IR 05000155/1987014

Safeguards Insp Rept 50-155/87-14 on 870526-0611.Major Areas Inspected:Allegations Re Alleged Falsification of Record & Alleged cover-ups of Incidents by Contract Security Mgt. Attachment Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)

ML20235S482
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	07/14/1987
From:	Axelson W, Creed J, Madeda T, Pirtle G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235S420	List: IR 05000155/1987014 ML20235S417
References
50-155-87-14, NUDOCS 8707210671
Download: ML20235S482 (12)

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-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

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Report No. 50-155/87014(DRSS)- 1 Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: . Consumers Power Company 1 212' West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Big Rock-Point

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l Charlevoix, Michigan Inspection Conducted: May 26-28, 1987 onsite June 3-11, 1987 in Region III office j Telephone Exit Interview conducted June 16, 1987 1 Date of Previous Physical Protection Inspection: January 26-29, 1987'

Type of Inspection: Special Allegation Review Inspectors: $_iOM L.~ Pirtle 7/ml07 Date Physical Security Inspector ks.P h .

T. J. Madeda

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.[ Physical ~SecurityInspector

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Reviewed By: %L J. R. Creed, Chief-

%b IMkJ~I Date Safeguards Section Approved By: /Md W. L. Axelson, L'hief 7/#M7 Date

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Nuclear Materials Safety f and Safeguards Branch

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' Inspection Summary I- - Inspection on May 26 through June 16,.1987 (Report No. 50-155/87014(DRSS)) )

L Areas Inspected: Special inspection of allegations pertaining to alleged .

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falsification of a. record, alleged " cover-ups" of incidents by contract security management, alleged incompetence of recently assigned assistant shift leaders,

, and alleged nonresponsiveness by the contract security manager in reference to performance deficiencies brought to his attentio Results: One allegation was partially substantiated in that on one occasion a required protected area . patrol was not conducted. However, there was no information to support the allegation that records pertaining to the incident were. falsified. The remaining allegations were not substantiated. The failure l to perform the required protected area patrol constituted a violation of the

. licensee's security plan but, the violation meets the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.A for licensee identified violations and' therefore a Notice of Violation has not been cite (Details of security plan criteria pertaining to protected area patrols are addressed in an attachment to this report and are considered UNCLASSIFIED )

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DETAILS  ;

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1. Key Persons Contacted:

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• T. Elward, Plant Superintendent, Consumers Power Company (CPCo)

• Pettijean, Planning / Administrative Service Superintendent, CPCo .

'G. Whiterow, Acting Plant Superintendent, May 26, 1987, CPCo i

• B. Alexander, Technical Engineer /NRC Liaison, CPCo  !

J. Bradshaw, Property Protection Supervisor, CPCo

• T. Dugan, Property Protection Operations Supervisor, CPCo ,

• H. Cooper, Corporate Security Director, CPCo J

• S. Kiss, Corporate Property Protection Supervisor, CPCo j

• B. Rabidean, Corporate Property Protection Representative, CPCo q

• J. Warner, Corporate Property Protection Representative, CPCo l R. Baker, Captain / Training Coordinator, Burns International Security i Services, Inc. (BISSI)

• Post Commander, BISSI

• S. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector, US NRC Region III .

The asterisk (*) denotes those present during the telephone Exit Interview conducted on June 16, 1987. In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspector interviewed approximately 12 additional members of the security organization to resolve the allegation issue Names of personnel identified in the allegations are not included in the Report Details to protect their rights to personal privac . Entrance and Exit Meeting (MC 30703): On'May 26, 1987, the acting Plant Superintendent was informed of the purpose of the inspection. The specific allegations were not identified to the licensee, but they were advised that the allegations pertained to alleged record irregularities and the capability of certain security force personnel to perform their required duties. A single point of licensee contact to assist in providing documents and arranging for interviews was identified

. during the entrance meetin On May 28, 1987, the Property Protection Supervisor and licensee NRC liaison representative were advised that the onsite work in relation to the allegations he.d been completed, but further review of documents obtained from the security staff would be completed at the NRC Region III office before the allegations could be resolved. They were also advised that no actions on the part of the security staff were required as of a result of the onsite inspection effort. They L were advised that the specific allegations and our conclusions would l be discussed with them after our review of the allegations had been

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complete No written material pertaining to the inspection was left with the licensee or contract security representative Encicsun tenimins

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• ' The inspector conducted a telephone exit meeting with the licensee

! representatives denoted in Section 1 on June 16, 1987. The licensee l representatives were advised of the specific allegations and conclusions as addressed in Section 3 of the Report Details. The personnel preser.t during the telephone exit meeting had no questions or comments pertaining to the specific allegations and conclusion The Plant Superintendent thanked the inspector for the thorough review of the allegation issues. The licensee personnel were advised that the allegation conclusions were subject to NRC Region III management review and that the-. final inspection report would contain the forraal perspective of the inspection result They were also advised that the inspection report, excluding the report attachment which contains Unclassified Safeguards Information, would be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo . Independent Inspection - Allegation Review (IP 92706)

The following information provided in the form of allegations was reviewed by the inspector as specifically noted below: Background: (Closed) Allegation No. RIII-87-A-0069. The NRC Region III office received information on May 15, 1987 involving four allegation The allegations pertained to: (1) one specific incident of an alleged falsified record; (2) alleged cover-ups by the contract security force management for the past four years; (3) alleged incompetence of some assistant shift leaders; and (4) alleged lack of responsiveness by the contract security force senior' manager to identified problem An onsite investigation of the allegations was conducted between May 26-28, 1987 and document reviews were completed at the NRC Region III office between June 3-11, 1987. The investigation pertaining to the allegations was completed on June 11, 198 The licensee was contacted on June 10, 1987 to schedule a telephone exit meeting. They requested that an exit meeting be scheduled for June 16, 1987. The delay was due to nonavailability of personnel until June 16, 1987 that the licensee wanted present during the telephone exit meeting. The exit meeting was conducted on June 16, 1987 (refer to Section 2). The specific allegations, NRC review actions, and conclusions are addressed below:

(1) Allegation: On March 19, 1987, an Assistant Shift Leader (ASL)

allegedly failed to dispatch a security officer for a required patrol check of the protected are The ASL allegedly falsified >

his log to indicate that he had dispatched an officer and the record falsification was known to the contract security management. Additionally, the original log sheet was allegedly removed and a falsified copy was inserted into the files to show l

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that the required patrol was completed (Note: The specific security plan criteria pertaining to protected area patrols is considered as Unclassified Safeguards Information and exempt from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21. Details are addrested in the attachment to this report.)

Another incident of a missed protected area patrol allegedly occurred about October 1986. Falsification of records was not alleged for that inciden NRC Review: The inspector reviewed the Central Alarm Station (CAS) Daily Activity Log and Perimeter Fence Patrol Log for March 19,1987. Other related documents were also reviewed as described below. Additionally, the Assistant Shift Leader (ASL) assigned to work in CAS, the security officer believed to have conducted the patrol of the protected area, and the supervisor and security management personnel involved in the incident were interviewed by the inspecto The investigation showed that a required protected area patrol was entered on the CAS Daily Activity Log as being initiated at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br /> (1:30 p.m.) and completed at 1338 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.09109e-4 months <br /> (1:38 p.m.)

on March 19, 1987. The two entries on the Daily Activity Log were lined through and initialed by the CAS operator. The CAS operator's Perimeter Fence Patrol Log for March 19, 1987 had an annotation, initialed by the CAS operator, which stated that the required patrol was forgotten and the missed patrol was because of the CAS operator's error. Additionally, An Incident Report was prepared by the CAS operator at 1510 hours0.0175 days <br />0.419 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.74555e-4 months <br /> (3:10 p.m.) on March 19, 1987 describing the circumstances pertaining to the missed protected area patrol. A Security Deficiencies Report (SDR) was also prepared by security management which described the incident and the SDR was sent to the license Corporate security office. A memorandum dated April 1, 1987 and addressed to all security personnel stated that a required protected area patrol was not completed and described four corrective measures to be implemented to prevent recurrences of the event. The corrective actions primarily described multiple levels of responsibility for monitoring and conducting protected area patrols. At the time of occurrence (March 19, 1987) such patrols were the CAS operator's responsibility to assure they were conducted. Another memorandum dated April 6, 1987 and addressed to all security supervisors emphasized the change in procedures for monitoring protected area patrols. The CAS operator was designated as responsible for dispatching the required patrols and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) operator was designated responsible for monitoring the dispatch and completing required log sheet Enclosure Contafns

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h The inspector's intervi.ew with the CAS operator on duty at the L'" time of the incident showed that the CAS operator had returned

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to CAS about 1325 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.041625e-4 months <br /> (1:25 p.m.)'and his supervisor discussed

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his (CAS operator's) performance (<ppraisal. The CAS operator stated that some radio transmission of a routine nature occurred during that time and he thought he had dispatched a security officer for the required patrol and entered it into his Daily Activity Log. When another security officer reported the subsequent protected area patrol completed, the CAS operator noted that the 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br /> (1:30 p.m.) patrol entry in his Perimeter Fence Patrol Log was not completed. Subsequent inquiries by the CAS operator and others confirmed that the required patrol was not completed. The CAS operator stated that he did not prepare a new Daily Activity Log or Perimeter Fence Patrol Log. The CAS operator did prepare a new incident report based upon instructions from his supervisors to explain the reasons for the lined through entries in the Daily Activity Log described earlie In reference to the alleged missed protected area patrol which occurred in October 1986, the inspector interviewed security management personnel and reviewed the appropriate Perimeter Fence Patrol Log and incident repor Interviews and document reviews showed that a protected area patrol scheduled to be completed at 1545 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.878725e-4 months <br /> on October 22, 1986 was not performed because of the CAS operator's erro An incident report was prepared in reference to the missed patrol. The licensee's analysis concluded that the nunber of protected area patrols required to'be completed by the security plan had been completed, even though a' scheduled patrol was not performed. Completion of the scheduled patrol would have resulted in the licensee exceeding the patrol frequency required by the security plan. The inspector's review of the Perimeter Fence Patrol Log for October 22, 1986 showed that the required number of protected area patrols had been completed on October 22, 198 Section 3.2.1.4.3 of the licensee's approved security plan requires the protected area to be checked at certain intervals ,

unless specific circumstances described in the se.curity plan exist. When the required patrols are not conducted, the security plan requires certain actions to be completed (Details are unclassified Safeguards Information).

Conclusion: The allegation was partially substantiated in that the CAS operator failed to dispatch a security officer for a required patrol check of the protected area at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br /> on March 19, 1987 as required by Section 3.2.1.4.3 of the licensee's security plan. However, there was no information to substantiate OA-~M"""

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substituted. When the missed protected area patrol was noted, the required reports were prepared and security management conducted an appropriate investigation and initiated corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The licensee's corrective actions appear adequat The failure to conduct the required patrol of the protected area constitutes a violation of Section 3.2.1.4.3 of the licensce's security plan. However, the violation meets tne criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.A as a licensee identified violation. Therefore, a separate Notice of violation will not be cite The required number of protected area patrols were completed on October 22, 198 (2) Allegation: The individuals implied that other incidents similar to those described in Section 3.b(1) above, and referred to as

" cover-ups," had allegedly occurred within the past four years and the contract security management was aware of such incidents and failed to take appropriate actio NRC Review: The individuals were contacted during the investigation in reference to the implied allegation. The individuals could not recall any specific or general examples of alleged " cover-ups" except for the March 19, 1987 incident which is addressed in Section 3.b(1) above. One of the individuals cited an example of errors which occurred on May 2, 1986 which resulted in one incident of personnel and vehicle search requirements not being complied with prior to entry into the Protected Area. This incident was made known to the NRC at that time and followup actions were initiated. The licensee provided the documents requested by the NRC on July 14, 1986. The NRC Region III staff's review, addressed in an August 12, 1986 letter to the licensee, concluded that the incident constituted a violation of the security plan. However, the violation met the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.A as a licensee identified violation and therefore a separate violation was not cite Conclusion: Based upon the lack of knowledge or examples of issues pertaining to contract security management cover-ups, coupled with the fact that the incident described above was made known to the NRC and resolved by the Commission, this allegation was not substantiate Enclosure Contains ,

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Y (3) Allegation: Relatively new and inexperienced Assistant Shift Leaders (ASLs) working in the alarm station were so unknowledgeable of security procedural requirements that their guidance and direction could not be relied upon. Their lack of knowledge caused security officers to have a concern about their personal safety in an emergency situation. The lack of knowledge by the ASLs was known to the contract security management and no actions were taken (names of the ASLs were provided but are excluded from this report to protect the personal privacy of the personnel),

NRC peview: The licensee's Security Force Training and Qualification (SFT&Q) plan contains the criteria for security force member proficiency. Assistant Shift Leaders (ASLs) normally perform duties as central and secondary alarm station operator These stations are primarily responsible for monitoring alarms and dispatching personnel to such alarms during normal and emergency conditions and monitoring response actions. They are supervised by'a Shift Leader who is responsible for control and command of the response force and overall effectiveness of all security functions, to include CAS and SAS operations. The personnel named by the allegers usually performed ASL duties on a part-time basi Two of the five personnel named were not certified as ASLs until May 21, 1987 (after the date the allegation was received by NRC Region III). Their performance as ASLs, at the time 'of the allegation, was in a training status and under the direct supervision of a SFT&Q plan certified ASL. Their performance as ASLs was therefore not specifically reviewe The inspector reviewed SFT&Q plan documentation for the remaining named personnel. Additionally, security event reports from June 1986 to May 30, 1987 were reviewe Interviews with fourteen supervisors (from all three shifts)

were also conducted to determine peer perspective and supervisor and management perspective of the individuals competence and duty performanc (Specific individual interview results of ASL's were requested to be treated in a confidential manner.) The interviews with management personnel also included the named ASL's most recent performance appraisal results and incident reports that were prepared because of poor duty performance by an AS The inspector confirmed that the personnel identified were

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certified as proficient in all appropriate tasks required by l-

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the licensee's SFT&Q plan. The three named ASLs had experience as part-time security officers ranging from nine months to two years before being certified as ASLs. The SFT&Q plan does not require a minimum amount of experience. Supervisors (shift Enclosure contains SAFEGUARDS !!UCRMATION Upon Separat!m This g

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c a r- n i ; a m v su vm w i s m 'si V 8 Wil13 ~ U M lieutenants) and management personnel interviewed stated that the recently certified ASLs were performing their duties in an adequate manner and they had no hesitation about assigning the named ASLs to perform duties as ASLs. Eight of ten ASLs interviewed stated that, in their judgement, the recently certified ASLs were performing their assigned duties in an adequate manner. Two ASLs stated that one of the recently assigned ASLs had problems maintaining logs and asked more questions about routine tasks than they would expect from an ASL certified as long as the person had been certified (about five months). They questioned the competence of the other AS Interview results with management personnel showed that the named ASLs had received a rating of satisfactory or higher on all portions of their performance appraisals. The interview '

results with management personnel also showed that no incident reports had to be prepared since January 1987 because of inadequate duty performance by the named ASL's. The investigation did disclose two incidents in May 1987, after the onsite inspection, whereby other persans' performance resulted in incident reports being prepared. These incidents will be reviewed and addressed by separate correspondence since they are not directly related to the allegation. Additionally, interview results with the Property Protection Operations Supervisors showed that no loggable events required by 10 CFR 73.71(c), security event reporting, were required since January 1987 because of poor performance by the ASLs as CAS or SAS operators. The inspector's review of security event reports submitted to the NRC since June 1986 showed that no such reports were submitted as a result of inadequate duty performance by the named ASLs while performing CAS or SAS operator dutie The inspector followed up on the comment's made by two ASLs during this inspection, that one of the recently certified ASLs had difficulty in keeping accurate logs and asked excessive questions about routine task Security management was aware of the individual who was experiencing difficulty with logs and l had counseled the individual on his need to be more careful in logging and was monitoring the improvement in this administrative j function of the job. The inspector's review of on-the-job '

documentation showed that the individual's need to be more attentive to log issues had been documented. The inspector randomly reviewed Daily Activity Logs prepared by the named ASL from January through May 1987. The number of crossed out entries were considered excessive by the licensee, but there is no regulatory requirement pertaining to logging entries as long as the log is accurat The number of crossed out and initialed entries appeared excessive compared to other named ASL entries for the January through March 1987 time frame. The named ASL's corrected log entries for April and May 1987 appeared about as frequent as other ASL's corrections. The lined through log entries were initialed as required by the licensee's local polic Enclosure Contains SAFEGUARDS II;FORMTION g Upon Separation This Pase is Decontrolled

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In reference to the same ASL asking excessive questions, this issue was discussed with other ASLs and security shift supervisors during the interview process. Practically all, but the two ASLs mentioned earlier, believed the named ASL asked questions primarily for re-enforcement rather than lack of knowledge and noted that the ASL asked fewer questions as he gained experience in the positio The security shift leaders considered asking questions as a positive attribute and noted that the part-time ASLs may not perform the ASL duty except on an infrequent basis and preferred that an ASL ask questions rather than make a mistake or cause a violation to occur. The ASL in question was not working during the period when onsite interviews were conducte During the onsite interviews, the licensee Property Protection Operations Supervisor and contract security management personnel stated that they are sensitive to the performance level of personnel working as CAS/SAS operators and noted that they had relieved a person (more than a year ago) as an ASL because of poor performance in the position. The individual was decertified as a CAS/SAS operator about a year later after further experience and training. This individual was not one of the ASLs identified by the alleger Subsequent to the onsite inspection of May 26-28, 1987, the licensee corporate security office conducted an annual audit of the security program. A telephone interview with the audit team leader was held on June 11, 1987. The team leader stated that the audit had reviewed CAS/SAS operations and conducted two drills. The audit team leader stated that two weaknesses were noted during the drills but they did not constitute a violation of procedures or warrant decertification of any security force members. He characterized the weaknesses as items the CAS/SAS operator s need to be more sensitive to and consisted of a delay in referring to a contingency checklist, and dispatching of officers to a threat. The audit findings will be reviewed during a future inspection. (155-87014101)

Conclusion: Collectively, training completed in accordance with the SFT&Q plan, interview results of peers and supervisors, performance appraisals, and lack of incident reports or security event reports caused by the named ASLs poor performance showed that there was no basis to support the allegation that the named ASLs were incapable of performing their duties in an adequate manner or that they constituted a personal safety concern to other security force members. The one ASL's deficiencies noted during interviews was known to security management and was being monitore During an onsite inspection (Regulatory Effectiveness Review)

conducted during October 5-10, 1986, the inspector had an opportunity to observe the performance of one of the named ASLs Enclosure Contains SAFEGUAMS I!ZiUuTION Upon Seperatia This 10 Pase is cecontrolic.d

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as a CAS operator. The interview and observation period lasted )

for about an hour and the ASL performed all routine duties in an adequate manner. Additionally, no personnel deficiencies in CAS/SAS operations were noted during the onsite inspection conducted in January 1987 or the Regulatory Effectiveness Review conducted in October 198 (4) Allegation: The senior onsite contract security force manager was not responsive when advised of a concern pertaining to cover-up of mistakes and ineptitud NRC Review: The inspector interviewed the senior onsite contract security manager in reference to his methodology for addressing significant concerns brought to his attention by members of the security force. The security manager stated that he responds to any such concerns, but the natLre of the information and incident determines what actions he take Significant incidents, such as the March 19, 1987 missed protected area patrol, are investigated immediately. Incidents or information of a vague nature may be addressed by him personally, referred to his assistant, or the shift security leaders may be advised to be sensitive to an issue or attempt to gain more information. He further stated that his supervisors raise almost as many concerns as the security officers do and he felt that he, his assistant, and security shift supervisors collectively are sensitive to or made aware of significant concerns of the security organization. He further stated that he may not advise the person who initiated the concerns of the final actions taken, particularly if disciplinary actions are involved, because BISSI policies and state Right to Privacy law impose strict limitations on the disclosure of information pertaining to personnel disciplinary action Conclusion: This investigation did not disclose any incidents of cover-up of mistakes or ineptitude. During previous inspections, the contract and licensee management staff have been found to be aware of issues and/or irritants identified by security officers during interviews with inspector personne In reference to personnel weaknesses noted during this inspection, the security management staff was aware of the weakness in reference to logging activities for one ASL and was monitoring the person's improvement. Additionally, Section 3.b.(2) of this report cites an example of mistakes aade on May 2,1986 which was properly documented. This allegation was not substantiate . The individuals expressed a concern in at least one case about disparity in disciplinary actions involving supervisors and nonsupervisors. Their perception was that compared to nonsupervisors, supervisory personnel received more lenient or no disciplinary action for errors or poor performance. The individuals were advised that the NRC does not normally l review or judge the adequacy of individual personnel disciplinary actions.

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Such issues are normally addressed through established grievance procedures, state, or other U.S agencies.

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v - )i ib k h.1lV[\ h k 5. Additionally, the morale of the onsite contract security force was reviewed. An in-office review of NRC Region III safeguard files (SALP 6 - most current and Inspection Reports 1984 to present) has conducted in May 1987 and showed that the morale of the onsite contract security force was low, but had not deteriorated to the point where job performance was adversely affected. The primary cause for the morale issue was attributed to long-term labor relation concerns (lack of a labor contract). NRC Region III is aware, and has been aware, of the low security force morale issue at the Big Rock Point site. This issue is being monitored and will continue to be evaluated.

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