protective action recommendations were correct and timely. Transfers of command and control of event response were orderly and timely (Section P4.2).

The Vice President of Nuclear Operations provided excellent guidance to the TSC j

regarding the overall event. Discussions related to emergency priorities and plant corrective actions were excellent and demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of the plant systems (Section P4.3).

The OSC staff performed well despite several problems with the facility that had to

be overcome. Communications and command and control were maintained in the OSC by the OSC Director. This was significant due to the noise and high temperature caused by the ccmpressors and electrical equipment in the facility.

Emergency response team status was effectively maintained. OSC supervisor provided comprehensive briefings and debriefings to the response teams (Section P4.4).

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was rapidly and effectively activated. The

EOF Director maintained good comma'nd ano' control. Status boards were well maintained and periodic briefings were informative (Section P4.4).

Exercise critiques were very good and included comments from controllers and

players (Section P4.7).

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Report Details IV. Plant Suncort P3 EP Procedures and Documentation P3.1 Review of Exercise Obiectives and Scenario (82302)

The inspectors reviewed the 1996 exercise's objectives and scenario and determined that they were acceptable. The scenario provided an adequate framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan.

P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P4.1 Proaram Areas insoected (82301)

The licensee conducted a utility only exercise on September 10,1996. The exercise was conducted to test major portions of the onsite emergency response capabilities. The licensee activated its emergency response organization and emergency response facilities.

The exercise scenario was conducted using the control room simulator. The exercise began at 12:00 p.m. with the plant operating at 100 percent power for the past three weeks. Off gas activity had been increasing and at 12:30 p.m. the off gas isolation valve isolated; however, the valve was leaking. At 12:45 p.m. an Unusual Event was declared due to off gas activity greater than or equal to 140,000 micro curies per second. At 12:50 p.m. the number two control rod drive pump stopped running and would not restart. No rod motion occurred when a manual scram was inserted and an Alert was declared.

At 1:30 p.m. core damage monitor readings reached 10 rad per hour. A Site Area Emergency was declared when site boundary dose rate calculations exceeded 50 millirem per hour for 30 minutes. At 4:00 p.m. the reactor was shutdown and containment pressure reduced to atmospheric pressure and the radiological release stopped. A 24-hour time jump was initiated at 4:15 p.m. and reentry and recovery discussions were initiated.

l P4.2 Control Room I

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Insoection Scoce (82301-03.02)

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The inspectors observed and evaluated the control room simulator staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise scenario conditions. These tasks included detection and classification of events, analysis of plant conditions, notification of offsite authorities, and adherence to the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency plan

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implementing procedures, logs, checklists, and notification forms generated during the exercise.

b.

Observations and Findinas Control Room Crew response was coordinated and efficient. The shift supervisor performed frequent concise briefings and maintained effective command and control j

in the facility. Initial notifications for the Unusual Event and Alert declarations were made in a timely manner. Clear communications between the shift supervisor and the crew included repeat backs and acknowledgements.

The shift supervisor and on-call duty superintendent used the emergency procedures appropriately and were proactive in declaring the Unusual Event based on a reactor shutdown required by exceeding a limiting condition of operation and increasing stack gas and offgas radiation level trends.

c.

Conclusions Overall, performance by the control room crew was very good. The emergency classifications were declared in a timely manner, and offsite agencies were notified within the required times. The control room personnel exhibited good briefings and communications.

P4.3 Igchnical Sucoort Center a.

Insoection Scooe (82301-03.03)

The inspectors observed and evaluated the technical support center staff as they performed tasks necessary to respond to the exercise scenario conditions. These tasks included staffing and activation, facility management and control, accident assessment, classification, dose assessment, prctective action decision making,

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notifications and communications, assistance and support to the control room,

evaluation of post-accident sampling results, and dispatch and coordination of monitoring teams. The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of the emergency plan, emergency plan implementing procedures, logs, checklists, status boards, and computer-generated forms and work sheets.

b.

Observations and Findinos The facility was activated in an timely and orderly manner following the Alert declaration. Personnel rapidly configured the Technical Support Center (TSC) and signed in on the appropriate status board. Habitability was monitored by surveys conducted at periodic intervals. The inspector noted the Site Emergency Director a

(SED) did not make a formal declaration of facility activation until several minutes after the facility was fully functioning. At that point, a plant public address announcement was made indicating both the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC) were operational.

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The bridge communicator did a very good job maintaining the sequence of events board, advising the SED of appropriate times for briefing and public address announcements and injecting important new information as appropriate.

Initially, communications from the TSC to the State of Michigan were slow. The delays were due to problems the TSC communicator had obtaining information from the control room simulator regarding notifications status and obtaining correct j

telephone numbers for offsite contacts. Also, the SED was slow to review and authorize the notification forms because his attention was centered on plant conditions. Additionally, the inspectors noted a problem with a misnumbered notification form from the TSC. The message was numbered one instead of three, which would confuse the offsite authorities. Efforts to improve TSC offsite communications and notifications will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (50-155/96007-01)).

The Vice President of Nuclear Operations provided excellent guidance to TSC personnel on several occasions and encouraged them to focus on the overall event.

He participated in both the main steam line valve closure and the general emergency (GE) declaration discussions.

The GE discussions in the TSC were good and indicated a comprehensive understanding of the plant's expected response to actions and the emergency action levels. A conservative decision was made to declare the GE when increased radiation levels were detected in the parking lot. Communications with the State of Michigan clarified that the classification and related Protective Action Recommendation were conservative, and no Protective Action Guidelines had been exceeded.

Priorities were discussed, properly established, and posted on a status board.

Priorities were communicated to and discussed with other facilities. An excellent discussion was held between the TSC and control room simulator staff in which a decision was made to pursue control rod drive restoration as the highest priority.

Communication with the OSC and tracking OSC emergency response teams were well demonstrated. Requiring the SED's approval prior to OSC response team dispatch ensured the SED's responsibility for directing onsite emergency response was met and that the SED was knowledgeable of all onsite emergency activities.

Elevated dose authorizations, offsite monitoring team control, dose projections, and protective action recommendations were performed well. The plume tracking status board indicated open and closed window radiation instrument readings by offsite field monitoring teams. TSC personnel made an appropriate recommendation to the EOF to upgrade the PAR based on current information and a review of the PAR flowchart.

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Conclusions Overall performance in the TSC was very good. Status boards were well i

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maintained. Technical discussion were excellent. Priorities were discussed, properly established, and posted on status boards. A problem was identified with slow initial communications from the TSC to the State of Michigan.

i P4.4 Ooerations Sucoort Center

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Insoection Scope (82301-03.05)

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The inspectors observed and evaluated the OSC's staff as they performed tasks in response to the scenario conditions. These tasks included functional staffing, i

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inplant emergency repair team dispatch and coordination in support of control room and TSC requests. The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency plan

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implementing procedures, logs, checklists, and forms generated during the exercise.

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Observations and Findinas

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The OSC Director maintained very good command and control by frequent, concise briefings which included the TSC's priorities, plant emergency conditions, and status of emergency response activities. Command and control in the OSC was difficult due to air compressor noise, the cramped space due to compressor and

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i electrical breaker locations, and the high heat and humidity from the equipment.

These conditions also impacted emergency response team formation, team briefings, and returning response team debriefings. The staff did a good job overcoming these conditions by additional briefings, use of a portable speaker, and I

placing a water cooler outside the door of the facility. The staff successfully worked around existing difficult conditions.

I Health physics technicians frequently performed comprehensive habitability surveys l

of the facility and adjacent areas. These included gamma and beta dose rates, contamination, and airborne contamination surveys prior to and after the radiological release.

Dispatch of OSC response teams was slow. Communications of radiological

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information, briefings, and SED approval took additional time which contributed to i

these delays. One example was the delayed dispatch of the offsite radiological monitoring team vehicle drivers. The field team vehicle drivers were dispatched 45 minutes after the offsite field team members were dispatched and then returned to the OSC when they discovered the vehicles left without them. The delayed

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dispatch of OSC response teams will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item

(50-155/96007-02(DRS)).

The TSC priorities and OSC personnel sign in status boards could not be located for the OSC. The OSC Director was able to offset the Isck of a priorities status board

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by providing more frequent facility briefings and also held periodic discussions with the OSC Maintenance Supervisor to determine which persons were currently

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available for response teams. The licensee's corrective actions to ensure knowledge of the location of the sign in and priorities status boards in the OSC will

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be tracked as an Inspection Followup item (50-155/96007-03(DRS)).

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Conclusions Overall, the OSC staff's performance was good. Command and control was maintained by the OSC Director and briefings were periodic and informative.

Problems with slow emergency response team dispatch and unavailability of select OSC status boards were identified.

P4.5 Emeraencv Ooerations Facility a.

Insoection Scooe (82301-03.04)

The inspectc,rs observed the EOF's staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise. These tasks included facility activation, event classification, notification of state and local response agencies, development and issuance of protective action recommendations, dose assessment and coordination of field monitoring teams, analysis of plant conditions, and direct interactions with offsite agency response teams.

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Observations and Findinas The nearsite EOF, was activated following the Site Area Emergency declaration.

Initial and update briefings provided to the EOF staff were good. With few exceptions, status boards were effectively used and kept current.

The EOF staff quickly and efficiently established contact with their counterparts in the TSC and prepared to assume response functions. EOF Director maintained good command and control as indicated by the quiet efficiency of the staff. Periodic briefings were informative and information was verified as needed.

The EOF's environs staff assumed control of the licensee's offsite radiological survey teams from the TSC's environs staff. The survey teams were appropriately used to track and take measurements and air samples of the simulated release.

The sequence of events status board was well maintained and updated frequently.

Offsite radiological monitoring team information was tracked effectively on the status boards.

Minor confusion was identified by the inspectors related to initial messages coming in from the TSC during EOF activation, which included incomplete health physics data, late messages, and on one occasion multiple messages piled up and were sent

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to the EOF at the same time. These communication issues with the TSC were corrected after the EOF was in command and control.

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e The inspector observed the contamination instrument failed that was used for surveys of incoming personnel. Also, the inspector did not observe any backup

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personnel contamination survey equipment available to replace the out of service instrument.

c.

Conclusions

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Overall performance in the EOF was very good. Facility activation was effective and rapid. Status boards were continuously updated and very good command and

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control was indicated by informative facility briefings and quiet efficiency of the

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staff. Communications with the offsite radiological monitoring teams was very good and team radiological information was continuously updated on the status

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boards. Minor confusion was identified during communications with the TSC.

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P4.6 Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and realism of the scenario and to evaluate the control of the exercise.

The inspectors determined that the scenario was appropriate to test emergency i

i capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. Control of the exercise was

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good and no problems were identified.

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'P4.7 Licensee Self-Critiaue i

a.

Insoection Scooe 182301-03.13)

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The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's post exercise facility critiques and the controller meeting held conducted the morning of September 11,1996, to determine whether the process wcolo Hentify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective action.

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b.

Observations and Findinas i

The post-exercise facility critiques included input from controllers, evaluators, and participants and were generally thorough, open, and self-critical. The controller j

meeting was very detailed, quite self critical and emphasized participants'

comments.

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The input for the formal management critique included comments from participants, j

controllers, and evaluators. The issues identified by the licensee's team were l

generally consistent with those identified by the NRC inspection team.

c.

Conclusions

The licensee's self-critique process effectively identified areas for corrective action.

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O P8 Miscellaneous Emergency Preparedness issues P8.1 (Closed) insoection Followuo item (50-155/95010-04(DRS)): During the 1995 emergency preparedness exercise, an exercise weakness was identified concerning i

the failure to properly declare a GE classification in the TSC. Corrective actions included all SEDs and EOF Directors being required to attend a speciallessons learned training session to discuss emergency classification, annual attendance of performance based simulator training, and completion of classification problem sets.

Also, during the 1996 emergency preparedness exercise, the SED correctly declared the GE. This item is closed.

P8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item (50-155/95010-05(DRS)): During the 1995 emergency preparedness exercise, an exercise weakness was identified concerning the f ailure of the SED to be aware of all emergency actions taken by the plant during an emergency. Corrective actions included development of a new TSC

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status board to display OSC onsite team status for the SED and participation in quarterly table top training and mini-drills which involved the SED's emergency direction and control of onsite activities. Also, during the 1996 emergency preparedness exercise, the SED authorized and maintained control of inplant emergency activities. This item is closed.

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i P8.3 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item (50-155/95010-06(DRS)): During the 1995 emergency preparedness exercise, an inspection followup item was identified related to inadequate onsite radiation surveys. Corrective actions included the i

addition of lessons learned from the 1995 exercise in the annual radiation protection training, and performance based mini-drills. Also, during the 1996 emergency preparedness exercise, the inspector observed beta surveys performed during onsite habitability surveys during the simulated radiological release. This item is closed.

P8.4 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item (50-155/95010-07(DRS)): During the 1995 emergency preparedness exercise, an inspection followup item was identified related to inadequate emergency team briefings by the OSC Maintenance Supervisor. Corrective actions included a change to the emergency implementing i

procedure incorporating a briefing / debriefing checklist. Table top training and mini-drills were also used to reinforce the procedure's new checklist. Also, during the 1996 emergency preparedness exercise, briefings and debriefings by the OSC Maintenance Supervisor were observed by the inspectors. This item is closed.

V. Manaaement Meetinas '

X1 Exit Meetina Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 11,1996 licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The licensee did not identify any of the documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors as proprietary.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee P. Donnelly, Plant Manager R. Addy, Assistant Plant Manager S. Beachum, Systems and Project Engineering Manager E. Bogue, Plant Training Manager K. Pallagi, Chemistry / Health Physics Manager G. Boss, Operations Manager D. Hice, Maintenance Manager G. Withrow, Plant Safety and Licensing Director K. Wooster, Senior Nuclear Emergency Planner J. Rany, Decommissioning Manager S. Beachum, Engineering Manager M. Bourassa, Licensing Supervisor M. Moore, Nuclear Performance Assessor M. Hobe, Emergency Planner INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED i

IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED and CLOSED Ooened 50-155/96007-01 IFl Slow initial communications from the TSC to the State of Michigan.

50-155/96007-02 IFl Dispatch of OSC response teams was slow.

50-155/96007-03 IFl Status boards were not available in the OSC for tracking TSC and OSC emergency priorities or for staff to sign in on to track personnel availability.

Closed 50-155/95010-04 IFl Exercise weakness concerning the failure to properly declare a general emergency classification in the technical support center.

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50-155/9500--05 IFl Exercise weakness concerning the failure of the site emergency director to be aware of all emergency actions taken by the plant during an emergency.

50-155/95010-06 IFl inadequate onsite radiation surveys.

50-155/95010-07 IFl inadequate emergency team briefings by the OSC maintenance supervisor.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

i CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DRP Division of Reactor Projects i

EOF Emergency Operations Facility l

EP Emergency Preparedness

GE General Emergency

IFl Inspection Followup Item

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSC Operational Support Center

1 TSC Technical Support Center j

EAL Emergency Action Level

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IP inspection Procedure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR Public Document Room

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SED Site Emergency Director

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TSC Technical Support Center i

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