IR 05000155/1989010

Insp Rept 50-155/89-10 on 890522-25.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise Involving Observations by Three NRC Inspectors & One Consultant of Key Exercise Functions & Locations

ML20245B188
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	06/09/1989
From:	Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245B186	List: IR 05000155/1989010 ML20245B183
References
50-155-89-10, NUDOCS 8906230070
Download: ML20245B188 (15)

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e NUCLEAR REGULATORV. COMMISSION 7:

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REGION III

i Report No. 50-155/89010(DRSS)

' Docket No.'50-155 License No.' DRP-6 '

L'1censee: .' Consumers Power Company I f

212 West Madison Avenue ';

Jackson, MI 4920 .

Facility Name: Big Rock Poi _nt Nuclear Plant '

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Inspection At:: Big Rock Point Site, Charlevoix,' Michigan Inspection' Conducted: May 22-25, 1989-

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.ha& i T,/9f . Inspectors:

~ tterson l Team' Leader Sat ' '

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LO.SJ~

T. Ploski

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~ Approved By: W. Snell, Chief 4,/.9/8) ,

Emergency Preparedness and' Date  !

Effluents Section ,;

d Inspection Summary  :;

I Inspection on May 22-25, 1989 (Report No. 50-15589010(DRSS))

= Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of the annual Big Rock Point  !

[ Emergency. Preparedness Exercise involving observations by three NRC inspectors  ;

and one consultant of key functions and locations during the exercise I

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(IP 82301). Section.6'of this report provides an updated summary of the TMI

. Safety' Issues Management System (SIMS) items related to emergency preparednes ~Results: The licensee demonstrated a good response, in terms of facilities, i procedures, and personnel performance, to a hypothetical accident scenario involving a radioactive release. No violations, deficiencies, deviations or l exercise weaknesses were identified. One open item was identified which .;

recommended improvements 11 sampling techniques for environmental sampling, l 1.e., water, soil, and vegetation, j i

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DETAILS Persons Contacte r NRC Observers and Areas Observe J..Patterson, Control Room (CR), Field-Monitoring Teams, and Environmental Monitoring Team T. Ploski, Technical Support Center (TSC)

P . G. Stoetzel, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility. (E0F)  !

W. Snell, EOF: ' Consumers Power Company (CPCo) Personnel l T. E1 ward, Plant Manager P. Loomis,. Emergency Planning Administrator (CPCo) j R. Abe1~,' Production and Performance Superintendent l W. Trubilowicz, Operations Supervisor j P. Donnelly,' Nuclear Assurance Administrator J. Horon,- Shift Supervisor l A.;Katarsky, Exercise Coordinator (CPCo) i D. Fugere, Senior Emergency Planner (CPCo) l M. Dawson, Health Physics Supervisor, Controller .j M. Hobe, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (EPC) i J. Beer,: Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent  !

R. Alexander,: Technical Engineer E. P .::iborski,. Operations Support Center (OSC), Lead Controller l T Hancock, TSC Health Physics Group Controller  !

5. White, Quality Assurance, (CPCo) _!

C. MacInnis, Public Affairs Director, Big Rock Point '

G. Boss, Reactor Engineer l M. Bielinski, Technical Support Group Leader i R. Krchmar, Quality Assurance -j G. Petitjean, Lead Controller, Contro1 ~ Room All names listed above attended the exit interview on May 24, 198 i i General l l

An exercise of the Big Rock Point Site Emergency Plan (SEP) was conducted l at the Big Rock Point site on May 23, 1989. This exercise tested the .{

response to a hypothetical accident scenario, which could have resulted i in a potential major release of radioactive effluent to the environmen !

An attachment to this report includes the scope and objectives and a l sequence of events for the exercise scenario. This was an announced ,

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daytime exercise with full scale participation by the State of Michigan j and Charlevoix and Emmet Counties. The ingestion pathway, which represents a 50 mile radius surrounding the plant, was also included in this' exercis I i

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. General Observations- Procedures-L This exercise was conducted in accord'ance with 10 CFR Part 50,1 ( Appendix E requirements using the Big Rock Point SE : Coordination

.The. licensee'sl response was generally coordinated, orderly, and timely. If these events had been real,'the~ actions taken by the licensee'would have been sufficient to permit State and local-authorities to take appropriate actiuns to protect the public heal;h and safet OS ' 'Wrs Licensee observers and four NRC observers monitored and critiqued the exercis ~,

d Exercise Critique

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The licensee held their critiques.following the. exercise on May'23, 1989. The NRC critique and exit interview was conducted on May 24,

1989. In addition, a public meeting was held in Petoskey, Michigan on May 25, 1989 in which FEMA and the NRC summarized their preliminary findings for both offsite and onsite exercise activitie '

' Specific Observations

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a ..- Control Room (CR)

At 0831,:a formal announcement was madesthat the 1989 exercise had-begun. .The' Shift Supervisor.(SS) and the CR staff responded in a correct and coordinated effort to the first message issued by the Lcad Controller. The fire in the cable' tray area brought the On'

Outy Superintendent (Plant Manager) quickly to-the CR, where he was

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well briefed on conditions as known at that time. The Notification of Unusual Event (NUE)'at 0840 and'the Alert declared at 0848 were each correctly classified and onsite and offsite notifications were made

.in a timely manner for both event One of the conditions leading to the Alert was a core spray valve indication loss. This information was not readily recognized by the CR staff, and a contingency message had to be given by the Lead Controller to maintain the pace'of the scenario. Control Room Operator No. I maintained a current and objective log in a chronological order for the SS. He also was directly involved in and made several good contributions 'towards mitigating the acciden The Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) as well as the EAL Tables were ut.ilized and kept out in a location where all the l staff could use them for references when needed. The Operations Supervisor was actively engaged as a TSC Liaison and also contributed his knowledge

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of; reactor systems' and' plant equipment, to assist lthe SS and the

'CR staf The SS' demonstrated good delegation in his assignment of two Auxiliary Operators (A0s), following their Fire Brigade duties,.to return to the CR for a briefing on how to switch t'o'an alternate

. power supply, specifically diesel generators., Also,at'about

,0956, the SS decided to ask an A0 to reset'the 2B bus breaker Further discussion with'the OSS'and other CR crew de'cided that this-task was too dangerous,-i.e., closing-these breakers manuall The final dectsion was to have the A0 just identify which breakers were tripp'ed, but not to reset them manually. This is an example of good emergency planning with emphasis on personnel safet At approximately 1000, the Containment Isolation Alarm was actuated loss of feedwater' occurred and loss of reactor pressure was observed. .Enough indicators were alarming to indicate a loss of containment integrity and a release to the atmosphere. These events shortly led to a General Emergency being' declared'at.101 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was accep1.abl Technical Support Center (TSC)

Prior to the Alert, there was an excellent transfe'r of command and control form the SS to the new Site Emergency Director (SED) in the TSC as announced on the Public Address (PA) system. Following the Alert announcement was a-directive for all non-essential personnel t to report to their alternate assembly area, the Screen House building. This was a good decision by the SED, and was based on smoke conditions in the OSC area and other plant area Although notifications for the NUE and the Alert were made to the NRC within the one hour limit, the specificity of information relayed could have been improved. The location of the fire was given as a fire in a cable tray "above 2B." The acronym 2B was not identified to the NRC. The NRC Duty Officer does not know plant specific acronyms. The information on the Notification Form should be clarified before presenting to the Communicator for relay to NRC

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Headquarters. Since subsequent calls to the NRC were simulated, no further evaluation of such information was possible.

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For future exercises, the licensee should consider the use of a L " response cell" of Controllers to simulate NRC duty officers. This L would be used to challenge the Communicators and evaluate as to how well they can satisfy the NRC's information needs as the exercise !

progresse l Onsite assembly / accountability was successfully completed in approximately 35 minutes. Following the Alert, the TSC staff correctly gave priority to identifying the operability and positions of the Core Spray Systems discharge valves. A containment entry by

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attempted. This effort was blocked by the Controllers, and the team returned to the TSC. As the exercisa progressed, the SED provided several good briefings to the TSC staff. He also kept the corporate office (Vice President - Nuclear) informed and later his (the SED's)

counterpart in the EOF. This informatica conveyed included changing plant conditions and onsite emergency response activities and assessments.

l Shortly aftt. 1000, the SED, Operations Supervisor and the l Engineering Group Leader had several good discussions on how to evaluate the consequences of the large drop in reactor vessel level

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and the loss of emergency csndenser. They quickly realized that the emergency condenser's tube _ leak constituted a loss of two fission product barriers and a release path to the environment through the condenser vent stack. When they learned that an automatic Reactor Depressurization System activation had occurred, and the core spray system did not operate, the SED correctly classified a General Emergency at 101 Since there was not yet evidence of fuel damage or a release, the HP Group Leader formulated a procedurally correct PAR to shelter within a two mile radius of the plant and shelter from two to five miles in downwind sectors, E, F, and G. Although the SED and the HP Group Leader utilized the Evacuation Time Estimate data and the current wind direction, it was unclear how they could so quickly determine that persons within two miles of the plant would receive less exposure by sheltering than by evacuation. Stability Class F or G implied a rather narrow plume, and they gave no apparent consideration to forecast weather conditions. The NRC Observer never heard weather conditions mentioned in any of the PAR decisionmaking conversations in the TSC and Procedure EPIP 5B does include the need to check forecast weather conditions. Dur:ng the exit interview, it was established that the TSC HP Group was using forecast meteorological data; however, it was not readily apparent

, to the NRC observer Dose projections in the 1100 to 1200 time frame showed the cumulative dose to the child thyroid to exceed 5 rem at five miles, assuming a release time of three hours. However, no discussions were heard regarding extending the Protective Action Recommendation (PAR)

given to the State to consider evacuation beyond file miles, to be consistent with the EPA Protective Action Guidelines. The call to the senior official at State E0C by the SED was a prudent decision, which ensured that the State understood the rationale for the General Emergency and the initial PA In general, the TSC status boards were adequately maintained with some exceptions. The offsite PARS and other actions being implemented by offsite officials should be posted prominently on a status board, not just left as messages or in other written formats; forecast meteorology information should be posted while the TSC still has decisionmaking authority for offsite PARS; and information listed under " Event Description" should be updated to correspond

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with that'provided to offsite officials.'for each emergency

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re-classificatio Recovery and reenetry discussions began early in the TSC and many

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worthwhile pursuits were identified prior to the SED and his supportl leaders joining.their EOF counterpart at the E0F:in Boyne Cit Good involvement and_ interactions were demonstrated by the SED and his_ support group leaders. The last two hours of the TSC's actuation were involved in'11ttle, if any,' meaningful tasks except-for the preparation for reentry and recovery. This was partially

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due to scenario inactivity with the EOF-involved in the main action Based on the above findings, this portion of'the licensee's program was acceptable. However, the' following- item should be considered for improvement:

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. Notification information to the NRC for an' emergency classification or an update of emergency information should

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not include acronyms or plant specific identities unless these are described.and defined.in the balance of the_

particular messag Offsite Monitoring Teams Observations and' evaluations on the offsite monitoring teams were limited to Team 2. The team was initially dispatched from the plant site parking lot. An initial check of emergency' equipment, dosimetry, protective clothing and ' radiation monitoring instruments was satisfactory. An early reading of 5 roentgen while the' team was still in the parking lot at 1020 resulted in a quick departure' for the team. The vehicle windows were rolled up except for the space to extend the monitoring instrument outside for readings. Radiation monitoring techniques were properly demonstrated at this time as well as throughout the team's coverage of the EPZ area. Both open and closed windows were reporte Air samples were correctly taken. Handling techniques, including the charcoal filter, were_ proper and cross-contamination was-not

. observed. Air samples were adequately labeled with location, time, date, and volume for future referenc One particularly impressive technique demonstrated was smear samples taken from the vertical hexagonally shaped stop signs at various key road intersections within the plume. Also, smears were taken on the flat surfaces of the road where contamination would be suspected. Overall, good plume-tracking methods were followed throughout the assignmen Monitoring data was recorded a bound log book, which the team found to be more efficient ard practical than using individual sheets of pape At 1245, when the EOF requested the particulate content in an air sample, a Team 2 representative, without hesitation, went to his procedural guideline and made a quick calculation which was

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immediately forwarded in the proper units to the EOF. Prior to

. returning-to the EOF smears:were taken on the vehicle's-surfaces;.

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andithe. Controller indicated levels were only background. This-

field team performed very well in all' phases of the' tasks: assigned :

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including radio communication .

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Based on the-above findings, this portion.of the licensee's= program-was acceptable'. ~ Environmental S'ampling Team n

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o -A team was dispatched from the EOF'at approximately 1420 exclusively for the; task' of obtaining environmental samples, .i.e. ,' soil, ~ water,.

and vegetation. Basically,-the team was.following the guidance'of EPIP 5F, Environmental Monitoring. This procedure is:an outline of-

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steps to take in ob+aining samples under. accident conditions and

retrieval of Therg .aminescent dosimeters (TLDs). -This. procedure provides no explar ation of sampling technique, how to avoid -

cross-contamination, proper labeling, storage of waste material,' and -

h other vital steps needed to obtain valid, uncontaminated' sample These sampling techniques may be addressed.in other. implementing procedures which the NRC observer.was not aware o Only one set of plastic gloves was used'in sampling. No inner cotton. liners or other inner gloves were'used which could aid in preventing. skin surface contamination if the outer plastic glove

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m s ripped. An eight ounce bottle was used to obtain water from 5.. san Creek while the procedure EPIP 5F, specifies a'one liter sample. When questioned the sampler told the Controller.that.if-this were real conditions, .a one . liter sample of water would be taken. The object of the exercise is to duplicate realistic conditions as much as possible, which obviously would have included a'one liter sample. No direct cross-contamination was observed'in -

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the~ handling and labeling of this sample with one exception. The eight ounce water-sample, after being placed in the' seal type bag and labeled, was put directly into the emergency kit in the rear of

3 the vehicle. If the gloves were contaminated,' handling the plastic bag could have spread the contamination. Within a.few minutes, the

'other team member obtained a large clean plastic bag and put the water sample bag in it. This large bag should have been readied prior to transferring all the samples into it as soon'as the samples were labeled and seale A poor example of sampling technique was observed in the obtaining of a soil sample. The team member merely scraped up some dirt with his single pair of plastic gloves without the use of a small shovel or similar tool. The gloves could have been punctured easil Proper soil sampling is taken within a square fnt or other specified dimensions to a certain depth, as 1/8 or 1/4 inch. The-vegetation sample appeared to be properly taken, bagged, and labeled. Pre-labeling of a large plastic pouch for dry active waste as contaminated gloves and other paraphernalia is also recommende __:___- ._ - - . _ _ _ -

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The Environmental Sampling Team'did obtai.n their samples, which was i the goal. However, more disciplined and definitive methoc's should be used in obtaining, handling,~1abeling and disposing of waste items developed in these tasks with a main objective to avoid-cross-contamination of samples. This wil1~be an 0 pen Item No. 50-155/89010-01. It is recommended that the licensee provide additional. training in environmental sampling for their staf 'Also, a general revision of Procedure EPIP 5F, Environmental Monitoring, should be considered.to include more specifics in sampling techniques, including steps to avoid cross-contamination.

u Another procedure could be developed independently to serve,the same needs. Either way, these sampling techniques should be included.as n part of an implementing procedure in the emergency preparedness progra Based upon the above findings, with the exception of the Open Item identified above, this portion of the licensee's program was adequat Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The EOF was quickly and efficiently set up and staffed by plant-personnel. Personnel arriving at the EOF signed in on the Emergency Response Staff status board, checked procedures and verified that telephone and other communications equipment were working. The initial-briefing by the EOF Administrator was thorough 'and up-to-dat The E0F Administrator did an excellent job of coordinating the transfer of communications responsibility from the TSC. However, the actual transfer of command and control from the TSC was not announced on the PA and was somewhat unclear to the observers. When the General Emergency was declared, the decision was made to allow the dC to complete all offsite notification before that responsibility was transferred to the EOF. The E0F Emergency Officer and the EOF Director'were given a very thorough, yet brief and succinct briefing by the EOF Administrator at a time which woul simulate the telept.One call they would have had on the plane ride from Jackson, Michigan to the EO Meteorological forecast information was obtained and incorporated into the PARS, For example, the EOF recommended that the State concentrate their efforts on the downwind sectors (D through G) for evacuation and not to be concerned about Sectors H through L, because the wind was expected to shift directions to l counterclockwise away from those two sectors. This was a good I planning decision. Status boards were very well maintained except  !

for the General Information status board which periodically lagged i l behind in current information. This lack of being current soma of 1 the time did not detract the EOF staff from being very well informed i of events due to excellent communication l The Health Physics Support Group did a very good job of coordinating l PARS with the State and the TSC. One of the first questions that j

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the corporate staff asked when they arrived at the' EOF'was why had the TSC recommended only sheltering from zero to two miles'in all

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sectors,'while recommending evacuation for two, to five miles in the

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downwind-sectors.

L The corporate group promptly resolved the basis.for the recommendation with the TSC and based on'further review upgraded

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to' recommend evacuation from'zero to two miles in all sectors. The L EOF was' kept current on the PARS.that were. implemented by the Stat Several times the State chose to expand their actions beyond what the licensee recommended. By keeping informed of.these actions by the State, the' EOF was. able to factor in these changes when upgrading their PARS as the exercise progresse Throughout_the exercise, the EOF dose assessment staff perfo med offsite dose calculations using their straight-line Gaussian model; and their segmented plume model. The straight-line Gaussian model was identical to the model used by the State of Michigan,

-therefore, it provided the basis for making protective action recommendations to the State. Since the release was from an unmonitored pathway, offsite doses were back calculated using field team data. The dose assessment staff used centerline field team data as a basis for backcalculating. Air sample data was used to determine:the ratio of noble gases to radiciodine The Health Physics Radiological / Meteorological Data Status board was

- not always well maintained. The noble gas release rate and radiciodine release rate entries were not completed for the duration -

- of the exercise. Noble gas release rates calculated by the dose assessment staff were. observed to vary from approximately 100 curies /sec to approximately'400 curies /sec during the duration of the release. Entry of this information on the. status board might

, have drawn attention to these varying rates and lead to inquires as to the caus There was no frisker set up at the entry to the EOF until approximately 1315. Due to the magnitude of the release and the potential of personnel reporting to the EOF encountering the plume, a frisker should have been set up at the entrance once the release had initiated to minimize the potential of contaminating the EO Reentry and recovery planning activities were well demonstrated, lj Key members of the TSC traveled to the EOF to personally discuss j the activities with their counterparts in the EOF. This face-to- )

face discussion proved more beneficial than communicating only by j telephones. Procedure EPIP-6C, Reentry / Recovery was utilized for q guidance. The discussion was thorough with consideration given '

to issues which included: ' establishing priority for the repair of plant equipment and systems; decontamination of the site; organization for recovery efforts; coordination with offsite 4 officials; radiation protection for workers and public affair !

One rather obvious task not addressed was the need to have a fire  :

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investigation _ team onsite to determine the cause of.the fire; ~After'

all/ the: fire was the initiating event' for the exercis '

During the recovery discussion, the licensee indicated:that they L would obtain environmental monitoring assistance from the Mutual Assistance Agreement with other' utilities. No mention was made.off

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assistance- that'could be provided by the State;and Federal agencies:

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responding under. the FederaliRadiological Monitoring 'and Assessment >

, Pl an.' Subsequently,3information wa's.obtained that the State-

-Emergency Operations Center did request. assistance from the; cognizant; Federal agencies. ~Still the reentry / recovery discussions-were meaningful, objective, and. realistic in. scope. This. effort was well demonstrated by the TSC-and EOF participant Based.on the~ findings, this portion of the licensee's program was

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- adequat . Scenario

The scenario content and general flow of activities was considered goo With the plume changing directions following identification of the release path to-the atmosphere, there were realistic challenges to continually evaluate.and upgrade the PARS. There were no easy solutions to mitigate the effects of.the reactor and containment related events;-

thus-requiring' innovative problem solving' The scenario. event culminated'

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in 'a good and. detailed demonstration of a recovery pla The' licensee chose to conduct assembly / accountability for all.onsite personnel even though many contractor personnel were onsite for an

- upcoming reactor..o'tage. u This clearly demonstrated their confidence in their assembly / accountability capability.which proved to be justifiabl '

The contemplated placement of non-destructive assay equipment within th working area of the EOF was not a good decision. The licensee's critiq'ue-also recognized this. Subsequent information confirmed that such equipment will be' located somewhere else in the building. This concern L developed following a decision to analyze environmental samples that were then being taken within the Ep The controllers performed well and kept the information flowing and related it in the proper perspective. No examples of prompting were identified by any of the NRC evaluating team. The scenario kept all involved emergency response facilities in a contributory mode with perhaps the exception of the time period in the TSC after command and control was transferred to the E0F. Most of the TSC staff at that time, with the exception of the SED and the Engineering Group Leader, didn't seem to have very meaningful tasks or assignments to complete. Thi s somewhat " dead period" should be considered when future scenarios are develope . TMI Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) Items On October 31, 1980, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, which incorporated into one document all TMI-related items approved for implementation by the Commission at that time. On December 17, 1982, the NRC issued

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Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 to provide ~ additional clarification regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revis' ion 2), " Application to Emergency _ Response _i Facilities, and Meteorological Data, as well as other areas. The status :)

of theLcompletion of these TMI SIMS items are internally tracked by the NR {

q-The August 4, 1988 Inspection Report (No. 155/88016) provided a status listing of the SIMS ite'ms related to emergency preparedness. The following listing provides an updated status of those SIMS items-that were "open" in the August 4, 1988 Report. All.other emergency preparedness H related SIMS items are' closed (complete) or not applicabl III.A' Current Status: Closed This item has been determined to be no' longer applicable, and has been administratively close MPA-F-63 Current Status: Open This item involves a review of the TSC during a future '

inspectio MPA-F_65 Current Status: Open This item involves a review of the E0F during a future inspectio . Exit Interview The inspection team met with'the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 on May 24, 198 The team leader discussed the scope an results of the emergency exercise. The exercise was well conducted and-the participants demonstrated a good level of competence in performing their emergency response functions. No program weaknesses were identified. One Open Item was identified and discussed during the exit which recommended an improved methodology for obtaining, handling labeling, and packaging environmental samples by licensee personnel within the'five miles EP The licensee indicated that none of the informat.on discussed during this meeting was proprietar Attachments:

1. Exercise Scope and Objectives 2. Sequence of Events I I

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] c 1.0. SCOPE'AND OBJECTIVES 1 l'- SCOPE BREX 89 is designed--to meet exercise requirements specified 'in.10ICFR 50,.

Appendix E,.Section I It will postulate events which would~ require activation of major portions of the site emergency plan.and response by

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state and local governments. The exercise will include participation' by -

Charlevoix. County, Emmet County, and the State of Michigan. . The. State.of

' Michigan will demonstrate ingestion pathway planning for the Federal

Emergency Management Agency.

L 1.2 OBJECTIVES The exercise will demonstrate: Assessment and Classification a. . Recognition of emergency conditions Timely classification of emergency conditions in accordance with emergency action levels Communication

, Initial notification within specified time constraints (state and

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, local -.15 minutes, NRC - I hour) Subsequent notification in accordance with procedure- Notification and coordination with other organizations, a required-(other utilities, contractors, fire or medical services) Provision of accurate and timely information to support news release activity Radiological Assessment and Control Calculation of dose projection based on sample results or monitor readings Performance of in-plant and offsite field surveys

. Trending of radiological data Formulation of appropriate protective action recommendations Contamination and exposure control

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4.: LEmergency Response' Facilities'

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a..! Activation,; staffing and; operation'at appropriate classifications andewithin'specified time: constraint Adequacy of emergency equipment and supplies Adeq'acy u of emergency communication. systems d. : Access control'

.5 . ' Emergency Management

. Command'and control'with transfer of: responsibilities'from-Control Room co. Technical Support Center to Emergency Operations

' Facility-b. LAssembly'and accountability within approximately 30. minutes- Coordination with State of Michigan emergency organization d.- Mitigation of operational and radiological conditions-ME Mobilization of emergency: teams

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6.. Reentry and Recovery a. ' Assessment of damage and formulation of . draft recovery plan, b., Identification of constraints, requirements and organization to-

~ implement the plan Exercise Control

!- Provision for adequate free play-

. Accurate assessment of player performance ,

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3 F BggX 89 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 0830 The plant has been operating for the past 60 days at steady-state power with equilibrium xenon. The daily reactor water sample has been taken. Results are within administrative limits. Weekly radiation surveys have been completed without inciden Fire alarms are received in the Control Room. A fire has broken out I

in the Station Power Room. The fire brigade respond On arrival, the fire brigade secs ha vy smoke and fire in the cable tray above the 2B bus. The fire ap,ects to be spreadin The brigade leader notifies the Control Room. The Control Room notifies the Charlevoix Fire Departmen Operator attempts to start one condensate pump and meets with failur The emergency condenser is placed in service to establish a cooldown at less than er equal to 100*F per hou Af ter reviewing the situation, the Shif t Supervisor declares an Alert based on the fire in the cable tray and loss of core spray indicatio An announcement is made and the siren is sounde ) 0852 Notifications are made to local and State government, Power Control and the NR Power is lost to the 2P panel in the Control Room due to che fir Operators attempt to restore power via Breaker 52-2A-1 The TSC and OSC are staffe The fire is extinguished. Though still smoky, the fire brigade can see numerous burned cables dangling from trays. The brigade leader informs the Control Roo Control rod drive is lost. Operations attempts to throttle emergency condenser outlet vales to control cooldow Accountability is complete l 0930 Steam drum level is slowly dropping. Operators attempt to power No 1 ]

control rod drive pump via emergency diesel generator transfer switc J i

0950 Plant personnel arrive at the EOF and JPIC to begin activatio i

1000 Emergency condenser tubes rupture causing rapid reactor depressurization and loss of water. A release is in progress. A Ceneral Emergency is declared. Protective action recommendations are made to the Stat M10189-0005A-NUO2-TP21 l

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i 41 1010 ' Fuel.is uncovered. The reactor depressurization system initiates;

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automatically. Peactor pressure continues to fall.. As fuel fails, I

'the release worsens and continues,for the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 20 minute ,

1045 General Office personnel arrive at the EOF and JPIC and prepare to-assume' responsibilitie Power is restored to core spray valves. Core spray is initiated-shortly thereafte '

1215 The' reactor'is shut down as core spray. continues to refill the' primary-coolant system. The release is still occurring through the emergency condenser vent..

L '1230

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Power supply to Panel 2P is restored. Operators close emergency l1 condenser inlets. 'The release is stoppe Plant condition begins to stabilize.

l The exercise is terminated for the Control' Room OSC and JPIC.

l- Communications with offsite agencies are closed ou EOF and TSC personnel are'provided new plant conditions after a 24-hour time jump. Recovery planning begin Plant personnel arrive at the EOF to d1scuss recover The exercise is termina'te ,

MIO189-0005A-NUO2-TP21

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