IR 05000155/1987027

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Enforcement Conference Rept 50-155/87-27 on 871021.Major Areas Discussed:Enforcement Options Pertaining to Apparent Violation of Licensee Security Plan Re Vital Area Physical Barrier
ML20236S742
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/20/1987
From: Madeda T, Mallett B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236S736 List:
References
50-155-87-27-EC, NUDOCS 8711300071
Download: ML20236S742 (3)


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og e >i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO ]

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Report No. 50-155/87027(DR'S) S i Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6

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ticensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201

~ Facility Name: Big' Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant

' Meeting At: Region III Office, Glen Ellyn,. Illinois Meeting _ Conducted: October. 21, 1987-Type..of Meeting: Enforcement-Conference Date of Previous Security Inspection: September 28 through October 2, 1987

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'In'spector: . Madeda' 8'

17f8I 1 Physical Security Inspector Date

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' Approved By: u . Mallett, Chief /I!90/8N uclear Materials Safety' Date-1 and Safeguards Branch Meeting Summary Meeting on October 21, 1987 (Report No. 50-155/87027(DRSS))

Areas Discussed: Included a review and discussion of the enforcement options pertaining to an apperent violation of the licensee's security plan relating to a vital area physical barrie ,

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J 8711300071 87112dl PDR ADOCK 05000155 G PDR

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DETAILS

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1. Key Persons Contacted l Consumers Power Company  ;

.F. Buckman, Vice President T. Elward, Plant Manager, Big Rock Point (BRP)

H. Hooper, Security Administrator T. Bordine, Licensing Administrator G. Slade, Executive Director for Nuclear Assurance L. Monshor, QA Superintendent S. Kiss, Security Operations Supervisor Nuclear Regulatory Commission, R.egion III C. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator J. Hind, Director, Division of Radiological Safety and Safeguards W. Guldemond, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2 R. Hall, NRR Project Manager D. Wiedeman, Chief, Nuclear Materials Section J. Creed, Chief, Safeguards Section B. Stapleton, Enforcement Specialist T. Madeda, Physical Security Inspector S. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector D. Schrumm, Project Inspector 2. Enforcement Conference An enforcement conference was held in the NRC Region III office on October 21, 1987 as a result of the preliminary findings which identified an apparent violation of NRC requirements. The report (No. 50-155/87027(D255)) was transmitted to the licensee by letter dated October 21, 1987. The attendees of this conference are noted in Paragraph 1 of this repor The purpose of the conference was to: (1) discuss the apparent violations, the significance, cause, and the licensee's corrective actions; (2) determine whether there were any aggravating or mitigating circumstances; and (3) obtain other information which would help determine the appropriate enforcement actio NRC representatives stated that the event appeared to allow an insider to gain unauthorized, undetected access to a vital area. It was also stated that the violation may be attributed to programmatic weaknesses on the part of the license ,

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Thei licensee l began tiy saying.that the enforcement history of' the Big Rock Point facility has:been-good as evidenced:by SALP ratings and the-

,-. licensee's' compliance record. The licensee.has received SALP Category l'

ratingslin four of the last five review periods. The licensee also

, stated.that the'last security violation occurred in 198 The licensee ^ stated'that the-area.through which access could have been

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obtained was-.a high traffic area. -The pathway would have been difficult'

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to utilize and had not been' detected previously. In terms'of safety significance, the licensee representatives stated that the plant could,

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'have been' safely shutdown without the equipment contained in this vital o' area. For these reasons,1the' licensee believes that the violation would

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be appropriately classified as a Severity. Level IV violation.

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The' corrective' actions included a walkdown of all vital areas, a study to determine the most effective means of securing the vital area, and notification of plant' personnel concerning their responsibilities. The subsequent walkdown' revealed an opening at another location, which is

.' continuously manned byLsecurity officers. Therefore, a violation is not appropriat NRC representatives stated that the vital area opening offered a pathway whichi could allow an individual unauthorized, undetected access. To a vital area. It appears that deficiencies in the licensee's program

contributed to the duration of the violation, i

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