IR 05000155/1985004

Insp Rept 50-155/85-04 on 850520-23.No Noncompliance or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise.One Weakness Re Licensee Failure to Demonstrate Capability to Assess Offsite Radiological Conditions Noted

ML20126C512
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	06/11/1985
From:	Brown G, Defayette R, Phillips M, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20126C480	List: IR 05000155/1985004 ML20126C478
References
50-155-85-04, 50-155-85-4, NUDOCS 8506140441
Download: ML20126C512 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

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REGION III

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Report No. 50-155/85004(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201

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Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Site, Charlevoix, MI-Inspection Conducted: May 20-23, 1985 Inspectors:

Team Leader 6/N[V Date n W in/ar Date M. Sm 6 V nn R. DeFayette

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Approved By: 1p , e /N)

Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on May 20-23, 1985 (Report No. 50-155/85004(DRSS))

Area Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by nine NRC ,

representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved 184 inspector-hours onsite by five NRC inspectors and i four consultant I

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Results: No items of noncompliance, deficiencies, or deviations were identified. One exprcise weakness was identified as summarized in the i Appendi Mk ! 5

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DETAILS l 1. ' Persons Contacted

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NRC Observers and Areas Observed G. Brown, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),

K. Loposer, Control Room G. Bryan, TSC R. DeFayette,LOSC L J. Mulvehill, Offsite Field Monitoring Team #1 J. Pappin, Offsite Field Monitoring Team #2

W. Snell, EOF l- M. Smith, EOF and Joint Public.Information Center (JPIC)

S. Guthrie, CR, TSC, and OSC Consumers Power Company (CPCo) and Areas Observed l' *D. Hoffman, Plant Superintendent

• R. May, Lead Controller E. McNamara, CR Controller

• R. Marusich, TSC Controller T. Hancock, OSC Controller E. Madsen, TSC Controller-

• D. Fugere, Emergency Preparedness, CPCo

• R. Alexander, TSC Controller

. *J. Werner, TSC Lead Controller N. Popa, Field Monitoring Team Controller

• G. Petitjean, Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant (BRPNP)

• C. MacInnis, CPCo

• R. Burdette, CPCo

• P. Loomis, Corporate Emergency Planning Administrator i- *M. Hobe, CPCo

• J. Beer, CPCo

• L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent BRPNP

• S. Anstutz, Office of Plant Superintendent BRPNP

• P. Connelly, Nuclear Safety l

• W. Blosh, BRPNP l *G. Withrow, Maintenance Superintendent BRPNP l *A. Sevener, Operations Superintendent BRPNP l *P. Slaughter, Emergency Planning CPCo i' *T. Hancock, BRPNP

• Heffner, Director of Public Information

• Denotes those attending the May 22, 1985 exit intervie '

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2. . General L

. An exercise of the licensee's Site Emergency Plan (SEP) was conducted at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant on May 21, 1985. The exercise tested the ifcensee's capability to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario

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resulting in a major release of radioactive material to the environmen Attachment 1 describes the scenario. The exercise was' integrated with a-test of the Charlevoix and Emmet Counties' emergency plans. This was a

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partial participation exercise for the State of Michiga ' General Observations

1. - Coordination

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This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50,

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Appendix E requirements using appropriate station and corporate i procedures. The ifcensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely. If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local

authorities to take appropriate actions.

1 Critique Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with nine NRC observers and several Federal Emergency Management Agency

, (FEMA) observers. The licensee held a critique after the' exercise F on May 21. The NRC held a critique on May 22, 1985. The NRC identified an exercise weakness in their critique as discussed in

! this report. In addition, a public critique was held on May 23, 1985 to present both the onsite and offsite findings by the NRC and

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FEMA representative ,

[ Specific Observations Control Room L 'The Control Room operators correctly interpreted instrumentation displays and other indicators and took appropriate actions for'the events which were progressing abnormall For' example, the scenario i provided for an explosion to initiate an Alert declaratio The

' -Control Room declared an alert and ordered. assembly /accountabi.lity within one minute after. confirmation of'the explosion. In another

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exa:nple, the scenario provided for the No.1 recirculation pump-breaker to fail and not be opened. The Shift Supervisor made a

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valid attempt to' trip the pump, realized his inability to do so, i and then properly ordered the pump isolated and reactor scramme i All actions were performed within seven minutes of the occurrence.

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After recognizing and classifying the Alert, the Shift Supervisor correctly implemented actions of the Emergency Operations Procedures

(EOP) by notification to State and local authorities within fifteen '

r minutes of the declaration and by ordering the assembly / accountabilit :

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!. Congestion and noise was kept to a minimum in the Control Roo Adequate logs were kept and important data, calculations, notifications and decisions were appropriately recorded. Personnel performing key functions in the Control Room were identified as those who would normally be involved in such responses. They appeared knowledgeable in their' duties and responsibilitie The inspectors observed the following improper actions:

Contro1LRoom personnel were not always aggressive in followup of directions given by the Shift Superviso For example, when the Shift Supervisor ordered isolation of the No. 1 recirculation pump, no one followed up to ensure that the order actually was implemented. In another example, when the recirculation pump breaker was reported racked out, the #1136 breaker was ordered closed. However, there was no feedback or followup to ensure that this had actually been don Intercommunications between the Control Room and the Technical Support Center (TSC) were not always timel For instance, after the core had become uncovered, the Control Room did not immediately notify the TS Twenty minutes. elapsed before the Emergency Director learned of the condition, and then'only because he actually came into the Control Room and asked about it.-

In another example, information concerning the initiation of the Rapid Depressurization System was 32 minutes late in being communicated to the TSC.

, TechnicalSupportCenter(TSQ The TSC was staffed within 17 minutes of the Alert declaratio Plant procedures were up-to-date and available to the staf Initial environmental sampling teams were deployed in a timel manne The Site Emergency Director demonstrated the ability to use the licensee's Emergency Action Levels to correctly classify the accident. The General Emergency was correctly and timely declared based on the loss of two of the three fission product barrier The simulation of evacuation of nonessential personnel was implemented in a_ timely manne Transfer of the appropriate responsibilities from the TSC to the EOF were carried out efficiently and without inciden The inspectors observed the following improper action:

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. Trending and plotting was not timely nor effectively used in the TSC. For example, the only trend plot displayed was that of a two point reactor pressure plot (which was 30 minutes late), even though several important events had already occurred (i.e., core was uncovered, no feed flow,.two fission product barriers had failed, and a General Emergency had been declared). Operational Support Center (OSC)

The OSC was staffed and activated in a timely manner. Operations in the OSC were supervised by Big Rock Point personnel who were identified as those designated in their emergency plan and proce-dures. The OSC supervisor appeared knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities. Assignment of personnel to perform specific tasks as requested by management or the Control Room was accomplished in an efficient and timely manne The inspectors observed the following improper actions:

At one point during the exercise, a personnel monitoring

"frisker" was set up at the door to the OSC. However, no instructions were given as to its purpose and it was unclear as to whether personnel were to monitor themselves

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when entering or exiting the OSC, and where the controlled boundaries were locate The GeLi sampling Detector could not be used because it was located in an area where the radiation background was too hig There was no general announcement to the OSC personnel to alert them that the core was uncovered. The nois level in the OSC was too high to hear public announcement The licensee's security guards seemed unfamiliar with radiological smergency procedures. For instance, during the General Emergency, one guard was improperly directed to position himself in an area of high radiation to guard an opening to the containment. Even though directed by Health Physics representatives, the guard hesitated because he was unable to get clear guidance from his superiors. He was, however, ordered away from the area and complie Field Monitorina Teams Both teams were dispatched in a timely manne Personnel performing key functions were identified as those assigned on the duty roste Vehicles were available and readily accessible to transport the team Instrumentation capable of detecting low levels of radioiodine under field conditions was available. The teams were equipped with an adequate communications syste !

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The inspectors observed the following weakness:

The EOF did not effectively conduct the operations of the teams. They were unable to locate the centerline or edges of the plume during the exercise. Additionally, the EOF did not use the teams to their fullest potentia Frequently, the teams were directed to standby for long periods of time and await further instruction Also, they failed tc monitor the team members' cumulative radiation doses. One of the objectives stated in the licensee's Emergency Plan, Section 9.2.4.3.C, is to assess offsite radiological conditions during and after

- an emergency. The licensee did not demonstrate that he could meet this objective. This is an exercise weakness (155/85004-01).

,7he inspectors observed the following improper actions:

Team #1 took too much initiative in trying to lead the

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EOF frto taking appropriate environmental monitoring actions. They overrode or ignored some EOF directive This contributed to confusion in the EOF as to the exact location and activities of the tea Team #1 failed to label vegetation and smear sample This could have caused subsequent confusion as to the sample type and locatio After two hours into the drill, the teams were not provided plant status updates or information concerning protection action Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

The EOF was activated in a timely manner, being initially staffed with plant personnel, followed by the addition of corporate personne Transfer of control from the TSC to the EOF was orderly and timel The subsequent transfer of the EOF Director position was smooth and efficien The trending and plotting of comparisons between the measured field readings with calculated dose assessment data for 1, 2, 3, and 5 miles was an effective and useful tool. Status boards throughout the EOF were adequately maintained and use Good communications were maintained between the EOF, the TSC, JPIC and offsite agencie Frequent briefings were provided the E0F staff by the Directo Accountability was well maintaine .-- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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However, the EOF Communicator for the Field Monitoring Teams was located in a different room a significant distance from the Health Physics Support Team base of operations. Because of this, the Health Physics Support Team Leader was required to move back and forth between these two stations. This resulted in a time lag in the flow of information between the team leader and the field monitoring teams. This probably contributed to the confusion in directing the field monitoring team Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

. The EOF Field Monitoring Teams Communicator should be relocated to a position of closer proximity to the Health Physics Support Team base of operation The adjacent storage area could be a possible alternative locatio Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

The licensee arranged for local high school students to serve as media representatives in the JPIC. The licensee prepared the students for their roles by providing them with in-depth tours of the plant prior to the exercise to familiarize them with Big Rock Point Nuclear Power system The JPIC was established at the Holiday Inn in Petoskey, Michiga Facilities there included a large conference room, several small conference rooms, podium, microphones, tables and telephones. Large diagrams and sector maps were displaye Federal, State and local public information coordinators were provided a separate conference room.

l The JPIC was fully staffed and activated within one hour of the

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Alert notificatio Media briefings were conducted every half hour. The press information was released accurately and timel Plant spokesmen utilized the large diagrams for good illustrations

! and avoided the use of technical terms and acronyms. Coordination of all releases by licensee, State and local authorities was successfully demonstrate . Exit Interview

On May 22, 1985, an exit interview with licensee representatives was held to present the NRC's preliminary findings. The inspector discussed the likely content of the inspection repor The licensee did not identify any of the material as proprietary or safeguard Attachment: Exercise Scenario Narrative Summary

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