IR 05000155/1993017
| ML20059H290 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1993 |
| From: | Schrum D, Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059H286 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-93-17, NUDOCS 9311100039 | |
| Download: ML20059H290 (6) | |
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U. S. f4UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ill Report fio. 50-155/93017(DRS)
Docket tio. 50-155 License fio. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company
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212 West Michigan Avenue
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Jackson, MI 49201 facility flame: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Charlevoix, Michigan Inspection Conducted: October 18 through 22, 1993 Inspector:
P W O.7 y
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D. Schrum l'
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Date
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Approved By:
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D W. Shafer, Chieff'
Date Maintenance and Outages Section Inspection Summary inspection from October 18 throuah 22. 1993 (Report tio. 50-155/93017(DRS))
Areas Inspected: Routine fire protection inspection of surveillances, equipment, fire brigade training, zebra mussel problems, and fire protection audits. The inspector utilized selected portions of NRC inspection procedures 64704 and 92702.
Results: Overall, the fire protection program was considered good. The staff was knowledgeable of the program and had taken appropriate corrective actions for most issues and problems.
Program strengths include: good communication among staff members and the various departments responsible in performing their fire protection duties.
The staff was vigilant in attempting to control zebra mussels until a plant modification is completed.
Emergency lighting was well maintained. There was a low backlog of fire protection open items and impairments One weakness noted was combustible material control in the turbine building (Inspection followup Item - Section 3.3).
Inspector concerns include: holes in the fire barrier between the RDS batteries and a portion of the machine shop; a large number of doors in the turbine building held open by fusible links; zebra mussel infestation problem; and a number of fire hoses that had recently failed surveillance pressure tests.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted k
Consumers Power Company
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- B. Rabideau, Property Protection and OPS Supervisor f
- M. Van Alst, Property Protection Supervisor
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T. Petrosky, Public Affairs Director
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- D. Turner, Maintenance Manager
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W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent
- G. Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent i
E. Bogue, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent
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- M. Bourassa, Senior Licensing Technologist i
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U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)
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- R. Leemon, Senior Resident Inspector
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- Denotes those individuals attending the exit 'neeting on October 22,
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1993.
i The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs, and the reactor and auxiliary i
operators.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinas l
i 2.1 (Closed) Open Item 91016-01(DRS)):
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This item was opened due to the Property Protection Operat;:<s Supervisor's (PPOS) lack of experience when Le was assigned fire protection duties.
The PPOS has worked two additional years in the fire protection area since this
item was opened.
In addition, the individual was sent to numerous fire i
protection training classes. During the inspection, it appeared that the PPOS was aware of most plant problems and had a working knowledge of Appendix R and
of the exemptions allowed at the plant. The experience level for the PPOS appeared to be adequate so this item is closed.
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2.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 91016-02(DRS)):
This item was opened because sprinklers in the electrical equipment area did not have flow detection capability.
There would have been a delay between when a fire started and when it would have been alarmed due to a low level in j
the fire protection pressure drum. A flow detector had been added to the sprinklers in the electrical equipment room, so a fire in this area can now be readily detected. This item is closed.
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3.
Routine fire Protection Program Review (64704)
i This inspection consisted of obs'ervations of plant areas and reviews of fire
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protection surveillances, maintenance on fire protection equipment, fire
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brigade training and drills, fire reports, deviation reports, safety
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evaluations, fire protection audits, and evatrols to prevent biofouling by
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3.1 Plant Observations t
The inspector observed several areas of the containment, turbine building, i
safe shutdown building, the screen house, and the emergency diesel generator
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building. The observation included hose stations, extinguishers, sprinkler valves, emergency lights, fire barriers, and housekeeping.
The inspector determined that the equipment was being maintained in good condition. Control of combustibles was good in the containment, but could of been improved in the turbine building as indicated in Section 3.3.
Fire extinguishers inspected t
had a current inspection date and the filled button indicated that the extinguishers were full. All emergency lighting inspected were correctly
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All fire doors inspected were functional.
However, one concern was that a i
i large number of fire doors were being held open with fusible links in the turbine building.
If the doors do not close during a fire, this makes safety
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related areas in the turbine building vulnerable to a fire.
Aedit report QA-
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91-21 describes an example of a door between the track alley and the condensate pump room being open without the required fusible link clo.er mechanism.
The licensee agreed to assess whether some doors can be kept closed or at least be closed part of the year.
The barrier bet een two reactor depressurization system (RDS) battery rooms
and a portion of the machine shop is only a 3/8" transite fire wall. This is
acceptable according the fire hazards analysis (FHA), but some hales were
observed in this wall. The area on the opposite side of this wall was being l
used as part of the machine shop. The machine shop area represt-s a potential
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fire hazard dur r.; machining, grinding, and welding.
This area :s listed as a tool crib in the FHA. The licensee agreed to review not using tnis area for a machine shop to improve fire protection in the plant.
3.2 Surveillar:es The inspector reviewed a sample of completed surveillance procedures for 1992 and 1993.
The surveillances were performed accurately and on ti e.
The only adverse trends noted was for fire hoses.
The condition of fire hoses in the plant are questionable.
Hoses are currently replaced when they fail. Five hoses had recently burst during pressure testing surveillances. The surveillances did not determine at what pressure the hoses failed. This may indicate that the hoses may fail at normal pressures used for fire fighting. The plant had agree to assess this problem
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by using a step pressure tests during surveillances to see if hoses are i
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failing at a much lower pressure then the 250% pressure test. This would
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indicate that old hoses may need'to be replaced on a planned scheduled bases i
to ensure they do not fail during a fire.
3.3 Combustible Control
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Combustible control in the turbine building was weak. For example, a cart containing acetylene and oxygen had been left in the middle of the track area of the turbine building. The bottles were loosely attached to the cart by chains. Anti-contamination clothing had been allowed to accumulate in several
j areas. Containers of oil in buckets and ple-tic containers were left sitting
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in the turbine building.
Very few safety cans were being used as oil
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containers. Substantial refuse had been allowed to accumulate in the machine shop prior to being frisked out of the building. Some combustibles were being
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stored in non-fire rated cabinets.
In addition, barrels of lubricants were
i located in the close proximity of a fire hose station. During the exit i
meeting, the licensee stated they would review each area of concern i
identified. Finally, a large number of barrels of resin were stored on the
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upper turbine deck posing a substantial fire hazard. Neither the fire hazards analysis nor the pre-fire plan address the storage of resi:.s in the turbine i
building. The licensee also stated that no fire load calculations were
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available for the turbine deck area.
Further discussions with the licensee on
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November 1 and 2.1993, revealed that the licensee plans to review the resin storage location and expect to complete this review by February 1994. This is
considered to be an inspection followup item and will be reviewed by the
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resident staff (50-155/93017-01(DRP)).
Housekeeping and combustible control in the containment was good. Also, the majority of wood used in the plant was fire resistant. No administrative
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controls were in effect for control of transient combustibles prior to l
allowing the material in the plant. Instead, the fire protection staff made tours to find areas where transient combustibles were becoming excessive.
While this method appears to be effective, the risk of exceeding fire loads is increased.
3.4 Fire Protection Staffina. Knowledge, and Responsibility The fire protection duties were shared by the operations, raintenance.
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engineering, ano security departments.
The responsibility for the fire protection program was not assumed by any one department. nowever, there was good communication among departments.
The diffusion of responsibility did result in a sense of ownership for the plant fire protection problems by each department.
But no overall monitoring of the program was occurring.
The PPOS had recently been trained and was knowledgeable in most aspects of fire protection. This individual is also assigned collateral duties in the security program which may detract from his fire protection duties.
Staffing for the security staff and control room would be very minimal when a fire brigade would have to respond to a fire on night shift. This situation allows very little fire brigade backup support during a fire.
The PPOS stated
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that two members of the fire brigade respond quickly without wearing fire
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fighting gear and the other individuals respond to the fire dressed in protective gear and bring the fire fighting gear for the first two persons.
The PPOS stated that this allows' a very quick response to a fire prior to the
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fire growing in size.
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3.5 Zebra Mussels
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The plant is taking corrective actions to deal with a zebra mussel infestation
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in its intake water. Zebra mussels were becoming an increasing concern to the i
plant. Zebra mussels were found last summer on screens in the intake structure. A zebra mussel shell had been found in the heat exchanger of the emergency diesel generator during this inspection.
Notable efforts were being made to prevent zebra mussels from entering the
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fire main systems and to kill those that had entered the system.
Thermal shock treatment was being used to kill mussels that may have entered the fire
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main system. Zebra mussels are killed at 94 - 104 degrees Fahrenheit.
The plant had thermal shock treated the fire main loop during the last outage and during this fire protection inspection. A modification is planned for an injection system for continuous addition of chloride or clam-trol into the l
water intake piping for the plant. The licensee also planned to install an underwater camera to observe zebra mussel infestations on the strainer of the
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i diesel fiv e pump. The surveillance frequency for strainers had been l
increased. Chemicals had been added to the intake water last summer and the I
licensee was attempting to gain permission from the state to treat the water again with clam-trol. The licensee felt that zebra mussels would not be a
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problem during the winter due to zebra mussels not being able to reproduce l
during cold weather. The zebra mussels do represent a threat to fire
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sprinklers because the shells will block sprinkler heads while spraying a
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fire. The zebra mussels also represent a threat to the emergency diesel i
generator, service water, and emergency core spray.
It appeared that a proper level of concern was given by plant staff in an attempt to deal with this l
problem.
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3.6 Diesel F re Pumps Deviation reports indicated that the diesel and electric fire pumps had a large number of f ailures during 1992 and 1993.
Although most of the problems
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appeared to be unrelated, the plant should assess whether addition resources are needed to - prove the reliability of tr ese pumps.
l 3.7 Fire Bricade. Fire Briaade Eauipment. and Fire Protection Backloa Training recorcs indicated the fire brigade members had received adequate l
classroom and offsite fire fighting training.
The onsite fire drill
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requirements had been met by all brigade members who were listed as qualified.
The fire brigace was only required to respond once during the 1992 and 1993 time period for a trash can fire outside of the plant.
The firefighting brigade equipment was in good condition but a wider range of
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sizes for big personnel is still needed.
The equipment was located at strategic locations in the plant allowing for a faster response to fires.
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O The backlog of open fire protection deficiencies was low. Also, the number of impairments in the plant was low.
I 3.8 Offsite Fire Protection Response
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The plant had recently lost the Charlevoix fire department as an offsite responder to a fire on August 1,1993, and the Charlevoix township fire department had become the main responder to a fire. The plant staff had j
provided training and performed a walkdown of the plant with the fire i
department, so they could correctly respond to a fire.
This is an all volunteer fire department. A drill was performed with this fire department's participation on October 26, 1993.
3.9 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations I
Fire protection requirements are still included in Technical Specifications.
i The inspector reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations issued for fire l
protection in 1992 and 1993. All of the changes were appropriate and none appeared to be detrimental to fire protection safety. The most recent 50.59 was written for heating the water in the fire main system to kill zebra mussels and how the increase in temperature would affect the core cooling during core spray. The evaluation appeared to be accurate and take all of the factors into account.
3.10 Fire Protection Audits t
r The inspector reviewed the following audits:
Quality Assurance Audit Report Numbers:
QA-91-21, August 19-23, 1991; PA-92-15, August 10-14, 1992; and PA-93-13, August 16-20, 1993.
Audits of fire protection had adequate detail to detect most plant problems.
The licensee had taken timely corrective actions for those fire protection
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deficiencies found during the audits.
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Inspection Followup Items Inspection followup items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector (s), and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An inspection followup item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Section 3.3 of this report.
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Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 22, 1993. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or
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processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such document / processes as proprietary.
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